forthcoming in G. Karamanolis and A. Sheppard, eds. Studies in Porphyry

for the most part purely Plotinian and often taken verbatim or nearly so from the Enneads, as can Porphyry and Plotinus’ Metaphysics 4 Steven K. Strange be seen from the excellent apparatus fontium in Lamberz’s Teubner edition: what is supplied by Emory University Porphyry himself seems intended to help clarify and only occasionally to expand upon his

Plotinian basis.5 If this picture of the Sententiae as a sort of handbook, like the Encheiridion of As editor and popularizer of his teacher Plotinus, as a founding figure of Neoplatonism, Epictetus, intended for Plotinian progressors, is correct, then any originality or innovation to be and as an important commentator on Plato and Aristotle, Porphyry deserves to be considered a found in the work will have been unintentional on the part of its author, and it is therefore not major figure in the history of philosophy. But though a first-rate scholar of philosophy as well as surprising to find the work cited somewhat rarely in discussions of Porphyry’s own thought. of other fields—and as such a worthy successor to his first tutor in Platonic philosophy, the A.C. Lloyd in his important article in the Cambridge history of later Greek and early medieval learned Longinus—it is much less clear to what extent Porphyry can be considered an original philosophy6 did claim to find in the Sententiae a new conception of the soul’s return to the contributor to the development of ancient philosophy.1 Indeed, much of Porphyry’s extant work intelligible realm (by abstracting in thought from all logical particularity),7 but he admits that this consists of excerpts, often extensive verbatim excerpts, from earlier writers: this is true of his De conception seems to have been suggested to Porphyry by the final chapter of Ennead VI.4-5, abstinentia, of his Pythagoras biography,2 and of his philosophical epistle to his wife, the Ad Plotinus’ treatise on the omnipresence of Being in the sensible world (VI.5.12). We should thus Marcellam, and it seems to hold as well of his extant commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories not look to the Sententiae for any specifically Porphyrian as opposed to Plotinian metaphysics.8 and on Ptolemy’s Harmonics, neither of which make any claim to originality and both of which Porphyry’s originality vis-à-vis Plotinus, if any, must be found in other works. But is it in seem only to wish to present older material in readily accessible form. Porphyry’s principal fact to be found? I wish to approach this question by examining some of Porphyry’s apparent extant metaphysical work, the so-called Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes, in Greek disagreements with Plotinus in metaphysics, to see whether they really are disagreements or !"#$%!& '$#( )! *#+)! (which might more precisely be rendered as “resources for merely further cases where, as in the Sententiae, Porphyry is merely expanding upon or trying to approaching the intelligible world”) appears to be an attempt at a sketch of the main points of explicate Plotinus. It is of course possible that where Porphyry thinks he is explicating Plotinus Plotinian Neoplatonism, and might usefully be compared with the Encheiridion, the collection of he is really disagreeing with him, but before we decide that this is so, we should first make sure excerpts made by Arrian of Nicomedia from his Discourses of Epictetus. Certainly, as A. C. we understand Porphyry’s point of view on the supposed disagreement in question. Thus I will Lloyd once remarked, the notion that a student looking to Porphyry’s Sententiae will find in it an first try to define somewhat more precisely how I think we should see Porphyry’s attitude toward easy introduction to the philosophy of Plotinus will not survive experiment,3 but the chapters of agreement with Plotinus. Following that, I will focus specifically on what Porphyry has to say the work do present well-defined discussions of crucial points upon which one who wished to about the Plotinian Hypostases in some of his attested fragments.9 Here he will reveal himself as make progress in Plotinus’ thought might do well to meditate. The material of the Sententiae is

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exegete of his master to a greater degree than has heretofore been recognized. I will close with a genuine apodeictic knowledge. Plotinus on the other hand asserts that dialectic, the developed few rather sketchy remarks about the relevance of this material to the fragments of the ability or power to properly employ collection and division, just is what philosophical knowledge

Anonymous Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides that has been attributed to Porphyry by Pierre or epistêmê is (Enn. I.3.5,1). This is an example of Plotinus’ rather deep understanding of

Hadot. Various features of this text turn out to reflect Porphyry’s discussion of the Plotinian differences between Plato and Aristotle, a rather important point, since Porphyry’s disagreements

Hypostases, and this appears to buttress Hadot’s controversial attribution of it to Porphyry. with his master are often seen in terms of Porphyry’s ‘harmonizing’ tendency to defend

Aristotelian views and attempt to fit them with Platonist ones, while Plotinus tends to reject We certainly do find areas of metaphysics where Porphyry is an innovator at least in the them. sense that he rejects views that were held by his teacher Plotinus. One such area, as was pointed out by P. Hadot in his classic article “La métaphysique de Porphyre”,10 concerns the very notion Porphyry, as Hadot points out, adopts from pre-existing Platonist speculation a conception of metaphysics itself as a special field of inquiry, that is, metaphysics conceived on analogy with of the ‘parts’ of philosophical inquiry that classifies them in the order ethics—physics—theology

Aristotle’s ‘theology’ or ‘first philosophy’, as the science that deals with supersensible reality, or metaphysics, that is, the study of the divine, which is also sometimes called epoptic after the literally ‘beyond’ physics or the science of nature. It is apparent from Plotinus’ treatise On visionary aspect of the mysteries.12 This conception of the structure of philosophy is consistent dialectic (Ennead I.3) that Plotinus did not accept this Aristotelian/Peripatetic view of the status with Porphyry’s greater continuity with Middle Platonist traditions, in contrast to Plotinus’ more of metaphysics. For Plotinus, what deals with intelligible reality is rather Dialectic, conceived on pronounced radicalism, though of course Porphyry was often willing to follow Plotinus’ more the model of the dialectical method of Plato’s late dialogues, the Sophist, Statesman and radical innovations as well, as in the case of the theory of Hypostases and the transcendence of

Philebus, which employs collection, division and definition in order to induce contemplation of the first One, or the placement of the Platonic Ideas within Nous, where he was first induced by the Ideas as the contents of Nous or the Divine Intelligence.11 Dialectic, that is, the method of Plotinus to break with the views of his earlier, more traditional teacher Longinus (Vita Plotini

Collection and Division, is for Plotinus the genuine method of inquiry of the philosopher: an §18).13 Porphyry employs the threefold division of philosophy into ethics, physics, and excellent example of his application of it is his official treatment of the overall structure of the metaphysics to order the treatises of Plotinus in his edition of them, the Enneads: the first intelligible world in the second book of his treatise On the kinds of Being, Ennead VI.2. Dialectic Ennead concerns ethics, the second and third physics, and the fourth through sixth the divine is opposed for Plotinus to Aristotelian metaphysics because he sees that Aristotle conceives them hypostases:14 the fourth Ennead soul, the fifth nous, and the sixth (although Porphyry does not as opposed as well: Aristotle’s science of being qua being or first philosophy is explicitly a explicitly say so in the Life of Plotinus) more advanced topics—in metaphysics, category theory replacement and rejection of Plato’s conception of dialectic as the method of the true and number—and the One (VP §§24-26).15 Through the very arrangement of the treatises of the philosopher—for Aristotle thinks Platonic dialectic can only yield probabilities and opinion, not Enneads, therefore, Porphyry has imposed upon the reading of Plotinus a not wholly appropriate

