Rebecca Böhling. A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reform and Economic Recovery in Postwar . Providence, RI: Berghahn Books, 1996. Ppp. 301. Cloth $49.95, cloth, ISBN 978-1-57181-035-9.

Reviewed by Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht

Published on H-German (May, 1997)

Twenty years ago, Lucius D. Clay recounted the municipal level in Frankfurt am Main, Stutt‐ his experience as U.S. military governor in Ger‐ gart, and Munich. many after World War II in a manuscript submit‐ Boehling analyzes the implementation of U.S. ted to the National Archives. "I had no policy giv‐ policies framed in Washington and (in‐ en to me as to what kind of we want‐ cluding JCS 1067 and the four Ds: denazifcation, ed," Clay recalled in an unforgettable passage on demilitarization, decentralization, and democrati‐ Germany's reeducation. "[W]e spent one whole zation). Her study moves from 1945 when the U.S. day disagreeing on a defnition of democracy... military government (MG) still controlled the ap‐ [however, we] could not agree on any common pointment of German ofcials, to 1946 and 1948 defnition."[1] when Germans reached self-government through For many scholars, Germany represents the the frst local elections. stage on which the geopolitical goals of the United In line with previous scholarship, Boehling States during the early phase of the Cold War emphasizes the lack of cohesive planning in were most fully revealed. Decisions made in the Washington after the war had ended. While the decade after 1945 formed the basis for the politi‐ War Department and the State Department fa‐ cal, social, economic and cultural development of vored a reconstructive peace and the Treasury the Federal Republic. Much of the existing litera‐ Department harbored a more interventionist de‐ ture concentrates on U.S. aims and policies. Few sign geared toward the pastoralization of Ger‐ monographs cover the German side, even fewer many, the Ofce of Strategic Services continually the interplay between German civilians and emphasized the potential of the "Other," i.e. more American occupiers. This is what Rebecca democratic Germany that could form a new Boehling has chosen to do. Abandoning the usual democratic postwar society. This confusion, never top-down perspective, she focuses on events at resolved, was carried over into the occupation in Germany. H-Net Reviews

Boehling describes the individuals in charge establishment of law and order. With the onset of of reeducation, who were university professors, the Cold War, MG ofcials increasingly perceived journalists and emigres in civilian life and who the Antifas to be "camoufaged bodies for the mainly operated in subordinate positions within propagation of " (pp. 175-6). The one the Information Control Division (ICD). The of‐ exception where the MG relied heavily on anti- cers in charge of selecting municipal administra‐ Nazis was in the denazifcation process and the tors, meanwhile, were mostly career ofcers, en‐ appointment of police ofcials. Yet this "almost ex‐ gineers, and the like. Their primary concern was clusively negative role of accusation and judg‐ not to denazify and democratize Germany but to ment" (p. 115), Boehling speculates, prevented the keep law and order, speed economic and material formation of bottom-up democratic movements recovery, and get life in the zone back to normal. and isolated leftist parties in the political arena. In other words, those who knew most about Ger‐ Boehling's case studies demonstrate individu‐ man afairs were stuck in minor positions while al vicissitudes on the local level, such as with the those who made political appointments had the infuence of the churches or the role of the ICD in least expertise in German culture. Frankfurt am Main, Stuttgart, and Munich. Yet her The author shows that U.S. ofcials, in an ef‐ conclusions stretch beyond city lines: the opportu‐ fort to establish order, preferred "apolitical" or nity of the Hour Zero, "one of those unique peri‐ conservative bureaucrats from the Weimar peri‐ ods in history when a boundary could be drawn od over younger and more "political," "anti-Nazi" to demarcate the past from the future" (p. 268), activists for political posts. Originally appointed was lost. Policy makers in the executive branch as temporary solutions, these German municipal were primarily concerned with the national inter‐ politicians often ran successfully for ofce in ests of the . Their concentration on 1946, nominated friends (often with shady pasts) economics yielded a host of positive side-efects to municipal councils, reinstituted parties and tra‐ for U.S. proconsuls in Germany. The sooner Ger‐ ditions valid before 1933, and exercised political many stabilized, the sooner the "GI boys could infuence for decades to come. Retracing the pro‐ come home," the faster Germany could be inte‐ fles and visions of both German administrators grated into the western economic orbit, and the and MG ofcials, Boehling shows that "the lines more forcefully U.S. propagandists could fght between the two groups were not drawn on ac‐ communism and the . After Secretary count of nationality or occupied and occupier but of State James Byrnes's speech in 1946 at the lat‐ on account of vision, interest and expertise" (p. est, economic reconstruction became not only a 125): career ofcers had much in common with priority but also the ofcial tenet of U.S. policy in local political and business elites; emigres usually Germany. Denazifcation, civil service reform, and allied themselves with political activists on the labor activities were all sacrifced on the altar of left. stability and anti-communism. In an impressive chapter on early grass-roots This study covers an impressive array of movements, Boehling examines Antifa groups sources from the local archives of Frankfurt, (antifascists) consisting of a wide array of politi‐ Stuttgart and Munich. The chapters are logically cally active anti-Nazis--notably communists-- structured along both chronological and topical whose common characteristic was staunch anti- lines. The narrative--though sometimes halting totalitarianism. In the eyes of U.S. ofcials, the owing to a host of acronyms, percentages, and quest of these groups for long-term political re‐ numbers--is concise and enticing. Boehling's argu‐ form and socioeconomic changes threatened the ment that the priority of economic reconstruction

