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The EU's conditionality in the case of Moldova (2001-2009): failure or success? Litra, Leonid

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Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Litra, L. (2011). The EU's conditionality in the case of Moldova (2001-2009): failure or success? (SPES Policy Papers). Berlin: Institut für Europäische Politik e.V. (IEP). https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-394230

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The EU’s Conditionality in the Case of Moldova (2001-2009): Failure or Success?

Leonid Litra

January 2011

The Study Programme on European Security (SPES) has been supported by the Volkswagen Foundation. This support is gratefully acknowledged. About the author Leonid Litra, fellow in the Study Programme on European Security (SPES), works as the Deputy Director on International Cooperation at the Institute for Development and Social Initiatives “Viitorul” in Moldova. His fields of expertise include EU-Moldova relations and Moldova‘s democratization.

About IEP Since 1959, the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP) has been active in the field of European integration as a non-profit organisation. It is one of Germany’s leading research institutes on foreign and European policy. The IEP works at the interface of academia, politics, administration, and civic education. In doing so, the IEP’s task include scientific analyses of problems surrounding European politics and integration, as well as promotion of the practical application of its research findings. www.iep-berlin.de

About SPES Policy Papers The electronic collection “SPES Policy Papers“ is dedicated to issues of current and future relevance to European foreign and security policy. Written by grantholders of the Study Programme on European Security (SPES) for fellows from Central and Eastern Europe – conducted by IEP and supported by the Volkswagen Foundation – as well as researchers from IEP, the papers focus on four thematic clusters:

• The EU and Russia • European Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy • The EU’s civilian and military crisis management • European energy policy and climate change policy

Against the background that the scientific debate on European foreign and security policy is often dominated by Western perspectives, this paper series stands out by providing a platform for alternative viewpoints that focus on external perceptions and assessments of EU policies, actions and discourses.

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ISSN 2191-0006

Editorial Team

Publisher: Prof. Dr. Mathias Jopp, Director, Institut für Europäische Politik

Executive Editor: Mariella Falkenhain, Research Associate and SPES project coordinator, Institut für Europäische Politik

Area experts: Dr. Elfriede Regelsberger, Deputy Director, Institut für Europäische Politik Editorial area: European Foreign and Security Policy

Dr. Katrin Böttger, Deputy Director, Institut für Europäische Politik Editorial area: European Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy

Layout: Matthias Jäger, Institut für Europäische Politik SPES Policy Papers 2011 3 Acknowledgments I would like to thank those who have shared preparing their this expertise research: and Prof. given Dr. their Mathias input Jopp, in Dr. Igor the Munteanu, course Dr. Victor Dr. of Chirila, Martin Sieg, Dr. Igor George Saghin, Botan, Adomas Davalga, Jens-Kristian Lutken, Andrew Dr. Stanislav Dr. Popescu, Nicu Secrieru, Dr. Hahn, Irene Berwanger, Harald Böttger, Katrin Dr. Falkenhain, Mariella remain to preferred who those to and Siroky David Dr. Gabanyi, Ute Anneli Dr. Gnedina, Elena Wilson, anonymous.