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Aristotelian element—for Platonic/Plotinian dialectic is not merely another term for Aristotelian first book of On the kinds of Being were intended by their originators, such as the 2nd century CE metaphysics, nor in fact does Plotinus in fact anywhere directly address the question of the (?) figures Lucius and Nicostratus, as hostile critiques of Aristotle. But in Plotinus that they can division of the parts of philosophy.16 Porphyry’s ordering of the Enneads also introduces the be seen as directed not against Aristotle himself, but rather against the standard interpretation of somewhat misleading suggestion—which is also the generally accepted view—that the real goal Aristotle’s Categories as found in Peripatetic commentators: one could mention Alexander of of Plotinian philosophy is contemplation of and union with the One, the principal topic of the last Aphrodisias’ lost commentary on the work as among Plotinus’ possible or even likely targets.21 three treatises of Ennead VI, whereas it is clear from Plotinus’ treatise on eudaimonia, Ennead For example, many of the arguments in Ennead VI.1 are directed against the assumption that the

I.4, that he instead conceives of the telos or goal of life as the sage’s identification with the ten categories are to be construed as metaphysical summa genera. But it is very far from clear

Divine Intelligence or Nous.17 The effect on our reading of the Enneads by Porphyry’s that Aristotle could have intended this interpretation, since for example he states in the arrangement of the treatises deserves, I think, more attention than it has received. Categories itself that quality is a homonym (§8 init., 8b25-26), which would be impossible if the

category of quality were a genuine genus, which by definition is predicated synonymously of its This raises again the issue of Porphyry’s alleged Aristotelianism and his tendency to species. I think that we should assume that Plotinus is suggesting that this standard interpretation harmonize Aristotle with Platonism, points on which he is usually thought to have differed of the Categories is wrong, and not that it is Aristotle who is wrong on this point.22 Porphyry significantly from his master. In my view, however, it is easy to make too much of this. I have

18 19 responds to this critique by assuming that Aristotle’s categories are intended to be a classification argued previously, following fundamental work of A. C. Lloyd, that at least in the area of of sensible items and properties only, i.e., he accepts the main point of Plotinus’ critique, that the logic and metaphysics, it is Plotinus rather than Porphyry who should be seen as originating this categories cannot be a complete classification of everything that exists. Porphyry certainly does ‘Aristotelianizing’ tendency within Neoplatonism. For Porphyry treats the criticisms that disagree with Plotinus about whether the ten categories of Aristotle are actually applicable to Plotinus directs against the text of Aristotle’s Categories in Ennead VI.1 as aporiai to be 23 20 sensible reality: Plotinus denies that they are, but Porphyry accepts them. So on this point at solved, and solves them in such a way that the Categories is seen precisely to be a work of least Porphyry thinks Aristotle can be harmonized with Platonist metaphysical truth, whereas logic and not of metaphysics, a work whose untoward metaphysical implications—concerning Plotinus doubts that complete harmony is achievable, but still sees the disagreement as not being the diminished reality of Platonic genera and species, for example—can be defused and the text the flat-out opposition that it has often been taken to be. In another essay, P. Hadot has shown and the Organon as a whole made safe for use by Platonists. how Porphyry (via Dexippus) argued that Plotinus’ critiques of the Aristotelian category of This has usually been construed as Porphyry’s response to an attack by Plotinus’ on substance (ousia) in On the kinds of Being can be read in a way that brought out the fundamental Aristotle’s Categories, but in pursuing this project Porphyry was not necessarily being untrue to harmony of the philosophies of Plotinus and Aristotle.24 Again, I would want to argue that what Plotinus’ intentions. No doubt many of the criticisms of the Categories that Plotinus retails in the

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this shows is not so much Porphyry’s harmonizing tendency in opposition to Plotinus more hard- What I would suggest, then, is that Porphyry sees himself as a fairly faithful but not wholly line attitude, but Porphyry’s understanding of some of Plotinus’ deeper motivations. uncritical follower of Plotinus and an adherent of Plotinus’ new or revived brand of Platonism, in

rather the same way as (in his view) Aristotle was a not uncritical follower of Plato himself.28 In Nevertheless, Porphyry is surely fully aware that Plotinus does have metaphysical any case Porphyry seems to have been a far more ‘orthodox’ Plotinian than his rival Amelius disagreements with Aristotle, some of them rather fundamental, such as over Aristotle’s view in Gentilianus, Plotinus’ other main student, whom Porphyry seems to portray himself in the Life as Metaphysics , that the divine Nous is the highest God, rather than the One or Good, with Nous supplanting as Plotinus’ designated successor. We know that Amelius disagreed with Plotinus on relegated to the status of the second Hypostasis (cf., very explicitly on this point, Ennead a number of important points and we may sometimes see Plotinus criticizing in the Enneads, for V.1.9,16ff.). Porphyry probably himself held that Aristotle’s philosophy could not completely be instance on the topic of the unity of soul (Enn. IV.3.1-8).29 This impression of Porphyry as self- reconciled with Platonism, since we are told that he wrote a work with the title On the dissension

25 consciously the philosophical heir of Plotinus is reinforced by the evidence of Porphyry’s treatise of Plato and Aristotle (P29 Smith) , but he must have thought that this disagreement was not De abstinentia, the longest of his surviving philosophical works.30 This defense of vegetarianism fundamental, since he apparently also wrote a work in three books On the unity of the sect of and ‘animal rights’ (i.e., that brutes can rightly be considered subjects of justice) is addressed to Plato and Aristotle (P30 Smith)—if this indeed is not just an alternate title for the same work,

26 Castricius Firmus, a former student of Plotinus whom Porphyry indeed seems to have inherited which would not substantially affect the point I am trying to make. But this reflects the attitude as an object of professorial concern. Castricius had abandoned the (Pythagorean) practice of toward Aristotle that we saw in Plotinus, and that as we saw Porphyry too recognized in him. We vegetarianism that had also been followed by Plotinus (VP §2), and Porphyry is in this work also know that Porphyry wrote a work against the earlier Peripatetic Boethus defending the attempting to recall him to the true path. There are a number of appeals to Castricius’ loyalty to immortality of the human soul against Boethus’ version of the entelechy-theory of Aristotle’s De and piety towards the teachings of the school—which Porphyry even refers to as “ancestral laws Anima (P32 Smith: extensive fragments). Plotinus also criticizes Boethus’ view in his early of the philosophy to which you were committed” (I.2.3: trans. G. Clark).31 This seems treatise on the soul’s immortality (Ennead IV.7), but we cannot be certain whether Porphyry

27 principally to mean the Pythagorean variety of Platonism that Plotinus had taught, but also may thought that Boethus’ interpretation of Aristotle was the correct one. Certainly there were later involve personal loyalty or commitment to the figure of Plotinus himself. Certainly the ascetic Platonists who thought that Aristotle could be read as not attacking the immortality of the ethics and the moral psychology upon which it is based that is laid out in chs. 27-47 of Book I of rational soul—essentially, by identifying Aristotle’s passive intelligence with rational soul, and the De abstinentia and elaborated in various passages later in the work seems essentially to be defending its imperishability—though there is no sign that Plotinus read Aristotle in this fashion, that of Plotinus, and especially of his great treatise on happiness, Ennead I.4. The goal of this or that Porphyry thought that he did (the harmonizing interpretation of Aristotle on this point ethics is to rejoin or become fully identified with one’s personal nous or true self in the could descend from Porphyry, though I think that Iamblichus is more likely as its source).

