THE HERITAGE OF INDIA

Th e e . a Ri gh t R ve re nd V . S Az ari h ,

B ishop o f Dor na k al .

J . . a u M . A D . Li t . N F r q h ar , t

A lrea dy pu blished.

Th e H o f B u ddh m K A N D ER S M .A . eart is . . J . U S , RE o M . M P M . A M D . V . . A As ka J C HAIL , . , . . India n PRIN IP A L R B R lcu tt C W Ca a . Painting . PE CY O N ,

K s L u . RE . E . B .A . V . anare e it erat re P RICE ,

T e S m m . B EI H h a h S . RR K T k ya yste A E IEDALE ,

D .Litt .

N L M A . D . Litt . m o a S . I O f M h i C M . Psal s ar t aints ACNICOL , , L u d M . A . H o o f H . RE V . . E . K A ist ry in i it erat re F EAY , H m o f t e T m S K B R a nd y ns h a il Saivite aints . INGS U Y

PHI LL IP S .

' a nd v lu m Su bj ects proposed o es u n der prefi a ra tzo n .

K T AND LI LITERA SANS RI PA TURE .

f h e d . o f M O H m s o m t V . . . fo y n r e as Pr A A ACDONELL , x rd . lo o f M h a a L o o f . L . Anth gy a y na iterat u re . Pr DE LA VALLE

POU IN Gh . SS , ent o f o m the n d WE ERN U . . . S T M . A electi ns r pa isa s F J S , . ,

Delhi .

S cenes fro m th e Ramayana .

Selectio ns f rom th e Mah ab h arat a .

I THE PHILOSOPH ES .

I o du o n t o d u h o o h H . . N AR R An nt r cti in P il s p y J . F QUHA , K a nd OHN MC EN Z IE M . A . Bo m J b . , , ay T o o f h d h e Ph ilo s phy t e Upanisa s . ’ V da . . K . S RM S M .A ankara s e nt a A HA A , Patiala ’ d Raman u j a s Ve ant a .

Th e B u ddh ist Syst em .

FINE ARTflA ND MUSI C . W I d n h u . L . E IN G B . A M d n ia Arc itect re R , . . , a ras , nd S u u I ian c lpt re , Th e M o . l R RO N n B W . i r Arts Principa PE CY , Calc u tt a

I d o . . BROWN M .A . n ian C ins . C J ,

BIOG HIES O EMINENT IND N RAP F I A S .

A o o . u m B ddh SA N D ER . G K . . u . . U M a t a a a J S , , Rang n R a m a n u j a . K A l M . . u b . . V . S . Ak ar F LAC , , C a c tt a

Tulsi Das .

R i dr n o . . T HO P ON u . M . A . B k a b n a a th T E . M ag re J S , , an ra

VERNACULAR LI TERATURE .

T u l E Y B A o h e K rra . H . . POP L . . E d . A , , r e

M . H P . d s . m o a . . S . OO ER A M H f th e M . y ns Alv rs J , , a ra

D . D u A M . A . . T i as M u G . . NN ls in iniat re J , , Patna

H m s o f B a e . E . THO M ON A . u . S . P M . B y n eng li ing rs J S , , ank ra m B T L M B a o . K H s . U ER anarese y n ISS , ang l re

HISTO I ES O VE N UL LITE TU E R F R AC AR RA R .

. M . A . u . B a . . S A R eng li C P TE SON , , Calc tta

M A . hm d . G a . . H . BO YD d u . a b jar ti R , , A a a A o M a i N M M . . D . Lit t . o . h . A ar t ICOL CNICOL , , , P na

T m l . R K G B R B . A . B o . a i F ANCIS IN S U Y , , ang al re C HE N CH A H a nd A T u . u . I M .A . M d s J el g P , , a ra , RA

BHUJ AN GA A E lo e . R O , l r

m . T . a d u M a m . T . K . JO EP H B . A . L . T alay la S , , riv n r

Sinh ales e .

M . h o U d u B . G HOSHAL . A B . r . , , pal

NOTABL E INDIAN PEOPL ES .

T h e Rajpu t s .

M M L LA l . T h h s s . K . . AMM A P I I e Syrian C ri tian C EN , A leppey

T h e Sikhs .

VARI OUS .

A Ph . D . . RO N W M . . d o T s . N RM B Mo ern F lk ale W O AN , , ,

Ph iladelph ia .

I ndian Village Go vernment .

o m o o . M R . N . M I d . S A P o ems b y n ian W en CNICOL , P na

Cla ss i cal Sanskrit Literatu re .

B . A . u . T m e L d . K . T . A In dian e pl egen s P UL , , Calc tt a

o DEWAN BA A R L . D . I ndian Astro n omy a nd Ch ro n lo gy . H DU

WA I K AN N M d s . S M U PILLAI , a ra EDITORIAL PREFACE

n b h ‘ o a re Fi ally , ret ren , whats ever things u h o h a re h o o u b wh o tr e , w ats ever t ings n ra le , at s

e h a re u o h s a re u ev r t ings j st , what s ever t ing p re , wh o h s re o l h o ats ever t ing a l ve y , w ats ever things o d a n u a nd a re f go o repo rt ; if there b e y virt e , ” if h b e i h o n h h . t ere any pra se , t ink t ese t ings

No section of the po pulation of India can afford to In neglect her ancient heritage . her literature , philosophy ,

art , and regulated life there is much that is worthless , much also that is distinctly unhealthy ; yet the treasures of knowledge , wisdom , and beauty which they contain are too I use precious to be lost . Every citizen of ndi a needs to

I . them , if he is to be a cultured modern ndian This is as

C n Z he true of the hristia , the Muslim , the oroastrian as of t

‘ But hile I Hindu . , w the heritage of ndia has been largely explored by scholars , and the results of their toil are laid o out for us in their books , they cannot be said t be really Th available for the ordinary man . e volumes are in most

cases expensive , and are often technical and difficult . Hence this series of cheap books has been planned by a C group of hristian men , in order that every educated

I his ndian , whether rich or poor , may be able to find way I ’ n into the treasures of ndia s past . Ma y Europeans , both I in ndia and elsewhere , will doubtless be glad to use the

series . The utmost care is being taken by the ' General Editors

in selecting writers , and in passing manuscripts for the

press . To every book two tests are rigidly applied "every thing must be scholarly , and everything must be sympathetic . The purpose is to bring the best out of the ancient

so ma . treasuries , that it y be known , enjoyed , and used

THE HERITAGE OF lNDl A “ ‘NH I . N O tl l

THE

KA RMA - MINI

D K D AL ITH . . L D. L . A . BERRIE E E , C ITT

r- - R of th e I n ner Temple Ba rri s te a t La w, egi us Prof ess or o f Sa ns k ri t a nd Co mpa ra tive Philo logy at th e Uni vers ity of Edi n b urgh )

A R OF AMK M UTHO THE S HYA SYSTE , ETC .

ASSO C IAT ION PRESS 5 USSELL ST EET L U , R R , CA C TTA

LOND ON "O"FORD UNI VERSITY PRESS NEW YORK T ORONT O M LBO , , E URNE,

BOM BAY, CALCUTTA AND M ADRAS 1921

CONTENTS

PAGE PREF ACE

T HE D P M A LI R R H R OF I . EVELO ENT ND TE A Y ISTO Y THE KARMA -Mi mAMSA — ' O o f th e m Th e Mimarns a Sii tra . Th e rigin Syste . — — Pra b h §k a ra a nd Ku m a ril a . L Th e Vrtti kara . ater — Writers Ot h er Literary S o u rces .

I T HE R B M OF K W G I . P O LE NO LED E T h e Valid ity o f A ppreh ensio n - Mod e o f Appre — Th e o m o f o o . h ensio n o f Co gniti o n . F r s C g niti n — — — I f o m o . e u m o . Perceptio n . n erence . C paris n Pr s pti n — — S u a nd b a s mo . Neg ati o n . cript re Ver l Te ti ny

T R OF I I I . HE WO LD REALITY d h m n dId Th e Refu t at io n o f B u d hist Ni ilis a ealism . — s o f P h a k a r a n d Ku m a ril Th e Categ o rie ra b a a . — — — u o Mo o . u . . o r G S b s t ance Q ality Acti n ti n enerality . — — — - No n - S m u . Inh erence . i ilarity . Ca se exist ence .

I O D S M R V . G , THE OUL , AND ATTE — Th e Refu tat i o n o f th e D o ctrine o f Creati on Th e Do i n o f th e So u —Th D e o f M a n —T ctr e l . e stiny h e o o f Pu rp se Sacrifi ce .

THE RULES OF RITUAL I NTERP RETAT I ON — Th e A u tho rity o f Script u r e Th e B réhm a nas as — V dh A rth a v fid a a nd N5 m a dh e a . Th e M i i , , y antras . —Sm tis V dan G mm a nd u o m — r , e gas , ra ar , C st . Th e — Class es o f Actio ns enj o ined Ori ginating I nju n e — —I tio ns Inju nctio ns o f A pplic at i o n . nju nctio ns o f m - u - f o . I u o o f alifi t o n O ca i . n Per r ance nj nct i ns Q rigi al , d L m I — e a n u o . o h R strictive , i itin g nj ncti ns Pr ib iti o ns — a n d Except ions Transf er a n d M o difi catio n o f D s — o nd O etail Repetiti n a ption .

MI AM w VI . T NI SA H LA HE AND INDU . .

- Th e Miméms é. a nd th e L a w S o o ch ls . Th e Int er — pret a tio n o f I nju nctio n s Reli giou s a nd Secular o O n h —I h n a nd o Fact rs in w ers ip n erit a ce Partiti n . — Ado ptio n a n d Part nership Criminal L a w a nd th e L a w o f E d n vi e ce .

INDE" PRINTED AT SLEYAN S ON PRESS TH E WE M IS I , Y M YSORE CIT . THE DEVELOPM ENT AND LITERA RY HISTORY OF THE KARM A M IM AMSA

a x NOT rarely in the B r hmanas , especially in later te ts like Kau i ta ki am a the s , the term Mim s occurs as the designation o f a discussion on some point o f ritual practise . The sacrifice left innumerable opportunities for divergence

of usage in detail , and the texts decide in favour of one or

the other alternative , on the strength of the reasons famili ar a to the Br hmanas , in special the symbolical significance

attaching to the action recommended . There is a vital

' difference between this form of M imarnsa and that of the

- am classical Karma Mim sa school , in the fact that in the

former the appeal to authority , and the necessity of

reconciling apparent discrepancies of authority , are entirely

lacking . But the tendency to surrender judgment in favour of tradition may be traced in the care with which in the Sotopa tha and the Ka usi ta ki Brahmanas the name of the teacher is adduced in support of the doctrines expounded

in the older style the reasonings stand by themselves ,

commended by their intrinsic value . The process by which the Brahmanas came to be regard o f ed as texts incontrovertible accuracy , and speculation on

the sacrifice ceased to be independent , cannot now be traced in v detail . The account of the sacrifices gi en in these texts , supplemented by the collections of M antras in the Samhitas o n of the vari us schools , would , obviously , ever h ave sufficed

to enable priests to carry out the sacrifices , and there must have been a full and precise oral tradition regarding the

mode in which the sacrifices , which formed the subjects of

the mystical speculations of the Brahmanas , were to be

performed . This tradition , however , in the course of time 2 T HE KARMA - MIMAMSA

seems to have become obscured , just as the tradition of the con o interpretation of the Mantras fell into fusi n , and in its o n place in some degree supervened an attempt , on the gr u d o f m reasoning , to deduce from the Sa hitas and the Brah

manas , taken together , rules for the regulation of the

performance of the offerings . The difficulties of such a course were considerable ; there are real divergences between S m a a the a hit s and the Br hmanas , which we may justly

attribute to change of ritual , but which in the opinion of

‘

the priests admitted of other explanations . Thus , in some

cases , the order of the Mantras is patently different from a the order of actions contemplated in the B r hmanas , a divergence which the new Mimamsa decided in favour of

the order of the Mantras on the ground that , as they were recited in the sacrifice they were more directly connected a with the sacrifice than the Br hmanas , which were not

immediately employed in the offering . With more plausi b ilit a y, the new doctrine held that i f a Br hmana mentioned o f an action out of its natural order , such as the cooking the

rice grains before the husking , it was nevertheless to be to assumed that the normal sequence was be followed .

