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Asquith assessed Lawrence Goldman Asquith and the Liberal legacy A hundred years on Iain Sharpe Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith An uneasy political partnership David Dutton The Glyndŵr manuscripts Denbighshire Liberals in the 1920s and ’30s Peter Dorey ‘Asking too much and offering too little’? The Con–Lib coalition talks of 1974 Liberal Democrat History Group Liberal history quiz Test your knowledge Liberal Democrat History Group 2 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 Journal of Liberal History Issue 61: Winter 2008–09 The Journal of Liberal History is published quarterly by the Liberal Democrat History Group. ISSN 1479-9642 Asquith and the Liberal legacy 4 Editor: Duncan Brack In a lecture given to mark the centenary of the formation of Asquith’s Deputy Editor: Tom Kiehl administration, Lawrence Goldman assesses his record. Assistant Editor: Cerise Thelwall Biographies Editor: Robert Ingham Reviews Editor: Dr Eugenio Biagini Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith 12 Contributing Editors: Graham Lippiatt, Tony Little, Iain Sharpe analyses the uneasy political partnership between the two Liberal York Membery leaders. Patrons Liberal history quiz 2008 19 Dr Eugenio Biagini; Professor Michael Freeden; The questions … Professor John Vincent

Editorial Board The Glyndŵr manuscripts 20 Dr Malcolm Baines; Dr Roy Douglas; Dr Barry Doyle; Dr David Dutton uses the Glyndŵr collection at the Denbighshire Record Office David Dutton; Professor David Gowland; Dr Richard to throw light on the fortunes of the local Liberal Party in the 1920s and ’30s. Grayson; Dr Michael Hart; Peter Hellyer; Ian Hunter; Dr J. Graham Jones; Tony Little; Professor Ian Machin; Dr Letters to the Editor 26 Mark Pack; Dr Ian Packer; Dr John Powell; Ed Randall; Jaime Reynolds; Dr Andrew Russell; Iain Sharpe Ireland’s Liberal MPs (Berkley Farr); News Chronicle (York Membery); Campbell as leader (Michael Meadowcroft); Liberal Foots (John Howe). Editorial/Correspondence Contributions to the Journal – letters, articles, and Liberal history quiz 2008 27 book reviews – are invited. The Journal is a refereed … and the answers. publication; all articles submitted will be reviewed. Contributions should be sent to: ‘Asking too much and offering too little’? 28 Duncan Brack (Editor) The Conservative–Liberal coalition talks of 1–4 March 1974, analysed by Peter 38 Salford Road, London SW2 4BQ Dorey. email: [email protected] All articles copyright © Journal of Liberal History. Report: Torrington ’58 – Liberal survival and 38 Advertisements revival, 1945–79 Full page £100; half page £60; quarter page £35. Full-day seminar, 14 June 2008, LSE; report by Matt Cole. Discounts available for repeat ads or offers to readers (e.g. discounted book prices). To place ads, please Report: Founding the welfare state 40 contact the Editor. With Ian Packer and Joe Harris; report by Graham Lippiatt. Subscriptions/Membership Reviews 44 An annual subscription to the Journal of Liberal History costs £20.00 (£12.50 unwaged rate). This includes Markwell, John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: Economic Paths to membership of the History Group unless you inform War and Peace, reviewed by Ed Randall; Shannon, Gladstone: God and Politics, us otherwise. Non-UK subscribers should add £5.00. reviewed by Michael Ledger-Lomas; Stanlis (ed.), Edmund Burke: Selected

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Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 3 Asquith and the Liberal Legacy

A hundred years ago, in April 1908, Herbert Henry Asquith became Prime Minister. In this lecture, given in the Convocation House, Oxford, on 15 May 2008 to mark the centenary of the formation of Asquith’s administration, Lawrence Goldman assesses Asquith’s record. If we admire Asquith’s constitutional and reforming legacies from the Edwardian years, we must likewise recognise the role that he played in a third and less benign bequest to the future, which was to have an enduring impact on the politics of the century to come: the decline of Asquith as Prime the Liberal Party. Minister, 1911

4 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 Asquith and the Liberal Legacy

ne hundred years well as some politicians, had Edwardian progressivism that he ago, on 8 April already recognised the need to tried to perpetuate throughout 1908, Herber t support the aged poor. But, in his own political career. Jenkins’ Henr y Asquith the spring of 1908, the introduc- discretion was so complete that, kissed hands in tion of a new type of ‘outdoor at the end of his account, he could theO King’s hotel room in Biar- relief’, a national benefit paid not bring himself to sum up and ritz where Edward VII was then without contribution, broke all pass judgement on Asquith’s life holidaying. Asquith had trav- precedent. No single measure as whole. Jenkins gave Asquith elled across France alone and better exemplifies the Edward- the benefit of the doubt at every incognito to meet the King and ian Liberal legacy to us today; in turn; and did not discuss, least of receive his commission to form the spring of 1908 we may, with- all question, the motives under- a government.1 That the King out exaggeration, note the ori- lying Asquith’s choices.2 required this of his next Prime gins of what came to be called The entry on Asquith in the Minister, and had not thought it the welfare state, and Asquith’s third of the twentieth-century necessary to return to London to role in that beginning. Asquith’s Asquith has supplements of the Dictionary assist in the creation of the new promotion from 11 to 10 Down- of National Biography was writ- ministr y, was to become the sub- ing Street likewise had political been well ten by another of his admirers, ject of adverse comment. On his and personal consequences: it in this case his personal friend J. return to London, on 29 April, was left to the new Chancellor, served by his A. Spender, the notable Liberal the parliamentary Liberal Party David Lloyd George, to intro- major biog- journalist and editor of the West- endorsed Asquith’s leadership. duce and administer old-age minster Gazette, among other This was the first time in British pensions, and thus to reap the raphers who papers.3 Prior to the publication political history that a political social and electoral kudos that of this entry, Spender had col- party had ratified the monarch’s naturally followed. The old-age have all, in laborated with Asquith’s young- choice in this manner. He went pension rapidly became known est son, Cyril, in a generous on to hold the office of Prime as ‘the Lloyd George’, not ‘the their ways, biographical tribute to Asquith.4 Minister for nearly nine years, Asquith’. This was a foretaste of appreciated The author, whose life also fig- the longest continuous tenure the later confusion and rivalry ures in the Oxford Dictionary of since Lord Liverpool at the end between the two men that was his political National Biography, is described of the Napoleonic Wars. to compromise them both and as having been ‘an ever depend- On 7 May 1908, Asquith came to imprison British Liber- style and able ministerial loyalist’ when introduced the budget he had alism, at its moment of crisis, in Asquith was in power, and been preparing that spring as a cage of their joint making. admired had, like Asquith, been a Lib- Chancellor of the Exchequer. Asquith has been well served his achieve- eral Imperialist in the 1890s. 5 It was in fact his third and most by his major biographers who Later, Spender’s position at the momentous budget, including have all, in their ways, appre- ments, while Westminster Gazette was under- provision for old-age pensions ciated his political style and mined by an attempt, traceable – non-contributory weekly pay- admired his achievements, while passing over to Lloyd George, to have him ments, financed by general taxa- passing over his weaknesses and removed from the editor’s chair. tion, for those over seventy years failings. In Roy Jenkins, Asquith his weak- The plot failed, only reinforcing of age. The idea was hardly new had a biographer who shared his nesses and Spender’s complete suspicion of – a whole generation of social temperament and outlook, one Lloyd George. Fastidious and investigators and reformers, as who revelled in the world of failings. fair-minded though he was, the

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 5 asquith and the liberal legacy effects of this are clearly read in the deliberate expansion of the a solution to a problem that has Spender’s memoir of Asquith, social and welfare services of the not been answered by any gov- which praised his friend above nation, than to the other twen- ernment since that time, includ- all for the virtues of a Liberal tieth-century war leaders, Lloyd ing the present government of attitude – for his ‘dignity, for- George and Churchill. Indeed, which Adonis is a member. titude and charity’; ‘his sense of it was Churchill who in 1937 left Asquith and his government decorum in public affairs, his us one of the best portraits of the were also at fault, according to dislike of mob-oratory and self- Asquith modus operandi: Adonis, in their handling of the advertisement, his high sense Irish question, although he does of honour’. Spender’s praise In Cabinet he was markedly not clarify how a Liberal gov- for Asquith’s personal quali- silent. Indeed he never spoke a ernment in London could have ties chime with Asquith’s own word in Council if he could get prevented the mass resistance of assessment of political require- his way without it. He sat, like Ulster to the Home Rule Bill of ments: as he told his second wife, the great judge he was, hearing 1912. Adonis also fails to specify Margot, in 1914: ‘In public poli- with trained patience the case how the Asquith government tics as in private life, character is deployed on every side, now might have dealt with home rule better than brains, and loyalty and then interjecting a ques- differently once the First World more valuable than either’.6 Nei- tion or brief comment, search- War had begun, and therefore ther Spender nor Asquith had ing or pregnant, which gave how it could have prevented the much stomach for what they matters a turn towards the goal incipient civil war that followed perceived as Lloyd George’s he wished to reach.8 and which ended in the parti- recurrent disloyalties to his col- The same tion of Ireland in 1921–22. He leagues and party. These were the techniques of qualities of recognises that it ‘took nearly The same qualities of quiet peacetime – they did not, how- a century to overcome the bit- dignity and character appealed ever, translate easily to world quiet dignity ter legacy’ of events in Ireland, to Colin Matthew whose mem- war. Vaughan Nash, the public in tacit admission of the intrac- oir on Asquith in the Oxford servant and Asquith’s wartime and charac- table nature of the situation, but DNB is surely one of the best and assistant, later recalled that ‘Mr does not acknowledge that the most judicious pieces among the Asquith saw everything down ter appealed problem was bitten deep into many that he wrote in the last to petty points of routine and to Colin Mat- the history of Ireland, rather years of his life as the first edi- detail’.9 He meant it as a com- than having been created by the tor of the dictionary.7 According pliment. Lloyd George was less thew whose Asquithian Liberals. Subsequent to Matthew, who particularly charitable about the same trait: British administrations, includ- admired Asquith’s stoicism in in a letter of 1915 he complained memoir on ing the Lloyd George coalitions taking Britain into war in 1914, that ‘Asquith worries too much between 1916 and 1922, found the leader remained a demo- about small points. If you were Asquith in no easy solutions to Ireland’s cratic statesman, determined buying a large mansion he would the Oxford religious, economic and national that the normal rituals and proc- come to you and say, “Have you divisions. esses of democratic government thought there is no accommoda- DNB is surely Adonis is even more critical should go on and that a liberal tion for the cat?”’ of Asquith’s failures of states- nation should continue to think More recently, Andrew one of the manship in the days before the and act in the same measured Adonis (Lord Adonis, Minis- outbreak of the Great War, and calculated manner of peace- ter of Schools, now Transport) best and impugning him for neglect- time. Matthew recognised that has challenged the essentially most judi- ing the crisis in favour of trivial the very attempt to continue respectful consensus among personal pleasures, for failing with business as usual brought historians and biographers who cious pieces to understand its gravity, and Asquith down; but with the have assessed Asquith’s career for failing to deliver a clear and rest of Europe falling victim and legacy.10 Adonis blames among the decisive warning to Germany to hysteria and jingoism, he Asquith for not reforming the concerning the consequences of paid tribute to Asquith’s early composition of the House of many that its aggression. If it is generally control of the war effort. Mat- Lords after having led the great he wrote in agreed that the signals sent to the thew’s portrait of Asquith is of constitutional struggle to limit German government in the days an effective chairman and facili- its powers between 1909 and the last years before the conflict began lacked tator, a man who encouraged 1911. Where others have praised the severity required by the situ- his subordinates and gave them Asquith’s commitment to ending of his life ation (a criticism which encom- their heads, rather than lead- the Lords’ veto of bills sent up passed Asquith’s meeting with ing from the front. According from the Commons, over which as the first the German ambassador, Prince to this biography, Asquith was he was prepared to fight two editor of the Lichnowsky, on 1 August 1914 at closer in style to Attlee, the next general elections in 1910, Adonis which the issues of Belgian neu- Prime Minister to preside over convicts him of failing to find dictionary. trality and German naval actions

6 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 asquith and the liberal legacy in the Channel were discussed), If Asquith’s Minister, later in 1908, he came that some of those new plans it is also generally agreed that to Oxford, and to his old col- were transformed into practical most governments across Europe leadership lege, Balliol, to attend a din- policies and politics. were taken by surprise in July is to be ner in his honour. It was here, Despite all his brilliance and and August 1914 – Asquith and in his after-dinner speech, promise whilst at Oxford, on his cabinet were not alone.11 It is criticised, we that he pronounced that state- leaving the university Asquith also very widely understood that ment about Balliol men that has struggled for a decade as a brief- there was little the British could must focus dogged them, and other Oxford less barrister and occasional have done to prevent a conti- men and women trailing in Liberal journalist, chafing at his nental war on two fronts, once instead on their wake, ever since: ‘effort- relative poverty and obscurity, mobilisation had begun on the the period less superiority’. But Asquith’s though gradually coming to the Russian front, for this was the career had not been effortless, attention of the leaders in his essence of Germany’s strategy, after the and though his maiden speech in profession and in his party. He planned long in advance of the the House of Commons in 1887 was first elected to the Com- 1914 conflict. Meanwhile, the First World on the subject of an Irish crimes mons for East Fife in 1886, and old lament that Britain would bill had impressed everyone who continued to represent the con- have done better to stay out of War had heard it, Mr Gladstone included, stituency until the coupon elec- the war, usually the card played begun, on his Asquith had experienced pro- tion of 1918 at the end of the by nostalgic imperialists and fessional struggles and personal Great War. In 1891 the sudden worse, neglects Britain’s his- handling of sadness in his formative years.12 death of his first wife, Helen, toric commitment to a balance Born into a relatively hum- left him chiefly responsible for of power on the continent, her the conflict ble family in Yorkshire in 1852, five young children. Though longstanding guaranty of Bel- his father, who was a minor Asquith’s talents brought him to gian neutrality, her alliances itself and on employer in the local wool the Home Office for the three with France and Russia and his unwill- trade, died when he was eight, years of Liberal government the ideological animus of some and his mother was an invalid. between 1892 and 1895, this was British liberals to an aggressive, ingness to His stroke of luck arrived when not an easy passage in the history authoritarian and expansionist he was sent to London to live of the Liberal Party, and the era German state. Among British cede power with relatives and to attend the as a whole is more notable for progressives in 1914 were those City of London School, where Liberal divisions and the absence who believed that the war had in a dignified he won a classical scholarship to of direction than for the pur- to be fought and that the fate of manner, in Balliol in 1870. A double first and poseful preparation for future Liberalism depended on it: that a clutch of university prizes then power. in fighting they were defending the interest followed; he was also President When, on the occasion of the liberal values rather than bury- of the Union. But perhaps the election of 1906, after a genera- ing them, as Adonis implies. of his party. greatest prize of all, and the most tion of Conservative dominance, With the benefit of hindsight, influential of Oxford’s legacies the Liberals’ opportunity came Adonis convicts Asquith’s lead- on Asquith, was to have been at again, it was more the conse- ership of various sins of omission, Balliol during the opening years quence of Tory mistakes and just as the subsequent carnage of of Jowett’s Mastership of the unpopularity than the positive the Western Front has led us to college, when T. H. Green, the endorsement of Liberal values. underestimate the rational com- great liberal moral philosopher, If the electorate was moved at mitment of many Britons who was at the height of his powers. all by a commitment to Liber- went to war in 1914. But this Asquith was never, by his own alism, it was of an older variety, was not how it appeared to con- admission, a devotee of Green, a recrudescence of the princi- temporaries, nor did solutions but the ethos of social and politi- ples of Gladstonian free trade come freely to hand in any of cal service that Green preached and religious equality, rather these situations, whether matters at Balliol, which was supported than an endorsement of New of parliamentary reform, self- by Jowett, rubbed off. Other Liberalism. determination in Ireland, or the Oxford men were more directly Thus Asquith’s first legacy fate of Europe. If Asquith’s lead- affected by their teachings, and as Prime Minister was one he ership is to be criticised, we must argued more vigorously and had himself inherited from the focus instead on the period after publicly for a rebalancing of the past rather than one that he and the First World War had begun, state’s relationship to the citi- his generation had fashioned for on his handling of the conflict zen in the late-Victorian period themselves and subsequently itself and on his unwillingness to – a phenomenon which would handed down: it was the finish- cede power in a dignified man- become known as the ‘New Lib- ing of constitutional business ner, in the interest of his party. eralism’ of the Edwardian era. concerning the House of Lords After Asquith had settled But it was under Asquith’s lead- and Ireland, begun earlier in the into his new position as Prime ership, between 1908 and 1911, nineteenth century. It is doubtful

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 7 asquith and the liberal legacy that Lloyd George’s People’s many lives, and that the outcome ideas from T. H. Green’s Balliol Budget of 1909 was deliberately in 1922 was not what any of the was slow and complex, without aimed at the Lords – first and parties in London, Dublin and doubt, but nonetheless reached foremost it was a genuine and Belfast had desired, was not the Asquith’s cabinet. As Chancel- necessary measure of revenue- responsibility of the Liberal Party lor, Asquith had the energy and raising in order to pay for the that framed and passed the leg- initiative to devise social policy unexpected costs of welfare and islation in 1912. In the long his- and as Prime Minister he had the national defence. However, when tory of Liberal attempts to pacify requisite sympathy and vision the Lords rejected the budget, the Ireland and to bring justice to its to encourage other ministers in Chancellor and Prime Minister people, Asquith’s government social innovation. were ready to use the oppor- deserves the highest credit for But the price exacted on tunity to settle the outstanding the lengths to which it went to Asquith’s personal life over these question of the powers of the fulfil an inherited commitment years – surely among the most upper house. In the first two to Irish self-determination. intense and also the most excit- years of the Liberal administra- Asquith’s second great legacy ing in modern British political tion under Sir Henry Campbell- was his government’s commit- history – was high indeed. His Bannerman, from 1906 to 1908, ment to the legislative foun- colleagues noted his growing the Lords had vetoed or heavily dations of the welfare state. fondness for alcohol from about amended a clutch of lesser Liberal Old-age pensions were only 1910. According to Church- welfare measures. If the Liber- a part of this; there were also ill in April 1911, Asquith was als were to fulfil their historic trade boards to regulate mini- perfectly competent until din- responsibility to Ireland they mum wages and conditions in ner – ‘serene, efficient, undis- would first have to deal with the the so-called ‘sweated’ trades, turbed’ – but after that he was Lords veto, for Gladstone’s two labour exchanges to help the forced to entrust proceedings previous home rule bills in 1886 unemployed find jobs and con- to his younger colleague. As and 1893 had been defeated in the tributory National Insurance to Churchill wrote to his wife, upper house. The protect the unemployed when ‘only the persistent freemasonry The epic struggles between they fell sick or were laid off. of the House of Commons pre- 1909 and 1911, the matter of ‘the Asquithian Likewise, the People’s Budget vents a scandal’.13 We can sense peers versus the people’, brought Liberals of 1909, when eventually agreed the pressure Asquith was under out the best in Asquith and by both houses of Parliament, from the teasing letters he wrote should be regarded as his most achieved not only confirmed the pre- to Venetia Stanley in the years notable achievement. In the eminence of the Commons in all leading up to the war, which public defence of historic Liberal what their financial matters, but also estab- have now been brought together principles he had no match. In lished the principle that pro- and edited in a single volume by complex parliamentary nego- Gladstonian gressive taxation would be used Michael and Eleanor Brock.14 In tiations with the Liberal Party’s fathers had thereafter to fund redistributive their very playfulness and some- allies, the new Labour Party and social programmes. times even in their triviality, the Irish Nationalists, in consul- not: an end The ideas underpinning this these letters tell us how desper- tations with the court over what historic series of changes in the ately Asquith needed a release two different kings, Edward VII to the con- role of the state and the respon- from the concerns of office. The and George V, would and would sibilities of the individual had, problems only intensified after not support, and in calculations flict of pow- in fact, been developing and August 1914, when Asquith’s of electoral mood and advantage ers between maturing since the 1870s and quest for such release not only which these struggles required 1880s. Stimulated by the social conflicted with the pressing – there were, after all, two gen- Commons investigation into poverty of the needs of government but also eral elections in 1910 to be con- late-Victorian era, and debated with the public’s perception of ducted and won – Asquith was and Lords and disseminated by the organs how a leader during a world war in his element. of Liberal opinion and by Liberal should behave. As Bonar Law, The Asquithian Liberals under the intellectuals outside of the gov- the leader of the Conservative achieved what their Gladsto- Parliament ernment, they were fashioned Party in the wartime coalition, nian fathers had not: an end to into workable policies by New had warned him in a letter of the conflict of powers between Act of 1911, Liberals in parliament and the February 1916, ‘In war it is nec- Commons and Lords under the cabinet, such as Lloyd George essary not only to be active but Parliament Act of 1911, and the and the pas- and Churchill. Key civil serv- to seem active’.15 passage of home rule for Ireland ants inside government depart- We know from Colin Mat- in 1912. That the realisation of sage of home ments, like the Board of Trade thew’s memoir that Asquith Irish independence took longer rule for Ire- and Board of Education, also enjoyed playing bridge in the than planned owing to the First played an important role in their evenings but that he never World War, that it also took very land in 1912. dissemination. The filtration of played cards after lunch or

8 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 asquith and the liberal legacy before dinner. Matthew said had written, ‘is A’s laziness & It may be party’s historic attempt to unite nothing about cards in the morn- lack of ideas’.17 By the autumn the workers and the bourgeoisie ing, however. There is a fateful of 1916 Lloyd George and many argued that in a political coalition began to story of Asquith’s premiership others had come to believe that by making a break down. The middle classes in June 1916 in which bridge the organisation of the govern- moved towards Conservatism; before lunch features, though ment and its consequent policy bad ending, the workers felt ignored and the story is disputed and the could not win the war, and that unprotected and their trade events may never have occurred Asquith should stand aside. As Asquith’s unions provided the basis for the in this manner. Following the Kenneth Morgan has suggested, new Labour Party. Others have death at sea of the War Minis- the problem with Asquith by this third legacy pointed to the decay of local ter, Lord Kitchener, Bonar Law stage was ‘not so much political was his con- Liberal organisations across the apparently went in search of the as psychological. Lloyd George country, often as a result of the Prime Minister to discuss the simply looked like the vigor- tribution to defection of richer local Liber- ministerial succession. Told that ous, dynamic leader who could als to the right, who took their Asquith was still at his home in win the war, while the faltering the division money and flair for local politics Sutton Courtenay on a Monday Asquith, so dominant in peace- with them.20 Prior to the Sec- morning three weeks before the time, did not.’18 Lloyd George’s of the Liberal ond World War, the American Somme offensive, he was forced plan for a new War Cabinet, Party that historian George Dangerfield to motor down to talk with him. excluding Asquith, precipitated saw the ‘death of Liberal Eng- ‘He found the Prime Minister the crisis and Asquith’s fall. destroyed it land’ prefigured in the indus- engaged in a rubber of bridge According to Enoch Powell, trial and social conflicts of the with three ladies. Asquith gen- ‘All political lives, unless they are as the major years immediately preceding ially requested him to wait till cut off in midstream at a happy the First World War: Liberal the game was finished. Bonar juncture, end in failure, because party of the rationalism was unable to man- Law, by now considerably that is the nature of politics and British left. age the violence and emotional- annoyed, declined to wait.’ human affairs’.19 No one knew ism of nationalists, feminists and ‘Asquith immediately offered this better than Powell himself. syndicalists.21 the War Office to Bonar Law’, That he should have written it in Asquith, indeed, was a nota- but the latter explained that his biography of Joseph Cham- ble opponent of women’s suf- he had already bowed to Lloyd berlain is, in the present context, frage until 1918, speaking as George’s determination to fol- not without interest. Though well as voting against it on many low Kitchener. ‘So Asquith Chamberlain’s career was cut occasions. Nor was his handling agreed to offer the post to Lloyd short by a sudden stroke rather of industrial disputes sure or George’. Little wonder that ‘the than a happy juncture, no one instinctive. His use of the Met- episode left a lasting impression did more in 1903 to worst Cham- ropolitan Police to control dis- upon Bonar Law’.16 Little won- berlain and his campaign for order among locked-out miners der also that in the second half tariff reform than Asquith him- at Featherstone in 1893, result- of 1916, as the shocking news self, whose speeches across the ing in two deaths, haunted him from the Somme registered in nation at that time in defence of for the rest of his career; just as the national mind and in its soul, free trade were among his most Churchill was always reminded the Conservative press should notable contributions to the re- of the deaths at Tonypandy in have begun a campaign against emergence of his party and to 1911, the cry of ‘Remember Asquith’s handling of the war the history of British Liberalism. Featherstone!’ was often heard at that assisted in his replacement as But Powell’s dictum points us an Asquith rally. At the very end Prime Minister by Lloyd George towards one of the great prob- of his life he took a public stance in the first week of December. lems of political life in any age against the General Strike, We must note here that Bonar or any type of political system: though Lloyd George, whose Law’s passenger as he motored how to make a good ending. For condemnation was reserved for to Oxfordshire on that Mon- it may be argued that by making Baldwin’s government, contra- day in June was none other than a bad ending, Asquith’s third leg- dicted him once more.22 Con- Max Aitken, later Lord Beaver- acy was his contribution to the cerning important issues of the brook, the owner of the Daily division of the Liberal Party that present and future – the rights Express, who was to play a large destroyed it as the major party of of workers and women in these public and also a private role in the British left. cases – Asquith provides some Asquith’s demise. Historians have long debated evidence in support of the so- As early as the spring of 1915 the reasons for the decline of called ‘Dangerfield thesis’. even the loyal Spender had pri- the Liberal Party during this For Colin Matthew and Ross vately criticised Asquith’s war period. For some, the origins McKibbin, meanwhile, the cru- leadership: the reason for much of the problem can be found in cial development came later in of the hostility of the press, he the 1880s and 1890s when the the mass enfranchisement at