SPES Policy Papers 2011 5 7 8 1 1 17 21 23

I. Types of conditionality and the EU’s conditionality enforcement in accession and ENP countries enforcement in accession and ENP conditionality of conditionality and the EU’s Types I. in the case of Moldova: democratic II. EU policy instruments and socialisation and economic conditionality Introduction Table of Contents Table III. The impact of EU conditionality in Moldova: Analysing intervening variables Analysing of EU conditionality in Moldova: The impact III. Conclusions and recommendations Bibliography 6 SPES Policy Papers 2011 SPES Policy Papers 2011 7 Conditionality is understood in this paper EU whether evaluate to is paper this of aim The to request different reforms and apply a certain degree of conditionality on the basis of the PCA and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), in 2004. established as a strategy whereby the EU offers rewards exchange in for the target requirements set country by the fulfilling EU the (Kratochvil/Lippert 2008; Schimmelfennig et al. 2002). This analyses paper those areas in which the EU has made considerable efforts to adjust Moldova’s policies and standards to those of the on had the have efforts these impact the EU. on focuses Moreover, it adjusting is Moldova that noteworthy is It country. to the EU without the prospect of Interest membership. in because 2008, Moldova August in conflict Russian-Georgian has increased since of certain similarities with Georgia that – namely, the Russia. by supported regions breakaway have both Nevertheless, differences between these countries more a has EU the Moldova, of case the In prevail. on situated is Moldova because interest significant keeping in interested is EU the and borders own its the Transnistria settlement process peaceful and ongoing, especially taking into consideration that the nature of both the Georgian and Moldovian/ Transnistrian conflicts are different. apparent instance of The most EU attention being paid to Moldova however, could be observed after 2009 elections the (5 April, 29 July) and during the Moldova led that April from protests post-election into a political crisis. whether and Moldova in working is conditionality it is capable of producing effects similar to those achieved in the accession countries in 2004 and 2001-2009, is analysis the of timeframe The 2007. communist a had Moldova which during period the government with a strong pro-European rhetoric but exhibited merely a selective compliance with question, this answer to order In conditionality. EU it is necessary to address further questions, such as: Which types of conditionality does utilise? Which the internal and EU external factors have Are conditionality? EU of effects the on impact an EU incentives sufficiently credible and sizeable to ensure Moldova’s compliance? Moldova expect What from does the EU and is Moldova in 1 The first 2 , which entered into force in 1998 and Accepted as a country under the monitoring of the Council the of monitoring the under country a as Accepted Moldova has had some short periods of foreign policy Due to the long ratification procedure within theEU, the 3 . Nevertheless, the EU has tried to create Moldova started the transition period more or success for Moldova was the negotiation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1994 1 This CoE monitoring continues to this day. of Europe (CoE). 2 reorientation towards Russia in 1995-1998 and 2001-2003, certain degree of reorientation in 2007 and 2009. and a 3 1998. formally entered into force on 1 July, PCA The enlargement of the European in 2004 Union and 2007 has (EU) made it a more significant actor in the world by increasing 27 its member number states. to At the this same time enlargement however, has also homogenous. Currently facing the financial made crisis the is EU EU the reform, institutional of challenge the and less not ready for further enlargement, all the more so because of the presence of so-called enlargement fatigue mechanisms for cooperation avoid with to designed are mechanisms neighbouring These countries. dividing lines within Europe, to create a “ring of friends” (European Commission 2003: 4), to help adjust standards across the continent, and to bring Republic The EU. the to closer countries interested of Moldova (hereafter referred to as Moldova) is among these countries. less successfully, being the first country from the former Soviet Union after the Baltic States, to be Europe of Council the of member a as accepted Introduction 1995 (Serebrian 2005). Its pro-western demarche however, did not Moldova’s of priority main the became integration finish hereforeign and policy in European the following years. established an economic and political framework for the relationship. Moldova expressed its has willingness to join consistently the EU. Despite having no membership perspective, and the unlike Ukrainian political establishment, Moldova’s represented parties all of consisting elites, political in the Parliament, continue to declare European integration their priority, while the EU continues 8 SPES Policy Papers 2011 EU-Moldova cooperation. of efficiency the improve actions significantly could that certain recommends it Moldova’s of and and compliance approach EU current the of special focusonthe‘Russianfactor’ inMoldova. a with analysed be will incentives EU of impact Thirdly, analysed. be external and internal factors that could impede the will – socialisation and of case Moldova – the democratic and in economic applied conditionality instruments policy EU’s ENP and the Secondly, briefly. presented be will countries countries accession conditionality EU’s in the enforcement and conditionality of types firstly, follows: as divided is which paper, meeting theEU’s expectations? The final section highlights shortcomings highlights section final The this of structure the suggest questions These n eooi srcue o te U n re to order in join. EU the of structures economic and EU, the of states need to adjust to the case political, administrative the In threat’. ‘Soviet the defy militarily to able be and Union Soviet the oppose to (NATO) had states time, that Organization War.At Cold the during Treaty Atlantic North the of those to different are membership EU for criteria selection the Nevertheless, organisation. nesod s h mi srtg o international of strategy main the as understood is conditionality Democratic 2009). Commission (European institutions democratic most in but importantly areas, of range wide linked a in is standards EU to the by applied conditionality the of proportion a significant a Today, of 2008). (Agné provision another” to organisation the or actor one from for good conditions “practice setting the is of definition general the but etc.) social, economic, political, (e.g. conditionality of types many are There conditionality. EU called clear criteriaofbeneficiaryselection. its to due concept fuzzy less a is Governance which Facility, the of exception the with obvious, less are countries ENP the of case the in rewards and Requirements EU. the in membership clear: was reward the candidates, accession the of case by neighbourhood immediate requesting reforms in exchange for rewards. In the its in countries those with today, and, 1990s the in membership for applied who those all with relations its build a ld ay f t sronig onre to countries surrounding join to willingness its their express of many led in has success EU’s the decades, achieving high standards two of economic development last the In sion andENP countries conditionality enforcementinacces- I. Types ofconditionalityandtheEU’s too; candidate countries have to fulfill the criteria agreed to in the in Membership Action Plan(MAP). to agreed criteria the fulfill to have countries candidate too; 5 European Commission’s by the President,JacquesSanter. to 1996 Lucinschi December, Petru Moldova 13 of President on former addressed the was EU the to association 4 ihn cdmc ice, hs taey is strategy this circles, academic Within 5 Under this adhesion logic, the EU started to started EU the logic, adhesion this Under Today, NATO has specific criteria for membership, for criteria specific has NATO Today, forMoldova’s asking statement official first The 4 this sui generis sui SPES Policy Papers 2011 9 reactive reactive However, However, the authors , making membership much coercive coercive reinforcement. strategy. strategy. As Scholtz argues: “EU as mandatory Today, the EU has several levels of conditionality, conditionality, of levels several has EU the Today, A A state to which conditionality is applied The EU most often uses the the employment requires of a careful analysis negative of can be effective” “where (Youngs 2008: 2) conditionality pressure and must be based on a study of how EU policies influence the domestic political environment. of groups or countries different to applies it which countries, according to the level of development more difficult to achieve.In the case of Moldova, as such instruments key the analyse will paper this Autonomous Trade Preferences, Visa facilitation, EUBAM and others. budgetary support, is expected to change to its avoid behaviour punishment in The order for Conditions non-compliance. of In Conditionality, emphasise four types (strategies) of conditionality once an international organisation has set out its conditions (Schimmelfennig et al. 2002). In the case of a state accepting the conditions, it is clear that the state receives the rewards; that in it the does case not, the a) withholds international the reward, which organisation: is called reactive reinforcement; b) inflicts punishment, whichcalled is coercive (proactive) reinforcement; or c) provides support, which is called supportive (also 1). proactive) reinforcement (See Figure reinforcement conditionality (in the case of the ENP) is mainly ‘positive’, that is, the EU offers carrots and but withholds does not carry a big et stick” al. 2007: 6). (Scholtz The EU does not punish the non- compliant state but withholds sometimes the even gives reward extra and money through the Governance Facility. Thanks to this feature, EU conditionality is widely perceived conditionality. There have, as however, been positive some exceptions, for example in the case of where Belarus, the EU has applied Belarusian travel leaders, restraints on withdrawn Generalised access to System (European the Commission of 2009) and also Preferences applied some other (GSP) restrictive categorised measures as that can be 2008: 27) and raised the standards by also including including also by standards the raised and 27) 2008: an economic criterion and the acceptance of the acquis programme, 6 The programme of Community Aid to the countries of The EU as leverage in its relations has always which were available to European applicants. In this regard, “in Central 1992, the and Eastern EU introduced a clause of reprieving within the European Agreements the signing of trade cooperation agreements if the and target country does not respect five fundamental areas: 1) rule of law; and free 4) system; multi-party 3) rights; human 2) fair elections and; 5) market economy” (Grabbe 2008: 23). This first examplewas followed by of conditionality other important documents that outlined and cooperation for areas broader out laid concrete desired outcomes to be achieved by the applicant countries. The Copenhagen established in 1993, “formally spelled out the link Criteria, between democracy and membership” (Merkel 6 Central and Eastern Europe (PHARE) was the main instrument for pre-accession assistance to EU candidate countries. The main aim of this programme was to support the countries in implementing the acquis and to teach them to manage structural funds. It was launched and Poland of economies the of reconstruction the support to 1989 in Hungary and in 1994 became available to all In candidate 2007, PHARE countries. was replaced by the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (European Commission 2009). used conditionality with membership candidates and third countries. introduced at the end of the 1980s and in the early EU conditionality 1990s, when was the EU in formalised European conditionality Agreements and Criteria. the Copenhagen Post-communist European countries thus Central “became the first target and of a East very demanding social political, conditionality, economic closely and process linked of with transition the market towards economy” (Anastasakis/Bechev 2003: 5). democracy and The first programmes of cooperation between the EU and countries willing to join it were related to trade and European financialAgreements and PHARE assistance through the actors and member organisations states to respect their fundamental rules to of influence statehood. Schimmelfennig et al. non- (2002: 1-2) defineconditionality as an appliedof reinforcement by mechanism a social actor to change the behaviour of another actor, while reinforcement represents a system of social control compliance by is which rewarded and non-compliance is punished. 10 SPES Policy Papers 2011 1). It is aimed at transforming the target countries target the transforming at aimed is It 1). 2007: (Maron neighbours” the its and between EU lines enlarged dividing new of emergence the avoiding of objective “the with created was both itscharacterandconsistency. perspective, however, membership conditionality is different in a without countries For (Lippert/Umbach 43). 2005: an actor” as EU external the authoritative of role active the and (Scholtz/ involvement highlight instruments Europe the “pre-accession this, EU’s than Eastern More 3). and 2007: Schimmelfennig Central countries transition of the in democratisation” as well as stability and peace recovery, economic to transformative power and contributed significantly considerable with EU the “vested have past the in which process, accession the for established rules credibility. strict are there its membership, Alongside and reward the of size the to due be conditions, accept to to states inducing for considered instrument best the is perspective membership The 2). 2007: (Schimmelfennig/Scholtz Union” European the of policy foreign successful most the called often is “enlargement why reason the is This reforms. pursuing for incentive powerful most the considered is enlargement that doubt no is There changes. requires EU the where areas in registered progress the to and relationship their of fe te U nagmn o 20, h ENP the 2004, of enlargement EU the After Figure 1.StrategiesofConditionality(Schimmelfennigetal.2002) eety anhd atr Partnership Eastern launched recently the with together ENP, The policy. enlargement the with comparison in 2009b), (Popescu doses” reduced in all “though assistance, economic and the of export dialogue, political through by creatingthe‘UnionofMediterranean’. 7 3). alwayscome from within” (Ferrero-Waldner 2006: must transition democratic genuine outside: imposed from be never can “democracy Ferrero-Waldner out, pointed Benita As place. take not will change democratic and beginning very the from conditionalityfailimplementation willofthe then EU, the to by recommended policies willing the implement not are state given a in authorities If 2007). (Schimmelfennig conditions to subjected very much on the local political elite of the country conditionalitysuccessofthemention that depends to important is it EU, the by Moldova to beingapplied is that conditionality social) or economic deadlines arenotenforced(Chirila2009a). the and unclear are conditions the because part, in enlargement, of case the in achieved those as results neighbourhood high-quality such eastern produce to able the not are in EU the by used accession the to process. At alternative the same time however, an the instruments as perceived is Before evaluating the features of the (democratic, For the southern countries, the EU boosted its engagement 7 (EaP) acquis SPES Policy Papers 2011 11