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intelligible world, from which one’s soul has descended into Becoming and embodiment, to evident from fragment 221F, which is connected closely with this particular passage of the reverse the process of descent by detaching oneself mentally from material conditions and from Enneads: indeed, I shall argue that all four of the Porphyrian fragments on metaphysics from the emotions they provoke. Strict simplicity of diet, including vegetarianism, is one of the main Book IV of the Philosophical history are very closely connected with Ennead V.1. elements in the ascetic regimen advocated by Porphyry: this is something that Plotinus never Fragment 221F opens with Porphyry’s statement that “Plato claims that the substance of argues for (though according to Porphyry he did practice it), but the metaphysical and 34 the divine extends to three hypostases” (ll. 2-3), which is a paraphrase of the last clause of psychological assumptions upon which Porphyry builds his case for it are throughout Ennead V.1.7, which closes Plotinus’ extensive discussion of the Hypostases that occupies the recognizably Plotinian, especially the notion that one reverts to one’s true intelligible self via first seven chapters of this treatise: “And as far as [!"#$% in place of Porphyry’s &#$%] these [= uninterrupted contemplation of the spiritual realm.32 Along with the Sententiae, we can take the One, Nous, Soul] the divine things extend” (V.1.7,49).35 Plotinus here calls his Hypostases “the De abstinentia as an example of Porphyry’s ‘Plotinian’ work, where he is concerned to present, divinities” or “divine things” (ta theia), whereas Porphyry has instead the apparently by now not to criticize, Plotinian thought. standard term hupostaseis, which Plotinus nowhere uses in this technical sense and which

Let us move on to the central question of Plotinus’ theory of hypostases. The extent to Porphyry perhaps was responsible for introducing. It occurs in the well-known title of Ennead which Porphyry accepted the Plotinian metaphysical hierarchy of hypostases, One, Nous and V.1 already cited, On the three hypostases that are principles ('($) *+, *$%+, -$#%.+,

Soul, and in particular the Plotinian distinction between One and Nous, is somewhat /012*32(4,). There is another reminiscence of the same Plotinian phrase a few lines below in controversial and hard to determine. If we look only at the fragments of the fourth book of Porphyry’s fragment 221: “[Plato says that] divinity (theôtês) reaches to the [level of] Soul” (ll.

Porphyry’s Philosophical history (220F-223F Smith, all cited by Cyril of Alexandria in his tract 5-6).36 Porphyry’s immediately following statement that Plato says that “the rest is the un-divine against Julian) it seems that Porphyry does accept Plotinus’ theory. Some apparent differences do (atheon), starting with corporeal differentiation” (ll. 6-7),37 which has puzzled commentators, is arise, but I shall suggest that what we see occurring is once more Porphyry attempting to just an amplification of and expansion through contrast and contrariety upon the Plotinian claim explicate and expanding upon Plotinus. The four fragments in question all come from Porphyry’s that the Hypostases are the ‘divine things’ that Porphyry is glossing. While Porphyry here discussion of Plato’s doctrine of principles,33 and they reveal, as we will see, that Porphyry identifies the Second Hypostasis with the Demiurge (line 5) rather than with Nous, this is an wishes to accept Plotinus’ hypostases in this work (the Philosophical history) as an interpretation echo of Plotinus’ own phrase “Nous is the Demiurge for Plato”38 (Enn. V.1.8,6). The only of Plato’s doctrine. This indeed is what Plotinus intended them to be, as he declares explicitly in obvious disagreement in this fragment with Plotinus’ strict doctrine lies in Porphyry’s the first treatise introducing his theory of the Hypostases, On the three hypostases that are identification of the Cosmic Soul (5 *16 .72!18 98#:), that is, the World-Soul of the Timaeus, principles (Ennead V.1.8,1-14). Porphyry’s endorsement of Plotinus’ theory is particularly with the Plotinian Third Hypostasis, since in Plotinus’ mature doctrine anyway, the Hypostasis

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Soul is definitely to be distinguished from the soul of the universe, as is explicit for instance in dialogues, which is why Plotinus and Porphyry, following Numenius, from whom Plotinus

Ennead IV.3, where Plotinus argues for just this claim against his pupil Amelius.39 As nothing in seems to have gotten the idea, are obliged to cite Epistle II, as here, as textual support of it.44 The

Plotinus’ early treatise Ennead V.1 requires us to take the Hypostasis Soul to be the World-Soul, Timaeus, however, does present Cosmic Soul as produced by the Demiurge (= Nous), which may

Porphyry would seem to have either over-interpreted or misinterpreted Plotinus on this point, or help account for Porphyry’s insistence, noted above, against Plotinus that the Third Hypostasis is else he has deliberately introduced a subtle variation into the doctrine here.40 But in any case, the to be taken as Cosmic Soul and not Universal Soul. doctrine of this fragment as a whole is Plotinian and taken from a central Plotinian text, and it An earlier chapter of Ennead V.1, chapter 5, cites the reports of Plato’s so-called Unwritten endorses Plotinus’ theory of Hypostases as a reading of Plato’s metaphysics.41 Doctrines concerning the derivation of the Dyad from the One in support of the procession of

Given the close connection of fragment 221F with the beginning of Ennead V.1.8, we may Nous (identified with the Definite Dyad) from the First Principle. My suspicion is that Plotinus suspect that fragment 222F too is connected with the same Ennead chapter, where Plotinus cites has taken this too from Numenius—perhaps from his best-known work, On the Good—and we

(Enn. V. 1.8,1-4) the same passage of the Pseudo-Platonic Epistle II concerning the ‘Three know from Porphyry’s notorious citation of Dercyllides’ On Plato’s philosophy in Simplicius

Kings’ (312e) that Porphyry quotes in 222F. However, Porphyry unlike Plotinus quotes Plato’s (fr.146F Smith) that Porphyry too was interested in Plato’s Unwritten Doctrines. In the earlier text directly rather than paraphrasing (and does so fairly accurately, with only minor variation passage, Plotinus notes (Enn. V.1.5,6-9) that Plato’s Dyad has the One as its ‘definer’ (horistês, from our received text of the Epistle) and makes clear what Plotinus does not, that the three kings 8), which agrees with Aristotle’s report of the Unwritten Doctrines in Metaphysics A, but are the same as the ‘three gods’ of Numenius of Apamea42, whereas Plotinus picks out only a Plotinus adds that the Dyad first proceeds, in its indefinite form, from the One, by which it is few key phrases from the Epistle. Cyril’s remark following the direct quotation of Porphyry’s then informed and transformed into Number (= the realm of the Ideas). That the Indefinite Dyad citation of the Epistle in fragment 222 is his gloss on what Porphyry is saying: “He [i.e., itself proceeds from the One is a feature of the account that is not found in the reports of Plato’s

