Egypt and the Middle East: Democracy, Anti-Democracy and Pragmatic Faith
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Saint Louis University Public Law Review Volume 35 Number 2 General Issue (Volume XXXV, No. 2) Article 6 2016 Egypt and the Middle East: Democracy, Anti-Democracy and Pragmatic Faith Matthew Crippen [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr Recommended Citation Crippen, Matthew (2016) "Egypt and the Middle East: Democracy, Anti-Democracy and Pragmatic Faith," Saint Louis University Public Law Review: Vol. 35 : No. 2 , Article 6. Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Saint Louis University Public Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more information, please contact Susie Lee. SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW EGYPT AND THE MIDDLE EAST: DEMOCRACY, ANTI-DEMOCRACY AND PRAGMATIC FAITH1 MATTHEW CRIPPEN* ABSTRACT In this article, I discuss prospects for democracy in the Middle East. I argue, first, that some democratic experiments—for instance, Egypt under Mohammed Morsi—are not in keeping with etymological and historical meanings of democracy; and second, that efforts to promote democracy, especially as exemplified in U.N. documents emphasizing universal rights grounded in Western traditions, are possibly totalitarian and also colonialist and hence counter to democratic ideals insofar as they impart one set of values as the only morally acceptable ones. A respectful dialogue in which people from both regions strive to understand conditions giving rise to certain social practices would be more productive than morally superior attitudes, and help all to see areas where their respective cultures could be improved. I conclude by discussing concepts of democratic and pragmatic faith articulated by John Dewey and William James, arguing that democracy will continue to flounder in the Middle East so long as the basic trust implied in these concepts is lacking; and how Westerners might consider this a cautionary tale regarding social attitudes and public policies contrary to democratic life in their own countries. 1. I would like to acknowledge the work of my graduate assistant, Hagar el-Houdaiby, who has a background in both philosophy and law. She went through numerous international documents, highlighting key portions and supplying some analysis, while also pointing me to a number of valuable secondary sources. * Matthew Crippen researches intersections between American philosophy, phenomenology and art with an eye to contributing to cognitive science. He also writes about the world around him, addressing both its problems and splendours. His publications discuss aesthetics and mind, and also media, politics, Wittgenstein, the Frankfurt School, Dewey, James, Thoreau, Nietzsche, history of science, religious faith, freewill, Greek philosophy and more. While diverse, his work unites around “ecological” approaches that place objects of investigation in world-contexts. Matthew has been pleased to teach an international population of students first at York University in Toronto, and now at the American University in Cairo, where he is an assistant professor. Outside of the academy, he has worked as a musician, mandolin and guitar teacher and gymnastics coach. 281 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 282 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXV:281 INTRODUCTION In what follows, I focus on prospects for democracy in Egypt and the Middle East, pursuing two interrelated points. First, I suggest what the West lauded as Egypt’s first democratic government under Mohamed Morsi was not keeping with etymological, historical and indeed U.N. conceptions of democracy. Accordingly, the experiment did not fail, as the Western media overwhelmingly suggested; it fizzled soon after the election because democracy never really happened in the first place. Second, I argue that many international projects promoting democracy, especially as exemplified in U.N. documents, tacitly extol Western values as the only morally acceptable ones. Insofar as this more or less subjugates the totality to a single order favoring Western ideology, it is arguably totalitarian and colonialist and consequently counter to democratic ideals. Throughout I suggest that Middle Eastern countries face realities foreign to the West, and it is wrongheaded to presume that straightforwardly Western systems will inevitably work there if the aim is to promote human wellbeing. While generally skeptical of Western attempts to export democracy, partly because concepts of democracy in the West are already impoverished, and also because “freedom” and “oppression” are often shallowly conceived, I finish by discussing prospects for democracy in the Middle East. Current conditions in the Middle East are bleak, with many justifiably afraid to speak out, intervene and engage in oppositional discourse. This is not only contrary to the establishment of democratic government, but to having what the pragmatic philosopher John Dewey, among others, characterized as democratic life. To the extent that conditions prevent the latter from flourishing, the former will flounder