9 As a result, a 8 Adomas Davalga, researcher at the Institute of Trans-national relations, cross-border cooperation The EU uses many policies and mechanisms Officially, the EU established its relationship brief analysis of official documents signed between signed documents official of analysis brief Moldova and the EU will be beneficial. that could be considered instruments of positive conditionality. Important policies relevant to the case of Moldova are the ENP and the while EaP, significant agreements includeEU–Republic of Moldova Action Plan the and Visa PCA, the Facilitation and Readmission conditionality positive of instruments the addition, Agreements. In include the Partnership Instrument (ENPI), Progress Reports, European Neighbourhood the monitoring of elections and other “linkages” and that form the chain of EU-Moldova relations and will be emphasised in the following overview. with Moldova negotiated through and signed in the 1994 and entered force PCA into on 1 July, 1998. The PCA that has become the basic was and most important document establishing 8 International Relations and Political 2009, Chisinau, Moldova. Science, 27 July, interview by author, Vilnius University, 9 and exchange that are influencing the domestic situationSchimmelfennig 2007). (Scholtz/ II. EU policy instruments in the case in the case instruments II. EU policy - and econo democratic of Moldova: socialisation and mic conditionality Academics argue that the nature of conditionality in the case of the EU is very fluid (SasseChirila 2008, 2009b, Davalga 2009). There are inconsistencies many in its application European Commission (by and by the EU in general) both the over time and no clear-cut between causal the relationship application of countries, reforms including in Moldova. the ENP conditionality and On the one hand, all instruments used by the EU in its Eastern of neighbourhood conditionality. are When Moldova instruments is something required not or advised doing by the EU, it can lead to a tougher EU position towards Moldova. On the other hand, these processes very difficult to are trace and to prove because usually of the absence of clear cause-effect links. “mega- While the EU is establishing the conditions under under conditions the establishing is EU the While As mentioned before, until now, the most which certain states will receive their rewards, these these rewards, their receive will states certain which and the benefits costs calculating are usually states of the reform before its initiating implementation. Consequently, the implementation requested by the of EU turns into an exercise in cost- reforms benefitbycalculation the target Asstate. a result, the general rule is that “the positive impact of the with EU increases states in on outsider democracy the of conditional size and the the EU’s credibility incentives” (Scholtz/Schimmelfennig 2007: 6). In other words, the larger and more credible the reward, the more likely it conditions. is established the with comply that the state will was reward and the credible functional of promise membership, which is considered to be a emphasis 13, 2005: (Emerson/Noutcheva incentive” in original) and the Moldovan political class still perceives the membership perspective as its own biggest incentive (Leanca 2010). context, In interdependence the is same often in asymmetrical favour of the EU. This is the case for instance, requires conditionality to subjected country a when the EU as export market or is reliant on receiving European aid, but the produced EU being are which goods, the on dependent is not, in country said the of principle, dependence The country. that in on its exports to are the There EU. the of favour EU in asymmetrical highly makes its relationship some exceptions to this, for example in the case of big like countries The Ukraine. gas crises from in that well very cases some showed 2009 January there might be a mutual dependence. 12 SPES Policy Papers 2011 2008: 8). (Sasse agreements” visa to references by replaced has persons of freedom disappeared from Council documents Nevertheless, – it has been the to Commission. reference President “the European then the Prodi, of Romano as by 2002) (Prodi described institutions” but “everything model the following persons), services, and capital of goods, movement (free to freedoms four especially the refers This a incentives. from of benefit variety to countries target the designed allow been to has it the that of provision the aspect is ENP attractive and sizeable most the the of However, 8). “politics 2003: (Timmerman door” half-open the called and being membership, partnership between something generally resembles ENP The 3). 2008: (Sasse countries” structures) neighbouring its and EU the both enforcement for vague “are and incentives (clear conditionality of components important most the because light” “conditionality of form a embodies happens ifMoldovadoesnotcomply. judiciary,the of Moreover,what etc. clear not is it of human rights, freedom of speech, independence the main problematic areas of Moldova in the areas touch not does that issue economic an of example 12). an 1994: is Community This (European years five than more not within area this in conventions multilateral to adhere should intellectual and rights protect property should Moldova that PCA states the concrete of 49 art. on of example, signs for conditionality, focused some are not there However, obligations. is and principles economy EU market and general democracy employing to a commitment not shows document is The Moldova conditionality. and EU the EU the to association (Serebrian 2005). for perspective clear a gave Agreement European the while framework, a with however,different inspired Agreement, European was the PCA by The cooperate. eventually could parties both which in areas of register a as more designed is and document general rather a is It Moldova. and EU the between relationship the h ms rcn plc iiitv ta was that initiative policy recent most The that strategy a considered be could ENP The between signed PCA the that argued be can It finalité i etbihs h institutional the establishes it : l sx countries six all and EU the between relations The impediment. location, geographical this its face not do countries EaP other and Moldova to due EU, the join EU. While it was made those clear that Morocco between the of south the to those and distinction east the to countries a make was to initiative initiated Swedish-Polish This EaP. the is adopted between the EU and its eastern neighbours Azerbaijan, Armenia andBelarus. 11 on thegroundsthatitisnot(geographically)aEuropeancountry. 10 socialisation anddemocraticconditionality. conditionality, economic discuss will subsections the outlined next the Having framework, policy and strategies general 2009b). things (Popescu how to stand as sides both on dissatisfaction Synergy,Sea Black lingering a of proof give EaP) Ostpolitik, (ENP,New basis annual almost an on policy neighbourhood its renew the to attempts EU’s fact, In sectoral countries. better eastern the a of integration for deepen measures platforms strengthen and multilateral EaP The 2009. EU- the Russia summit held in Khabarovsk on 21-22 May, after project the accepted partially 2009), but (Popescu/Wilson in influence interference of as sphere its EaP the considered Russia EU. the in integration for perspective clear a EUproposal be should there that this claiming with 2009), (Meister/May satisfied be to appear norUkraine Moldova Neither offers support. also financial but promises make simply not does EU the that fact the ignore however, statements, (Voronin(CIS) States Independent of Such 2009). Commonwealth EU-launched an create to attempt an as Voronin, Vladimir Moldova, of President former the by characterised was which initiative, this to approach critical a adopted Ukraine) institutional (and Moldova Initially, same ENP. and the PCA – in framework are Belarus, countries, except All development. of level different a

