ISBN 978-9934-564-01-7 1

THE MOLDOVAN INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT, HOSTILE NARRATIVES, AND THEIR RAMIFICATIONS

PREPARED BY THE NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE 2 ISBN 978-9934-564-01-7 THE MOLDOVAN INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT, HOSTILE NARRATIVES, AND THEIR RAMIFICATIONS

Project director: Antti Sillanpää Research team: Antti Sillanpää, Nadine Gogu, Igor Munteanu, Ion Bunduchi, Viorel Parvan, Marian Cepoi

Text Editor: Anna Reynolds Production & Copy Editor: Linda Curika Design of illustrations: Sergejs Bižāns The NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence, based in Latvia, is a multinational, cross-sector organization which provides comprehensive analyses, advice and practical support to the alliance and allied nations. This report is a product of the AN TO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE). It is produced for NATO, NATO member countries, NATO partners, related private and public institutions and related individuals. It does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO. © All rights reserved by the NATO StratCom COE. Reports may not be copied, reproduced, distributed or publicly displayed without reference to the NATO StratCom COE.

Riga, July 2017, 2nd edition (changes in page 56, see table "Moldovan Opinion Leaders Landscape") NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Riga, Kalnciema iela 11b, Latvia LV1048 www.stratcomcoe.org Ph.: 0037167335463 [email protected] 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... ……………………..4

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND...... ……………………..9

VULNERABILITIES AND MEDIA COVERAGE ...... …………..12

HOSTILE NARRATIVES AND PROPAGANDA ...... ………………..21

WHO CONTROLS THE MEDIA AND PEOPLE’S MEDIA CONSUMPTION? ...... ………………..35

LANDSCAPING THE MEDIA MARKET AND IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONING...... ……..52

THE MAIN INFLUENCERS OF PUBLIC OPINION ...... ……………..55

ANNEXES ...... …………...... …………..67

AND MEDIA COVERAGE INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Antti Sillanpää

This study describes the current promoted by the Kremlin and its information environment of Moldova. local affiliates, local media ownership The main focus is on how societal and control, and the most influential vulnerabilities are exploited by opinion-leaders in Moldova. political actors who are following Conclusions and recommendations policies promoted by the Kremlin. are given at the end of each section. The mechanisms linking societal vulnerabilities and people’s behaviour People living in Moldova today worry are described here in order to about their children’s future, poverty, unemployment, prices, corruption, better understand the Moldovan 1 information environment, especially and the possibility of war. This the Russian influence on Moldovan report highlights the importance of politics. Compared to a traditional corruption, weak state structures, the target audience analysis, this study dysfunctional political system, and the highlights the importance of the regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia structure of media environment, as the major vulnerabilities currently which promotes hostile Kremlin faced by Moldovan society. All of narratives in Moldova (see picture these issues are closely linked to both page 5). This study assumes that poverty and the lack of security many societal problems are not discussed people feel in the unstable political in a vacuum. Moldovans’ perception environment. of what is going on around them and These vulnerabilities are effectively the actions they take in response are leveraged to foster mistrust and shaped by the structure of and key polarization. After analysing the actors in the media environment. As a situation, we cluster Kremlin result, only some topics are selected promoted messages, speeches, for public consumption. videos, demonstrations, and other The chapters that follow describe the acts. We consider these clusters as vulnerabilities in today’s Moldovan 1 Barometer of Public Opinion, 2016. society, the divisive narratives Institute for Public Policies. Source: http://ipp. md/lib.php?l=en&idc=156 9. Study of Modovan information Evironment 5

Background information Vulnerabilities, perceived reality History, population and other country data

Media structure Infrastructure Media channels, usage patterns Ownership and control

Opinion leaders Persons Organizations

Topics and narratives

four identifiable hostile narratives that be contradictory, such as the idea serve to create divisions in an already of Russkii Mir, which attempts to fragmented society. We have named link the Moldovans more closely to them ‘Russkii Mir and Soviet Nostalgia’, their former Russian rulers, while ‘Federalization Will Ensure Equality’, federalization strategy claims to ‘The European Union is Bad, Russia’s promote self-determination for the Customs Union is What You Need’, ethnic Moldovan majority. Therefore, and ‘Romania and NATO are a Threat hostile narratives are not meant as to Peace’. Each of these narratives idealized truth that the audience targets feelings and emotions—the should swallow whole. Instead, sense of belonging, the sense of self- individuals pick and choose the story determination, a sense of economic elements that make sense to them, security, and a sense of physical security. like choosing dishes from a buffet. Each narrative touches upon particular What is crucial is that people accept a Moldovan vulnerabilities, but the tactics portion of the misleading information, behind them can be recognised in other, which itself is enough to deepen the similar narratives promoted by Vladimir wedges between the various factions Putin’s Kremlin in other countries along of Moldovan society. the Russian border. Post-Soviet narratives are a mix of The ideas in these hostile narratives residual memories, political failures, overlap, sharing many of the same and regional conflicts. Ideological features. For instance, ideological narratives affect minds and public conservatism supports both cultural behaviour via emotions and iconic propagation and is opposed to images. The ‘Russkii Mir and Soviet economic ties with the European Nostalgia’ narrative inspires unity Union. These narratives can also between Moldovans and Russia on 6 an emotional, even spiritual, level. Echoing messages from the Kremlin, The idea of Russkii Mir,’ or ‘the some political leaders are claiming Russian world’, is an ideology built that Western expansionism is on the assumption that those who underway, or that NATO and Romania speak Russian think and act like have ambitions towards the East. The the subset of Russians currently in narrative has produced results: a large power. In Moldova, this manifests number of Moldovans favour both itself through emphasizing Russian Vladimir Putin and political neutrality, Orthodox religion, remembering and which suggests that these audiences cherishing the sacrifices made during do not see the risks the current the Great Patriotic War, and clearly Russian regime poses to the region. distinguishing between Moldova and Romania. These are attempts to create These narratives are most powerfully positive feelings about influence from communicated through various forms the East and sharing the conservative of media. Without a mechanism for Russian mental space. the transmission of these narratives, they would have a limited audience The ‘Federalization Will Ensure and those sending messages would Equality’ narrative comprises acts be unable to bring about changes in and messages that stress the equality the behaviour of the people they seek of different ethnic groups living in to influence. Moldova. Here Russia wants to take on the role of an alternative to the For the most part, the Moldovan Moldovan titular group. The portrayal people are only exposed to that of Russians as the most important information, which local powerbrokers linguistic minority can be challenged. or the Kremlin-controlled media want Not only is the size of Ukrainian them to be aware of. At the moment population bigger, but Russians are Moldova has too many media outlets closely followed by other groups in for them all to remain economically number. Politically, federalization viable in the small Moldovan economy. might create veto-rights for the This reduces the quality of the news administrative areas of Transnistria and creates an incentive for affluent and Gagauzia, which themselves actors to promote their own agendas. are closely linked with Russia due to A handful of individuals in Moldova various historical circumstances. and the Kremlin are effectively The narrative ‘The European Union dominating the news landscape. is Bad, Russia’s Customs Union Much of the control lies in the hands of is What You Need’ seems to be politicians or oligarchs such as Vladimir about economics, but actually the Plahotniuc, who has consolidated arguments used are often based on his business and political power ideological conservatism and used to structure, leveraging also his media create fear among Moldovans. The assets. Plahotniuc plays a leading related Kremlin narrative, ‘Romania role in the pro-Western Democratic and NATO are a Threat to Peace’, Party of Moldova, while his television leverages people’s sense of insecurity. channels run programming produced 7 by Kremlin-controlled media. Some other influential politicians and businessmen active in the media include Chiril Luchinschi, Vlad Filat, Vadim Ciubara, Victor Țopa, Dan Hostile narratives Lozovan, Dumitru Țîra, and Ilan Shor. This report includes charts showing are kept alive who controls the Moldovan media (see picture page 48) and which with minimal parties are affiliated with pro-Kremlin and Pro-Western media outlets. (see effort. picture page 47). The media is a pipeline that carries content. Journalists and researchers, who influence the national agenda, the vulnerabilities of Moldova, the create the content. They are influential population itself is divided along several because audiences see and hear them lines. Self-interest, greed, and lust for actively analysing and discussing power are often veiled in political pressing issues. According to our rhetoric, which makes evaluating the study, some of the most influential information environment challenging. opinion-makers were Corneliu Ciurea, Large segments of Moldovan society Serghei Ostaf, Veaceslav Ionita, Victor are inclined to agree with messaging Gurau, and Alexandru Cauia, who originating from the Kremlin,2 while happen to be especially popular on the pro-Western segments of the platforms connected with Plahotniuc. population are divided on a number Because the situation in Moldova of issues. The current Moldovan shows every indication of remaining understanding of Western or challenging, there will be a constant European values is often distorted stream of opportunities to negatively either by adversaries, or by non- affect the fragile development of pro- credible proponents of alternative Western narratives. Hostile narratives messages. There are many flag carriers can be fine-tuned and kept alive with for European values in Moldova, minimal effort. Adversarial forces but many others exploit fears about needn’t actively worsen the current Russia for their own benefit. In order situation, as conditions are already bad. for the voices representing truth and justice to be heard in the Moldovan In the current political climate, information environment, the country Western values are under attack. In and its people will continue to need Moldova, neither the public sector, nor the public at large are clear about 2 The Russian media are seen as more where they want to be heading. trustworthy than Moldovan or European media, While the Kremlin is clearly leveraging see the Barometer of Public Opinion. Institute for Public Policy, April 2016. Source: http://ipp.md/ public/files/Barometru/BOP_04.2016_prima_ parte_finale-r.pdf (last accessed 20 May 2016) 8 support from free and open societies. Kremlin information bubble, we should Adversaries can affect decision further analyse what kind of content, making, first by distorting the quality e.g. entertaining or journalistic, would of information, second by controlling encourage people to change their media access to information, and third by habits. In Transnistria and Gagauzia influencing people’s perception and there are even fewer opportunities understanding of the information they to get Moldovan or Western content do come into contact with. There are due to local broadcasting decisions, so several ways Moldova and its partners reaching them requires other technical can help to protect Moldovan society solutions. along these lines. Third, protecting perceptions and First, there are various ways to improve understanding is the most difficult issue information quality in Moldova. to solve. Proposals for various types Western values can be promoted of co-operation projects that would using current media structures. The bring Moldova into closer contact political agenda of each media outlet with the rest of Europe and provide is partly moulded by a circumscribed work in Transnistria and Gagauzia are number of opinion leaders, many especially relevant, as they are more of whom are discussed in this study. isolated from the West. The situation Offering good journalistic content in these regions is only one symptom to the existing popular channels is a of the problem. As long as there is no way to improve understanding among shared national vision about present audiences. Adding new channels is realities and the future goals, all not effective in an already saturated solutions remain partial. The Moldovan market. Radio Free Europe/Radio authorities and citizens must bear the Liberty Moldova has managed to brunt of the responsibility for creating include both Romanian and Russian new opportunities and developing language programming on Moldova’s cohesion among the inhabitants of public TV and radio channels. the country. Western support for the Moldovan people, especially for education, rule of law, functioning Second, access to information might state structures, and quality journalism require marketing, more attractive will bear fruit in the long run. programming as well as technical solutions. Large segments of the To summarize the policy Moldovan population have limited recommendations, we are suggesting access to high-quality information. improving quality journalism They are barely in the Moldovan media leveraging the current media space but voluntarily rely on Kremlin structures, targeting marketing news sources. It is very difficult to and projects aimed at bursting pro- reach these people if they are stuck Kremlin information bubbles, and in their media habits and not used continued co-operation in supporting to searching for news from different the Moldovan response to improve sources. To find a way to break through state vulnerabilities. to individuals caught in this type of 9 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND Antti Sillanpää, IDIS Viitorul—Igor Munteanu, and IJC—Ion Bunduchi

This study on the Moldovan the interwar period, which itself was information environment focuses invaded by the Soviet Union as a result on how societal vulnerabilities are of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. exploited by Moldovan and other The annexation was finalized when actors who are following the Kremlin’s Moldova was incorporated into the lead. The chapters that follow Soviet Union at the close of World discuss vulnerability, hostile Kremlin War II. Although the country has been narratives, media ownership and independent from Russian rule since control, and public opinion leaders. 1991, Russian military forces have The study ends with a conclusion remained on Moldovan territory east and recommendations. The NATO of the Nistru River supporting the Strategic Communications Centre of breakaway region of Transnistria. The Excellence initiated and oversaw the Transnistrian population is composed study, while the research was carried mostly of Ukrainians and Russians, but out by the Institute for Development it also has a sizable ethnic Moldovan and Social Initiatives (IDIS Viitorul) minority.4 and the Independent Journalism Center (IJC). Domestic politics and the Moldovan vision about its international position The Republic of Moldova are intertwined. Since the defeat of has several fault lines. the Communist Party-led government By ethnicity the country is 75,8% in 2009, subsequent governments Moldovan, with 8,4% Ukrainians, have attempted to increase European 5,9% Russians, 4,4% Gagauz, 2,2% and Trans-Atlantic co-operation. The Romanians, and 1,9% Bulgarians impetus for EU integration gained comprising the remaining population.3 momentum with the inauguration of Moldova was part of Romania during the Eastern Partnership Policy in May 2008. 3 Source: http://www.statistica.md/ newsview.php?l=ro&id=2358&idc=168 4 Ibid. 10 TABLE 1. WHAT WORRIES YOU THE MOST (INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC

POLICY) 5 (%)1. What Worries You the Most (Institute for Public Policy)

Poverty

Prices

Children’s Future

Unemployment

Corruption

War in the Region

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Moldova to join NATO. Traditionally, However, more recent surveys show public support for Moldovan that support for the EU has dropped 6 neutrality has been considerable and from 64% in 2011 to 41% in 2016. is still high in 2016 at 58%, but there Only 11% of respondents in 2016 want is also 18% support for joining CIS security structures.7 The common 5 Barometer of Public Opinion, 2010, interpretation of these changes is that 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016. Institute pro-European parties have widely for Public Policy. Source: http://ipp.md/lib. php?l=en&idc=156 disappointed the people. The most 6 Barometer of Public Opinion, April common reasons given are Moldova’s 2016. Institute for Public Policies. Source: http:// high corruption scores, decaying ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/BOP_04.2016_ prima_parte_finale-r.pdf 7 Ibid. 11 standards of living for ordinary people, and the vested interests of affluent businesses and their close ties to governmental bodies. These conditions have resulted in the formation of alternative political groups to fill the void, and they have achieved greater popularity than the incumbent parties claiming to be pro- European. In Moldova, right-wing parties identify themselves as carriers of Western values; they are market-oriented‚ open to the EU, and some are even in support of NATO integration, while the left-wing parties position themselves as pro-Russian, Christian-Orthodox, anti-Western, and pro-Customs Union with Russia. In 2015, as a result of the public revelation of banking fraud, an alternative to the leading political parties emerged on the right side of the spectrum. After many weeks of anti-government protests in Chisinau led by the civic platform Dignity and Truth, the movement later developed into the Dignity and Truth Platform Party (DA) and the Solidarity and Action Party (PAS). The civic unrest has revealed that, for many people, the recent Moldovan governments have not been effective in solving the country’s problems. Table 1 describes the results of a survey showing that economic issues are the most pressing for the average Moldovan. The survey shows a strong emphasis on imminent problems instead of systemic problems or international issues. 12 VULNERABILITIES AND MEDIA COVERAGE IJC—Ion Bunduchi

social problems. The adversaries of ABSTRACT democratic development are also Moldova is facing a profound crisis. ready to exploit existing vulnerabilities. Although media institutions have, This chapter focuses on the issues of to some extent, been fulfilling corruption, weak state structures, their watchdog role, the country national politics, and the regions of is vulnerable and freedom of the Transnistria and Gagauzia. Poverty press is uncertain at best. The most and a lack of security also largely stem influential media outlets, especially from these issues. the television stations, are politically affiliated and often the personal CORRUPTION AND WEAK property of politicians and influential businessmen. These media institutions STATE STRUCTURES exert significant influence on the Moldovan society is rife with public agenda, often determining corruption, even its national security which subjects are put forward apparatus. Geopolitical risks linked to according to their private interests, corruption were already embedded in with no connection to the real needs the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact when of Moldovan citizens and society. The it was signed in 1939. For example, representation of issues that concern Soviet agents managed to enter the public interest has narrowed Bessarabia—the historical name of a considerably, while the representation region that today comprises parts of of private, political, and/or economic Moldova and Ukraine—with the help interests takes centre stage. This of corrupt civil servants who were makes it possible for politically, used to protecting their interests.8 ideologically, or economically power- hungry stakeholders to manipulate public opinion. However, the media are not the only actors revealing 8 Cristian Troncotă, ‘România şi frontul secret’, Bucureşti, Editura Elion, 2007 13 The US State Department’s 2015 only 43%.12 Human Rights Report stated, ‘The spread of corruption continues to be Corruption was also a topic when the most serious issue in the Republic evaluating progress in fulfilling of Moldova in terms of human rights’.9 the commitments assumed by the Moldovan authorities under According to a survey of social the National Action Plan for the perceptions conducted in the spring Implementation of the Republic of of 2016, Moldovan citizens consider Moldova-EU Association Agreement the Parliament, the courts, and the for 2014-2016. The authors of one government to be the most corrupt analysis pointed out that a number institutions in the country. The survey of activities proposed in the National indicated that lack of trust in central Action Plan were vaguely defined and state institutions stems from the immeasurable, such as developing perception that they are corrupt.10 and consolidating the capacity to fight corruption at high levels and in law However, as shown in Table 1, enforcement structures.13 corruption is one of the lesser concerns, while the greatest worries After monitoring sixteen media on the minds of the people are largely institutions for fourteen months, a generated by corrupt processes. report by the Independent Journalism This lack of understanding about Center on the coverage of corruption the effects of corruption can largely in the media stipulated that the media be attributed to the media. News ‘merely addressed official statements organizations have not raised public on corruption’, investigative reporting awareness sufficiently to result in on the subject was minimal, and popular demands to end corruption. the investigations ‘were usually not The actions that have taken by the followed up by any reactions from Moldovan authorities have largely authorities’.14 come about due to pressure from foreign development partners. In The lack of interest in corruption in 2011, Parliament approved the general and the dearth of investigative National Anticorruption Strategy for reporting into Moldovan corruption 2011–2015;11 however, five years continue to be an issue. There are after the adoption of the strategy, several explanations for this including a qualitative evaluation of the (i) a partisan media unmotivated implementation of the strategy scored to investigate corruption cases; (ii) a limited capacity to conduct investigations (most of them are done