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 9 asquith and the liberal legacy the end of the First World War. could have followed the public Asquith’s have taken Margaret Thatcher From this point of view, it was mood more sensitively and made with him to Maastricht in 1992? inevitable that the millions of way for Lloyd George at almost decision Merely to think of these alterna- working-class men and women any stage in 1916. In Septem- to move a tive scenarios from our own age now voting for the first time ber of that year, his brilliant and is to recognise the impossibility would automatically align with charismatic son Raymond was motion of of Asquith’s position. Instead of values of the Labour Party. It is killed on the Somme. A month statesmanship on a global scale undeniable that in the years fol- later when he became seriously censure on Lloyd George gave Asquith a lowing 1918, a crucial stage at ill as a consequence of this news, little piece of local parish-pump which the electorate was chang- coupled with the general strain the govern- politics as a sort of consola- ing and when many of its new of wartime leadership, Margot ment in May tion: chairmanship of the Royal members were forming political thought him ‘absolutely done’, Commission on Oxford and allegiances for the first time, the and he might have bowed to the 1918 over Cambridge in 1919–22. He per- division of Liberalism between evidence of growing fatigue.24 formed his duties well, though in supporters of Asquith and of After his fall from power he the ques- a conservative fashion, sticking Lloyd George fatally com- could have retired with dignity closely to the patterns that had promised Liberal identity and to the backbenches and worked tion of troop been laid down by the preceding encouraged the anti-Tory vote to minimise Liberal divisions. numbers on Victorian Royal Commissions to drift towards Labour.23 But Asquith’s decision to move on the two ancient universi- That the major cause for this a motion of censure on the gov- the Western ties. As the Oxford historian Sir division was Lloyd George’s ernment in May 1918 over the Charles Firth wrote at the time, decision to prolong the war- question of troop numbers on Front – which ‘My impression is that Asquith’s time coalition and to campaign the Western Front – which failed views on higher education are against those Liberals who were when Lloyd George mounted a failed when those prevalent at Balliol in 1870 not granted the ‘coupon’ (the bravura defence of his conduct in Lloyd George and that he has learnt nothing joint letter of endorsement that the subsequent Commons debate about it since.’26 he and Bonar Law had signed) – irreparably divided the party. mounted As his committee collected is not in doubt. But it may be True, he had performed evidence on the state of the two argued as well that Asquith could wonders behind the scenes as a a bravura institutions, an exchange took have chosen to try to concili- wartime Prime Minister hold- place that illustrates the impres- ate. Beyond the enmity caused ing together the cabinet and the defence of sion made by Asquith on the by the manner of his removal wider administration (despite his conduct younger generation – those who from office, there is no doubt its often fissiparous tendencies). had fought in the war and were that Asquith was also taking a Asquith no doubt imagined that in the subse- hoping to set about social recon- principled stance against Lloyd these skills were still required struction in the following years. George’s ambition and van- and at a premium. However, in quent Com- This was, in fact, an exchange ity, and in favour of traditional light of the numerous oppor- between two Balliol men, with Liberal principles and codes of tunities which had presented mons debate Asquith in the chair and the political behaviour. But for the themselves – and which Asquith – irreparably economic historian and socialist rest of his life he would remain had failed to take – that would thinker, R. H. Tawney, twenty- locked in a fatal embrace with his have enabled him to finish on a divided the eight years his junior, giving evi- former ally – a dance of political more positive note and to reduce dence on how to make Oxford death, in fact – which under- the divisions in his party, it is party. more open and accessible to the mined his party as it was being difficult to sympathise with his children of the working class. squeezed away from both the left case. His incapacity to bow out Plus ça change, plus c’est la même and the right. This essentially gracefully at an appropriate time chose, we might say. But the resulted in both Asquith and essentially contributed to the tone of the exchange and Taw- Lloyd George being deprived of undermining of Liberal identity ney’s evident frustration with his high office. and the party’s political authority interlocutors on the committee, Asquith could have bowed out which has endured to this day. Asquith included, suggests that with dignity in the early months There is no better example of more than university politics of the war at a stage when he had Asquith’s lack of self-awareness were at issue.27 For Tawney had successfully overseen mobilisa- at the end of his career than his come within an inch of his life, tion and the transition to a war request, put to Lloyd George in quite literally, on the first day of footing in government. He might person, that he should be made a the Somme, taking two bullets have resigned when the coalition member of the British delegation in his chest. When he had recov- was formed in May 1915, even if at the Paris peace conference in ered, convalescing in Oxford in it had been interpreted as accept- 1919.25 Would Gordon Brown the Examination Schools, which ing some of the blame for the take Tony Blair with him to the had become one vast military ‘shell shortage’ of that spring. He next summit? Could John Major hospital for the duration of the

10 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 asquith and the liberal legacy conflict, he dedicated himself had shown more self-awareness Churchill, 22 April 1911, in Ran- to a democratisation of the war, and self-possession. But if we dolph S. Churchill, Winston S. which, he argued, had been admire Asquith’s constitutional Churchill, vol. II (1901–1914) (Lon- fought by a traditional class in and reforming legacies from the don: Heinemann, 1967), p. 344. a traditional manner and to the Edwardian years, we must like- 14 M. Brock and E. Brock (eds.), H. detriment of the nation.28 wise recognise the role that he H. Asquith: Letters to Venetia Stanley We might hypothesise that played in a third and less benign (Oxford: Oxford University Press, when Tawney confronted bequest to the future , which 1982). Asquith in 1921 he saw before was to have an enduring impact 15 Spender and Asquith, Life of Herbert him a prime specimen of ‘the on the politics of the century to Henry Asquith, II, p. 230. old gang’ whom he held respon- come: the decline of the Liberal 16 Robert Blake, The Unknown Prime sible for multiple national fail- Party. Minister (London: Eyre and Spot- ings after 1914, and even perhaps tiswoode,1955), pp. 289–90 There before. Asquith, the Edward- If we admire Dr Lawrence Goldman is Fellow is an unresolved dispute about the ian progressive, now seemed and Tutor in Modern History, St. details of this incident and about to personify the weakness of a Asquith’s Peter’s College, Oxford and has Bonar Law’s recollections of it. See played-out ruling elite to a new been Editor of the Oxford Dic- Jenkins, Asquith, pp. 321n–322n and generation of more radical and constitu- tionary of National Biography p. 457n. impatient reformers. Tawney since its publication in 2004. 17 E. T. Cook’s diary, 1 and 3 April was perhaps the pre-eminent tional and 1915, cited in Stephen Koss, The Rise intellectual guide and inspira- reforming 1 J. A. Spender and Cyril Asquith, and Fall of the Political Press in Britain tion of the inter-war left in Brit- Life of Herbert Henry Asquith, Lord (London: Hamish Hamilton, 2 vols, ain, arguing, in this case, for the legacies from Oxford and Asquith (2 vols., London, 1981 and 1984), II, p. 272. accessibility and therefore the Hutchinson, 1932), I, pp. 196–97. 18 K. O. Morgan, ‘Lloyd George, reduction in cost of a univer- the Edward- 2 Roy Jenkins, Asquith (London, David’, Oxford Dictionary of National sity education and the opening Collins, 1964) Biography (Oxford: Oxford Univer- up of Oxford and Cambridge ian years, 3 J. A. Spender, ‘Asquith, Herbert sity Press, 2004), vol. 21, 890–912, to the sons and daughters of the we must Henry, first Earl of Oxford and quotation at 899. middle and working classes. For Asquith’, Dictionary of National Biog- 19 J. Enoch Powell, Joseph Chamber- him, Asquith was a figuration likewise raphy, Supplement 1922–1930, pp. lain (London: Thames and Hudson, of the politics and social values 29–40. 1977), p. 151. of the past. Later, in 1925, when recognise 4 Spender and Asquith, Life of Herbert 20 Paul Thompson, Socialists, Liberals Asquith was a candidate for the Henry Asquith. and Labour: The Struggle for London Chancellorship of Oxford, he the role that 5 A. J. A. Morris, ‘Spender, John 1885–1914 (London: Routledge & was beaten soundly, by more he played in Alfred’, Oxford Dictionary of National Kegan Paul,1967). than two to one, by the candi- Biography (Oxford: Oxford Univer- 21 George Dangerfield, The Strange date of the right, Lord Cave, the a third and sity Press, 2004) vol. 51, 899–902. Death of Liberal England (London: then Conservative Lord Chan- 6 Margot Asquith, The Autobiography Constable,1936). cellor. The centre did not hold; less benign of Margot Asquith (London: Thorn- 22 Spender and Asquith, Life of Herbert at the end of his career Asquith ton Butterworth, 2 vols, 1920–22), Henry Asquith, II, pp. 361–62. was assailed from right and from bequest to II, p. 202. 23 H. C. G. Matthew, R. I. McKibbin left, as well as from sections of the future , 7 H. C. G. Matthew, ‘Asquith, Her- and John Kay, ‘The Franchise Fac- his own party who had remained bert Henry, first earl of Oxford tor in the Rise of the Labour Party’, loyal to Lloyd George. which was and Asquith’, Oxford Dictionary of English Historical Review, 91, 1976, At this stage Asquith was National Biography (Oxford: Oxford pp. 723–52. referred to as the ‘last of the to have an University Press, 2004), vol. 2, 24 Jenkins, Asquith, pp. 465–66. Romans’; this was meant as 735–54. 25 Ibid., pp. 538–9, 546. a compliment.29 However, enduring 8 Winston S. Churchill, Great 26 Koss, Asquith, p. 244. whereas the Romans knew impact on Contemporaries (London: Butter- 27 Royal Commission on Oxford and when to fall on their swords, worth,1937), p. 140. Cambridge Universities, oral evi- Asquith may simply have stayed the politics 9 Spender and Asquith, Life of Henry dence, Bodleian Library, MS Top too long. Given the nature and Herbert Asquith, II, pp. 376–77. Oxon b 109, fos. 524–42, Evidence strength of the historical forces of the cen- 10 Andrew Adonis, ‘A Liberal Trag- of R. H. Tawney, 21 September that were challenging Liberal- edy’, Prospect, April 2008, pp. 14–15. 1921. ism after 1911, the last year of tury to come: 11 Stephen Koss, Asquith (London: 28 Lawrence Goldman, Dons and the heroic phase of Asquith’s the decline Allen Lane,1976), p. 158. Workers: Oxford and Adult Education career, it would be impossible 12 Spender and Asquith, Life of Her- Since 1850 (Oxford: Oxford Univer- to argue with any certainty or of the Liberal bert Henry Asquith, I, p. 56; Jenkins, sity Press, 1995), pp. 198–200. conviction that the outcome Asquith, pp. 44–45. 29 See Jenkins, Asquith, ch. xxviii, would have been different if he Party. 13 W. S. Churchill to Clementine ‘The Last of the Romans’.

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 11 Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith: an uneasy political partnership

This year marks the centenary of the death of Liberal Prime Minister Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and of the succession to the premiership of H. H. Asquith, the last head of a purely Liberal government of the United Kingdom. Iain Sharpe considers the relationship between the two Liberal leaders.

12 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith: an uneasy political partnership

ir Henry Campbell- The Liberal leadership middle-class and staunchly Bannerman and Her- The final decade and a half of Liberal family. He had been a bert Henry Asquith the nineteenth century was a brilliant classics scholar at Bal- between them pre- period of electoral failure for the liol, before becoming a bar- sided over the twenti- Liberals. The landslide defeat of rister and Liberal MP for East ethS century’s longest continuous 1886 followed the secession of Fife. In the House of Commons period of non-Conservative rule, the Liberal Unionists over Irish he was associated with figures from 1905 to 1915.1 They were home rule. The party staged a such as Richard Burdon Hal- instrumental in transforming modest electoral recovery in dane and Sir Edward Grey, who the Liberal Party’s political for- 1892, taking office under Glad- were imperialist in outlook and tunes in opposition before 1905, stone, and then Rosebery, but wanted the party to project a leading to the landslide election the government was short-lived moderate image, but who were victory of January 1906 and nine and accomplished little. The also open to new ideas on social and a half years in government, party suffered another cata- and welfare reform. Campbell- before the inclusion of Conserv- strophic defeat in the 1895 gen- Bannerman, known univer- atives in Asquith’s wartime coa- eral election. The resignation sally as ‘C-B’, was more clearly lition government in May 1915. of Rosebery as Liberal leader in a Liberal in the Gladstonian In government between 1905 1896 and that of his successor, tradition. Sixteen years older and 1908, Asquith was the clear Harcourt, in 1898, in both cases than Asquith, he had served in second-in-command to Camp- the result of disputes over impe- all Liberal governments since bell-Bannerman and deputised rial policy, created an impres- 1868, most recently as Secretary for the Prime Minister during his sion of a party in perpetual of State for War. His father was frequent illnesses. Yet for much crisis. a wealthy Glasgow merchant of the period before the Liber- The Liberals’ choice of leader and his family Conservative. als took office the two men were now fell between Campbell- Although he had attended Cam- on opposite sides of the divi- Bannerman and Asquith, both bridge University, his academic sions that beset the Liberal Party survivors of the 1892–95 Cabi- achievements were modest. As a and which at times threatened net. Of the two, Asquith seemed cabinet minister he was capable to divide it permanently. Their the more obvious choice. Aged and loyal, but by no means out- willingness to work together in forty-six, he was one of the few standing – neither a great orator spite of pressures from the rival success stories of the recent Lib- nor a shining intellect. His lack wings of the party that threat- eral government, in which he Liberal leaders: of leadership ambition is shown ened to pull them apart was cru- had served as Home Secretary. Asquith and by his unsuccessful pursuit in cial to rescuing the Liberals from Originally from Yorkshire, he Campbell- 1895 of the House of Commons the electoral wilderness. came from a relatively modest, Bannerman Speakership.2

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 13 campbell-bannerman and asquith: an uneasy political partnership

In the event, the party critical of the Unionist govern- C-B ulti- fudge over the war and hoped for was spared a leadership bat- ment’s diplomacy, but realised Rosebery to return to the lead- tle. Asquith ruled himself out that a responsible opposition mately ership with Asquith leading the of contention because, being could not appear to side with blamed the party in the House of Commons. dependent on his earnings at the their country’s enemies in war- Asquith, however, does not Bar to support a large family and time. Yet C-B ultimately blamed British gov- appear to have shared his friends’ a notoriously extravagant social- the British government for the desire to oust C-B, and contin- ite wife, he could not devote war and believed it an unnec- ernment for ued to support him.7 However, himself to full-time politics. essary blunder, while Asquith C-B’s notorious ‘methods of Indeed, despite his acute mind regarded Britain as more sinned the war and barbarism’ speech in June 1901, and academic achievements, against than sinning. In the early believed it in which he denounced the con- Asquith was regarded by many part of the war, they attempted ditions in which Boer prisoners of his contemporaries as a par- to coordinate their public state- an unneces- were being held in concentration venu, in contrast to C-B who, ments to avoid contradicting one camps in South Africa, plunged although he took little part in another. But it was impossible to sary blun- Asquith into open confronta- ‘society’, was at least wealthy.3 avoid differences of emphasis. tion with his leader.8 Despite Asquith offered his backing to Asquith, Haldane and Grey all der, while its celebrated position in the C-B, promising ‘the most loyal supported the diplomacy of Sir Asquith canon of Liberal speeches, the & energetic support’, while Alfred Milner, the British High phrase ‘methods of barbarism’ admitting that, with the party’s Commissioner for Southern regarded was at the time widely regarded ongoing difficulties, ‘it has not at Africa and Governor of Cape as a mistake, even by Liberals first sight a very friendly look to Colony, with whom they had Britain as loyal to his leadership,9 because urge a man into such a position’.4 close personal ties. C-B, on the it appeared to be a criticism of C-B’s election was confirmed other hand, was privately critical more sinned British troops fighting for their at a meeting of Liberal MPs on of Milner’s belligerent approach against than country. While C-B was sincere 6 February 1899, at which he and struggled to resist expressing in his comments on the suffer- made clear that he was a reluc- these views in public. sinning. ing in the concentration camps, tant party leader, and said: ‘I Key parliamentary votes in Asquith joined with Liberal hope I am well enough known the early part of the war high- Imperialists in seeing it as a sign to be a person of a pretty tolerant lighted the divisions among that the party leadership had and easy-going disposition not Liberals between three groups: been captured by the pro-Boers likely to exercise pedantically supporters of the war, its and that their own views were any powers of party discipline.’5 implacable opponents (dubbed being anathematised. This was Both men were to be severely ‘pro-Boers’), and those who partly because the speech was tested on these respective pledges followed C-B’s lead in trying given to a dinner sponsored by in the ensuing years. to steer a middle course. Unlike the anti-war National Reform Haldane, Grey and other impe- Union, and the whole event was rial-minded Liberals, Asquith seen as having an air of pro-Boer The South African war avoided voting against his leader triumphalism. Although C-B enjoyed a quiet on the parliamentary divisions. At first Asquith assumed that first few months as opposition He cooperated with C-B and C-B had made an unintentional leader, the war in South Africa, the Chief Whip, Herbert Glad- blunder. He offered to do what which broke out in Octo- stone, in agreeing an amend- he could to discourage repris- ber 1899, was guaranteed to ment to the Queen’s Speech als from Liberal Imperialists.10 reawaken divisions in the party. in February 1900 that briefly However, when it became clear Liberals in the Gladstonian and united all factions in regret- that C-B stood by his remarks, Cobdenite traditions opposed ting the government’s ‘want of Asquith spoke out in defence aggressive imperial adventures knowledge, foresight and judg- of Liberal supporters of the and instinctively sided with ment’ in its conduct of South war. He addressed a dinner at small nations such as the Trans- African affairs and preparations Liverpool Street Hotel when, vaal and Orange Free State, with for the war.6 although he did not mention which Britain was now at war. C-B by name, he attacked the By contrast, the ‘Liberal Impe- National Reform Union meet- rialists’, as they were to become Methods of barbarism ing. He did not threaten a Lib- known, felt the war was justified Despite C-B’s attempts to pre- eral imperialist secession from and did not want the party to serve unity, Grey and Haldane, the party, but defended the Lib- seem unpatriotic. along with other Liberal Impe- eral credentials of those who On the surface Asquith and rialists, believed that Campbell- supported the war and their Campbell-Bannerman held sim- Bannerman’s leadership was claim to be part of the orthodox ilar views on the war. Both were resulting in an unsustainable Liberal movement.11

14 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 campbell-bannerman and asquith: an uneasy political partnership

Asquith’s supporters arranged their statements on the policy. do in government, and willing a further dinner in his honour, But whereas C-B was happy to to amend unpopular policies. to be held on 19 July; it was let home rule sit quietly on the For example, he agreed to drop regarded by many as a direct back-burner, Asquith and the the party’s commitment to the challenge to C-B’s leadership. Liberal Imperialists wanted it to prohibitionist ‘local veto’ policy However, C-B outwitted his be publicly disavowed, signal- on temperance, at the suggestion critics by calling a meeting of ling a clear change in Liberal of Herbert Gladstone.18 He was the Liberal parliamentary party, priorities. aware of the faults of the party’s which endorsed his leadership On 15 December, Asquith radical wing. But he saw Rose- while allowing scope for Liber- was present at Rosebery’s noto- bery’s ‘clean slate’ position as an als to express dissenting views. rious Chesterfield speech, in abandonment of all that the Lib- Asquith came under pressure which the former Prime Minis- eral Party stood for. Asquith’s from many Liberal MPs to aban- ter appeared to point the way to views were probably somewhere don the dinner in a show of Liberal unity on the war, while between the two extremes, but, party unity.12 What followed was at the same time stirring up ten- in the wake of Chesterfield, he an early example of the sort of sions on domestic policy.16 The stood more clearly in the Rose- compromise that became typical speech was a political sensation, bery camp. of Asquith’s career. Pleading that seeming to herald Rosebery’s In February 1902, Rosebery the arrangements had gone too return to front-line politics. On launched a new organisation, far for cancellation, he insisted this point both C-B and Asquith the Liberal League, as a vehi- that the dinner go ahead, but had mixed feelings. Rosebery’s cle for his Chesterfield policy, then used his speech to deliver a prestige in the country meant and Asquith joined Grey in conciliatory message, in which that all leading Liberals had to becoming one of its vice presi- he commented: ‘I have never express the hope, in public at dents. From the start the Liberal called myself a Liberal Imperial- Relations least, that he would rejoin the League’s purpose was unclear ist. The name of Liberal is long active ranks of the party. In – was it a putative breakaway enough, good enough, and dis- between C-B’s case, this was tempered organisation or a haven for impe- tinctive enough, and always will by the knowledge that Liberal rialists within the Liberal Party? be for me.’13 Asquith and Imperialists wanted Rosebery to The fact that Rosebery, the Relations between Asquith C-B remained resume the leadership. Asquith League’s president, pronounced and C-B remained strained for too was aware that Rosebery’s himself ‘outside [the official Lib- some time afterwards, however. strained for return would threaten his own eral Party] tabernacle’,19 while its In his public speeches through position as the foremost figure vice presidents remained active the autumn of 1901 Asquith, some time on the party’s imperial wing. Liberals in the House of Com- while never directly repudiat- He was frustrated by Rosebery’s mons, added to the confusion. ing C-B’s leadership, took an afterwards, semi-detached relationship with It provoked a hostile reaction increasingly independent line. however. In the Liberal Party, on one occa- from C-B, to whose authority At Ladybank on 28 September sion describing him as ‘afraid to the League seemed a direct chal- he raised the question of Irish his public plunge, yet not resolute enough lenge. However, Asquith was home rule, advocating a ‘step- to hold to his determination to keen to assert the League’s posi- by-step’ approach, arguing that speeches keep aloof’.17 At the same time, tion within the Liberal fold and the Liberal Party should disavow Asquith’s allies, Grey and Hal- disavow any intention to break any immediate intention to leg- through the dane, were also strong support- away from the party or be driven islate for an Irish parliament and autumn of ers of Rosebery. out of it.20 instead consider Irish reforms that were compatible with, but 1901 Asquith, did not go as far as, a separate The Liberal League Free trade legislature.14 This appeared a while never If the Chesterfield speech In May 1902 the South African calculated attack on a long-held seemed at first to offer hope war came to an end. The Union- Liberal policy and therefore a directly of Liberal unity, its aftermath ist government’s Education Act direct challenge to C-B. In real- repudiating saw an increasingly bitter feud of the same year, with its per- ity, Asquith’s view was simi- between C-B and Rosebery. ceived bias towards Church of lar to the policy that C-B had C-B’s leader- The most divisive factor was England schools, enabled nearly acquiesced in before the 1900 Rosebery’s espousal of the ‘clean all Liberals to rally to the tradi- election, at the instigation of ship, took an slate’ – the view that the Liberal tional cause of religious equal- Herbert Gladstone.15 This made Party should abandon long- ity. The following year Joseph clear that home rule would not increasingly held policies that had proved Chamberlain’s tariff reform be an immediately priority of a independent unpopular with the electorate. campaign acted as a further cat- Liberal government and gave In practice, C-B was flexible alyst for unity, as all sections of Liberal candidates flexibility in line. about what the Liberals ought to the party wanted to defend free