hs cutis r Mloa Urie Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, are countries These Morocco applied to join the EU in 1987 and was rejected 11 nldd n hs rjc ae at are project this in included 10 cannot SPES Policy Papers 2011 13 In order to receive to order In 12 Dr. Igor Munteanu, Executive Director of the Institute for Institute the of Director Executive Munteanu, Igor Dr. The possibility to prove the effects of The ENPI is considered the instrument with 12 Development and Social Initiatives “Viitorul”, interview by author, 2009, Chisinau, Moldova. 26 July, of MFA conditionality were outweighed by the victory’. ‘electoral internal mega-reward conditionality depends on clear compliance conditions; with as such conditions can easily observed be and more measured (Reinhard 2008). illustrate To this, one can consider the case of the Visa Facilitation Agreement. In order to facilitate the issuing of visas and officials journalists, students, as such citizens, for certain categories businessmen, of and to grant free visas for certain other professionals (European and Commission freelance 2007a), to categories Moldova sign had the Readmission oblige to and migration illegal counter to Agreement, designed which is Moldova to readmit all persons not fulfilling the conditions of stay of a given EU state (European Commission Thus, 2007b). in small but important observed. be can conditionality of effect the areas, the strongest conditionality and is applied on an annual basis. This perception of the ENPI is due to the funds offered to the Moldovan government as budgetary support within the the framework of Food Security finances are Programme offered in tranches and according to (FSD). These the recorded economic progress, making the FSD the “single financial instrumentconditionality”. governmental with a strong this budgetary support, Moldova has to comply with the conditions set in the FSD, the which bind government to spend the assistance, money poverty on reduction social and In 2009). compensation Commission (European prices energy for focuses ENPI the that noteworthy is it context, this on three priorities: 1) development support and for good governance, democratic 2) for regulatory reform and support administrative capacity building and 3) support for poverty reduction and economic growth (European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 2007). So far, compliance with the ENPI has been limited capacity of Moldova to absorb funds from deficient, due to the the EU (Munteanu et al. This 2009). is despite the Economic conditionality Economic The most obvious conditionality concrete documents that is offer tangible incentives. present in Probably the most Agreement relevant of of Autonomous which Trade sets these several (ATP), conditions under which Preferences is the Moldova can sell its market: a) goods certify the origin on of goods, b) respect the European methods of administrative cooperation with the EU set out in the prevent Agreement, c) any cooperate risk to of of any fraud, restrictions for d) goods imported non-application from the EU, e) implement the priorities Moldova Action from Plan, the especially EU- those chapters related to economic reforms and, f) engagement to comply with conventions signed by Moldova (European Council 2008). Certainly, the EU expecting a is sort of spill-over from the economic to the political dimension in situation in order which Moldova would to be ‘forced’ to shape a cooperate due to economic dependence EU. on Consequently, there the would be a transfer of EU practices and standards. In the same context, another relevant example is the Macro Financial offered Assistance to (MFA) Moldova by the EU. Since 1991, the EU has given €87 million and the current grant of €15 million has been conditioned, requiring from Moldova certain reforms before disbursement. The main conditions required that Moldova strengthen its fiscal position,fiscal adopt policy, which would a lead to a reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio, enhance transparency and business the improve funds, public of management climate and create better conditions for sector private development 2009). From these two examples, two conclusions (European Commission can be drawn: the conditionality ATP is working well and is mostly results. generating Moldova started the to use anticipated the to exports its increased and the ATP the by offered possibilities EU to 54% in 2009 (National Bureau of Statistics 2009). The conditionality MFA is, however, only partially effective. Whereas the business climate in Moldova appears to have Bank Group 2009), the ratio internal debt-to-GDP improved (World has Basarabiei grown 2009) (Vocea and the fiscal system has worsened. Besides this, and because of the elections and quest for power, the effects 14 SPES Policy Papers 2011 rgams uh s Twinning as such programmes Moldova. the limited administrative and absorption capacity of Commission 2007: 12). In many cases, this is due to andcoherent long-term sector planning” (European national policy level partly due to andsector a at impact lackless hadof but levelproject continuitythe at results “good achieved of programme the evaluation TACIS, the to According programmes. aid Independent States (TACIS) Programme and throughTechnicalCommonwealththe theof Assistance to million €320 (European about Commission 2006), provided mainly Communityusing European the 2006, to different 1991 professional From groups. that indirectly boost the assistance socialisation technical process and among support budget contains ENPI, the under offeredtimeframetheapproved2007-2013,forwhich and being is Moldova to 13).Today, thelargest share 2005: ofEuropean (Emerson/Noutcheva assistance etc.” drawn, lessons emulation, model learning, social in results which students), and society civil business, government, (e.g. levels all or any at partner [European] the with ofincluding “a process behavioural as andidentity change defined through interaction is and track the on country target the positions Socialisation is a mechanism used by the EU, which Socialisation comply with. to parts easiest the of one is this that fact the by explained is and benefits social and prices energy of compensation to related activities of fulfilment the in observed been has progress good that fact Russia (EuropeanCommission2009). The and 1996. countries ENP countries, since candidate for available operational is programme been has which acquis Community the of enforcement and application adoption, the in assistance term short- for instrument institution-building an (TAIEX)is Programme 14 Commission (European 2009). communautaire acquis the implement to needed skills management and resources human structures, the with beneficiary help to countries in the development 1998 of modern and efficient administrations, in launched programme a is – Twinning 13 uhrte i peaig oeet etr strategies sector coherent preparing in authorities Plan. Action the Theseprogrammes are of designed tosupport national implementation the support n h sm vi, h E i crety using currently is EU the vein, same the In h Tcncl sitne n Ifrain Exchange Information and Assistance Technical The – Building Institution for Assistance Pre-Accession 13 n TAIEX and Europeanisation 14 to to Mnen e a. 09. hs te top-down concept that could the essentially raise the Thus, government’s 2009).approach should be al.complemented with a bottom-up et (Munteanu environment the and rights human to related issues some and campaigns electoral showing in mainly interest (NGOs), organisations governmental non- Moldova’s financed poorly has EU the far, so economicdeepertransformation.reformsand But, democratic more run to government the persuade and demands make latter’s potential to the to due EUcould rely oncivil society credibleasa partner, important role in the transformation of Moldova. The research opportunitiesintheEU. among Moldovan students in dealing with study and experiencedeficitanprogrammes theseand about This reveals a deficient dissemination of information Mundusprogramme (European Commission 2009). Erasmus the under scholarships received students 6 by Moldovan universities within Tempus IV and only academicthe year2008-2009, projects9 were won implementationtheENPof2008in shows that, for and their full extent. For example, the Progress Report on the students to programmes of Mundus Erasmus and useTempus IV make European not did Moldova institutions, amongst unknown socialisation process. the of considerations in instruments these of inclusion exchange the justify learning, social through and socialisation for environment programmesthesepositivegenerateof mosta that includedbe undereconomic conditionality, thefact Although Twinning and TAIEX projects could easily only by Ukraine (129 projects) (Vanhoeacker 2009). Moldova are much better Jordan-10 (88 projects), Tunisia- being and (Vanhoeackeroverrun 2009).TAIEX,forAs results Georgia-13 thefor Ukraine-32, Azerbaijan-21, 23, Egypt-32, Morocco-32, Ukraine): (except perspective membership a on demands no less with integration and European on rhetoric preparation/ countries under behind falling 6 identification), and launched/ongoing projects (2 8 mere a has Moldova that shows which example,one may consider the latest data for 2009, littleprogresswinninginTwinning projects. an As made has Moldova However, field. the in issues and teach the employees who are working with such Last but not least, civil society plays an equally equally an plays society civil least, not but Last relatively still is country, it a as though,Even SPES Policy Papers 2011 15 The 16 (Youngs (Youngs 17 . The document . The document 15 EU-Moldova Action Plan, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/ EU-Moldova Dr. Igor Munteanu, Director of the Institute for Harald Berwanger, Expert of the German Social Generally, Generally, the EU–Moldova Action Plan 15 pdf/action_plans/moldova_enp_ap_final_en.pdf, accessed 2 August, 2010. 16 Development and Social Initiatives “Viitorul”, interview by author, 2009, Chisinau, Moldova. 26 July, 17 Democratic Party (SPD) on Eastern Europe, interview by author, 11 August, 2009, Berlin, Germany. Republic of Moldova Action Plan is is “consistent” (Buscaneanu 2007), 294 and actions 7 objectives, areas of cooperation. having 80 The vast majority of these actions and objectives were to be implemented by Moldova, with only 14 of these referring explicitly to the EU and 40 concerning both. As such, the document illustrates an asymmetric volume of tasks and responsibilities following (Buscaneanu the 2007). In general, for the the resembles Partnership Accession candidate Action “centre-periphery” Plan Reports Country ENP Commission’s The countries. model are similar to the opinions Commission’s for the and countries the candidate ENP Reports Progress Reports Regular Commission the to comparable are relating documents the However, candidates. the for reform the on details fewer contain countries ENP to progress (Sasse 2008). The monitoring process is “reminiscent of the formalism, generalities absence and of clear benchmarks that the characterised during the countries candidate the on reports regular (Sasse 2006: 1). Eastern enlargement” is monitored quite statements attentively. on However, the the remain very cautious and usually no punishments non-implemented if, Even chapters according are mentioned. or consequences to official reports, only the experienced backsliding, EU observes limited 2 of 147 actionsor have minor progress among the remainder. EU’s EU’s policy of with through dialogue engagement Moldova has been characterised as issue “keeping of and democracy human rights high the on the agenda, but not the really punishing undemocratic practices” (Kwarciak/Panainte 2006: 34). reason for such The behaviour is the EU’s desire keep Moldova to at least partly cooperative 2008). Otherwise, if the EU punished Moldova, the the Moldova, punished EU the if Otherwise, 2008). latter might with cooperate Russia and put a stop In February 2005, following the ENP A general assertion is that many organisations and organisations many that is assertion general A institutions in do Moldova not know how institutions to apply and use within European funds because to aspect, their political full extent. symbolic The a has ENPI the ENPI there are also programmes, In this countries. which for accession available were previously being are countries ENP other and Moldova regard, financing ENPI The countries. accession like treated is based on a system of of earmarking EU funds, which, however, results in more difficult access to EU As funds. a result, a upgrade political may a In context, this downgrade. an economic become joint a of establishment the be would solution viable experts EU which in Unit Application EU-Moldova how and others teach experience their share would lead would which application, successful a submit to is socialisation as socialisation, of degree greater a to twinningand exchange different within mostly done programmes. Democratic conditionality In 2008, the PCA expired and provisions. due to its was special by one year, extended automatically The a received Commission European mandate to However, 2008. December in PCA new the negotiate the on conditions placed Commission European the negotiation of a new agreement by stating that thewould agreement future of the quality the and level freeassured Moldova which to extent the on depend used conditionality the However, elections. fair and elections, The fair purpose. its and served not has free EU the by partially only were 2009, April, 5 on held the of 2009). (OSCE protests violent by followed were and occasion the on seen be could compliance More which 2009), July, (29 elections parliamentary early previously the of dissolution the after organised were Although an improvement in theelected parliament. remain still they observed, was elections of standard deficit. in the EU framework, and the signed Moldova EU – accountability accountability as well as society’s awareness, as the reports assessment show that the EU is likely to fund more on government budget support Sustainability NGO (2008 NGOs thanto assistance direct 2010; Index, Sustainability NGO 2009 2009; Index, Munteanu et al. 2009). 16 SPES Policy Papers 2011 Conditionality Democratic Socialisation Conditionality Economic far ad euiy oiy n Vc Peiet f h European the of President ViceCommission (changesmadeafterthe adoptionoftheLisbon Treaty). and Policy Security and Affairs 19 Association, interviewbyauthor, 11 June,2009, Chisinau,Moldova. 18 majority ofMoldova’s exportsgototheEU. the that given happen, to unlikely is this that argued be may it hand,other the reforms.ongoingOn to is publicly visible and trying to promote the EU’sthepromote to trying andpubliclyvisible is whereas the EUSR has no money or instruments but active,verybe appeartoinstruments notdoes and gap. The European Union Delegation has funds EU- and influenced substantially Moldovarelations. This not is mainly due to a systemic has EUSR far, the So conflict. Transnistrian the political and EU-Moldova dialogue the of promotion the with andthe Council of the EU. TheEUSR deals mainly Javier Solana and now represents Catherine Ashton Representative formerly represented who (EUSR), appointedEuropeanhasSpecialUnionthe EU the olwn te betvs f h Ato Plan, Action the of objectives the Following