9 Source: http://www.dw.com/ro/ 12 Source: http://anticoruptie.md/ro/stiri/ corup%C8%9Bia-a-%C3%AEngenuncheat- strategia-nationala-anticoruptie-ineficienta-din- moldova/a-19203022 cauza-incoerentelor-si-contradictiilor 10 Source: http://www.dw.com/ro/ 13 Source: http://expert-grup.org/ro/bibli- corup%C8%9Bia-a-%C3%AEngenuncheat- oteca/item/download/1436_231b054237558ba- moldova/a-19203022 feccd893eca22480b 11 Source: http://lex.justice.md/ 14 Source: http://ijc.md/Publicatii/ md/340429/ coruptie/raport_final_coruptie_rom.pdf 14 with outside financial support), and difficult to imagine that a coalition (iii) an inadequate reaction or lack government capable of mobilizing of reaction on the part of authorities Moldovan society to overcome its once they had been notified of an vulnerabilities will easily come to instance of corruption. power. Although the EU Association Agreement was signed in the summer A DYSFUNCTIONAL of 2014, Moldovan authorities POLITICAL SYSTEM demonstrated difficulties to cope with the commitments they had Moldovan society has had to undertaken. A report was published accommodate diverse actors making on 31 March revealing that the it ‘pluralistic by default’.15 However, implementation of the Association pluralism has not led to efficient Agreement stood at 46%,17 and the governance. In an attempt to increase implementation of the National powers of the parliament compared Action Plan for 2015–2016 stood at to the President, the Moldovan 23.9%.18 This lack of demonstrable Parliament voted to change the progress has largely been influenced governmental system from semi- by the ongoing government crises. presidential to parliamentarian The credibility of government in 2000. This success of the vote authorities in the eyes of Moldovan turned the office of President into citizens has fallen dramatically. A a largely ceremonial position. In survey conducted in April 2016 2016, after a controversial ruling by indicated that trust in the two the Constitutional Court, Moldova parties that make up the governing brought back presidential elections by coalition—the Democratic Party popular vote. Once again, the checks (PDM) and the Liberal Party (PL)—was and balances in Moldovan politics will at 8% and 6% respectively, while the undergo changes in ways that remain most trusted parties were both pro- to be seen. Kremlin—the Party of Socialists enjoys There are 44 political parties registered a 30% confidence rating, while Our in Moldova.16 About half of them are Party (PN) trails slightly with 29%.19 oriented toward Russia, while the Moreover, pro-Kremlin parties have other half consider themselves to be become influential by openly showing aligned with European values. Political hostility toward the EU, including parties with opposing platforms have Romania, and are able to generate often polarized Moldovan society and maintain tensions in society. and the media into proponents of 17 Source: http://www.expert-grup.org/ either Eastern or Western paths for ro/activitate/comunicate-de-presa/item/1172- development. In this situation, it is comunicat-euromonitor-aa&category=188 18 Government Decision No. 808, 7 15 This term is attributed to Lucan Way, October 2014, Source: http://mec.gov.md/sites/ who employed it in ‘Pluralism by Default in default/files/planul_national_de_actiuni_pentru_ Moldova’, Journal of Democracy, Vol.13, Number implementarea_aa_rm-ue_2014-2016.pdf 4, October 2002, pp. 127-144 19 Source: http://ipp.md/public/files/ 16 Source: http://www.justice.gov.md/ Barometru/BOP_04.2016_prima_parte_finale-r. pageview.php?l=ro&idc=212&id=780 pdf 15 Platform rejects dialogue suggested by president Nicolae Timofti, speaker of the Parliament Andrian Candu, and prime minister Valeriu Strelet’.21 Jurnal Parties have turned TV and the internet portal jurnal.md media outlets responded with heavy criticism of Vladimir Plahotniuc: ‘Andrei Nastase: they control into In order to denigrate the DT platform, Plahotniuc pays mercenaries, mouthpieces. paedophiles, and losers from the media across the Prut River using the money from the stolen billion’, ‘Deputy Maria Ciobanu: Moldova was transformed by LLC Plahotniuc’, Political instability led to social ‘Plahotniuc and bouts of rabies’.22 instability and finally generated The information portal politics.md is massive protests against the closely affiliated with the authorities authorities. In the spring of 2015 tens and has posted news items creating of thousands of people participated in suspicion about intentional actions protests organized by the civic platform aimed at discrediting DT: ‘From Dignity and Truth. In September, the actions against the authorities, the DT members of the protest platform Platform has started acting against reorganised into a political party and citizens!’.23 ‘The DT Platform: Trojan announced that they would organise Horse of Russia at the EU gates’,24 and non-stop protests until changes were ‘Russian agents have infiltrated the DT made. The platform is enthusiastically Platform! The Topa brothers’ Jurnal supported by the TV station Jurnal, was writing about them back in 2009’.25 but equally denigrated by the stations aligned with Democratic Party leader The portal sputnik.md is a branch of Vlad Plahotniuc. The way these the multimedia news agency Sputnik events were reported reveals how the in Russia and published stories against media are divided along party lines. the DT platform although it has not Some of the headlines broadcast on announced any political affiliation. Publika TV, Prime TV, Canal 2, and the portal publika.md included: ‘Be vigilant with the Sunday protest! The 21 Source: http://www. DT Platform prepares for bloodshed’, publika.md/cauta/?cx=partner-pub- ‘Incredible! The DT Platform ready 9476046694301239%3Aofjnkr- to literally fight for power’,20 ‘They d8h0&cof=FORID%3A10&ie=UTF- 8&q=platforma+DA&x=0&y=0 came, they criticized, and they left. DT 22 Source: http://jurnal.md/ro/politic/ 23 Source: http://politics. 20 Source: http://www. md/?view=articles&id=6037 publika.md/cauta/?cx=partner-pub- 24 Source: http://politics. 9476046694301239%3Aofjnkr- md/?view=articles&id=7522 d8h0&cof=FORID%3A10&ie=UTF- 25 Source: http://www.politics. 8&q=platforma+DA&x=0&y=0 md/?view=articles&id=7532 16 Some of its headlines include: ‘The DT Platform, a tool in the fights between oligarchs’, ‘The DT Platform is in zugzwang’ [at a disadvantage], Memorandum of and ‘Andrei Nastase [DT frontman] to enter Parliament or prison?’26 The collaboration between headlines demonstrate the intention Russian Federation to distract the people’s attention from the essence of the protests. It should and Transnistrian be noted that the DT platform includes calls to reform the justice system, fight Media Service. corruption, and reform the financial- banking system to recover ‘the stolen billion’—all priority actions for Chisinau also suggested by European bodies.27 In 2014, immediately after the The Moldovan political parties have illegal referendum in Crimea, the managed to turn the media outlets Transnistrian region also asked the they control into mouthpieces for Russian Federation to ‘consider the party interests instead of addressing possibility’ of absorbing Transnistria. the vulnerabilities of society. This wish was reiterated by the Transnistrian leader Evgheni Șevciuk in Tiraspol on May 9, 2016 after the THE TRANSNISTRIAN REGION traditional military parade marking Since 1992 there has been a frozen the occasion of the 71st anniversary armed conflict in the Transnistrian of World War II, or the Great Patriotic region of the Moldova. Transnistria War, which included for the first has declared its independence and time the participation of 36 Russian its orientation toward the Russian military units from the task force Federation. In autumn of 2006, the local deployed on the left bank of the Transnistrian authorities organized a Nistru River. Șevciuk told journalists, ‘I referendum seemingly demonstrating think that sooner or later, but it would vast majority support for independence be better if it is sooner, we will live in from Moldova and joining the Russian one country’,29 referring to Russia. Federation. Neither Moldova nor the Many media institutions in the international community recognized 28 Transnistrian region are strongly the referendum. influenced by the local authorities and are largely hostile to Chisinau. Transnistrian authorities control 26 Source: http://sputnik.md/ public media through the State search/?query=platforma+DA 27 Source: http://www.bbc.com/news/ world-europe-34244341; http://www.euronews. 29 Source: http://deschide.md/ro/news/ com/2015/09/06/moldovans-protest-over- social/27177/FOTO--Parad%C4%83-la-Tiraspol- banking-scandal-in-a-rare-show-of-defiance -%C8%98evciuk-sper%C4%83-c%C4%83- 28 Source: https://freedomhouse.org/ %C3%AEntr-o-zi-va-tr%C4%83i-%C3%AEntr-un- report/freedom-world/2007/transnistria stat-unit-cu-Rusia.htm 17 Media Service. Editorial policy is Even though two sources are quoted, coordinated with Moscow through the story contained an obvious the Ministry of Communications of informational imbalance.32 the Russian Federation with which the Transnistrian service signed a Cable television is very popular in memorandum of collaboration in the Transnistrian region, as it is in 2014. It stipulates the‘implementation Moldova. According to the data of joint projects and programs in the available on nistru.net, the digital field of communications, information package offered by the main left Interdnestrcom technologies and media’ and bank cable operator ‘supporting Russian and Transnistrian includes two right bank television media in publishing information stations—ProTV Chișinău and Publika about the friendship between the TV, three Transnistrian TV stations— Pervii Pridnestrovskii TSV BTV two parties’.30 Media outlets on , , and the left bank of the Nistru, such as from Bender, and 85 stations from the the portal novostipmr.com, almost Russian Federation. The share of TV always classify news about Moldova stations broadcasting in the Russian under the rubric ‘International’. This language (local, international, and is a propaganda method used to Russia-based) is over 98%. spread the idea that the Transnistrian The media on the right bank of region and Moldova are two different the Nistru cover the Transnistrian countries.31 The portal posts political region only sporadically, e.g. on news items about Moldova that, the occasion of negotiations in the despite covering controversial topics, ‘5+2 format’ (Moldova, Transnistria, are written almost solely on the basis Ukraine, Russia and the OSCE, with of a single source of information— the EU and the US), meetings of the the ruling party. The rare exceptions Joint Control Commission, or when when two sources are used do not tensions between political parties alter the situation. For instance, flare up. Most often, journalists rely a news item published in January on official sources of information. 2016 referred to the meeting of a The Moldovan authorities do not Transnistrian representative, Vitali encourage the media to address Ignatiev, with Pirkka Tapiola, Head of issues concerning Transnistria. This is the EU Delegation to Chisinau. The usually done by foreign donors as part story was 474 words long. A single of media projects; however, these eleven-word statement was quoted projects end when the funding ends. from the Head of the EU Delegation, A good example is the series Bridges while the ten statements quoted from produced in 2014 and 2015 by the Vitali Ignatiev comprised 240 words. national public radio station Radio Moldova and the state-funded Radio 30 Source: http://pan.md/rassledovanie/ 1 station in Tiraspol as part of a project sherifyi-pridnestrovskih-smi- 31 Source: http://mediacritica.md/ 32 Source: http://mediacritica.md/ studiu-de-caz-nr-1-elemente-de-propaganda- studiu-de-caz-nr-2-elemente-de-propaganda- dezinformare-si-de-razboi-informational-in- dezinformare-si-de-razboi-informational-in- spatiul-mediatic-autohton/ spatiul-mediatic-autohton/ 18 supported by the Council of Europe.33 Agreement with the EU.34 After the completion of the project, no budgetary resources were allocated Regional elites have often challenged to continue the programming. Moldovan legislation on issues such as anti-discrimination law35 and rebroadcasting limitations of THE AUTONOMOUS Russian-based TV Programs.36 The regional public radio broadcaster, TERRITORIAL UNIT GAGAUZ Teleradio-Gagauziais, is influenced YERI by political pressure, and the private broadcasters, newspapers, and online Along with the Transnistrian region, press are largely politically affiliated. another major area of vulnerability For this reason the regional media is the profoundly pro-Kremlin cover events in a way that suits the autonomous region of Gagauzia. ambitions of the local political leaders After the collapse of the Soviet Union, rather than the information needs the separatist movement Gagauz of the population. Media experts Halki was established with support consider the portal gagauzinfo. from Moscow. In December 1990 the md to be a relatively balanced separatists proclaimed the Gagauz news source, given that it publishes Republic to consist of three districts information concerning all the events in the south of Moldova—Comrat, in the region, the country, and abroad Ceadar-Lunga, and Vulcanesti. At the without filtering or commenting on end of 1994, the Moldovan Parliament them as other media institutions do. acknowledged the autonomy of But even this portal demonstrates its the Gagauz region, and granted it sympathies and prejudices, especially special status in the constitution. in how the news is presented and the The autonomous region often defies visibility of certain topics. For instance, the central Moldovan authorities in May 2015 the Gagauzia district of and opposes European facets of Ceadar-Lunga received a fire truck development. In February 2014, a as a gift from the UK, as well as an referendum was held in Gagauzia in ambulance and a fire truck as gifts from which 98% of the inhabitants voted the Moscow regional government. to join the Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union. Separatist tendencies, supported by Russia, have increased in Gagauzia along with the unfolding 34 Deutche Welle, ‘Gagauzia: A new crisis in Ukraine. One example of this stumbling block for Moldova’, Source: http:// is the exception made for Gagauzia www.dw.com/en/gagauzia-a-new-stumbling- block-for-moldova/a-18333303 in the embargo on Moldovan wine 35 On 30 April 2013 the regional assembly and agricultural products—a ban of Gagauzia approved a bill to forbid the imposed by Russia in response to ‘propaganda’ of homosexuality, bisexuality, and Moldova entering into an Association transsexualism such as same-sex marriage and adoption by same-sex couples. 36 The autonomous region of Gagauzia 33 Source: http://trm.md/ru/mosti- will keep broadcasting all TV channels, RIA podurile/mosti-podurile-din-27-iulie-2014/?p=1 Novosti, 12 July 2016. 19 slightly more than 2% preferred Romanian-language news.40 In the case of radio, the share of those who listen to the news in Russian was 97%. 90% preferred All in all, 83% of respondents trusted watching TV news media from Russia, 43% trusted media from Moldova, and 21% trusted programs in Russian, media from the Transnistrian region. The media from Romania, the EU, and 2% in Romanian. Ukraine enjoyed levels of trust that varied between 6% and 14%. A total of 95% of the respondents declared positive attitudes toward Russia, 74% supported Turkey, while 44% declared The portal covered both events. their sympathies for Ukraine, 27% In the first case the heading was supported Romania, and 20% were ‘Ceadar-Lunga received the gift of positively toward the EU. Less than a fire truck with the steering wheel 20% had a positive attitude toward on the right side’.37 The news item the USA, and less than 10% had a was 217 words long and included positive attitude toward NATO. a picture. In the second case, the The Chisinau media rarely cover headline read ‘Ceadar-Lunga received Gagauz issues. The national an ambulance and a fire truck as broadcaster Teleradio-Moldova gifts from the Moscow regional broadcasts a series of radio government’. The story was 460 words programs—Bucaan dalgasinda41— long and included videos and 17 and TV programs—Gagauz ogea42— pictures.38 Unlike other media outlets that originated during Soviet times, in the autonomy, the portal publishes but as in the past, their content is stories under the rubric ‘Gagauzia limited to ‘neutral’ subjects such between the European Union and the as customs and traditions. The ‘hot Customs Union’.39 However, a simple topics’ concerning relations between count of the news items published in central and regional authorities are 2015 yields twenty stories about the missing and are avoided in the other European Union vs. fifty about the programs on Teleradio-Moldova. Customs Union. According to a survey conducted at the end of 2015, over 90% of the population preferred watching TV news programs in Russian and only 40 Survey on the level of integration of the TAU Gagauzia and the Taraclia District into 37 Source: http://gagauzinfo.md/index. the society of the Republic of Moldova, Sorce: php?newsid=25161 http://ipp.md/public/files/Evenimente/Sondaj_ 38 Source: http://gagauzinfo.md/index. Gagauzia_-_Taraclia_draft_ro.pdf. php?newsid=25202 41 Source: http://trm.md/ro/program- 39 Source: http://gagauzinfo.md/index. actualitati/ php?do=cat&category=s3 42 Source: http://trm.md/ro/tv-program/ 20 an essential role. Otherwise, the CONCLUSIONS currently entrenched vulnerabilities Media institutions in a democracy will continue to represent a major represent the vital centre of public threat to the country’s sovereignty life43 while ‘freedom of the press and and independence. freedom of expression in general are essential for the protection and development of democracy’.44 In fragile democracies, such as the Republic of Moldova, the media itself is weak. Instead of strengthening democracy, media influence is often trivial, or, conversely, might even be used to propagate anti-democratic values. Manipulation, disinformation, internal and external propaganda, the rush of sensationalism, public televised battles between media institutions—all these professional deficiencies can be found everywhere in the Moldovan media environment; they reduce its credibility, erode the quality of information, increase the danger of disorienting the public, and, finally, affect the consolidation of democracy in Moldova. The right to free information, freedom of expression, and freedom of the press is universally acknowledged, but the right to truthful information is less often examined. The vulnerabilities Moldovan society is facing today are systemic in character. They can be minimized only through systemic reforms in which the media should play

43 Coman, Mihai, Introduction to the media system, Polirom Printing House, Bucharest, 1999, p. 62. 44 The role of the media in the crisis of contemporary democracy and in the conditions of globalization. Sorce: http://www.fisd.ro/art/ Massmedia.html 21 HOSTILE NARRATIVES AND PROPAGANDA IDIS Viitorul—Igor Munteanu

instability that often transgressing ABSTRACT generational frontiers. Thus, by using This chapter describes four Kremlin familiar elements from their collective narratives that are hostile to Moldovan Soviet memories, skilful foreign actors sovereignty, namely ’Russkii Mir and can engage with other post-Soviet Soviet Nostalgia’, ‘Federalization Will populations to shape their emotional Ensure Equality’, ‘The European Union preferences as part of a larger strategic is Bad, Russia’s Customs Union is What project. Ideological narratives affect You Need’, and ‘Romania and NATO are minds and public behaviour via a Threat to Peace’. These narratives emotions and iconic images. overlap and are often contradictory and Kremlin narratives in Moldova are contain lies. Still, they share some basic infused with geopolitical rifts, based principles—they leverage Moldovan on linguistic, cultural, and political vulnerabilities, touch the emotions of polarization. Many Moldovans different local audiences, and attempt appreciate the Russian Orthodox to develop mistrust toward modern Patriarch and Vladimir Putin, who has Western countries and Trans-Atlantic 65% popularity in domestic Moldovan values and relationships. polls.45 In comparison, the approval ratings are 79% for the Church, 42% EXPLAINING KREMLIN for the media, and 47% for the local authorities according to a 2016 IPP NARRATIVES ABOUT poll.46 MOLDOVA Several of the countries occupied or Post-Soviet narratives describe a controlled by the former Soviet Union complex mix of residual memories, are vulnerable to influence due to political failures, and regional conflicts. Most people born in the Soviet 45 IPP, Opinion Barometer April, 2016, Union inherited habits and patterns Source: www.ipp.\md 46 Public Opinion Barometer (BOP), IPP. from that era, which can be revived Source: http://ipp.md/libview. by nostalgia, or bad luck, or fear of php?l=ro&idc=156&id=773&parent=0 22 complicity between groups of oligarchs who are interested in preserving their NARRATIVE #1: grip on economic and political power, RUSSKII MIR AND as well as affluent foreign actors, feeding this complicity with attractive SOVIET NOSTALGIA benefits.47 Also, Russian pop-icons, The Russian narrative on compatriots singers, actors, films, writers, lawyers, is expressed in the doctrine Moscow Sputnik, RT, NTV, RTR, and ORT all elites call ‘Russkii Mir’ or the strengthen the Russian cultural footprint in Moldova. Pro-Russia Russian world, which is built on the parties, NGOs, cultural centers, and assumption that those who speak Orthodox parishes often join existing Russian and think in Russians, also networks and coalitions, or create act like Russians do. This concept was new ones to advocate for policies introduced in the Russian Foreign favourable to Russia. ‘Rewiring’ Policy Review in 2008,49 and then old connections revitalizes hostile developed in the 2013 Russian Foreign narratives and keeps target audiences Policy Concept, consisting of specific alert to new messages coming in. priority areas, such as: (1) Protecting Sometimes these connections result in the interests of Overseas Compatriots odd combinations of friends, strange (citizens of the former Soviet Union), bedfellows. In 2011-13, priests of the (2) consular issues, (3) human rights Mitropoly of Moldova were joining issues, and (4) cooperation in culture, ranks of the Party of Communists education, and science. On 31 August (PCRM), and jointly opposed the 2008 Russian President Dmitry anti-discrimination law. Later they Medvedev said, ‘There are regions in followed the Party of Socialists and which Russia has a privileged interest. some of its former adversaries, under […] We will pay particular attention to the re-invented symbol, the Ribbon of our work in this region […] Ukraine, 48 St. George (Георгиевская лента). Moldova, and undoubtedly the South