2 H-Net Reviews blocked a democratic transformation and en‐ recent studies emphasizing the active role of Ger‐ forced the reemergence of pre-1933 personalities, man civilians in the process of reconstruction. At structures, and traditions will catch the attention the same time, Boehling undeniably echoes earli‐ of all scholars working in the feld of postwar Ger‐ er claims dating from the 1970s and 1980s that man-American relations as well as U.S. perspec‐ criticized the notion of an Hour Zero, blamed the tives during the early Cold War. United States' lax occupation policy, and stressed Yet Boehling's quest for detailed accuracy on the persistence of the old German cadre. There is the local level may have blurred her vision of the a crucial diference; Boehling implicitly questions big picture. The rising Soviet-American tensions the common assumption that U.S. policy makers receive only marginal attention. Boehling re‐ unanimously wanted to democratize Germany. As proaches the United States for having isolated left‐ she demonstrates, the decision-making process in ist parties, a process which accelerated the East- Washington and the resulting directive JCS 1067 West confict. Yet she misses the signifcance of remained sufciently nebulous to allow various the Soviet tenure during this time; Soviet-Ameri‐ factions to interpret it however they desired. can relations deteriorated rapidly in 1946. The So‐ In sum, A Question of Priorities is a well-writ‐ viets viciously attacked the Western Allies in their ten and informative source for U.S. actions on the newspapers, swamped western zones with their municipal level that makes for a useful contrast to own publications, and secretly banned U.S.-li‐ much of the existing literature. Boehling has censed papers from their zone as early as January sharpened our perception of the many factions 1946. U.S. ofcials had every reason to fear com‐ that created American policy in occupied Ger‐ munist infuences (including the KPD) in the west‐ many. We need more studies on the micro-level, ern zones. They were also convinced that material analyzing economic, social, and cultural interest reconstruction formed an indispensable basis for groups in both Germany and the United States. reeducation. Clay's reminiscences mentioned Boehling has drawn our attention to a specifc above indicate that he defnitely expected a direc‐ cast of actors and perspectives; there exist many tive concerning the implementation of democracy more who merit historians' attention, such as reli‐ in postwar Germany. gious leaders, professional guilds, intellectuals, The author's now-traditional argument that artists or even those bi-national emigres whose anticommunism replaced antifascism in 1946-47 infuence she downplays emphatically. merits cautious investigation. Rolf Steininger and NOTE others have shown that through- out the occupa‐ [1]. Lucius D. Clay, "Proconsuls of a People, by tion, U.S. ofcials dreaded nationalism from both Another People, for Both People," in Robert D. the right and the left. Nationalism would push Wolfe, Americans as Proconsuls: United States Germans (and their hopes for reunifcation) into Military Government in Germany and Japan, Stalin's embrace. It is questionable whether of‐ 1944-1952 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univer‐ cials were interested in non-Nazis rather than ac‐ sity Press, 1984), pp. 103f. tivist anti-Nazis: active resistance did not neces‐ Copyright (c) 1997 by H-Net, all rights re‐ sarily comprise democratic ideals. On the other served. This work may be copied for non-proft hand, the infuence of (even leftist) emigres, still a educational use if proper credit is given to the au‐ neglected aspect, was probably more enduring thor and the list. For other permission, please con‐ than Boehling wants us to believe. tact [email protected]. It is difcult to judge the theoretical afliation of this book. Boehling's methodology merges with

3 H-Net Reviews

If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the network, at https://networks.h-net.org/h-german

Citation: Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht. Review of Böhling, Rebecca. A Question of Priorities: Democratic Reform and Economic Recovery in Postwar Germany. H-German, H-Net Reviews. May, 1997.

URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=983

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

4