More legitimately still , the new science devoted itself to such problems as the determination of the person by whom the o several actions enjoined , without specification of the act r , fell to be performed ; the connection as principal and subordinate of the many details of the offering ; and the o Vikrtis precise m de of performance of the , or derivative o f forms of the main sacrifices , the particulars which are

seldom adequately indicated in the sacred texts . The antiquity of the new science is vouched for by the 1 A asta mb a Dharma Sutras . p in two passages disposes of contested p o ints by the authority o f those who know the o o f Nyaya , a term which is the early designati n the Karma Mimamsa and persists through its hist o ry in its generic “ ” a o sense of reasoning , while the Ny ya philos phy proper to borrows it , and applies it more specifically denote the v A astamb a syllogism . What is still more con incing is that p

1 Bu hlcr a cr B k o h Eas t II ""V , S ed oo s f t e , , xxviii , xxix ; ,

Iii . xlvii , DEVELOPMENT AND LITERARY HISTORY 3

uses arguments which are to be found in the Mi mams d Sfi tra ; thus he maintains that no text can be inferred from o a custom for which a secular m tive is apparent , and that a revealed text has superior validity to a custom whence a

text might be inferred . The corresponding rules in the mdms d atra I 3 3 - 4 M i S ( , , ) do not textually agree , and we not may fairly conclude that at this date , probably later

o f B . C . Su no t than the middle the third century , the tra did

exist in its present form , but it is plain that the science o M imamsa ka itself was in full v gue , and a appears to have i been deemed a necessary member o f a Par sad. The influence of this disci pline can plainly be discerned in the S o f ASvala an a Saf1kh a ana existing utra texts ; the works y , y , A astamb a Hiran akeéin La a a na Drah a an a p , y , ty y , and y y

have been composed under its influence , and the same con sideration applies even to texts like those of the Baudhayana a and M nava schools , which Show greater affinities to the

a . o Br hmana style We need not , of c urse , assume th at the wa s o old sacrificial tradition entirely l st , but we may be certain that it has been largely transformed in the process

of remodelling . S Su imultaneously with the remodelling of the tras , there must have proceeded the definition of the rules of interpre tation until they were finally codified in the M i mdms d ' 1 Sictra aimini , which passes under the name of J , but the

details o f this process must remain unknown to us . What is certain is that the M i mdmsd Satra presupposes a long

history of discussion , and that its aphorisms , which often

assume , without expressing , general rules of interpretation , deal largely with difficulties affecting individual Vedic

texts , which had long been the subject of dispute . This characteristic is shown clearly in the mode of discussion followed in the text ; the essential subdivision Adhik aran a is the , which , according to the school , is to be deemed to fall into fi ve parts ; these M adhava reckons vi a a as the subject of investigation ( s y ) , the doubt sa ms a a rima acie urva a ks a ( y ) , the first or p f View (p p ) , the

d ed Bi b li theca I n a E , o di c , 1873 1889 a s . o f Adh a as I II it , tr n y y I , b G an a na tha ha Sa cred B ook th H d v s o e in us o ". y g J , f , l. 4 T HE KARMA -M IMAMSA answer or demonstrated conclusion and the o f o sam a ti h relevance the t pic ( g ) , but the last ead is else 1 o n where reck ned as the third , and a more atural division omits it , and regards as the fourth and fifth members the utta ro a k a nirn o a answer ( p s ) , and the conclusion ( y ) . Thus in the first Sfi t t a of the text there are two Adhikaran as ; is the study of the Veda necessary for the three upper castes , and is Dharma a proper subject of study "The latter alone needs full discussion , the reply to the former being self is evident . The subject then formed by the two Vedic pre ” e ts er c p , One should study the Veda , and One should p ” form the final bath after studying the Veda . The doubt is one whether should , after learning the Vedic text , perform ’ o the bath and end ne s studentship, or remain longer with rima a i the teacher to study Dharma . The p f c e view is that the bath sh o uld follow immedi ately on the learning of the text , but the reply is that real study of the Veda is not satisfied by mere reading of the text , and the conclusion , to therefore , is that the final bath is be postponed for a time in o rder that the student may complete his learning of the

. Su text by a study of Dharma Of all this , however , the tra “ itself has nothing , consisting merely of the words , Now , therefore , an enquiry into Dharma , and , though in some o f Adhikaran a cases there is more full development an , it is to the commentators that we must lo ok f o r enlightenment I t o f on the exact issues in dispute . is not , course , to be supposed that at any time the Sutra was handed down o without oral explanati n , but , as usual , the authentic version was early obscured . ’ Of these Adhika ran as there are in the Sutra in M adhava s 9 1 5 o reckoning about , divided int twelve books with sixty

Padas , the third , sixth , and tenth having eight each in lieu o of the normal f ur , and aphorisms in another a imini reckoning) . J is the chief authority cited , but men a s a tion is made also of other names , such those of B dari , re a Bada ra ana Vedanta At y , and y , who occur also in the

tra Lab uka ana Aitasa ana . a imini Sa , and of y , y , etc Who J ‘ A aimini is was we cannot say. J credited with the author

1 eb oo ke sa s I 326 . Co well in Col r , Es y , DEVELOPM ENT AND L ITERARY H ISTORY 5

Srauta Grh a Sil tra he ship of a and a y , and t name occurs ' in lists of doubtful authenticity in the Asva la ya na and Sdh khdyana Grhya Sdtros ; a Ja imi niya Sa mhitd and a As Jaimi niya Brahmon a Of the Sant a Veda are extant . an authority on philosophy Jaimini appears in the 1 nt fi tr Veda a S a and often in later works , but it is significant M a habharota o that , while it is possible that the rec gnises the existence of the Mimamsa it d oes not refer to Ja imini 2 as a philosopher , but merely as an ancient sage . Neither Buddhist or Jain literature throws light on his personality Su - or date , and the period of the tra can be determined , its therefore , merely on grounds of comparison of contents with those of other works . I t is probable that the Mi mdms d Sfi tra is the earliest of i Yo a Sfi tra the s x DarSanas preserved to us . The g is not an early work ; it seems to recognise the Vijfi anav ada school to of Buddhism , which , in all probability , belongs the

A. D . fourth century , and the popular identification of Patafij ali with the author of the M a hdbhdsya is clearly unten 3 T he amkh a Sfi tra able . lateness of the S y is admitted , and the theory that its contents include early matter ha s ai ika atra been controverted . The V ses S has no point of contact with the M imamsa such as would render any con clusion a fi tra I I 1 6 1 possible , but the Nydy S ( , , ) is familiar am is with the Mim sa terminology , and it improbable that , ’ N a a Mmam a Sfi tra had the y y existed before the took form , it would have been ignored by the latter as it is . The relation to the Veddn ta Satra is less clear ; the mention of Ja imini and Badarayan a in bo th texts affords some ground for the view that the two works were simultaneously n redacted , but this conclusion is by no mea s assured . We have no valid reason for assumi ng that the Sutras were aimini Badara an a actually redacted by J and y themselves ,

1 ' His dea h a used b a n e e ha is e o ded in P t , c y l p nt , r c r a iz ca ta ntra

II 34 b ut no t in the Ta ntrakh d ika . T he ame is s a e b ut s , , y y n tr ng , i ' o ed a a nd the M a habha s a wh h ho we e Ign r in P nini y , ic , v r , kno ws o f Mimamsa kas o b a b adhe e s o f h s s ho o l I ndi s che tu di , pr ly r nt t i c ( S en , III 455 X , , 3 Ho k s rea t i c o I ndi a . 97 . p in , G Ep f , p m Sa kh a . y Sys tem , pp 56 , 57 . 6 THE KARMA- MIMAMSA

contem or and , unless this is established , the argument for p anei I ty is invalid . t is true that it is impossible to deduce from the style of the Mimamsa as Purva - Mimamsa a ’ relation of temporal priority for Ja imini s work ; the M imamsa is prior to the Ved anta because it deals with the sacred rites , the knowledge of which , in the view of one o f a school Ved nta , is an indispensable preliminary to the o o f o m kn wledge the abs lute , though Sa kara declines to accept this view and insists instead on the diverse character of the ends of the two disciplines , which renders it impossible to treat the former as the normal or necessary prelude to the 1 o latter . N netheless it remains true that we must assume 2 that the Mimamsa as a science developed before the Vedanta . The former was plainly necessitated by the development of the sacrificial ritual with which it is immediately connected , and it serves an impo rtant practical end ; the latter is pro of Of S the growth of a philosophical pirit , which sought to comprehend as a whole the extremely varied speculations which are scattered in the Aranyakas and Upanisads .

While , of course , it is not impossible th at the redaction of u o the two S tras was contemp raneous , despite the earlier am a o development of the Mim s , the pr bability surely lies in favour of the view that the M i mams d Sfi tf a was redacted

first and served as a model for the other schools . E f ven i f this view is accepted , it remains di ficult to It assign any definite date to the Sutra . contains no certain reference to B uddhist tenets of any kind , for the b uddha I 2 3 3 term , in , , , has not this signification , and we need not with Kumarila read a reference to Buddhism into

I 3 5 6 . edanta Sfi tra , , , and The V is of uncertain date if , arh kara I I 2 28- 3 2 Vi fi ana we believe S , it criticises ( , , ) the j o vada scho l of B uddhism , but this doctrine is probably Wrong3 and we need see only a reference to the Sfi nyavada a ar una of N g j . The date of this school is uncertain i f we accept the opinion that it was not enunciated before Nagarj una in such a manner as to invite criticism in the

1 nta . D eussen , Veda , ch . I

b au .E . IV ff T h . B . i t , S XXX , ix ‘ b I ff Kei h J .R .A .S 19 14 . J aco i , J .A . O . S XXX , l ; t , , pp

If s e b e w . 46 47 . 1091 ; e lo , pp , DEVELOPMENT AND LITE RARY HISTORY 7

an a Sfi tra Ved t , that work cannot be earlier than the third ’ A D Ar adeva Na ar una s century . . , for y , g j contemporary , — refers to the zodiacal signs and the week days , which were not known in Indi a until that epoch . But it is possible n a ASVa ho a that the Su yav da , which can be recognised in g s , Na ar un a i s was of older fame than g j , though on the whole it more likely than not that it was the dialectical ability of that teacher which made the doctrine the object of Ved antic It confutation . is , then , a plausible conclusion that the i s fi tra 20 0 A. D . s Mimdm d S does not date after , but that it o probably n t much earlier , since otherwise it would have

’ been natural to find in the M ahdbharata some reference to i it and to ts author . s Su A we have seen , the tra must from the first have been was accompanied by a comment , which in course of time los t m or became defective . The first com entator of whom we Vrttikara have certain knowledge is a , from whose work a long extract is made in the Bhdsya of Sab arasvamin on ' amsa Sntra I 1 5 Mim , , , , in which the author attacks and

. If Kumarila dis refutes B uddhist views we believe , the cu sion is Vi iianavada s directed in art against the j school , fi n avada in part against the y , but in this case we have o b every reason to distrust his asserti n , for , plainly y error , he ascribes the major portio n of the discussion to Sahara Vrt ikara I i t . t s svamin , and not to the , therefore , not improbable that he is also in erro r in finding any reference Vi ii navada to the j a , for the passage seems to deal with one Sun avada It topic only , and that the y . follows , accordingly , that the date of the Vrttik ara wa s probably not later than