47 RFERL, 5.05.2017, Petru Macovei, Caucasus are high on the priority list’. Petru Macovei: Autoritățile noastre nu se ocupă 50 de problema propagandei rusești în Republica Moldova’. Source: http://www.europalibera.org/ Many in Russia have a deep sense of content/article/27715838.html entitlement to interfere in regions 48 The Ribbon of St. George is one of the political markers that has recently migrated into formerly controlled or occupied Moldovan politics. The ribbon lacked any sort by the Soviet Union. This sort of of public relevance, until the Kremlin decided thinking is revealed in Putin’s casual to use it in response to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Now, any organisation that relys on remark that the Soviet Union was, funding from Moscow must wear the Ribbon as in essence, ‘Russia, just under a a symbol of loyalty to Kremlin, campaigning with it during various memorial celebrations, and 49 Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy in that way paying tribute to the ambitions of Review, 2013. Source: http://www.mid.ru/en/ Russia to use the war memory as political capital. web/guest/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/ In response, pro-Western parties are publicly dismissive of the Russian symbol, claiming that asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/ it carries an imperial meaning, subversive to the id/122186. Accessed on May 1, 2016. idea of independent statehood everywehere in 50 Source: http://archive.kremlin. the post-Soviet space. This creates a kind of dual ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/31/1850_ politcal reality with multiple ideological tangents. type82912type82916_206003.shtml 23 different name’.51 Major General L. Shershnev concurred with this statement, ‘Russia campaigns for the re-collection of the Russian people’.52 Until events The Russkii Mir doctrine carries two basic meanings—one is the value in Ukraine, model, which constructs Russia as a Russkii Mir was civilization separate from the West and based on traditional values, Slavic an academic myths, philosophy, and the arts, while excercise. the other is a prescriptive model, which attempts to replace old Russia with a new Russia, emerging from the ruins of the former Soviet Union. Some promoters of Russkii Mir think In 2014 alone, the Council held that war in Ukraine has improved the twenty seminars and dozens of impact of their messaging. As Sergey roundtable discussions with the Panteleev, Director of the Institute of specific aim of identifying injustices Russians Abroad, remarked, ‘Until the that affect Russian-speakers.54 tragic events in Ukraine, the concept Overall, pro-Russian groups promote of Russkii Mir was to some extent an the idea of ‘equal nations living in academic exercise; now these values Moldova’, support the imperative can mobilize people to accept the for bilingualism, and demand highest sacrifices’.53 that Russian be given official status (gossudarstvennyi iazik),55 The activities of the Coordinating recognized in the Constitution, not Council of Russian Compatriots have merely considered a ‘language of included contesting bans on some interpersonal communication’. Above Russian media and other decisions all, they represent and articulate the made by the Moldovan authorities, views of other ‘ethnic groups’ [non- including grievances concerning Moldovans] in Moldova.56 education and statements about Russians not being given top positions in Moldovan power structures.

54 Pravotsentr v Moldove. Михаил 51 VG. Interview given by Vladimir Putin СИДОРОВ, руководитель информационно- on the three federal TV channels, 18 November аналитического правозащитного центра. 2011. Source: http://www.vg-news.ru/news- Подробная информация о деятельности intervyu-putina-trem-federalnym-kanalam- правозащитного центра содержится также на polnyi-tekst. сайте: www.Рravotentr.ru 52 Общественный фонд «Русские» 55 Source: http://regnum.ru/news/ Соотечественники за рубежом получат polit/882693.html «карту русского»- http://www.kp.md/daily/ 56 Russians represent 5% of the article/516850/?cp=6 population in Moldova; largest national 53 Source: http://krorm.ru/news/ minority is represented by Ukrainians – 8,6%, sootechestvenniki/765-russkiy-mir-kultura-i- Gagauz – 4,5%, Bulgarians – 2,1%, titular group civilizaciya.html (Moldovans) represent 76%. 24 Moscow’s historical narrative about Russian ideologically.59 Moldova seeks to exploit the deep divisions present in Moldovan The leaders of these pro-Kremlin society—not only among Russian- organisations support the Russian speaking Gagauz, Bulgarian, Russian, annexation of Crimea. The Congress and Ukrainian minorities, but also of Russian Communities informed among ethnic Moldovans. One of the the Ukrainian President that it would schisms arises from the ‘Moldovenist’ defend its Russian compatriots in ‘Congress proposal supporting a ‘distinct Ukraine and that the [of can send more nation of Moldovans, separated Russian Communities] than 4000 well-trained fighters to cool ethnically from Romanians’.57 For the heads of the radical nationalists’ 60 many ‘Romanianists’ there is no such . separation. The Kremlin’s efforts to keep There are a number of pro-Kremlin Transnistria out Moldova’s organizations active in Moldova constitutional space has created including Antifa, Voievod, RedFront, a situation where thousands of and Grenada. These organizations Transnistrians, Russian citizens, work have considerable resources, access and live in Moldova without residential to Russian-controlled state media rights, while thousands of Moldovans, holdings, and promote various willing to work in Russia, are turned messages activities favourable to back from the Russian border accused Russkii Mir policies.58 For instance, of having violated the passport Grenada represents a large media regime. In 2014, Russian Consular portal that styles itself as the Officers confirmed there more than mouthpiece for ‘the truest left- 200 000 Moldovan citizens have wing ideological youth movement in been banned from entering Russia, thus increasing the unease among Moldova’. The so-called RedFront, 61 where several radical Russian- Moldovans willing to work there. speaking youth groups mix with This situation has reduced the value of a diverse composition of former the Moldovan passport in comparison military servicemen and intelligence officers, and cultural, business, and 59 Grenada. Source: http://www.grenada. md/post/VETERANI_SILOVIH_STRUKTUR_ media groups that see themselves MOLDOVI_ZAIAVILI_NATO_NAM_NE_NADO as pro-Russian. They include former 60 Председатель Конгресса русских KGB leaders, such as Anatol Plugaru общин Молдавии, лидер Общественно- and Ion Mahu, and other former политического движения «Равноправие» Валерий Клименко, Центральное ideologues, who identify themselves информационное агентство Новороссии, as ethnic Moldovans, but are pro- http://www.e-news.su/news/10438-russkaya- obschina-moldovy-turchinovu-ostanovite- boynyu-ili-my-dvinemsya-na-vostok.html 57 В.Боршевич, Унионизм превратился в 61 Official statistics indicate that in 2014 прибыльный бизнес, Молдвавские ведомости, over 540.000 of Moldovans (i.e. Transnistrians) 25 марта 2015ю worked in Russia, while 200.000 were suspect 58 Sputnik Молдова Source: http:// to extradition. Source: http://unimedia.info/ ru.sputnik.md/society/20160325/5501928. stiri/Circa-240.000-de-moldoveni-ar-putea-fi- html#ixzz441M4Um8m deportai-din-Rusia-74894.html 25 to Russian identity documents. A Russian passport brings benefits to those who hold one, including long- term visas, automatic labour permits, entrepreneurship rights, social Remembrance of benefits, free medical insurance, and free education in Russia. All those who war and religion identify themselves as Russian are eligible, including anyone ‘who shares are intertwined the basic tenets of Russian culture, its spiritual power and language, who concepts. connects his/her destiny with that of Russian civilization, and who regards Russia as the center of the Russian World’.62 after Rome itself and Constantinople.64 The Russian Patriarch is often drawn Education has been used as a tool out on various topics of political for these policies. The first distance- proselytism, which include delicate learning centre in the CIS was foreign policy issues, the effects created in Moldova in 2005 with of globalization, and the clash funds from the Russian Federation, of civilizations. For instance, the designed specifically to connect local reaction of the Russian Church to the students with Russian universities. annexation of Crimea and the war in Annually, Russia allocates at least Donbas mirrored the Kremlin’s views 220 scholarships to students from and decisions. Moldova.63 The Orthodox Church attaches For the ideological Russkii Mir great value to its role in combating community, the remembrance of war Western expansion and ‘foreign, non- and religion are intertwined concepts. Christian influences’ on Moldovan The Christian Church is very popular believers. When the Moldovan in Moldova, which is why Moscow is Parliament adopted the Law on Equal keen to use its outstanding networks Opportunities in 2011, some church- of loyal parishes to spread political affiliated groups launched protests. discourse. A powerful segment of The protests lasted long after the the Orthodox clergy was educated adoption of the anti-discrimination through the Russian Orthodox laws, and were intertwined with anti- Patriarchy’s theological seminary. government and anti-EU criticism and Many of these individuals become culturally russified, and are, therefore, willing to promote the ideological thesis that ‘Russia is the third Rome’,

62 Odnarodnya. Source: http://m. 64 Poe, Marshall."Izobretenie kontseptsii odnarodyna.org/content/karta-russkogo "Moskva—Tretii Rim." Ab Imperio. Teoriia 63 Source: www.Ava.md, 15 February i istoriia natsional'nostei i natsionalizma v 2013. postsovetskom prostranstve 1: 2 (2000), 61-86.) 26 public demonstrations.65 Some of the Russian influence. In this regard, the Christian Orthodox Synod high-ranked pro-Kremlin forces do not differentiate priests were actively involved in this between the ‘Russophobic policies of campaign, which was initiated by the Baltic and Moldovan leaders’.69 the Party of Communists of Moldova Pro-Kremlin parties affirm that‘calling (PCRM).66 The Church plays a crucial for the liberation of Bessarabia role in Russian narratives, spreading from Romanian rule tantamount to the Kremlin’s messages while fostering occupation’70 is an attempt to distort the appearance of neutrality. the truth and view the liberation mission of the Soviet Union and Remembering World War Two, or the the Red Army in a negative light. In Great Patriotic War, is an effective addition, they claim that talking about way to recreate Kremlin narratives. ‘the occupation, portrays Russian- All initiatives attempting to evaluate speakers as “occupants”, denies them the damage done to Moldova by equality with ethnic Moldovans, and the Soviet occupation have received 67 educates young Moldovans to be a strong reaction from Moscow. “enemies of Russia”’.71 These initiatives included a decree ‘On establishing an official holiday in remembrance of the Soviet NARRATIVE #2: Occupation’ and the intention to open a Museum of Soviet Occupation. Pro- FEDERALISATION WILL Kremlin forces claim that instead of ENSURE EQUALITY working for welfare, modernization, and economic growth for their It would be expedient for Kremlin citizens68, Moldovan politicians still policies if Moldova changed its prefer to fight communism, dismantle constitutional unitary state into a Soviet monuments, and contest federation of two or three subjects. Some fear that federalization could be 65 RFERL, Church Pressures Moldova's a way to increase the Kremlin’s control Government To Repeal Antidiscrimination Laws. over Moldovan domestic and external Source: http://www.rferl.org/content/moldova- gay-church-rights-discrimination-laws/25024061. priorities due to its close connections html with Transnistria and Gagauzia. So 66 OSF, Viorel Ursu, How the European Union Persuaded Moldova to Fight 69 Gzt. Source: Выход из СССР обошелся Discrimination, July 9, 2012. Source: https:// Прибалтике дороже «советской оккупации», www.opensocietyfoundations.org/voices/ Source: http://gzt.md/article/%D0%B2_%D0%BC how-european-union-persuaded-moldova-fight- %D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B5/22945/ discrimination 70 Actualitati.md. Source: Была ли в 67 Russian beyond the headlines: действительности "советская оккупация" FM criticizes proposal to open 'Soviet Молдовы, мифы о которой сочиняют occupation' museum in Moldova. September унионисты? Source: 23, 2015, Interfax. Source: http://rbth.com/ http://actualitati.md/ru/analitika/byla-li-v- news/2015/09/23/foreign_ministry_criticizes_ deystvitelnosti-sovetskaya-okkupaciya-moldovy- proposal_to_open_soviet_occupation_museum_ mify-o-kotoroy-sochinyayut in_49494.html 71 Actualitati.md. Source: http:// 68 Gzt. Source: http://gzt.md/arti- actualitati.md/ru/analitika/byla-li-v- cle/%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%82 deystvitelnosti-sovetskaya-okkupaciya-moldovy- %D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%B0/22946/ mify-o-kotoroy-sochinyayut 27 far, the Moldovan population has resisted federalization. Almost 70% of voters were opposed to a federal arrangement in 2003, although, by 2016, that number had decreased by Russians are almost half.72 the third largest The Russian narrative in favour of a federalized Moldova is based on ethnic group in an argument regarding the multiple ethnicities present in the Moldovan Moldova. population. This is in stark contrast to the centralization paradigm of the Kremlin’s federal arrangements in the Russian Federation. Russian narratives emphasized the Russians are the third largest ethnic ‘nationalism of elites’ in Moldova, group in Moldova, comprising less and the ‘internationalism’ of the than 5,4% of the population, while Transnistrian population, in order Ukrainians are the largest ethnic to legitimize the creation of the minority at 7,6% according to the separatist Transnistrian statelet.73 The 2004 national census. But years of TASS News Agency claims that the language oppression and sovietisation war in 1990 broke out in response policies have imposed a high toll on to the calls in Chisinau to unify with self-identification of the multiple Romania, and that only because of ethnic groups and cultural attributes. the heroic intervention of the Soviet The argument is that ethnic groups troops, bloodshed was avoided in are distinct peoples, and ‘peoples’ Gagauzia. And, later on, that the war [equated with ‘nations’] shall enjoy in Transnistria was stopped thanks to the right to self-determination. the Russian Peacekeeping Operation.74 Especially if Moldovan elites were to seek reunification with Romania, this In 1999, at the OSCE Summit would harm other ‘loyal’ peoples, such Declaration, Russia committed to as Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauzians, withdraw its troops from Moldova. or Bulgarians. Retaining use of the However, with the emergence of Cyrillic script for writing Moldovan/ Vladimir Putin, old commitments Romanian in Transnistria works to differentiate the area from the rest of 73 The unrecognized Republic of Moldova using Latin letters. Transdnistria came into existence in 1990, following a war of secession with Moldova. The Kremlin’s policy of creating It has a population of over 500 000, most of divisions was particularly them ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers. Russia currently maintains a peacekeeping evident in 1990/1991. force of about 1 000 soldiers stationed in the Transnistrian capital, Tiraspol, to ensure security 72 IPP Social Opinion Barometer, 2003, IPP and stability in the region. Social Opinion Barometer, 2016, Source: www. 74 ZDG, StopFake, No.16 (565), April 28, ipp.md 2016, p. 14. Source: www.zdg.md 28 were ignored. In 2003, a new its proposed Consulate are absurd, federalized plan known as the Kozak infringing upon [Russia’s] obligation Memorandum triggered a large to serve its almost 180 000 Russian political crisis.75 The memorandum citizens in Transnistria.77 was finally rejected by the Chisinau authorities, causing an outburst Soon after his nomination, Rogozin in the Kremlin. Regional elites in talked tough with his Moldovan Gagauzia and Transnistria continue to counterparts on various issues demand a radical reformation of the including the accumulated debts Moldovan state, with regional veto- of the separatist regime. Russia power actors. Accepting it would maintains that the accumulated debts have diverted Moldova from its path of Transnistria [almost 6 billion USD] toward integration with the European are the responsibility of the Republic Union. In Russia, the 2003 Kozak of Moldova, and that if Moldova wants Memorandum continues to be cited to unify the state through a federal as the only feasible way of achieving project, then Moldova should pay the the reintegration of the breakaway debts and then recognise Transnistria. region. The idea of Transnistria as a fortress In 2012, Vice Prime Minister D. under siege has been widely employed Rogozin was appointed Personal in the last decades; the region is described as a military outpost or Representative of the Russian 78 President for Transnistria, as well ‘Russia’s outpost in the Balkans’. as Co-Chair of the Russia-Moldova The region of Gagauzia often links Inter-governmental Economic itself with the Transnistrian region, Cooperation Commission Rogozin’s effectively supporting arguments dual appointment treats Moldova and from the Kremlin. In March 2012, the the separatist region of Transnistria legislative body of the region, the as two separate entities. The Russian People’s Assembly of Gagauzia (PAG) Federation has also been considering signed a collaboration agreement opening a Consulate General and an with the Supreme Council, its office for theSpecial Representative of counterpart in the Transnistrian the Russian President for Transnistria region. Previously, the PAG had in Tiraspol.76 After Chisinau rejected concluded such agreements with the these initiatives, the Kremlin’s Parliament of South Ossetia and with reaction was clear: for them the the People’s Assembly of Abkhazia79— objections raised by Moldova against 77 Grigori Karasin, February 15, 2014. Source: http://infoprut.ro/27282-deschiderea- 75 I.Botan, E-Democracy, Kozak Plan unui-consulat-la-tiraspol-ramane-o-prioritate-a- implications, 30 November, 2003, Source: http:// rusiei.html www.e-democracy.md/en/monitoring/politics/ 78 Александр Сергеев: Приднестровье comments/200312031/ сегодня: важнейший форпост России 76 Rogozin Institutionalizing Direct нуждается в защите, March 8, 2014, REGNUM, Relations with Transnistria, Eurasia Daily Monitor Source: http://regnum.ru/news/polit/1775976. Volume: 9 Issue: 79. Source: html http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_ 79 Source: http://gagauzinfo.md/index. news]=39292&no_cache=1#.Vz9Z074w3IU php?newsid=3363 29 two separatist regions in Georgia. National Broadcasting Council The PAG also requested that the suspended Rossia24, which was found President and Parliament of Moldova to be ‘lacking professional attitude acknowledge the independence of and pluralism’ in its reporting on the Georgian separatist regions.80 In the Gagauz referendum.83 In March 2014, Gagauzia held a referendum, 2015 Irina Vlah elected leader by the which was declared illegal by several Gagauz Autonomy with support from Moldovan Courts,81 and, as part of the Kremlin and the Party of Socialists the campaign, a TV show claimed of Moldova; she also received ‘Gagauz doesn’t want to leave under congratulations from the speaker of a Romanian flag, suffering gendarmes the Supreme Council.84 The visibility [historical Romanian police units]’.82 and credibility of Vlah were improved The influence of the Russian by visits from Russian Duma MPs, mass media in aggravating ethnic strong media coverage by the Russian Gagauzians has been substantial, media, and by visiting Russian artists. which may explain the high turnout for the illegal referendum [98,09%]. Top-level regional officials criticized In February 2014, the Moldovan Moldova’s Association Agreement with the EU, saying that ‘no one in EU 80 Source: http://www.ziare.com/ is interested in buying cheap products international/abhazia/independenta-abhaziei- from Moldova, which means our si-osetiei-de-sud-recunoscuta-de-autonomia- gagauza-418620 agriculture will be destroyed, while 81 On 2 February 2014, Gagauzian Gagauz will be lost; suspending the authorities called the local population to vote Association Agreement is a matter in a referendum on two issues: integration into of survival’.85 Russian Deputy PM either the EU or the Moscow-led Customs Union and the draft law ’On the deferred status of the Rogozin accused the EU and Moldova Autonomous Region of Gagauzia’, considered of ‘violating the basic rights of the illegal by constitutional authorities.Under the Russian people in Transnistria by proposed legislation, if Moldova were to lose signing a trade deal that does not its sovereignty, e.g. through the unification of Moldova and Romania, or, as some politicians take Russian interests into account’. have argued, through Moldova’s further He pledged his personal support to integration with the EU, the autonomous region maintain the same level of financial would automatically become the independent assistance to the separatist regime, Republic of Gagauzia. As expected, the outcome 86 of the vote showed overwhelming support backed by loyal Russian compatriots. for both the Customs Union and the draft law. According to the figures released by Gagauzia’s 83 RFERL, July 5, 2014. Source: http:// Central Electoral Commission, 98.5% of the www.rferl.org/content/moldova-tv-bans-rossiya- voters supported Moldova’s integration into the broadcasters/25446461.html Customs Union, while 98% voted in favour of the 84 Source: http://gagauzinfo.md/index. ‘deferred independence’ bill. Support for closer php?newsid=17300 integration with the EU was marginal, reaching 85 Молдавские гагаузы не хотят терять just over 2%. Source: http://www.osw.waw.pl/ «второй дом», Россию, 18/04/2014. Source: en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-03-10/ http://inosmi.ru/moldova/20140818/222429448. gagauzia-growing-separatism-moldova html 82 Rossbalt, Гагаузия намерена 86 Russia Today, Russian Deputy PM создать свою армию и выйти из состава pledges support to Moldova’s breakaway region Молдави. Source: http://www.rosbalt.ru/ Source: https://www.rt.com/politics/169928- exussr/2014/03/18/1245620.html rogozin-moldova-transdniester-russia/ 30 Russia excluded Gagauz winemakers annexation of Crimea.90 The narrative from the embargoed list of Moldovan of a new of nations in the region producers, thus creating incentives to of Budjak [Ukrainians, Bulgarians, blame the Moldovan authorities for Moldovans, Jew, Gagauz, Roma] being solely responsible for signing the deciding to establish their own state Association Agreement with the EU.87 outside of Ukraine was copying The Speaker of the Gagauz People’s the earlier Russian narrative on Assembly, D. Konstantinov, announced Transnistria91 in Donbas. that a General Consulate will be established in the region, that Russia NARRATIVE #3: THE will provide a 35-50% tax rebate on EUROPEAN UNION IS BAD, gas consumption for the population of the autonomy, Gagauzians working in RUSSIA’S CUSTOMS UNION Russia will be able to apply for Russian IS WHAT YOU NEED! passports, and Rosspotrebnadzor, the Russian Federal Service for the NATO was seen as Russia’s main Supervision of Consumer Rights opponent in the near abroad after Protection and Human Well-Being, 1991-2000, but after 2009, as the idea will open a sanitary-epidemiological of bringing the six most willing Eastern lab in Comrat. In addition, Gagauzia Partnership States closer to the EU will establish its own political evolved, the Russian media shifted its representation in Moscow.88 focus to the European Union. Russian diplomats proposed a possible joint- In Odessa, Ukraine on 27 October membership in both the Euro-Asian 2014 pro-Kremlin militants rallied Union (EAU) and the European Union to proclaim the creation of a new (EU) for countries of the former Soviet separatist state, the Bessarabian Union, even while the EAU was still Republic of Budjak, with the only a concept on paper.92 participation of several districts of Ukraine, and also with Gagauzia.89 The Russian policy line has been Meanwhile, pro-Kremlin groups that Moldova’s orientation rallied in two Gagauz cities in support should not be directed toward of Donbass secession and Russia’s the EU, and the argument enjoys significant support in the region.

