Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Putting the President into Presidency The Turbulent Situation in Prague and its European Repercussions

Tomislav Maršić SWP Comments

With the successful vote of no confidence in the Prague lower house against the Civic Democratic (ODS) government, a difficult domestic political constellation has become even more complicated. Although the pro-European Social Democrats (ČSSD) have been able to set the tempo since then to a large degree, this has few positive implications for the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty: Not only has this move on the part of the Oppo- sition made the Euroskeptic Czech President the dominant figure of domestic and foreign politics, the political situation in the Senate has also decisively shifted. Here, where the final vote on ratification remains to be taken, an important disciplining factor on the mostly Euroskeptic senators of the majority Civic Democratic Party has been lost since their pragmatic party head is no longer part of the ruling coalition. Independently of these factors, moreover, the upcoming national and European elec- tions will further escalate the already tense and volatile political atmosphere within the country, raising questions about the functionality of the interim government. In sum, these developments mean a dual setback for the EU: first, the new “government of experts” will scarcely be capable of carrying out the key leadership tasks of the Council Presidency. Second, and more serious: in this situation, the prospects for ratification of the Lisbon Treaty are uncertain at best.

A no-confidence vote on March 24, 2009 numerous changes of deputies, resigna- saw the end of the ODS-led government. tions from political groupings, and other This ruling coalition was just five votes unpredictable schisms. Although Prime short of an absolute majority, but it had Minister Topolánek had already withstood only been formed after long and difficult four no-confidence votes in the past, the negotiations and had been plagued by in- coalition began to disintegrate when two stability since its inception. After summer Green members of parliament left their 2006, elections in the Lower House resulted parliamentary groups. When two longtime in a split down the middle between the dissenters from the ODS camp also defected ruling center-right camp on the one side to support the Opposition, this pushed the and the center-left camp on the other. As a support for the government just below the result, the government has been riven by needed majority.

Tomislav Maršić is a doctoral fellow in the EU Integration division of SWP SWP Comments 4 April 2009

1 Before these events, a series of domestic interim government as head of the largest political reforms had led to an unprece- group in the lower house. Paroubek—in dented failure of the ODS in the regional anticipation that his insistence on bringing and senate elections in October 2008. The down the government in the middle of the already debilitated authority of ODS leader Czech Republic’s EU Presidency could have Topolánek was further weakened as he serious negative repercussions for him— met with harsh critique from within his pushed for the formation of a government own party following these electoral results. of non-partisan experts. And despite the Nevertheless, on the eve of the EU Council timing of this proposal during the Czech Presidency, he was able to convince an ODS Republic’s current Council presidency, it still reeling to retain the current party succeeded, thanks to decisive support from leadership. Thus, he survived another elec- Václav Klaus. tion debacle even stronger than before— The Topolánek government will there- not least of all because he had succeeded fore clear the field in early May 2009 for the in defending his position as party head little-known head of the Czech Statistical against Euroskeptic Prague Mayor Pavel Office, Jan Fischer. Fischer selects his cabi- Bém. The Prime Minister thus succeeded in net members based on nominations from limiting the influence that President Václav the parties supporting him, the ČSSD, ODS, Klaus, as Bém’s supporter, would have had and Green Party; the conservative KDU-ČSL on the party. Topolánek was able to im- had decided in the run-up to switch to the prove his public image even more through opposition. The distribution of posts in the the European Council Presidency. interim cabinet clearly reflects the strong Yet the Prime Minister’s success at keep- position of the Social Democrats, who are ing the critics within his party at bay was taking on not just the Foreign Ministry but short-lived: protracted political feuding also the portfolio for European integration. ultimately spelled disaster for Topolánek. After the early elections in October, Fischer He blamed his fall on former ODS chairman will return to his former position. Given Václav Klaus, whose influence in the party the structure of the interim government, it had been declining steadily since Topo- is unlikely that he will remain impervious lánek took over party leadership in 2002. to the influence of the parties supporting Topolánek also has a strong personal aver- him. Vested with only a limited mandate— sion to opponent and opposition leader Jiři his priorities being to fulfill the tasks Paroubek (ČSSD) due to the mudslinging stemming from the Council Presidency and of the past electoral campaign. It was just to minimize the impact of the economic prior to the Social Democrats’ party con- crisis on the Czech population—Fisher will gress—which, incidentally, Klaus attended enable the two popular parties to run an for the first time ever—that Paroubek electoral campaign playing the role of a announced his plans to call for a no-con- quasi-opposition. fidence vote, apparently with the primary By refusing to entrust Topolánek with aim of distinguishing himself within his the formation of an interim government, party. The fact that he actually succeeded President Václav Klaus apparently wanted this time in toppling Topolánek apparently to provoke the ODS to unseat its party head. even surprised Paroubek himself. The question remains open whether Klaus What is new about the present domestic merely intends to bring down Topolánek, political situation is that Klaus and Parou- or also harbors serious hopes of reinstalling bek merged their efforts to force Topolánek his own supporters in the ODS party leader- out of his top party post and out of office as ship. Prime Minister. Contrary to previous con- This depends to a significant degree stitutional practice, the President declined on how successful the new “Party of Free to assign Topolánek the task of forming an Citizens” (Strana svobodných občanů, SSO)

