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La Russie De 1991 À Nos Jours

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La Russie De 1991 À Nos Jours La Russie de 1991 à nos jours Contenu : Introduction : L’indépendance de la Fédération de Russie ..................................................................... 1 I- La Russie d’Eltsine : des débuts difficiles ............................................................................................. 2 A) L’échec de la thérapie de choc et du virage libéral ........................................................................ 2 B) Un repli sur ses propres conflits internes ....................................................................................... 3 C) Un niveau de vie en baisse manifeste ............................................................................................. 4 II- Sous Poutine, vers un nouveau départ ?............................................................................................. 5 A) Une expansion économique remarquable ..................................................................................... 5 B) Un retour sur la scène internationale, mais tensions persistantes au sein de l’ex-URSS ............... 6 C) Un Etat-providence limité et une démocratie remise en cause : la Russie, Etat non-occidental ... 7 III- Un retour en force sur la scène internationale .................................................................................. 8 A) Une politique d’expansion à nouveau clairement visible ............................................................... 8 B) Un nouveau statut sur la scène internationale et la construction d’un bloc eurasiatique ............. 9 C) L’économie russe, d’une crise à l’autre......................................................................................... 10 Conclusion : Une situation économique toujours instable, un retour en force sur l’échiquier mondial ............................................................................................................................................................... 11 A retenir ................................................................................................................................................. 11 Personnages clés : ............................................................................................................................. 11 Chronologie synthétique : ................................................................................................................. 12 Pour approfondir… ................................................................................................................................ 12 A) Le semibankirchtchina ou les « sept banquiers » ......................................................................... 12 B) Gazprom ........................................................................................................................................ 13 Introduction : L’indépendance de la Fédération de Russie Malgré les réformes engagées à la fin des années 1980 par Gorbatchev, l’URSS connaît de profondes difficultés économiques au tournant des années 1990. Globalement, la situation économique de l’URSS continue de s’aggraver au travers de lourds déficits, d’un endettement croissant vis-à-vis de l’extérieur et de la hausse de l’inflation. D’autre part, l’URSS connaît en son sein des dissensions de plus en plus manifestes sur le plan politique : en 1990, toutes les Républiques, y compris la Russie, proclament leur souveraineté. En effet, la Russie est elle aussi hostile au système fédéral car ce sont en réalité deux hommes qui s’affrontent, Boris Eltsine pour la Russie et Mikhaïl Gorbatchev pour l’URSS. © Charles Larue – Les Yeux du Monde – 2015 Page 1/13 Eltsine, élu Président du Soviet suprême de la République socialiste fédérative soviétique de Russie le 29 mai 1990, proclame le lendemain de son élection que la Russie sera indépendante avant 100 jours. Beaucoup de Russes sont favorables à l’indépendance et estiment que les autres Républiques vivent au crochet de la Russie. Gorbatchev souhaite quant à lui contrer ces velléités sécessionnistes, et forme le projet d’une nouvelle constitution soviétique qui offrirait plus d’autonomie pour les Républiques. Il mène alors une course contre la montre face à la montée de ces revendications indépendantistes, mais l’opposition conservatrice réalise un putsch le 19 août 1991 pour empêcher la signature de ce nouveau traité d’Union. Gorbatchev, déclaré inapte à tenir son poste, est remplacé par Guennadi Ianaïev, un conservateur qui était devenu vice-président grâce à lui. Cependant, Boris Eltsine, élu Président de Russie le 12 juin 1991, s’oppose à ce putsch et apparaît comme un sauveur. Les putschistes abandonnent leur action et Eltsine sort en grand vainqueur de cet épisode, tandis que