90 RusskaiaVesna. Гагаузия — тюркская 87 Aljazeera. Source: http://www.aljazeera. крепость Русского мира, 31.05.2014 com/indepth/features/2015/07/kremlins-alcohol- - 11:44. Source: http://rusvesna.su/recent_ diplomacy-divides-moldova-150701105943120. opinions/1401522241 html 91 The State Duma adopted a law calling 88 KM.RU. 28.03.2014. Source: http:// the promotion of separatist ideas in Russia a www.km.ru/economics/2014/03/28/ekonomika- criminal violation; those found guilty of sharing i-finansy/735965-rossiya-reshila-otkryt- their ideas of separation in the media may be konsulstvo-v-gagauzskoi-avton jailed for up to 5 years. 89 Gagauzinfo. В Одесской области 92 Chaillot Papers, Nicu Popescu, The провозгласили «Буджакскую народную Eurasian Union: the real, the imaginary and the республику» с участием Гагаузии. Source: likely, September 2014. Source: http://www.iss. http://gagauzinfo.md/index.php?newsid=21304 europa.eu/uploads/media/CP_132.pdf 31 freeze this winter’,96 alluding to the unsettled situation with the Gazprom- Moldovagaz supply contract. Rogozin has claimed that the Moldovan The Russian government never asked for Tiraspol’s point of view during its political anti-EU narrative discussions with the EU concerning the Association Agreement. In reality, intensified during Moldovan negotiators included one representative from Transnistria in 2015/2016. every meeting forum, but it was the Transnistrians who chose to minimize their involvement.97 The Russian anti-EU narrative intensified during 2015/2016, Socialist party leader and president- capitalizing on the failures of the elect Igor Dodon, together with Moldovan government and the various MPs, made a promise to banking fraud scandal involving cancel the EU Association Agreement, Vlad Filat, but also on the strained but not to touch the visa-free regime, atmosphere in Europe, where the so as to maximally open the Russian refugee crisis and economic decline market to exports, and strengthen were constantly in the headlines. For Moldova’s strategic partnership with instance, Sergey Narishkin, Speaker Russia.93 and 94 Russian Deputy PM of the Russian Duma, stated that Rogozin warned that ‘Moldova will ‘Ukraine and Moldova have lost the lose Transnistria, if it continues moving Eurasian market, getting nothing toward the EU’, and metaphorically, instead’. He also added that although ‘Moldova’s train en route to Europe the EAU is smaller than the EU or the will lose its wagons in Transnistria’.95 USA, it is still accessible, secure, and He added that, ‘Energy is important, open to equal benefits for market the cold season is near, winter on participants’.98 Some pro-Moscow its way. We hope that you will not authors were triumphant, claiming that the EU is finished and is now

96 V. Socor, The Jamestown Foundation. 93 Экономическое обозрение. И.Додон. Rogozin Threatens Moldova with Sanctions over Молдавские власти получили американскую Association Agreement with the European Union, лицензию на разгон протестов, 19.02.2016, Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 155, но.6 September 4, 2013 94 Panorama. Source: http://www.pan. 97 The Jamestown Foundation,Rogozin md/replika/Igori-Dodon-Dogovor-ob-assotsiatsii- Threatens Moldova with Sanctions over s-ES-budet-otmenen Association Agreement with the European Union. 95 World Affairs, A.Motyl, Ukraine’s Source: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: Orange Blues. Source: http://www. 155 worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/alexander-j-motyl/ 98 Nash Vybor. Source: http://vybor.md/ russia%E2%80%99s-revisionist-claims-ukraine- naryishkin-ukraina-i-moldova-vyibrav-evrosoyuz- and-moldova nichego-vzamen-ne-priobreli/ 32 Russia, even if it is the latter imposing an embargo on food items.102 Farmers from the North of Moldova have joined the protests and the political parties have Russian narrative also gotten involved. Some of the most vocal activists created a political party on economics in 2014‚ the ‘Popular Movement for the Customs Union’, which transformed is fused with itself into the Russian-Slavic Party of conservatism. Moldova in February 2016.103 When the EU lifted its financial support to Moldova as a result of the banking scandal in 2015, Moldova tried to free its hands by negotiating ‘a return to getting what the Soviet Union got in the Russian markets’. Recently, the the 1990s.99 Russkii Mir ideologues Minister of Economy, O. Calmik, stated are well aware of the political and that he expects Russia to reconsider strategic stakes, and hope that Eurasian its embargo on 19 types of exports at integration ‘could destroy the global the Moscow economic forum ‘25 years dominance of the West and put an end together in the CIS’ to re-launch bilateral to US hegemony’.100 economic relations, bringing new The Russian narrative on economics Russian investments into the Moldovan is fused with conservatism. One of energy sector.104 However, the Director Sputnik’s Directors, I. Rosca, formerly of the Institute of Current Economy, a leader of the opposition Popular Nikita Issaev, has openly stated that Christian Democrat Party (PPCD), the only stone on the road between called liberal ideas ‘a virus’.101 Several Moldova and Russia is the Association organizations are involved in the Agreement with EU, and that ‘it is economic anti-EU narrative. Presenting practically impossible to reconcile two itself as a classical Marxist political group, different trade zones, so Moldova will the Red Block pickets EU embassies and have to decide with whom she will Parliament, and blames the difficult stand, the CIS or the EU’.105 economic conditions on the EU, not

99 Молдавские Ведомости, Валерий 102 Grenada, Социальный форум Осталеп. Евросоюз закончился, Но.21, Молдовы передал свое обращение ряду левых 25.03.2016. партий страны. Source: http://www.grenada. 100 Elena Ponomareva and Lubov Shishilina, md/post/socforum_prizyv_levym_partiam ‘Krah Operatsii Vostochnoe Partnerstvo’, 18 103 Source: http://vybor.md/stala-yas- June 2014. Source: http://zerkalokryma.ru/ na-tsel-peredvizheniya-nato-vskoy-tehniki-v-ne- specialproject/novorossiya/predsedatelstvo_ greshtyi/?_utl_t=fb latvii_v_es2015_vostochnoe_partnerstvo_ 104 Source: http://vybor.md/stala-yasna- vmesto_ili_vmeste_s_rossiej/ tsel-peredvizheniya-nato-vskoy-tehniki-v- 101 Iurie Rosca. European integration as a negreshtyi/?_utl_t=fb state ideology and social malady. Source: http:// 105 Экономическое обозрение, iurierosca.md/opinii/european-integration-as- Стабильная нестабильность в молдавско- state-ideology-and-social-malady.html/ российских отношениях, 25 марта 2016, но.11. 33 but stand alone in the Center’.107 Igor NARRATIVE #4 ROMANIA Dodon, president-elect and leader AND NATO ARE A THREAT of the Party of Socialists (PSRM), stated that, ‘inviting NATO troops to TO PEACE celebrate Victory Day [May 9th] in the Russian and pro-Kremlin media central square of Chisinau is a rough promote opinions in which geopolitical slap in the face’, and an ‘insult to the relationships are described as a Constitution following Parliament’s contest for territory. One of Sputnik’s Declaration of Permanent Sovereignty 108 Directors, I. Rosca, stated that a and Neutrality’. similar crisis to the one that erupted Reporting on the war in Ukraine has in Ukraine could easily break out also been used as a tool in domestic in Moldova, since the Western politics. The Party of Socialists declared obsession with expanding its frontiers that banning journalists D. Kiseliov and to the East is based on geopolitical A. Kondrashov from TV news channel ambitions. If Russia provides some Rossia-1 confirms the ‘authoritarian support for the ‘rebel groups’, it is only character of the current regime’,109 because the USA is openly financing in the situation where Moldovan the militarization of the Ukrainian authorities banned Rossia-24, and 106 Army’. The author concluded that fined Prime, TV7, REN-TV, and RTR- ‘Moldova is ready for war, blockading Rossia for their independent news. In the Russian peace-keepers, promoting fact, the reason for the ban was anti- Russophobia and the image of Russia Ukrainian propaganda conducted by as the enemy, which are the bricks Russian war correspondents from to an imminent escalation of actions separatist battlefields in Donbass. that could provoke a new war with Transnistria’. 107 Юрий Якубов: Молдова не должна There is support for distancing рваться ни на Запад, ни на Восток, а оставаться Transnistria and Gagauzia from по центру, Gagauzinfo. Source: http://gagauzinfo. Chisinau, while Romanian and md/index.php?newsid=23485 Western relations with Moldova are 108 Bloknot. Source: http://bloknot- moldova.md/news/dodon-ne-dopustim-chtoby- contested. Russia and its supporters na-moldavskoy-zemle-gospo-738582 also exploit this theme to instil 109 In fact, the SIS banned several Russian fear of military conflict. As a result, TV groups and propagandists from entering there has been call for neutrality, Moldova. In May 2014, Johan Beckman, leader of the Antifa Committee of Finland, was banned e.g. Iurie Iakubov, who financed the from entering Chisinau Airport. Also, Vice PM referendum in 2014 in Gagauzia, Rogozin’s plane was checked by SIS operatives, promotes the idea that ‘Moldova shall which resulted in the confiscation of all boxes not rush for the West, nor for the East, with signatures collected in Transnistria to join Russia. In October 2014, RISI Senior Researcher V. Kashirin was banned when he publicly called on the Gagauz population to rebel against Moldovan authorities. Source: http://actualitati.md/ru/ vnutrennyaya-politika/batryncha-v-respublike- 106 Эксперт новостей, М. Лупашко, Война moldova-realizuyutsya-dvoynye-standarty-v- стучит в нашу дверь, Но.7, 11.03.2016 oblasti 34 The Russian media constantly raises policy, breaking the Constitution the issue of the unification of Moldova [neutrality], and playing into NATO’s and Romania. Igor Dodon has also playground’.114 According to their alleged in Zvezda that ‘any attempt to statement ‘the region is becoming a unify the two states could erupt into hotbed of instability only because of a new hotspot in our region’, and that the Western militaristic views, and ‘the military conflict of 1992 can be the Pentagon’s risky initiatives could repeated’.110 The Kremlin claims that easily ignite a fire in Moldova, a new Romania is not capable of acting alone civil war in our country’. on the unification project ‘Unirea 2018’,111 therefore, any activity in this In summary, the four hostile narratives area can be seen as resulting from the described here are widely circulated USA’s project for the region. in Moldova. As the examples show, recent years have seen a tremendous Pro-Kremlin media outlets are firm number of activities promoting in their accusations of NATO and the Kremlin ideas. It is very difficult to West harbouring violent intentions examine how much Moldova’s agenda in Moldova. Examples are easily has changed due to pro-Kremlin found: ‘American instructors teach messaging. The measurement of its Moldovan soldiers to kill’, as subtitle success should be done on a more under the news headline ‘NATO – Yes, general level. Nonetheless, it is safe Rossiya – Nyet’.112 Reporting on anti- to argue that Western values are not corruption protests, one journalist rated highly if the European Union predicted ‘there are signs that if chaos has lost so much of its appeal, while prevails, then the Romanian Army is Russian President Vladimir Putin ready to invade Moldova and install a enjoys great popularity. Romanian administration, as it was in the past’.113 In 2013, the radical political groups Antifa and Krasnyi released a series of harshly critical statements concerning Moldova’s pro-EU orientation, stating that ‘the Moldovan Government is promoting a militaristic

110 Panorama. Source: http://pan. md/poslednie-novosti/dodon-unirea---eto- grajdanskaya-voyna 111 Panorama. Source: http://pan.md/ mneniya/chubashenko-proekt-unirea-2018- made-in-usa 112 Moskovskii Komsomoletz, Moldova. World Weekly, 10-16 March 2016, p.3 113 B1 Tv. Source: http://www.b1.ro/ stiri/externe/propaganda-rusa-in-functiune-in- 114 Grenada. Декларация I-го Съезда moldova-va-intra-armata-romana-va-fi-sfarsitul- политической партии «Красный Блок» (Наш independentei-moldovei-pentru-totdeauna- дом Молдова) Source: http://www.grenada.md/ video-138525.html post/net_voine_net_nato_militarizmu 35 WHO CONTROLS THE MEDIA AND PEOPLE’S MEDIA CONSUMPTION? ICJ—Nadine Gogu

ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION This chapter describes who or Given the role of the mass media what controls the media and media in shaping the perceptions that consumption. The analysis emphasizes the average person holds about the importance of the power to control the political world, it is particularly what Moldovans read, see, hear, and important during elections and in experience. Russian media is seen times of war and political crises. as more trustworthy then Moldovan While the public relies on the news media.115 The fact that much of the media as a source of information media is linked to the local political about politics, politicians also and business elite, most often to depend on the press, both during Vladimir Plahotniuc, but also to Chiril elections and when governing. This Luchinschi, Vlad Filat, Vadim Ciubara, explains why politicians do their best Victor Țopa, Dan Lozovan, Dumitru to control what issues journalists Țîra, and Ilan Shor among others, cover, and to frame their reports so does not help the situation. Television as to show themselves in the best is still seen as relatively reliable, as light. Consequently, politicians have it is the third most trusted source of developed skills and strategies to socio-political information.116 increase their power over the media, and to interact with and control the press. 115 Barometer of Public Opinion. Institute for Public Policies, April 2016. Source: http:// Studies and surveys conducted in ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/BOP_04.2016_ recent decades have shown how the prima_parte_finale-r.pdf (last accessed 20 May, media can shape public opinion and 2016) change people’s perceptions about 116 Measuring perceptions of socio-politi- cal news by the media audience in the Republic foreign and domestic issues. While of Moldova. Independent Journalism Centre, the average citizen doesn’t know November 2015. Source: http://media-azi.md/ much about politics, what he or she sites/default/files/Studiu-calitativ%202015-eng. does know comes via mass media. pdf (last accessed 6 April, 2016) 36 Therefore, how the media operates Radio and print media do not have and what they report greatly influence such a wide following at 38% and 9%, what people know and think about respectively, however their online politics.117 versions do. There are 126 national and regional THE MOLDOVAN MEDIA broadcasters in Moldova, including 70 television stations of which five LANDSCAPE AND MEDIA have national coverage—the public CONSUMPTION broadcasters Moldova 1, Prime TV, Canal 2, Canal 3, and Publika,119 and Despite its status as the poorest nation 56 radio stations including eight with in Europe, Moldova is media rich. The national coverage—Radio Moldova, market is over-saturated, which makes Muz FM, Publika FM, Radio Plai, Hit media independence challenging and FM, Vocea Basarabiei, Fresh FM, and vulnerable to pressure. Broadcast and Radio Noroc. Moldovan citizens are print media are pluralistic in terms of the largest consumers of Internet numbers, but not so pluralistic in terms among the Eastern Partnership of providing balanced coverage of countries: they are leaders in the use politics, economics, finance, as well as of social networks [53%], Internet the arts, sports, and lifestyle features [Skype, YouTube, emails at 55%], for the diverse Moldovan audience. radio [62%] and online television A multitude of media outlets operate [35%].120 In the beginning of 2014, in the information market, some of approximately 24 000 websites were them representing political parties, registered in Moldova with the .md others claiming to be independent, domain, and nearly 200 of them but actually associated with certain published media content. These political parties and movements, numbers have continued to grow while a few are truly independent. The since then.121 There are no recent media are currently more pervasive data on the share of print media in due to the expanded availability and the market, but according to data use of new technologies. Television published in 2008, 253 newspapers and the Internet, which is still and magazines and 16 news agencies spreading throughout the country, are were operating in Moldova, including the primary sources of information for most Moldovan media consumers at 79% and 50%, respectively.118 119 Broadcasting Coordinating Council’s 117 The Media and Democracy: Theory and web page. Source: http://www.cca.md/news/ History. Source: lista-radiodifuzorilor-c u-acoperire-na-ional (last https://online.missouri.edu/exec/data/ accessed 6 April, 2016) courses/2339/public/lesson01/lesson01.aspx 120 Report on the state of media in (last accessed May 29, 2016) Eastern Partnership Countries, November 2016. 118 Barometer of Public Opinion. Institute Source: http://media-azi.md/sites/default/files/ of Public Policies, April 2016. Source: Report%20on%20state%20of%20media%20 http://ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/ in%20EaP%20countries%202015_0.pdf (last BOP_04.2016_prima_parte_finale-r.pdf (last accessed 12 May 2016) accessed 20 May 2016) 121 Ibid. 37 those in the Transnistrian region.122 In recent years, several newspapers MEDIA OWNERS AND THEIR and news agencies have gone out of INFLUENCE ON MEDIA business and some newspapers have given up their print versions in favour CONTENT IN MOLDOVA of posting online.