SWP Comments 4 April 2009

2 will be. It was launched by Petr Mach, a The government’s capacity to engage close confidante of Václav Klaus, with in European politics support from the Czech President’s two Regardless of the unclear situation in the sons. The party’s main goal is to prevent ODS and in Czech politics in general, ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon. The the international conditions for the Czech founding of this party could shift the Council Presidency in the first half of 2009 balance of power within the ODS: if some could scarcely be more difficult. Interna- Euroskeptic “fundamentalists” should tional crises such as Israel’s intervention in resign, the party could become more homo- the Gaza Strip and the Russia-Ukraine gas geneous in the long term. The SSO is ideo- conflict put Prague to a severe test at the logically aligned with the anti-European very beginning of the Czech Republic’s Libertas party of Irish businessman Declan Council Presidency. Since the outset of the Ganley, and has registered to run both in Presidency, the weakness of the country’s the European elections in June and in the political leadership has been clearly early parliamentary elections. Although reflected in its lack of inter-party consensus Klaus—who resigned as honorary ODS over European policy issues. With the suc- chairman in December 2008—may yet come cessful vote of no confidence, the leader- over to support the SSO, the chances of ship vacuum within the Czech government voters migrating to the party in significant has expanded into the EU, which would numbers remain small. First of all, this is have benefited from strong leadership— because of the zero-sum character of the especially now, with the current inter- competition for votes between the SSO and national crises. Libertas. Second, the dissatisfied voters The government has been plagued since from the liberal-conservative camp, who the start of the Presidency by accusations to are the SSO’s main target group, tend the effect that the Czech Republic is unable largely to support the EU reform treaty. to adequately represent the EU in difficult With the realization of his call for a times. These can be seen as a self-fulfilling cabinet of experts, Klaus, has achieved one prophesy. Even before the domestic politi- of his central goals: he has deprived cal problems had become so virulent, many Topolánek of the advantage of incumbency, observers called into question whether the which could have gained the latter another Czech Republic, as a new, relatively small term of office as Prime Minister in the EU member, would be capable of leading upcoming elections. Furthermore, he has the Council of the European Union on stra- weakened Topolánek’s position within the tegic questions. This applied particularly to party. Finally, due to the weak interim its potential mediator role after the failed cabinet, Klaus will remain in the pivotal Treaty referendum in Ireland. One of the position of power in Czech politics up to most prominent critics of the Czech Coun- the early parliamentary elections. Due to cil Presidency has been French President vague constitutional provisions, he could Sarkozy, who is now straining the already exercise his authority quite broadly, and it tense relations between France and the is still unclear to what extent he actually Czech Republic with his attempts to keep intends to test the limits of this authority. leading the European response to the eco- Furthermore, there exist legitimate expec- nomic and financial crisis. tations that Klaus could use this opportu- As expected, the Czech Republic—like nity to exercise a stronger influence on the other smaller member states—has relied EU-level. to a large extent on assistance from the Council Secretariat, and has attempted above all to make its influence felt in the specialist councils. In this respect, the Czech Presidency has focused on a limited

