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Power Shift in Tunisia WP Electoral Success of Secular Parties Might Deepen Polarization

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Power Shift in Tunisia WP Electoral Success of Secular Parties Might Deepen Polarization Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments Power Shift in Tunisia WP Electoral Success of Secular Parties Might Deepen Polarization Anne Wolf S Tunisia’s main secular party, Nidaa Tounes, emerged as the largest force in the October 2014 parliamentary elections. The party’s leader has also a high chance of being elected president in a runoff ballot in late December. The results risk to increase polarization between Islamists and secularists, especially if Nidaa Tounes forms an all-secular gov- ernment coalition. It might also deepen frictions between the country’s marginalized regions and the richer Tunis and coastal belt. Already, the success of Tunisia’s main secular party has triggered protests in the poor south, as some people accuse Nidaa Tounes of rejecting more conservative sections of society and criticize its close asso- ciations with some former members of Ben Ali’s regime and the business sector. These ties and vested interests are likely to make it more difficult to launch structural eco- nomic reforms. They also risk to foster alienation, especially among young Tunisians, and might trigger radicalization. Europe should continue to support Tunisia’s young democracy with financial aid as well as specific economic and security expertise, and, most importantly, promote cooperation between various ideological forces. Tunisia held its first post-revolution general Republic (CPR) with 8.7 percent and Etta- parliamentary and presidential elections katol with 7 percent. on October 26 and November 23, 2014. The The main secular party, Nidaa Tounes ballots were classified by international ob- (Call for Tunisia), emerged as the largest servers as being by and large free and fair, force in this year’s parliamentary elections, thereby reaffirming the democratic process winning 86 of the 217 seats in the legis- almost four years after the ouster of Zine lature, followed by Ennahda with 69 seats. el-Abidine Ben Ali. The outcome of the The parties next in line are the Free Patri- elections implies a major shift in political otic Union (UPL), which lacks any distinct power, which had been marked by a strong political orientation, with 16; the leftist Ennahda party and fragmented secularists Popular Front coalition with 15; and the since the October 2011 elections, when the liberal Afek Tounes with 8 seats. It is strik- Islamists had gained 37 percent of the vote, ing that all of the secular parties that did followed by the secular Congress for the well in the 2014 parliamentary elections Anne Wolf is a non-resident fellow in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world” realized by the SWP Comments 54 Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in the framework of the transformation December 2014 partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the PhD grant programs of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung. 1 did rather poorly in the 2011 Constituent In the elections, Nidaa Tounes was able Assembly elections or did not exist at the to capitalize on the economic downturn time, like Nidaa Tounes. Many Tunisians and the emergence of political violence are longing for a new start. They were dis- in 2012, which reinforced the perception appointed with the former Troika govern- of many secularists that a major political ment – a coalition of Ennahda with the change was needed to keep the transition CPR and Ettakatol. The CPR gained only on track. Ennahda’s perceived dominance four seats while Ettakatol was left without following the 2011 elections had led to any parliamentary representation at all, increasing polarization between Islamists as many secular Tunisians reproached both and secularists over the past two years. This parties for having been co-opted by the came to a head after the assassination of Islamists. two secular politicians in February and July The first round of the presidential ballot 2013 by radical Islamists, which fuelled in November 2014 reaffirmed the success popular protests that summer. The simul- of Nidaa Tounes. Nidaa Tounes’ Beji Caid taneous coup against the Muslim Brother- Essebsi came first (39.5 percent), followed hood’s Muhammed Mursi, former president by the current interim president, CPR’s of Egypt, made many secularists believe Moncef Marzouki (33.4 percent). A runoff that Ennahda could also be forced out of between both candidates will be held in office, but mainly through protests. It thus late December. Essebsi has a high chance ultimately strengthened Nidaa Tounes. In of winning, especially because he has the fact, the Islamist-led government was forced support of the business elite and major to resign in January 2014 and a techno- media outlets. cratic government took over. Nidaa Tounes, which was formed in Ennahda did not present or