It is worth mentioning that public The media are vulnerable to trust in the media in general is still manipulation by both political high, even though lately it has started authorities and economic forces. to decline. Currently, the media rank In democratic states where the third on the list of the most trusted authorities do not have direct control institutions following the church and over news outlets, they may still be local administrations. Television is the able to indirectly control news content most trusted source of socio-political by providing various inducements information for 59% of the population to encourage journalists or owners while the Internet/websites are to bias their coverage.125 In less considered the most trusted sources democratic states, the government by 26%, radio by 4%, and newspapers uses the media to mobilize citizens 123 by only 2%. Most media consumers to take actions that may not be in either consider themselves to be their individual best interests.126 very informed or are quite satisfied Consequently, in many countries with the level of information they the independent media, whose role 124 possess. However, if the quality of resides in contributing to democracy that information is actually low, this and economic progress, fail to take would imply that large sections of root or survive.127 Media researchers the public have the habit of trusting have suggested employing the most everything the media offers. concept of ‘media capture’ to describe As a result, actors such as politicians a systemic governance problem where and business people are interested political leaders and media owners in controlling broadcast and online work together in a symbiotic, media in order to influence large segments of the population. 125 Noeline Gannaway Mind Control and the Media. Pacific Institute of Resource Management. Source: http://www.converge.org. nz/pirm/mind_con.htm (last accessed 10 April 2016) 126 Scott Gehlbach and Konstantin Sonin. Government Control of the Media, September 122 Mass Media Guide. Independent 2008 Source: http://www.wallis.rochester.edu/ Journalism Centre. Chisinau, 2008. wallisseminarseries/GehlbachSoninRochester2. 123 Measuring perceptions of socio-political pdf (last accessed 10 April 2016) news by the media audience in the Republic 127 Captured News Media: Bosnia- of Moldova. Independent Journalism Centre, Hertegovina, Serbia and Montenegro. Center November 2015. Source: http://media-azi.md/ for International Media Assistance, June 2016. sites/default/files/Studiu-calitativ%202015-eng. Source: http://www.cima.ned.org/publication/ pdf (last accessed 6 April, 2016) captured-news-media-bosnia-herzegovina- 124 Ibid. serbia-montenegro/ (last accessed 8 June 2016) 38 Even though the Broadcasting Code prohibits political parties from owning radio or TV stations, party members Most Moldovan media are allowed to hold licenses.130 Consequently, political leaders may outlets are biased, and in own broadcast media and use them some cases are used as to promote their party’s programs propaganda machines by and ideology. Ownership statements published in electoral contestants. November 2015 on the Broadcasting Coordinating Council (BCC) web page131 revealed that, in terms of the territorial coverage and audience figures, the most influential TV but mutually corrupting relationship: stations belong to politicians and media owners provide news coverage business people linked to politics. supportive of political leaders in exchange for favourable government The Democratic Party, which is treatment of their businesses and the leading party in the governing political interests.128 coalition, has the greatest control on media, mainly due to Vladimir The interference of politicians is Plahotniuc, a local oligarch and of particular concern, especially politician seen by many as the most during election campaigns. As media powerful and influential man in the monitoring reports have shown, country.132 He owns four TV stations most Moldovan media outlets are with countrywide coverage, as well as biased, and in some cases are used three radio stations133 that represent as propaganda machines by electoral about 60% of Moldova’s TV market.134 contestants. Thus, during the 2014 parliamentary elections about 66% of the media outlets monitored either favoured or maligned certain candidates and failed to inform voters 130 Source: http://lex.justice.md/ 129 document_rom.php?id=041D82D8:3A07C731 in a correct and balanced way. The (last accessed June 3, 2016) same was true during the local general 131 Broadcasting Coordinating Council. elections in 2015. Source: www.cca.md 132 Maria Levcenco. Vlad Plahotniuc: Moldova’s man in the shadows, February 2016, Source: https://www.opendemocracy.net/od- russia/maria-levcenco/vlad-plahotniuc-moldova- 128 Ibid. s-man-in-shadows (last accessed 6 April, 2016) 129 Media monitoring during the 133 Prime TV, Canal 2, Canal 3, Publika TV, parliamentary election campaign in 2014. Publika FM, MuzFM and Maestro FM. Independent Journalism Centre, Chisinau, 2014. 134 Proprietarii televiziunilor din Moldova: Source: http://media-azi.md/ro/publicatii/raport- Miliardari ameriani, afaceristi locali, banci din final-monitorizarea-mass-media-%C3%AEn- Rusia si milionari de la Tiraspol. Moldstreet. campania-electoral%C4%83-pentru-alegerile (last md, November 2015. Source: http://www.mold- accessed 5 May 2016) street.com/?go=news&n=4266 39 Some media135 recently wrote that Mr Plahotniuc has also purchased CTC Mega and Super TV, but his name is not included on ownership documents or Mr Plahotniuc’s on the list of final beneficiaries of the two stations. It should also be noted dual role in pro- that the Democratic Party is affiliated with a number of web portals and Western parties and Vladimir Plahotniuc is also the owner Kremlin controlled of the ad agencies Casa Media and Casa Media Plus that control over programming. 60% of the advertising market in Moldova.136 An analysis by the Eurasia Daily General Media Group, including Prime Monitor137shows that Mr Plahotniuc’s TV, Canal 2, Canal 3, and Publika TV. power instruments include: 1) These four television stations with control of law enforcement bodies— nation-wide coverage are among mainly the Anti-Corruption Centre, the top ten most-viewed stations in the Prosecutor General’s Office, the terms of news consumption: 53% National Commission for Integrity, a of respondents interviewed within governmental telecommunications a national survey mentioned Prime and data centre, as well as parts of TV as their primary source of socio- the court system and the Ministry political news. Publika, Canal 2, and of Justice; 2) economic and financial Canal 3 had also high figures—42%, levers—the Democratic Party controls 20%, and 18% respectively.138 the Ministry of the Economy and most of the regulatory and market-oversight Mr Plahotniuc’s dual role is agencies; 3) local administrations— interesting—he plays a leading role in the Democratic Party won many one of the pro-Western government seats in elections for local councils parties, while his TV channels that were held country-wide in June broadcast Kremlin-controlled 2015; and 4) the media conglomerate programming. It should be noted that, in addition to local programming, 135 Source: http://mediapowermonitor. which is shown mostly in the mornings com/content/controversial-businessman-vlad- and evenings, Prime TV rebroadcasts plahotniuc-buys-two-more-tv-stations-moldova Pervii Kanal programs from Russia, (last accessed 13 May, 2016) 136 More details on media ownership which are very popular in Moldova. patterns can be found in the chapter ‘Media The most popular Russian-produced ownerships and linkages to Moldovan politics’ content includes entertainment 137 Vladimir Socor, ‘Plahotniuc’s Power Base in Moldova: Allies and Instruments’ (Part Two), 138 Measuring perceptions of socio-politi- Eurasia Daily Monitor, January 2016. Source: cal news by the media audience in the Republic http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/ of Moldova, Independent Journalism Centre, single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44977&- November 2015. Source: http://media-azi.md/ cHash=0561b914e7d6299bb01d0daeb97d3fd7 sites/default/files/Studiu-calitativ%202015-eng. (last accessed 10 June, 2016) pdf (last accessed 6 April, 2016) 40 ownership—9% of them believe that the local Novosti newscast broadcast in Russian is produced in Russia or is a Pluralism is jointly produced program.141 diminished, since The TV news station Publika TV broadcasts only local content—24 consumers have access hours of newscasts, social and economic shows, and political talk to the same sources, shows. Most newscasts and talk voices, and images. shows closely cover the Democratic Party agenda and Vladimir Plahotniuc in particular, both as a politician and businessman, and founder of the charity foundation Edelweiss.142 programs and talk shows.139 Viewers are also exposed to Pervii Kanal’s daily As media experts have noticed,143 in newscast Vremea and the weekly certain cases the same news report, show Voskresnoe Vremea. It should produced by a single news crew, be noted that the Vremea newscast is broadcast on all four television is re-broadcasted immediately after stations owned by Mr Plahotniuc. Primele Stiri [First News], the local In this way pluralism of opinion is Moldovan newscast, at approximately diminished, since media consumers 21.40 each evening. This explains the have access to the same sources, confusion of some media consumers voices, and images. The main regarding the ownership/provenience gatekeepers—editors, producers, of newscasts. For instance, about 15% and high-level management—are of those who watch Prime TV believe watching the topics covered and that Vremea newscast from Russia is sources interviewed closely to make either local, i.e. produced in Moldova, sure that only opinions in line with or a mixed newscast.140 editorial policy (supporting the DP Canal 2 and Canal 3 broadcast local content (newscasts, talk shows) as well as documentaries, movies, and 141 Measuring perceptions of socio-political television series purchased from news by the media audience in the Republic Russia. Because of this mixture of of Moldova. Independent Journalism Centre, local and foreign content, Canal November 2015. Source: http://media-azi.md/ sites/default/files/Studiu-calitativ%202015-eng. 3 media consumers are also pdf (last accessed 6 April, 2016) confused regarding media content 142 Media monitoring reports conducted by the Independent Journalism Centre. Source: 139 Ibid. http://media-azi.md/ro/publicatii 140 Measuring perceptions of socio-political 143 Panel discussions on fighting media news by the media audience in the Republic concentration in Moldova. Independent of Moldova. Independent Journalism Centre, Journalism Centre. April 2016. Source: http:// November 2015. Source: http://media-azi.md/ media-azi.md/ro/stiri/scenarii-optimiste- sites/default/files/Studiu-calitativ%202015-eng. %C8%99i-realiste-privind-adoptarea-noului-cod- pdf (last accessed 6 April, 2016) al-audiovizualului (last accessed 10 June 2016) 41 agenda) are represented.144 As some Canal 3 and Canal 2, at 39% and 43%, journalists have seen, the editorial respectively.147 Prime TV and Publika policy at Publika TV is influenced by TV also consistently manipulated ‘high-level decision makers’, while information when covering various experts who criticize the Democratic political issues, including protests, in Party are blacklisted, meaning they an attempt to distort the message and are not invited to appear on shows to discredit protesters by spreading and are not quoted as sources.145 rumours aimed at distracting attention from the essence of the problem and In the past, as a rule, the General creating panic instead.148 Also, thanks Media Group did not so much favour to its financial power, the General Vladimir Plahotniuc personally, but 146 Media Group employs trolls in large rather opposed his opponents. From numbers relative to the local media 2011 to 2014 Mr Plahotniuc did not scene.149 interfere much in the editorial policies of the media outlets he controls; Given the influence Mr Plahotniuc however, starting with the election has on the government as one of campaign in 2014 his influence the leaders of the Democratic Party has become obvious. The media currently in power, and the fact that monitoring reports during 2014 and the broadcast regulatory agency is 2015 produced enough data and politically controlled,150 one may evidence to support allegations that assume that he will not relinquish the TV stations owned by Plahotniuc any of his stations to diminish media were used as a tool to promote concentration. On the contrary, some his interests and those of the voices say that Mr Plahotniuc will Democratic Party. Prime TV, Canal continue strengthening his media 2, Canal 3, and Publika TV heavily holdings and will not refrain from promoted and decisively favoured the Democratic Party during the 147 Media monitoring report. Broadcasting Coordinating Council. December 2014, Source: parliamentary elections in November http://cca.md/files/PLURALISM%20TV%20 2014. For instance, Prime TV allotted 2014%2020.10%20-%2030.11.2014%20%28gen- around 31% of its broadcasts to cover eral%29_0_0.pdf (last accessed 5 May, 2016) Democratic Party candidates, who 148 Protest next to the home of democrat Vlad Plahotniuc: Manipulation and incompe- were exclusively presented as either tence. Media Azi.md, July 2015. Source: http:// positive or neutral. The same situation media-azi.md/en/node/316422 (last accessed 6 was observed at Publika TV, while April, 2016) the percentage was even higher at 149 Vladimir Socor. Plahotniuc’s Power Base in Moldova: Allies and Instruments (Part 144 Исследование NM: Two), Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume, Janu- какподеленмолдавскийтелерынок. Source: ary 2016. Source: http://www.jamestown. http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/issledovanie- org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_ nm-kak-podelen-moldavskiy-telerynok-22680 news%5D=44977&cHash=0561b914e7d6299bb- (last accessed 10 May 2016) 01d0daeb97d3fd7 145 Ibid. 150 Press Freedom Report, Republic of 146 Vladimir Socor. Plahotniuc’s Power Moldova 2015, Independent Journalism Centre. Base in Moldova: Allies and Instruments (Part Source: http://media-azi.md/en/press-freedom- Two), Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 7, report-republic-moldova-2015 (last accessed 16 January 2016. April, 2016) 42 while NTV Moldova, a channel that only received its broadcasting license in December 2015, appeared as Alteration of channel number nine.153 These changes were detrimental to channels that were numbering to moved down, since, according to some media representatives,154 viewers the advantage or used to watching certain channels in disadvantage of certain specific positions continued watching whatever channels were now placed broadcasters. in those positions. Also, in several instances representatives of the opposition media accused Vladimir Plahotniuc taking further steps to eliminate of persuading cable operators to jam competitors in the information their broadcasts,155 and accused the market.151 Some media representatives Broadcasting Coordinating Council have recently claimed that Mr of using a tenuous reason to exclude Plahotniuc influenced cable operators them from the mandatory list of to alter the channel numbering to channels that cable operators should the advantage or disadvantage of retransmit in Moldova.156 certain broadcasters.152 For instance, the first 4 stations broadcast by It is worth mentioning that in national operator Moldtelecom were 2015 the Democratic Party (PDM) given to the private channels Prime parliamentarians developed a TV, Canal 2, Canal 3, and Publika TV, controversial draft law that included, while broadcasters that used to be among other issues, a provision listed in the first ten positions were regarding the mandatory percentage moved down. Similar changes were of Moldovan programming. A number noticed with other cable providers. Moldtelecom stated that the changes 153 Moldtelecom Has Changed the Order of TV Channels in the List of Services Based on were made based on, ‘…the analysis Some ‘Internal Analyses’. Media Azi.md, February of television channels’ popularity, 2016. Source: http://www.media-azi.md/en/stiri/ their topics, convenience of use and moldtelecom-has-changed-order-tv-channels- subscribers’ requests’; however, the list-services-based-some-%E2%80%9Cinternal- analyses%E2%80%9D (last accessed 25 May ‘popularity’ criterion is not convincing. 2016) For example, TV7 was moved from 154 Source: http://www.tv7.md/ro/social/ position nine to position fifteen, tv-7-a-fost-schimbat-in-grila-posturilor-tv-oferita- de-moldtelecom-acum-tv-7-poate-fi-gasit-la- 151 Participants at public debates on the numarul-15/ (last accessed 25 May 2016) Draft of the new Broadcasting Code, organized 155 Source: http://www.jurnaltv.md/ by the Parliamentary committee on media in ro/news/2016/1/21/jurnal-tv-bruiat-de- December 2015 and January-February 2016. moldtelecom-10186181/ 152 Source: http://www.tv7.md/ro/social/ 156 Source: http://www.media-azi.md/en/ tv-7-a-fost-schimbat-in-grila-posturilor-tv-oferita- stiri/accent-tv-excluded-moldtelecom-cable-offer, de-moldtelecom-acum-tv-7-poate-fi-gasit-la- http://ziarulnational.md/jurnal-tv-a-fost-exclus- numarul-15/ (last accessed 25 May, 2016) din-lista-unor-operatori-de-cablu/ 43 of TV stations accused the PDM of Services SRL, specifying that he would trying to eliminate competitors from sell to any interested parties except the media market; according to them media tycoons.160 Consequently, TV7 it is very difficult to produce the has encountered various problems. required amount of local content.157 For instance, on 5 April 2016 the The author of the draft law stated that Moldovan company TDB-service, the number of TV stations that operate which provides satellite transmissions in Moldova is too high, stressing that of TV signals to the majority of six or seven broadcasters would be cable networks, ceased performing more than enough.158 its contractual obligations to TV7 without explanation. As a result, Another party linked to media viewers in the majority of localities influence is the Liberal Democratic in the country had no access to TV7 Party (PLDM). Chiril Luchinschi, PLDM programs.161 Also, many viewers Member of Parliament and former reported they did not have access to head of the Parliamentary Committee TV7 political talk shows because they on Media, owns two TV stations— were jammed. Also, on 25 May 2016 TV7 Analitic Media-Group TNT ( ) and the popular talk show Politika went Bravo Alcasar Media , as well as the off the air. The host of the show said Services SRL sales house. Since its that it is very difficult for independent inception in 2006 and until 2015, media in Moldova to compete under TV7 re-broadcast programming from unfair conditions.162 Also, newmaker. NTV the Russian station , with local md recently reported severe staff cuts inserts, mostly consisting of newscasts at TV7, because of financial problems and talk shows. In terms of news encountered by the station. These are consumption, its rating was relatively indicators that TV7 is now seen as part high for a TV station with regional 159 of the opposition, and its owner does coverage, constituting 10%. At the not have much political influence. It end of 2015, after the management’s is worth mentioning that coverage NTV decision to replace the newscasts on TV7 was relatively balanced and political talk shows with other during the elections, although Liberal programs, TV7 was denied the right to rebroadcast NTV programming. Recently, Mr Lucinschi announced 160 Исследование NM: как поделен his intention to sell TNT Bravo as well молдавский телерынок. Newsmaker.md, as his shares (50%) in Alcasar Media February 2016. Source: http://newsmaker. md/rus/novosti/issledovanie-nm-kak-podelen- 157 Public debates on the draft law on moldavskiy-telerynok-22680 (last accessed 6 changing the Broadcasting Code, organized by April 2016) the Parliamentarian committee on media, June 161 Source: http://media-azi.md/en/ 2015. stiri/declaration-media-ngos-discretionary- 158 Ibid. ceasing-tv7-transmissions-serious-violation- 159 Measuring perceptions of socio-political citizens%E2%80%99 (last accessed 20 May 2016) news by the media audience in the Republic 162 Наталья Морарь объявила о закрытии of Moldova. Independent Journalism Centre, ток-шоу Politica на TV7. May 2016. Source: November 2015. Source: http://media-azi.md/ http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/natalya- sites/default/files/Studiu-calitativ%202015-eng. morar-objyavila-o-zakrytii-tok-shou-politica-na- pdf (last accessed 6 April 2016) tv7-25262 (last accessed 25 May, 2016) 44 radio station was biased toward the Liberal Democratic Party during the last elections.166 Among other media linked to the PLDM are the Ziarul Vocea Basarabiei National newspaper, the National FM radio station, and the web portal TV reduced its unimedia.md that backed the party coverage after during the 2014 and 2015 elections.167 The Party of Socialists, currently in Filat’s arrest. opposition, has obvious connections with the final beneficiary ofAccent TV, Vadim Ciubara, who is a consultant for the Party of Socialists, and the newly established NTV Moldova, Democratic candidates received more which is owned by the Socialist positive coverage in the newscasts deputy Corneliu Furculiță.168 As some than other candidates.163 The TV media sources claim, an agreement shows Politika and Interpol were was made between Democratic perceived as balanced since they used Party leader Vladimir Plahotniuc and to present different perspectives and Socialist leader Igor Dodon. According viewpoints on various issues. to the agreement, NTV Moldova The TV and radio stations of Vocea would have no problem securing Basarabiei are are owned by relatives of a licence to operate if Plahotniuc’s the former Prime Minister and former advertising agency Casa Media Sales PLDM leader Vlad Filat, currently on House would be its media buyer.169 trial for corruption and influence peddling. Valeriu Saharneanu, one of the stations’ founders, stated that 166 Media monitoring during the parliamentary election campaign in 2014. both stations were aggressively taken Independent Journalism Centre, Chisinau, 2014. over by Mr Filat; he went to court to Source: http://media-azi.md/ro/publicatii/raport- recover them.164 It should be noted final-monitorizarea-mass-media-%C3%AEn- that Vocea Basarabiei TV reduced its campania-electoral%C4%83-pentru-alegerile (last accessed 5 May 2016) coverage of events after Vlad Filat’s 167 Media monitoring reports conducted arrest and currently does not provide by the Independent Journalism Centre. Source: news or talk shows,165 while the http://media-azi.md/ro/publicatii 168 Исследование NM: как поделен молдавский телерынок. Newsmaker.md. 163 Media monitoring report. Independent February 2016. Source: http://newsmaker. Journalism Centre, 2015. Source: http:// md/rus/novosti/issledovanie-nm-kak-podelen- media-azi.md/ro/publicatii/raport-nr2- moldavskiy-telerynok-22680 (last accessed 6 monitorizarea-mass-media-%C3%AEn-campania- April, 2016) electoral%C4%83-pentru-alegerile-locale (last 169 Либерал-демократ Кирилл Лучинский accessed 6 April 2016) может продать часть медиа-активов. February 164 Source: http://www.jurnaltv.md/ro/ 2016. Source: http://newsmaker.md/rus/novosti/ news/2014/10/30/scandal-la-vocea-basarabiei- liberal-demokrat-kirill-luchinskiy-mozhet-prodat- quot-10071077/ chast-media-aktivov-22399. (last accessed 5 May 165 The author’s personal observation. 2016) 45 NTV Moldova broadcasts local newscasts and talk shows but also re-broadcasts NTV programs from Russia. Since NTV Moldova started broadcasting only recently, no data Journal TV was on its behaviour is available. Media experts have noted, however, that heavily biased the editorial policy of NTV Moldova against the is exclusively based on promoting the Party of Socialists.170 Democratic Party. In addition to their influence over these two TV stations, Party of Socialists representatives own the newspaper and web portal Argumenti From its inception in 2009, Jurnal i fakti, tsn.md, as well as control the TV has acted as an opposition TV newspaper Panorama and the web station and regularly criticizes the portal actualitati.md. During elections government, specifically Democratic in 2014 and 2015, the newspaper Party (PDM) leader Plahotniuc. Taking Panorama and Accent TV were the into account audience numbers, main media backing the socialists. especially for socio-political news,172 Their efforts resulted in the election it can be said that Jurnal TV plays of the Socialist candidate Irina Vlah a substantial role in influencing as Governor of Găgăuzia and winning people and forming public opinion. additional seats in Parliament in 2014. For instance, public opinion polls Another important broadcaster, Jurnal conducted in 2015 have shown a TV, is one of few influential TV stations significant increase in the credibility in Moldova that do not re-broadcast ratings for Andrei Nastase, one of programs from Russia. All newscasts, the PPDA leaders who is intensively talk shows, and entertainment promoted on Jurnal TV.173 Mr Nastase programmes are locally produced, has family ties with Jurnal TV owner while movies are purchased. The Victor Țopa. owner of the station is Victor Țopa, a The TV station was heavily biased Moldovan businessman who runs his against the Democratic Party in the business from Germany, where he fled election campaigns. According to BCC after being convicted of blackmail in Moldova. He claims he was the victim 172 Measuring perceptions of socio-political in a case staged by Plahotniuc.171 news by the media audience in the Republic of Moldova, Independent Journalism Centre, November 2015. Source: http://media-azi.md/ sites/default/files/Studiu-calitativ%202015-eng. 170 Sorina Stefarta, Editor at Mediacritica. pdf (last accessed 6 April 2016) md web portal, June 3 Source: 2016. 173 Public Opinion Barometer. Institute for 171 Source: http://unimedia.info/stiri/ Public Policies. April, 2015 Source: http://ipp.md/ doc-victor-Topa-reactioneaza-sunt-con- public/files/Barometru/Brosura_BOP_11.2015_ damnat-dupa-ce-l-am-demascat-pe-plahot- prima_parte_final.pdf (last accessed 6 April niuc-40319.html 2016) 46 monitoring reports, during the local As some case studies have shown, by elections in 2015 30% of its news asking/urging people to join protesters content covered the Democratic Party, and by extensively promoting the mostly in a negative light, and PDM viewpoints of PPDA leaders, these candidates were not presented at all in media outlets are biased and infringe the news on Jurnal TV.174 In contrast, on the professional ethical standards the station intensively promoted of objectivity and balance.177 the PPDA platform leaders that are covered exclusively in positive light. The two public broadcasters in Teleradio Moldova Thus, 64% of the content of evening Moldova— and Teleradio Gagauzia newscasts from 6 to 27 September —are partly 2016 was about the PPDA platform, funded with public money. Since the most of it neutral or positive.175 government decides on the budget, Media monitoring reports also there is a danger that these stations assessed manipulation techniques will favour the government or the showing that, in some cases, Jurnal local authorities. This is obvious, TV resorted to manipulation in order especially in the case of the regional to promote certain messages against broadcaster that supported the local administration during the last local Vladimir Plahotniuc and in favour of 178 PPDA leaders.176 elections in 2015. It is worth mentioning that the recently There is no recent data on how the established political party, the Dignity central and local administrations and Truth Platform, is backed byJurnal have distributed state advertising in TV, along with Jurnal FM, jurnal.md, the media, but research conducted and the Jurnal de Chisinau newspaper, in 2008 by the Independent which all promote the party’s actions, Journalism Centre showed that, as a specifically their non-stop protests. rule, such advertising contracts are given to media that are loyal to the 174 Media monitoring report. Broadcasting authorities.179 Coordinating Council. June 2015 175 Media monitoring report. Broadcasting Coordinating Council. Source: http://cca.md/ files/Raport%20de%20monitorizare%20cu%20 177 Studiu de caz. Protestul din 24 aprilie privire%20%20la%20protestele%20organizate_0. de la Chișinău: manipulare și dezinformare en- pdf (last accessed 15 May, 2016) gros. Mediacritica. Source: http://mediacritica. 176 ‘Measuring perceptions of socio- md/studiu-de-caz-protestul-din-24-aprilie-de-la- political news by the media audience in the chisinau-manipulare-si-dezinformare-en-gros/ Republic of Moldova’, Independent Journalism (last accessed 15 June 2016) Centre, November 2015. Source: http://media- 178 Source: http://trm.md/ro/regional/ azi.md/sites/default/files/Studiu-calitativ%20 unele-institutii-media-din-gagauzia-nu-au-un- 2015-eng.pdf (last accessed 6 April, 2016) comportament-corect-in-campania-electorala- Monitoring Report nr.1: ‘Elements of raport propaganda, disinformation and informational 179 Relatiile dintre mass media si war in the domestic mass media’, Independent autoritatile de stat – spre transparent si Journalism Centre, February 2016. Source: responsabiolitate. Independent Journalism http://media-azi.md/en/monitoring-report- Center, 2008. Source: http://media-azi.md/ro/ nr1-elements-propaganda-disinformation-and- publicatii/studiul-rela%C5%A3iile-dintre-mass- informational-war-domestic-mass-media (last media-%C5%9Fi-autorit%C4%83%C5%A3ile-de- accessed March 31 2016) stat-spre-transparen%C5%A3%C4%83-%C5%9Fi 47 as well. Some of the other influential MAPPING OWNERSHIP politicians and businessmen in the (VIOREL PARVAN) media include Dan Lozovan, Chiril Lucinschi, and Dumitru Țîra. The Summarizing the information from mass media is largely affiliated documents, reports, press articles, either directly or indirectly with and interviews the following chart certain people, but also with political ‘Concentration of Media’ was created. parties. The chart ‘Media affiliated Vlad Plahotniuc plays a dominant with Moldovan parties’ attempts to role in the television and advertising document the relationships between markets. He also exerts his influence the owners, political parties, and on certain newspapers and web their position on pro-Kremlin or pro- platforms and is thought to have Western axis. influence over some cable companies 2. Media affiliated with Moldovan parties MEDIA AFFILIATED WITH MOLDOVAN PARTIES Pro–Kremlin Pro–Western