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 15 campbell-bannerman and asquith: an uneasy political partnership trade, one of the party’s longest- In 1903, Herbert Gladstone all over the house’.26 However, held and most treasured causes. reported to Asquith a conversa- it would be wrong to see their Relations between Asquith and tion with C-B in which the lat- agreement as simply the product Campbell-Bannerman thawed, ter said that ‘in the event of Govt of treachery and personal ambi- and regular correspondence he did not think that he would tion. They feared being margin- between them resumed from be able to take any post which alised within a largely pro-Boer early 1903, although never quite involved heavy & responsible Liberal administration and on the same friendly terms as work’, adding that he would wished to ensure they had real before the summer of 1901. prefer a largely ceremonial post influence. They believed that C-B remained suspicious of the such as Lord President of the a government which could not Liberal Imperialists, comment- Council.24 C-B’s comments are demonstrate its patriotic creden- ing privately that: ‘That sec- surprising from a party leader tials would be short-lived, pav- tion, for their ends, which are who was presumably intending ing the way for the Unionists’ mainly personal, exaggerate to lead the Liberal Party into the return to office on a tariff reform their zeal in the fiscal quarrel in next election and who did in the programme.27 order to cover their old back- end serve as Prime Minister. It Asquith appears to have been slidings.’21 However, he encour- is possible that, as C-B and his a largely passive participant in aged Asquith to follow Joseph wife were constantly troubled by the conspiracy. Always averse Chamberlain round the coun- ill-health, the leader’s remarks to direct personal confronta- try with a series of speeches indicated his state of mind at tion and internal party conflict, countering tariff reform propa- that moment rather than his set- he may well have acquiesced ganda, a campaign that revived tled intention. Asquith relayed with Haldane’s plan, hoping that Asquith’s reputation within the The Relugas the information to Haldane C-B would prove amenable to party as a whole. C-B valued and Grey and it may well have their requests. Unlike Haldane Asquith’s mastery of the facts compact is inspired the so-called Relugas and Grey, Asquith was not in and detailed arguments on free compact of September 1905. a position financially to refuse trade, referring to him as ‘the one of the office if it was offered. In addi- sledgehammer’ for his ability most con- tion, as he pointed out in a later to rebut the tariff reformers’ The Relugas compact letter to Haldane, his refusal to arguments.22 troversial The Relugas compact is one of serve under C-B might well From 1902, the Liberals the most controversial episodes undermine the viability of a Lib- began to notch up a series of by- episodes in in Asquith’s career, since he can eral administration, something election victories and it became be charged with duplicity on that was not true of Haldane or increasingly clear that the party Asquith’s two counts – conspiring against Grey.28 was likely to win the next his party leader and then reneg- On 4 December 1905, Balfour general election. This raised career, since ing on the conspiracy as soon resigned office, in the hope of the question of who would be he can be as he was offered high office. regaining the political initiative Prime Minister in an incom- The compact, reached between by demonstrating that the Lib- ing Liberal administration. C-B charged with Asquith, Haldane and Grey in erals were too divided to form a was officially only the leader of September 1905, at the latter’s stable government.29 When C-B the party in the House of Com- duplicity on fishing lodge at Relugas, Moray- was invited by the King to form mons, and not an automatic shire, involved the three men a new government, Asquith choice to lead a Liberal gov- two counts agreeing to refuse to take office accepted his offer of the Chan- ernment. Many Liberal Impe- – conspir- under C-B, unless certain con- cellorship of the Exchequer rialists hoped that Rosebery ditions were met. These were without insisting on the Relu- would agree to form a govern- ing against that C-B should take a peer- gas conditions. He argued that ment, but as the former Prime age, allowing Asquith to lead the compact was based on an Minister still refused to make his party the House of Commons, and assumption that a Liberal gov- a political comeback, Asquith that Haldane and Grey should ernment would be formed after a became their favoured choice. leader and become Lord Chancellor and general election victory; instead, In 1903, Haldane told Asquith then reneg- Foreign Secretary respectively. C-B was being asked to form a that neither he nor Grey would The Relugas conspirators minority government before the be willing to serve under C-B ing on the have not had a good press from general election, and public dis- either as leader in the House of historians.25 The clumsiness of unity might prejudice the party’s Commons or as Prime Minis- conspiracy their conduct bears the hallmarks electoral prospects. ter. He claimed that Rosebery of a conspiracy initiated by Hal- Asquith did urge C-B to refused to consider forming a as soon as he dane, of whom C-B once said: take a peerage and to offer Hal- government and was going to was offered ‘Haldane always prefers the back dane the Lord Chancellorship. ‘work with all his strength for stairs to the front, but no mat- However, C-B, having taken an A.[Asquith] ministry’.23 high office. ter, for the clatter can be heard advice from his wife, and under

16 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 campbell-bannerman and asquith: an uneasy political partnership pressure from pro-Boer Liber- of the challenges of the new gov- According political partnership – one that als,30 resolved to remain in the ernment was to reverse the Taff was often tense and difficult but House of Commons. Haldane Vale decision, which had made to Asquith’s which yielded great dividends and Grey then refused office, trade unions liable for damages official biog- for the Liberal Party. Although with Grey being the more sustained by employers due to they belonged to different social implacable, unless C-B met strike action. While Asquith raphers, circles and differed in their polit- the Relugas terms. The forma- wanted to see trade unions given ical style and on some policy tion of the Liberal government only limited immunity from C-B’s parting issues, there was far more that was therefore stalled by the legal action, C-B insisted on a united than divided them. Both strange situation in which Grey, Labour-inspired measure that words to were practical politicians, more although he had been offered gave them full immunity and his succes- comfortable in government than his preferred position of For- which became the 1906 Trades with broad political theory or eign Secretary, would not join Disputes Act.33 Asquith and the sor were to the posturing of opposition. the government unless Asquith Liberal Imperialists wanted to Despite Asquith’s imperialism, was made leader in the House see disputes between the Lords thank him he was also a Liberal in the Glad- of Commons, even though and the Commons resolved by stonian tradition, and like C-B Asquith had agreed to serve joint sittings of the two cham- for being ‘a had been strongly influenced by without such a precondition and bers, while Campbell-Banner- wonderful Gladstone himself.39 was trying to persuade Grey to man preferred the more radical Both were highly partisan take office. Eventually, cajolery policy of a suspensory veto, in colleague, so Liberals and believed in the ben- from various leading Liberals which the Lords would merely efit to the country of Liberal persuaded Grey that it was his have power to delay measures loyal, so dis- government. This contrasted duty to accept the Foreign Sec- passed by the elected chamber.34 with the radical pro-Boer left of retaryship; Haldane too joined Asquith acquiesced without pro- interested, the party, who often appeared the Cabinet as Secretary of State test in C-B’s decision and wound so able’, add- to prefer opposition, and with for War, C-B having denied up the debate on the House of Grey, Haldane and Rosebery, him the Lord Chancellorship.31 Commons resolution in sup- ing: ‘You are whose semi-detached attitude It is tempting to conclude that port of the suspensory veto.35 His to the party gave the impression the Relugas compact was a com- own government, of course, was the greatest that they were willing to partici- plete failure, with two of its three to legislate for the veto in 1911. pate in Liberal politics on their main objectives not achieved. In The correspondence between gentle- own terms or not at all. Asquith fact, the outcome was a compro- Asquith and C-B during the man I have and C-B alike believed strongly mise. C-B disliked both Grey latter’s premiership shows a enough in the goal of Liberal and Haldane and had at first friendly collaboration.36 Indeed, ever met. electoral success to make per- attempted to pass the former in government the mutual suspi- sonal and political compromises over for the Foreign Secretary- cion between C-B and Haldane This is not in order to achieve it. ship and to offer the latter the and Grey largely disappeared.37 Whereas Haldane, Grey and non-Cabinet office of Attorney- During C-B’s final illness in the last of Rosebery viewed C-B with General.32 Instead, they had both 1908, Asquith deputised for him, me; we will thinly veiled contempt for his secured high office; the Relugas presiding over Cabinet meetings intellectual and oratorical short- triumvirate was in a strong posi- and leading the House of Com- meet again, comings, Asquith’s correspond- tion to influence or even control mons. According to Asquith’s ence suggests that he either did government policy. And as C-B official biographers, C-B’s part- Asquith.’ not share this view or kept such survived for just two years as ing words to his successor were thoughts to himself. Likewise, Prime Minister before ill-health to thank him for being ‘a won- C-B recognised the impor- led to his resignation and death, derful colleague, so loyal, so tance of Asquith to the success possibly he made the wrong disinterested, so able’, adding: of the Liberal Party and did not choice in declining a peerage. ‘You are the greatest gentleman regard him in the same light as I have ever met. This is not the the other Liberal Imperialists. last of me; we will meet again, Although C-B privately used The Liberals in government Asquith.’38 C-B resigned on 6 disparaging nicknames for Hal- In government, relations April 1908 and died on 22 April, dane (Schopenhauer, to make between C-B and his Liberal with Asquith taking over as fun of his pretensions as a phi- Imperialist ministers were more Prime Minister. losopher) and Sir Edward Grey harmonious than they had been (Sir E. Hur), Asquith escaped his in opposition. Asquith was leader’s mockery.40 the clear heir apparent and was Conclusion One interesting question is treated as such by the Prime C-B’s resignation and Asquith’s whether, had C-B lived and Minister. There remained, how- accession to the premiership continued as Prime Minister, he ever, some disagreements. One ended what had been a successful might have kept Britain out of

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 17 campbell-bannerman and asquith: an uneasy political partnership the European war in 1914. One Asquith and principle of progressive taxation 12 See Daily News, 2 July 1901 for contemporary supporter of C-B, and succeeded in defending free Asquith’s reply to a letter from forty F. W. Hirst, was in no doubt, C-B’s willing- trade. But for the intervention Liberal MPs urging him to abandon writing in his memoirs that C-B ness to work of the First World War it could the dinner. ‘would have wished … to follow have claimed to have completed 13 For the Asquith dinner, see The up the Entente with France by a together much of the unfinished busi- Times, 20 July 1901. similar Entente with Germany’ ness that the Liberal Party had 14 The Times, 30 September 1901. and highlighting the reluctance when other accumulated over the previous 15 See Herbert Gladstone Autobiogra- with which C-B appointed Grey quarter of a century. Asquith phy BL Add Ms 46,118 ff.79–80. as Foreign Secretary.41 Such elements and C-B’s willingness to work 16 See Brack and Little, Great Liberal counterfactual speculation can in the party together when other elements Speeches, pp. 217–27. never produce definite answers, in the party sought to pull them 17 Asquith–Herbert Gladstone 7 but there are strong reasons to sought to apart was essential in ensuring October 1900, BL Add. Ms. 45,989 doubt this conclusion. C-B was that the Liberal Party was in a f.44. aware of the need for the Liberal pull them position to take office in 1905, 18 Herbert Gladstone–Campbell-Ban- Party not to appear unpatriotic. win an election and enjoy its nerman, 16 and 18 December 1899, His election address in 1906, apart was longest ever continuous period BL Add. Ms 41,215 ff.180–83 and which was effectively the Liberal essential in government. report of Campbell-Bannerman manifesto, committed the party speech at Aberdeen, The Times, 21 to ‘continuity’ with the previ- in ensur- Iain Sharpe is a part-time doctoral December 1899. ous administration’s foreign student at the University of London, 19 Rosebery letter to the Editor, The policy.42 Of the two alternative ing that researching a thesis on the Liberal Times, 21 February 1902. candidates for the Foreign Sec- Party in the early twentieth century. 20 Wilson C-B, p. 388; Asquith speech retaryship that C-B considered, the Liberal He works as a university administra- at St Leonards, 14 March 1902, Lord Cromer was a Unionist and Party was in tor, and is a Liberal Democrat coun- reported in The Times, 15 March Lord Elgin, although a Liberal, cillor in Watford. 1902. was an essentially non-partisan a position to 21 C-B–Vaughan Nash, 29 August figure who had spent much of 1 An achievement eclipsed by the 1903, quoted in Wilson C-B, p. his career, like Cromer, in colo- take office Labour administration of Tony 408. nial administration. Any Liberal Blair in 2006. 22 A. G. Gardiner, Priests, Prophets and Foreign Secretary would have in 1905, win 2 John Wilson, C-B: A Life of Sir Kings (London, 1914). had to maintain a delicate bal- an election Henry Campbell-Bannerman (Lon- 23 Haldane–Asquith, 5 October 1903, ance between showing that a don, 1973) pp. 350–58. National Library of Scotland, Hal- Liberal administration was com- and enjoy its 3 Roy Jenkins, Asquith (London, dane papers, 5906 ff.58–59. mitted to defending Britain’s 1964; third edn., 1986). 24 Herbert Gladstone–Asquith, 29 interests abroad and not alien- longest ever 4 Asquith–Campbell-Bannerman, October 1903, Asquith papers, Bod- ating the anti-war left of the 19 December 1898, BL Add. Ms. leian Library, Asquith 10 f.98. party by appearing excessively continuous 41,210 ff.155–56. 25 See, for example, Matthew, The belligerent. period in 5 The Times, 7 February 1899. Liberal Imperialists, pp. 112–120. The course of the First World 6 Herbert Gladstone–Campbell-Ban- 26 F. W. Hirst, In the Golden Days War led to the demise of the Lib- government. nerman, 16 January 1900 ff.205–06 (London, 1947), p. 264. eral government that C-B and and 18 January 1900 ff.209–10; 27 Richard Burdon Haldane, An Auto- then Asquith had presided over Campbell-Bannerman–Gladstone biography (London, 1929), p. 174. for nine years, when Asquith 21 January 1900 ff.216–17 (copy). 28 Asquith–Haldane, 7 Decem- formed a coalition government 7 H. C. G. Matthew The Liberal Impe- ber 1905, quoted in Spender and in May 1915. Although, as with rialists: The ideas and politics of a post- Asquith, Life of Lord Oxford and any administration, it had its Gladstonian elite (Oxford, 1973) pp. Asquith vol. 1 (London, 1930), pp. failures as well as successes, its 52–53. 174–75. achievements were consider- 8 The speech is reprinted in full in 29 It was a common tactic during this able: it introduced old age pen- Duncan Brack and Tony Little period of Prime Ministers in dif- sions, laid the foundations of (eds.), Great Liberal Speeches (Polit- ficulty to resign rather than seek the welfare state, established the ico’s, 2001), pp. 211–14. a dissolution, giving the opposi- democratic principle of suprem- 9 See Herbert Gladstone–Grey 28 tion the dilemma of whether to acy of the House of Commons, December 1901 BL Add Ms 45,992 form a potentially weak minority enacted both home rule for f.91. administration or to risk the accu- Ireland and Welsh disestablish- 10 Asquith–Campbell-Bannerman, sation of being unable to form a ment (although both of these 15 June 1901, BL Add Ms 41,210 government. were suspended for the dura- f.206–07. 30 A. G. Gardiner papers, British tion of the war), established the 11 The Times, 21 June 1901. Library of Political and Economic

18 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 campbell-bannerman and asquith: an uneasy political partnership

Science, letter from Herbert of the Campbell-Bannerman 36 See Asquith–Campbell- PhD thesis, London: Coun- Gladstone–A. G. Gardiner, 6 government, Herbert Samuel Bannerman correspondence, cil for National Academic December 1905, and subsequent papers, Parliamentary Archives, Campbell-Bannerman papers Awards, 1983). For Asquith, note by Gardiner of exchange A155 III ff.99–100. Also see British Library, Add. Ms. see Roland Quinault (1992) of letters with Campbell- Margot Asquith, An Autobiog- 41,210 ff.256–314 ‘Asquith’s Liberalism’, History Bannerman. raphy (London, 1962; originally 37 See, for example, Haldane’s 77 (249), 33–49. 31 See T. Boyle ‘The Formation of published 1920 and 1922), p. tribute to C-B in his memoirs: 40 See Spender and Asquith, Campbell-Bannerman’s Gov- 236; Margot Asquith diary, 5 Haldane, Autobiography, p.182. Oxford and Asquith, vol. 1, pp. ernment in December 1905: a December 1905, Bodleian MS. 38 Spender and Asquith, Life of 144–45. Memorandum by J.A. Spender’, Eng. d.3204 f.85; Haldane Auto- Lord Oxford and Asquith, vol. 1, 41 Hirst, In the Golden Days, p. Bulletin of the Institute of Histori- biography pp. 170–71. p. 196. 252. cal Research, 45 (1972), 283–302. 33 Ian Packer, Liberal Government 39 For Campbell-Bannerman’s 42 British General Election Mani- 32 For C-B’s view of Haldane and and Politics, 1905–1915 (Basing- political outlook, see R. W. festos, 1900–1974, compiled and Grey, see Herbert Samuel’s stoke, 2006) pp.157–58. Strong, ‘Campbell-Bannerman edited by F.W.S. Craig (Lon- memorandum on a conversation 34 Ibid, pp.79–80. as opposition leader’ (unpub- don: Macmillan, 1975) p. 13. with Asquith on the formation 35 See The Times, 27 June 1907. lished Ulster Polytechnic

Liberal history quiz 2008 This year’s Liberal history quiz attracted a fair amount of attention at the History Group’s exhibition stand at the Liberal Democrat conference in Bournemouth in September. The winner was Robin Young, with an impressive 19½ marks out of 20. Below we reprint the questions – the answers, and some observations on what the entrants thought were the answers, are on page 27.

1. Which Liberal Democrat leader had been an Olympic 12. Which Whig Prime Minister had seventeen children? athlete? 13. In 1905, which three leading Liberal MPs plotted against 2. Which was the first by-election won by a Liberal Democrat Campbell-Bannerman in the agreement known as the (constituency and year)? Relugas Compact? 3. The Liberal Party was founded in 1859. Where? 14. At the time of its formation in March 1981, how many MPs formed the SDP’s Parliamentary Party? 4. Whose Dimbleby Lecture was instrumental to the foundation of the SDP? 15. In a piece of prose associated with the Liberal Party’s presidency, which poet wrote ‘Give me the liberty to know, 5. Who did David Steel beat to become the leader of the to utter and argue freely according to conscience, above all Liberal Party? liberties’? 6. Who was the Liberal Leader in the Lords at the end of the 16. In what year did William Beveridge become a Liberal MP? Second World War? 17. For how long, in years and days, was David Lloyd George MP 7. What was the year of the Orpington by-election? for Caernarfon Boroughs? 8. In which twentieth-century elections did the Liberal Party 18. Which Liberal Prime Minister said of which other Liberal achieve its: premier – (a) highest share of the poll? (a) He is one of the ablest men I have ever known; (b) lowest share of the poll? (b) He is of the highest honour and probity; 9. In 1929, Lloyd George published a pamphlet advocating a (c) I do not know whether he really has any common programme of public works which formed the basis of the sense? Liberal manifesto in that year’s general election. What was 19 Who was the first president of the National Liberal its title? Federation? 10 Which Liberal leader proclaimed, ‘I intend to march my 20. Who wrote: ‘I am not aware that any community has a right troops towards the sound of gunfire’? to force another to be civilised’? 11. Which Liberal Democrat leader described his party as ‘confused, demoralised, starved of money and in the grip of a deep identity crisis’?

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 19 The Glyndŵr Manuscripts Denbighshire Record Office, Ruthin

The survival of local party records, as serious students of Liberal history will be well aware, is largely a matter of chance. In general, the Conservative and Labour parties are better resourced in this respect than are the Liberals. While the formal constituency papers of the East Denbighshire (Wrexham) constituency for the first half of the twentieth century seem to have disappeared, the Glyndwr collection at the Denbighshire Record Office contains a fascinating archive which offers an invaluable insight he collection is dwelling in Bersham Road, essentially the pri- Wrexham, into which Hughes into the fortunes of vate archive of Alder- and his family moved in 1895 and man Edward Hughes which housed the archive until the local Liberal Party (1862–1938), main- its transfer to the Record Office at a critical stage in its Ttained into a second generation in Ruthin. Hughes claimed that by his youngest daughter, Edna his family was descended from history. David Dutton (1894–1982). The name Glyndwr a daughter of Owain Glyndwr, examines its contents. derives from the large redbrick the legendary Welsh patriot of

20 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 The Glyndŵr Manuscripts Denbighshire Record Office, Ruthin

the early fifteenth century, who Hughes’s training as an allegiances of the local Liberal led a major rebellion against accountant no doubt contrib- Party were increasingly chal- English rule in Wales. uted to the meticulous develop- lenged by Labour’s growing Born in Oswestry, the sec- ment of his private archive. But appeal to a working-class elec- ond child in a family of four he was, in any case, by instinct torate. Before 1914, however, the sons and a daughter, Hughes a compulsive hoarder, and the local Liberal Party maintained moved to Wrexham in 1884 to collection houses some bizarre strong links with the miners and work as a bookkeeper for a local items. One neatly typed note it was normal for consultation to firm of leather manufactur- pasted on a lightbulb sleeve take place with the leaders of the ers. In 1902 he became Com- reads, ‘this lamp was fixed over North Wales Miners’ Federation pany Secretary to the Cambrian my desk this date at 12 o’clock before the name of the Liberal Leather Works and in 1910 he noon, 17 September 1936’.1 parliamentary candidate was was appointed Joint Managing Overall, the archive reflects announced. In the period after Director. Ousted from this posi- Hughes’s business and local gov- the First World War, the Labour tion in 1922 following a coup led ernment activity together with Party in the constituency made by his fellow Managing Direc- his passion for local history, rapid gains while the social dep- tor Charles Prescott, Hughes topography and genealogy. But rivations of the following decade resigned from the company’s it also enables the researcher to enabled it to demonstrate the board two years later. While follow the fortunes of the Wrex- attractions of a socialist agenda. his business career progressed, ham Liberal Party over a period In the course of 1925 alone the Hughes had also become promi- of more than three decades. area suffered three major indus- nent in local politics. Elected to By the beginning of the trial setbacks with the closure the Wrexham Borough Council twentieth century, coal mining of the Llay Main and Vauxhall in 1898, he was Mayor for two was already the largest employer collieries and the disappearance successive terms, 1906–07 and apart from agriculture in North of the Cambrian Ironworks. In 1907–08. He served as Chair- Wales. The North Wales coal- total more than 3,000 work- man of the Borough Finance field extended from Oswestry ers lost their jobs. By the end Committee from 1908 to 1919 on the English border to the Left: courtyard of the 1920s Labour was setting of Ruthin Gaol and of the Electricity Commit- Point of Ayr on the coast. And, up relief funds to raise money museum, Ruthin tee from 1919 until his death with coal miners forming a sig- (photo: Arwel for the families of mine-work- nearly twenty years later. In the nificant proportion of the elec- Parry). The Gaol ers living in abject poverty as a meantime, he became the essen- torate, East Denbighshire was now houses the result of prolonged strikes and tial power-broker of the local one of many constituencies in Denbighshire subsequent redundancies. These Liberal Party. which the traditional values and Record Office. developments quickly impacted

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 21 the glyndŵr manuscripts

upon the local political scene Alderman and did not speak the Welsh lan- John as the constituency’s MP. and the electoral history of the Edward Hughes guage. It was Hughes who mas- Strikingly, both Hemmerde and constituency in the 1920s sug- (1862–1938). terminded the party’s victory in John would end up inside the gested that Labour could not (Photos East Denbighshire in the general Labour Party, the former as MP easily be beaten in a three-cor- reproduced election of January 1910 despite for Crewe in the 1920s. This, nered contest. by kind Hemmerde’s absence until the however, was not a course which permission of the Hughes’s involvement in last days of the campaign. But Hughes himself was ever likely Denbighshire Liberal politics went back to an Record Office.) there was an erratic and unpre- to follow. earlier period, when the Labour dictable side to the MP’s char- By the time of the next gen- challenge was less potent. He acter. In 1909 he had been saved eral election in December 1918, formed a close association with from financial ruin and political the First World War had helped Edward Hemmerde who was disaster only when the celebrated to transform the political land- first elected as the constituency’s charlatan, Horatio Bottomley, scape and, nationally, it was a MP in a by-election in August organised a round-robin col- much weakened Liberal Party, 1906, following the elevation of lection of £10,000 among his divided between the followers the sitting MP to the position fellow MPs.2 Now, when the of Herbert Asquith and David of County Court Judge on the country again went to the polls Lloyd George, which faced the Chester and North Wales circuit. in December 1910, Hemmerde electorate. Hughes was a friend Hughes recognised the talents of decided to contest Portsmouth of Lloyd George and the latter the new member, an articulate rather than East Denbighshire. stayed on more than one occa- and ambitious barrister, whose It was Hughes who seized the sion at Glyndwr. But the form nomination had been strongly initiative and, after considering of Lloyd Georgeite Liberalism resisted by many other local Lib- standing himself, secured the of which Hughes approved was erals, because he was English adoption and election of E.T. that manifested in the era of the

