The Moldovan Information Environment, Hostile Narratives, and Their Ramifications
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ISBN 978-9934-564-01-7 1 THE MOLDOVAN INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT, HOSTILE NARRATIVES, AND THEIR RAMIFICATIONS PREPARED BY THE NATO STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE 2 ISBN 978-9934-564-01-7 THE MOLDOVAN INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT, HOSTILE NARRATIVES, AND THEIR RAMIFICATIONS Project director: Antti Sillanpää Research team: Antti Sillanpää, Nadine Gogu, Igor Munteanu, Ion Bunduchi, Viorel Parvan, Marian Cepoi Text Editor: Anna Reynolds Production & Copy Editor: Linda Curika Design of illustrations: Sergejs Bižāns The NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence, based in Latvia, is a multinational, cross-sector organization which provides comprehensive analyses, advice and practical support to the alliance and allied nations. This report is a product of the AN TO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE). It is produced for NATO, NATO member countries, NATO partners, related private and public institutions and related individuals. It does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO. © All rights reserved by the NATO StratCom COE. Reports may not be copied, reproduced, distributed or publicly displayed without reference to the NATO StratCom COE. Riga, July 2017, 2nd edition (changes in page 56, see table "Moldovan Opinion Leaders Landscape") NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Riga, Kalnciema iela 11b, Latvia LV1048 www.stratcomcoe.org Ph.: 0037167335463 [email protected] 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .........................................................................................................……………………..4 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND.................................................................................……………………..9 VULNERABILITIES AND MEDIA COVERAGE .................................................................................…………..12 HOSTILE NARRATIVES AND PROPAGANDA ..........................................................................………………..21 WHO CONTROLS THE MEDIA AND PEOPLE’S MEDIA CONSUMPTION? .....................………………..35 LANDSCAPING THE MEDIA MARKET AND IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONING....................................……..52 THE MAIN INFLUENCERS OF PUBLIC OPINION ....................................................................……………..55 ANNEXES .........................................................................................................………….....................…………..67 AND MEDIA COVERAGE INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Antti Sillanpää This study describes the current promoted by the Kremlin and its information environment of Moldova. local affiliates, local media ownership The main focus is on how societal and control, and the most influential vulnerabilities are exploited by opinion-leaders in Moldova. political actors who are following Conclusions and recommendations policies promoted by the Kremlin. are given at the end of each section. The mechanisms linking societal vulnerabilities and people’s behaviour People living in Moldova today worry are described here in order to about their children’s future, poverty, unemployment, prices, corruption, better understand the Moldovan 1 information environment, especially and the possibility of war. This the Russian influence on Moldovan report highlights the importance of politics. Compared to a traditional corruption, weak state structures, the target audience analysis, this study dysfunctional political system, and the highlights the importance of the regions of Transnistria and Gagauzia structure of media environment, as the major vulnerabilities currently which promotes hostile Kremlin faced by Moldovan society. All of narratives in Moldova (see picture these issues are closely linked to both page 5). This study assumes that poverty and the lack of security many societal problems are not discussed people feel in the unstable political in a vacuum. Moldovans’ perception environment. of what is going on around them and These vulnerabilities are effectively the actions they take in response are leveraged to foster mistrust and shaped by the structure of and key polarization. After analysing the actors in the media environment. As a situation, we cluster Kremlin result, only some topics are selected promoted messages, speeches, for public consumption. videos, demonstrations, and other The chapters that follow describe the acts. We consider these clusters as vulnerabilities in today’s Moldovan 1 Barometer of Public Opinion, 2016. society, the divisive narratives Institute for Public Policies. Source: http://ipp. md/lib.php?l=en&idc=156 9. Study of Modovan information Evironment 5 Background information Vulnerabilities, perceived reality History, population and other country data Media structure Infrastructure Media channels, usage patterns Ownership and control Opinion leaders Persons Organizations Topics and narratives four identifiable hostile narratives that be contradictory, such as the idea serve to create divisions in an already of Russkii Mir, which attempts to fragmented society. We have named link the Moldovans more closely to them ‘Russkii Mir and Soviet Nostalgia’, their former Russian rulers, while ‘Federalization Will Ensure Equality’, federalization strategy claims to ‘The European Union is Bad, Russia’s promote self-determination for the Customs Union is What You Need’, ethnic Moldovan majority. Therefore, and ‘Romania and NATO are a Threat hostile narratives are not meant as to Peace’. Each of these narratives idealized truth that the audience targets feelings and emotions—the should swallow whole. Instead, sense of belonging, the sense of self- individuals pick and choose the story determination, a sense of economic elements that make sense to them, security, and a sense of physical security. like choosing dishes from a buffet. Each narrative touches upon particular What is crucial is that people accept a Moldovan vulnerabilities, but the tactics portion of the misleading information, behind them can be recognised in other, which itself is enough to deepen the similar narratives promoted by Vladimir wedges between the various factions Putin’s Kremlin in other countries along of Moldovan society. the Russian border. Post-Soviet narratives are a mix of The ideas in these hostile narratives residual memories, political failures, overlap, sharing many of the same and regional conflicts. Ideological features. For instance, ideological narratives affect minds and public conservatism supports both cultural behaviour via emotions and iconic propagation and is opposed to images. The ‘Russkii Mir and Soviet economic ties with the European Nostalgia’ narrative inspires unity Union. These narratives can also between Moldovans and Russia on 6 an emotional, even spiritual, level. Echoing messages from the Kremlin, The idea of Russkii Mir,’ or ‘the some political leaders are claiming Russian world’, is an ideology built that Western expansionism is on the assumption that those who underway, or that NATO and Romania speak Russian think and act like have ambitions towards the East. The the subset of Russians currently in narrative has produced results: a large power. In Moldova, this manifests number of Moldovans favour both itself through emphasizing Russian Vladimir Putin and political neutrality, Orthodox religion, remembering and which suggests that these audiences cherishing the sacrifices made during do not see the risks the current the Great Patriotic War, and clearly Russian regime poses to the region. distinguishing between Moldova and Romania. These are attempts to create These narratives are most powerfully positive feelings about influence from communicated through various forms the East and sharing the conservative of media. Without a mechanism for Russian mental space. the transmission of these narratives, they would have a limited audience The ‘Federalization Will Ensure and those sending messages would Equality’ narrative comprises acts be unable to bring about changes in and messages that stress the equality the behaviour of the people they seek of different ethnic groups living in to influence. Moldova. Here Russia wants to take on the role of an alternative to the For the most part, the Moldovan Moldovan titular group. The portrayal people are only exposed to that of Russians as the most important information, which local powerbrokers linguistic minority can be challenged. or the Kremlin-controlled media want Not only is the size of Ukrainian them to be aware of. At the moment population bigger, but Russians are Moldova has too many media outlets closely followed by other groups in for them all to remain economically number. Politically, federalization viable in the small Moldovan economy. might create veto-rights for the This reduces the quality of the news administrative areas of Transnistria and creates an incentive for affluent and Gagauzia, which themselves actors to promote their own agendas. are closely linked with Russia due to A handful of individuals in Moldova various historical circumstances. and the Kremlin are effectively The narrative ‘The European Union dominating the news landscape. is Bad, Russia’s Customs Union Much of the control lies in the hands of is What You Need’ seems to be politicians or oligarchs such as Vladimir about economics, but actually the Plahotniuc, who has consolidated arguments used are often based on his business and political power ideological conservatism and used to structure, leveraging also his media create fear among Moldovans. The assets. Plahotniuc plays a leading related Kremlin narrative, ‘Romania role