Party Democratic Party of Moldova Civic Platform of Socialists «Dignity of the Republic Prime TV Publika TV Adevarul Moldova and Truth» / STS Mega Canal 2 today.md of Moldova Party «Dignity Retro FM Canal 3 publika.md and Truth Maestro FM Super TV onlinemoldova.md NTV Moldova Radio Plai politics.md Platform» Accent TV Publika FM democracy.md tsn.md Muz FM mesaj.md Jurnal TV pan.md moldova24.info Jurnal FM aif.md 24h.md actualitati.md Jurnal de Chisinau lifnews.md replika.md jurnal.md argumentul.info voxpublika.md epresa.md vesti.md Party Liberal Party of Communists deschide.md of the Republic of Moldova Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova N4 European People's Moldova Suverană Party of Moldova Vocea Basarabiei TV noi.md TV-7 Vocea Basarabiei omg.md TNT Bravo Realitatea TV Ziarul National realitatea.md unimedia.md agora.md Ilan Șhor infotag.md (Party tribuna.md «Ravnopravie») ziarulnational.md ― Euro TV TV Radio Alt TV Print Internet 48

CONCENTRATION3. Concentration OF MEDIA of media in the Republic of Moldova

Vladimir Plahotniuc Victor Ţopa

Publika TV Publika FM Jurnal TV jurnaltv.md publika.md Retro FM Jurnal FM jurnal.md voxpublika.md retrofm.md Jurnal de Chisinau jc.md Canal 2 Muz FM canal2.md muzzfm.md Canal 3 epresa.md canal3.md autostrada.md STS Mega vesti.md Prime TV 24h.md prime.md zumi.md Super TV

Ilan Shor

Euro TV eurotv.md Alt TV alttv.md

Dumitru Ţîra

Realitatea TV realitatea.md kankan.md bani.md stireata.md topmedia.md Chiril Lucinschi

TV-7 tv7.md TNT Bravo

Dan Lozovan

HIT FM Radio Alla Rado Stil

Offshore companies ― TV RTR NTV Radio REN-TV TV-21 Print Pro TV Acasa Internet 49 Comparable figures were 33.5% for FOREIGN ACTORS the Romanian president, 25.3% for A major issue that has recently been the American president, and 10.7% 182 on the agenda of local politicians, civil for the Ukrainian leader. society, and the Moldovan media is The impact of the media on forming the influence of foreign media on the public opinion is shown in answers Moldovan public in the context of an to questions assessing perceptions information confrontation. Judging by regarding the role of specific countries the level of use and trust in foreign in maintaining world stability based media coverage of socio-political on knowledge gathered though information, one can say that Russian various means. 40% of the population media are important players in the see Russia as a guarantor of peace Moldovan information space. About and a factor in stability compared 36% of the population consults Russian with 21% who believed the country media on a daily basis and 60% of that was a destabilizing factor. Notably, audience likes the content. 14% of 80% of those who see Russia as a the population consumes Romanian peacekeeper and 58% of those who media and 48% of them like the see the US as a destabilizing factor content, while US media attracts just identified as ethnic minorities.183 1.1% of population with 23% saying These are the consequences of the 180 they like the content. fact that most people in Moldova get Russian media are the most trusted their news from Russian TV stations. news source among Moldovan For instance, Prime TV, which consumers at 49% of respondents, rebroadcasts the Russian stationPervii while only 40% stated that they Kanal, had the highest figure in terms trust Moldova media.181 35% of of socio-political news consumption respondents said they trust European at 53%, while RTR Moldova, REN media and 28% trust Romanian TV Moldova, and TV7, which used media. The trend continues in regard to rebroadcast content provided by to the popularity of foreign political NTV, also had relatively high news leaders. Kremlin leader Vladimir Putin consumption rates of 18%, 10%, and 184 is the most popular politician among 9.7%, respectively. Moldovans with a 62% approval rate. The consequences of Russian media 180 Measuring perceptions of socio- influence on the 2014 parliamentary political news by the media audience in election results are noteworthy. the Republic of Moldova, Independent Journalism Center, November 2015. 182 Ibid. Source: http://media-azi.md/ro/publicatii/ 183 Measuring perceptions of socio-political studiul-%E2%80%9Em%C4%83surarea- news by the media audience in the Republic percep%C8%9Biei-consumatorilor-de-media-din- of Moldova, Independent Journalism Centre, republica-moldova-asupra (last accessed 6 April, November 2015. Source: http://media-azi.md/ro/ 2016) publicatii/studiul-%E2%80%9Em%C4%83surarea- 181 Barometer of Public Opinion. Institute percep%C8%9Biei-consumatorilor-de-media-din- for Public Policies, April 2016. Source: http://ipp. republica-moldova-asupra (last accessed 6 April md/public/files/Barometru/BOP_04.2016_prima_ 2016) parte_finale-r.pdf (last accessed 20 May 2016) 184 Ibid. 50 The Party of Socialists and its leader improve their performance as well- Igor Dodon exploited the images of managed businesses, and ensure Russian leaders, assuring voters that the distribution of local and regional Moldova’s relationship with Russia news across Moldova. In addition, would improve substantially if the the program aimed to improve the Socialists won. In the autonomous capacity of the media in Transnistria region of Gagauzia, the pro-Kremlin to serve local information needs. candidate Irina Vlah won the election Regional for Bashkan [local governor] in March The second network is the Broadcasters Association MERIDIAN 2015. Russian TV stations gave Vlah’s , campaign positive coverage, which a network of local television and had the desired effect.185 radio stations supported by the Soros Foundation-Moldova. The goal In addition to media from the Russian of the project was to strengthen Federation and media funded by local good and democratic governance in politicians, there are a number of Moldova through increased public independent outlets, which struggle participation in decision-making at to survive in a media market marked the local and national levels, and to by disloyal competition. Given the promote social inclusion policies for undersized advertising market and all groups. The Soros Foundation- its monopolization by politicians, Moldova also implements additional these media outlets cannot operate media programs with the goal of without financial support provided by building the capacity of independent international donors through various regional media to deliver objective, media development programs. During unbiased, and reliable information on the last decade, a series of projects the complex democratic development aimed at developing and strengthening issues of the country and the EU the free and independent media in Association Agreement to the rural Moldova were conducted. Foreign population, with a particular focus on donors have invested in establishing Russian-speaking regions. networks of local television outlets to enhance their ability to defend media The Council of Europe and the interests. Examples of such networks European Union Joint Program on include the AICI TV Network, created Democracy Support in the Republic during a three-year Media Program of Moldova supported the reforms in Moldova that was implemented carried out at the BCC and at the Teleradio- by IREX with the financial support public broadcaster Moldova of the United States Agency for through strengthening International Development. The professionalism and introducing goal of the project was to raise the guarantees for the independence of level professionalism at the stations, the broadcasting regulatory authority. 185 Nadine Gogu, Who really rules the Among other donors that support airwaves in Moldova? Open Democracy. March the development of independent 2016. Source: https://www.opendemocracy. media in Moldova are Finland, the net/od-russia/nadine-gogu/who-really-rules- Netherlands, Slovakia, the United airwaves-in-moldova (last accessed 6 April 2016) 51 Kingdom, the United States, and the European Commission in Moldova. Due to these programs, independent media outlets can attract funds to cover production expenses and do not have to depend on local politicians. The main condition international donors require for their support is fair and objective coverage of events, and to urge the government to implement reforms and be accountable to the public. 52 LANDSCAPING THE MEDIA MARKET AND IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONING IDIS Viitorul—Igor Munteanu