22 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 the glyndŵr manuscripts post-war coalition. Hughes’s but these must all be destroyed felt that I could slide out of the basic instincts were anti-social- and your [Williams’s] word party (locally) and thereby you ist and they led him to view the must be accepted. Prominent would not have to use the “Bell, Conservatives as potential allies Conservative workers say that Book and Candle” and pro- in the quest to keep East Den- Richards will win on a three- nounce excommunication. I said bighshire out of Labour’s hands. cornered fight.’5 Though logic nothing about it to anyone, but I ‘A strong Anti-Socialist policy is might have suggested that, in considered that … I had ceased our best plan’, he wrote in 1929. the event of a candidate stand- to be associated with the Wrex- ‘We lost l15 seats at the last [1924] ing down, it was now the turn ham Liberal Association.’8 election because the Liberals, of the Tory candidate to have a This, however, was far from under Asquith, put the Labour free run against Labour, Hughes being the end of Hughes’s Party in office.’3 almost succeeded in once again influence over the local politi- Formally re-titled Wrex- persuading the Conservatives cal scene. The Glyndwr papers ham in time for the general to give way. The argument he allow the student to trace the election of 1918, the East Den- used – that Wrexham was the way in which the mainstream bighshire electorate was con- sort of constituency whose radi- Liberal Party, still a significant siderably enlarged as a result of cal traditions meant that Con- force in the constituency at the a rapidly-growing population servatives would probably vote beginning of the 1930s, was and the government’s extension Liberal but that Liberals could comprehensively outmanoeu- of the right to vote. The pre-war not be relied upon to vote Con- vred and relegated to the politi- electorate of under 12,000 now servative – would become the cal sidelines over the course stood at around 39,000. Whether common currency of the Con- The Glyndŵr of the decade. The documents the extension of the franchise servative–Liberal National dia- papers allow make it possible to see the Lib- worked, of itself, to the advan- logue of the next decade. In the eral National schism less as the tage of the Labour Party remains event, however, an ill-judged the student self-serving action of a group of a matter for historical debate.4 article in the local press, which beleaguered MPs desperate to At all events, in Wrexham the Hughes attributed to the mal- to trace cling on to their parliamentary general election of 1922 was ice of an ‘Asquithian gang’, left seats and more as the expres- clearly the turning point, with Bushby with little alternative the way in sion of a reasoned and long-term Labour, in the person of Robert but to insist that his candidature which the strategy of a particular strand of Richards, a lecturer at the Uni- should go forward.6 With the Liberalism which believed that versity College of North Wales, anti-socialist vote split, the result mainstream it was the Labour Party which capturing the seat for the first of the general election of 1929 in posed the ultimate threat to Lib- time. Thereafter, as the archive Wrexham was entirely predicta- Liberal Party, eral values and ideals. reveals, it was Hughes’s primary ble. Robert Richards recaptured The general election of 1931 goal to prevent the anti-Labour the seat for Labour with a major- still a signifi- saw the return of the Liberal Aled vote being split. In the general ity of more than 6,500 over Wil- cant force in Roberts in a straight fight against election of 1924, as Chairman liams, the Liberal candidate. the sitting Labour MP, Robert of the local Liberal Party, he But not all in the Wrexham the constitu- Richards. On this occasion the helped to secure the withdrawal Liberal Party approved of what Conservative candidate with- of the Conservative candidate, Hughes had tried to do. As the ency at the drew, not as part of a local bar- E.F. Bushby, a move which ena- local Treasurer explained: gain but as a result of nationally bled the Liberal Christmas Wil- beginning led negotiations between those liams to recapture the seat. But With regard to your Chairman- of the 1930s, parties which were participating as the general election of 1929 ship of the party, I may be quite in the newly formed National approached, and notwithstand- frank and say that there was was compre- Government. It was, however, ing optimism about the Liberal considerable doubt as to where striking that, in the most unfa- Party’s prospects nationally, you stood. Many hold the view hensively vourable climate for Labour and Hughes doubted whether Wrex- that you were a good old Tory, outmanoeu- in the context of its first national ham could be held. With no help and that you had become a real electoral setback since the party’s on offer from party headquar- Protectionist, and with these vred and rel- formation, Roberts’s margin of ters, Hughes determined to pur- doubts, whether based on fact victory was a mere 1,800 votes. sue his preferred strategy. ‘We or not, it was felt that the Lib- egated to the Hughes fully understood that should go on our own and try eral Party could not exist with this majority ‘came from Tories’ to get a Secret Agreement with you as its Leader.7 political side- and was under no illusion about the Conservatives.’ Secrecy was the difficulties that would have central to Hughes’s purpose. ‘If By the end of 1929, Hughes had lines over the to be overcome if the Liberal [Bushby] does withdraw there been eased out of his offices in course of the victory were to be repeated at must be nothing in writing. We the local party. ‘Being thus freed any future elections.9 Possible may have notes in writing at first from office’, recalled Hughes, ‘I decade. success would depend not only

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 23 the glyndŵr manuscripts on maintaining the alliance Association was duly set up on consummate political operator. with the Conservatives but on 14 October 1936 with Hughes as First, Roberts was persuaded doing so without losing any Lib- Chairman. to enter negotiations with the eral votes in the process. Such Hughes knew, however, that Liberal National Organisation thinking ruled out any possibil- he would have to take as much of in London. A joint consulta- ity of an immediate transfer of the local Liberal Party as possible tive committee was set up with allegiance to the newly formed with him if his goal of recaptur- the Wrexham Conservatives at Liberal National group, even ing the seat from Labour were to which the latter were once again though that body, headed by be fulfilled. His hopes continued induced to play second fiddle Sir John Simon, espoused pre- to rest on Aled Roberts: to a Liberal (or now, a Liberal cisely the same strategy of full National) candidate. As Hughes electoral co-operation with the If we could only prevail upon recorded, the Conservative Conservatives as Hughes did. Mr Aled Roberts to become a Chairman ‘stated quite clearly The problem was that any such member of the Liberal National that there was a feeling in his step would almost certainly Party it will secure the seat com- party that the candidate should involve a serious breach in the ing back from the Labour Party be a Conservative but upon the ranks of Wrexham Liberalism. because in that case the Con- figures that had been produced Edna Hughes Hughes therefore moved cau- servative vote will go in his sup- [by Hughes] he could see that the (1894–1982) in tiously and hoped that Roberts port. Without that we have no prospect of a Conservative was 1916. (Photo 11 could be persuaded to take up reproduced chance of regaining the seat. not so good as a National Lib- 12 a half-way position, supporting by kind eral’. Before long, Hughes had the National Government while permission of the Over the following months, as persuaded the Conservatives that still maintaining his ties with the Denbighshire the Glyndwr archive reveals, Roberts should be their man. local Liberal Party. Record Office.) Hughes displayed his skills as a ‘Satisfactory to the Conservative Hughes was not helped when Roberts joined the Lib- eral Leader, Herbert Samuel, in crossing the floor of the House of Commons and rejoining the ranks of opposition in 1933, estranged by the National Gov- ernment’s commitment to tariffs and the Ottawa agreements on Imperial Preference. Nonethe- less, Hughes was again successful in persuading the Conservatives to give Roberts a free run against Labour at the general election of 1935. But the Chairman of the Wrexham Conservative Asso- ciation registered his misgivings about the Liberal candidate by advising Tory voters to abstain. Denied full Conservative back- ing, Roberts faced almost inevi- table defeat and Labour’s Robert Richards regained the seat with a comfortable 5,000 majority. It was in this situation and in the knowledge that the mainstream Liberal Party had now been reduced to just twenty-one seats in the House of Commons that Hughes began to consider the Liberal National option more seriously. ‘The old Liberal Party is dead’, he declared, ‘dead as Queen Anne, so what is the use of holding a wake over it?’10 A Wrexham Liberal National

24 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 the glyndŵr manuscripts

Party and the Liberal Nationals, National stance, a minority of From the between the two associations he will pull over a large body of local Liberals soon reacted and was secured in 1949 very much the Liberals – he may drop a few formed a rival ‘Radical Asso- point of view on Conservative terms, with of the old fashioned Liberal die- ciation’. With the newly-formed of the politi- Conservatives dominating all hards, but with the united sup- Liberal National Association aspects of the resulting joint port of both parties I think we backing Roberts, the former cal historian, association. Most National Lib- can win.’13 Finally, and perhaps Liberal MP; the long-stand- erals (the name was reversed in most remarkably, the local Lib- ing Liberal Association, which the Glyndŵr 1948) accepted force majeure and eral Association also threw its ‘agreed to support Mr Aled readily acquiesced in this situa- weight behind Roberts as a ‘Lib- Roberts and to co-operate with archive tion, but a small group, includ- eral candidate supporting the the Liberal National Association stands as a ing Edna Hughes, refused to be National Government’. but could not see their way to reconciled. The archive reveals Though he felt a little ‘uneasy join the Liberal National Move- remarkable a brave but ultimately futile about the “trimming” of the ment’; 16 and now a ‘Radical attempt by surviving National Liberal Association’,14 there was Association’ trying to revive the monument Liberals in 1953–54 to reassert no doubt about what Hughes cause of independent Liberalism, a degree of independence from had achieved. In due course potential Liberal voters in Wrex- to a right- their over-bearing Conservative Roberts would ham could have been forgiven leaning partners. But, deprived of any if they were confused. At all backing from National Liberal … write to Lord Hutchison events, when the war was over, strand in Brit- headquarters in London – ‘what [Chairman of the Liberal Liberalism failed to recover any- an appalling exhibition of weak- National Organisation] thing like its pre-war strength in ish Liberalism ness!!’ protested Edna Hughes, requesting that on election Wrexham. It was in fact finished ‘I am sorry that I have wasted he should receive the Liberal as a significant political force. which has as twenty years in the support of National whip. The designa- Liberal candidates came a distant yet received such a party’17 – the Wrexham tion of Liberal National Candi- third in the general elections of rebellion was doomed to failure. date will come in time and I am 1945 and 1950 and the party then insufficient In what had now become a safe of [the] opinion that the sugges- failed even to contest the con- Labour seat, the local Conserva- tion will come from the Liberal stituency again until 1966. scholarly tive Party maintained a joint Association. There will [be] The travails of the post-war ‘Conservative and National three Associations. The Liberal Liberal Party do not feature attention. Liberal’ label in its constituency Association, independent and prominently in the Glyndwr activities and parliamentary can- not affiliated to either Liberal archive, maintained now by didatures until after the Liberal Party. The Liberal National Hughes’s daughter, Edna. But National Organisation in Lon- Association affiliated to us and there is much material relating don was itself wound up in 1968, the Conservative Association. to the Liberal Nationals, which but the designation increasingly From these three Associations a is of particular value given the lacked meaning. Symbolically, in small working committee will absence of any central archive what was now only a passing ges- be formed to conduct the work relating to this party. The pres- ture to an all-but-defunct politi- of organising the constituency ence in the Glyndwr archive of cal tradition, Edna Hughes was and [this] will become the elec- an almost complete run of the persuaded to sign the nomina- tion committee.15 party’s pre-war house journal, tion papers of the Conservative the Liberal National Magazine, and National Liberal candidate Because of the outbreak of Euro- which is to be found in few other for the general election of 1966, pean war in September 1939, the locations, should also be noted. the last at which the joint label general election which would What is described is the process was used. have put Hughes’s strategy to the by which the Liberal National By the time Edna Hughes test never took place. In any case, party in Wrexham was swal- died, aged 88, in 1982, the family Hughes himself had succumbed lowed up by the Conservatives. archive filled most of Glyndwr to cancer, aged 76, on Christmas After 1945, the Liberal Nationals apart from the restricted living Eve, 1938. But it is hard to resist no longer had the institutional area which she still occupied. the conclusion that Liberalism as strength to maintain a partner- The preservation of the archive an independent political force in ship on equal terms with the had become the abiding concern Wrexham had been the victim Tories of the sort that Edward of her final years. From the point of his manoeuvres. While the Hughes had envisaged. Despite of view of the political historian, majority of the Wrexham and an initial success in persuading the Glyndwr archive stands as a East Denbighshire Liberal Asso- the Conservatives to give their remarkable monument to a right- ciation had declared its readi- support to a Liberal National leaning strand in British Liber- ness to follow Roberts into what candidate in the general elec- alism which has as yet received was, in all but name, a Liberal tion of 1945, institutional union insufficient scholarly attention.

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 25 the glyndŵr manuscripts

The Denbighshire Record 1 A. K. Matthias and W.A. Wil- Glyndwr MSS, DD/G/2511, 12 Glyndwr MSS, DD/G/2544, Office is housed in the Old liams, A Wrexham Collection Hughes to Williams, 26 April Hughes to Major Broadhurst, Gaol, 46 Clwyd Street, (Wrexham: Bridge Books, 1929. 28 Oct. 1936. Ruthin and is open for 1998), p. 4. 6 Ibid., Hughes to D.T. Salathiel, 13 Ibid., Hughes to G. Fitzhugh, 3 research from 10 a.m. to 4.45 2 R.S. Churchill, Winston S. 4 June 1929. April 1937. p.m., Mondays to Thursdays Churchill, (London: Hein- 7 Ibid., R. Thomas to Hughes, 2 14 Ibid., Lewis Edwards to and 10 a.m. to 4.15 p.m. on emann, 1969), vol. 2, compan- Nov. 1931. Hughes, 4 Oct. 1937. Fridays. Users will need to ion, part 2, p. 917. 8 Ibid., Hughes to R. Thomas, 15 Ibid., report of meeting of the be in possession of a County 3 Denbighshire Record Office, 29 Oct. 1931. Executive Committee of the Archive Research Network Glyndwr MSS, DD/G/2511, 9 Glyndwr MSS, DD/G/188, Wrexham Liberal Association, (CARN) ticket. Hughes to C.P. Williams, 27 Hughes to A. Roberts, 20 Nov. 24 Sept. 1937. April 1929. 1933 16 Glyndwr MSS, DD/G/2547, David Dutton is Professor of 4 See the discussion in D. Dut- 10 Glyndwr MSS, DD/G/2544, minutes of meeting of the Modern History at the Univer- ton, A History of the Liberal Hughes to Ffoulkes Roberts, Wrexham Liberal National sity of Liverpool. His latest book Party in the Twentieth Century 31 March 1937. Association, 4 May 1939. is Liberals in Schism: A His- (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 11 Glyndwr MSS, DD/G/184ii, 17 Glyndwr MSS, DD/G/2564, tory of the National Liberal 2004), pp. 76–78. Hughes to Henry Morris- Edna Hughes to Ensor Walters, Party (I. B. Tauris, 2008). 5 Denbighshire Record Office, Jones, 12 June 1936. 26 Nov. 1953. LETTERS

Ireland’s Liberal MPs I welcome Dr Waugh’s letter publication before I was 1981 was not 1,600 to 112. He was an active member ( Journal of Liberal History 59, born. I wondered whether Gruff Evans, chairing the of the Oxford University summer 2008) and interest any readers might have a debate, counted the votes Liberal Club and became in Irish Liberal MPs. James spare copy or two, or be against the Alliance and its President in the Hilary Wood fought the 1902 East able to put me in touch with then deducted that figure – term of 1960. He remained Down by-election on the someone who might be able 112 – from the total number on the Club committee for single issue of T. W. Rus- to help. of delegates! There were a year. At the same time sell’s campaign for land Contact details: 16 many abstentions, myself he was pursuing a political reform. However, the illu- Heatham Park, Twicken- included, whose pres- career in the Oxford Union, minated address presented ham, TW2 7SF; tel. 07946 ence would have reduced of which he was President to Wood by his supporters 421771; email york.mem- the quoted vote in favour in Hilary term, 1961. My in 1906 begins: ‘After your [email protected] significantly. papers do not reveal when contest at the late General York Membery Second, I left the negotia- he left the Liberal Party, but Election to remain Lib- tions on merger primarily my recollection is that it was eral Representative of East over the nonsense of the in that summer. Some of Down in the Imperial Par- Campbell as leader proposed party name, and us put it down to the influ- liament …’ I was moved by much of the diminution of the ‘Lib- ence of his uncle Michael, I suspect party labels, par- Ming Campbell’s autobi- eral’ presence, rather than who he much admired at the ticularly in Ireland, were not ography, and felt that your on the inclusion of NATO time, while the more cyni- as precise a century ago as interview with him (both in the new party’s preamble. cal said it was because he they are now. I am content in Journal of Liberal History Michael Meadowcroft wanted a seat in Parliament, to leave the description to 60, autumn 2008) answered and thought that this would his East Down supporters, some of the questions the be harder to achieve as a who seemed in little doubt book prompted. However, Liberal Foots Liberal! that he was their Liberal MP. there are two errors therein As a footnote to Profes- In view of his subsequent Berkley Farr that have got themselves into sor Morgan’s article on the membership of the Socialist the cuttings files and which, dynastic Liberalism of the Workers’ Party, it seems that for the historical record, Foot family ( Journal of Liberal the cynics were wrong. News Chronicle should be corrected. History 60, autumn 2008), it John R. Howe (President, I am trying to get hold of First, the vote at the is of interest that Paul Foot, Oxford University Liberal some copies of the News Llandudno Liberal Party too, had a brief Liberal phase Club, Trinity term 1961). Chronicle, which, alas, ceased Assembly in September when he was at university.

26 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 Liberal history quiz 2008 See page 19 for the questions; here we print the answers, and a commentary on what our respondents thought the answers were …

1. Menzies Campbell 13. Asquith, Grey and Haldane Far too easy, this one: everyone got it right! About half the respondents got this one right; most of the others correctly identified Asquith, but a fair few suspected 2. Eastbourne, David Bellotti 18 October 1990 Churchill and Lloyd George too. Almost as easy, though a few people put down by-elections 14. 14 in the 1980s, presumably thinking of the SDP. Almost no one got this one; answers varied between 9 and 3. Willis’s Rooms, St James, London 29. Fourteen was the number at the formal launch of the This one proved rather surprisingly difficult (‘London’ and SDP on 26 March 1981; it then climbed steadily for the next ‘UK’ were not allowed); quite a few put the Reform Club. two years, reaching 29 by the end of 1982. 4. Roy Jenkins 15. John Milton, in Areopagitica (1644) Another easy one; several people added the date (1979), and Most people knew their Milton – or, possibly, knew the even the title (‘Home thoughts from abroad’). association with the Liberal presidency – and several correctly identified the work as well. 5. John Pardoe 16. 1944 Almost everyone got this one right, but a couple thought it was Alan Beith (who Paddy Ashdown beat in 1988). Most got this right too, though a few said 1945 – when in fact Beveridge lost his seat. 6. Viscount Samuel (Leader, 1944–1955) 17. 54 years 266 days Most people got this one, but a couple thought it was Lloyd George; that would have been tricky, even for him, since he In fact no one gave this answer, possibly because we died in March 1945. might have got it wrong ourselves. Several respondents put 54 years (we gave them a half point), but there was a 7. 1962 (won by Eric Lubbock on 14 March 1962) wide spread of answers for the number of days. On further Most people got this right. investigation, it seems that our own answer may have been wrong (it wouldn’t have made any difference to the winner, 8. (a) 1906 (49.0 per cent); (b) 1951 (2.6 per cent) we hasten to add). Lloyd George fought his by-election in Surprisingly, the first date proved more difficult. Most Caernarvon Boroughs (thank you to the respondent who people got 1906, but 1929 was also suggested, and some, pointed out the correct name in 1890) on 10 April 1890, presumably thinking we meant only post-war elections, though the result was not announced until 11 April; he suggested 1974 or 1983. Almost everyone got 1951, though took his seat on 17 April. His peerage was announced on 1 other dates in the 1950s and ’60s were also suggested. January 1945, but he was too ill ever to sit in the Lords, and he died on 26 March. These three possible start dates and 9. We Can Conquer Unemployment two possible end dates gives answers of 54 years and 266, Responses were evenly split between the correct answer and 265, 259, 350, 349 or 343 days. Anyone who knows the real the ‘Yellow Book’ (Britain’s Industrial Future), the much longer answer should let us know! policy programme on which the manifesto was based. 18. W. E. Gladstone, of Lord Rosebery 10 Jo Grimond Almost no one got this right, though several suspected it Another fairly easy one, particularly for the respondent who was Gladstone who said it. In fact more thought Asquith claimed to have been there at the time. was one of the two, with views split between Gladstone of Asquith, Asquith of Lloyd George, and Lloyd George of 11. Paddy Ashdown (looking back, in an interview on 7 Asquith. September 1991, in The Independent) 19 Joseph Chamberlain Another easy one; almost everyone got it right. Another tricky one; more people said Gladstone than got 12. Earl Grey (seven daughters and ten sons) the correct answer. Much more difficult: only a handful got it right. One 20. John Stuart Mill, in On Liberty respondent said he thought Grey had sixteen children; in fact both the Encyclopaedia Britannica and Wikipedia think it was And a slightly easier one to end on: possibly thanks to the fifteen, while the figure of seventeen we used comes from profile we gave him in the ‘Great Liberal’ contest last year, the Dictionary of Liberal Biography, and includes one known most people got Mill, and one (the winner) identifiedOn illegitimate child. Whatever the number, though, there was no Liberty too. A fair number, however, thought it was probably chance of confusion with any other Whig PM! Gladstone.

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 27 ‘Asking too much and offering too little’? The Conservative–Liberal coalition talks of 1–4 March 1974

Recently released he general election as Argyll, were not announced held on 28 February until the Saturday4), ‘a tired and Cabinet papers have 1974 yielded a highly downcast fag-end of a Cabinet’5 provided new insights ambiguous and constitu- met to hear Edward Heath delin- into the March 1974 tionally intriguing result. eate the three options available TThe Conservative Party won to them. These were: to concede talks between Edward five fewer seats than the Labour defeat, and thereby advise the Party – 296 to 301 – yet polled Queen to invite Harold Wilson Heath and Jeremy 240,000 votes more. Meanwhile, (the Labour Party leader) to form Thorpe over a possible the Liberal Party won 14 seats a minority administration; to (8 more than in 1970), although consider whether the Conserva- Conservative–Liberal they had actually polled six mil- tives themselves could continue coalition government. lion votes, thereby starkly illus- as a minority government, in the trating the iniquity of Britain’s hope that the party could secure Peter Dorey re- voting system. With neither overall parliamentary support for examines these talks, Labour nor the Conservatives a policy programme to tackle having secured an overall par- Britain’s urgent economic situa- and notes that their liamentary majority, Edward tion; and, finally, to seek support failure went much Heath was faced with the choice from the smaller parties for a pro- of either immediately conceding gramme which would address deeper and wider than defeat, and thus tendering his these immediate problems. resignation forthwith, or seek- The Conservatives were natu- the disagreement over ing a deal with one or more of rally reluctant to concede defeat electoral reform. They the smaller parties. Heath pur- immediately, partly because they sued the latter option, observing had actually polled nearly a quar- were always hampered that as neither of the two main ter of a million more votes than by a lack of support parties had secured an overall Labour, but also because minis- majority ‘My responsibility as ters were anxious that if Labour among MPs and Prime Minister at the time was formed a government and sub- grassroots members of to see whether I could form an sequently accrued the economic administration with a majority’.1 benefits of North Sea oil (which both parties, convinced He thereby heralded what one was just about to flow fully ‘on that the other was minister subsequently described stream’), then the ensuing eco- as ‘two days [of ] rather unseemly nomic upturn would rebound ‘asking too much and bargaining’,2 at the end of which to Labour’s political advantage offering too little’ in the Conservatives ‘were begin- in the next general election.6 Yet ning to give the impression that ministers also appreciated that return. Even if the we were bad losers.’3 the second option – attempting to continue in office as a minor- talks had succeeded, ity government and relying on the two leaders would I general parliamentary support At the end of Friday afternoon (1 for its policies – would not only have encountered a March), by which time the par- entail too much instability and lack of support from liamentary situation arising from uncertainty, but it would also the election result had become ‘not be honourable’ and would their parliamentary Jeremy Thorpe arrives at 10 much more apparent (although create a clear and damaging colleagues. Downing Street, the results in one or two remote impression beyond Westmin- 2 March 1974 Scottish constituencies, such ster that the Conservatives were

28 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 ‘Asking too much and offering too little’? The Conservative–Liberal coalition talks of 1–4 March 1974

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 29 ‘asking too much and offering too little’?