too. Open and respectful discourse is key to democratic life. Yet by and large, critiques of the Middle East and its largely Islamic culture have the air of one party taking a morally superior stance over another without adequately pondering the specific situation of the other. The West and Middle East would benefit from a respectful dialogue, which would enable people in both regions to better see flaws in their respective cultures. This relates to another concept discussed by Dewey, namely, “democratic faith.”2 Elaborating on this concept with help from William James and his pragmatic understanding of faith, I argue that prospects in the Middle East are currently poor because the basic trust that democracy requires and entails is largely lacking. For such reasons it may also be threatened in Western countries as well. 2. See generally John Dewey, The Democratic Faith and Education, 4 THE ANTIOCH REV. 274 (1944). SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 2016] EGYPT AND THE MIDDLE EAST 283 SHALLOW DEMOCRACY I arrived in Egypt at the beginning of what came to be known as the “January Revolution,” and witnessed the mass protests in Tahrir that contributed to the removal of the military dictator Hosni Mubarak. Hope in Egypt and abroad was high, with Barack Obama, if a billboard at Cairo International Airport is to be trusted, declaring: “We must educate our children to become like young Egyptian people.”3 However, optimism dwindled for those specifically opposing military governments, for the army was still governing as it had since the time of Gamal Nasser. Moreover, living conditions remained essentially unchanged and in fact worsened to the extent that tourism—one of the most important sectors in Egypt—nearly collapsed. Roughly a year-and-half after the January uprising, Egypt had a run-off vote to determine who would be president. Even though this was lauded as Egypt’s first free presidential election, with voter turnout barely above 50%, many were less than enthusiastic and it was not hard to see why.4 One choice was Ahmed Shafik, a retired air marshal and last Prime Minister under Mubarak and therefore a representative of the old guard. The other was the Islamist candidate Mohammed Morsi, a second-choice substitute for Khairat el-Shater, who was disqualified because of past convictions—possibly and perhaps likely politically motivated—for terrorism and money laundering. Morsi went on to win by a narrow margin.5 Things did not appreciably improve. Aside from economic problems that were not really the fault of the government, Morsi, as an article from The Economist put it somewhat hyperbolically, “did his best to flout the norms of democracy during his short stint as president.”6 He commenced his term with an act of quasi-fraud since the Brotherhood had promised not to run a presidential candidate, and Morsi merely resigned from the party that had heavily financed his campaign a few days before swearing into office. Then, in the fall of 2013, Morsi decreed absolute power on himself and declared himself above the law, with some claiming he did so because Mubarak and military loyalists were interfering with the judiciary and political system. He pushed a new constitution to a vote with only a few weeks’ notice and therefore little 3. Mohamed El-Bendary attributes this to remarks Obama made the day Mubarak resigned. See MOHAMED EL-BENDARY, THE EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION: BETWEEN HOPE AND DESPAIR: MUBARAK TO MORSI 11 (2013). 4. See Voter turnout data for Egypt, INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL ASSISTANT, http://www.idea.int/vt/countryview.cfm?id=69 (last visited Jan. 26, 2015). 5. See David K. Kirkpatrick, Named Egypt’s Winner, Islamist Makes History, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/world/middleeast/mohamed-morsi-of-mus lim-brotherhood-declared-as-egypts-president.html?_r=0. 6. The Arab Spring: Has it Failed?, THE ECONOMIST (July 13, 2013), available at http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21581734-despite-chaos-blood-and-democratic- setbacks-long-process-do-not-give-up. SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 284 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXV:281 chance of informed and hence empowered consent. During the same period, his backing party, The Muslim Brotherhood, objected to an U.N. bill because, among other things, it would designate spousal sexual assault of women— currently legal in most Middle Eastern countries—as rape, while also giving equal rights to homosexuals and children born out of wedlock.7 Free expression was stifled on even trivial matters, with the exceptionally popular satirist Bassem Youssef investigated for maligning Morsi and later charged for insulting Islam.8 Furthermore, Morsi and his backing party were mostly silent and indeed encouraging in Arabic posts of violent mobs outside the U.S. embassy,9 and his supporters vandalized the property of minority Copts and murdered them en masse in the aftermath of his ousting.10 In short, Morsi, along with many of his supporters, “reverted to the same undemocratic policies that he was elected to change.