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The Muslim Brotherhood and Hizbullah Evangelos Venetis* /// January 2008 Issue 09 Ι.I.R. STUDY GROUP OF THE CENTER FOR MEDITERRANEAN & MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES (CE.M.M.E.S) Middle East Bulletin A GREEK REVIEW OF MIDDLE EASTERN AFFAIRS TheThe MuslimMuslim BrotherhoodBrotherhood 80 years, 1928-2008 contents Muslim Brotherhood Islamism in the West page 19 Vs Salafi-Jihadi Islam page 02 Africa: The identity crisis of the MB page 22 The Brotherhood and its values page 06 Islamic radicalism in Central Asia page 24 Hamas: Back to the roots? page 08 Political Islam in North Africa page 27 The Brothers in power: What if? page 11 Analysis: Hizbullah and Ikhwan page 30 The parallel path Book review: Insurgents, of Jamaat-e-Islami page 16 Terrorists and Militias page 33 CENTER FOR MEDITERRANEAN & MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES /// January 2008 Issue 09 MUSLIM BROTHERHOODVs SALAFI-JIHADI ISLAM: Page2 CONFRONTING THE "BLACK SHEEP" OF POLITICAL ISLAM Marina Eleftheriadou Marxism, Anarchism, Socialism, Leninism, Stalinism, Trotskyism, Maoism… It took 150 years of theoretical-ideological evolution and still for some it's just "commies of slightly different shades". In this light, it is barely a surprise that nearly a century of existence and 30 years of active involvement in regional politics are far from sufficient to surpass the all-inclusive characterization of "Islamists". Nevertheless, Political Islam currently encompasses the most vivid and interesting politico-philosophical discourse. A dis- course still in "evolutionary formation" with plenty of overlaps and vague "borderlines". he nucleus of the debate within Political than the official clergy (ulema, Al-Azhar), despite Islam lies on the "Salafi-Wahhabi" substra- the fact that both - either voluntarily or with govern- T tum and the primary polemic is centered mental prompting - seek to play a role in this around intra-Salafi theoretical battles rather than on debate. Then the inclusion of the Wahhabi "stratum" a Salafi-versus-Wahhabi order of battle, as is com- comes as a result of the Wahhabi-enriched monly believed. In fact, the Wahabbi establishment Salafism, brought about by the intersection some that solidifies the Saudi regime is no more relevant time during the 1980's of the parallel courses of CENTER FOR MEDITERRANEAN & MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES /// January 2008 Issue 09 these two Islamic schools of thought. The former term denotes the MB only in its contemporary form, produced little innovation and was unable to sup- because all "Salafi" groups in some sense sprang plement the original ideology of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, ideologically from the original MB) and the second thus becoming subordinate to the dynamic devel- one the "Salafi-Jihadi trend". opment of the latter which built on the works of the The latter can be divided into two further cate- 19th century Islamic theoreticians Muhammad gories: the "nationalist-" and the "internationalist-ori- Abduh, Rashid Rida and, especially, Jamal al-Din al- ented" Salafi-Jihadism - though of late this division Afghani. has become increasingly difficult, even more so This "intermarriage" (made possible through the since important representatives of the nationalist Page 3 influence of several Salafis who, persecuted by the strand (Al-Gamaa Al-Islamiya, Islamic Jihad), follow- authorities in the birthplace of modern political ing their defeat in countries like Egypt, have chosen Islam, Egypt, found sanctuary in the Gulf States the path of ideological revisions and retractions, the and, conversely, through Arab labourers in the Gulf most recent example being a book entitled "Docu- returning to their homelands) took place relatively ment of Right Guidance for Jihad Activity in Egypt smoothly due to converging views concerning the and the World" by IJ's Sayyed Imam al-Sherif corruptive and pervasive influence of the West in (author of the "Foundations of Preparation for Holy the Muslim world and their repugnance for innova- War" which was used as a manual in al-Qaeda train- tion or bida', (either Western-driven or initiated by ing camps). However, even if we overlook those Muslims themselves), both of which, according to who were left behind at the enemy camp -who Salafis and Wahhabis, drive contemporary Islamic receive comments such as that of Ayman al practice away from the -earthly- "platonic ideal" of Zawahiri who, referring to al-Sherif, asked: "Do they Islam's Golden age under Prophet Muhhamad's rule now have fax machines in Egyptian jail cells? I won- and that of the first four "rightly guided" Caliphs (the der if they're connected to the same line as the elec- Prophet's companions). tric-shock machines"-, the internationalist-oriented The various politico-philosophical approaches Salafis' emphasis on the "near" and the "far" enemy, which have developed along the Salafi-Wahhabi far from being a doctrinal issue, rather stems from spectrum lack clear-cut theoretical distinctions. operational opportunities and concerns. Nevertheless, to avoid generalizations or oversim- In any case, the central