A. D . the fourth century , since , had he lived later , he would hardly have omitted an explicit discussion of the tenets of the idealistic school of Buddhism . 1 Vr ik r The name of the tt a a is uncertain . The conjecture wa s Bh avadasa Ku ri that he , mentioned in one place by ma la , as may be dismissed wholly without support . The current O U avar a pinion makes him to be p s , who , we know from Sam da nta Sutra III Ve 3 . kara ( , , , 53 ) wrote on both the texts To this the objection has been brought that in the passage cited

1 G an anatha hé a s . f l dr ika . 116 . g J , tr n o S okav tt , p 8 THE KARMA -MIMAMSA from the Vrttikara by Sa b a rasvamin there is a reference to U avar a p s with the epithet Bhagavat , implying that he was in the eyes of the Vrttikara an author of venerable auth o rity . It Vrttikara is probable , however , that the citation from the 1 é o S is only a résum , not a verbatim quotati n , and that ahara 1 a o U avar a sv min is resp nsible for the reference to p s , the ’ Vrttikara s proper name , and for this view support may be derived from the mo de in which the Vrttikara and Upavarsa Kum rila I I 3 If are referred to by a elsewhere ( , , this o Bodha an a view is rejected , it is p ssible that he is y , who o o n dnta Sfi tra o certainly wr te the Ved , but this the ry is a o Bo dha ana bare and unnecessary c njecture , seeing that y

m o . nowhere else appears as a Mima sa auth rity Of other , 2 o Bhartrmitra presumably early , commentat rs we hear of 3 no to and Hari , but there is reason identify either of these rttik ra with the V a . The extract from the Vrttikara proves that an im portant addition has been made to the teaching o f the Mimamsa in the shape o f the introduction o f discussio ns of the validity of knowledge and its diverse forms . The Sutra itself is content with the denial of the validity o o of percepti n for the purp se of the knowledge of Dharma , and the exaltation of Vedic inj unctions as the source o f the necessary knowledge ; under the influence , perhaps , of the Nyaya the earlier doctrine is now elaborated into o a a critical examinati n of the nature of evidence , its v lidity , It and the fo rms o f pro of . is not illegitimate to assume that the Vrttikara j ndulged also in metaphysical discus si o ns ; at any rate Sab a ra svamin enters into a long discussion of the nature of soul , despite his predilection for brevity u am a in treatment of the S tra . The Mim s therefore by this o f o W time enters into the whole field philos phy , hile maintaining its primary duty of expo unding the rules by which the ritual can be reconstructed from the Brahmanas and the Samhitas .

1 1 3 16 he ea des bes the Vrttikara as bha a vdn In 1 , , , cl rly cri g

b ha o e o o ed . h CI. 111 1 6 . T hese ass a es a o s acdrya ; , , p g j c i v rl k 3 l r tika . 4 . 10 he is ed o n the Partha sara thi o n S o kao d t , p ( v ) cit

o f so u d N d a ma fi o ri . 213 . o rgan n , y y j , p s i ika x 2 59 60 . Sdstra d p , , , ,

10 THE KARMA - MIMAM SA

Erb ati has P bh kara enabled us to correct this error . ra a follows Sab a rasvamin closely ; he does not refute the o f Kumarila I 1 opinions ; in one passage ( V, , when he does criticise an Opinion of the latter , the form of words used by him in adducing it differs entirely from those in Kumarila which the view of is expressed , showing clearly o Ku ila that he is dealing with some lder author , whom mar

. Kumarila has followed On the other hand , frequently Bhd a I diverges from the views of the sy ; he criticises ( , 2 3 1 3 2 4 1 Prab ha , , , ) views which are expressed by kara , and asserts independent views . There is a clear difference of style between the two authors ; Prab hak ara is o S c mparatively simple , vivid and direct like ahara svamin ; he seldom uses long compounds ; he avoids the com bination of various reasonings in a single clause in lieu of the fo rmal termin ology o f objection and reply ( n a nu ced n a s dd etot ta d a u ktam , or y y ) he adopts the form o disadvan of question and answer , which , h wever , has the o f In tage leaving at times the meaning in doubt . all these Kumarila aspects shows a richer , more varied , and elaborated ’ k b a m Sari ra a hds S . style , which is reminiscent of the y of a kara ’ Kumarila s great exposition of the Sa b arabhdsya falls 1 lo kao' ci rttika into three parts , the first , the S , in verse , deals I A h a I Bh a with Pada of d ) ay of the dsy , and is of the greatest value as an explanation of the metaphysics and ‘ Ta ntra vart epistemology of his system . The second , the 2 tiha a Adh a a I , covers the remaining three P das of y y and I h a a I I II . the whole of Ad y y s and The third part , the I n ti kd p , consists merely of scattered notes on the last nine

Adhyaya s . Each part has been commented on ; the first by Parthasarathi M i ra N d a rotndka ra Sucarita S in his y y , and by ikd ome ar on Misra in his d ; the second by S év a , s of N d a sudhd Rdn a ka Mahadeva , in his y y or ; the third by ’ ’ k i ttik h ara n a Ku rila s Veh ateévara Diks ta in his Vdr ab . ma 3 date is determinable within definite limits ; he used the

1 - Ed . Be a es 1898 99 a s . G an anatha ha Biblio theca n r , ; tr n g J ,

- I ndica , 1900 8 . 1 Ed Be a es 1890 a s . G afi anatha ha Bibli otheca I ndi ca n r , ; tr n g J , , - 1903 20 .

a h a VIII 2 13 ff . P t k , X , DEVELOPMENT AND L IT ERARY H ISTORY 1 1

' Va kyapodiya of Bhartrhari ; neither Hiuen- Thsang nor I- tsi ng mentions him ; he was before Samkara ; he attacked the Jain theory of an omniscient being as propounded in the Z to mi mdmsd Samantabh adra p of , but is not answered by ‘ k alari ka As tasati o n A ta A in his , which comments the p ' n mi mai sd. On the other hand , he is freely attacked by Vi an anda Pra bhacandra dy and , who both lived before i n o A. D . V d a anda 83 8 y assures us , d ubtless correctly , that Dha rmaki rti Pra bhaka ra he criticised the B uddhist , and , on the latter point agreeing with the result above arrived from is internal evidence . The upper limit of date , therefore ,

A. D not earlier than 70 0 . The lower limit depends on his ’ precise chronological relation to Samkara and the latter s Sa mka ravi a as Madhava exact date . Later tradition , the j y of o - An anda iri o and the pseud g , w uld make him an older contem

orar . p y, but the interval may have been considerably longer Kum rila Only slightly later than a was Mandana Misra , Vidhiviveka o n author of the , a treatise the significance of Mimdms dnukra mani injunctions , and the , a summary of ’ a ara i a amka ra S b svam n s Bhdsy . The tradition of the S vi a a s ur vara j y makes him out to be identical with S eS , a ’ S m An anda iri s pupil of a kara , but g account insists that he K rila was also a pupil of uma . The identification with SureSvara , which might be suspected because of the lateness is and inferior character of the authorities , to some extent ’ 1 co nfirmed by Vidyananda s description of Mandana M iSra Vedantavadin as , which could hardly apply to him re unless he were the author of the works ascribed to Su évara . Kumarila he His direct connection with , however , need not His insisted upon . lower limit of date is fixed by the fact

' that the famous Vacaspati Misra devoted the Nydya konika ’ 2 Vidhimveka Vacas a i to the exposition of his , and p t pro ’ 8 50 A. D T tt in bably lived about . He wrote also the a o ab du ’ Kum ril on a a s views . Of the later writers the most important is perhaps “ Parthasarathi s dstradi ik Mi ra , who wrote the S p d to explain

1 I b id . p. 228 . 1 - - Ed . P a n dit V V ""III 1903 6 . , XX , Ed Be a es 189 . n r , 2 .

Ed . Be a es 1 9 H a ha d 8 1 . M y . n r , e is e rlier t n a ha a 12 T HE KARMA- MIMAMSA

4 kr n Su 15 3 A. D R ma a the tra ; on it commented , in . , a s M adhava Yu ktisneha ra arani Bhatta , son of , in the _ p p , Soman ath a so n Sara A , of Bhatta , an ndhra Brahman of the

' ' Ni al M a ickha mdlika Va id anétha 1 7 10 tt family , in his , ( , y y ' Sarnk a ra Din ak ara K amalakara Bh atta , Bhatta , , To ntrarotn a o and others . His c mments on points in the Adh a a s Su Bhd a last nine y y of the tra and the sy , while his ' 1 Nyaya ra tna mdlci is an independent treatise on which Rama n u a o j , apparently the great Vedantist , h as written a c mment , ' N a a kara tna the y . Khan a deva Much later in date is d , who died at Benares 1 t i i k 66 5 A . D o the Bhdt ad d in . His w rks , p , and on a larger 2 Mi mci rias dka u stu ha Sfi tra scale the b , deal fully with the ; , the former was commen ted on in 1 70 8 by his pupil Sambhu M imdms dsfi tra didhiti Bhatta . Value attaches also to the or N d clv o li h i R h av n a nda S y y did it of ag a arasvati , pupil of Adva a Vi sveSva ra M i mdms dna a y , pupil of , and to the y viveka Bhavan atha S h of Mi sra , which deals also with a ara svamin . Yet other commentaries are recorded , including a Vedantin Kamalakara works by Mah deva , and Vaidya 3 a son o f R macan dra Su b odhi ni RameSVara n tha , a , the of

Sh Bhdtlo i ntdmoni o f Vi veSvara a a . ri , the c é or G g Bhatta , etc Apart from the Sii tra there was developed a considerable s literature which aims , as did Mandana Mi ra , at dealing systematically with the doctrines of the school . First in " ' 4 Jaimi ni a n ci a ma lcimsto ra o f importance , perhaps , is the y y y o the fam us M adh ava written in the fourteenth century , which , however , is merely a summary in verse , with a prose

’ r At Mimdnz s d Sil i a . comment , of the the end of the 5 A a Diksita Vidhiras d a n a sixteenth century ppayy wrote his y , a disquisition on the nature of injunction , adding himself

Sukho a o ini . a commentary , the p y j This text was refuted idhi ra sd a na bhfi on a by Gopala Bhatta in his V y s , and by d a n o fi o n a Samkara Bhatta in his Vidhiras y d s . The same A a a author , who was of the same period as pp yy , wrote

1 Ed . Be a es 1900 . n r , 2 d n the Ed . o e e am 1902 I 2 o . T he D i ikd is e . i C nj v r , ( , nly) p

Bib li o theca I n di eo .

- d V ""I . Ed . Lo do 1878 . E . Pa ndit "II , n n , 5 d Be a es 190 1 . E . n r DEVELOPMENT AND LIT ERARY H ISTORY 1 3

’ dstra di ikd Mi ma ms dsdra a commentary on the S p , and the 1 sam raha Adhikaranas g , in which he enumerates , An allotting to each a quarter verse . extended version of ’ 2 M i mci ms a b cila ra leci sa this work forms his p , on which there Ke a a f v o s a . A a is a commentary by S , son Vi van tha pp yya a krama ardkrama himself wrote also the Up p , a treatise on the comparative impo rtance of the commencement and end of a continuous Vedic passage .