SWP Comments 4 April 2009

3 number of key issues that did not necessar- hope is that this will remain the case. For ily originate in Prague but that have been example, the former head of the Czech EU embraced there in the meantime as well. Mission, recently ousted by the ODS, Jan As a result, the Presidency has undoubtedly Kohout becomes the new foreign minister. succeeded in distinguishing itself with Thus, as the Council Presidency continues initiatives such as Eastern Partnership and under the new government of experts, energy security—both topics that already there will be no apparent changes. enjoyed broad acceptance within the EU. At the same time, the interim govern- The same is true for the successful defeat ment will have to limit its activities, both of protectionist measures at the European in European policy and in internal politics, level, true to the motto of the Czech Presi- to the management of existing problems: in dency, “Europe without barriers.” These the current situation, it cannot be expected more positive aspects have faded into the to pursue autonomously defined program- background, however, with the disastrous matic aims. The main reason, along with situation that has emerged within the the explicitly apolitical character of the Czech government. cabinet of experts, is the abiding fault line The fragile state of its parliamentary between the popular parties that support support led the government to focus most the new government. Here, personal ten- of its attention on finding a solution to the sions between the two party heads will national conflict—at the expense of car- carry over into fundamental questions of rying out the standard tasks of the Council political direction. These disputes will Presidency. One outcome of this could probably intensify in the run-up to the be seen, for example, in the relatively un- elections to European Parliament (EP) in coordinated efforts by the French President June and to the lower house of Czech Par- on the one hand and the Trio Presidency liament in October. (including France and Sweden) on the other In attaining the strong parliamentary hand, to help end the Gaza Crisis at the support that it will crucially require, the beginning of the year. Furthermore, the interim government could face similar Prague government not only lacked the problems to its predecessor. While ČSSD capacity to push its own agenda within Head Paroubek still has to justify calling a the Council; it also had difficulties even vote of no confidence in the middle of the pushing for compromises on European Council Presidency, Topolánek at the helm questions at the national level. There is no of the ODS has been weakened considerab- little irony in the fact that President Klaus ly, making his behavior difficult to predict. has now significantly reduced the Czech If the latter is able to maintain leadership Republic’s influence in the EU through the of the ODS up to the parliamentary elec- formation of his interim cabinet of experts. tions, there is reason to fear that he will After all, it was he who always criticized attempt to compensate for his weakness the relative impotence of smaller nations within his party with antagonistic behav- within the EU. ior. Further, the fact that the ODS-cohort In the remaining months of the Council in the European Parliament will soon leave Presidency, it is unlikely that the interim the conservative European People’s Party- government will be able to develop the European Democrats (EPP-ED) to join a strength and assertiveness required to per- more Euroskeptic group will bolster ODS form the important tasks its role entails. opponents of the Lisbon Treaty at the On the one hand, European policy has not national level and could induce Topolánek significantly been affected at an operative to burnish his Euroskeptic image. Against level by the recent events. By maintaining this backdrop, his willingness to com- continuity among high government of- promise in the national interest will be ficials and political representatives, the limited.