‘hanging on to office at all costs speech in Perth in 1968, Heath Having ministerial posts offered to other despite defeat at the election’, had expressed his support for a senior Liberals.10 in which case the party risked directly elected Scottish Assem- rejected the The Cabinet generally agreed being seriously ‘discredited’.7 bly, although there was little options of that the third option, ‘the forma- Having vowed not to relin- enthusiasm for such an institu- tion of a right-centre coalition’, quish political office immedi- tion amongst his parliamentary a political was the most attractive and feasi- ately, however, Heath and his colleagues – devolution ‘had ble of the three, not least because ministerial colleagues ruled out always sat lightly on the shoul- partnership the combined 17,900,000 votes a political alliance with either ders of Conservative MPs’.9 Fur- won by the Conservatives and the Ulster Unionists or the Scot- thermore, when the Kilbrandon with either the Liberals, compared to the tish National Party (SNP). Report was published in 1973, the Ulster 11,700,000 polled by the Labour Although the (Official) Ulster Heath’s own response was rather Party, was interpreted as evi- Unionists had returned 9 MPs more circumspect than might Unionists dence of ‘a large anti-Socialist (there were also two additional have been expected given his majority’ in Britain. Certainly, Unionist MPs not linked to the Perth speech. In contrast, it or the SNP, one or two senior figures were Ulster Unionist Party, and who had become apparent that the favourably disposed towards were therefore discounted in this SNP wanted a Scottish Assem- Heath – with this option almost solely on the context), most of whom ordinar- bly established immediately, the full grounds that ‘a coalition with ily took the Conservative whip and imbued with greater pow- the Liberals would keep the in the House of Commons, many ers than those proposed by the endorsement Labour Party out’,11 while other of them had, in this election, Kilbrandon Report, including a senior Conservatives acknowl- stood on an ‘anti-Sunningdale’ degree of ‘fiscal autonomy’. Such of his Cabinet edged that the Liberal Party platform, explicitly opposing the a stance thus effectively ruled supported two of the key poli- power-sharing Executive and out a deal between the Heath colleagues – cies in the Conservative mani- Assembly established in North- Government and the SNP. turned to the festo, namely the continuation ern Ireland by the Heath gov- of a statutory incomes policy (as ernment the previous year. In Liberal Party a vital means of curbing infla- so doing, they had made it clear II tion) which would eventually be that they would continue to Having rejected the options in an increas- replaced by a voluntary incomes oppose Heath’s current policies of a political partnership with policy, and British membership concerning Northern Ireland, either the Ulster Unionists or ingly desper- of the (then) European Eco- even though they would prob- the SNP, Heath – with the full ate attempt nomic Community (EEC).12 ably support him on most other endorsement of his Cabinet col- A Conservative–Liberal coali- issues. Consequently, Heath leagues – turned to the Liberal to remain in tion formed on this basis, min- adjudged the UUP to be ‘unreli- Party in an increasingly desper- isters agreed, could thus serve able’ potential allies, and thereby ate attempt to remain in office. It office. ‘to unite the moderates in the ruled out a deal with them. was reckoned that three options country.’13 Moreover, Heath At the same time, a deal with were available to the Cabi- himself noted that the Con- the SNP – which had achieved net. The first was to secure an servative Party and the Liberals the election of 7 MPs – was ruled undertaking by the Liberals to together had obtained 57 per out after informal talks between provide parliamentary support cent of votes cast, which under Conservative MP Teddy Taylor’s for ‘any policies and measures a system of proportional repre- agent (who had been a member introduced by a Conservative sentation would have secured a of the SNP prior to joining the administration which seemed to clear majority of parliamentary Conservatives) and Bill Lind- them right and justifiable in the seats.14 This observation proved say, Vice President of the SNP. national interest’, while remain- rather ironic, given that Heath Taylor informed Heath that the ing free to oppose other policies. and his ministerial colleagues SNP seemed amenable to a deal Secondly, the Conservatives subsequently refused to accede whereby they would support could seek a parliamentary pact to the Liberals’ insistence on a the Heath government in any whereby the Liberals would clear commitment to electoral parliamentary confidence votes provide parliamentary support reform, thereby precipitating the in return for the creation of a for a package of polices over breakdown of the inter-party Scottish Assembly.8 After all, the which they had been consulted, talks, and thus the resignation of previous year had witnessed the and which would constitute the the Heath government. publication of the Kilbrandon basis of the government’s legis- Report, which recommended lative programme for the next devolution for Scotland (and session. The third option would III Wales), albeit with divergent be to form a coalition govern- Having discussed these options views over the actual form that ment, with a Cabinet post for with his Cabinet colleagues, this might take. Moreover, in a Jeremy Thorpe, and one or two and obtained their approval

30 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 ‘asking too much and offering too little’?

for approaching the Liberals, he be appointed Home Secretary agreement with the Liberals, to Edward Heath invited Jeremy in a coalition Cabinet. Moreover, which Heath retorted that both Thorpe, the Liberal leader, to 10 Thorpe claimed that he subse- sides would probably need ‘to Downing Street from his Barn- quently learned ‘from a reliable agree to postpone a number of staple constituency in Devon, source’ that Heath envisaged policies and measures which they where the latter had been cele- offering him a ministerial post would have thought desirable in brating the Liberals’ remarkable in the Foreign Office, with spe- other circumstances’, although 19 per cent share of the national cific responsibility for Europe.18 these would probably be polices vote. Although hindsight sug- In response to Heath’s deline- of lower priority compared to gests that it was entirely under- ation of the three options (and his those necessary to tackle the standable that the Conservatives expressed preference for the third, short-term economic situation. should seek a political deal with namely a coalition), Thorpe To this end, Heath informed the Liberals, at the time the invi- began by asking whether Heath Thorpe, on a highly confiden- tation by Heath was an initia- had contemplated a ‘Grand Alli- tial Privy Councillor basis, of tive that the Liberal Party ‘was In this ance’ of all three main parlia- some of the economic measures totally unprepared for’.15 first round mentary parties (Conservative, under consideration, including When Thorpe arrived at Labour and Liberal), with a view an approach to the International Downing Street on Saturday of talks to forming a National Unity Monetary Fund. afternoon, an 80-minute meet- government to tackle the grave In this first round of talks ing ensued (at which the only between economic situation facing the between Heath and Thorpe, other person present was Heath’s country. Heath swiftly rejected the crucial (for the Liberals) Private Secretary, Robert Arm- Heath and the idea, pointing out that, apart issue of electoral reform did not strong), which Heath opened Thorpe, the from any other considerations, prove to be a major stumbling by delineating the three broad such a move would split the block, for although the Liberal options available to them: ‘a crucial (for Labour Party (as it had done in leader naturally raised it, and loose arrangement’ whereby the 1931), and whilst many Conserva- received an equally predict- Liberals ‘could pick and choose the Liberals) tives might relish such a prospect, able non-committal response which governmental measures Heath was sure that the Labour from his Conservative coun- they supported’; full consulta- issue of elec- leader, Harold Wilson, would terpart, Thorpe acknowledged tion over the contents of the toral reform ‘wish at all costs to avoid the role that ‘electoral reform was of Queen’s Speech, which the Lib- and fate of Ramsay Macdonald’. less immediate priority than the erals would then support; and a did not prove Moreover, the Labour Party had economic situation and dealing coalition government, in which already issued a statement ruling with inflation’.19 This first meet- Thorpe himself would be offered to be a major out any deals with other par- ing concluded with both leaders a Cabinet seat (although the pre- ties, including the formation of agreeing to report back to, and cise post was not specified at this stumbling a coalition government. Clearly, undertake consultations with, juncture). Heath then intimated block, for Heath explained, this meant their senior colleagues pending to Thorpe that his (and the that a Conservative–Liberal another meeting the following Cabinet’s) preference was for the although parliamentary pact or coalition day over Sunday lunch. third of these options.16 government remained the most It is worth noting here that the Liberal viable and attractive option. the offer of a Cabinet seat to For his part, Thorpe remained IV Thorpe subsequently gave rise leader relatively guarded, emphasising It was during that Sunday, 3 to rather divergent accounts by naturally the natural need to consult his March, however, that the diffi- the two party leaders. Heath senior colleagues before offer- culties materialised which were claimed that Thorpe intimated raised it, and ing a response, but in lieu of such ultimately to contribute to the ‘a strong preference for the post consultation, Thorpe sought eventual collapse of the coali- of Home Secretary’, although received an Heath’s views on various other tion talks between Heath and Heath himself maintained that issues prominent at that particu- Thorpe. Thorpe consulted three ‘I made no such offer to him’, equally pre- lar juncture, most notably the of his most senior colleagues – particularly as the Cabinet Sec- dictable non- government’s stance on a pay his predecessor, Jo Grimond, retary had warned Heath, prior deal for the miners, which was David Steel (the Liberals’ chief to the meeting, that ‘there were committal expected to be recommended whip), and Lord Byers (the Liber- matters in Thorpe’s private life, by the Pay Board in a few days’ als’ leader in the House of Lords) as yet undisclosed to the public, response time, and the fate of the Indus- – over Sunday lunch, although which might make this a highly trial Relations Act. He also asked many other Liberals, both inside unsuitable position for him to from his Heath what ‘dramatic changes’ and outside Parliament, were hold.’17 Yet Thorpe maintained Conservative he envisaged making to the Con- considerably uneasy, fearing ‘that that he neither demanded nor servative Party’s programme in some deal was being concocted’. indicated any expectation that counterpart. order to accommodate a political In fact, the four senior Liberals

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 31 ‘asking too much and offering too little’?

affecting the putative coalition Woodrow Wyatt, who advised talks concerned the issue of elec- that if a deal with the Liberals toral reform, which most Liber- did not materialise, he should als deemed to be non-negotiable, seek a short-term coalition with and thus the prerequisite of any the Labour Party, his reason- parliamentary pact or coalition ing being that if Labour refused, with the Conservatives. Given ‘they will look very bad’, whereas that Heath had already alluded if they accepted, they would to the lower priority which this have to share responsibility for issue should enjoy in the (eco- the necessary austerity measures. nomic) circumstances – quite Either way, Wyatt advised Heath, apart from the Conservatives’ ‘you would look very good and own lack of enthusiasm for it – come out of it very well’.24 the insistence of other Liberals When Thorpe subsequently on the primacy of this issue was phoned Heath himself early bound to prove problematic. on Sunday evening, the Lib- However, it transpired that eral leader made no allusion to Thorpe had encountered an having already spoken to Nigel even more immediate and Fisher earlier in the day, but did ‘rather embarrassing’ problem report to Heath – ‘it is no good with his parliamentary col- beating about the bush’ – the leagues, namely their unwilling- concerns of other Liberal MPs ness to serve under or support a about the Conservative lead- Conservative administration led ership. Nonetheless, Thorpe by Heath himself. This prob- expressed his confidence that lem was initially reported to this particular issue as not ‘insu- Heath indirectly, following a perable … I can handle my party telephone call to Robert Arm- on that issue’. What was likely strong (Heath’s Private Secre- to prove more problematic, tary) from Conservative MP Thorpe warned, was the issue Nigel Fisher, who had himself of electoral reform, for this was been telephoned by Thorpe (the the issue that his colleagues ‘feel two of them were close friends, somewhat hard about’, to the in spite of their political differ- extent that there would need ences). Thorpe was at pains to to be some concrete proposals emphasise that this was certainly ‘before there could be talk about not a view which he personally an agreed package of economic shared, for although he acknowl- proposals’. If something could edged that he was ‘not very close be agreed concerning electoral to Ted’, he considered him to be reform before the end of the were agreeing at the time that Edward Heath ‘by far the most able man’ to lead year (1974), Thorpe suggested, the terms offered by Heath were and Jeremy the country at that moment, and then the Liberals might feel able inadequate as the basis for Lib- Thorpe as such, Thorpe himself would and willing to move beyond eral entry into a coalition gov- have been perfectly happy to offering ‘general support from ernment with the Conservatives, serve under him.21 Nonetheless, the Opposition bench to actual particularly as there was no firm many of his Liberal colleagues coalition’, whereas entering a commitment to introducing ‘had many grave reservations coalition under the existing vot- electoral reform.20 Yet in jump- about him [Heath] leading a coa- ing system would be viewed by ing to the wrong conclusions lition, partly because they had many Liberals as ‘simply putting over Thorpe’s ‘elite-level’ dis- been highly critical of Heath’s their heads under a chopper’. cussions, it may be that Liberal “handling of the miners” dispute The issue of electoral reform MPs were henceforth inclined to before the election’,22 but also subsequently yielded somewhat view almost any subsequent pro- because while it was difficult to divergent accounts of these talks, posals with unwarranted scep- discern who had actually won for according to Heath’s account ticism, thereby making it even the election, ‘we did know who of their first meeting, Thorpe harder for Thorpe to secure an had lost it.’23 ‘raised the subject of propor- agreement with either his own Incidentally, Heath might tional representation’, and when party or with Heath. have taken some comfort from Heath had a subsequent meeting Beyond this potential prob- another telephone call, this with his Cabinet colleagues, it lem, the first main difficulty time from former Labour MP, was ‘with particular reference

32 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 ‘asking too much and offering too little’?

to proportional representation.’25 Liberal colleagues appeared to be given legislative effect by his Margaret Thatcher too refers be proving somewhat intransi- Cabinet colleagues. Moreover, explicitly to the Liberals’ insist- gent on this issue (the implica- he pointed out, electoral reform ence on proportional representa- tion being that Thorpe himself had always been a matter for tion, hence her claim (see below) would much more readily have the House of Commons itself, that to accede to their demand reached an agreement with expressing its view by means of would have meant that the Con- Heath), acknowledging that a free vote. servatives would never form a ‘this is obviously hell – a night- Needless to say, Heath’s posi- majority government again.26 mare on stilts for you’.28 Cer- tion was effectively matched by For his part, however, Thorpe tainly Thorpe recalled that ‘I Thorpe’s stance on behalf of the insists that: ‘The term propor- don’t think I left him [Heath] Liberal Party, namely that there tional representation was never very sanguine about the chance could be no coalition or parlia- used’ when he sought a com- of success’ when leaving to con- mentary agreement between mitment from Heath that a coa- sult the Parliamentary Liberal the two parties without a firmer lition Cabinet would introduce Party.29 commitment from the Cabinet electoral reform.27 Following these consulta- Thorpe was with regard to electoral reform. In fact, Thorpe did use the tions during the Sunday evening, Thorpe reiterated that the Lib- term ‘proportional representa- Heath and Thorpe held another convinced eral Party would see little dif- tion’, but explicitly with regard meeting at 10.30pm to discuss ference between a minority to electoral reform for borough the respective outcomes. That that ‘unless Conservative government and a council elections, while recom- there was little progress on their Labour government, and would, mending the alternative vote for earlier discussions was indicated the Cabinet therefore, not be inclined to rural (shire) elections. There was, by the fact that this meeting only took a col- do a deal with either of them.30 however, no specific recommen- lasted for thirty minutes. Heath Thorpe was convinced that dation from Thorpe as to what explained that his senior col- lective view ‘unless the Cabinet took a col- type of electoral system should leagues had become even more lective view in favour of reform be adopted for general elections. convinced over the weekend in favour of and made it a vote of confidence The important point at this that nothing less than a coalition in the government, no reform stage, Thorpe emphasised, was with the Liberals would suffice reform and would have any chance of going for Heath to pledge the estab- in order to provide the country made it a through Parliament whilst the lishment of a Speaker’s Con- with the degree of political sta- Conservative Party continued ference on electoral reform, to bility that the economic situa- vote of confi- to favour the present first-past- report before the end of the year, tion warranted. An agreement the-post system.’31 This meeting whereupon its recommendations by the Liberals merely to sup- dence in the therefore ended with no clear (if acceptable to the Liberals, of port the government from the decision one way or another, course) would be enacted in the opposition bench in the House government, beyond Heath and Thorpe following parliamentary session. of Commons would not be suf- no reform agreeing to conduct further If this course of action could be ficient. Furthermore, Heath consultations with their respec- undertaken, then the Liberals insisted that if the Conservatives would have tive senior colleagues the next would subsequently be willing were to remain in office at this (Monday) morning. It was evi- to countenance the transition juncture, it would be under his any chance dent, however, that a ‘deal’ was from parliamentary support for continued leadership, which, he looking increasingly unlikely. the Conservative government to emphasised, was supported by of going This was confirmed the fol- participation in it through join- his senior colleagues. through lowing morning, when Heath ing a coalition. Without such a With regard to the Liber- and Thorpe reaffirmed that their course of action, however, most als’ demand that a Speaker’s Parliament – or, rather, their senior colleagues’ Liberal MPs would almost cer- Conference on electoral reform – positions had not subsequently tainly conclude that from their be established, with its recom- whilst the altered. Following a Cabinet perspective, ‘the difference mendations being implemented meeting at 10.00am, Heath wrote between a minority Labour and in the following parliamentary Conservative to Thorpe to reiterate the Con- a minority Conservative gov- session, Heath reported that Party contin- servatives’ view that nothing less ernment are matters which are while there was little objection than the participation of the Lib- outside their control’. to such a conference in prin- ued to favour erals in government (i.e., a coali- Thus it was that this second ciple, he could not guarantee tion) could provide the requisite round of talks was brought to an that its findings would prove the present political stability, but at the same end, in order that Thorpe and acceptable to the Parliamen- time, the Cabinet could only Heath could conduct further tary Conservative Party and as first-past- offer a Speaker’s Conference on consultations with their senior such, could not promise that the-post electoral reform, whose recom- colleagues. Thorpe did apolo- whatever was recommended by mendations would then be sub- gise to Heath for the fact that his a Speaker’s Conference would system’. ject to a free vote in Parliament.32

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 33 ‘asking too much and offering too little’?

In reply, Thorpe insisted that this the bulk of the Conservative That the controversial remark I made was an inadequate basis for coop- Party was opposed to such a deal, at the time.’ Whitelaw subse- eration between the Liberals and especially if it might eventually coalition quently maintained, however, the Conservatives. He did sug- lead to the adoption of propor- talks failed that his televised comments gest, however, that in view of the tional representation.35 This had were a genuine reflection of his urgency of the economic prob- been confirmed at the Mon- to yield a views on the political situation at lems facing the country at the day morning Cabinet meeting, that time, and that the failure of time, ‘a Government of national when it had also been noted that Conserva- the coalition talks ‘was the cor- unity’ should be formed, com- many Conservatives were con- rect outcome’ constitutionally, prising members from all of the vinced that the Liberals were tive–Liberal even though it heralded ‘a weak main parliamentary parties.33 The ‘asking too much and offering administra- minority Labour government’.38 latter option was firmly rejected too little’.36 Heath was evidently forgiving of by Heath (the Cabinet had, ear- Similarly, Margaret Thatch- tion was not Whitelaw’s indiscretion, because lier that morning, acknowledged er’s ‘own instinctive feeling was he nonetheless invited him to that the time might come when that the party with the largest solely due join ministerial colleagues in a national unity government number of seats in the House London to discuss their options would become necessary, but not of Commons was justified in to disagree- that weekend, but Whitelaw just yet), who cited a statement by expecting that they would be ments over was not well enough to under- the Labour Part y that it would not called to try to form a new gov- take the long journey from his be willing to enter into any such ernment’, and whilst she obvi- the issue of Penrith & Border constituency. coalition. The only option now, ously deeply disliked the notion Also believing that it was ‘just Heath explained, was to tender of the Labour Party benefiting electoral as well’ that the coalition talks his resignation forthwith.34 from the Tories’ travails, this failed was Peter Carrington, was probably preferable to a reform, who later acknowledged that the Conservative–Liberal coalition vitally impor- electorate would not ‘have taken V from which the Liberals secured kindly to the two minority par- That the coalition talks failed the prize of electoral reform – tant though ties (in the immediate past being to yield a Conservative–Liberal in which case the Conservative most abusive about each other) administration was not solely Party would never form a major- this was, of making common cause to form due to disagreements over the ity government again. 37 a Government and to exclude issue of electoral reform, vitally Meanwhile, one of Heath’s course. the majority party, however ten- important though this was, of closest colleagues at the uous the majority was.’39 course. What also undermined time, William Whitelaw, had Such comments, particularly Heath’s attempts at crafting a appeared on television on the as they emanated from senior coalition with the Liberals was Friday morning immediately figures spanning the ideologi- the antipathy towards such a following polling day to com- cal strands in the Conservative venture which existed amongst ment on the election results, Party at that time, suggest that senior figures in both parties, an declaring that ‘if Labour seemed even if Heath had managed opposition which was undoubt- to have won most seats, then to secure a commitment from edly often closely linked to pol- they had … effectively won Thorpe to enter a coalition, icy disagreements, but which the election’, which meant that many Conservatives themselves also derived from unease at the ‘any effort in 1974 by the Con- would have been antipathetic. clear impression of short-term servatives and Liberals to form Certainly, the parliamentary opportunism which such a a coalition together against majority that would have been coalition would engender, and Labour would have been very attained by a Conservative– which might ultimately damage unpopular and thus doomed to Liberal coalition would still the credibility and popularity of early failure’. Whitelaw subse- have been extremely narrow, both parties at the next general quently accounted for this some- and thus highly susceptible to election, to the Labour Party’s what injudicious assertion by ‘cross-voting’ or abstentions by electoral advantage. claiming that he had felt unwell even a handful of disgruntled Within the Conservative earlier that morning, and that MPs in either party. The ensu- Party, Norman Tebbit recalls whilst he had felt able to pro- ing image of weakness and lack that his surprise at Heath’s ceed with the television inter- of authority would probably refusal immediately to accept view, the medicine he took to have done lasting damage to the that he had lost, and resign alleviate his feverish symptoms Conservative Party’s reputation accordingly, ‘turned to real ‘completely dulled my memory for statecraft and strong govern- anger’ when it became evident and my senses’, to the extent ment, an important considera- that ‘he was seeking Liberal sup- that ‘I had absolutely no subse- tion which doubtless led many port for a coalition government.’ quent recollection of my inter- Conservatives to conclude that Moreover, Tebbit was sure that view … nor of the somewhat in the short term, allowing a

34 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 ‘asking too much and offering too little’?