' The most popular introductio n to the Mimérnsa is pro ’ 3 Mimdmsdn d o ra kds a A adeva son bably the y y p of p , of His n nta eva o f . A a d , and pupil Govinda date is determined son An a nta deva o mrti by the fact that his , , wr te his S koustu bh a under a prince who lived in the middle of the An an tadeva o i seventeenth century . c mmented on h s ’ o Bhdttdlamkdra father s w rk in the , and his brother , ivadeva B hdtto bhds ka ra J , discussed in the the divergent

o . views prevalent in the scho ls Even better known , f Arth a s om ra h a La u ak i a perhaps , is the g of g s Bh skara , A adeva which seems to be based in part on the work of p ,

so . and , i f , must belong to the seventeenth century This date would suit adequately the probable period of his

- aiSes ika Tarka ka umu i popular Nyaya V treatise , the d . 5 Another sh o rt text is the Mi mdmsdparibhdsd of Krsna Dik ita Mi mdms dra tn a Ra hun atha s , and the of g , who uses Kdéikd o the , contains some informati n of value on the views of ’ ‘ ara a i r h B the opposing schools . N yan t t a Muni s h a tta bhdsd ' 6 ra ka sa am p is an exposition of the terminology of the Mim sa, ’ Ramakr n a Udic a Bhattac a ik r n while" s y ary s Adh a a a ka u mudi u i expo nds a selection of interesting Adh karan as . ’ 8 Kh andadeva s Bhdtta ra ha sya deals with the mode of determining which is the leading word in a text under discussion . More interesting is the fact that the famous Valla bha Acar a Pfi rva mi mdmsdkdri kd y is credited with a , ’ 4 2 aimini s an epitome in verses of J views , written with Valla bh reference to the doctrine of faith which a expounded ,

1 1 Ed . Be a es 1904 . Ed . Be a es 1902 . n r , n r , 1 Ed . a u ta 190 1 Be a es 1905 . C lc t , ; n r , 4 Ed . a nd a s . T h b a u Be s a e 1882 . tr n i t, n r , 9 3 Ed . Be a es 1904 . Ed . Be a es 1900 . n r , n r , 7 3 Ed . a u a 1885 . Ed . o e am 90 . C lc tt , C nj ver , 1 0 14 THE KARMA - MIMAMSA

and a Jaimi nisfi tra bhdsya which deals with the first chapter

- Su . o of the second book of the tra The well known sch lar , '' 1 Venka anatha Vedantaca r a in Mi mdmsd czdukd t y , his p , in Adhikaranas o f verse , discusses the in the first chapter the

’ Su Sesvarami mdms d first book of the tra , and in his seeks to A combine the Mimamsa with the Vedanta . nother writer o India Venk a dhva rin fr m southern , ta , deals with the threefold o f Vidhitra a a ritrdn a classification inj unctions in his y p , while in his Mi mdmsdma kara nda he discusses the authoritative

’

- Arthavadas . a a character of N r yana of Kerala , the well known Ndrd ani a the author of the y y , who flourished at the end of six 2 teen th M (i na me oda a century , gives in the first part of the y y ’ an account of Kumarila s views on the nature of pro of ; he purposed completing his task by adding an account of the ’ same author s views on the world of reality , but this part of

his work was never carried out , and was supplied at a later

date by another Narayana , who was patronised by M ana aila hi o deva , king of S bd ; the work is interesting as sh wing how far the school of Kumarila went in appropriating the — i ika views of the Nyaya Va Ses philosophy . a l Of the other systems it is the Ny ya , and ater the com b ined a - Vai e ika school of Ny ya S s , which throws the most light m a d a Sil tra on the M ima s . The Ny y deals critically with m the Mima sa doctrine of the eternity of the word , and 3 Kumarila and Prabhaka ra alike appear to have developed their philosophical tenets under the influence of the contro versy on logic which took place between the Nyaya school Di na a Dharma ki rti and the B uddhists , especially g g and on the other hand ; Kumarila attacked both o f these writers

' ' N a av a rttika Udd otakara and was clearly aware of the y y of y , in which the orthodox Nyaya view was set out in refutation ’ Di n a am a a s . of g g onslaughts On the other hand , the Mim s ’ views are freely disputed in Vacaspati Misra s comment o n ’ Uddyotakara and in Jayanta Bh atta s Nydya mafij ari Varada ’ ’ T rkika ra k d a ana s raj a s d s , and Ud y works , much of the ' Ku sumdnj ali being expressly devo ted to dealing with Mimamsa criticisms of the doctrine of the creation of the

1 1 Ed o e e a m 1900 . Ed . T i a d um 19 12 . C nj v r , r v n r , 1 ’ ’ Pra ka ran a a ii cika . 47 6 d s usses Dh armaki rti s ews o f p , pp , 4, i c vi d f perceptio n an in erence . DEVELOPM ENT A ND LIT ERARY H ISTORY 15

' ’ Tattvacinta mani Garr eéa s world . The of g repeatedly attack ‘ the Mimarnsa views of the nature and validity of proof , and the controversy is continued in the voluminous literature

based on that important text , and in the short text books of the combined school of Nyaya- Va l ses i ka I n his commentary ’ ' Pra as a ada Bha a Sridhara on S t p s sy , from the point of view Va i e ika am a of the S s deals freely with Mim s views , moreover , ‘ the Jain Haribhadra (ninth century) includes in his Sa ddars a n a sam a a Guna ratna ucc y , commented on by , an account of the ' M imarnsa Sarva siddh , and there are ch a pters upon it in the

' antasam ra ha arnka ra a g , falsely ascribed to S , and in M dha ’ rva rso nasom raha va s Sa da g . The former work deals separ ately with the doctrines of Pra bhaka ra and Kumarila ; it betrays its late character by its attempt to show that Prab ha Kum rila kara was the pupil o f a , and by converting the doc il o trine of Kumar a int a form of the Ved anta . The work of M adhava gives a long specimen of the conflicting views o f the two schools as to the interpretation of the opening of

' Stttra o the , and contains an interesting exp sition of the

arguments for and against the eternity of the Veda , and the

- o self evidence of cogniti n . ’ 1 a anta Bha a s o is J y tt w rk of special interest , as i t is the am a product of a member of a family skilled in the Mim s , Pra b hak ara his w and its author freely attacks and follo ers , ’ ’ lo ka va rttik and repeatedly cites the S a . The author s grand father was confirmed in his faith In the efficacy of sacrifice by obtaining as the result of one o ff ering the village of Gauramfi laka t , doub less from a king of Kashmir , for ’ a anta s - aktisvamin wa s J y great grandfather , S , a minister M ukta i a Lalit it a I of p d , better known as ad y . ncidentally Jayanta affords a welcome confirmation of the d ate of Vaca s ati 1 2 s . 0 p Mi ra , whom he quotes (pp , for , ’ Lali di a s 7 3 A D ta t 5 . . as y reign ended about , it is impossible to place Jayanta later than the second half of the ninth t century , and hence the dispu ed era of the year 89 8

’ given by Vacaspati himself a s the date of his Nyayasaci

1 Ed . Be a es 1895 . His u o a o f o m Vacas a ti o n Su II n r , q t ti n r p tra , 1 , 32 is f d Hi so n A in nd o u at . 312 . s b h a a w o e K a ri , n p , , r t the da mb a ka tha ara and i ed . 900 . D T ho mas Ka vindr a a l v c A , ava c nas a mu cc ya p é0 16 THE KARMA - M IMAMSA

‘ must be taken as falling in the Sarnvat reckoning as 84 1 A D tells stron l . . This date , it may be added , g y against any ’ 1 w arnkara effort to bring do n the date of S , on whose ' ar ra ka bh a a V cas a ti Bhamati S i sy a p wrote the , and the same conclusion is favoured by the view that M a ndana s o Vacas ati Mi ra , on wh se work p also commented , was a m pupil of Sa kara . Vara a r o d aja also claims , with obvi us truth , to have been ' 2 an expert in M imarnsa; he was evidently familiar with ’ alikanatha s s work , and his commentator fortunately preserves for us a fragment of the Pra meyaparayan a chapter of the ’ M Pra ka ra n a a hcika S. p , no of which has yet been discovered , ’ Prab haka ra s which gives an authentic list of categories .

1 - S. V . Venkat swara 1916 . 151 62 o es his e , pp ) ign r t ’ d - a o h a e evidence in giving Samka ra s ate as 805 897 A .D . He c nn t v d d 8 . o r so . i e la ter than 25 A O . 1 Ed Be a es 1903 . 364 . . n r , , p

18 THE KARMA- M IMAMSA

between the two sets of instances can only be supplied by to reference an external factor , which is fatal to the belief a in intrinsic validity or the reverse . Therefore , the Ny ya

argues , it is best to accept the doctrine that apprehensi o n or o auth ri cognition is intrinsically unauth ritative , and its o ta tiveness in any special case is derived from the perfection of

. o the cause of the apprehension This d ctrine , it is pointed o out , explains the case of dream consci usness ; it is invalid n o because there is perfection in its cause , while the waking

' consci o usness may be valid i f it is due to a perfect source ;

i f , however , the source is vitiated , when the sense organs are

defective , the apprehension is doubtful or erroneous , while — in the case of non apprehension there is no defect in the

cause , but absence of cause . o f K umarila The reply is that , i f apprehension were not o so in itself valid , it c uld not be made by any external power . i A prehension needs , indeed , an originating cause , but t p j does not depend on any external cause for its power of n ascertaining the true nature of thi gs . The conclusive l argument is that , i f the va idity of a cognition is deemed on o dependent the perfecti n of its source , then there must be o to o r an o ther cogniti n guarantee the c rrectness of the sou ce , a d i n nitu m o and so fi , and such a pr cess is illegitimate , at Ku marila who o not least in the eyes of , d es appreciate the o f p ossibility regarding truth as a complete system , in which o n no all parts are dependent one another , and there is simple All n primary truth . cases of apprehensio , therefore , are ri ma a ci e p f valid , and , i f cognitions are erroneous or to doubtful , that is , due defects in their causes , while non o to apprehensi n is due the absence of any cause , as on the K rila uma . Nyaya theory , with which agrees in this regard The recogniti o n o f the non- validity of an apprehension establishes itself most simply when a subsequent cognition C o fo r w sublates an earlier ogniti n , instance , hen the erroneous “ j udgment , This is silver , is supplanted by the correct ” - - o f . judgment , This is mother pearl More indirectly the fo rmer judgment can be sublated by another judg

ment , based on the recognition of the defect of the cause ; “ thus the proposition , The shell is yellow , may be sub n lated by the further j udgment , The eye is j au diced . THE PROBLEM O F KNOWLEDGE

is is Normally , however , a j udgment valid , and accepted as as valid without question ; only if , for any reason , such is distance , doubt possible , are further cognitions sought ; i f is then a sublating cognition found , and on further investiga

tion it is not sublated either directly or indirectly , then the

falsity of the first cognition appears ; i f , on the other hand ,

the sublating cognition is itself sublated , the validity of the i first cognition s fully established . Thus , in lieu of the r r ss s i n i n nitum eg e a fi of the Nyaya theory , no more than three or four cognitions are necessary to establish the validity

of any cogn ition , or , to put it more precisely , to negate the objections which may be adduced to impair its normal

validity . 1 Pra bhakara similarly maintains the validity of all cogni as m tions such , and illustrates , in an interesting anner , the — diverse modes in which apparent non validity arises . When — - of mother pearl is mistaken for silver , the error is due to the fact that the percipient observes in the object p resented to to him the qualities common the shell and the silver , and omits to notice those which differentiates the two ; memory

thus brings back to him the cognition of silver , and this is cognition itself real , leading no less than the actual perception of silver to the normal action of seeking h to take up the object . Memory ere plays the percipient

false , for it does not present the silver as connected with

something formerly perceived , thus differentiating it

from the object actually before the eyes , and this failure

. S is due to a certain weakness of the mind imilarly , memory is to blame when we mistake one direction fo r another ; the real direction is not seen , and the wrong In is remembered . the dream state the cogni tions

which arise are erroneous , in as much as the things seen

seem to be directly apprehended , whereas they are only

remembered . The factor of apprehension on a previous s occasion is lo t sight of , thus obliterating the essential distinction between what is apprehended and what is