SWP Comments 4 April 2009

4 Moreover, the interim government’s The discussion around the limited mandate has exponentially in- Lisbon Treaty creased the political clout of President On February 18, 2009 the Lower House Klaus in both foreign and domestic affairs. passed the Lisbon Treaty with 125 votes With a view to the Czech representation in (with a quorum of 120)—but just barely. the European Council, Topolánek and Klaus When almost half of the ODS deputies had agreed on a division of responsibilities, voted “no”—36 of the 79 present—support whereby the President was to confine him- for the party and government leadership self to his more symbolic function in proved weaker than generally assumed. The foreign affairs. But as the acting president rejection would have been even stronger of the European Council, President Klaus if the government had not announced just will attempt to reach a larger audience for prior to the vote that it would put the his own agenda. He has already announced new parliamentary standing orders on that when the Fischer administration takes the agenda of the lower house in March. over, he will expand his role on the EU The orders stipulate that all transfers of stage. And in the run-up to the European sovereignty from the government to the election, he has all the opportunities he EU must be approved by parliament. Mean- needs to get his political message out. This while, the ODS group in the Senate has raises concerns, particularly regarding the made the introduction of the new parlia- possibility that Klaus might disturb EU mentary standing orders a condition for talks on measures to combat climate even considering ratification of the Treaty. change. Now that the first step toward ratification For the strategic leadership of the EU, has been completed with the approval this means that France and Sweden, as from the lower house, the treaty still awaits partners in the Trio Presidency, will have to a green light from the senate, and will be more actively involved in the standard then go to President Václav Klaus for his tasks of the Council Presidency. Moreover, signature. the Commission—which is up for reelec- The political discussion around the tion—will be very interested projecting a Lisbon Treaty is marked by a paradox: good image, and has shown a great deal of although the treaty’s supporters are among initiative in this regard. the most pro-European on the Czech party Thanks to its Council Presidency, the spectrum, the ODS is the only Euroskeptic Czech Republic is in the limelight of inter- party among the moderate political forces national attention. But here in open public at the center. Although the influence of the view, it becomes glaringly obvious that the most prominent Euroskeptic, Václav Klaus, country is the last member of the EU not to has been waning in the ODS for some time, have completed parliamentary ratification voices can still be heard in the party that of the Lisbon Treaty. The fact that the em- favor continued European integration as barrassing ratification question has become agreed upon in the Lisbon Treaty for prag- so central at a time like this is due partly to matic reasons only, that is, for raisons bad timing, but mainly to successful pro- d’etat. crastination tactics by the Treaty’s oppo- This applies particularly to Mirek Topo- nents. In contrast to the more or less per- lánek, who has frequently described the sonal animosities that led to Topolánek’s Treaty as unnecessary, but who has always fall, conflicts between the two wings of the spoken in favor of its speedy ratification. ODS—the pragmatic supporters of EU mem- The reason for this ostensibly contradictory bership and the proponents of national position is probably mainly that the Reform sovereignty—will play an important role in Treaty, in contrast to the Constitutional the case of ratification. Treaty, was negotiated with the participa- tion of the previous ODS government. Presi-