Porphyry] shows that Plato also indicates their coming into existence (hupostasis!) from one Unwritten Doctrines—we should recall that the 1st century BCE ‘Academic’ Pythagorean- another, and the descent and diminution of those that follow upon the First, by saying Platonist Eudorus of Alexandria wished to add it to the report of Plato’s views in Aristotle’s

‘primarily’, ‘secondarily’ and ‘thirdly’, and that all things come from One and are preserved by Metaphysics A6 (988a10-11)—but it is ubiquitous in the versions passed down in the it” (ll. 8-12).43 If this remark by Cyril is correct, as seems plausible, then Porphyry is endorsing Neopythagorean tradition,45 of which Numenius was an adherent and from which Plotinus has

Plotinus’ idea of the procession of the Second and Third Hypostases from the First (as well as, inherited it as the basis for attributing the procession to Plato. presumably, the Third from the Second), what is usually and somewhat misleadingly called In the first fragment of Philosophical history IV cited by Cyril, fr.220F, which comes a ‘emanation’. This procession is of course not to be found explicitly anywhere in Plato’s little before fr.222 in Cyril’s text, Porphyry discusses Plato’s view on the First Principle itself,

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and attributes to him a sophisticated version of apophatic or negative theology, very much along a proper understanding of this passage in its Plotinian context may call this assumption into the lines of that found in Plotinus.46 Cyril here represents Porphyry as claiming for Plato a belief question. in the One God (= the One as highest god), who can (following Parmenides 142a) neither be Fr.223 again concerns Plato’s conception of the procession of Nous (here given its proper fittingly named or known by humans, so that the designations that we do use for God can only be Plotinian name for the Second Hypostasis) from the Good as First Principle. It begins as follows: predicated improperly or katakhrêstikôs of him. That being said, the names that are most properly (or least improperly) used of God are “One” and “Good”, i.e., the terms that Plato “From this [= the Good, as can be gathered from Cyril’s opening remarks], in a way himself uses of the First Principle in Republic VI and in the Parmenides respectively. “One” inconceivable to humans, there comes to be Nous whole and on its own, in which are contained indicates the divine simplicity and self-sufficiency, while “Good” communicates insofar as is the really real beings [= the Ideas] and the whole essence (ousia) of beings. This is also primary possible that God is the source of all good things, in that all things strive for the good by Beauty and Beauty-Itself, having the form of Beautifulness from itself…” (ll. 3-7)48 imitating God (or his “so-to-speak characteristic”,47 as Porphyry puts it in line 14) and are preserved by God. Of the two designations, therefore, “Good” reveals the most about the (strictly inexpressible and unknowable) divine nature, its as-it-were proper characteristic (idiôtês). This is So far this looks to be standard Plotinian doctrine, including the notion that Nous is the because things are made good by imitating God, who must therefore be good in some sense, at primary Beauty,49 save for the claim that the manner of the procession is inconceivable to least paradigmatically so. If we could assume that Porphyry, like some later Neoplatonists, humans. Now Plotinus himself clearly does not think that it is wholly inconceivable to humans, associated the goodness of things with their existence or being, this would also help explicate the since he tries to explain it in Ennead V.1 chapters 6 and 7, though not, it must be said, very notion that all things derive from the Good as first principle. successfully. In fact much scholarly ink has been spilled over the details of his attempted

50 Finally, let us turn to the fourth report of Porphyry’s Philosophical history on Plato’s explanation. Porphyry may have had trouble making sense of Plotinus’ explanation as well, and doctrine that Cyril cites, fr.223F Smith (which is actually cited third by Cyril, a little after 222F). this may account for his characterization of it as ‘inconceivable to humans’. It also seems that the

This is in several ways the most interesting and puzzling of the four Cyril fragments. I think that details of Plotinus’ explanation are what Porphyry has in mind in the difficult passage it too is connected with a particular passage from Plotinus’ early treatise on the Hypostases, concerning pre-eternity and eternity that follows next (ll. 7-20):

Ennead V.1, though it has so far as I am aware not previously been discussed in this regard.

Discussion of the fragment has focussed rather on its strange distinction between eternity and “[Nous] has proceeded pre-eternally,51 starting from God as its cause, being self-generated pre-eternity, which looks to be a definite innovation by Porphyry over Plotinus. However, I think (autogennêtos) and Father of itself (autopatôr). For it is not the case that the generation has taken

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place when the former (ekeinos = the Good) moved toward the generation of this one (toutos = move toward anything else), or is he saying that since the One is barred by its nature from doing

Nous), but rather this one has come forth self-generated from God. And it (Nous) has not come anything at all in order for Nous to be generated, that Nous must in effect generate itself, by forth from any temporal beginning.52 For time did not yet exist, nor yet when time has come to reverting (in its preliminary indefinite state of ‘pre-intellect’60) toward the One? Once the be is time at all related to it.53 For Nous is always54 timeless and solely eternal. Just as the First question is posed, it becomes clear, I think, that Porphyry here is adopting the second reading of

61 God is always one alone55 even if all things come from him, in virtue of the fact that he is not epistraphentos, with its subject being Nous. Thus ‘reversion’ (epistrophê) is being treated as a

kind of motion towards something else: there is hence no notion here of any self-reversion of the counted in with them nor is their value (axia) able to be compared with [literally: is not at the One, in Porphyry’s view. The idea is that Nous must ‘first’ generate or constitute itself (again, in same level as] his existence (huparxis),56 so too Intelligence has come to be solely eternal and an indefinite state) so as to be able to revert upon the One and so become definite (the stage that timelessly, and is itself time for the things that are in time, remaining in the sameness of its own Plotinus thinks of as corresponding to the One ‘defining’ the Indefinite Dyad in Plato’s eternal existence [hupostasis: cf. Timaeus 37d6 on eternity ‘remaining in unity’]” (ll. 7-20).57 Unwritten Doctrines).