Te U ih ersnaie f h Uin o Foreign for Union the of Representative High EU The Policy Foreign of Director Executive Chirila, Victor

Instruments Action Plan Twinning Autonomous Trade Preferences to Moldova Statements ofEU’s Ambassadors EU SpecialRepresentative Election supervision Advisors EUBAM Erasmus Mundus/ Tempus Civil SocietySupport TAIEX Macro Financial Assistance Visa Facilitation Budgetary Support 18

Assessment Minimally effective/moderately effective Moderately effective 29 July, 2009) Moderately/highly effective (mainlywithregard to electionsfrom tely effective intermsofsocialissues derately/highly effective intermsofeconomicissuesandmodera Moderately/minimally effective intermsofdemocracyissues,mo no evaluationresultssofar As theEUadvisorymissionwasdeployedinspring2010,thereare sing transparency(seechapterIIIforfulldescription) Effective/moderately effective indecreasingsmugglingandincrea tive forErasmusMundus Moderately effective for Tempus andmoderately/minimally effec- interest oftheEU Moderately effective duetoatop-downapproachandinsufficient Highly effective (secondcountrywithinENP) Minimally effective duetosmallabsorptioncapacity Partially effective, halfoftheconditionswerenotmet and extendedcategoriesofbeneficiaries ant, butpublicopinionrequestslessdocumentsforvisaprocessing Moldova signedtheReadmission Agreement andisfullycompli Almost fullcomplianceandtargeted spending Mostly successfulimplementationandalmostfullcompliance 19 Table I. TheimpactofEUconditionalityinMoldova2001-2009