re membered . The presentation of impressions in sleep is

1 ’ Pra ka an a a nei k - r p a , pp. 32 38 ; Bha ndarka r Co mmemorati on - olume . 167 0 . V , pp 7 THE KARMA- MIMAM SA due O n to the peration of the unsee principle , that is the ’ destiny begotten of man s previous acts , which thus secures to man pleasure or pain in due course . In i n other cases the explanation rests , not on the nterve tion of memory , but on fusion of impressions . Thus the white shell appears as yellow as a result of j aundice , the o cogniti n being a blend of the shell perceived without colour , ‘ and the yellowness of the bile in the eye , perceived without its So substratum . the bilious man feels sugar bitter , because his taste is a blend of the sugar and bile . The vision of two moons is due to a lack Of co - ordination o f the rays of light which issue from the eyes and bring back the images . In the case of merely doubtful cognitions the explanation of their character is that some object is seen as possessed of a quality which produces two discrepant remembrances ; n n thus , see at a dista ce a tall object may be either a pillar , or an ascetic buried in meditation and motionless . As the Mimamsa differs from the Nyaya in its view of the validity of cognitions , so it differs in its attitude to the In mode in which a cognition itself is apprehended . the Nyaya view this is an act of mental perceptio n ( mana sa praty a k a Vi iianavada s ) , and the j school of Buddhism holds the opinion that one cognition is known by another , though , a going further than the Ny ya , it draws the conclusion that , if o the first c gnition is to be apprehended by the second , it o must have form , and form therefore does not bel ng to any

a . am a a s external reality , as the Ny ya holds The Mim s 1 early as the Vrttikara maintains that in apprehension it is a rth avi a a hi the object that is perceived , not the cognition ( s y ra t o k a b uddhih no As p y s , expounded by r sa mvit - Pra b haka a , consciousness ( ) , which is self illumined , o co ni is c gnised , but not as an object of cognition , but as g m n ata ta oiva hi s amuil sa ved a a sa mved a . tion ( s o mvit y y , y y )

To say that the cognition is unknown is absurd , since the cognitio n of things is possible only i f the cognition is known . The mode in which cognition is kno wn is inference ; in its inference we grasp the existence of a thing only , not

’ 1 - am a atra . 9 l. 16 ct. Pra ka rana a ncika . 56 63 Mim s S , p , ; p , pp

darsan as amucca a . 289 290 . Sa d y , pp , T HE PROBLEM O F KNOWLEDGE 1 concrete form ; we learn the presence of fire on the mountain not ee from its smoke , but we do s the actual form of the C t fire . ognition , therefore , we infer from the fact hat we know things ; it , therefore , may be classed as an object of ra me o o f proof (p y ) , since it is arrived at by the use infer ramana is ence , which is a means of proof (p ) , but it not an ’ 1 In Kumarila s object of direct apprehension . doctrine also

- this view appears , though the doctrine of self illumination is rejected ; the perception of any object does not result in a further cognition of the perception , but in the direct o apprehensi n of the object , and every act of perception involves a relation ( s omb andha ) between the self and the object ; this relation implies action on the part of the self as w agent , and this action constitutes the cognition , hich is inferred from the relationship between the self and the object . From this point of view it is possible to understand the definition of thevalid apprehension given by Parth asara thi s as a re Mi ra that which , being free from discrepancies , pp 2 hends things not previously apprehended . This definition does not really derogate from the principle of the self evidence of cognitions ; the qualification of freedom fro m discrepancies merely lays stress o n the fact that it is the absence of a sublating cognition which assures us in case o of question of the validity of a cognition , while the c ndi tion that the thing in questi o n should not have been i previously apprehended s not a new factor , but merely a formal expression of the essential n ature of apprehension . The exact process of cogniti o n as explained in the ’ ' ' 3 Siddha ntamu Itatava li consists in the production in the fi atata object of the quality of being cognised (j ) , and , however often we cognise the same object , nevertheless in each instance the quality in question i s generated anew . T he e was pr cise character of the doctrine , i t is clear , largely determined by the desire to avoid the difficulty of

1 M a m o da a . 0 Ta i r Cf . Sas tra di i a . 37 an e 1 r ka o p k , p ; y y , p 3 ; k ksa, f pp. 39 f . 2 Sas tra di ika 28 . p , p. 3 8 cf . K fi a li IV . P. 11 ; usu ma j , 1 22 THE KARMA - M IMAMSA

w the infinite regress , hich seemed to be involved in the theory that a cognition could only be known through the o f instrumentality another cognition , and perhaps still more n o by the aim of avoidi g the c nclusion , which was derived I from this doctrine by the dealist school of B uddhism , that there existed no self , but merely a series of cognitions , held am together by no substantial unity . To the Mim sa such a doctrine was naturally anathema , since the essence of the sacrificial ritual lay in the fact that there was a self who could profit by the performance of sacrifices , not merely in I this world but after death . t might have been hard to convince men that sacrifices were worth performing, if the o ut f o r only reward held had been success in this life , facts would too often have controverted the claim that sacrifices were availing ; when the reward was predicted for the verifi ca next world , the issue was removed from empirical tio n . But the denial of the possibility of introspection thus o necessitated was obvi usly a real difficulty , and rendered the

' imarnsa a M view less plausible than that of the Ny ya , which accepted cogniti o n ( vyava s aya ) and as supervening upon it o o n u as a a consciousness of c gniti n ( a vyav y ) . The dis advantage o f the Nyaya view was that it tended to ignore the ' h Mimarns a fact , whic was strongly emphasised in the , of the o necessary implicati o n of the subject in all cogniti n . The o an distinction between the c gnition d the subject , which possesses it , is illustrated clearly in the case of sleep ; in it , the school holds , there is no cognition normally , and apparently n no cogniser or object of cognitio , yet the existence of both , despite sleep, is proved by the fact of remembrance of o n o is no t dreams . The kn wi g subject , theref re , , like the

- cognition , self illumined , though as to its exact character

Pra bh aka ra and Ku marila are far from agreed . Of forms o f apprehension or co gnition Prabhakara fi ve " recognises perception , in ference , analogy , scripture or Ku marila verbal testimony , and presumption ; while accepts

- also non perception or negation , in accordance with the view r ikara of the V tt , who thus supplements the bare mention of o fi tra I 1 as percepti n in the S ( , , where it is defined the contact of the sense organs with the object , which must be T e actually present . h analysis of perception given by T HE PRO B LEM O F KNOWLEDGE 23

Pra bhakara shows on every hand clear trace of derivation a Vai se ik a from the views of the Ny ya and s , which again o are ultimately based on popular psychol gy , such as appears

fi tf ully in the Upani sads and in B uddhist texts . The essential feature is contact between the object and the o rgan of sense , which is essentially something real ; but the unity Of consciousness makes it clear that there must be a further contact between the organ and the self , whether directly or mediately . The fact that , despite the presence of objects in o contact with the senses , there may be no cogniti n of them , o pr ves that the contact cannot be direct , but must be It medi ated by an instrumentality called mind . is this which prevents all facts being always and at once present to a a the self , and it is this which perceives ple sure and p in and I brings them home to the self . t is through the mind also e o that the s lf experiences desire , aversion , and v lition . But mind has no qualities , such as colour , smell or taste , and therefore f o r the cognition of colour it needs the aid of an organ which possesses that quality , namely , the eye , which to possess colo ur as its distinctive quality must be possessed of light ; similarly there must be the nose , composed of earth , o for the cognition of smell ; the tongue , c mposed of water , for o o the c gnition of savours ; the skin , the rgan of air , for the cognition of touch ; and the ear , consisting of the ether , for the cognition of sound ; the organs themselves bei ng imper i l cept b e.

This doctrine , of course , rests on metaphysical grounds and assumes in its treatment of the organs the doctrine that like must be kno wn by like . The deduction of the ex is tence and atomic size of mind by Prab haka ra rests on the 1 is basis of a doctrine of causation which different from , a a i but allied to , that of the Ny y , and which s applied to explain the partial and evanescent characteristics o f our

. C experience auses are either material or immaterial , the con un latter head covering all the circumstances which , in j c tion with a material cause , result in an effect . The immaterial or non - inherent cause may subsist either in the

1 ‘ - Pra ka ra na a ricika . 52 54 cf . Slo ka varttika I 1 4 p , pp ; , , , , vv . 157 ff 24 T HE KARMA - M IMAMSA

material or inherent cause , or in the material cause of that ‘ i cause ; thus , when by contact with the fire smell s generated

in a substance , the immaterial cause is the contact with the

fire , and the contact subsists in the substance itself , while ,

in the case of the colour of a mat , the colours of the yarns

which cause the colour of the mat subsist in the yarns ,

which are the material cause of the mat . In the case of a perception the soul is the material cause , and , s the soul is

uncaused , the immaterial cause must subsist in it ; in a

substance , like the soul , only a quality can subsist , and therefore the immaterial cause of perception must be a

quality of the soul , and this can only be some contact with an

independent substance , just as the colour of the earth atom

is produced by contact with fire . This independent sub b e - stance cannot all pervading like space or time , contact with which is from their nature as all - pervading out of the question ; it must therefore be atomic , and the only substance which fulfils the necessary condition is mind , residing in the

body ensouled by the self , and possessing the power of swift motion , by which it can form a rapid series of contacts , giving the appearance of simultaneity in our mental life . o The deduction is ingeni us , but unconvincing ; it is significant o f a of the consciousness the g p between the self and the body , which it seeks to bridge by the mediation of the atomic and therefore corporeal , but yet eternal substance , mind . Of greater philosophical significance is the attitude of the school to the vexed question of the nature of perception as determinate or indeterminate ( savikalpaka or nirvikol o ke N a a Satre I 1 4 p ) . The y y ( , , ) poses the problem in its famous definition of perception as knowledge produced by the contact of the sense organ and the object , consist ing of a determination which does not require definiti o n by i v o hicari name ( evyepedesye ) and s not discrepant ( a y b ) .

The precise of this declaration is far from certain , as the Vats a ana Udd otakara ambiguities of the commentors , y y , y , V as ati s Di na a and ac p Mi ra , clearly show , but g g and Dh armaki rti developed a perfectly definite theory in which a clear distinction was drawn between the element n of sense in perception and the function of imaginatio . In the narrowest sense perception is without imagination

26 T HE KARMA - M IMAMSA

Kumarila o , though their verbal expressi n differs Kumarila holds that in cognition in the form o f indeterminate perception neither the genus nor the diff erentia is presented to conscio us ness , and that all that is present is the individual in which both

. Prabh kar these characteristics subsist Like a a , he holds that determinate perception is no less valid than indeterminate n perceptio , since it merely makes explicit what is implicit in the indeterminate fo rm . The views of the school are best understood when brought into contact with the metaphysical doctrine to which they correspond . The essence of that doctrine accepts generality as a real existence which is perceptible a s o f much as individual things , and in the simplest form o percepti n , therefore , the two aspects of reality are equally present .