minority Labour government to propping up the Heath govern- still have been in a minority be formed was the lesser of two ment, and thereby destroying unless support was offered by evils (although as noted above, the significant progress achieved the SNP’s 7 MPs, and as such, there was also some concern that by the Liberals in February 1974. the putative coalition ‘would a Labour administration might Indeed, this consideration was have been strangled at birth.’ For subsequently benefit from North particularly pertinent given that all of these reasons, therefore, Sea oil revenues). much of the Liberal Party’s elec- Grimond observed that: ‘The Furthermore, there was con- toral success in February 1974 Liberal Party at that time were siderable antipathy in the Parlia- had accrued from erstwhile hostile to any arrangement with mentary Conservative Party to Conservative voters defecting to the Tories’, one which, in any pursuing a political alliance with the Liberals, to the extent that in case, ‘could not have got over a Liberal Party which ‘had been many constituencies, the Con- the first hurdle of a vote of con- the main beneficiary, if not the servatives, rather than Labour, fidence’ in Parliament ‘unless cause, of the Government’s loss were the Liberals’ main rivals. extra support could have been of support’, and as such, many In this context, more prescient drummed up from the minor- Conservatives were strongly Liberals adjudged that enter- ity parties.’41 Similarly, accord- inclined to ‘leave the Liberal ing a coalition with the Con- ing to a Conservative participant Party alone’, while anticipating servatives would appear to many in the ministerial discussions that much of its increased sup- voters to be highly opportun- that ‘dreadful’ weekend, two port would dissipate in the next istic, thereby undermining the other prominent Liberal MPs, election, whereupon many of Liberal Party’s perennial claim David Steel and Cyril Smith, those who had voted Liberal in to offer a new kind of politics were not interested in any coa- February 1974 would ‘return’ to which transcended the oppor- lition with the Tories. Indeed, the Conservatives, suitably chas- tunism, partisan self-interest it is suggested that had Jeremy tened by their folly.40 and ‘short-termism’ which the Thorpe agreed to enter a coali- Liberals attributed to the Labour tion with the Conservatives, ‘his and Conservative Parties. It was Parliamentary Party would have VI also considered that the almost split.’42 Certainly, David Steel One might have expected rather inevitable failure of a fragile recalls that when Thorpe met more enthusiasm from the Lib- Conservative–Liberal coalition his parliamentary colleagues erals for a Conservative–Lib- would cause immense harm to on Monday 4 March, in lieu eral coalition, for participation A further the Liberal Party’s own cred- of making a final decision over in such a government would ibility and longer-term political Heath’s invitation to form a coa- ostensibly have raised the Lib- reason for prospects. lition, ‘it became clear that the eral Party’s profile and enhanced Certainly, with the Con- almost universal view was that their credibility after decades Liberal servative and Labour parties’ we should not go into a Heath of electoral decline and parlia- reluctance to combined share of the vote in government’. 43 Moreover, just as mentary marginalisation. How- February 1974 having fallen to Conservative opponents of a deal ever, the Liberals’ antipathy make a deal 75 per cent (this heralding a new felt that the Liberals were ask- went wider and deeper than the era of partisan dealignment in ing too much and offering too obvious disagreements with the with the Con- British politics), and the Liberal little, so did many Liberals feel Conservative leadership over Party having correspondingly that by asking them to entering electoral reform (or, rather, the servatives, increased its share to 19 per cent, a coalition while offering only a absence of it), and disapproval particularly many Liberals were of the view Speaker’s Conference and a par- of Heath’s refusal to resign the that their party’s future electoral liamentary free vote on electoral Conservative leadership, having in the form prospects would best be served reform, it was the Conservatives failed to win the election. Cer- by not aligning themselves with who were asking too much and tainly, many, if not most, Liberal of a coali- either of the main parties, but by offering too little. MPs were generally hostile to maintaining their independence A further reason for Liberal such a partnership in the politi- tion, was and ‘equidistance’, and thus their reluctance to make a deal with cal circumstances pertaining the fear that integrity. This, it was envisaged, the Conservatives, particularly at the time, this hostility being would leave the Liberal Party in the form of a coalition, was underpinned by a concomi- ‘they would, well placed to attract further the fear that ‘they would, sooner tant calculation that a coalition support from the growing num- or later, be swallowed up’.44 would be unsustainable in prac- sooner or bers of disillusioned, dealigned There was undoubtedly a sus- tice – in which case, another voters in subsequent elections. picion that this was one of the general election would prob- later, be Besides, as Jeremy Thorpe’s reasons why senior Conserva- ably have to be called, where- swallowed predecessor as Liberal leader, Jo tives were apparently so keen upon the Liberal Party was likely Grimond, observed, a Conserv- to persuade the Liberals to join to be ‘punished’ by voters for up’. ative–Liberal coalition would a coalition. Such scepticism

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 35 ‘asking too much and offering too little’?

and antipathy towards doing Even if 1 Quoted in David Butler and Den- ‘Note for the Record: Minutes of a deal with the Conservatives nis Kavanagh, The British General meeting between Edward Heath was certainly not confined to Heath and Election of February 1974 (London: and Jeremy Thorpe, held on 2 Liberal MPs, for it was subse- Thorpe had Macmillan, 1974), p. 253. March 1974’, 3 March 1974. quently alleged that ‘Liberal 2 Geoffrey Howe, Conflict of Loyalty 20 Steel, A House Divided, pp. 14–15. activists were … up in arms at succeeded (London: Macmillan, 1994), p. 81. 21 National Archives, PREM 15/2069, the suggestion that the party … 3 James Prior, A Balance of Power Robert Armstrong, ‘Note of Tele- might lend itself to propping up in agreeing (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986), phone Conversation with Nigel a defeated Tory government.’45 p. 95. Fisher’, 3 March 1974. Indeed, it has been suggested the basis of 4 Butler and Kavanagh, The British 22 Most Liberals were also critical of that if Thorpe had agreed to a coalition, General Election of February 1974, p. the militancy of the NUM in its form a coalition with Heath’s 258. pursuit of the strike, but there was Conservatives – ‘For himself, they would 5 Margaret Thatcher, The Path to nonetheless considerable sympathy he would have loved to have Power (London: HarperCollins, in the party with the miners’ case been able to accept’46 – it would almost cer- 1995), p. 238. per se. almost certainly have prompted 6 National Archives CAB 128/53, 23 Thorpe, In My Own Time, p. 115. ‘a far-reaching split in the Liberal tainly have CM (74) 9th conclusions, 1 March 24 National Archives, PREM 15/2069, Party’, for the ‘radical anti-Tory encountered 1974. ‘Record of Telephone message from mood in the Party was strong’, as 7 National Archives, PREM 16/231, Woodrow Wyatt to Edward Heath’, articulated in the communica- a distinct and Robert Armstrong [Heath’s Private 3 March 1974. tions submitted to Liberal head- Secretary] ‘Note for the Record: 25 Heath, The Course of My Life, p. quarters in London throughout damaging Events Leading to the Resignation 518. the weekend.47 of Mr. Heath’s Administration on 4 26 Thatcher, The Path to Power, p. 239. It is evident, therefore, that lack of sup- March 1974’, 16 March 1974. 27 Thorpe, In My Own Time, p. 115. while the Conservative Party’s port from 8 National Archives, PREM 15/2069, 28 National Archives, PREM 15/2069, refusal to offer a firm commit- ‘F.E.R.B to Heath’, 2 March 1974. ‘Transcript of Telephone Conversa- ment to introducing electoral their respec- 9 Vernon Bogdanor, ‘Devolution’ in tion between Edward Heath and reform is the most obvious and Zig Layton-Henry (ed.), Conserva- Jeremy Thorpe’, 3 March 1974. well-publicised reason for the tive parlia- tive Politics (London: Macmillan, 29 Thorpe, In My Own Time, p. 115. eventual breakdown of the 1980), p. 88. 30 Of course, three years later, the Conservative–Liberal coalition mentary 10 National Archives, PREM 15/2069, Liberal Party did do a deal with talks during the first four days colleagues. ‘Points for Talk with Mr. Thorpe’, 2 a minority Labour government, of March 1974, these talks were March 1974; ‘Note for the Record: when it joined the Lib-Lab Pact. always hampered by a lack of sup- Minutes of meeting between 31 Thorpe, In My Own Time, p. 116. port among the MPs and grass- Edward Heath and Jeremy Thorpe, 32 National Archives, PREM 15/2069, roots members of both parties. held on 2 March 1974’, 3 March Heath to Thorpe, 4 March 1974 Heath and Thorpe conducted 1974. (morning). their negotiations, increasingly 11 Norman St John-Stevas, The Two 33 National Archives, PREM 15/2069, cognizant of the fact that many Cities (Faber, 1984), p. 71. Thorpe to Heath, 4 March 1974. of their Conservative and Liberal 12 National Archives CAB 128/53, 34 National Archives, PREM 15/2069, colleagues on the backbenches CM (74) 9th conclusions, 1 March Heath to Thorpe, 4 March 1974 were unenthusiastic about, or 1974, Jeremy Thorpe, In My Own (afternoon). See also CAB 128/53, even hostile to, any deal between Time: Reminiscences of a Liberal Leader CM (74) 11th conclusions, 4 March them, and with MPs in both par- (London, Politico’s, 1999), p. 114. 1974. ties convinced that the other was 13 National Archives CAB 128/53, 35 Norman Tebbit, Upwardly Mobile ‘asking too much and offering too CM (74) 9th conclusions, 1 March (London: Weidenfeld and Nicol- little’ in return. As such, even if 1974. son), 1988, p. 134. Heath and Thorpe had succeeded 14 Edward Heath, The Course of My 36 National Archives, CAB 128/53, in agreeing the basis of a coali- Life: My Autobiography (London: CM (74) 10th conclusions, 4 March tion, they would almost certainly Hodder and Stoughton, 1998), p. 1974. have encountered a distinct and 519. 37 Thatcher, The Path to Power, p. 239. damaging lack of support from 15 David Steel, A House Divided: The 38 William Whitelaw, The Whitelaw their respective parliamentary Lib-Lab Pact and the Future of British Memoirs (London: Aurum, 1989), colleagues. Politics (London: Weidenfeld and pp. 133–34, 135. Nicolson, 1980), p. 14. 39 Lord (Peter) Carrington, Reflect Peter Dorey is Reader in British 16 Heath, The Course of My Life, p. on Things Past: The Memoirs of Lord Politics at Cardiff University, and is 518. Carrington (London: Collins, 1988), the author of numerous books, arti- 17 Ibid. p. 266. cles and chapters on the three main 18 Thorpe, In My Own Time, p. 115. 40 National Archives, PREM 16/231, British political parties. 19 National Archives, PREM 15/2069 Robert Armstrong, ‘Note for the

36 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 ‘asking too much and offering too little’?

Record: Events Leading to 42 Prior, A Balance of Power, p. 95. Mr. Heath’s Administration on 47 Butler and Kavanagh, The Brit- the Resignation of Mr Heath’s 43 Steel, A House Divided, p. 14. 4 March 1974’, 16 March 1974. ish General Election of February Administration on 4 March 44 National Archives, PREM 45 John Campbell, Edward Heath: 1974, p. 258. 1974’, 16 March 1974. 16/231, Robert Armstrong, A Biography (London: Jonathan 41 Jo Grimond, Memoirs (London: ‘Note for the Record: Events Cape, 1993), pp. 616–17. Heinemann, 1979), p. 232–33. Leading to the Resignation of 46 Ibid, p. 616.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS If you can help any of the individuals listed below with sources, contacts, or any other information — or if you know anyone who can — please pass on details to them. Details of other research projects in progress should be sent to the Editor (see page 3) for inclusion here.

Letters of Richard Cobden (1804–65). Knowledge of the whereabouts Recruitment of Liberals into the Conservative Party, 1906–1935. of any letters written by Cobden in private hands, autograph collections, Aims to suggest reasons for defections of individuals and develop an and obscure locations in the UK and abroad for a complete edition of understanding of changes in electoral alignment. Sources include his letters. (For further details of the Cobden Letters Project, please see personal papers and newspapers; suggestions about how to get hold of www.uea.ac.uk/his/research/projects/cobden). Dr Anthony Howe, School the papers of more obscure Liberal defectors welcome. Cllr Nick Cott, 1a of History, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ; [email protected]. Henry Street, Gosforth, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, NE3 1DQ; [email protected]. Cornish Methodism and Cornish political identity, 1918–1960s. Liberal Unionists. A study of the Liberal Unionist party as a discrete Researching the relationship through oral history. Kayleigh Milden, political entity. Help with identifying party records before 1903 Institute of Cornish Studies, Hayne Corfe Centre, Sunningdale, Truro TR1 3ND; particularly welcome. Ian Cawood, Newman University Colllege, [email protected]. Birmingham; [email protected]. Liberal foreign policy in the 1930s. Focusing particularly on Liberal anti- Life of Wilfrid Roberts (1900–91). Roberts was Liberal MP for Cumberland appeasers. Michael Kelly, 12 Collinbridge Road, Whitewell, Newtownabbey, North (now Penrith and the Border) from 1935 until 1950 and came from Co. Antrim BT36 7SN; [email protected]. a wealthy and prominent local Liberal family; his father had been an MP. Roberts was a passionate internationalist, and was a powerful advocate The Liberal Party’s political communication, 1945–2002. PhD thesis. for refugee children in the Spanish civil war. His parliamentary career is Cynthia Messeleka-Boyer, 12 bis chemin Vaysse, 81150 Terssac, France; +33 6 coterminous with the nadir of the Liberal Party. Roberts joined the Labour 10 09 72 46; [email protected]. Party in 1956, becoming a local councillor in Carlisle and the party’s Liberal policy towards Austria-Hungary, 1905–16. Andrew Gardner, 17 candidate for the Hexham constituency in the 1959 general election. I am Upper Ramsey Walk, Canonbury, London N1 2RP; [email protected]. currently in the process of collating information on the different strands of Roberts’ life and political career. Any assistance at all would be much The Liberal revival 1959–64. Focusing on both political and social appreciated. John Reardon; [email protected]. factors. Any personal views, relevant information or original material from Liberal voters, councillors or activists of the time would be very The political career of Edward Strutt, 1st Baron Belper . Strutt was gratefully received. Holly Towell, 52a Cardigan Road, Headingley, Leeds LS6 Whig/Liberal MP for Derby (1830-49), later Arundel and Nottingham; in 3BJ; [email protected]. 1856 he was created Lord Belper and built Kingston Hall (1842-46) in the village of Kingston-on-Soar, Notts. He was a friend of Jeremy Bentham The rise of the Liberals in Richmond (Surrey) 1964–2002. Interested and a supporter of free trade and reform, and held government office in hearing from former councillors, activists, supporters, opponents, as Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Commissioner of Railways. with memories and insights concerning one of the most successful local Any information, location of papers or references welcome. Brian Smith; organisations. What factors helped the Liberal Party rise from having [email protected] no councillors in 1964 to 49 out of 52 seats in 1986? Any literature or news cuttings from the period welcome. Ian Hunter, 9 Defoe Avenue, Kew, Student radicalism at Warwick University. Particulary the files affair in Richmond TW9 4DL; 07771 785 795; [email protected]. 1970. Interested in talking to anybody who has information about Liberal Students at Warwick in the period 1965-70 and their role in campus Liberals and the local government of London 1919–39. Chris Fox, 173 politics. Ian Bradshaw, History Department, University of Warwick, CV4 7AL; Worplesdon Road, Guildford GU2 6XD; [email protected]. [email protected] Liberal politics in Sussex, Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight 1900–14. Welsh Liberal Tradition – A History of the Liberal Party in Wales The study of electoral progress and subsequent disappointment. 1868–2003. Research spans thirteen decades of Liberal history in Wales Research includes comparisons of localised political trends, issues but concentrates on the post-1966 formation of the Welsh Federal Party. and preferred interests as aganst national trends. Any information, Any memories and information concerning the post-1966 era or even specifically on Liberal candidates in the area in the two general elections before welcomed. The research is to be published in book form by Welsh of 1910, would be most welcome. Family papers especially appreciated. Academic Press. Dr Russell Deacon, Centre for Humanities, University of Wales Ian Ivatt, 84 High Street, Steyning, West Sussex BN44 3JT; ianjivatt@ Institute Cardiff, Cyncoed Campus, Cardiff CF23 6XD; [email protected]. tinyonline.co.uk. Aneurin Williams and Liberal internationalism and pacificism, 1900– The Liberal Party in the West Midlands from December 1916 to 22. A study of this radical and pacificist MP (Plymouth 1910; North West the 1923 general election. Focusing on the fortunes of the party in Durham/Consett 1914–22) who was actively involved in League of Birmingham, Coventry, Walsall and Wolverhampton. Looking to explore Nations Movement, Armenian nationalism, international co-operation, the effects of the party split at local level. Also looking to uncover the pro-Boer etc. Any information relating to him and location of any steps towards temporary reunification for the 1923 general election.Neil papers/correspondence welcome. Barry Dackombe. 32 Ashburnham Fisher, 42 Bowden Way, Binley, Coventry CV3 2HU ; neil.fisher81@ntlworld. Road, Ampthill, Beds, MK45 2RH; [email protected]. com.

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 37 his biographer Alun Wyburn- reports Powell doubted his charisma. Speaker Michael Meadowcroft similarly reported that a flyer publicising a meeting to be Torrington ’58 – Liberal survival and revival, addressed by Davies in Colne Valley promised that he would 1945–79 not speak for more than ten minutes! As for David Steel, Full-day seminar, 14 June 2008, at the LSE Archy Kirkwood (who worked Report by Matt Cole for Steel during the 1970s) gave a candid assessment of the leader’s role in agreeing the he Liberal Democrat judgement and skill of its lead- Lib-Lab Pact, stressing Steel’s History Group, in asso- ers; the tenacity, organisation distinction between ‘principles’ Tciation with the British and endeavour of its members; and ‘demands’. Kirkwood rec- Library of Political and Eco- and the strategies and attitudes ognised, though less fully than nomic Science and the Richard of other parties. some present, that in retrospect Scurrah Wainwright Trust, Lords Wallace and Dhola- we might argue that Steel could supported a day of discussion kia, both of whom had joined have won further commitments and recollection at the London in the Grimond enrolment of Contributors from the Callaghan adminis- School of Economics on 14 the late 1950s and early 1960s, repeatedly tration, particularly in matters June, to mark the half-cen- addressed the role of party of PR, and some contributors tenary of the Torrington by- leadership. Dholakia described returned to quoted recollections of Labour election, when Mark Bonham Grimond and Torrington vic- ministers crowing that Steel had Carter captured a Conservative tor Mark Bonham Carter as three sali- been ‘robbed’. seat, securing the Liberals’ first ‘the most influential’ figures The focus on leadership as by-election gain for thirty years. in the party, whilst Wallace ent factors the monocausal driver of party Attendees included party leaders paid tribute to the ‘astounding’ responsible success is, however, a fallacy from local government, from impact made by Grimond in of the age of television, as the the Commons and the Lords, marshalling a range of intellec- for the day’s discussions demonstrated. as well as academic analysts and tual figures into the Unservile Alun Wyburn-Powell, for one or two former supporters. State Group and other policy- survival of example, showed that the Liber- Debate was focused around making forums. According to als’ strong second place at the the causes of the party’s remark- Wallace, Grimond’s impact the Liberal 1954 Inverness by-election had able recovery over the last fifty was reflected in two waves: Party: the demonstrated their potential to years, a period which has seen the ‘reactivation’ of existing win votes even in the twilight the number of Liberal Demo- membership between 1955 judgement of Clement Davies’s leadership. crat MPs multiply tenfold and and 1958 and the addition of Furthermore, as the present the party’s role in government new members such as himself and skill of author pointed out, in a survey enhanced at all levels, to the between 1961 and 1963. From of dozens of Liberal Associa- point where even a voice as this latter group, Tony Bunyan its leaders; tions no reference appears in sceptical as Lord Greaves’s could and Hilary Wainwright, who the tenacity, local branch minutes to Jo acknowledge that ‘the Liberal drifted away from the party Grimond during his leadership. Democrats are part of the politi- in the 1970s, acknowledged organisa- In parts of the country at least, cal scene’. What the day empha- that Grimond’s leadership had Liberal organisation and activity sised most of all, ironically, was inspired their hopes of building tion and persisted regardless of national that a single event, such as the a radical movement rather than profile. Michael Meadowcroft Torrington victory, was no a conventional party. endeavour and Tony Greaves gave compel- more than a staging post in a Conversely, the leadership of of its mem- ling evidence of the importance journey which had begun years Jeremy Thorpe was the subject of local government campaign- earlier. of widespread criticism due to bers; and the ing and representation to the Contributors repeatedly his failure to consult with the party’s survival and prosper- returned, each with a differ- party or to lead policy innova- strategies ity. Meadowcroft noted that ent perspective, to three salient tion – for having been, as some in Blackpool, for example, the factors responsible for the sur- put it, a very conventional poli- and attitudes Liberals won control of the local vival of the Liberal Party, some tician. Clement Davies’ defence of other council in 1958, even though of which are more frequently of the party in its darkest hour they had not fought either of recognised than others: the was recognised, though even parties. the town’s parliamentary seats

38 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 reports at the two previous elections. Tony Bun- common sense and capacity to vulnerable to them when the When a by-election occurred inspire and invoke the confi- revival occurred. in 1962, Harry Hague, local yan, Michael dence of the Liberal Party in The speakers never explic- activist of many years’ standing, Meadowcroft its entirety, despite his attach- itly drew attention to a cer- came within a thousand votes ment to the Commons. Lord tain factor in Liberal survival, of winning the seat. That same and Lords Greaves remarked wistfully that which historians also tend to week, Meadowcroft argued, the Wainwright was ‘looked up to. overlook (though it cropped Orpington victory was the first Wallace, He had a healthy disdain for the up in most discussions) – luck. parliamentary contest won on London establishment. There’s Certain events and outcomes the basis of municipal election Kirkwood nobody like that there now’, which favoured the party were success. By 1962, Meadowcroft and Greaves adding wryly that ‘he could a matter of chance, from Lord was the Local Government sometimes go over the top in Dholakia’s recruitment into the Officer at Liberal HQ (he was19 all paid his integrity’. Yet Wainwright party to make up the quorum years old), where he began to would have been the last to at a Young Liberal meeting in build up a set of card files of warm tribute claim that any one personal- a pub, to the fact that certain Liberal local government activ- ity was at the root of Liberal candidates were unsuccess- ity. The growth in this repre- to Wain- success. ful (one wonders what would sentation, and the contact it wright’s Relations with other par- have happened to the Liberals created with popular political ties are both an unavoidable had Violet Bonham Carter or reaction, sustained the party in unique com- part of Liberal history and a Megan Lloyd George – or both later years during problems with neglected factor in Liberal for- of them – won their contests in the leadership. bination of tunes. Sometimes inspirational 1951) or successful (for instance, Martin Wainwright gave in their sheer odiousness (the the three MPs who between specific evidence of Liberal shrewdness, example of Lord Dholakia’s them had a majority of less than constituency work in his rec- common motivation in becoming a Lib- 1,600 votes in 1970). Torrington ollections of campaigning in eral councillor due to the rac- itself saw a narrow margin of Colne Valley, where his father, sense and ism he experienced at the hands victory of only 219 votes, and Richard, was MP from 1966 to of Brighton Tories springs to could easily have been a near 1970 and from 1974 to 1987. He capacity to mind), the conference had miss. The survival of the Liberal emphasised the roles of local nonetheless to acknowledge Party in some form or other patrons and campaigners such as inspire and the short-term benefits of co- might have been guaranteed by Harry Senior and Jessie Kirby, invoke the operation, from the launching its membership and organisation of both the organisation and the of the parliamentary careers and its revival may have relied faith of Methodists in the party confidence of Donald Wade and Arthur upon national leadership – but (he remembered being inspired Holt in the 1950s and 1960s, the difference between whether by hymns such as ‘Stay, Master, of the Liberal to the Liberal Party’s entrance it survived or grew was in part a Stay’, as well as the promise of a into the sphere of govern- matter of chance. fish-and-chip supper) and of the Party in its ment in the 1970s. The issue Many thanks are due not local press and Liberal Clubs. entirety, of the point at which these only to the Wainwrights for Richard Wainwright, whose relationships became more their generous support of the family trust supported the con- despite damaging than useful was like- conference, but also to Sue ference and whose widow and wise addressed, and Russell Donnelly and Becky Webster of three children were present, his attach- Deacon’s analysis of the Car- the LSE archives for their work reflected the importance of both marthen by-election (where the in making the conference possi- organisation and leadership, ment to the Tories stood down but the Lib- ble, and for displaying examples as all those present who knew Commons. erals still lost), Michael Mead- of election material from the him recognised in turn. Martin owcroft’s work on ending pacts Liberal Party archives. The Lib- compared his father to the enig- in local government, and the eral Democrat History Group matic Hiram Yorke in Charlotte contributors’ overall reaction looks forward to developing its Bronte’s Shirley – an independ- to the discussion of the Lib-Lab work with the LSE archives in ent, successful and sometimes Pact all suggested that the Lib- the future. mischievous entrepreneur: eral Party had allowed itself to ‘revolt was in his blood. He be drawn too deeply into these Matt Cole lectures at the London could not bear control.’ Tony relationships. It is ironic that School of Economics on the Hansard Bunyan, Michael Meadowcroft the Conservatives, who did the Society’s International Scholars pro- and Lords Wallace, Kirkwood most to cultivate a relationship gramme. He is currently writing the and Greaves all paid warm with the Liberals in the 1950s biography of Richard Wainwright, tribute to Wainwright’s unique and who could most easily have former Liberal MP for the Colne combination of shrewdness, destroyed them, were most Valley.

