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Wednesday August 13 2003, 2Pm: Gavin Hewitt, Reporter for the BBC and Richard Sambrook, Head of News for the BBC

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Wednesday August 13 2003, 2Pm: Gavin Hewitt, Reporter for the BBC and Richard Sambrook, Head of News for the BBC Wednesday August 13 2003, 2pm: Gavin Hewitt, Reporter for the BBC and Richard Sambrook, Head of News for the BBC (2.00 pm): LORD HUTTON: This morning the Inquiry heard the tape played of the recorded conversation which took place between Ms Susan Watts and Dr Kelly on 30th May. In order that the press and television and radio and, through them, the public should know precisely what was said in the course of that conversation, copies of the full transcript of that conversation were immediately given by the Inquiry to the media. Out of respect for Dr Kelly's family, I decided that the tape in the possession of the Inquiry which was played this morning should not be released to the media for the media to broadcast it in their television and radio programmes because it is my view that it would be insensitive for Dr Kelly's voice on the tape to be broadcast on television or on radio, although the same objection could not be raised to someone else reading out Dr Kelly's words from the transcript. Mr Knox. MR KNOX: Mr Hewitt, when you spoke to Dr Kelly on 29th May, did you ask him to comment on any of the three specific allegations which had been reported by Mr Gilligan that morning? I shall list the first of them. The first is this: that Downing Street had ordered the dossier to be sexed up a week before publication. Did you ask Dr Kelly to comment on that allegation at all? A. No, I never asked him in those words. I did ask him at the outset what his view was about the dossier, but I never phrased it in the language which had been used on the Today Programme. Q. You did mention that in the last week, according to Dr Kelly, material was being put in and taken out. Did he give you any indication as to who was behind that process of putting in and taking out material? A. In my view it was a two-way process. He did not give me the impression that this was merely material being taken in and out on, say, behalf of Downing Street. He gave me the impression that life in that final week was very frenetic, with material coming in, material being taken out. But he did not apply to that a sense that this was against the Government in some way. He felt that this was -- he was just telling me this was a very busy period in which substantially the dossier was changed. Q. But it was not specifically at the behest of 10 Downing Street? A. No, although that actual part of the conversation happened after he had already said to me "No. 10 spin came into play". Q. Did you put to Dr Kelly the suggestion that in the process of transformation in the last week, the 45 minute claim was added for the first time? A. No, I did not. Q. And finally did you put to Dr Kelly what Mr Gilligan had said, namely that the Government probably knew that this information, i.e. the 45 minute claim, was wrong? A. No, I did not put that. I said to him: what is your view about the 45 minute claim and whether it was inserted into the dossier against the wishes of the Intelligence Services, as I referred to earlier. And he came back with words to the effect of: well, I would not go along with that, I would not go as far as that. And, as I indicated earlier, we then moved the subject of the conversation because I felt I was not going to be able to get significant backing from him to report on that during the news that night, which I did not. Q. Was there any specific reason why you did not put the specific allegations made by Mr Gilligan? A. No, there was no particular reason. In agreeing to follow up on this, I actually wanted to, if you like, establish for myself a baseline in relation to this story; and the emphasis in my questioning was to discover whether an official such as Dr Kelly, who clearly had some standing, whether he felt unease about the language used in that dossier. So in a sense we were following our own agenda rather than trying to establish or not establish what had been reported on the Today Programme that morning. Q. Did it cross your mind that you might be talking to the same source as the story for Mr Gilligan's piece? A. Never. Q. How long did your conversation last with Mr Kelly? A. Around 10 minutes. Q. We know that later Dr Kelly attended a Foreign Affairs Committee on 15th July. Can we call up FAC/4/7? It appears from that, and we shall go to the reference in a moment, it appears from that that he was asked whether he had had any contact with you around this time and he said "no". You can pick that up, I think, from rather near the end of page 7. You can see the question 44: "Ms Stuart: You have neither met nor talked to her [that is Ms Watts] since? "Dr Kelly: I have spoken to her on the telephone but I have not met her face-to-face. "Ms Stuart: When have you talked to her on the telephone? "Dr Kelly: I would have spoken to her about four or five times. "Ms Stuart: During May at all? "Dr Kelly: During May? I cannot precisely remember. I was abroad for a fair part of the time in May, but it is possible, yes. "Ms Stuart: Have you had any conversations or meetings with Gavin Hewitt? "Dr Kelly: Not that I am aware of, no, I am pretty sure I have not." Did you see Dr Kelly's interview with the FAC at all as it was being broadcast live? A. No, I did not when it was broadcast live. It was only in fact subsequently, some time afterwards, that somebody said: do you know your name was mentioned at the FAC? I asked him what context and clearly was surprised. And on that Dr Kelly was incorrect. Q. Are you able to give any explanation as to why he might have got that wrong? A. No, I cannot begin to think why he did. Maybe it is possible he had a lot of conversations within that period but I do not have a ready explanation, no. Q. Did you ever speak to Dr Kelly again after 29th May? A. No, that was the one and only conversation during this period that I had with him. Q. Did you speak to anyone else on 29th May for the purposes of your report that evening? A. I did. After I had finished the conversation with Dr Kelly, I went to see Dame Pauline Neville-Jones at her house to record an interview. I felt this was quite important because she was a former head of the JIC, the Joint Intelligence Committee. I wanted to see if we could try and corroborate in some ways what Dr Kelly had said. And I had already made up in my mind that I would only discuss on the news that night the more broad question, the more broad assertions he had made about language in the dossier. I did not feel I had made any real progress in the area of the 45 minute claim. If you look at what I broadcast that night, you will see I very much limited to this question that he believed that the language had been put over in a very black and white way. I obviously use his quote to me that No. 10 spin did come into play, so -- Q. What did Dame Pauline tell you? A. Well, this was both on camera and off camera, and on camera I did at one point say to her: at the time that the September dossier was published, did you hear anything from your contacts in the intelligence community, any expressions of concern or unease? And I pushed her on this and I asked a supplementary on it. And she came back to me and said: yes, I did hear some mutterings, some murmurings. Q. Was there anything off camera that was said which was not repeated on camera of relevance? A. Pretty much what she said to me off camera was recorded in the interview. The interview lasted for about, I suppose, six or seven minutes, maybe a touch longer. Pretty much, no, what she said off camera she said on camera. Q. Can I ask you to look at BBC/7/111? This is a transcript, as I understand it, of your report on the BBC 10 o'clock News that night, is that right? A. That is right, yes. Q. Would you mind reading into the record the whole of the report, that is to say the whole of the words spoken? A. You want me to read the whole report. Q. Yes. A. Where would you like me to begin? Q. Fiona Bruce. A. "Here, MPs are calling for an inquiry after accusations that the government's dossier on Iraq's weapons was distorted by Downing Street. Security sources have told the BBC they believe parts of the report overstated the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. Downing Street though has dismissed the claims. Our Special Correspondent Gavin Hewitt investigates." This is now when the report begins: "This is really a story about trust.
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