messages. United Kingdom. on Foreign Relations, interview by author, 18 August, 2009, London, 21 London, UnitedKingdom. author,by 18 interview 2009, Relations, August, Foreign on Council 20 shows themainresultsofaboveanalysis. separately, treated as they beproduced different should effectiveness results. their conditionality Table shown, economicI has and democratic the of analysis the As future. the in changedemocratic (European Commission 2009: 22) and for endorsing whichallocated €16,6million goodforgovernance GovernanceFacilitytheProgramme,with 2008 in rewarded was Moldova Thus, 2009a). (Popescu decade and last the in elections powerconstitutional of transfer through occurred change government a which of in CIS, the from country only ot N cutis n opyn wt EU with complying in conditionality. countries ENP most eetees Mloa a dn bte than better done has Moldova Nevertheless, Dr. Nicu Popescu, Policy Fellow at the European Council Dr. Andrew Wilson, Senior Policy Fellow at the European 20 21 o eape Mloa s the is Moldova example, For - - - - SPES Policy Papers 2011 17 (Popescu/Wilson 2009: 38) (Popescu/Wilson and usually do not take place 23 to Russia, the energy dependence on 22 Insofar as Moldova does not recognise the breakaway For a detailed explanation see Miler (2010). EU information centres Lingering accession hopes Biggest trading partner Economic opportunities Aid to governments and civil society Supports democracy Table Table II gives a comparative overview of the In this context, the government regularly • • • • • • European Union European because Russia uses direct economic tools such reforms Other products. different on embargoes as are related to Moldova’s foreign policy priorities that Russia is trying to influence by its powerful media that is largely popular Moldova. and broadcast in Eastern the in power soft of use Russia’s and EU’s Partnership countries. Russian energy resources, and the political pro-Russian parties are only a few examples where outrunning the EU. Russia is consistently does not implement reforms due to the influence exerted by Russia. Some of political or historical in nature (problem these of Soviet reforms are occupation) 22 becomes Transnistria of debt billion $US1.8 the Transnistria, of region debt. Moldova’s 23 governments) governments) is still through key manipulated mechanisms where the EU by is weak Russia and has no tools to influence. The Transnistrian many of control the minority, Russian the conflict, Transnistria’s capital, Russian by companies media gas debt Table II. Russia’s and EU’s use of soft power in the Eastern Partnership countries use of soft power in the Eastern Partnership countries and EU’s II. Russia’s Table Rhetoric of fraternity Multilateral institutions with membership benefits Strategic investments regime and open labour market Visa-free Protects authoritarian regimes The “sovereign democracy” model Sets the media narrative • • • • • • • Russia Evaluating the impact overlaps to of due challenges with fraught EU is Moldova conditionality in implemented the assessing while appear could that result might difficulties These Moldova. in reforms from the fact that one cannot precisely distinguish whether the government of Moldova is compliant with the requests of the EU due motivation or because to of globalisation trends. For an intrinsic a complete conditionality changing assessment and one intervening should are that factors the analyse These power. transformative EU’s the of impact the internal (3) Transnistria; (2) Russia; (1) are factors political struggles; and (4) EU hesitance because of Russia. Russia The Russian Federation, as traditional player in an this area, knows historical better than and the EU how to employ conditionality and other instruments to achieve its interests and reduce the that declared Moldova if Even EU. the of influence its strategic priority was European integration, the current Moldovan government (and all previous III. The impact of EU conditionality conditionality impact of EU III. The intervening Analysing in Moldova: variables 18 SPES Policy Papers 2011 netv. t ean ucer o ht extent what to simply could examples these from accession unclear drawn lessons the remains of It lack incentive. the of because weaker significantly course 2004 of is conditionality 2007, in and EU the joined that countries European some progress. Compared with the Central Eastern had when it initially set up the ENP, there has been Moldova have not met the expectations that the EU helping usdoso”(Emerson2005:1). be to pretend EU) (the they and values European common on converging be to pretend countries) relationship” (ENP “we when the joke a seems It of 4). 2008: (Sasse substance the than rather rhetoric the “deepen to opportunities many offer requested the reform. implement to reluctance this for account base) power its consolidate to leadership political the of desire the (e.g. reasons reveals other that however, look, closer A small. too fact in is reward the that arguing reform particular a the implement to principle, refuses sometimes in party governing attractive is reward the even when Nevertheless, transformation. for catalyst a receiving of assurance the general, In criticism. of wave a generate might EU the by requested reforms the and state companies the from aid financial state-owned receiving still are the of Many 6). 2008: (Kratochvil/Lippert efficiency market improve to order in subsidies” and aid state of “removal the as ENPsuch not like reforms citizens, among popular are EU the by requested reforms the Often, its this’ justify is not enough to proceed with implementation. to requires ‘EU the that argument the and decisions needs reforms, government many starting Moldova’s While forecast? not is membership if implemented be reforms economic costly should why poses: government Moldovan the question simple and usual the appears Here the that reforms. the of cost calculation the than smaller are rewards their is elites Moldova’s among problem biggest The EU. the by offered incentives small too to due Moldova, in observed clearly be conditionality,cannot and socialisation ENP,the of principles differentiation,The as such Internal struggles Although the results of the EU´s policy towards mechanisms these that argue authors Some consistent ead ih wr a a as work might reward le te oetc aac bten those reforms between against within Moldova. those balance and favour in domestic interested the enough provide alter significantly to could that failed incentives and has attention EU the while reforms, careful rather and partial in only engage the government. In of conclusion, Moldovan ruling elites base power the endanger to when seemed they short fallen always nearly have relations EU-Moldova of framework the within required reforms Moldova, In themselves. countries their of modernisation the for reforms decisive more and faster wanted usually latter the political of leadership the where countries European Eastern another is Central other and Moldova This between dissimilarity groups. political or economic uncomfortable democratic developments for some generate would reforms that fact actual the to due 2-8) their 2008b: with Commission short (European implementation fell EU-Moldova but the Plan, in Action outlined requirements of number a to legislation adopted have authorities sanctions. over dialogue political prefer would EU the that not are fulfilled. conditions In such cases, one could always calculate the if even withdrawn be to rewards likely not are they granted, once and progress; as for only not and reasons political other or economic for granted be, to likely are or been, advantages. But, in the case of Moldova, they have considerable offer agreement, trade free future a even or preferences, Trade Facility. Governance designed instruments to specifically to reward political applies reforms, such as the also this and perspective; accession explicit an with countries the ENPI is comparatively small comparatively is ENPI the of framework the