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 39 Founding the welfare state least accountability) it became Fringe meeting, 14 September 2008, with Ian Packer and possible for Liberals to imagine Joe Harris; Chair: Lady Jane Bonham Carter it as a liberating influence. Lib- eral thinkers, most famously L. Report by Graham Lippiatt T. Hobhouse and J. A. Hobson, started to promote the ‘New Liberalism’, with social reform hundred years ago, in accrue more credit for the pol- added to the list of traditional 1908, the Liberal govern- icy than he was entitled to. Liberal demands, like democ- Ament of Herbert Henry Dr Ian Packer of Lincoln racy, religious equality and Asquith introduced the Old Age University (author of Liberal Irish home rule. They painstak- Pensions Bill. This was just the Government and Politics, 1905–15) ingly demonstrated that social beginning of a comprehensive delivered a broad overview of reform was merely an extension Liberal programme of social the social welfare legislation of existing Liberal precepts, reform including national insur- enacted by Asquith’s govern- entirely compatible with Liberal ance, minimum wages, labour ment between 1908 and 1914, ideas and language. Moreover exchanges and compulsory and its significance in the Liberals were starting to think school meals, amongst much administration’s programme. about ways in which rising else. Was this programme evi- Social reform as an agenda for government expenditure might dence that nineteenth-century central government was the be paid for. Their determina- notions of the minimal state outcome of the breakdown of tion to preserve free trade ruled had finally been abandoned, the mid-Victorian idea of the out the Tory solution of taxes or was it an attempt to counter minimal state, embodied in the on imports. This left the party the challenge of the emerging concepts of low taxation and with no option but to defend Labour movement? the least possible government increases in direct taxation, Lady Jane Bonham Carter interference in society and the especially on the very wealthy, introduced the meeting with economy. In the 1880s and 1890s as the fairest way to raise rev- a plea for the role of Prime the dominance of this idea was enue – a policy first seen in Sir Minister H. H. Asquith (her increasingly challenged as it William Harcourt’s budget of great-grandfather) to be given became clear that the minimal 1894, which consolidated and its proper recognition by his- state could not solve a wide graduated death duties. tory. The Old Age Pensions range of problems, including However, while increased Act of 1908 had become linked an economy that was falling direct taxes might provide the in the popular mind with the behind major international Many means to pay for social reform, work and personality of David competitors, the spiralling cost the abstract arguments of think- Lloyd George; it was enacted of national defence and the per- nineteenth- ers like Hobhouse and Hob- soon after Lloyd George became sistence of poverty in what was, century son did not commit a Liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer comparatively, a very wealthy government to any particular and has been widely seen as society. Tories turned to impe- Liberals had course of action and did not a prelude to the other social rialism and taxes on imports determine the form or timing reforms heralded in and paid to promote economic growth. been hostile of legislation in 1905–14. In fact for by Lloyd George’s People’s The Labour and socialist move- there were three distinct waves Budget of 1909. Indeed, a col- ments argued for measures like to the state of Cabinet initiatives on social loquial term for being in receipt the eight-hour day as solutions because they reform in this period, the first of the pension was ‘being on to unemployment and poverty. of which was largely a response the Lloyd George’. As Bonham The trend towards collectivism saw it as to the political agenda that had Carter reminded the meeting, was reflected in many areas of built up in the previous decade however, it was Asquith who, thought, including sociology, controlled of Tory government. Its centre- as Chancellor in 1906–08, had philosophy and theology, so piece was undoubtedly the Old been the driving force behind it was unsurprising that it also by a nar- Age Pensions Act of 1908. There the championing of pensions by became a feature of Liberalism. row clique had been discussion around the the Liberal government and it Many nineteenth-century feasibility of a scheme of state was Asquith who, although by Liberals had been hostile to who acted pensions since the 1870s, but, now Prime Minister, piloted the state because they saw it as ironically, pensions had become the 1908 budget, in which pen- controlled by a narrow clique in their own a front-rank political issue only sions were introduced, through who acted in their own and not when Joseph Chamberlain had the House of Commons. Lloyd the wider public interest. But as and not the taken them up during the 1895 George handled the separate the extension of the franchise wider public general election on behalf of the legislation on pensions later in brought the state increasingly Tories; and the Liberal govern- 1908 and, as a result, began to under popular control (or at interest. ment’s pensions legislation was

40 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 reports at least partly a rebuff to the What was legislation was more limited: it Churchill. The key to their ideas Tories for not introducing pen- was either non-controversial, was National Insurance. Lloyd sions during their term of office. crucial about like the provision of school George’s experience of piloting Pensions, though, were prob- the Pensions meals, which had passed the the pensions legislation through ably not a response to Liberals’ Commons in 1905 in the last the Commons had convinced fears about the appearance of Act was its year of the Unionist govern- him that social reform made the the Labour Party, which won 29 ment; or it was the result of party popular and stimulated his seats in 1906. Labour fought that introduction pressure group activity such as interest in schemes to provide election largely in alliance with the extended 1906 Workmen’s sickness benefits for widows and the Liberals and the party was of impor- Compensation Act, a concession orphans. Lloyd George was also already in favour of pensions, tant new to lobbying from the TUC, the convinced that future schemes an idea endorsed by 59 per cent maximum eight-hour day for could not be financed out of of Liberal candidates in 1906. principles in miners in 1908, prized by the general taxation alone. National Asquith had promoted the idea coal miners’ unions, then still a Insurance was devised by the of pensions well before Labour welfare leg- powerful force within the Lib- Welshman and his eclectic group won two by-elections from the eral Party, and the Trade Boards of advisers as a way of spread- Liberals in 1907 at Jarrow and islation, prin- Act of 1909, which set mini- ing the cost between the state, Colne Valley, so fear of Labour ciples the mum wages in four areas of, employers and employees. Under does not seem to have been a mainly female, home-working, what became the National Insur- significant factor in the genesis Liberals were which was the outcome of vig- ance Act of 1911 everyone in of pensions. What was crucial orous lobbying by the National work earning under £160 pa about the Pensions Act was its to develop Anti-Sweating League. This was compulsorily enrolled in a introduction of important new certainly did not amount to state scheme, in which they paid principles in welfare legislation, further – a coordinated programme, 4d a week, their employers 3d a principles the Liberals were to particularly though it did establish some week and the state 2d a week, in develop further – particularly important, if limited, prec- return for the right to sickness the idea that welfare provision the idea that edents – especially in the case benefit. This ingenious scheme should be separated from the of the Trade Boards Act, which made use of the insurance prin- Poor Law and given to recipi- welfare pro- created Britain’s first modern ciple that was already familiar ents as a right, rather than the regulation of wages. to millions of people and of the humiliating and grudging relief vision should At the elections of January expertise of existing friendly given to paupers. be separated and December 1910, pensions societies who would administer It was the perceived popular- were the only social policy hav- it. In some ways, Lloyd George ity of pensions and the advan- from the ing a prominent role, being was just extending and subsidis- tage they gave in the battle with mentioned by 75 per cent of ing existing forms of insurance the Tories that allowed Liberals Poor Law Liberal candidates in their provision. But to be successful it to regard themselves as a party election addresses. But even had to be compulsory, making particularly associated with and given to they were outstripped by other it a massive advance in the state’s social reform. This process was recipients issues. In January 1910 the fate role in welfare provision; and, as hastened once pensions became of the House of Lords, free trade with pensions, it rested on rights entwined with Lloyd George’s as a right, and the 1909 Budget were all and entitlements to relief. People ‘People’s Budget’ of 1909 and mentioned more often than received benefits on the grounds the constitutional struggle rather than pensions by Liberal candidates; that they were part of, and had between the Lords and Com- in December 1910 these issues contributed to, an insurance mons which followed when the the humili- were joined by defence and scheme. Lords rejected the Budget. For ating and Irish home rule. So, while social The party accepted the many Liberals, social reform reform was an important com- legislation of 1911 willingly, became inextricably linked grudging ponent of Edwardian Liberal- hoping for another triumph with other items in the party’s ism, it was only one. on the lines of old age pen- agenda, especially graduated relief given In 1908, a second wave of sions. The only real opposition direct taxation and the achieve- initiatives began to take shape, to the legislation came from ment of democracy. However, to paupers. carrying the administration interest groups like the BMA while pensions were not alone much further. Whilst the ear- who feared that their position among the Liberals’ achieve- lier reforms stemmed from would be affected. However, ments in the field of social long-standing issues and were while National Insurance was reform in 1906–08, they were handled by a variety of minis- undoubtedly a parliamentary by far the most eminent and the ters, the new departures of 1908 triumph for Lloyd George, and a only measure that captured the represented a fresh agenda and milestone in welfare provision, imagination of the party or sus- were largely the work of two it failed to repeat the politi- tained public attention. Other ministers – Lloyd George and cal success of pensions, being

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 41 reports overshadowed by the crisis over The achieve- wage for agricultural labourers, intention was that these ideas the reform of the Lords. Once it arguing that low rural wages would form the centrepiece of came into operation in 1912–13 ments of the depressed earnings in the towns. the government’s manifesto it became clear that many peo- Edwardian This rather crude analysis was when the next general election ple resented paying a flat rate not a personal foible of Lloyd occurred in 1915. tax of 4d per week to belong to Liberal gov- George’s, but a reflection of a The achievements of the the National Insurance plan, widely held view in the Liberal Edwardian Liberal governments and it was blamed for the party’s ernments in Party that many industrial dif- in the field of social reform were poor performance in a series of ficulties could ultimately be truly outstanding and long-last- by-elections. Nevertheless, the the field of traced back to the unreformed ing. The concept of a centralised Liberals pressed ahead with the social reform social structure of the country- state welfare system first took second part of the scheme which side. Liberals were deeply suspi- form in 1905–14. The longer Churchill had presented to the were truly cious of the role of landowners, the Liberal government spent in Cabinet in 1909. This created a holding them responsible for power, the more committed it system of unemployment insur- outstanding rural poverty by monopolising became to social reform. More- ance for 2.5 million workers in power for their own ends. This over, its agenda on social reform trades like shipbuilding, where and long- feeling had crystallised after the underwent continuous inter- cyclical and seasonal unemploy- lasting. The mass desertion of Liberal land- nal renewal and by 1914 it was ment were common. Together owners in 1886 over Irish home more bound up than ever before with the first labour exchanges, concept of a rule and the hostile attitude of with other elements of Liberal which had been introduced in the House of Lords. ideology. But this position was 1909, unemployment insurance centralised Policies to challenge the role also fragile, depending for its was a rather belated response to of landowners became increas- success on leadership from the the unpopularity the govern- state welfare ingly popular amongst Liber- top, particularly from the com- ment had suffered in 1908 when system first als – hence their enthusiasm manding and ingenious figure a trade depression had produced when Lloyd George put land of Lloyd George. But Asquith rising levels of unemployment. took form taxation at the centre of his played a vital role in this proc- While National Insurance 1909 budget. In 1909 hostility ess too. More than anyone, it proved a lasting achievement, in 1905–14. to landowners and social reform was he who was responsible for its initial unpopularity meant had become entwined because committing the Liberal govern- that the political imperative that The longer the land taxes were one of the ment to old age pensions. And, drove the role of social reform the Liberal most high-profile elements of as Prime Minister, he supported in the government’s programme the budget that was raising the Lloyd George’s great initiatives suddenly looked much less govern- money for pensions and because of the People’s Budget, National compelling. After 1911, it was the House of Lords had rejected Insurance and land reform, entirely possible that the Liberal ment spent the budget. This helped unite uniting the cabinet behind commitment to social reform Liberals by fusing traditional these policies. If it is the enmity would have died away, as Irish in power, radicalism with the new agenda between the two men that has home rule and Welsh disestab- the more of social reform, demonstrat- been remembered for the period lishment came to dominate ing that there was no contra- after 1916, it should not be for- the parliamentary timetable. committed diction between them. Lloyd gotten that before 1914 they By 1911, too, Churchill was at George launched his own land formed a remarkable team that the Admiralty, removed from it became enquiry, headed by the social led Liberalism in the direction domestic affairs. The third investigator, Seebohm Rown- of social reform. wave of Liberal proposals in to social tree, which provided the argu- If Ian Packer reviewed the the field of social reform was reform. ments to support his idea of a Liberal position on old age pen- not, therefore, inevitable. It was minimum wage for agricultural sions from the point of view sparked by a political crisis – the labourers and extended the land of elite politics in the context national miners’ strike in favour reform agenda by producing a of party competition with the of a minimum wage in March programme of rent courts and Conservatives, Joe Harris, Gen- 1912. A compromise bill set up security of tenure in the coun- eral Secretary of the National boards in each mining district tryside and state encouragement Pensioners Convention, and to determine local minimum for urban house-building. The author of Paupers’ Progress: From wages, representing an unfore- new strategy was called the land Poor Relief to Old Age Pensions, seen extension of the principle campaign. Its rural side was preferred to approach their of the 1909 Trade Boards Act to launched in October 1913 and introduction from the perspec- a major industry. Lloyd George its urban elements were being tive of grassroots campaign- leapt on this concept and took it discussed and approved by the ing amongst working-class in a new direction, suggesting Cabinet in the months before organisations, religious and the introduction of a minimum war broke out in 1914. The charitable institutions, trade

42 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 reports unions, friendly societies and The Committee was backed because of the growing bill for prominent and concerned by many well-known public the Boer War which had begun individuals. At the root of the figures, including philanthropist in 1899. crusade was the desire to relieve Edward Cadbury, labour and Although not acted upon, the social conditions experi- feminist organiser Margaret the work of the Chaplin com- enced by most older people in Bondfield, who would later mittee was important in inspir- the nineteenth century who had become Britain’s first female ing a number of proposals for to resort to Poor Law provision cabinet minister, future pensions pensions legislation over the and the workhouse to survive. minister George Barnes, Lib-Lab next few years. The committee That this state of affairs should candidate and journalist Fredrick also met again in 1903 but all be necessary in economically Maddison, and Will Crooks, the efforts to pass bills incorporat- developing, wealthy, industrial, trade unionist and Fabian Society ing pensions provision into law Victorian Britain disturbed the stalwart. Bernard Shaw, Cardinal between 1900 and 1908 failed. conscience of the nation. This Vaughan and the Archbishop of In December 1905 the Conserv- campaign of nationwide pres- Canterbury also declared their ative administration of Arthur sure was rewarded when the support. Mass rallies took place Balfour was replaced with the Old Age Pensions Bill, moved in Newcastle, Leeds, Manchester, Liberal administration of Sir by Asquith and John Burns (the Glasgow, Bristol and Birming- Henry Campbell-Bannerman, first working class man to hold ham. Five hundred and sixty whose government won a government office) received petitions containing 799,750 sig- landslide victory in the general Royal Assent on 1 August 1908. natories were presented to Parlia- election of the following year. It established for first time the ment by Fred Jowett, the Labour Campbell-Bannerman prom- right of the poor to a mini- MP for Bradford West. For ten As a plaque ised a pensions bill but died mum income as an alternative years, from 1898 to 1908, the four months before it became to the perceived charity of the Victorian and Edwardian con- erected at law and his name is now rarely Poor Law and the cruelty of the science was stirred and the public associated with the measure. workhouse and was truly an his- campaign for old age pensions the Brown- Asquith, however, kept his toric measure. filled halls and assembly rooms predecessor’s promise. In July There was little moral argu- across the country. ing Hall 1908, 304 Liberals, 20 Lib-Labs, ment against such provision, The first positive response Settlement 23 Labour, 23 Irish National- with ideas about public funding came from Salisbury’s adminis- ists, 43 Unionists and 1 Socialist to support the old and infirm tration, with the appointment of to celebrate voted for the first old age pen- going back several centu- a Select Committee on ‘Improv- sion bill; only 29 MPs opposed ries. Numerous government ing the Condition of the Aged that first it. The act received Royal committees had previously Deserving Poor’ in 1899 under Assent on 1 August 1908. The ‘investigated how to improve the chairmanship of Henry pension battle for the provision of old the condition of the aged and Chaplin, a Unionist who was stated, it age pensions had been won. deserving poor,’ discussing President of both the Board of Lloyd George paid out the possible systems and costs. As Agriculture and the Local Gov- was a first first pensions in January 1909 early as 1892, the reformer and ernment Board. The committee through local Post Offices; but sociologist Dr Charles Booth contained Unionists and Liber- step and the the means-tested maximum of had proposed a practical old als, including Lloyd George. five shillings weekly for the over age pension plan, while on 20 They accepted the moral case struggle for seventies, hedged with many November 1898 the Congre- to provide for those ‘whose a universal conditions, was a long way from gationalist Reverend Francis conduct and whole career has the ‘endowment of old age’ Stead, warden of the interde- been blameless, industrious and pension that Booth had envisioned and nominational Browning Settle- deserving but find themselves, for which the trade unionists, ment in Southwark, convened from no fault of their own … above the philanthropists and Christian a meeting of councillors, MPs, with nothing but the workhouse Socialists had fought. As a and trade unionists to consider or inadequate outdoor relief as official pov- plaque erected at the Browning what could be done to pres- the refuge for their declining erty level for Hall Settlement to celebrate that surise the government to intro- years’. The Chaplin commit- first pension stated, it was a first duce old age pensions along the tee reported to Parliament on all men and step and the struggle for a uni- lines already operating in New 26 July 1899 and recommended versal pension above the official Zealand. On 13 December 1898 a non-contributory scheme for women. The poverty level for all men and the National Pensions Com- the deserving poor, hedged with women. The struggle for that mittee was formed with Stead many conditions. However the struggle for continues today. and Frederick Rogers, a former Conservative government took that contin- bookbinder and trade unionist, no action. Its resistance was Graham Lippiatt is Secretary of the as joint secretaries. on the grounds of cost, mainly ues today. History Group.

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 43 Keynes’s activities as Britain’s reviews principal international Treasury negotiator after 1940 took him to Washington (in 1943), Atlan- tic City and Bretton Woods (in Liberal pragmatist 1944), Washington again (in 1945) and Savannah (in 1946). Donald Markwell: John Maynard Keynes and International Keynes had been transformed from an outspoken critic of Relations: Economic Paths to War and Peace (Oxford his own government (as well University Press, 2006) The move as the international economic and political system) – someone Reviewed by Ed Randall from out- who felt impelled to leave the government service (in 1919) sider to – to the chief negotiator of the his is a book that will his economic theorising and insider had British national interest and reward liberals (and many his polemical writing about principal exponent of his own Tothers) who are interested economic policy. Markwell’s happened brand of internationalism at the in Keynes’s contribution to the book, subtitled Economic Paths international top table. understanding and the shaping to War and Peace, takes the in a little The move from outsider to of international relations in the reader from Keynes’s early insider had happened in a lit- twentieth century. However, and – in Markwell’s view – over twenty tle over twenty years. It also Donald Markwell also has a largely uncritical acceptance years. It seemed to result directly from grander and more demand- of the classical liberal faith Keynes’s criticisms of conven- ing ambition, ‘to facilitate the in free trade as the universal also seemed tional economic theory, and of assessment, from time to time, antidote to war, to his deeply the foreign and economic policy of the contemporary relevance disillusioning role as a British to result nostrums supported by the Brit- of Keynes’s ideas to evolv- government adviser at the Paris ish establishment, as well as his ing circumstances’ (p. 5). That Peace Conference at the end directly from brilliant and sustained advocacy grander aim is one to which I of the First World War. It was Keynes’s of alternatives. The latter placed will briefly return at the end of an experience that gave rise greater emphasis on institution- this review. to his fierce and very public criticisms of building, international coop- Markwell is a political sci- denunciation of international eration and rehabilitating and entist with an abiding interest statesmen and the conference’s conventional restoring (rather than punish- in economic thought and its main product, the Treaty of ing) defeated military enemies impact on international rela- Versailles. Readers should be economic than almost any of his peers and tions. He was a Fellow at New aware that while Markwell theory, and academic rivals. It is hard to and Merton Colleges, Oxford, does not skimp on the evolu- envisage any similarly weighty before taking up a senior aca- tion of Keynes’s ideas about war of the for- academic critic of British pub- demic post at the University of and peace or his changing atti- lic and foreign policy being Western Australia. He has writ- tudes to international relations eign and eco- entrusted with such sweeping ten a study that is both accessible before 1920, he devotes most authority to negotiate on behalf to the general reader and valu- attention to later times, when nomic policy of their country. Felix Frank- able to academic specialists who Keynes’s liberal international- nostrums further (a Supreme Court justice seek expert guidance. Markwell ism – and what Markwell calls who had been present with demonstrates an encyclopaedic his ‘liberal institutionalism’ – supported by Keynes at the Paris Conference) knowledge of Keynes’s writ- became far more nuanced and wrote to him in 1945 about a ings and correspondence, which pragmatic. the British transformation in attitudes that facilitates the reader’s explora- Readers of this book will appeared to reflect and embody tion of the relationship between find themselves on a political establish- Keynes’s ideas and arguments Keynes’s economics, his liberal as well as an intellectual jour- ment, as (made by him behind the scenes internationalism and his myriad ney; it is a journey that finally in Paris and later in public), prescriptions for establishing delivers them – along with well as his ideas that favoured ‘a more and sustaining mutually ben- Keynes – to a time when Key- decent unfolding of world eficial economic and political nes himself played the leading brilliant and affairs’. This general change in interactions between states. British role in defending British beliefs had produced, Frank- The range of Keynes’s writ- interests, obtaining financial sustained furter told Keynes: ‘a … perme- ings on international affairs aid from the US for post-war advocacy of ating and informed realisation is quite remarkable, but it is reconstruction and shaping the … of the extraordinary dif- also deeply entwined with international financial system. alternatives. ficulties of peacefully evolving

44 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 reviews

cooperation but that he also could not be reconciled with ‘acknowledged the realities theory, and his prioritising of power’. A key feature of of British national interests Keynes’s diatribe against the even when that entailed some Versailles treaty (in Economic dilution of liberal ideals. For Consequences of the Peace), and Keynes, the announcement of the political manoeuvring long-term goals – economic that he believed made further and political – was one thing, conflict virtually inescapable, whilst the formulation and was his scathing criticism of implementation of detailed Woodrow Wilson’s idealism: policy was quite another. Wilson was condemned, in Eco- Keynes famously changed his nomic Consequences of the Peace, views on free trade between as the President who ‘could the wars and proved hard to preach a sermon’ but lacked a label when it came to report- plan to help rebuild Europe. ing his attitudes to war. As his The American President was, in biographer Skidelsky recounts, Keynes’s eyes, so extraordinarily Keynes believed that politi- detached from the requirements cal judgements about war and of effective international nego- peace should not confuse per- tiations that he preferred to ‘do sonal beliefs about the morality nothing that was not just and and horror of war (however right’. Kirshner finds in Mark- strongly held) with the business well’s scholarly exposition of of making policy for the whole Keynes’s changing ideas about of the nation. economics and international It is probably best to describe relations ‘glimpses of a fasci- Keynes as a proponent of a decent world order’. The nating, if not idealistic or even optimistic but uncompromis- change in attitudes toward rela- coherent, Keynesian perspec- ingly pragmatic liberalism and tions between states had, they tive on international relations’. internationalism. His militant both believed, been matched by I share Kirshner’s assessment to optimism and grand vision for the readiness of the victors in a some degree, even if I employ the future – of human socie- world war to be more generous somewhat different language in ties – is most clearly articulated and more realistic about what doing so. Keynes had a strong in an essay that was intended to was needed to establish and sense of direction concerning be widely read: Economic Pos- then maintain the peace than both himself and liberal socie- sibilities for Our Grandchildren national leaders had ever been ties, but he was constantly alert (initially published in 1928, before. to the difficulties of formulat- then reworked and published All this may well make it ing a truly winning case and in two parts in Nation and Ath- appear, as Markwell’s objective creating a feasible plan of action enaeum in October 1930). When seems to be, that Keynes was at that valued liberty whilst rec- times seemed at their hardest his core an idealist-liberal inter- ognising the vulnerabilities of and economic and interna- nationalist, even if his method markets and the dangers that tional developments at their of pursuing international peace brigand states represented to most discouraging, Keynes was and political harmony between international peace, as well as determined to explain why he states had became increasingly to the conditions of their own believed most people would, in sophisticated – i.e. via economic population. the future, be able to live better and political means, rather Keynes was far too con- and more fulfilling lives. than undirected market means. cerned with weighing up dif- He did not set out, in Eco- However, I have to agree with ferent policy goals, and the nomic Possibilities, to minimise another reviewer of Markwell’s relative likelihood of success in what needed to be done to cre- study of Keynes’s approach to pursuing different strategies to ate a more prosperous world for international relations, Jonathan achieve worthwhile ends, to be our grandchildren, but argued Kirshner, who believes that either a dogmatist or an idealist that four factors within our Markwell overplays Keynes’s in the philosophical sense. Two control would shape the lives of liberal idealism. He points out hallmarks of Keynes’s thought, our descendants: our individual that Keynes sought changes in well represented in Markwell’s ability to control population, public attitudes and government study, were his willingness to the strength of our determina- policies to improve the pros- change his mind and his policy tion to avoid war, our capac- pects of peace and international prescriptions when evidence ity to make intelligent use of