The obj ects of perception include , besides generalities , Kumarila substances , qualities , and , in the view of , but not

Prab hakara . a of , motion The Ny ya holds that there are six forms of contact in perception ; substance is perceived by conjunction ; qualities by their inherence in what is in o conjunction , and so als the generality of substance ; generality of quality by inherence in that which inheres in that which is in conjunction ; sound as a quality of o ether , a portion of which forms the rgan of hearing, is perceived by inherence , and its generality by inherence in o that which inheres , while negati n and inherence itself are perceived by a peculiar and artificial variety of contact , styled the relation of qualification and qualified . Prabhakara , though he accepts the doctrine of inherence , o o denies genus to quality , m tion , and sound , and so c ntents himself with recognising the first , second , and fourth o forms of contact as valid , and with p inting out that to perceive qualities , there is requisite the contact of the substance and the organs , of the organs and the qualities , Sub of the organs and mind , and of mind and the self .

may . In stance and qualities , he holds , be perceived apart ’ rila s Kuma school , however , which denies inherence , the contacts are reduced to simple conjunction , and identity o em u ktatadatm e with what is in conj uncti n ( s y y ) , the second covering perception of generality of substance , quality and THE PRO BLEM O F KNOWLEDGE 7

motion , while the generalities of these two can be perceived by a relationship o f identity with that which is identical with that which is in conj unction . A a further technicality , also found in the Ny ya , is the discussion of the exact nature of the means of proof and its “ If Pra m n a result . the term a is understood as means of ” o proof , then percepti n denotes one or other of the contacts o an d between bject organ , organ and mind , mind and soul , each of which is essential to the result (phele ) in this case I Pram n a the mental percept . f , however , a denotes the cognition itself , then perception signifies the mental its percept , and result is the attitude of acceptance , rejection , or indifference of the subject to the object presented to him I n the cognition . 1 Inference in the view of the Vrttikara is the apprehen b sion of a thing not efore the subject , by reason of the perception of some other thing, between which and the first

object we know an invariable connection to exist . The Prabh kara relation , according to a , must be both general and constant ; examples are the relatio n between the class and the individuals ; substance and quality ; the qualities of the

same substance ; or cause and effect . Smoke stands in an o vice verse invariable relati n to fire , but not , for on the I o ih ndian view gl wing iron emits no smoke . Even ’ divid ual events may thus be related in Kumarila s view ; thus the sight of the constellati o n Krttika suggests the

proximity of Rohini . How , then , is this relation to be " a recognised The Ny ya view , when it realised the question as Di na a a result of the introduction by g g and , following PraSasta ada o f him , p the conception of a universal relation v a ti o ship ( y p ) in lieu of mere reasoning by anal gy , found refuge in the devel opment of a tran scendental perception z e la ukike ra t e ks e ( p y ) , by which in perceiving , for example , o fire and smoke , the percipient rec gnised not merely the

1 ’ ’ - M im ni a Sittre . r k n e s 10 P e ara a e ri ika . 8 l . p ; p c , pp 64 7 ; S oka

- - vartti ka . 345 405 M ane me ode e . 1 1 46 N e e m fi eri , pp ; y y , pp ; y y e j , pp.

- Ato mi . 109 41 Lo ic a nd s m t 11 ch . . g , p , iii 1 T he Mimarh sa e e s who the e e o o f Yo i s whi h r j ct lly p rc pti n g n , c is th ecurso r o f h s ea the ea N a a cf N emaii eri p t i id in rly y y ; yay j , PP' gs é 28 T HE KARMA -MIMAMSA

connection of the individual fire and smoke perceived by o him , but that of fire and sm ke in their general aspect . Pra bhak a ra , however , does not recognise this view , the o elaborati n of which is characteristic of a later epoch . He denies that sense perception can give the knowledge

of a universal connection , since it deals only with particular times and places ; he a lso rejects the view that the connection can rest on inference or presump o r r ss i n tion , since obviously thus there w uld be a eg e a s i nfinitum; nor will he accept the View that it is due to Di na a mental activity only , as suggested by the doctrine of g g , i since i f the mind had this power , why is man not omn s cient "His o wn view is that fire and smoke are perceived by

sense as in relation to each other , as qualified by certain

conditions of place and time . By repeated experience the o impressi n is gained that , while the presence of smo ke is o f always accompanied by the presence fire , the reverse o relati n does not hold , but is qualified always , unlike the

former , by special conditions of place and time . Hence emerges the recognition of the permanent relati on o f smoke and fire , so that the sight of smoke immediately produces o the conception of fire . He admits that we d not by o inference arrive at any knowledge which we had not bef re , but he does no t admit that this is any defect to the inferem tial process , which does not involve novelty of result . The o f Kum rila defi ni school a , however , in accordance with its tion of apprehensi o n as involving knowledge of something o not previously apprehended , p ints out , with perfect truth , that the actual inference gives us much more than the mere o knowledge of the connecti n of smoke and fire , which is already known ; it enables us to infer the presence , at a and o particular time place beyond our visi n , of the existence 1 f Cidan anda of fire as result o the perception of smoke . recognises also the part played by the redu ctio a d a bsurdum in arriving at the knowledge of the universal connection . o The relationship , however , which aff rds the basis of inference , need not refer merely to things which fall within the limits of perception (dystesvela ksen e ) ; matters which

1 M n eme o da a . 15 . a y y , p THE PROBLEM OF KNo WLEDGE

are supersensuous ( edrstasvelaksane ) may equally be in ferred ; thus Prabhaka ra deduces from the general principle of the relation of cause and effect the existence of the ik i i e. . . In V tt ara d st nc capacity , g of fire to burn the r the ti o n appears as pratye ksa to drstesamb a ndh a and Samanyato drs es emb endhe t , terminology reminiscent at once of the Nyayo Satra and of Praéastapada ; the latter is illustrated by the inference to the sun ’ s movement from the observation ’ of a man s change of place as following on movement . Di n a a PraSasta ada Following g g and p , but in disagree N a e iltra ment with the orthodox commentators on the y y S , am a the Mim s distinguishes between the inference for oneself , is which the true logical process , and that for another , which is in reality enunciation for another person of the process of

reasoning , which leads to his drawing the conclusion already ’ In arrived at by the first person . inference for one s self t is the process is tha something perceived , and recognised as is inva riably connected with something else , which thus recalled to the mind ; in inference for another a formal o order of statement is usually adopted . First the pr position b lished h to b e esta e. . T e _ is enunciated , g mountain is ” fiery , the enunciation serving to bring before the mind any

contrary j udgment which might sublate it . Then the ground for the conclusion thus set out is given in the form

of a general rule , supported by a corroborative instance , e . g . “

as . Where there is smoke , there is fire , in a kitchen

Finally , the necessary link between the conclusion and the general principle is supplied by the statement that the “

e. o middle term exists in the subject , g. The m untain is ” o smoking. The order of the pr positions is not regarded as of importance by Prabhaka ra or the other members of the

school , who agree in rejecting the more complicated scheme

a 5. of the Ny ya in which , with certain redundancy due to its origin in dialectic the argument is expounded in the five

e. . i propositions , g The mountain is fiery ; Because it s is smoking ; Where there is smoke there fire , as in a kitchen ; And this ( mountain ) is so ( possessed o f smoke With which fire is invariably concomitant) ; Therefore is it thus The omission of the last two members is no material injury to the scheme , while B uddhist logici ans 30 THE KARMA- MIMAM SA

reduce the scheme to two members only . The retention of the example is due to the o rigin of inference as a process of reasoning by simple analogy ; even when the necessity of a universal connection was asserted by Dign aga and adopted PraSasta ada by p and his followers , the example was religiously attained , and it is not until the latest days of the Nyaya that we find La ugaksi Bhaskara declaring that the u rfl i example is a mere s pe u ty. B ut Pra bhakara and the scho ol of Kumarila are agreed in insisting on the use of positive instances only , rejecting the process of argument from such a general proposition as , Where there is no fire , ” o K rila there there is no sm ke , as in a lake , though uma as himself recognises its utility , though not its necessity , or , in the Buddhist view , sole validity . In o the case of in ference als there arises the problem , ' in re ard already seen g to perception , of the exact force of Anumana the term and the corresponding result . If An umana to I C is used as equivalent nferential ognition , An umiti which is more precisely designated , then the fruit in iff r or result is the attitude of acceptance , rejection or d e sub ect o ence assumed by the knowing j _ t the inferred result . If Anuman a , however , is referred to the means by which o the c gnition is attained , there is a divergence of view as to the exact process to which the name should be applied . The most immediate cause of inference is the perception of “

e . the middle term or minor proposition , . g The mountain ” i o a s smoking , but a m re scientific Ny ya view accepts as Anumana the true the whole mental process , including the consciousness of the relation between the middle and the re major terms , through which the major term comes to be p

icated e . . . d of the minor term , g fire of the mountain The result in either cas e is the inferential cognition itself . The doctrine o f fallacies is deduced both by Prabhaka ra and by Kumarila from the definition given by the Vrttikara Pra bhak a ra o of the nature of inference . Thus h lds that the o co nditi n , that the relation between the two terms whence the inference is deduced , must be previously known , precludes all those cases styled in logic cases of the too restricted middle a s adharen e ( ) , where the middle term , which it is proposed is to use as a basis of proof , connected with the subject THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 31

1nf rence of the e alone , thus permitting no further conclusion . Earth , for example , has odour , but nothing further can be derived from this unique relationship .

Again the relation must be universally valid , a rule which excludes the too general middle It is impossible to prove that sound is eternal because it can be known , since many things can be known and yet are not eternal . The necessity of some relation existing excludes the variety of middle term known as annulled to prove sound eternal because it is a product is impossible , since the character of being a product

o n . is flatly inc nsiste t with eternity Finally , the necessity , that the middle term should be perceived as the basis of the attribution of the major to the minor , excludes the variety of middle term kno wn a s unreal ( e siddhe ) ; thus the per ception by the Buddha of righteousness and unrighteousness on the ground of his omniscience is an illegitimate argu o f ment , since the omniscience the B uddha has never been i perceived . No other form of fallacy of the middle s accepted by Pra bhaka ra he rejects the Nyaya view of the fallacy of the counter- balanced middle ( setprotipekse ) ; e im rce . . e which balances against the argument , g of the p p tibilit y of air because of its lack of colour , the argument of ’ i Pr h ar its perceptibility because of ts tangibility . a b ak a s argument is that it is not possible for contradictory predi cates , such as lack of colour and tangibility , are thus assumed to be , to exist in respect of one subject ; hence one two is is of the alleged inferences wholly invalid , and there i no true counterbalancing . He holds that really contrad c tory inferences are possible only of some subject whose is nature unknown , in which case , however , in the absence o of the essential kn wn relation , no true inference is attain able . The views of Kumarila do not differ materially from those of Prabhakara ; he classifies the too restricted and the too general fallacies under the head of doubtful e neikantike ( ) , and adds as a third class the case of con flictin g inferences , which he accepts , contrary to the views of ra bh ka P a ra . Of the unreal ( a siddho ) and the contra dictor ub - I y types of fallacy he gives various s divisions . n 32 THE KARMA- MIMAM SA this and in his elaborate examination of the generality saman e o f ( y ) , which lies at the basis inference , he shows plainly his close relation to the Nyaya and his polemic In against the B uddhist views . accord with the older view o P h k r accepted in Buddhist l gic , rab a a a recognises not o f o h etu merely fallacies the gr und ( ) , but also of the minor oks a drs tante o f ( p ) , the example ( ) , and even the proposi tion which in the Nyaya view are all reduced to special cases of fallacies of the ground . Analogy or comparison is accepted by both schools of 1 am a Vrttikara o f Mim s with the , but their view the exact nature of this form of proo f difl ers from that of the Nyaya generally , which accepts analogy as a distinct form of proof . In the Nyaya view the process results in the cognition u o u that an object , hitherto nkn wn , when bro ght within the range of perception , is recognised , by reason of its similarity to something already known , to be the object designated by a name communicated by some person of experience . Thus a man who has never seen a buffalo in his li fe is informed by a forester that the buffalo is like the cow on entering the waste he sees an animal similar in appearance to the cow , and formulates the j udgment , f ” This thing is a buf alo . The precise force of the j udg o o ment is disputed in the school , but the best pini n is that it applies not merely to the single animal seen , but that the precipient acquires a correct apprehension of the specific f 2 o f o . nature the whole class buf al Thus , as Udayan a says , the effect of this means of proof is to give a clear un der standing of the meaning of a word , though he rejects the 3 Bhas a rva ii a o a view , held by j and his f llowers in the Ny ya school , that analogy can be reduced to a particular instance of verbal testimo ny as well as that of the