within provided assistance the because weaker also is Conditionality situation. the social to and economic political, regards different country’s with Moldova to transferred be 29 July, 2009,Chisinau, Moldova. the German Christian Democratic Union (CDU), interview by author, 25 different sources). from (author’scalculations EU the from million €317 approximately 24 n priua polm s ht Moldovan that is problem particular One h nw oenet f odv ta took that Moldova of government new The Dr. Martin Sieg, Foreign Policy and Security Adviser at Adviser Security and Policy Foreign Sieg, Martin Dr. receive will Moldova 2008-2012 period the For 25 24 as compared to compared as SPES Policy Papers 2011 19 Since Russia is supporting is Russia Since 30 Elena Gnedina, Visiting Research Fellow at the Centre 30 for European Policy Studies, interview by author, 18 August, 2009, London, United Kingdom. blockades blockades and energy interests in the short run, in the long term they actually cuts may advance diminish Russian leverage Russian by driving target states (Popescu/ markets” export or economies their diversify to 2009: 45). Wilson The EU became more engaged in order to assure that there would be no such a developments represents EUBAM The as 2008. August in in Georgia nevertheless, but instrument, conditionality of sort the EUBAM also brings transparency and more border. the to security the conflict settlement in Transnistria at a declarative a at Transnistria in settlement conflict the level, it does not openly criticise the EUBAM or other EU instruments that are used to deal Russia influences issue. However, with Transnistria the the process the express usually who Smirnov Igor like leaders’ through so-called unofficial point of view of Russia. ‘Transnistrian EU hesitance The new or Agreement PCA the Association New (without a membership perspective) an represents important tool of influence. Theto negotiate EU agreed the new agreement Moldovan elections only in April 2009 after and July 2009 the last the in that, is problem The 2009). al. et (Botan four years, Brussels admonished that had Moldova not implemented a series of the chapters EU-Moldova from Action Plan mainly independence media, related the of freedom rights, human to of the judiciary and the fight against corruption (Prohnitchi et al. 2008). voiced The EU’s claims, by as completely European ignored by Moldovan representatives. officials,Despite this werefact, the EU has continued to tolerate almost the way in which Moldova pretends to implement democratic reforms, the being pro-European ’appreciative’ rhetoric government. of Empty promises of not backed up the for “déjà-vu” a by almost became action concrete any Moldovan European officials (Chirila 2009a). There is some evidence that the EU has geopolitical reasons for having very cautious and soft attitudes towards Moldova and other countries (Chirila irritation in Russia’s incurring avoid to order the region, in 2009c; Munteanu 2009; Ciurea 2009). Thus, it is , 28 recommend 26 after the Russian-Georgian Russian-Georgian the after 29 is the outcome of EU and US efforts. efforts. US and EU of outcome the is 27 Germany, Poland, Romania, Lithuania and Sweden. Germany, Memorandum Draft Russian (officially plan “Kozak” The The inclusion of the EU in the negotiation format (5+2) The mandate of EUBAM has been prolonged until enhancing the cooperation within The EaP. EU’s openness towards the new government represents unprecedented levels of cooperation in a situation where Moldova findscrisis. itself The former in terrible government financial an economic situation left and massive behind disorder in a the judicial system that is causing significant difficulties in dealingattempts to reform many sectors. with the government’s Transnistria A good example of the EU’s partial success in Moldova is related to the Transnistrian conflict. Moldova’s refusal of the Russian federalisation “Kozak” plan an idea which Russia vehemently opposed. Even it is at least if the EU remains only as an observer, territorial Moldova’s of problems the to connected integrity. The EU’s interest in the rose Transnistrian significantly issue 26 27 on the Basic Principles of the State Structure of a Moldova) was a United federalisation plan proposed by State Russia in 2003 in and due to the influence Voronin by President in the last moment rejected and diplomats. of many international organisations 28 of the Transnistrian settlement should also be regard. emphasised in this 29 December 2011. “war in pressure Georgia – economically, politically and demonstrated ideologically – that had failed. What is more, while Russian embargoes, the Russian office after theJuly elections in2009 met some difficulties with the transfer of communist power from the party. The Alliance Integration, formed for by four European democratic parties, might have more chances to reforms and boost to bring democratic Moldova closer to the EU. The new government is asking inclusion for in Moldova’s the ’Balkan same package’, time, but at many the EU members war (Grund/Sieg 2008), because the On the same issue, in 2006 the the EU European established Union Border Assistance the in Mission border Ukraine – Moldova the on (EUBAM) perimeter of the Transnistria breakaway region 20 SPES Policy Papers 2011 United Kingdom. on Foreign Relations, interview by author, 18 August, 2009, London, 32 Germany. Berlin, 2009, August, 24 author, by interview Affairs, Security and 31 privileges offered EU’s the with dissatisfaction Moldova’s and Moldova about knowledge limited EU’s the is failure policy’s EU the to factor contributing a context, this In 2009b). (Chirila governance good and rights human as such areas, policy other for said be also can same The happen. to likely most is which reforms, committed of implementation qualitative and timely by conditioned strictly be should incentives these but 2008a), Commission (European free-trade) and regime liberalisation EaP is offering both integration components (a visa the that say might One liberalisation agenda. EU-Moldova the visa on appeared already have and which of both regime, agreement trade free comprehensive and deep a including strategies, add not clear components of European integration does to these EU the if destiny same the suffer might EaP and ENP The sphere. political the in particularly period, 2001-2009 the in Moldova in 2008). (Kratochvil/Lippert illustrated wine on imposed embargoes of case the as ‘advice’, Russian with non-compliance for and EU the towards openness more for Moldova punish might Russia that fear the elite’sexpense, the at dialogue political real a the former within Moldovan government (2001-2009) will to start political of lack the include can we EU’srecommendations the of implementation the impeding factors the Among 2009a). (Chirila irritate Russia – might result in a lack of credibility to unwillingness its to due – countries eastern the of some in promotion democracy of detriment the to game geopolitical the playing actor, normative a be to perceived is EU the as long as that argued regime. f hs meig ws h poie f €100 a disbursed was of which EU, the from promise credit million the was meetings aspect these significant of most The officials. EU with meetings many been have there power,into come The EU mainly failed to implement its policy its implement to failed mainly EU The Since the Alliance for European Integration has 32 Dr. Nicu Popescu, Policy Fellow at the European Council Dr. Anneli Ute Gabanyi, German Institute for International 31 epcal toe eae t te visa the to related those especially , ates o eom h ms iprat sectors important programme Moldova” “Re-Think the most within the reform to partners the €2 billion, which will be spent by development mention to noteworthy also is It 2009). October late in (signed from Fund Monetary million International the $US580 received Moldova after edit-110310.pdf, accessed30March,2010. org/INTMOLDOVA/Resources/Rethink-Moldova-2010-2013-Final- http://siteresources.worldbank. 