News-making is a powerful instrument plotted according to their editorial for shaping public sentiment. We policy (pro-Kremlin, mixed, or. pro- have attempted to map the Moldovan Western), and to ownership type media in order to highlight its variety. (state-controlled, privately funded). Three factors were considered in Both national and regional media are positioning the various media outlets included. The funding states include on the chart: (1) Are the media outlets not only Moldova, and Russia but also state owned or privately owned? (2) Ukraine and Western governments. Do they broadcast in Russian or in Romanian? (3) Do they use cultural/ Moldovan media regulations do geopolitical framing? Ownership data not stipulate editorial policies or is publicly available, but the rest of the ownership rights, which makes information was gleaned by surveying mapping more subjective. For some the editorial line of each media outlet. outlets pro-Kremlin/pro-Western attitudes are difficult to evaluate. Even There are several reasons the the positioning of the Kremlin’s news Moldovan media environment does outlet Sputnik is challenging. It is a not live up to Western journalistic Russian-state news channel reflecting ideals. These include Russian the official position of the Russian influence and problematic ownership authorities, but it is also platform issues. The media is concentrated in for the unofficial and more radical the hands of wealthy groups, who can views of the Kremlin propagandists. instil a rigid editorial policy. In addition, ‘Mixed’ columns implies platforms the largest media conglomerates that are either neutral or change their are often owned by global offshore position. business. Charting the ideological positioning of media is fuzzy and subjective. Based on our judgement and the available data, the most influential outlets are positioned on a graph. Media is 4. Platforms and bias 53 PLATFORMS AND BIAS Privately funded State funded

Pro–Kremlin Mixed Pro–Western Pro–Kremlin Mixed Pro–Western

Accent TV Realitatea TV Publika–TV REN-TV CTC (Ukraine) Regional TV TV-7 Canal 2 Regional IPNA TVR1 IPNA Teleradio TNT Bravo MAKLER Canal 3 Teleradio Gaugauzia TVR2 Moldova TVC-21 LOGOS-PRESS Jurnal–TV EURO TV Kommersant Pro TV RIA-Novosti RFE/RL Radio N4 Acasa TV Moldova ITAR-TASS Deutche Welle ALT TV/Orhei TV Regnum BBC Prime TV* Publika-FM lenta.ru RFI NTV Moldova* Vocea Basarabiei Radio Chisinau RTR Moldova* Kiss FM Rossia-1* Radio Noroc Pro FM Panorama Radio Nova Moldavskie Vedomosti AiF Jurnal National Komsomolskaya Pravda Ziarul de Garda v Moldove* TIMPUL ― * — reproduces mostly state funded content Prime FM iPN News Agencies and other news-making media INFOTAG Unimedia TV companies Life News agora.md Radio stations broadcasted in Moldova Sputnik* newsmaker.md Private printed media

LANGUAGES5. Languages AND BIAS and bias

Privately funded State funded

Pro–Kremlin Mixed Pro–Western Pro–Kremlin Mixed Pro–Western

Panorama MAKLER Publika–TV REN-TV CTC (Ukraine) RFE/RL Radio Moldavskie LOGOS-PRESS Canal 2 Regional IPNA Deutche Welle Vedomosti Kommersant Canal 3 Teleradio Gaugauzia TVR1 BBC AiF Jurnal–TV RIA-Novosti TVR2 RFI Prime TV* Realitatea TV Pro TV Regnum Radio Chisinau INFOTAG Acasa TV Moldova lenta.ru Regional TV Life News iPN IPNA Teleradio Accent TV Unimedia Moldova TV-7 Publika FM TNT Bravo Vocea Basarabiei TVC-21 Kiss FM NTV Moldova* Radio Noroc RTR Moldova* Pro FM Rossia-1* Jurnal National Sputnik* Ziarul de Garda Komsomolskaya Pravda TIMPUL v Moldove* newsmaker.md ― EURO TV * — reproduces mostly state funded content N4 ALT TV/Orhei TV Media outlets in Romanian Media outlets in Russian 54 The graph shows that Russian content and worldview have wide penetration. Russian language services have much larger audiences than would be expected from looking solely at the number of ethnic Russian speakers. One of the main factors determining media consumption is the language in which information is sought. Almost 80% of the public give preference to information in Russian, albeit to different extents, and 11% access information only in the Russian language.186 There is a tendency that there is more state sponsored content in Russian channels, while content in Romanian comes from private owned media. The concentration of Russian language media is obvious in such a small market, where the largest national licenses belong to the companies that rebroadcast popular Russian state-owned programs in Moldova. This pattern is replicated by dozens of private cable TV channels across the country. Linguistic divisions remain sharp. During the search for a national and state identity in Moldova, political manipulation by those who seek to exploit identity gaps and gain supporters is a significant danger.

186 Independent Journalism Centre (new portal of IJC iswww.media-azi.md), ‘Measuring the perception of the average consumer in Moldova on social-political news’, November 2015. Source: http://media-azi.md/ro/stiri/ studiu-cji-70-dintre-consumatorii-de-media- din-r-moldova-sus%C8%9Bin-c%C4%83- presa-manipuleaz%C4%83 (last accessed on 27.04.2016) 55 THE MAIN INFLUENCERS OF PUBLIC OPINION. IDIS Viitorul – Marin Cepoi

ABSTRACT platforms.187 This chapter attempts to identify INTRODUCTION and characterize the main Moldovan opinion leaders, and link them to the political currents promoted by the For Moldovans, television is the main main mass media channels. We classify source of information about politics.188 the opinion leaders according to their Another important avenue for shaping political preferences, affiliations, and opinions, especially among elites, are external orientation, supplemented by other personal history. A 187 Subjective evaluation of opinion leaders highlights the variety of opinions in the Moldovan subjective look is taken at their lives public space and is based on the expertise of and work experience, ideas they the author. The author works for IDIS Viitorul, have promoted in the past, links with which is itself an important opinion leader; important people and organization, many IDIS Viitorul associates are closely linked to Moldovan political networks. Therefore, these their interests, and other elements characterizations might reflect an unnecessary that can help to explain their actions bias. The characterizations do not reflect the in the public sphere. The chapter opinions of the NATO Strategic Communications focuses separately on four groups: Centre of Excellence, the Alliance or the countries associated with the Centre. pro-government media and opinion 188 The most watched TV talk-shows are: leaders, non-Plahotniuc media and Moldova in direct [Moldova 1 TV], Puterea a 4-a opinion leaders, promoters of Kremlin [N4 TV], Replica [Prime TV], Politica [TV7], In narratives, and emerging opinion PROfunzime [Pro TV Chisinau], Fabrica [Publika TV], Tema Zilei [Canal 3], Pahomi [Realitatea TV], leaders. According to our study, Cabinetul din umbra [Jurnal TV], Tara lui Dogaru some of the most influential opinion- [Publika], Peatnita s Anatoliem Golea [RTR], makers were Corneliu Ciurea, Serghei MEGAfon/Glavnii Vapros [NTV Moldova], Punctul Ostaf, Veaceslav Ionita, Victor Gurau, pe AZI [TVR Moldova], Unimedia [Alb&Negru], 1+1 [Accent TV]. The talk show ‘Puterea a patra’ and Alexandru Cauia, all of whom are [Timpul.md], 2014. Source: http://www.timpul. linked to pro-Plahotniuc media and md/articol/emisiunea-puterea-a-patra---lider- de-audienta-63960.html (Last accessed 11 April 2016) 56 MOLDOVAN OPINION LEADERS LANDSCAPE 6. Moldovan opinion leaders landscape

Promote ideologies of others Express independent views

Pro–Kremlin Pro–Western Pro–Kremlin Moldovenists Pro–Western

Vlad Batrincea Alexandru Cauia Valerii Ostalep Vitalie Gamurari Oazu Nantoi Bogdan Tirdea Corneliu Ciurea Vladimir Soloviov Igor Botan Victor Gurau Serghei Ostaf Zurab Todua Natalia Morari Victor Juc Victor Nichitus Iulian Groza Vitalie Andrievschi Vitalie Catana Alexei Tulbure Anatol Taranu Iurie Risca Roman Chirca Vitalie Sprinceana Vasile Botnaru Alexandr Odintov Veaceslav Ionita Valeriu Renita Victor Ciobanu Roman Mihaies Dumitru Ciubasenco Valerii Demidetchi Viorel Girbu Cristi Tabara Ernest Vardanean Sergiu Tofilat Alexandru Solcan Nicolae Chirtoaca Victor Chironda Aurelian Lavric Ion Tabarta Arcadie Barbarosie Alexandru Machedon Iulian Chifu Nicolae Negru Ion Terguta Petru Macovei Valentin Buda ― Appears regularly on pro-Plahotniuc media Viorel Chivriga such as Publika TV, Prime TV Ion Stefanita Appears regularly on pro-Kremlin media Igor Munteanu such as NTV, Accent TV, Sputnik Gheorghe Cojocaru Independent actors, regularly appearing on media Octavian Ticu such as RFE, TVR Moldova, National.md Vitalie Calugareanu

public events and debate platforms.189 public events for a period of three to Therefore, we looked primarily at the five months, taking into consideration people who were asked to appear the author has been accumulating on different television programs knowledge and making observations and at public events. The rankings, for more than six years. In the charts, and descriptions were made following chart, we have mapped after analysing the content of TV talk influential opinion makers, and based shows, websites, radio content, and on their independence and position on pro-Kremlin vs. pro-Western 189 The most frequently held and best positioning in their public comments. attended events are organized by—IDIS (Institute for Development and Social Initiatives), APE Annex 2 describes the criteria for (Foreign Policy Association), Expert Group, IPRE these rankings. (Institute for European Policies and Reforms), Promo-LEX Association, TI (Transparency Today, the Moldovan public space International – Moldova), CID NATO in is more varied than ever. Opinion Chisinau, International Media Club Format A3 leaders take a wide range of positions Chisinau, Sputnik, Novosti-Moldova (branch Ria Novosti), Press Club. Top 10 NGO’s that including: pro-European, pro-Kremlin, influence politics. Tribuna.md, 2012. Source: pro-Third-Way, Moldovenists, pro- http://tribuna.md/2012/10/21/top-10-ong- Romania, anti-Russia, pro-radical cu-%E2%80%9Einfluenta%E2%80%9D-asupra- reforms, pro-Plahotniuc, pro- politicienilor/ (Last accessed 11 April 2016) 57 protests, etc. The graphs above changed their political affiliation. depict the political positions of the Our evaluation suggests that this is most influential opinion leaders by the case for Veaceslav Ionita, Serghei affiliation and orientation according Ostaf, Roman Chirca, Vitalie Catana, to the frequency of their appearances and Alexandru Cauia. We also observe on various politically oriented TV talk that they were/are mainly pro- shows. European and even pro-NATO or pro- Romania, but have become supporters PRO-GOVERNMENT MEDIA of the so-called ‘Third Way’.193 This approach is largely against Russian AND OPINION LEADERS activities and Moldovenists, but The most influential and promoted pro-reform. This is different from opinion leaders are Cornel Ciurea, the current establishment thinking, Serghei Ostaf, Veaceslav Ionita, Victor because it promotes the integration of Gurau, Alexandru Cauia, and Victor Russian-speakers, and it is rationally Catana. They are frequently invited190 critical towards the EU and NATO, to appear as guests on TV channels and especially against unification with such as Publika TV and Prime TV Romania—essentially maintaining [both owned by Plahotniuc],191 status quo on external relations. Many Moldova 1, Realitatea TV, and other opinion leaders are also involved in channels indirectly controlled by politics, for example Alexandru Cauia, Plahotniuc.192 Based on our research, who recently became president the most influential opinion makers of the Democratic Party’s youth can be characterized as promoters organization. But there are also cases of Plahotniuc’s ideas, the Democratic in which the opposite has happened, Party, government plans, etc. Cornel for example Roman Mihaies was Ciurea is the most frequently invited previously a highly promoted speaker, commentator and the range of TV but now is no longer invited to channels that invite him to appear appear on Plahotniuc’s stations. Not is very wide. Some of the people all the guests invited to appear on who formerly did not support Plahotniuc’s media outlets necessarily the Moldovan government have promote him, but at least they do not oppose him. 190 They appeared in 20-40% of talk shows within a 3-5 month period. The editorial focus can also change 191 Plahotniuc’s empire. Ziarul National, quickly in the Moldovan media, e.g. 2013. Source: http://ziarulnational.md/imperiul- Publika was previously interested lui-plahotniuc (Last accessed 11 April 2016) th 192 The most powerful oligarch from in promoting the 98 anniversary Moldova controls state institutions and holds of the unification of Bessarabia [the the Republic of Moldova as a ‘captivate state’. historical name for a territory that Appreciations given by the General Secretary of now comprises parts of Moldova and the Council of Europe and US Ambassador to Moldova. Jurnal TV, 2015. Source: http://www. Ukraine] with Romania, while during jurnal.md/ro/politic/2015/10/6/ambasadorul- the last years, Publika has taken a more sua-moldova-un-stat-capturat-sectoare- sceptical Moldovenist approach. Still, importante-se-afla-sub-controlul-catorva- persoane/ (Last accessed 11 April 2016) 193 See Annex 1 for more information. 58 we judge Publika to be pro-European, pro-Romanian, pro-Third Way, anti- NON-PLAHOTNIUC MEDIA Russian, and neutral toward NATO. AND OPINION LEADERS These facts lead to the conclusion that Opinion leaders characterized by the opinion-leader media landscape is professionalism, independence, largely shaped by Plahotniuc through some of whom have been promoting attracting prospective charismatic activism and democracy since the intellectuals and promoting them 1990s, are lower down on the 194 on all of his TV channels. In a poor scale of influence and frequency of country, even small amounts of appearance. They appear on the money can have a significant effect. more independent, objective, or pro- Publika pays valuable guests around European mass-media institutions 195 500 MDL per appearance. such as Radio Free Europe, TVR The opinion leaders described above Moldova, Pro TV Chisinau, Jurnal TV, are also often invited to appear on the TV7, etc. These mass-media channels Moldova 1 national television network, and the opinion leaders they promote, which, at the moment, is influenced represent another current of thinking: by the government under Plahotniuc’s pro-European, pro-radical reform, leadership. Overall, former Liberal against defensive Russian politics, and Democrat prime ministers influenced usually pro-NATO and pro-Romanian. the programming on Moldova 1. It This cluster includes Igor Botan, is happening now too—Moldova 1 Oazu Nantoi, Anatol Taranu, Nicolae invites guests and analysts who are Negru, Petru Macovei, and Vasile loyal to the current government and, Botnaru to name a few. Radio Free indirectly, to Plahotniuc’s network.196 Europe Moldova is one of the most Also, Moldova 1 TV invites experts popular and influential mass-media who try to stay objective, while not channels among pro-democracy elites criticizing the government. and intellectuals. This radio station promotes only opinion leaders, who are incorruptible pro-reform professionals. Even more, RFE creates opinion leaders—although their approach is pro-European and pro- NATO, they strive to be objective. 194 Prime TV, Canal 3, Canal 2, Publika TV. Official, Plahotniuc owns 4 TV and 3 radio Another emerging platform is Natalia channels. Site Anticoruptie.md, 2015. Source: Morari’s talk show on TV7, which http://anticoruptie.md/ro/stiri/oficial-vlad- plahotniuc-proprietar-a-patru-televiziuni-si-trei- has also begun creating new opinion posturi-de-radio (Last accessed 11 April 2016) leaders. This channel is owned by 195 Information obtained from one expert Chiril Lucinschi,197 MP from the invited to appear on Publika, but angry that he was not paid as much as his colleagues. 196 Plahotniuc’s network—all of the 197 Who owns TV channels in Moldova? people, institutions, parties, businesses, banks, mold-street.com, 2015. Source: http://www. etc. that Vladimir Plahotniuc controls directly or mold-street.com/?go=news&n=4266 (Last indirectly. accessed 15 April 2016) 59 Liberal Democrat Party, son of former differ much from the two previously a president of Moldova who used to described channels, but it emphasises be close to the Kremlin, and Morari’s an anti-Plahotniuc tone. It is a highly boyfriend. TV7 used to transmit partisan channel and the main NTV Russia, but their agreement platform for Andrei Nastase and his has ended. NTV refused to continue protest movement. If previously working with TV7 after the local this channel was one of the most station decided to replace newscasts influential promoters of pro-Romania and analytical shows with other types movements, today it is under the of content. The re-transmission of Platform of Dignity and Truth, which NTV has been taken over by NTV promotes the idea of a Moldovan Moldova owned by Igor Dodon.198 The society with a common goal—fighting talk show Politika has created opinion against corruption and the oligarchs.199 leaders linked to Morari. Her talk show was once very popular among In addition to TV and radio, and online elites and intellectuals from Moldova, news sites, other important ways of but has now been shut down. The talk shaping opinion are participation in show was 60% in Romanian and 40% relevant public events and online in Russian. Morari promotes opinion social networks. The abovementioned leaders with different positions opinion leaders are also most involved and views, mainly views that are in pro-reform and pro-European pro-European, pro-reform, anti- public events. Plahotniuc, and anti-Kremlin. Many of them are supporters of the Third Way. PROMOTION OF RUSSIAN Third Way opinion leaders include Alexei Tulbure, Vitalie Sprinceana, NARRATIVES Dumitru Ciubasenco, Valerii Ostalep, On the left side of the graph are and Valeriu Demitetchi. Another Moldovan opinion leaders who of Morari’s goals is to raise a new promote Russian thinking. Several generation of political leaders, who common features characterize them: also support the Moldovan project. they are Moldovenists, and are against She promotes young perspective both NATO and Romania. Russian activists/technocrats like Victor or Russian-language mass-media Chironda, Vitalie Sprinceana, Marin channels from Moldova promote this Ciobanu, Sergiu Tofilat, Viorel Girbu, type of thinking. Many of their ideas Alexandru Machedon, and Ion come from pro-Kremlin radical forces Stefanita. that promote close relations with Another media channel from Russia, or even unification. Others Moldova is Jurnal TV. It does not are more flexible toward the EU and declare themselves to be pro-reform. 198 Chril Lucinschi explains why TV7 does not transmit Russian propaganda. Ziarul National, 199 Platform of Dignity and Truth—an 2015. Source: http://www.ziarulnational.md/ anti-Plahotniuc protest movement, which grew chiril-lucinschi-explica-de-ce-tv7-nu-va-mai- into a political party. Some oligarchs, who are difuza-buletine-de-stiri-din-rusia/ (Last accessed opponents of Plahotniuc, support the party 15 April 2016) financially. 60 Talk show guests are also often (Комсомольская правда)202 publishes ethnically Russian, speak Russian, or subjective reports and editorials, are somehow close to Russia and its but not news. It depicts Moldovan values. politics as a big mess. Komsomolskaia Pravda is not directly against the EU NTV Moldova/Accent TV , which and neither does it directly promote Glavnii broadcasts the talk shows the Eurasian Union, however, it uses Vopros 1+1 and in Russian, are pro- stories about the refugee crisis to NTV Moldova Kremlin channels. paint a disturbing picture of the EU. is owned by politician Igor Dodon For many years, KP was the most NTV 200 (PSRM) and transmits Russian . popular newspaper in Moldova.203 Talk shows on these networks have focused on criticizing the Moldovan Almost weekly, the Russian government, and have also invited international news agency Sputnik pro-European opinion leaders organizes round table discussions and who are against the government, conferences with the most influential such as Victor Ciobanu and Oazu pro-Russia, anti-EU experts from Nantoi, to appear as guests. But this Moldova and Russia, or from the EU seems to be changing. Steadily, NTV through online video at the Kentford Moldova is offering an alternative Office building, which houses the to the government and European offices for Sputnik and Ria Noviosti integration.201 Moldova.204 The list ‘Pro-Russia events’ shows the most highly promoted This channel provides analytical actors in descending order. Another and subjective interpretation or event platform is the International storytelling, even within the news. Media Club Format A3 Chisinau,205 This is the style of Russian channels and 206 which organizes political Pervii Kanal NTV Rossia such as , , , etc., and cultural events in Chisinau and because it is easy for ordinary people to understand. The news and analysis site sputnik. md is also emerging as one of the most powerful tools of pro-Kremlin forces in Moldova. It started with 202 Political news from Komsomolskaia anti-Government messaging and Pravda. Source: http://www.kp.md/politics (Last has now switched to a stronger pro- accessed 11 April 2016) Eurasian, anti-European, anti-NATO, 203 Political news from Komsomolskaia Pravda. Source: http://www.kp.md/politics (Last and anti-Romania agenda. The accessed 11 April 2016) newspaper Komsomolskaia Pravda 204 Press center. Source: http://sputnik.md/ press_center/ (Last accessed 15 April 2016) 205 Site of Format A3 Platform. Source: 200 Leader of Party of Socialists that http://www.format-a3.ru/events/event-242/ (Last promote joining the Eurasian Union and repeal of accessed 11 April 2016) Association Agreement with EU. Site promis.md. 206 Source: https://www.facebook. Source: http://www.promis.md/partide/psrm/ com/International-Media-Club- 201 See the example of emerging site Sput- Format-A3-126923524023116/ (Last accessed 11 nik.md April 2016) 61 7. Opinion leaders 8. Some prospective OPINION LEADERS IN SOME PROSPECTIVE PRO-KREMLINin pro–Kremlin EVENTS events OPINIONopinion LEADERS leaders