This line of thought leads naturally, in both the Plotinus and the Porphyry passages so It seems clear that Porphyry has in mind here, and is in fact glossing, the controversial and interpreted, to the problem of ‘when’, so to speak, these stages of generation are supposed to be extremely obscure passage Enn. V.1.6,15-27, where Plotinus attempts to explain the generation taking place, i.e., to the problem of the apparent essential temporality of the process. There is of Nous from the One.58 The allusion in Porphyry’s phrase 1; <=$ >.(?,18 .%,18!",18 0$@A also an apparent contradiction lurking—in that it would seem that Nous has first to generate itself <",(2%, *B, *1C*18 at lines 9-10 to Plotinus’ denials of motion (towards something) to the in order to revert upon the One, i.e., in order to generate itself—but apparently this is supposed One at V.1.6,16-17 and 22-23, as well as the parallels between Plotinus’ explanation why time is to be resolved for Plotinus at least by distinguishing the two stages of Nous, indefinite and irrelevant to his account and Porphyry’s lines 11-13 especially are sufficient to establish the definite: neither Plotinus or Porphyry is explicit in dealing with this problem here, though existence of this allusion. If this be accepted, we can then ask how Porphyry is reading the Plotinus is more so elsewhere.62 In fact, it may be the puzzling nature of this latter problem that disputed Plotinus passage. The central issue, notoriously, is a grammatical one: what is the led Porphyry to declare the whole process to be, strictly, incomprehensible to humans. In his subject of the participle epistraphentos at Plotinus’ line 18?59 Is the subject of this participle response to the general issue about temporality, Porphyry is satisfied merely to deny that the Nous, or is it the One? In other words, is Plotinus saying that since it is impossible for the One to process is temporal. Plotinus adds the somewhat helpful point that the stages in the temporal move towards Nous—which at this point does not ‘yet’ exist, so to speak—in order to generate account are supposed to be analogues of (eternal) relations of causality and effect/product among it, that it must revert upon itself to accomplish the generation of Nous (since, clearly, it can’t the items in the account, that is, to reflect the fact that the One is the cause of the generation of

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Nous (6,18-22). Plotinus seems to be thinking here of what might be called a process of ‘eternal pre-eternal element (presumably to be somehow identified with the One and perhaps also with generation’, but Porphryry goes farther and speaks of it as being ‘pre-eternal’.63 If Porphyry’s pre-Nous) is within the Hypostasis Nous, so that as it were Nous contains its father within itself. notion of ‘pre-eternality’ is supposed to explain anything here, I think it must be that the process We also see in our fragment the important and seemingly opposed notion that the One is not to is supposed to account for the generation of eternity itself, so that talk of eternal generation is out be ‘counted in with’ (sunarithmeisthai) other things. This has already come up in the perhaps of place. But if this is so, we see Porphyry attempting to clear up a difficult point in Plotinus’ Porphyrian sequel to fr.221 (ll. 6-12), which I omitted to discuss above, where certain unnamed account by expanding on it. and mysterious66 persons are said to object to the Plotinian account of the Hypostases that the

First Principle should not be counted in with the other two Hypostases (line 9). This echoes How can the One be called the cause (aition, fr.223F7-8) of the generation of Nous, if Nous known criticisms of Porphyry elsewhere for counting in the First Principle as the Father of the is self-generated? The answer to this must again lie in the two stages of generation: the One is First Intelligible Triad (cf. the Damascius passage), and may represent Porphyry himself stating the cause of the outflowing of the indefinite pre-Nous (cf. Enn. V.2.1, the image of the fountain this objection against his own view, or against his own interpretation of Plotinus’ metaphysical overflowing), which then ‘generates itself’ or bootstraps itself into existence in reverting on the view. One. Our Porphyry fragment, however, appears innocent of all these complexities, perhaps because he thought them to be incomprehensible to the human mind. What Porphyry does add to This paradox, concerning the One in Porphyry’s thought both being conceived as somehow the Plotinian picture is the distinction between pre-eternity and eternity, which seems intended to a constituent of Nous and on the other hand as strictly transcending it as its source, has been express the idea that the generation of Nous (identified with eternity) takes place, not only before connected by Hadot and Dillon with similar themes in the Anonymous Parmenides commentary time, but so to speak ‘before’ eternity as well.64 (fr. XI-XII) concerning the dual status of the One of the Second Hypothesis, as both somehow

being identical with the strictly transcendent One of the First Hypothesis and as also having its Now the concept of pre-eternity is also found in the unique fragment of Porphyry’s On role as constituent of the One-Being of the Second Hypothesis, which on the Neoplatonic principles from Proclus’ Platonic theology (fr.232F Smith), which speaks of the pre-eternal interpretation is to be identified with the Hypostasis Nous.67 In my view, as in Hadot’s, these element within the eternal Nous and connecting it with the One, rather than as here in fr.223F of parallels provide rather strong evidence in favor of his attribution of the Anonymous its procession from the One or First Principle before eternity. This would seem to be linked to the Commentary to Porphyry, and I do not think that they have been sufficiently appreciated in notorious difficulty about Porphyry’s having posited the One as Father of the so-called First recent controversies over this attribution. Proper discussion of this issue, however, would take us Intelligible Triad Being/Existence-Life-Intelligence (Nous) (Damascius Prin. I.86 Ruelle, cf. also

65 far beyond what I have tried to do here. There are also rather striking resemblances in both Proclus In Parm. 1070.15 and Anon. In Parm fr.IX init.) Note that in our fr.223 of the language and doctrine between the Anonymous Commentary and the fragments from Book IV of Philosophical history, Nous is said to be its own father, while in the On Principles fragment the

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Porphyry’s Philosophical history that we have been discussing. Most or all of them were pointed main reading of the Ennead V.1.6 passage, according to which the One generates Nous by itself out by Hadot in his monumental Porphyre et Victorinus,68 but they also have not been made moving towards its generation.74 This does not much affect his case for identifying the enough of in the recent controversies over the authorship of the Commentary. Let me just Anonymous Commentator with Porphyry, since he does call attention to the parallels between mention here two points from fragment 220F. First is the term prosegoriai for the designations or the account of the relationship between the First and Second Ones of the Parmenides in the denominations of the First God, which—though a common technical term of the period—occurs Anonymous Commentary, frs. XI-XII75 and Porphyry’s account of the self-generation of Nous in in the same context in Anonymous fr. I.18.69 The doctrinal point is similar there too, concerning Philosophical history fr.223F, as well as between the discussion of the relation of the One to the the applicability of the name “One” to the First Principle.70 Much of the text of the First Intelligible Triad in fr.IX,1-7 and fr.223F and the Damascius passage. Does my new

Commentary’s fragments as we have them is concerned with ‘negative theology’, the difficulty reconstruction of Porphyry’s interpretation of Plotinus’ account of the generation of Nous of talking sensibly about the first God, identified with the One of the First Hypothesis of Plato’s increase the probability that the Anonymous Commentator is Porphyry? This remains an open