2010, Development, Term Medium 33 as soonreformsarecarriedout. membership perspective will appear on the agenda the and process reform Moldova’s of stagnation the for reasons other many are for there shown, analysis has this prerequisite As process. reform mandatory the continuing membership a concrete as Criteria a perspective Copenhagen demanding stop the and fulfilling on focus to a EU membership perspective, Moldova should regard In reforms. these of implementation the in society involve and path reform comprehensive a for Moldova. funds of availability the revoked end, the in and, million $US200 to credit the limited government Russian the office, Alliance took Integration the European of After government. former the support for its of signal clear a was 2009) (Infotag elections parliamentary 2009 July, 29 the before promised Federation worth Russian the million from credit of $US500 The support. financial giving when party governing the of colour the to contrast to Russia, the EU pays almost no attention The new Moldovan government should pursue should government Moldovan new The Government of Moldova, Rethink Moldova, Priorities for 33 . In . SPES Policy Papers 2011 21 - Alongside Moldova, the EU has its own Finally, one of the main factors that are As for my recommendations, there are several boost its socialisation strategies by engaging Moldova in more official frameworks (as sug gested in the EaP), Application Unit for create an EU-Moldova the earmarking EU funds, increase the incentives for reforms, especially along the political dimension, create a link between political progress and eco- economic incentives by granting larger nomic incentives for political reforms and compliance, Transnistrian increase its involvement in the conflict and continue to support EUBAM and and other related concerns. Currently, Moldova’s society is not aware of many reforms and the top- high-quality produce to able not is approach down results without civil society support, which is still financed. modest and poorly shortcomings. The ENP lacks political instruments change, although for it has economic leverage development, over the Autonomous Trade Preferences being a relevant with this example. instrument, the EU In is expecting a spill- line over from economic to political dialogue, which remains EU the if years coming the in occur might biggest trade partner. Moldova’s contributing to the in failure Moldova, of but some neighbourhood, is the also Russian factor. policies Russia has in the a vital interest in keeping its influence in this area whole eastern for reasons of geographical proximity and other benefits. The Russian Federation is successfully counterbalancing and often outrunning the in Moldova EU by using its hard power tactics, like blackmail, fuelling the energy Transnistrian resources, conflict, embargoes like and media soft control, power free-visa the makes This minorities. Russian or investments regime, strategic objective of keeping Moldova on the European integration path a challenging policy goal, which is nevertheless achievable. actions that could improve the ongoing The EU should: process. reform • • • • • It is obvious that Moldova would like to join To advance its relationship with the EU, In line with the conditionality applied to the This research has shown that the impact EU’s of conditionality the is modest in that Moldova conditionality and has not been able to produce high quality results as in the case of the accession countries. Its impact in the political and economic separately. fields should be considered rhetoric the by encouraged being not is but EU, the of the EU or by the partnership framework. The absence of the mega-incentive makes of the membership EU’s current incentives to induce insufficient Moldova’s compliance, given that the costs of the required reforms are bigger than the announced rewards. This also reduces the quality of the reforms; many of which have been adopted in legislation, but fallen short in implementation. Moreover, a lack of a clear-cut cause-effect links between conditionality and outcomes a deleterious has effect. In had many cases, reforms are implemented at the governments’ own initiative for adjusting to world economic trends and not as a result of European influence. underpinning by ‘homework’ its do to has Moldova its rhetoric with some facts and filling its requests with some substance. continues to Nevertheless, apply positive conditionality, the even though Moldova EU is not fully complying. In context, this the EU does not inflict punishmentnon-compliance, for trying to engage with Moldova and create linkages, which might later a become point of leverage to to influence apply Moldova and stronger comprehensive analysis should conditionality. be undertaken by However, a most be could pressure where determine to EU the effective. Keeping Moldova the cooperative EU with is another reason Otherwise, punishment for may non-punishment. induce Moldova to reform the quit to and Russia with more cooperate path. approach bottom-up a be should there government, with substantial support for NGOs in fields where Moldova still suffers from deficiencies, such as human rights, freedom of speech, social issues Conclusions and recommendations Conclusions 22 SPES Policy Papers 2011 • • • • • adapt itspoliciestothespecificsituationin Moldova’s integrity, Moldova Action Plan. monitor closelytheimplementationofEU- of laws, upon theimplementation(notonlyadoption) assistance (especiallythebudgetarysupport) condition theamountofmacro-economic deeper relationshipwiththeEU, pation to/ofMoldova,whichwouldleadtoa multilateral institutionalmembership/partici intensify thepoliticaldialoguebyoffering achieved, tion untilthevisaliberalisationprocessis offer abettervisaregimeforcircularmigra ship andindividualisation, Moldova, meaningco-ownershipofpartner - - - SPES Policy Papers 2011 23 CEPS MPRA MPRA Foreign Foreign Foreign Alternatives: L’Union L’Union Européenne et ses : quel avenir pour le nouveau le pour avenir quel : . 15 April, 2009. . http://www. 15 Timpul Prohnitchi/Alexandru Oprunenco/Ana Popa/Adrian 8 (1): 1-18. South East European Studies . Programme Oxford: St Antony’s . Brussels: Bruylant. . 6 May, 2009. http://www.timpul.md/article/2009/05/06/1967, accessed http://www.timpul.md/article/2009/05/06/1967, 2009. May, 6 . Timpul . Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies. Turkish Journal of International Relations Turkish College. University of Oxford. College. University Commitment to the Process.” [Moldova in the firstENP, evaluation report of the European Commission] Chisinau: Asociatia pentru Democratie Participativa. Lupusor/Victoria Lupusor/Victoria Vasilescu (2009): “Implementarea reformelor Actiuni initiate UE-RM, Evaluarea progresului conform în perioada aprilie-iunie Planului 2009.” [Implementation of de the reforms Action initiated Plan, April-June within Evaluation 2009] the of EU-Moldova progress in Euromonitor 15. Chisinau: Asociatia pentru August, 2009. accessed 8 Democratie www.e-democracy.md/files/euromonitor15.pdf, Participativa si Expert-Grup. http:// not have]. PRO Chisinau. TV. 18 October, 2009. http://protv.md/stiri/politic/carl-bildt-moldova- 2009. accessed 19 October, cheltuie-bani-pe-care-nu-i-are.html, espaces de proximité, Entre stratégie inclusive et partenariats rénovés partenariats et inclusive stratégie Entre proximité, de espaces voisinage de l’Union? 3386. Pisa: Department of Economics, University of Pisa. Paper 3386. Pisa: Department of Economics, Policy Brief 71 burden for the EU?] the for burden 14 June, 2009. UE.” [Eastern Partnership – a possible transition/preparedness for accession to the EU] Policy Association. 3 September, 2009. http://www.ape.md/libview.php?l=ro&idc=152&id=817, 2009. accessed 18 October, accessed 14 June, 2009. ape.md/libview.php?l=ro&idc=152&id=607, Policy Association. 11 December, 2008. http://www.ape.md/libview.php?l=ro&idc=152&id=442, accessed 14 June, 2009. 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