Va i e ika o . S s , which reduces anal gy to inference The

' Mimarnsa view o f the analogical co gnition is that it consists

1 ‘ - 43 n fi ik . 1 10 1 Slo ka ve rttika . 3 . ka r a e c a 2 P 10 ; Pra a p , pp ; , pp

- 293 . 0 M an a me o d a . 47 5 1 a de rsa n a sa mu cca a . 292 5 ; y oy , pp S d y , pp , ' 1 - - K u m n a li 111 8 12 N a a ma ii a ri . 14 1 49 Tarki s u a j , , ; y y j , pp ;

- ka ra ksa . 84 93 . , pp 3 mu cca a N a esara . 30 31 . T he a ew a dda rsa n e sa y y , pp , J in vi ( S y ,

. 205 206 edu es to e o o 3 fo m o f Pa ro k a . pp , ) r c it r c gniti n , r s

34 THE KARMA - MIMAMSA

man who is alive is not in his house , we must assume that he has gone out , in order to make our thinking consistent with our perception . To give rise to presumption there Prab hakara must , holds , be doubt , which the presumption removes , and this element serves to distinguish presumption from inference , since inference can only begin when a certain

e . . fact , g the existence of smoke , is known with perfect K ’ certainty . On the other hand umarila s view is that pre sumption is impossible , i f the original fact were in doubt ; it is only because the absence of the man from his house is for certain known that it can come into operation ; the origin of presumption lies rather in the apparent inconsistency of ’ two equally certain facts , in this case , the man s absence and his being alive , which leads to the enunciation of a presumption to reconcile the apparent discrepancy , and it is this reconciliation of apparent discrepancies which marks out presumption from inference . The Nyaya on the contrary finds place for presumption under the purely keve lav eti reki n negative ( y ) form of in ference , in which it is impossible to adduce a positive instance of the general am a i rule , but the Mim s could not accept this view s nce it declined to regard the use of the negative form in inference as satisfactory . 1 Unlike the Nyaya the Vrttikara accepts non- existence

- or , as it is also termed , non apprehension

a nu elebdhi o f . ( p ) , as a separate means proof The argu ment in favour o f this view adopted by Kumarila is that the absence of any thing, e . g . of a j ar on a particular spot o of ground , cann t be the object of direct perception , which

' o Mi mamsa admittedly , acc rding to the definition o f the tre Sa , requires a present contact with the organs of sense , he nor can it arrived at by inference , analogy , presumption It or verbal testimony . can only arise into an object of knowledge through the fact that none of the normal methods o o of cogniti n can come into operati n , and this peculiarity bhakara . Pra distinguishes it from any of these means ,

1 - i l k a . 7 0 re ke ren a a hc ka . 18 5 S a v rttika 4 3 . 1 P 1 2 o P ; p , pp ; , pp ' - - - ane me o da e . 8 62 1 14 18 c f . N a e mo fi e ri . 49 54 92 ; M y y , pp 5 , y y j , pp - s e e m the a s a d dda rse n a s e mu cca a . 295 98 i r fu d f o Sa y , pp ; it t r J in t n

- o i b id . . 206 7 p int , pp . THE PRO BLEM O F KNO WLEDGE 5

a i e ika with the Nyaya and V S s , declines to accept non sa apprehension as a distinct means of proof . When we y, “ ” The j ar is not on the ground , all that we mean is that , i f the j ar were on the ground , we would perceive it there , but that as a matter of fact we see the ground alone . The o f seeing the ground is mere perception , and the further statement is merely a qualificati o n o f what is perceived in n terms of something which , formerly seen alo g with it , is n I n not o w present . this there is no separate mental a pro cess leading to proof . The Ny ya also escapes the difficulty by adopting a peculiar doctrine of its own , under - a which non existence , reg rded as a positive entity , is perceived by a peculiar mode of contact known as the relation of qua lifier and qualified . r Prabhakara Whether , howeve , four , with , or , with the “ t ik r Kumarila fi Vrt a a and , ve means of proof other than o o verbal testim ny or scripture are reck ned , all these means o f proof are subject to the defect that they do not avail to ’ o f determine the nature Dharma , man s duty and righteous

' Strtra I 1 4 ness . This is established by the ( , , ) for the case of perception ; that means of pro o f deals only with existing things which can be brought into co ntact with the o is rgans of sense , but duty is a th ing which not already ’ to existing , but needs man s action bring it to fruition , and duty is not tangible so as to be able to come into contact I with the organs . nference , analogy , presumption , and

- to non apprehension , all have relation perception , and for “ that reason are vitiated by the defects of the latter , as we Vrttikara a i i gather from the , who thus supplements J m n i . aimini On the other hand , J declares that the relation of the its word to meaning is natural and eternal , and Vedic inj une tions are , therefore , the source of knowledge of duty , which o f is something not open to ordinary means apprehension . B ar Such injunctions are authoritative , according to ad ayana ' Mi mams e Sil i ra inde n as cited in the , because of thei r pe d 1 In V ttikara ence . the definition of the r scriptural cognition sastre is ( ) the cognition of some thing , which is not percept

1 pp - 70 ; S a ka ’ va rtti ka . 405 33 498 ff 728 ff M eneme ode e . 40 47 , pp , , ; y y , pp ; cf . N a n i ff ff y ya ma j a r , pp, 150 , 205 . 36 THE KARMA - MIMAMSA

o f ible , through the instrumentality intelligible sounds , that o is words . wh se meaning is known . The further analysis o f Prabhak ara shows that each word is co mpo sed of letters a which are sever lly apprehended , impressions of the earlier letters blending with that produced by the cognition of the to o f last letter bring about the idea the whole word , which alone has the power to bring about the comprehensi o n of a

. T he single definite meaning letters , then , are the means of o o verbal c gnition , since it is they which by c mbination compose the word and bring about the co mprehension of its Kumaril ra h k meaning . With a P b a ara agrees in disregard ’ oo o o f S ho a ing the grammatical sch l s d ctrine p t , an entity which is invented to meet the diffi culty felt by the grammar ians as to the po ssibility of any co mbination of impressi o ns

from individual letters producing the unity , which enables to us comprehend the meaning of a word , and in this view a a Va rses ika Sam the Ved nta , Ny ya , and khya are at one with am a o o the Mim s , leaving the Y ga nly to support the doctrine 1 of the grammarians . The meaning of words is declared by Jaimin i to be natural ( eutpettike ) and Prabhaka ra insists on the fact that words cannot be supposed to owe their meanings to conven o f tion , whether human or divine . The view the school in this regard can h ardly be regarded as anything else than an attempt to bring the doctrine o f verbal testimony into har

mony with their traditional beliefs in the nature in the Veda , which do ubtless long preceded their speculations on the

n ature of the relation o f word and meaning . The Nyaya n view , that meanings were give to words by a convention due am a to the action of God , offended the Mim s belief that the

Veda had no creator , and that no God , as understood by the o co n Nyaya , existed . The alternative of human conventi n tradicted flatly the Mimarh sa belief that the essential function of the Veda was to lay down inj unctions for the perfo rmance o y a arve of actions , whence arose an invisible p tenc ( p ) leading

to a desirable end , and that this potency was a thing of

1 - M ax M u e Six S s tems . 527 44 a fu l efu a o o f the Cf . ll r , y , pp ; l r t ti n doctrine o f Bh a rtrh a ri t ha t Sa b da is the so urce o f the w orld a nd is the

t b so u e B a hma is e N a a ma fi a ri . lo wer form o f he a l t , r n , giv n in y y j , pp

- a rva da rsa nesam ra he ch . . 531 36 ; cf . S g , xiii T HE PROBLEM O F KNOWLE DGE 37

which no person , save through the Veda , could have any knowledge . The Nyaya argument in favour of convention , derived from the case of proper names , is met by the admission that in the case of such names convention is active , but that common names stand on a different footing . k In the former case , we now that the persons or things n an so called have a begi ning in time , d that some person must have applied the names to them ; in the case of common names we have no warrant for finding a begin o ning in time for either the things or the w rds . There has been no beginning of the world or of men , and they must have from the first talked of the things of the o world , j ust as in actual life it is fr m observing the conver sation of his elders , or by their instruction , that a youth learns the meanings of words . What is still more conclusive is evidence that , unless we recognised , as we do , that words o possess of their own nature meanings , we c uld never form is the conception of conventional meanings , which a later development . The eternity of the word is established formally and at

a imini I 1 6 - z 3 o f length by J in a systematic refutation ( , , ) the objections directed against the doctrine by the Nyaya school a 1 in particular . The Ny ya holds that the eternity of the word is precluded by the fact that it is perceptible only after effort ; that it is evanescent ; that in common parlance o f men talk producing a sound , j ust as they speak of produc ing any ordinary article ; that the same word is pronounced by many people and in many places ; that words have dadh etre dedhi changes in form , such as y for ; and that , n i whe uttered by many people , the volume of sound s i in i increased . The reply of Ja m insists that the apparent a production of sound , regarded by the Ny ya as a creation , is - only a manifestation of a pre existing entity , a fact in harmony with the disappearance of words on the cessation of the mani festation , while products proper remain in being . T he analogy of the sun refutes the argument from simultaneity of perception by many persons ; the change to

1 ‘ T he Strtra II 2 23 - 59 dea s w h the o b u t in su h a a ( , , ) l it t pic , c w y as to sho w a ll ke hoo d to the in li li posteriority M imams a Sil i ra . 38 THE KARMA- MiMAMs A dadh o tra o f i y is not a modification the letter , but the substitutio n of a quite different fo rm ; increase of magnitude to o refers to the tone , not the w rd itself . Positive argu f ments for the eternity of the word are not lacking . I it were o o not so , it would fail in its purp se , the c nveying of a A . a do o f meaning to another g in , we find in point fact that men reco gnise words as being the same when uttered on o o o diverse ccasions by diverse pe ple . Language supp rts the ' M imarns a case ; when a word is repeated , we talk of ten o f o repetitions the w rd . not of ten words . Moreover , no cause for the destruction of words i s adduced , and in non r o ete nal things causes of destructi n are always to be found . o Finally , there is Vedic authority for the doctrine and n o valid counter auth rity .

The word then exists ever , but only from time to time by effo rt o n the part o f some being is it made mani fest to f not us . But ef ort is enough ; the deaf do not hear , and the effort must be supported by a suitable organ which aids in o o Of the c gniti n of the word . Through the effort on the part the speaker , the ai r from his lungs rises upwards and comes o o d into contact with the v cal ch r s , by which it is modified n in character . Passi g, then , out from the mouth , it reaches a o f n the e rs those near e ough to be affected , pro duces in their ears a change favourable to audition , and passes out , o bringing t a close the audition . The ear cavity contains a o f layer air , upon which the air current issuing from the ’ o n o speaker s mouth impinges , pr duci g the c ndition on which audition supervenes . Thus the Mimamsa rejects the primi tive conception under which , as light from the eye travels to its object and brings back vision , so the sound travels in to o some form the s urce of the sound , as held by the Jains , sam and the khya view that the sense of hearing , as all f o . It pervading, reaches the place the sound also rejects the B uddhist vie w that actual contact is unnecessary for a - Va iSes ika o o hearing , and the Ny ya d ctrine of pr pagation of sound on the analogy of waves , or the filaments of the

Kadamba flower , in the ether until it reaches the ether enclosed in the ear cavity , which , on that view , constitutes Kumarila the organ of hearing . To this opinion objects that , the ether being one and indivisible , i f one ear is THE PROBLEM O F KNOWLEDG E 39

f af ected , all ears should equally be affected , and every sound be heard by every one ; or, again , i f one man is deaf , am a everyone should no less be deaf . The Mim s evades this objection by the doctrine that the ear cavity contains air, and that it differs in size and shape from man to man . A further objection to the wave theory is also based on the fact that sounds travelling with the wind are heard at further distances than sounds travelling against the wind , which is inexplicable if the propagation of waves takes place in the ether , which , of course , is unaffected by wind .

