The Voluntary Export Restraint (Ver) Agreement with Japan on Automobiles in the 1980S
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THE VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINT (VER) AGREEMENT WITH JAPAN ON AUTOMOBILES IN THE 1980S Carl H. Tong Allen L. Bures Radford University ABSTRACT Detroit went through a turbulent period during the I 970s and suffered tre mendous financial losses in 1980. The governments of the United States and Japan worked out a VER agreement in 1981 to help Detroit get back on its feet. This article investigates the U.S. motor vehicle industry’s problem in the early 1 980s, examines supporting and opposing views on the VER agree ment, reports how the VER agreement played out, and offers comments and suggestions. Historically American auto companies together with their suppliers and distributors have provided good-paying jobs for hundreds of thousands ofAmerican workers. Auto motive products have also affected many other important industries in the U.S., such as primary metal, machine tools, plastics, rubber, glass, tire, battery; and electronics indus tries. A strong U.S. motor vehicle industry has been essential to a healthy and prosper ous U.S. economy. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, the big three American auto mak ers—GM, Ford and Chrysler—were profitable every year between 1958 and 1979. However, they experienced a huge pre-tax operating loss in the amount of $6.2 billion in 1980.’ Meanwhile, the total import share of the U.S. new car market increased dramati cally from 6.12 percent in 1965 to 28.20 percent in 1980, with Japanese-made vehicles accounting for about 80 percent of the import segment in 1980.2 In 1981, with the U.S. auto industry facing huge financial losses and Chrysler con fronting bankruptcy; the U.S. government and the Japanese government negotiated a deal—a Voluntary Export Restraint (VER)—that required Japan to limit its auto exports to the U.S. on an unforced, willing basis. The primary purposes of the deal were to provide American auto firms time to retool in order to become more competitive, to generate funds to finance the U.S. auto industry’s revitalization, and to save American jobs. In his book The American Automobile Industry, Rae recorded: The gasoline crisis of the spring of 1979 appears to have marked a watershed in the history of the American automobile industry; The long period when the United States had held undisputed first place in the automotive world came to an abrupt end. Even the giants like General Motors and Ford found themselves in a grim competitive struggle and faced with the necessity for making drastic and expensive changes in their operations.3 51 ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS HISTORY (2003) The objectives of this paper are threefold: (1) to investigate Detroits problem in the early 1 980s; (2) to present supporting and opposing views on the U.S.-Japan deal de signed to restrict Japanese auto exports to the U.S.; and (3) to discuss how the Japanese so-called “voluntary export restraint” on automobiles played out. Some comments and suggestions are provided. Detroits Problem in the Early 1980s The U.S. auto industry comprised three major companies (GM, Ford, and Chrysler) and one minor producer (American Motors) in the 1950s. These firms faced virtually no foreign competition in the U.S. until 1954, when the Volkswagen (VW) Beetle started to gain popularity VW’s sales increased continuously between 1954 and 1970, but de Table 1. Import Penetration of the U.S. Car Market, 1960-1984 (in millions unless otherwise indicated) Total new car Import share Year registrations Imports (percent) 1960 6.58 0.50 7.60 1961 5.85 0.38 6.50 1962 6.94 0.34 4.90 1963 7.56 0.39 5.16 1964 8,07 0.48 5.95 1965 9.31 0.57 6.12 1966 9.01 0.66 7.33 1967 8.36 0.78 9.33 1968 9.40 0.99 10.53 1969 9.45 1.06 11.22 1970 8.39 1.23 14.66 1971 9.83 1.29 13.12 1972 10.49 1.53 14.59 1973 11.35 1.72 15.15 1974 8.70 1.37 15.75 1975 8.26 1.50 18.16 1976 9.75 1.45 14.87 1977 10.93 1.98 18.28 1978 10.95 1.95 17.81 1979 10.36 2.35 22.68 1980 8.76 2.47 28.20 1981 8.44 2.43 28.79 1982 7.75 2.27 29.29 1983 8.92 2.46 27.58 1984 10.12 2.52 24.90 Source: Automotive News: Market Data Book, 1985, p. 26; quoted in Robert W. Crandall, et al., Regulating the Automobile (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986), 11. 