Bogdan Tirdea Octavian Ticu Vlad Batrincea Sergiu Tofilat Iurie Risca Adrian Plesca Valerii Ostalep Dumitru Alaiba Alexandr Odintov Alexandru Tanase Zurab Todua Virgil Pislariuc Ghenadie Vaculovschi Dima Belan Vladimir Novosadiuc Dorin Dusciac Emil Ciobu Serghei Diaconu Andrei Neguta Vadim Brinzan Ana Tkaci Viorel Girbu Vladimir Bukarski Marin Ciobanu Igor Caldare Alexandru Machedon Dumitru Ciubasenco Vladislav Gribincea Valeriu Demidetchi Pavel Postica Alexei Tulbure Ion Stefanita Valeriu Renita Vitalie Sprinceana Dumitru Roibu Victor Chironda Iulian Groza Vlad Batrincea

Tiraspol.207 The Debate Club Ibzorsk, a Russian debate platform, opened EMERGING OPINION a branch in Moldova with the goal of LEADERS discussing the future national idea for Moldova. The group organizes A number of new opinion leaders conferences, analyses, and public are also emerging in the Moldovan debates to promote the Kremlin’s political landscape, mainly young plans in Moldova.208 technocrats. They also include young politicians and activists, with During the course of this study, it increasing involvement in public life emerged that a great many pro-Kremlin from both the left and the right sides experts declare themselves to be of the political spectrum. Natalia directors, presidents of organizations, Morari promotes many of them on think tanks, etc., even if their respective her talk shows or at public events. organizations exist only on paper.

207 Site of Institute for Actual Economics. CONCLUSIONS AND Source: http://instaeco.ru/novosti/440-direktor- iae-nikita-isaev-obsudil-v-tiraspole-vozmozhnosti- RECOMMENDATIONS uvelicheniya-tovarooborota-mezhdu- pridnestrovem-i-rossiej (Last accessed 11 April This study on the current Moldovan 2016) information environment is 208 Rosca: Izborsk Club of Moldova as a essentially about how vulnerabilities platform for developing of National Idea, 2016. are exploited by the Kremlin. The Source: http://www.noi.md/md/news_id/82010 (Last accessed 11 April 2016) structure of the Moldovan media 62 environment and the people involved situation in Moldova, but they are very have a significant effect how public similar to narratives the Kremlin and discourse takes place and which allies have pushed in other countries issues are discussed. This study within its sphere of influence. highlights the importance of these issues and attempts to provide a new Ideological narratives affect thinking framework for studies on information and public behaviour via iconic images environment. and powerful emotions tied to basic human needs. In Moldova they are The topics discussed in the national mix of residual memories, political media and way in which they are failures, and regional conflicts. The discussed reflect a country’s character, objective of ‘Compatriots,Russkii Mir, history, and current political climate. and Soviet Nostalgia’ is to create unity In Moldova the concerns stem from between Moldovans and Russians on major current vulnerabilities, which an emotional, and even spiritual level. include corruption, weak state The ideological construction Russkii structures, a dysfunctional political Mir, invoking the social importance of system, and the ways in which control the Orthodox Church, the memory of over the regions of Transnistria and loss and sacrifice endured during the Gagauzia can potentially be leveraged Great Patriotic War, and drawing a for political gain. All of these issues clear distinction between Moldova and are closely linked with both poverty Romania are all ideas that have been and the lack of security many people introduced into the social discourse feel. to nurture positive feelings about Eastern influence, and to differentiate Vulnerabilities are effectively used it mentally from the West. Some pro- to foster mistrust and polarization Kremlin groups are not necessarily in Moldova. In this study we use friendly with each other, but are the word narrative to describe the clearly united against what the West clusters of ideas political actors and is offering, e.g. Orthodox priests and organizations use to promote their communist functionaries collaborated positions, focusing primarily on in demonstrating against legislation in the particularly hostile narratives support of equal rights/opportunities that, according to our analysis, are for people of both genders and all orchestrated by the Kremlin or pro- sexual orientations. In this case, Kremlin actors. ideological networks that otherwise The hostile narratives promoted by the may be at odds joined forces, sharing Kremlin address real vulnerabilities the same conservative mental space. using emotionally manipulative Kremlin narratives concerning arguments—the desire to belong, Moldova are infused with geopolitical to make independent decisions, rifts, based on linguistic, cultural, and to feel secure both physically and political polarization. The narrative economically—rather than taking ‘Federalization Ensures Equality’ the time to engage reason as well. comprises acts and messages focusing These narratives are particular to the on the equality of different peoples 63 in Moldova. Here Russia offers itself Hostile narratives easily escape as an alternative to the leadership of rational demands for consistency, the Moldovan government. Russian- e.g. the idea of Russkii Mir attempts speakers are portrayed as the most to link Moldovans as a whole more important linguistic minority in closely with their former Russian Moldova. This reasoning can be rulers, while the federalization challenged, since there are more strategy claims facilitation of more Ukrainian-speakers than Russian- self-determination for different speakers, closely followed by other groups in but actually could create linguistic minorities. Politically, wedges inside the country. These federalization might give veto-rights contradictions make little difference to the areas of Transnistria and to the Kremlin, because its efforts are Gagauzia, which themselves are focused more on dividing opponents closely linked with Russia. than offering anything sustainable of its own. It is important to understand The narrative ‘The European Union each argument in a given narrative on is Bad, Russia’s Customs Union is its own merits, instead of accepting What You Need’ is at first glance each one as part of an integrated about economics but the arguments whole. As a result local stakeholders it contains are often based on are likely to accept or reject ideas as conservatism and fear mongering. one selects food items from a buffet ‘Romania and NATO are a Threat to according to taste. Nevertheless, even Peace’ leverages the lack of security if only bits and pieces of the Kremlin’s many people feel. Some political hostile narratives are accepted, the leaders are claiming that Moldova is strategy succeeds in driving and in danger from Western expansionism maintaining wedges between the and the alleged ambitions that NATO various factions in today’s disjointed and Romania have on their eastern Moldovan society. boarders. These claims echo messages from the Kremlin and have worked The people’s perceptions about well. Moldovans are largely in favour internal and external political issues of both Putin and political neutrality, are thus affected by the media which suggests that large segments of content they consume. For the the Moldovan population do not see most part, Moldovan people only the risks posed by the current Russian have access to information that regime. local powerbrokers or the Kremlin- controlled media want them to have. The ideas/arguments that make up There are too many media outlets for the hostile narratives about Moldova them all to succeed as economically overlap in many places and share viable. This reduces the quality of the many of the same features, e.g. local media, and creates incentives ideological conservatism serves as for affluent actors with political the basis for positive messages about agendas to influence programming. Russkii Mir or blaming the European Union. 64 Vladimir Plahotniuc, de facto leader are involved in creating the national of the Democratic Party, which is agenda. Their independence varies currently in power, owns the lion’s greatly, as many seem to have vested share of the Moldovan media interests. Our analysts have charted the market. Consequently, most of the political positions of the major actors in population has access to information Moldova according to their social and that promotes his party, the current political ties and the type of messaging government, and Vladimir Plahotniuc they use. Although an evaluation of this himself, while discrediting other nature can never be truly objective, it leaders. Some of the other influential is a tool to gain a better understanding politicians and businessmen in the of how certain individuals make use media include Chiril Luchinschi, Vlad of their positions and connections Filat, Vadim Ciubara, Victor Țopa, Dan to influence the opinions of the Lozovan, Dumitru Țîra, and Ilan Shor. Moldovan people. According to our The influence of these politicians on study, some of the most influential media outlets is obvious, especially opinion-leaders were Corneliu Ciurea, during election campaigns, when the Serghei Ostaf, Veaceslav Ionita, Victor media are extensively used to promote Gurau, and Alexandru Cauia, who also candidates and their programs. happen to be especially popular on the media platforms owned or influenced In addition to media outlets owned by by Plahotniuc. politicians, the Moldovan information space is dominated by Russian media Because the situation in Moldova outlets, which heavily manipulate will remain challenging, there will be the information they broadcast to a constant stream of opportunities propagate their political ideology. to negatively affect its fragile Surprisingly, Plahotniuc’s television development. Hostile narratives can channels also run programming made be fine-tuned and sustained with by the Kremlin-controlled media. minimal effort. Adversarial forces don’t have to actively worsen the Mr Plahotniuc’s combination of current situation, as conditions are business and political interests is already difficult. also interesting from an analytical perspective. If his relationships Adversaries can affect decision with Kremlin controlled media are making by distorting the quality of company-to-company or network-to- information, controlling access to network relationships, they are driven information, and influencing the by organizational logic, which in this perception and understanding of that case is purely about making a profit. information. There are several ways But, if they are person-to-person Moldova and its partners can help to relationships, it makes Plahotniuc’s protect Moldovan society on these duplicitous position rather awkward. issues. The media is a content-carrying Improving information: Quality of pipeline into people’s living rooms information should not be improved and pockets. Political commentators by adding even more channels, as such as journalists and researchers the media environment is already 65 oversaturated. Western values can so reaching them requires other and should be promoted using technical solutions. A variety of co- the current media structures. The operation projects could also be people who control the media maintained to keep the populations channels and provide content are in these regions from being isolated. not unapproachable. Many central opinion makers are named in this Perception and understanding: The study. Among them are speakers third issue is the most difficult. As long who participate in Moldovan public as there is no widely shared vision discourse and already share European about the present and the future, values, or may do so in the future. In solutions remain partial. Moldova, order for them to have all the facts, both its authorities and citizens, bear these people should be informed in a the greatest responsibility in creating manner, which will not put them in a opportunities for the country. In bad light. There is no obvious reason, addition, Western support for the why Western messaging could not be Moldovan people, especially in terms more prevalent in public events and of education, rule of law, other state media discussions. structures, and quality journalism will bear fruit in the long run. Offering quality content to the existing popular channels is a way In the current situation, it is not to reach audiences efficiently. Radio self-evident that Western values are Free Europe/Radio Liberty Moldova prevailing in Moldova. Neither the has managed to have both Romanian public sector, nor the public at large and Russian language programming are clear about where they want on Moldova’s public TV and radio to be heading. While the Kremlin channels. is clearly making self-interested use of Moldovan vulnerabilities, Improving access to information: the population itself is divided on a Large segments of the Moldovan number of critical issues. In the game population barely participate in the of politics self-interest, greed, and Moldovan media space, but voluntarily lust for money and power are often rely on Kremlin media sources. It would veiled, making evaluating information be very difficult to change their media environment challenging. Large consumption habits by, for instance, segments of Moldovan society are simply offering a new satellite news inclined to listen to political messaging channel. It would be difficult to reach originating from the Kremlin,209 but to these people solely through providing make things worse the pro-Western alternative journalistic content, side is further divided, and less likely but a start could be made through promoting appealing combination of 209 The Russian media has been seen as entertaining and journalistic content. more trustworthy than Moldovan or Europe- In Transnistria and Gagauzia there an media. See the Barometer of Public Opin- ion, Institute for Public Policies, April 2016. are even fewer opportunities to Source: http://ipp.md/public/files/Barometru/ access Moldovan or Western content BOP_04.2016_prima_parte_finale-r.pdf(last due to local broadcasting decisions, accessed 20 May 2016) 66 to join forces to support a unifying agenda. The current understanding of European or Western values is often distorted either by their adversaries, or by non-credible political actors. There are many flag carriers for European values in Moldova, but plenty of unscrupulous individuals exploit fears about Russia for their own benefit, as well. In order for the voices of reason and stability to be heard more clearly in the Moldovan information environment, the country and its people will continue to need support from free and open societies. To summarize the policy recommendations, we are suggesting improving the quality of journalism by leveraging the current media structures, targeted marketing, and projects aimed at bursting pro-Kremlin information bubbles, as well as continued co-operation in supporting the Moldovan response to improve the status of its vulnerabilities. 67 ANNEX 1. GLOSSARY AND KEY POLITICAL PLAYERS

Bessarabia—an ancient historical somebody or something.210 The name, possibly stretching back to concept of vulnerability, has been the 7th century BC, for the territory used to refer to the risks of not between the Prut, Dniester, and being able to withstand a hostile Danube Rivers and the Black Sea. In environment. Recently it has grown more recent times, it was annexed increasingly important in studies on by the Tsarist Empire in 1812, which global environmental changes and resulted in a policy of Russification sustainable development. In this contested by the ethnic Romanian study, vulnerability is something that population. The territory is now split can be intentionally exploited by between Moldova and Ukraine. different actors to the detriment of a state or of its citizens. Moldovenist—used to denote the supporters of a Moldovan identity, Some prominent politicians as distinct from Romania. There are more Moldovenists among Igor Dodon—winner of the Russian-speakers. They are focusing presidential election in 2016, leader of on strengthening friendly ties with the Party of Socialists of the Republic Russia, instead of Romania or the of Moldova. He served as Minister of European Union. Trade and Economics (2006-2009). He left the Party of Communists and Plahotniuc’s network—in this study joined Party of Socialists in 2011. we use this term to describe persons, institutions, parties, business, banks, Vlad Filat—former Moldovan Prime etc. controlled directly or indirectly by Minister (2009-2013), founder and Vladimir Plahotniuc. President of the Liberal Democrat Party (PLDM) since 2007, and The Third Way—a movement in Plahotniuc’s main opponent. In 2016 support of Moldova developing he was sentenced to nine years in strategic relations with both West prison for corruption and abuse of and East, not integrating into either, power while in office, charges he and seeking to defend its own self- denies. interest. In fact, supporters of the Third Way tend toward maintenance Plahotniuc, Vladimir —First Deputy of the status quo. Chairman of the Democrat Party of Moldova. Plahotniuc is Moldova’s Vulnerability - According to the 210 Florin MARCU, Great dictionary of Romanian dictionary of neologisms, neologisms, SAECULUM I.O. Printing House, vulnerability is a weakness in Bucharest, 2000, p. 230. 68 leading oligarch, a media owner who controls many public institutions and business in Moldova. Maia Sandu—Former Minister of Education (2012-2015). In 2016 she created a new political party, the centre- right Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), which has a social-liberal orientation. She lost the presidential election to Igor Dodon in 2016. Vladimir Voronin—former President of Moldova (2001-2009) and has been the First Secretary of the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova (PCRM) since 1994. Abbreviations of the names of Moldovan political parties: PSRM—the Party of Socialists (Igor Dodon) PLDM—the Liberal Democratic Party (Vlad Filat) PCRM—the Party of Communists (Vladimir Voronin) PDM—the Democratic Party (Marian Lupu) PL—the Liberal Party (Mihai Ghimpu) PPEM—the European People's Party of Moldova (Iurie Leancă) PAS—the Action and Solidarity Party (Maia Sandu) PPDA—the Dignity and Truth Platform Party (Andrei Năstase) PPCD—the Christian Democrat People’s Party (Iuie Rosca) PN—the Our Party, previously the Republican People's Party (Renato Usatîi) 69 ANNEX 2. MOLDOVAN OPINION LEADERS

Moldovan opinion makers are first 5. Professionalism/oratorical classified by their role and their abilities, quality of debate/ideas activity. The most important opinion generated, pertinent opinions, leaders are then further analysed etc. by their presentations and personal 6. Number of mentions by other histories.211 opinion leaders Types of opinion makers: Points considered: 1. Politicians, experts, commentators, journalists, 1. Media appearances: which media bloggers, civic activists, etc. 2. Curriculum Vitae: work experience, 2. Think-tanks, NGOs, debate studies, life experience, family, etc. platforms, other social and 3. Ideological position: pro-UE, political movements pro-Kremlin, pro-Romania, pro- Moldovan project/‘Moldovenist’, Criteria for identifying and ranking a pro-Third Way, etc. the most influential opinion leaders: 4. Thinking trend (thematic 1. Frequency of appearance on TV affiliation): pro-radical and deep talk-shows (ideologically affiliated reforms, pro-status quo, strong and not affiliated) against corruption, strongly for economical reforms, etc. 2. Frequency of appearance in online media 5. Political affiliation: pro-PD (Plahotniuc), pro-PLDM (Filat), 3. Participation in important public pro-PSRM (Dodon, Russia), pro- events (appearing, initiating, PN (Usatii, Russia), pro-Platform of organizing) Dignity and Truth (Nastase, Țopa 4. Popularity/activity on Facebook oligarchs), pro-PPEM (Leanca/ (the most popular social network Plahotniuc), pro-PAS (Sandu). for middle and upper class Persons who are not affiliated with Moldovans) a party can be either sympathetic 211 This subjective evaluation highlights the to some political party/movements variety of opinions in the Moldovan public space or content focused without clear and is based on the expertise of the author. The leaning to any groups. author works for IDIS Viitorul, which is itself an important opinion leader; many IDIS Viitorul 6. Special links with influential associates are closely linked to Moldovan political people, organizations, and networks. Therefore, these characterizations businesses from Moldova and might reflect an unnecessary bias. The characterizations do not reflect the opinions abroad of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre 7. General information of Excellence, the Alliance or the countries associated with the Centre. 8. Professionalism, integrity 70 71 72