Parmenides. The main point of Anonymous fr.1 seems to be, as in Philosophical history fr. 220, question, but certainly it seems to bring the Anonymous into closer proximity to Plotinus.76 that “One”, though in some ways quite inadequate as a designation of the First, is nonetheless most appropriate among human names for this role: in particular it is the cause of the being of 1 See on this point Andrew Smith, Porphyry’s place in the Neoplatonic tradition (The Hague other things (fr.I.10-12, cfr. fr.II.9-1071). Elsewhere the One is also said to be responsible for the 1974), Introduction xii ff. Part One of Smith’s book, chapters 1-5, deals extensively with the question of Porphyry’s originality vis-à-vis Plotinus in psychology, rather than in metaphysics in ‘preservation’ (sôteria, fr. V.672) of other things, recalling 220F15. Another striking parallel general, with which I will be concerned here. comes at the end of the first fragment of the Commentary, where it is denied that the One can be 2 The Life of Pythagoras originally formed part of the first book of Porphyry’s Philosophical conceived in terms of activity, thought or simplicity, recalling the statement of fr.220F10-12 history, from which come the fragments on Platonic metaphysics which will be discussed in the last part of this paper. (which however affirms the One’s simplicity and denies its need of parts).73 There are other 3 “The Later Neoplatonists”, in A. H. Armstrong, ed., The Cambridge history of later Greek and linguistic and doctrinal parallels noted by Hadot, but the general impression certainly seems to early medieval philosophy (Cambridge 1967) 286. 4 support Hadot’s identification of the Anonymous with Porphyry. Porphyry, Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes, ed. E. Lamberz (Leipzig 1975). 5 A good example is Sententiae ch.32 on the scale of types of virtues, which presents an However Hadot, like other commentators, fails to note the close connection I have pointed interesting rational reconstruction of Plotinus’ discussion of the same topic in his tractate on the to between Philosophical history fr.223F and Plotinus’ account of the generation of Nous from virtues, Ennead I.2. 6 Ibid. 288-291. the One in Ennead V.1.6, where Porphyry seems to be identifying his own account of Nous’s so- 7 Ibid. 289. called self-generation with Plotinus’ account. Instead, Hadot is on record as advocating the other 8 M. Zambon, Porphyre et le Moyen-Platonisme (Paris 2002) 19-20 mentions two supposed

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differences between the metaphysics of the Sententiae and that of Plotinus: a stronger contrast One. Insofar as Ennead I.4 can be taken as a definitive statement of Plotinus’ ethics, this does not between being and non-being, approaching a dualism, and a rigidifying of the differences seem to be the case. between the various hierachical levels. But if these are indeed genuine disagreements with 18 “Plotinus, Porphyry and the Neoplatonic interpretation of the Categories”, Aufstieg und Plotinus (which I doubt) they amount at most to differences of emphasis, or would not have been Niedergang der römischen Welt II.36.2 (1987) 955-974. seen as disagreements by Porphyry himself. 19 “Neoplatonic logic and Aristotelian logic”, Phronesis 1 (1955-56) 58-72, 146-160. See also 9 There is quite a bit about the Hypostases in the Sententiae as well, but I will not have anything especially F. J. De Haas, “Did Plotinus and Porphyry disagree about Aristotle’s Categories?”, more to say about this work. Phronesis 46 (2001) 492-526 and “Context and strategy of Plotinus’ treatise On the genera of 10Porphyre (Entretiens Hardt 12 [1965]) 125-164. Being VI.1-3” in V. Celluprica and C. D’Ancona, eds., Aristotele e i suoi esegeti neoplatonici 11 Contrast on this point A. C. Lloyd, The anatomy of Neoplatonism (Oxford 1990) 164-165, who (Naples 2004), pp. 39-53. I find myself in in general agreement with De Haas’s view of the in my view fails to distinguish Plotinus’ Platonic dialectic sufficiently from Aristotelian logic. attitude of Plotinus and Porphyry to Aristotle: I only wish to emphasize here a few salient points. 12 Cf. Hadot, op. cit. 127-129. Politics is presumably to be classified with ethics. This For a thorough defense of the more traditional view of Plotinus’ attitude to Aristotle, see most arrangement is Aristotelian only in that it distinguishes physics from metaphysics, which it recently R. Chiaradonna, Sostanza movimento analogia: Plotino critico di Aristotele (Naples places ‘above’ physics: it does not, for instance, respect Aristotle’s fundamental distinction 2002). between practical and theoretical philosophy (and much of ethics would perhaps count as 20 As is also seen, more explicitly, in the slightly later Categories commentary by the theoretical). But it does seem to be connected with the idea that logic, as in Aristotle, is an Iamblichean Dexippus. instrument or organon of philosophy, not a part of philosophy, as it had been for the Stoics, a 21 Again, see the above-cited works of De Haas. He notes the view of the Categories as being view that Plotinus certainly also accepts: cf. Enn. I.3.4-5, where formal logic is compared to about the genera of being, which is attacked by Plotinus, as being Alexander’s, but does not, I learning grammar as a propaedeutic study. think, sufficiently stress this. De Haas also sees that Plotinus seems to be attributing to Aristotle 13 Cf. Zambon, op. cit., on Porphyry’s continuity with Middle Platonism. I do not wish to deny the view—which he thinks is correct—that the category-classes of the Categories are what that Plotinus’ thought is generally continuous with Middle Platonism as well, but at least on the Plotinus calls katêgoriai and not genera of being. issues mentioned, Plotinus seems to exhibit a notable degree of innovation. On the transcendence 22 A similar situation arises with respect to Plotinus’ critique of Aristotle’s theory of time in his of the Plotinian One as an innovation, see especially P. Meijer, Plotinus on the Good or the One treatise on eternity and time, Ennead III.7. In chapter 9 and following of this treatise, Plotinus (Enneads VI,9): an analytical commentary (Amsterdam 1992). subjects Aristotle’s proposed definition of time from Physics IV as ‘the number of motion 14 See below on Porphyry’s interpretation of Enn. V.1.7 fin. (kinêsis)’ to a devastating critique, but later explains that he does not actually think that Aristotle 15 Hadot, op. cit. 128 meant to propose this characterization as a definition, and that the tradition has misunderstood 16 An exception is Enn. I.3.5-6, where dialectic is connected with wisdom (sophia, 6,12-13) as him on this point: he meant instead that time is what is measured by motion, not what measures the highest and most valuable part of philosophy and distinguished from physics and ethics, it, and we misunderstand him because his text was intended to be esoteric, and only read by while logic of the Aristotelian sort is declared not to be a part of philosophy or a concern of the students who had been attending his lectures, who would have been able to comprehend what he real philosopher—probably, not even as an organon (cf. 5,10). was up to (III.7.13,10-18). On Plotinus’ critique here, see my essay “Plotinus on the Nature of 17 Porphyry actually asserts at Vita Plotini 23,15-16 that the telos for Plotinus was union with the Eternity and Time”, in Lawrence Schrenk, ed., Aristotle in Late Antiquity (Washington, DC