Gorbatchev est affaibli politiquement. Dès lors, le Parti Communiste de l’Union Soviétique est rapidement dissout et, le 8 décembre, la Russie, l’Ukraine et la Biélorussie signent le traité de Minsk qui crée la Communauté des Etats Indépendants (CEI), proclamant également l’obsolescence de l’URSS. En décembre 1991, Gorbatchev démissionne lors d’un discours le 25 décembre et l’URSS est officiellement dissoute. I- La Russie d’Eltsine : des débuts difficiles A) L’échec de la thérapie de choc et du virage libéral Boris Eltsine, plutôt que de sauver le système économique hérité de l’URSS, décide de le détruire, son but étant de mettre en place des réformes dures mais rapides : « la thérapie de choc ». Aidés d’économistes, tels qu’Egor Gaïdar, il entreprend rapidement le passage à l’économie de marché, inspiré de la fameuse « école de Chicago », ce qui permet à la Russie de rejoindre les grandes instances internationales telles que la Banque mondiale et le Fonds Monétaire International (FMI) en 1992. Les réformes prévoient alors, avec l’aide du FMI, la libéralisation des prix et des importations tout en contenant l’inflation, une politique monétaire stricte, l’élimination du déficit budgétaire et la privatisation des entreprises d’Etat, mesures à l’origine d’une contestation importante. Un environnement économique propice est également mis en place, via des lois sur la faillite (1993) ou l’adoption d’un Code civil (1995-1996), mais leur application reste difficile. Afin de privatiser l’appareil de production, les citoyens russes se voient remettre un coupon qu’ils peuvent utiliser pour acheter une part d’entreprise ou tout simplement vendre. Entre 1992 et 1994, plus de 15 000 entreprises sont ainsi privatisées auprès de quarante millions de Russes, malgré le fait que la rapidité de ce processus ait empêché beaucoup d’entre eux de comprendre et de participer. Les entreprises les plus importantes, notamment dans les secteurs miniers et énergétiques, ne sont quant à elles pas concernées. Mais en 1995, les problèmes économiques de l’Etat le poussent à accepter un prêt des grandes banques russes en échange du contrôle de ces grandes entreprises. Ce pacte permet l’émergence des « sept banquiers » (voir « Pour approfondir… »), un groupe d’oligarques contrôlant la quasi-totalité de l’économie et de la vie médiatique russe. Elle permet en outre à Boris Eltsine de s’assurer le soutien des oligarques russes face à Guennadi Ziouganov, candidat communiste à la © Charles Larue – Les Yeux du Monde – 2015 Page 2/13 présidentielle de 1996, première élection démocratique dans l’histoire russe post-soviétique. Si ce dernier est largement en tête dans les sondages, Eltsine profite de l’aide économique extérieure pour sa campagne et s’assure le soutien des médias et des autres candidats lors du second tour pour l’emporter avec 53% des votes. Néanmoins, aujourd’hui encore, l’issue de cette élection est controversée, des fraudes massives étant suspectées ou, dans certains cas, avérées. Durant la décennie, de nombreux problèmes économiques secouent la Russie. Tout d’abord, le Rouble, monnaie héritée de l’URSS : si celle-ci ne peut être qu’imprimée par la Banque centrale de Russie, les autres Etats de l’ancienne URSS peuvent continuer à délivrer des crédits. La Russie n’a donc pas complètement le contrôle de sa monnaie, jusqu’à la création du Rouble russe en juillet 1993. Dans le même temps, le troc, courant durant la période soviétique, se développe particulièrement, empêchant les entreprises de payer leurs salariés et l’Etat de collecter l’impôt. L’impôt, justement, consiste en une multitude de taxes qui, additionnées entre elles, peuvent dépasser 100% des revenus des entreprises, d’où des fraudes importantes, tandis que la plupart des particuliers refusent de payer un impôt sur les revenus. Cette difficulté à faire entrer l’impôt rend alors difficile l’accomplissement des obligations budgétaires russes. Ainsi, en 1998, un an après la crise asiatique, la Russie entre à son tour en crise : le 17 août, le Premier ministre Sergueï Kirienko dévalue le Rouble de 34% tout en demandant un moratoire pour payer ses dettes étrangères. Le Rouble est alors considéré comme surévalué et la dette trop importante, notamment à court-terme. Rapidement, l’économie russe sombre, la bourse russe décline de 90% entre 1997 et l’été 1998, et le chômage explose. B) Un repli sur ses propres conflits internes Contrairement à l’URSS, superpuissance au même titre que les Etats-Unis jusqu’à la fin des années 1980, la Russie n’a pas, dans les années 1990, les moyens de rivaliser au plan géopolitique sur la scène internationale. Certes, elle récupère le siège permanent de l’URSS au Conseil de Sécurité de l’ONU ainsi que la majeure partie des infrastructures et équipements militaires hérités de l’Union Soviétique. Mais ceux-ci
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