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 45 reviews scientific knowledge, and the it was for Keynes. Finding an life of Gladstone (1986, 1995) extraordinary productive power appropriate place for economic did much to reverse the neglect that capitalism unleashed. A growth, controlling our num- of Gladstone’s Christian faith truly liberal society needed to bers, keeping the peace and that had prevailed ever since his invest, Keynes believed, much making more intelligent use of first biographer, John Morley, more heavily in the first three the power we have in order to turned a positivist’s blind eye to and to worry a good deal less lead fulfilling lives, without at it. Yet in Matthew’s interpre- about the final member of this the same time destroying the tation, Gladstone’s migration quartet. We should not, Key- planet or sinking into avoid- from the Conservative to the nes wrote: ‘overestimate the able military conflict with each Liberal Party was synonymous importance of the economic other, is the trial that we face with the diminishing salience problem, or sacrifice to its sup- today. of his Anglican agenda. Scorned posed necessities other matters by Sir Robert Peel, ridiculed in of greater and more permanent Ed Randall is a lecturer in Politics print by Macaulay, and unable significance’. The liberal chal- and Social Policy at Goldsmiths to accommodate the griev- lenge of our own times is even University of London. ances of Ireland or political more clearly established than dissent, the young Gladstone’s Coleridgean doctrine that the state should work exclusively for the Church of England quickly became a political liability. He had therefore moved quickly So many Gladstones towards considering the state’s priority as the promotion of Richard Shannon: Gladstone: God and Politics (Hambledon fiscal justice between classes Continuum, London 2007) – Peel’s lesson – and justice between nations. Gladstone’s Reviewed by Michael Ledger-Lomas crusading governments worked on the assumption that the peo- ple had a fiscal contract with ome years ago, Travis to come, historians of religion, the state and duties towards Crosby introduced readers culture and gender will turn up Ireland and the wider world, Sto The Two Mr Gladstones. even more Gladstones as they Historians of Victorian Liberal- continue to explore his vast ism might now be forgiven for hinterland, which survives in wishing there were so few to the physical form of his library contend with. The first genera- at St Deiniol’s, Hawarden. Yet tions of Gladstone’s interpreters Gladstone’s eminence as a Lib- only had to map the stern young eral politician remains his major Tory churchman on to the title to our attention: home rule crusader for disestablishment mattered more than Homerol- and home rule, who backed the ogy; the Liberal Party more masses against the classes. Since than the ladies of the town. then, the publication of his dia- Both scholars and the general ries and the ongoing exploration reader will then continue to of his papers has generated ever need lives of Gladstone that more Gladstones to be squeezed reintegrate the burgeoning into the grand old man’s silhou- research into his inner life with ette: the lay theologian inter- his outer activity. It is this need ested in Dante and Christian art that Richard Shannon’s mas- who also scribbled anti-papal sively researched and pithily polemics; the icon of popu- written Gladstone: God and Poli- lar radicalism who was also a tics aims to satisfy. patriarchal Welsh squire and an Shannon argues that the ‘out and out inequalitarian’; the reluctance of previous biogra- erudite scholar of Homer; the phers to ‘do God’ has prevented dabbler in spiritualism and the them from offering a rounded self-scourging rescuer of pros- or fully accurate picture of titutes; even the progenitor of Gladstone the politician. Blairite foreign policy. In years H.C.G. Matthew’s two-volume

46 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 reviews not an exclusive covenant with Shannon the right ‘juncture’, to deter- and the Queen’s, which worked God. Without disputing the mine public opinion. Where differently than his own. intensity of his religion or deny- is fond of the people did have a role it was The suggestion that Glad- ing the tensions between him Palmerston’s as a picturesque backdrop to stone’s peculiar faith made the Liberal Party, this account his prophetic oratory, or as an ‘Gladstonian liberalism’ an established Gladstone as the prediction abstraction that could be used unstable, even an oxymoronic progressive heavyweight in to shake Disraeli’s government concoction is hardly novel. opposition to Benjamin Disrae- that Glad- and menace Salisbury’s House Shannon made it himself in a li’s court jester, and was widely of Lords. two-volume biography of Glad- popularised in Roy Jenkins’s stone would Shannon is fond of Palmer- stone (1982, 1999), of which God biography (1995). destroy the ston’s prediction that Gladstone and Politics represents a sort of Shannon mounts a com- would destroy the Liberal Party executive summary. Jonathan prehensive assault on this Liberal Party and die in a madhouse: his trust Parry has compellingly argued interpretation. While claim- in a ‘great and high election of a similar case, but differs from ing that historians can identify and die in a God’ made him a commanding Shannon in his empathy for the consistent themes in Glad- but ultimately disastrous Liberal Protestant latitudinarianism that stone’s career, he denies that madhouse: leader. This was particularly actuated many of Gladstone’s his understanding of politics his trust in true when it came to Ireland. rivals for the control of the underwent even mild seculari- Gladstone’s obsession with Liberal Party. God also ‘spoke’ sation. Gladstone’s mind ran on a ‘great and providential mission led him to to Lord John Russell and even a noxious cocktail of evangelical ignore the promising reforms to Lord Palmerston, although conscientiousness, Aristotelian high election proposed by other liberals and admittedly in a different accent. logic-chopping and high- in due course to introduce a Moreover, Shannon’s cursory church ecclesiology until the of God’ made home rule measure that was and overly psychologised treat- end; he even privately wished him a com- eccentric in its reading of Irish ment of Gladstone’s theology that his death might occur in history, vague in its details and makes it an overly reductive the middle of a church serv- manding but absurdly sanguine in gauging key to his politics: little more ice. Shannon identifies some the feelings of Ulster. In strong- at times than the belief that the startlingly direct connections ultimately arming the party into persisting ace that was invariably up his between Gladstone’s beliefs and with this hopeless measure, the sleeve had been put there by the his political conduct, invoking, disastrous elderly Gladstone condemned Almighty. David Bebbington for instance, the Tractarian doc- Liberal the late nineteenth century Lib- has shown that it is possible to trine of ‘reserve’ to explain why eral Party to impotence. At one give a more nuanced account Gladstone stubbornly withheld leader. point, Shannon suggests that of the religious ‘mind of Glad- his intentions on home rule General Gordon’s mulish fanati- stone’. This emphasises change from his party and stressing that cism made him the only man rather than consistency in his he privately credited successful able to mirror and outface Glad- religious views and specifically speeches to the direct interven- stone’s wilfulness. If the parallel his embrace from mid-century tion of the Almighty. is admitted, then home rule was of a mellower, incarnational Without disputing the form- the murderer of Gordon’s Khar- Christianity and of the human- ative influence of Gladstone’s toum, a disaster resulting from a ism inculcated by his studies of membership of Peel’s second holy scorn for sound advice. Homer, which were not as off administration, Shannon denies The book’s dense narrative the wall as Shannon implies. that it was a school of modera- of Westminster politicking Many Liberal electors shared tion. If anything, it strength- etches the negative lines of the these values, if not always the ened his authoritarianism, as he portrait even deeper, as it nec- faith itself: the freedom of absorbed Peel’s conviction that essarily shifts attention away individuals and nations from it was legitimate to defy party from Gladstone’s God to the unjust restraint and iniquitous feeling in wielding the power intricate scheming required to taxation, tempered by rever- of the state. Gladstone was no implement His will. Hostile ence for social and intellectual more interested in listening to in its framework, Shannon’s superiors, and a love of common the people than Peel had been. biography is also disapproving humanity. They were not just Unlike Peel, his rhetoric dwelt in detail. Briskly dismissive of browbeaten into stage-managed lovingly on the moral purity Gladstone’s scholarly produc- acquiescence by their ‘Caesarist of working men and came to tions, Shannon also has a sharp plebiscitarian’ leaders. Indeed, if welcome their enfranchise- eye for his foibles: his weakness we follow Eugenio Biagini and ment, but it denied them intel- for foreign holidays paid for Peter Ghosh’s recent arguments, ligent agency. It was generally by wealthy businessmen and Gladstone was less of the impe- reserved for Gladstone, with his his inability to understand or rious Peelite and much more of providential gift for scenting respect minds, notably Disraeli’s the sincere party man, anxious

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 47 reviews both to naturalise himself in tactics, but the profoundly partly determined by a desire Whig liberal tradition and to conflicted attitudes of British not to abridge, and all but one, meet the desire of popular lib- and particularly English Liber- the four-day ‘Speech in Open- erals for peace, economy and als towards Ireland: itching on ing the Impeachment of Warren Cobdenite free trade. the one hand to meet religious Hastings’ (15–18 February 1788), The problem, then, with grievances and extend consti- are presented in their entirety. this kind of narrative biography tutional liberties, they worried This compilation does not, is that the very sharpness of on the other about maintaining therefore, include early works, its focus on a Victorian states- the rule of law, the integrity of such as A Vindication of Natural man’s quirks causes the envi- the Empire and the influence of Society (1756), Tract on the Popery ronments that sustained him Protestantism. Laws (1765), and Thoughts on the to fade from view, making it Richard Shannon has, then, Cause of the Present Discontents harder to explain the politi- not so much put a stop to the (1770). Instead, it begins with cal achievement that drew our proliferation of Gladstones as his first speech for the con- attention in the first place. The added yet another to the list, tested seat of Bristol in 1774, shortcomings of that approach with which historians of Lib- and is the shorter (by nearly 200 are particularly evident when it eralism will want to take issue. pages) and the more compact comes to Ireland. Even if Glad- It is only a pity that the book’s of the two selections, though stone’s embrace of home rule hefty price tag is likely to deter it is nonetheless representative represented a last fling of religi- the general reader. of much of Burke’s political ose selfishness, popular British thought. Both editions provide Liberalism, as Eugenio Biagini Michael Ledger-Lomas is a Fel- a general introduction as well as has powerfully argued, was set low in History at Selwyn College, more specific preambles to each to become increasingly preoc- Cambridge, and a research associate of Burke’s pieces. Both editors cupied with the Irish problem of the Cambridge Victorian Studies appear to greatly admire their anyway. If Gladstone’s proposed Group. He works on the history of subject, not least for his moral solution split the party, this nineteenth-century Protestantism. fortitude. reflected not just his devious The Burke that emerges from Bromwich’s collection is the gifted parliamentarian, principled, tenacious, and an unembarrassed apologist of high politics in a lost world, Burke reflected The Burke one that was suspicious of the ambitious power of a commer- Peter J. Stanlis (ed.): Edmund Burke: Selected Writings and that cial elite, and which perceived Speeches (Transaction Publishers, 2007). emerges a marked distinction between political and mercantile inter- Reviewed by Sylvana Tomaselli from Bro- est. As Bromwich sees it, the real subject of Burke’s writings mwich’s on France is the ruination of t is a testimony to Edmund Burke in 2000, which is closest deliberative representation by Burke’s enduring popular- in aim and content to Stanlis’s collection is plebiscitary politics and slavish Iity as a political writer that volume. All are indebted to the gifted reliance on the popular will, Edmund Burke: Selected Writings Thomas Copeland’s The Cor- while the real subject of his and Speeches is the fourth edition respondence of Edmund Burke, 10 parliamen- writings on India is the ruina- of this collection of speeches vols. (Chicago, 1958–78) and tion of constitutional govern- and letters, first published in Paul Langford’s The Writings tarian, ment by the usurping power of 1963. Furthermore, Peter J. and Speeches of Edmund Burke a commercial empire. Stanlis’s is the only available (Oxford, 1981– ). principled, The Burke that emerges volume of its kind. 1984 saw Both Stanlis’s and Brom- tenacious, from Stanlis’s collection is the the publication of Harvey C. wich’s selections seek to make impressively erudite man of let- Mansfield Jr.’sSelected Letters more easily accessible Burke’s and an ters, the talented stylist steeped of Edmund Burke, followed in writings and utterances other in the classics, deeply knowl- 1993 by Ian Harris’s edition of than the work with which he is unembar- edgeable about the natural law Burke’s Pre-Revolutionary Writ- most readily, and, regrettably, tradition and continental legal ings, while Yale University Press often almost solely, identi- rassed apol- philosophy, as well as English published David Bromwich’s fied, namely hisReflections on ogist of high legal history. His legal train- Empire, Liberty, and Reform: the Revolution in France (1790). ing, whilst abandoned, shaped Speeches and Letters, Edmund Bromwich’s choice of texts was politics … his understanding of the nature

48 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 reviews

Writing in 1963, Stanlis thought Thought and History (1971), the this the accepted interpretation received view of Burke now of the political philosopher. It is that he brought together a may well have been, but it is number of political discourses no longer. This is not because and that amongst those com- Stanlis’s view is now rejected mon law was one of the more out of hand, nor because com- significant ones. The politi- mentators have returned cal labelling that was once de unreflectively to the pre-war rigueur in studies of Burke is understandings of Burke, but now also a defunct endeavour. because however much one Today’s Burke is a sophisticated recognises the continuity in and subtle thinker who tack- his thought, there is no deny- led highly complex issues of ing that events in France made continued relevance. He can him particularly aware of what be seen as such, for instance, could be done, or one might say, in Richard Bourke’s ‘Edmund undone, in the name of nature, Burke and the Politics of natural law, and natural rights. Conquest’ (Modern Intellectual Burke was too artful an orator History 4, 3 (2007)), which not to be profoundly aware of examines how Burke’s inter- the power of moral and political vention in the debate on the languages and the terrifyingly Quebec Bill in 1774 led him to destructive uses to which the develop his thought on con- language of nature was being quest, and in particular, how he put in France. This was particu- dealt with the difficulties raised larly disquieting for England, by the desire to respect the a country that had slowly but native culture and religion of a surely perfected a constitution conquered people, while giv- of society and government. and a system of law that were ing them the benefits of what Stanlis’s Burke is the author equal to none. Burke thought a superior legal of A Philosophical Enquiry into Burke’s world was compli- system. the Origin of our Ideas of the cated and difficult to ration- The scholarly world has Sublime and the Beautiful (1757) alise, even for Burke himself. changed since the 1960s, and (although regrettably no part The language of natural law in this case for the better, but of that work is reproduced in was insufficient for the task. if Stanlis’s introduction is of this selection; it is in Harris’s), Persuading as well as under- its time, Burke’s works remain the anonymous general editor standing, which was what timeless for anyone interested in of the very successful Annual Burke spent his entire life the nature of politics. Register to which he contrib- trying to do, required more uted historical articles as well as than one idiom. Following J. Sylvana Tomaselli is a Fellow of St book reviews, and the experi- G. A. Pocock’s lead in ‘Burke John’s College, Cambridge, who enced and long-serving politi- and the Ancient Constitution: works principally on eighteenth- cian. Above all, this is a Burke A Problem in the History of century British and French political who consistently applied and Ideas’ in his Politics, Language, thought. developed ideas and principles and Time: Essays on Political he acquired at the beginning of his intellectual life, and remained true to himself. Stanlis’s anthology affirms that the common perception Email mailing list of Burke has changed dramati- We have recently changed the mailing system through which we send out email notices of History cally since 1948. ‘Far from being Group meetings, latest publications, special book offers forJournal members, etc. an empiricist, utilitarian, and If you have already signed up to the mailing list, you should be automatically transferred to the new pragmatist, and therefore an system. However, we have been experiencing problems recently, and it is possible that you may not be. enemy of Natural Law’, he argues, ‘[Burke] was in principle If you received an email from us in late October, advertising our meeting on the People’s Budget in and practice one of the most January (see back page), then you are on the list, and no further action is needed. eloquent and profound defend- If you did not, then you are not on the list. To join the list, send a blank email to liberalhistory- ers of Natural Law morality and [email protected]. You will be asked to confirm your email address, to avoid spam. Our politics in Western Civilisation’. apologies for any inconvenience.

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 49 reviews

Politics as self-sacrifice including Social Statics (1851) as radical juvenilia in which Spen- Mark Francis: Herbert Spencer and the Invention of Modern cer flirted with popular suffrage Life (Acumen, 2007) and democracy before coming to view democracy as an atavis- Reviewed by Melissa Lane tic expression of will-theory, in which the popular will replaced monarchical despotism, and his is a monumental, attend Oxford or Cambridge, which was unsuited to the painstakingly scrupulous, though Spencer proudly did complex conditions of modern Tand innovative study, not). Although he believed that life. A fear that such democracy based on a complete grasp of love and play were the keys to was on the verge of triumph- Spencer’s corpus and a thorough human happiness, he nonethe- ing in the early 1880s led to The use of archives relating to his less was incapable of returning Man ‘versus’ the State (1884), the circle and period. Francis suc- George Eliot’s love in an emo- crudeness and extremism of ceeds in recovering the precise tionally or physically satisfying which Francis views as separated lineaments of Spencer’s complex way for either of them, and his by a ‘rift’ (p.323) from his other, project, and in rebutting the ponderous attempts at play and and mature, political writings. unconscionable oversimplifica- exercising his ‘philoprogenitive’ (Francis notes without really tions which have dogged, and instincts on friends’ children explaining the fact that ‘para- to a large extent substituted were self-conscious efforts to doxically … he was an advocate for, his scholarly reception: in construct a balanced life around of democracy in his psychology’ particular, in Spencer’s relation his emotionally crippled core. (p.339), in which as, the book to ‘social Darwinism’, his clas- More positively, he drew from shows, Spencer rejected the sification as a sort of Comtean his unhappy upbringing the crude domination of reason or positivist, and his purported sta- moral that anger was a barbaric will in favour of a sort of con- tus as an arch-individualist of a emotion to be expelled from sensus model acknowledging laissez-faire type in politics. He civilised life. Francis argues that the reality of the various pas- is also alert to Spencer’s contri- Spencer’s ethics and politics sions and emotions.) In focusing butions to his own mis-recep- were a form of self-sacrifice, in on Spencer’s ethics and politics, tion and instructive on aspects which Spencer advocated the I cannot do justice to Francis’ of his personal life, including sort of emotionally harmoni- supple and revisionist treatment his relationship with George ous, calm and playful future Eliot. The book’s larger pur- which he had not been able to poses – portraying Spencer as achieve for himself, and criti- the inventor of modern life and cised militarism and aggression tracing the possible contribu- as forces that, while previously tions that a proper understand- necessary to progress, had no ing of Spencer’s politics could place in that future state. To offer to political life today – are mark how far this is from the more sketchily realised, though conventional image of Spencer, thought-provoking. Francis recounts that his single At the heart of the book’s public address on his 1882 tour argument is a novel reading of the United States, far from of Spencer’s Autobiography as endorsing the law of the market the key to his mature ethical jungle, admonished his audi- and emotional outlook. Spen- ence of businessmen and public cer came to see the emotional figures to spend more time at tumult and lashings of duty play (pp.103–05). imposed on him by his particu- By ‘Spencer’s ethics and poli- lar breed of moderate dissenter tics’ in the preceding paragraph family as psychologically dev- I am implying his Principles of astating (Francis is particularly Psychology and Principles of Sociol- good at distinguishing the old ogy, the latter including among dissenters from those, like Spen- its parts Political Institutions, cer’s partly Methodist family, which Spencer regarded as his who bordered on and some- most important book and which times married into Anglican inter alia expressed his vehe- circles and who could, without ment anti-militarism. Francis conscientious scruple, choose to views the works up to and

50 Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 A Liberal Democrat History Group fringe meeting Fighting Labour: the struggle for radical supremacy in Scotland 1885–1929

The Liberal Democrat History Group is holding its first meeting in Scotland, part of the fringe at the Scottish Liberal Democrats’ spring conference. The meeting will look back at the Liberal Party’s contribution to radical, progressive politics in Scotland and its struggle with Labour in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, culminating in the years following Asquith’s by-election win in Paisley in 1920.

Speakers: Professor Richard Finlay (Strathclyde University); Dr Catriona MacDonald (Glasgow Caledonian University, author of The Radical Thread: Political Change in Scotland; Paisley politics, 1885–1924); Jim Wallace (Baron Wallace of Tankerness, former Deputy First Minister of Scotland). Chair: Robert Brown MSP.

6.45pm, Friday 13 March 2009 Royal George Hotel, Tay Street, Perth

of Spencer’s biology, in attempted to free philosophy respects, as a prophet of an of force and state power which, while acknowledg- and social science from the idealised vision of the latter. could be reconciled with his ing that Spencer coined the inherited prejudices of past In ethics and politics, Fran- demand for governmental term ‘survival of the fittest’, metaphysicians, whilst bas- cis contends that Spencer’s powers to administer social he stresses Spencer’s interest ing them on a zealous and twin legacies should be the complexity and institute in the adult organism and indefatigable assemblage value he attributed to human justice – remains unclear in its adaptive rapport with its of empirical knowledge – emotions and his desire to both this biography and in environment rather than in Spencer’s rebuttal of Paley’s see suffering diminished his thought. The book is also natural selection, and his natural theological paean to (although, as Francis demon- rather better at summing view of human intelligence the oyster by dryly ranking strates throughout the book, up the results of Spencer’s as enabling a break-out its sensations below those this did not prevent him thinking (sometimes taking of previous conditions of of the cuttlefish (p. 290), is from a lifelong hostility to the reader’s knowledge of evolution. priceless) and his valuing of what he viewed as a hyper- its basic content too much Does Francis justify his peace and altruism rather individualist and unscientific for granted in the quest portrayal of Spencer as the than militarism and compe- Benthamite utilitarianism), for interpretation) than at inventor of modern life, tition as part of the evolution coupled with his advocacy of illustrating his thought proc- even while placing him of civilisation. These con- a liberalism unencompassed ess – more could be said firmly in the now neglected tentions mix ways in which by democratic politics that about what Spencer read and debates and concerns of the Spencer was ahead of his acknowledges ‘the primacy how he wrote, for example. mid-, rather than late, Victo- time but far from influential of communal decision-mak- This is nonetheless a land- rian period? This claim rests (anti-militarism) with ways ing’ (p.311) and protects the mark work of intellectual variously on his rejection of in which he is portrayed as notion of ‘private’ life which biography Christianity (although his an inaugurator of new cur- has a non-political value advocacy of the ‘Unknown’ rents of thought, though of its own as a more highly Melissa Lane teaches the history played, as Francis deftly even then his repudiation evolved site of ethics. Yet of political thought and political shows, a key role in eas- by the Edwardians make just what form ‘the primacy philosophy in the History Fac- ing mid-Victorian angst), it difficult to see him as a of communal decision- ulty at Cambridge University, his resolutely scientific and causal fashioner of moder- making’ would take – and where she is a Fellow of King’s anti-classical outlook (which nity rather than, in some how Spencer’s rejection College.

Journal of Liberal History 61 Winter 2008–09 51 A Liberal Democrat History Group evening meeting ‘Taxes that will bring forth fruit’ the People’s Budget of 1909 2009 sees the centenary of the ‘People’s Budget’, introduced by Liberal Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George. The Budget featured increases in income tax and excise duties, a new supertax for those with incomes above £5,000 a year, new taxes on cars and petrol and crucially on land. It was a truly radical budget: for the first time the attempt was made to redistribute wealth from the rich to the poor.

The principal repercussion of the budget was the constitutional stand-off between the government and the House of Lords. Finally, after the two general elections of 1910, the Lords agreed to the Parliament Act of 1911, confirming the primacy of the elected over the hereditary chamber.

A hundred years on, this meeting will examine the political context in which the budget was introduced and evaluate its importance both to Liberalism a century ago and its resonance today.

Speakers: Lord Kenneth O. Morgan (biographer of Lloyd George); Dr Vince Cable MP (Deputy Leader of the Liberal Democrats and Shadow Chancellor). Chair: Lord William Wallace (President of the Liberal Democrat History Group).

7.00pm, Monday 12 January 2009 (following the History Group AGM at 6.30pm) Lady Violet Room, National Liberal Club, 1 Whitehall Place, London SW1A 2HE

A Liberal Democrat History Group fringe meeting Liberal Democrats in Europe 21 years of success or failure? The Liberal Party and the SDP were the most pro-European of the British political parties. So how has their successor party fared in European politics since merger in 1988? How has the party adapted to the wide range of liberal thought represented by its sister parties in ELDR and ALDE?

Speakers: Graham Watson MEP (Leader of ALDE) will look at the record of the Lib Dem group in the European Parliament; Florus Wijsenbeek (former Dutch Liberal MEP and the first secretary-general of ELDR) will examine where the party fits on the European liberal spectrum, and whether there have been changes in ideological or political position by the Lib Dems over the past twenty years.

8.00pm, Friday 6 March 2009 Queen’s Suite 2, Harrogate International Centre, Harrogate