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1994) 22-53. 30 I exclude Porphyry’s commentary on the Harmonics of Ptolemy, which does however contain 23 On all this, see now J. Barnes, Porphyry: Introduction (Oxford 2003), Additional Note G. passages of considerable philosophical interest. Only the very end of Book IV of the De 24 “L’harmonie des philosophies de Plotin et d’Aristote selon Porphyre dans le commentaire de abstinentia is missing. The work is now conveniently accessible in an excellent English Déxippe sur les Catégories”, in Plotino e il neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente (Rome translation, with copious notes, by Gillian Clark: Porphyry, On abstinence from killing animals 1974), 31-47: English translation by V. Caston in R. Sorabji, ed., Aristotle transformed: the (London 2000). ancient commentators and their influence (London 1990) 125-140. 31 Compare Amelius’ reference in his letter to Porphyry (Vita Plotini 17,39) to Plotinus’ 25 Porphyry’s fragments will be cited in the edition of Andrew Smith, Porphyrii philosophi philosophy as “our spiritual home” (5 1F.(GE H2*?E, trans. A. H. Armstrong). fragmenta (Stuttgart and Leipzig 1993). The title of the present work is reminiscent of Numenius 32 There is a problem in that Porphyry seems to think of the full accomplishment of the ethical of Apamea’s polemic against the skeptical Academy, On the dissension [also D%32*E2%A] of the goal in terms of complete detachment from worldly concerns, and even from awareness of this Academy with Plato. world, whereas Plotinus appears to think that the sage will be able to be active in the world even 26 George Karamanolis argues persuasively in his forthcoming book that they were indeed while retaining his unbroken contemplation of the intelligible (and in fact Porphyry describes different works, but both upheld the essential agreement of Plato and Aristotle. I am grateful to Plotinus in such terms in the Life). I am indebted to Kelly E. Arenson for calling this problem to Karamanolis for allowing me to see his unpublished work on this topic. my attention. The solution is perhaps that Porphyry in De abstinentia I is discussing the 27 I say this even though I assume that title reported in the Suida lexicon Against Aristotle conditions under which the re-ascent and rejoining with the higher self can be accomplished, and concerning whether the soul is an entelechy (P31 Smith) refers to the same work of Porphyry not what would be possible for the ‘ascended’ sage after he has reached the stage of eudaimonia against Boethus, for the report could be confused about the work’s contents (see Smith’s described in Ennead I.4. apparatus to P31 for this possibility). See also A. Smith, “A Porphyrian treatise against 33 There are actually five fragments of Book IV preserved by Cyril, but the first one (219F Aristotle?”, in F. X. Martin and J. A. Richmond, eds., From Augustine to Eriugena : essays on Smith) concerns only details of Plato’s biography, not metaphysics. Neoplatonism and Christianity in honor of John O'Meara (Washington, D. C. 1991) 183-186. 34 &#$% <=$ *$%+, /012*32(4, IJK 'L3*4, *B, *16 M(?18 0$1(LM(G, 1;2?E,. The principle issue regards whether frs.245F and 245F Smith are directed against Aristotle Translations of the fragments of the Philosophical History are my own. himself, or against members of the Peripatetic tradition (i.e., Boethus). 35 NE) !"#$% *1C*4, *= M(GE, Enn. V.1.7, 48. 28 It should be noted that according to the fragments of On providence of the 5th century 36 &#$% <=$ 98#OA *B, M(7*K*E 0$1(LM(G,. This second parallel, though not the earlier one, Alexandrian Neoplatonist Hierocles (apud Photius codd. 214 and 251), the essential harmony of is noted by Smith in his apparatus. the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle was a basic tenet of the school of Ammonius the teacher 37 L1%07, DP *@ &M(1, -0@ *OA 24!E*%.OA >,O$#ME% D%EJ1$QA. of Plotinus. This testimony, though isolated, is perhaps not to be lightly dismissed, since it seems 38 DK!%18$<@A <=$ R ,16A E;*S. to come through the Academy of Plutarch of Athens and may derive from the above-mentioned 39 See n27 above. work or works of Porphyry on the agreement or disagreement of Plato and Aristotle. See now on 40 This may be connected with Porphyry’s claim elsewhere that the Demiurge for Plotinus (not Hierocles’ work H. Schibli, Hierocles of Alexandria (Oxford 2002). Plato!) is the immanent nous of the World-Soul, which suggests that the alteration to Plotinus’ 29 See the commentary on this text by W. Helleman-Elgersma, Soul sisters: a Commentary on formulation in our fragment may be deliberate on Porphyry’s part. See W. Deuse, “Der Demiurg Enneads IV 3 (27), 1-8 of Plotinus (Amsterdam 1980), who is convincing on this point. bei Porphyrios und Jamblich”, in C. Zintzen, ed., Der Philosophie des Neuplatonismus