support mid-2012 by Essebsi – former interim prime any presidential candidate in the November minister who was also interior minister elections, because it initially assumed under Habib Bourguiba and president of that it had a high chance of becoming the parliament under Ben Ali – has promised strongest force in parliament and did not to unite secular parties around a “modern want to be perceived as dominating politics democratic project” to counter Ennahda. once again. In Tunisia’s system of govern- During the first year of the Troika govern- ment, the president has power in the realm ment, internal fragmentation had weakened of foreign affairs and defense, whereas most secular parties in government and oppo- other executive tasks remain with the prime sition and reinforced the dominance of minister. The absence of an Islamist can- Ennahda. Therefore, many secular Tuni- didate in the presidential elections also sians were keen to join Nidaa Tounes, explains the relative success of Marzouki, including former members of the Ben Ali for whom many conservative Tunisians regime, important businessmen, as well as voted, especially in the south and interior leftists, trade unionists, independents, and regions. members of the Destourian (constitution) However, Ennahda’s success in gaining Movement. The Destourian Movement 69 parliamentary seats in the October 2014 had a central role in the fight for Tunisian elections – despite broad levels of frustra- independence. Under Bourguiba it took tion among the public with the former Troi- the form of the Neo-Destour and later the ka government – still reaffirms the Islam- Socialist Destour Party, while Ben Ali sub- ists as a major force in politics. Ennahda’s sequently established the Constitutional relative success is partially due to the Democratic Rally (RCD), which became absence of other important conservative primarily an apparatus of patronage and parties as well as to the fact that the Islam- cronyism that had very little to do with ists tend to be better organized than any the original movement. other party, have a strong party platform, SWP Comments 54 December 2014 2 and are represented in all regions. Most im- dential elections – about one million less portantly, however, the Islamist base had than in the 2011 ballot. created strong bonds during the decades of Moreover, more than twice as many repression it suffered under Ben Ali, which Tunisians prefer Nidaa Tounes when has led to a level of unity that secular par- presented with a list of parties, compared ties lack. Following the Troika government, to when they are being asked in an open moreover, Ennahda was quite successful in question about their political preferences. convincing its constituency that the Islam- This signals that many Tunisians voted for ists were not able to perform better in gov- Nidaa Tounes for lack of a better alternative ernment because the opposition did not rather than because they strongly believe in assume a constructive democratic function the party. Many Tunisians, including secular but rather boycotted many policies. voices, have been especially critical of the age of Essebsi (88) as well as the integration of many former representatives of Ben Ali’s Changing Priorities regime. Many also resent the quick rise Tunisia’s new political landscape reflects of Essebsi’s son, Hafedh, who was initially how the priorities of many Tunisians have installed at the head of Nidaa Tounes’ list changed. Whereas in 2011 parties with for the electoral district Tunis 1, but later a track record on human rights, strong had to resign owing to internal protests, identity politics, and a history of anti-Ben given that he did not have any obvious cre- Ali militancy did well, in 2014 people dentials for this position. elected parties they perceived as being able to solve their economic malaise and security concerns. In early recognition of Nidaa Tounes’ Options that, even Ennahda, which had in the past Nidaa Tounes is the only party capable of harshly condemned Tunisia’s economic forming a government. Too many parties elite, integrated important businessmen on in parliament are categorically opposed to their electoral lists – including the head of Ennahda, which makes it impossible for the Syphax Airlines – to create the impression Islamists to assemble a coalition. No party that it would provide better governance other than Nidaa Tounes has this kind of than under the Troika government. leverage. However, Nidaa Tounes will need An increasing number of Tunisians pre- 23 more deputies to achieve an absolute fer stability and a strong leadership figure majority in parliament. This presents Nidaa over democracy. An October 2014 Pew sur- Tounes with two main political options: vey found that only 48 percent of Tunisians forming an all-secular coalition, or a broad think that democracy is preferable to other coalition that includes the Islamists. kinds of government, compared to 63 per- cent of Tunisians polled just months after the 2011 revolution.
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