SWP Comments 4 April 2009

5 dent Klaus, who has attracted attention in The fact that the opponents of the Treaty the past as a harsh yet extremely popular would like to use every opportunity at their critic of further European integration, disposal is evident in the case brought rejects the Reform Treaty for substantive before the Czech Constitutional Court in reasons, just as he did the European Con- October 2007 by the ODS-dominated Senate stitution, because he sees in both a wide- majority. The plenary assembly of the ranging disempowerment of national Upper House recommended specifically governments. Each additional step toward that the Court determine whether six ratification of the Treaty should, according sections of the Treaty are compatible with to Klaus, be made contingent on a positive the Czech Constitution, among them the vote in a new referendum in Ireland. Klaus transfer of competencies, the implementa- thus follows the lead of Polish President tion of majority decisions in specific policy Lech Kaczyński, who has said he will only areas, and the highly controversial recogni- sign the Polish ratification law when Ire- tion of the Fundamental Rights Charter. On land has found a solution to the current November 26, 2008, however, the Constitu- ratification crisis. The Czech President tional Court ruled that the Lisbon Treaty appears determined to use every opportu- did not stand in contradiction to the Czech nity at his disposal to obstruct ratification. Constitution. It remains a contested question among The fact that the constitutional judges Czech constitutional scholars whether did not examine the Treaty in its entirety, President Klaus actually can legally refuse only ruling on the clauses called into ques- to sign a parliamentary ratification. If the tion by the Senate, could be a decisive fac- Treaty of Lisbon should indeed be classified tor for the further ratification process. The as an “international accord” as defined possibility exists that some of the Senators under the Czech constitution, Klaus could or the President himself could call for the block conclusion of the process by refusing examination other parts of the Treaty and to sign the treaty. The constitution men- thus further delay the ratification process. tions in article 39 para. 4 only that the agreement of both chambers of parliament with a three-fifths majority is required for What chances does the ratification. But this stands in opposition to Lisbon Treaty have? article 63 para. 1b, which states that the Like the Lower House, the Senate has to President agrees upon and ratifies interna- ratify the Lisbon Treaty with a three-fifths tional accords. majority (article 39 para. 4 of the Czech Along with the President, the Euroskep- constitution). If the approximately 43 pro- tic celebrities in the ODS include a group European Senators in the Upper House vote around European Parliament member Jan in favor of the Treaty, as expected, at least Zahradil, who already sharply criticized another seven votes will still be needed Topolánek’s signing of the Treaty, invoking from the ODS, which is equivalent to about a party resolution from the year 2006 that one-fifth of the 33-member ODS senate forbids the ceding of any further compe- caucus. tencies to the EU. In his defense, Topolánek In order to further delay a vote on the said that the Czech government was not treaty, some senators have announced that “strong enough” to prevent ratification of they plan to file an additional constitution- the Reform Treaty. The decisive factor, he al complaint, with the President’s support. claimed, was that he had not been able to It is not certain, however, whether the find any allies within the EU, and the Czech necessary quorum of 17 senators will be Republic would have isolated itself inter- reached. Senate President Přemysl Sobotka nationally by taking such an approach. (ODS) currently views this option as offer- ing relatively limited prospects of success.

SWP Comments 4 April 2009

6 President Klaus, however, could certainly decision was forced through at the last ODS make use of a similar tactic of obstruction. party convention in Fall 2008 by the Euro- His vague reactions to the Court’s judgment skeptic supporters of transatlantic cooper- suggest that he is keeping his options ation. However, there are increasingly open—although he has repeatedly indicated strong doubts surrounding the project that he would sign the ratification instru- of a missile defense shield, particularly ment under the condition of a successful given the intense pressure on the new US referendum in Ireland. Alexandr Vondra, Administration to cut spending and its the outgoing Deputy Prime Minister for general reorientation towards disarma- European Affairs, who has turned from an ment. ČSSD head Paroubek came out in opponent of the Lisbon Treaty into a prag- clear opposition to the ratification of the matic supporter since taking office, pur- related treaties at the Social Democrats’ sued a dual strategy here: he supported party convention. As a result, Topolánek examining the treaty in constitutional took the vote off the agenda of the Lower court but at the same time said that if the House because he was afraid it might fail. court deemed that it lacked conformity, This decision, which was sharply criticized he would seek to have the constitution by the Euroskeptic politicians within the changed. He will probably make good on ODS, will probably dissuade many ODS his statement if, as mentioned, further senators from ratifying the Lisbon Treaty aspects of the Treaty are subjected to in return. scrutiny in constitutional court. Such a Third, the prospects for successful con- scenario would, however, probably lead to clusion of the parliamentary ratification indeterminable delays in the ratification procedure have gotten worse, if anything, process and thus to a postponement of EU since the collapse of the coalition also treaty reform overall. means that the pragmatic government How the ODS senators will ultimately leadership of the ODS has been lost as a vote is hard to predict from a present-day disciplining factor. The Euroskeptic ODS perspective. Their decision will, however, senators will thus probably be even less very likely depend on the following three willing to follow the party’s leadership issues: than they were before. Furthermore, they First, the senators are more independent enjoy the complete backing of the key of the party line than the deputies to the political figure in Czech politics at present: Lower House and are accountable first and President Václav Klaus. foremost to their constituencies. The senate In this situation, the ardent and persua- caucus is autonomous, and can decide with- sive lobbying of Mirek Topolánek for the out “interference” from the party leader- ratification of the Reform Treaty will be ship. This was determined at the party con- decisive. Topolánek is obligated, not only vention in December 2008 as a concession to the EU partners but also to the Czech to the Euroskeptics. people, to ensure that his signature on the Second, a “package deal,” in which Treaty is followed by its ratification, and the ODS only wants to support the Lisbon is therefore “adamant” that the Treaty be Treaty if the ČSSD supports the construc- ratified. Topolánek argues that the Czech tion of a radar station on Czech soil as part Republic must decide “between Lisbon and of the missile shield planned by the former Moscow,” and he has repeatedly invoked Bush administration, could play an im- the threat of the potential consequences portant role. After the Reform Treaty was of failure, which, in his view, could lead accepted in the Lower House, Topolánek to exclusion from the EU. It is also con- underscored that the radar station agree- ceivable that he will distance himself from ment would have to be signed before the the Reform Treaty once the interim govern- ratification process could continue. This ment takes power in order to fortify his