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(Darmstadt 1977) 238-280. Note also that Numenius of Apamea’s Third God, which is this, but misses, I think, an especially apt one at Enn. III.8.9,15-18, which says precisely, as associated with the Plotinian soul or at least with dianoia (Numenius fr.22), is particularly Porphyry will also say in fr.220, that calling the One the Good and most simple closely connected with the sensible cosmos (Numenius fr.21). Plotinus’ reference to his (T0L1C2*E*1,), though true, conveys nothing clear about it to our minds. hypostasis Soul as to dianooumenon (Enn. V.1.7,24) seems to be an allusion to Numenius’ third 47 *B, >.(?,18, (F #$B J3,E%, FD%7*K*E god. See further below on Plotinus dependence on Numenius’ theology. On Numenius’ Three 48 -0@ DP *1C*18 *$701, *%,= -,M$U01%A -,(0%,7K*1, ,16, <(,"2ME% *( VL1, .E) .EM' HE8*@, /J(2*+*E, >, W DB *= X,*4A X,*E .E) 5 0Q2E 1;2?E *+, X,*4,. Y DB .E) Gods, cf. M. Frede, “Numenios”, Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II.36.2 (1987) 0$U*4A .EL@, .E) E;*1.EL@, 0E$' HE8*16 *OA .ELL1,OA I#1, *@ (ZD1A 1044, 1055-1056. 49 41 The mention of cosmic soul indicates that the parallel passage at Eusebius PE XI.20 is Cf. Ennead V.8. 50 probably derived from Porphyry and not directly from Plotinus, as W. Theiler held, against P. The fullest and perhaps most illuminating discussion is still that of A.C. Lloyd, “Plotinus on Henry (see Smith’s apparatus to 221F3ff.). the genesis of thought and existence”, Oxford studies in ancient philosophy 5 (1987) 155-186. 42 As in Numenius’ reading of the Epistles passage, which Plotinus and Porphyry are both See also K. Corrigan, “Amelius, Plotinus and Porphyry on Being, Intellect and the One: A following here: cf. Numenius frs. 21 and 22, and fr.24.51, attributing the belief in the three gods reappraisal”, Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II.36.2 (1987) 986-991, who to Socrates. I believe that fr.22 shows that Numenius’ three gods corresponded closely to the discusses the Anonymous Parmenides commentator in connection with these Ennead passages, Plotinian hypostases One, Nous and Soul, although Numenius identified them all with types of but not this fragment of the Philosophical history. 51 0$1E%4,?4A nous, and that fr. 21 from Proclus, identifying the third god with the cosmos rather than its soul Accepting Hadot’s conjecture at line 7. 52 *%,1A represents some sort of confusion (as E. R. Dodds also thought, see his “Numenius and in line 12 should probably be retained, contra Smith. 53 Ammonius” in Les sources de Plotin (Entretiens Hardt V [1960]) 13-14). I.e., presumably, time is not relevant to it. 54 43 D(D:L4.( DP >µ-.?,4, .E) *B, >b -LL:L4, ;072*E2%, -$#1!",K, -0@ *16 This is the ‘timeless always’, as at Enn. III.7.4, fin. fE2%L"4A .E) *B, /07fE2%, .E) dJ(2%, *+, !(*= *@ 0$+*1, D%= *16 ‘0$U*4A’ .E) 55 Omitting Smith’s comma in line 15. ‘D(8*"$4A’ .E) ‘*$?*4A’ (F0(G,, .E) V*% >b H,@A *= 03,*E .E) D%’ E;*16 2gh(*E%. 56 Note the parallel here with the terminology of the Anonymous Parmenides commentary for the 44 He also cites the closing passage of Epistle VI (323d) for this, concerning the ‘Father of the ‘existence’ of the First God, fr.XIV.6. Cause’ (Enn. V.1.8,4), connecting it in a passage of the Sixth Ennead (VI.8.14,37-38) with the 57 0$1OLM( DP 0$1E%4,?4A -0' EF*?18 *16 M(16 [$!K!",1A, E;*1<",,K*1A \, .E) E;*103*4$] 1; <=$ >.(?,18 .%,18!",18 0$@A <",(2%, *B, *1C*18 5 0$71D1A <"<1,(,, causality of the Idea of the Good with respect to the Ideas in Republic VI. -LL= *1C*18 0E$(LM7,*1A E;*1<7,4A >. M(16, 0E$(LM7,*1A DP 1;. -0' -$#OA *%,1A 45 As reported in Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos /.261 and Diogenes Laertius #$1,%.OA] 1^04 <=$ #$7,1A _,. -LL' 1;DP #$7,18 <(,1!",18 0$@A E;*7, >2*? *% R VIII.25. This tradition is very much concerned to avoid attributing a dualism of principles to #$7,1A] &#$1,1A <=$ -() .E) !7,1A EFU,%1A R ,16A. `20($ DP R M(@A R 0$+*1A (FA .E) Plato. It is interesting, however, that Numenius, though a Neopythagorean Platonist, does !7,1A -(?, .a, -0' E;*16 <",K*E% *= 03,*E, *S !B *1C*1%A 28,E$%M!(G2ME% !KDP *B, maintain a dualist interpretation of Plato and Pythagoras with regard to the independence of -b?E, 28<.E*E*3**(2ME% DC,E2ME% *c >.(?,18 /03$b(%, 1d*4 .E) R ,16A EFU,%1A Matter from the First Principle—a dualism that Plotinus wishes to reject. We may perhaps !7,1A .E) -#$7,4A /012*3A, .E) *+, >, #$7,e E;*@A #$7,1A >2*?,, >, *E8*7*K*% suspect here the influence of Plutarch of Charoneia on Numenius. !",4, *OA HE8*16 EF4,?EA /012*32(4A. 46 Smith’s apparatus ad loc. collects some of the relevant passages from the Enneads illustrating 58 Not noted by Smith ad loc. or by other commentators.

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59 A perhaps related question concerns the referent of auto, the subject of epistrophê in the Cyril’s text, and thus presumably comes from his source, and therefore plausibly reproduces following chapter, V.1.7,6, though Lloyd, “Plotinus on the genesis of thought and existence”, Porphyry’s own words. 161, following J. Igal, “La genesis de la inteligencia en un pasaje de las Eneadas de Plotino 67 Cf. “La métaphysique de Porphyre” and his commentary in Porphyre et Victorinus. (V.1.7,4-35)”, Emerita 39 (1971) 133n2, argues that the two passages should be taken to be 68 P. Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus (Paris 1968). See the parallels listed in the “Index des textes about different subjects. cités” of that work, v2 144. For Dillon, see the works cited in n59 above. 60 Corresponding to the Indefinite Dyad: see Lloyd, op. cit. 69 Hadot, op. cit. v2 67n1. 61 This is the more traditional interpretation, opposed to that accepted by Hadot (see below, n70) 70 The name “Good” is not at issue here, since we are dealing with a commentary on the first two and Lloyd, op. cit., which takes the One to be the subject of the participle in question. That it was Hypotheses of the second part of the Parmenides, where according to the Neoplatonic reading also the interpretation in later Neoplatonism may be suggested by Proclus, Elements of Theology the First Principle is referred to as “the One”, not as in the Republic as “the Good”. props. 26-27. See on this point J. Whittaker, “The historical background of Proclus’ doctrine of 71 Hadot, op. cit. v2 69n9. the !010'#()!)!”, in De Jamblique à Proclus (Entretiens Hardt XXI [1975]) 219-220 and 72 Hadot, op. cit. v2 79n2. 228-230. 73 Hadot, op. cit. v2 69n2. 62 Again, cf. Lloyd, op. cit. 74 Taking the One as the subject of epistraphentos at Enn. V.1.6,8, see above: cf. Hadot’s review 63 Cf. J. Dillon, “Porphyry’s doctrine of the One”, in M.-O. Goulet-Cazé et al., eds., !"#$%! of v.2 of Henry and Schwyzer’s OCT editio minor of the Enneads, Revue de l’histoire des &'$%(")*! 'Chercheurs de sagesse': Hommage à Jean Pépin (Paris 1992) 363-364, who religions 164 (1963) 92-96. This review is in fact the origin of the modern controversy about the connects this passage of Porphry with the Plotinian notion of pre-Nous; also J. Dillon “Porphyry interpretation of Enn V.1.6-7. and Iamblichus in Proclus’ Commentary on the Parmenides” in Gonimos: Neoplatonic and 75 Cf. also fr.II.5-10, where the First One is said to be cause of the being of the other things. Byzantine studies presented to Leendert G. Westerink, (Buffalo, NY 1988) 42. 76 Insofar as the details of the generation of Nous represent a speficially Plotinian departure from 64 This point was already made by Hadot in his discussion of the fragment in “La mêtaphysique Numenian theology, my reconstruction may also count against recent suggestions that the de Porphyre” 147, who sees the passage as concerning Porphyry’s theory of the generation of Anonymous Commentary predates Plotinus. Nous, with parallels in the Anonymous Parmenides commentary, but not Plotinus’ theory of the generation. Another non-Plotinian feature here is that Nous or eternity is claimed to be time for those things in time. This role in Plotinus would be played instead by the life of the soul (Enn. III.7.11-13). 65 See Hadot, in “La mêtaphysique de Porphyre”, passim, as well as his “Être, Vie, Pensée chez Plotin et avant Plotin”, in Les sources de Plotin (Entretiens Hardt V [1960]) 105-141. It is not clear if this is a feature of Porphyry’s own conception of the Triad, or of his interpretation of the Chaldaean version of it, or (perhaps) both. Cf. also Dillon, “Porphyry’s doctrine of the One” (above, n59). 66 “The aforementioned ones” (2i 0$1(%$K!",1%) in line 7 of fr.221 refers back to nothing in

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