52 THE VOLUNTARY EXPORT RESTRAINT (VER) AGREEMENT creased steadily between 1970 and 1984. While VW’s sales in the U.S. went downhill after 1970, the Japanese auto makers—Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Mazda, and Suburu— were riding an upward sales trend in America.4 As Table 1 shows, the import share of the U.S. car market passed 10 percent for the first time in 1968, and then exceeded 20 percent in 1979. In fact, Japanese car manufacturers substantially increased their market shares in many foreign markets in the 1 970s (see Table 2). Table 2. Japanese Car Import Penetration: Selected Countries (percent) Country 1970 1978 1981 Australia 15.4% 33.3% 34.1% Austria 0.9 7.0 25.4 Belgium 4.9 17.9 24.7 Denmark 3.4 13.7 24.2 Finland 18.3 20.4 33.0 France 0.2 1.8 2.6 West Germany 0.1 3.7 10.0 Italy -- 0.1 0.1 Norway 11.4 20.4 37.9 Sweden 0.7 9.7 13.7 Switzerland 5.6 12.6 26.9 Netherlands 3.1 19.0 24.4 UnitedKingdom 0.4 11.0 11.0 United States 3.7 12.0 21.8 Source: Motor Vehicle Manufacturer’s Association, “World Motor Vehicle Data”; quoted in U.S. Department of Commence, The US. Motor Vehicle and Equipment Industry Since 1958 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 18. Automobiles and oil are complementary goods; the availability and price ofgasoline definitely affect the total demand for cars and the types of cars preferred by customers. In the 1 960s, with rapidly-rising oil consumption but gradually-dwindling domestic oil supply, the U.S. became a big oil-importing country. A war between Israel and its Arab neighbors broke out in October 1973, resulting in the 1973-1974 Arab oil embargo. When the embargo ended in 1974, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) raised the oil price substantially and the price ofgasoline jumped three- to four fold. American consumers turned away from big “gas guzzlers,” and the total new car sales in the U.S. fell sharply in 1974 and 1975. The 1973-1974 Arab oil embargo and the U.S. government’s control of oil prices through the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 sent confusing signals to Ameri can car buyers and created a great deal of uncertainty for Detroit’s product planners. By late 1975 Americans’ worry about oil shortage had eased off. Car sales in the U.S. rebounded during the 1976-1979 period and the consumers showed interests in larger models. Douglas Fraser, who became the president of the United Auto Workers (UAW) in 1979, reported that the auto industry. as late as February or March of 1979 . .was selling practically all the cars we could build. It was selling every single large car that 53 ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS HISTORY (2003) could be built. The American people were not buying small cars. They had 150,000 Datsuns on the shores that they couldn’t sell, about 75,000 Toyotas that they couldn’t sell; and there was a reason for this. The reason is the American people simply wanted larger cars.5 The tide changed again in the spring of 1979, when the Iranian Shi’ite cleric Khomeini overthrew the U.S.-supported Reza Shah Palilavi regime and established the Islamic Re public of Iran. This led to a five-percent reduction in crude oil imports which prompted the second oil crisis in the 1 970s for the United States. According to automobile histo rian Rae, “in a matter of a few weeks the American public’s preference in passenger automobiles changed radically and apparently permanently. Large cars became unsal able, and there was a stampede toward compacts, which the domestic manufacturers could not satisfy because they had not anticipated any such drastic changes in demand.”6 ‘When their preferences for smaller cars could not be met by Detroit, a large number of American consumers bought imports, which by this time were largely from Japan. The import share of the U.S. car market rose from 17.81 percent in 1978 to 22.68 percent in 1979, and then to 28.20 percent in 1980 (see Table 1). By 1980 it had become clear that American auto makers were not internationally competitive in terms of product quality; fuel efficiency; product innovativeness, produc tion process techniques, and labor costs.7 The findings of a survey ofAmerican automo tive engineers showed that 48.5 percent of respondents gave top honors, in terms of product quality; to the Japanese, 27.2 percent to the Americans, and 23 percent to the West Germans.8 The stratified-charge engine and the NAPS-Z (Nissan Anti-Pollution System) engine were developed by the Japanese. European cars were equipped with front-wheel drive and disc brakes earlier than American cars.9 The Japanese auto manu facturers set up their production systems in such a manner that engines, axles, and other parts were delivered to the assembly line just in time, thus saving them hundreds of dollars per car in storage and carrying expenses.’° In 1980, the inventory costs per ve hicle produced by GM, Nissan, and Toyota were about $1,000, $350, and $100, respec tively.11 Part of Detroit’s international competitiveness problem around 1980 was caused by the UAW’s undue demand for higher wages and fringe benefits without commensurate productivity improvement.