SWP Comments 4 April 2009

7 position within the party. This is the gener- matic politicians in the ODS. President al thrust of Topolánek’s statements that he Klaus should also be brought into the wants to bolster his claim to leadership by process in a constructive manner—espe- seeking the votes of voters from the right cially if he expands his activities on the in the upcoming election. European stage—in order to prevent con- It is therefore crucial for ratification frontations and to avoid effects of domestic that Topolánek remains at the head of the groups fraternizing with the President. party and the government, at least until At the same time, the ČSSD should be cau- the Treaty has been signed: only the author- tiously supported in their attempt to force ity of his offices will allow him to influence a referendum if the Treaty does fail. After key decision makers to vote in favor of all, this would mark a means of keeping the Lisbon. Treaty alive even after a failed ratification, Although the Euroskeptics were and the Czech public is not necessarily as strengthened by the no-confidence vote, Euroskeptic as the parliamentarians that

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und it is not altogether improbable that the represent it. Since the positions of the Politik, 2009 Lisbon Treaty will receive the necessary various actors involved in the Lisbon Treaty All rights reserved three-fifths majority given that only seven are defined largely with reference to domes-

These Comments reflect of the 33 ODS senators have to vote in favor tic political issues, the chances of influenc- solely the author’s view. of it. At the same time, the current domes- ing these positions from the outside are

SWP tic political situation in Prague seems to be small. Thus, it appears necessary to prepare Stiftung Wissenschaft und characterized more by surprising reversals damage-control measures in case the ratifi- Politik German Institute for than by continuity. cation process fails. International and In view of the complicated domestic Security Affairs political situation, the main focus now Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 should be on not giving the ODS Euro- 10719 Berlin skeptics any more fuel for their arguments. Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 Here, the conflict between the smaller and www.swp-berlin.org larger EU states plays an important role, [email protected] since—according to the treaty opponents in ISSN 1861-1761 the ODS—mainly the latter will profit from

Translation by Deborah Bowen the Treaty of Lisbon. President Václav Klaus is a particularly vocal proponent of the (Short english version of SWP-Studie 13/2009) view that the EU is controlled by the “big four”—Germany, France, Great Britain, and Italy—and that countries like the Czech Republic will automatically be at a dis- advantage. Considering the upcoming cam- paign for the European elections in June, which will be an important test-run for early voting in mid-October and will take place in a still tense and volatile atmos- phere, political signals from the large neighboring states could easily be instru- mentalized for domestic policy purposes. Since it is unlikely that the Euroskeptic senators will be swayed by arguments from German or European actors, the most realistic means for promoting the Treaty’s successful ratification will be through sup- port for Mirek Topolánek and the prag-

SWP Comments 4 April 2009

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