dividing line between plifications, we could distinguish between two dis- the two main schools of thought lies on their pro- tinct schools of thought which, although interacting posed methods by which to restore Islam's inside the confines of the "paradigm" described grandeur through the creation of an Islamic state. above, take a different position concerning some The "Muslim Brotherhood trend" builds on the issues, as a result of additions or interpretations by teachings of its founder, Hassan al-Banna, who was subsequent influential scholars. The first school comprises the "Muslim Brotherhood trend" (the in favour of bringing about the Islamic Revival CENTER FOR MEDITERRANEAN & MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES /// January 2008 Issue 09 through a long term bottom-up process of educat- a nationalist agenda, and the organization decided ing and Islamizing the Muslim society (the "dawa" to abnegate violence, the road was open for partic- approach). On the other hand, the Salafi-Jihadi ipation in the established political structure (either approach bases its militancy on the works of Sayid through affiliated parties and cooperation with Qutb and Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi. Qutb built on other opposition forces or as independent candi- Mawdudi's reinterpretation of the Muslim term jahi- dates). The ideological justification was spelled out lyya (the historic period of "ignorance" before God's by Yusuf al-Qaradawi - leader of the international message to Muhammad) to justify the application of Muslim Brotherhood and maybe the only exception the rules pertaining to the Dar al-Harb (meaning to the general theoretical stagnation inside the MB jihad) to the un-Islamic settings inside the Dar al- - who in his book "Priorities of the Islamic Move- Islam. (The notion was further developed by Dr. ment in the Coming Phase" formulated the "wassat- Page4 Abdullah Azzam -al-Qaeda's first ideologue- who tiya" doctrine which reserves an important role for restored the importance of the jihad against exter- "ijtihad" (the process of reasoning in the interpreting nal threats to Islam, and to a lesser degree, by Islamic law) thus paving the way for a more modern, Ayman al-Zawahiri.) The jihad against infidel Muslim accommodationist MB. regimes was not only permitted, but imperative and As Muslim Brothers in Egypt, Algeria, Jordan, urgent. As Islamic Jihad's Abdessalam Farag wrote Morocco and Palestine turned to the ballot box, in his pamphlet "The Neglected Duty": "it was use- criticism ran high. Ayman al-Zawahiri denounced less to wear oneself out in social works …. the only the MB's participation in Egypt's parliamentary elec- way to establish an Islamic state was to strike the tions: "Today you are winning 80 seats and after five "impious" state at its head". years you will win 100 seats. Hence, at whatever The emphasis on dawa is not the only point of time your behaviour improves, we will offer you dispute between the two trends. What creates most more. Once you become secular and falsely affiliat- of the contention are the policy implications result- ed with Islam…we will let you assume power provid- ing from this approach. Dawa is legitimate but what ed that you forget about the rule of Sharia, welcome is to be done in the meantime, that is, until the for- the Crusaders' bases in your countries, and mation of the "Muslim man" is completed. Al-Banna acknowledge the existence of the Jews". This type advocated the postponement of the shift from edu- of accusations were also directed against Hamas cational to political work for only after the entire when, in a videotaped message, Zawahiri warned society endorses the Muslim Brotherhood's mes- the organization not to engage in the "American sage. However, with the passing of time the Muslim game called political participation". The same Brotherhood, in Egypt and beyond, had to find a atmosphere prevailed during the Iraqi elections. way to deal with the regime politically. As soon as Besides the fact that, as Mohammed al-Maq- the militant elements of the MB turned disi (dubbed the "most influential living Islamist autonomous, evolving into Salafi-Jihadi groups with thinker" by a study on the material posted on al- CENTER FOR MEDITERRANEAN & MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES /// January 2008 Issue 09 Qaeda websites conducted by the Combating Ter- "theoretical battle" for the soul of the true -and rorism Center at West Point in 2006) asserted, potent- Islam. Zawahiri (touching on these issues in "democracy is a religion", thus constituting a "sin" an alleged letter to Zarkawi), al-Maqdisi (in a 2005 equivalent to that of conversion from Islam into public debate between Zarkawi and his ex-mentor another religion and hence deemed synonymous imprisoned in Jordan), Abu Mus'ab Al-Suri and with apostasy, according to the Salafi-Jihadist logic Osama bin Laden felt obliged to take a stand on the the democratic process is also part of the "Cru- issue. At the same time that the theoretical gravity saders' war against Islam" and, as such, it should leans towards the Jihadi pole, the social outcome be fought against.
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