The essential character of the word is , in the view of aimini J , not mere denotation , but injunction , a view which clearly stands in close relation to the doctrine that the meaning o f words is largely learned by the young from the observation of intercourse among the old ; one addresses the am ana a other , and the other acts as a result ; one says , g y , a the other brings the cow . Hence , as against the Ved nta , it is denied that the essence of Vedic texts lies in the making manifest of the sole existent Brahman , and asserted that , even when this seems to be the case , the real import of the i text s an injunction to meditate on the Brahman . From Prabhakara this view proceeds to develop a conclusion , is ara v min which in harmony with the view of Sab s a , that words themselves have no meaning , and obtain it only in am sentences , properly injunctive clauses ; g by itself is o ane a nothing , but attains meaning when c njoined with y , the whole then signifying generically the genus cow as con nected with bringing . This view in the school obtains the name of the theory of signification in syntactical combination envitabhidhane Kum rila ( ) , in opposition to the view of a , who admits that words possess a meaning independently of m i in co b nation injunctive sentences , and whose theory accepts , therefore , the combination of significant terms a bhihitanve e ( y ) . The two schools , however , are at one in holding that the signification of words is a class signifi I 3 3 cation ( , , 0 as the theory of the eternity of words

. a demands The modern Ny ya , on the other hand , insists that the import of words is always the concrete individual , II 2 6 1 - 7 1 while the older Nyaya ( , , ) adopts the doctrine ati v ekti that the word expresses the class (j ) , individual ( y ) , 40 THE KARMA -MIMAMSA

akrti and characteristic mark of the class ( ) , all at once . o n The Buddhist view , again , insists negative determination only , on the ground that it is impossible to determine Of positively the specific nature anything, and that all that o f o can be attained is a series negati ns , a view which 1 Kumarila o refutes at great length , insisting that the d ctrine would mean the impo ssibility of distinguishing between any f o r o co w two things , since , instance , b th the and the horse are negatives of the elephant , and could never deal with individuals , each negation being necessarily general . The defender of Apoh a thus accepts the existence of negative h e classes , which must be all identical , since cannot rely , ex h othesi yp , on any positive means of discrimination between them . fo r The case the claim that words denote individuals , as u t Sa 33 Prabhak ara p in the tra ) in the view of , is that , so o o o if it were not , all injuncti ns , Vedic or pr fane , w uld beco me meani ngless ; number and gender wo uld be out of place with regard to n o uns ; there co uld be no words to u express q alities , and agreement between noun and adjective

o . Pra b haka ra would be imp ssible replies by insisting that , Bh as a as indicated by the y , i f words had individual o meanings , such a sentence as , One sh uld pile the fire altar ” o o f a o in the f rm kite , w uld be meaningless , as it cannot be supposed that such an inj uncti on was intended to refer to an individual kite , while its plain meaning is a reference ” o t o f to the class kite . With u this element generality all inj unctions are absurd , and the necessary individual reference o in certain cases i s btained through the generality , with Kum rila which it is inseparably connected . a adds that this “ view is supported by the fact that the word cow , as o no t experience shows , d es suggest to us an individual cow , o but the class ; i f individuals were denoted by w rds , a generic idea like cow would be impossible , and even i f possible would merely consist of the impression of all the peculiarities A of all cows known to the thinker . gain , the word cannot denote all the individuals , since this would mean that the

1 - ma n e - o ttika . 566 614 N a a ri . 303 8 as Slo keva r , pp ; y y j , pp ; c ntr t ’ dhist N a a Tracts . 1 Ra tna ki rti s Apo ha s iddhi ( Six B u d y y , pp

42 T HE KARMA - MiMAMs A according implicit belief to the assertions made to us by o any merely human auth rity .

There is an obvious difficulty in this reasoning , when it Prabhak ara rttikara is remembered that , like the V , insists

- on the self evidence of cognitions , from which it would seem to follow that the asserti o ns of any man are prima f acie Kumarila valid , until sublated by better evidence . , who is always anxious to acco mmodate the views o f the school to o popular beliefs , is at the same time m re in harmony with the tenets of the school in adopting a doctrine , which does not involve the general denial of the validity - o i human testi mony . He adopts , therefore , the plan of distinguishing - e aurus e a testimony as human and super human ( p y ) , while

o f o r . admitting both as valid , th ugh different reasons I n the case of the Veda there is no author , and there fore the possibility of defects is absolutely precluded . In the case of human testimony its validity may be impaired by defects in the speaker , but the presence of excellencies in him precludes the presence of defects , so that i f we are assured of the latter we can be assured that the defects do not exist . But it must not be understood that the excellencies positively contribute to the validity of his utterances , which they possess of themselves ; the excellencies are of service merely in assuring us of the absence of those defects , which might cause his testimony to be suspect .

The Veda , however , has special claims on our regard , and M i mamsa Sfi tre I 1 24 - 28 the ( , , ) meets detailed criticisms of its claim to eternity . Thus it is argued against its validity that parts of it bear names of men , or refer to human aimini beings , to which J replies that passages bear names of persons who studied them in detail , and that apparent human names in the Veda are really mere cases of homon mns as ab ara svamin Pravahan a y ; thus , S points out , “ i s not the name of a man , but an epithet , The excellent ” carrier . Similarly , apparently absurd statements , such as “ ” The cows performed a sacrificial session , are to be under stood merely as emphasising the value o i some ritual action a by way of hyperbole , not s showing that the authors of the

Veda were foolish mortals . The eternity of words , and the fact that it alone serves to reveal the unseen potency , which T HE PROBLEM O F KNOWL EDGE 43

its results from obeying inj unctions , are conclusive proofs of the eternity of the Veda , and the alternative view of a creator is needless and unsatisfactory both in regard to the

Veda and to the world . Prabh ka ra Kumarila Other forms of proof, both a and 1 Sambha va expressly reject . , which is variously interpreted

a s e . . probability , g that ten is included in fifty , or much more probably as inclusion pure and simple , is regarded as h o . amb ava merely a f rm of inference Rumour , which like S is Pa uranikas is claimed as a means of proof by the , patently useless for purposes of proof ; its source being uncertain , it is quite impossible to affo rd its contents any measure of ca te is as a credit . Gesture ( s ) which given . means of proof am a by the Tantra school , the Mim s ignores . The relation between the various means of proof is developed by Kumarila ; the use of any means of proof such as inference is debarred i f there is a more direct mode

e . . of cognition , g sense perception , or i f the contrary of what is sought to be established is established in advance by the use of some simpler means of proof .

1 ' Praka ra na afi cika . 125 126 M a n ame da e . 64 5 p , pp , ; yo y , pp , 6 ;

loka varttika . 49 W . 57 Ta kik reksa . 1 S , p 2 ( , r a , pp 116 , 17 ;

S a ddersanas a mucca a . 07 . y , p 2 THE WORLD OF REA LITY

THERE is nothing to show that the question of the reality o f the world had ever occurred t o the framers ’ M i mamsa Satro a b ara svamin s Bha of the , but in S sye we find the problem definitely faced in answer to the onslaught made by the Nihilist schoo l o f B uddhism on the o whole c nception of the reality of existence as we know it . 1 Na ar un a f The doctrine of g j , doubtless an ef ective restate ment of tendencies earlier mani fested in the B uddhist

schools , denies at once the reality of the external world , and of the ideal world which seems to present us with the know o f o f ledge external reality . That much its dialectic is o sophistic is true , but its n velty of view and the energy with Na ar un a o f Z which g j , an eastern parallel eno , urged his o paradoxes , ev ked from the orthodox schools elaborate replies , bo th the Nyaye and the Vedanta Sil tres seeking to refute o heresies so dangerous t their own tenets . The reply of the am a Mim s , in keeping with what appears to be the early

' character of that Sti tra as compared with the Vedanta or Nyaye Sil tra s is given only in the Vrttikara as cited in the 2 Bh a a An o sy . opponent bjects , in his version , to the o f validity our waking perceptions , on the ground that in a dream we ha ve cognitions which all admit to be witho ut n o fou dation , and , if this is true of one set of c gnitions , it may s be a sumed to be equally true of another . The reply of the Vrttikara is , in effect , that the argument assumes what is to be

1 90 - M ala ma d me ke karik ed . Bi b li theca B u ddhica 1 3 19 13 hya a, o , M ax Wa lleser D i e Mi ttlere L ehre des Na ar una H e de b e 191 1 a nd , g j , i l rg, rva id hant m 1912 . f . a r s m r e h . 11 a s d as a ra h a C S va da r a nas e g a h , c ; S g , ch . IV.

1 - Pp. 8 10 . THE WORLD O F REALITY 45

proved , namely , that all cognitions as such are invalid . On o the co ntrary , we can f rm the idea of the invalidity of dream cognition simply from our having waking cognitions which afford us a basis for discrediting the dream cognitions , and we can explain the defects of dream cognitions by the assumption i f that the mind in dream s weak and does not act ef ectively , a view which we can support by the fact that in deep sleep d n the min is wholly absent , suggesti g that in the dream state it is in a condition intermediate between its effective waking presence and its disappearance . The opponent , however , continues the argument by urging that the o bject o f the cogu i is tion really a void , thus discrediting the validity of the cognition . There is , he says , no difference between the object of perception and the idea ; the idea is directly perceived , and there is nothing in reality co rresponding to an external rttikara on object . The V replies that this View rests the erroneous assumption that an idea must have a form ; it w o really is without form , hich , on the ther hand , the external o object p ssesses . What we perceive is not our idea , but something lo calised as outside ourselves ; no idea can perceive another idea , for each has a momentary existence only , whence one cannot be present to another . The opponent contends that the second idea has a certain con tinuity with the first as it originates it becomes known to the first and reveals to it the obj ect , just as a lamp illumines and thus makes known things . Or , put in s another way , it is the idea which first originate , and then o o the object becomes kn wn , having no anteri r real existence . Vrttikara The refutes this by insisting that , though the idea net originates first , it is known first ; as we h ave seen , the idea is known by inference from the fact of our cognition of an object , and the actual knowledge and the knowledge of the idea cannot possibly be simultaneous . Though we know not an object , we sometimes say we do know it , that is , that we are not conscious of having an idea about it . Further , ideas are essentially connected with names , while perception is essentially immediate knowledge , in which naming is not necessarily involved . Moreover , i f the idea and the object ’ is had the same form , as assumed in the opponent s argument , i this would sublate the idea , not the object , which s directly 46 THE KARMA -M IMAMSA

perceived , but in truth the idea is formless and known by o n inference , while the bject is endowed with form a d is an o object of sense percepti n . Or , again , the reali ty of an external world is shown by the fact that we have the idea of a o mat only when threads f rm its material cause ; i f otherwise , then a man might form the idea of a j ar despite the use o f o o o f ut threads in the comp siti n an object ; p more broadly , our ideas are not the free result o f our mental activity ; they a re u o i mposed pon us as regards their c ntent by external reality .

The argument as a whole thus falls into two parts , the first dealing with the contention that ideas have no nirala mb e ne foundation ( ) , and the second with the view san e that external reality is void ( y ) . Both these con tentions are the tenets of the Nihilism of Buddhism , and there is no real ground for doubt that the arguments ik r of the Vrtt a a are directed against this contention . 1 Kumarila o , however , or some predecess r , has interpreted the passage otherwise , treating the first part of the argu ment as directed against the Vijfi anavada of Va sub andhu ' 2 Asa rr a and g , which admitted the reality of ideas , while ou ter wo rld denying that of the , and the second art he , p treats as a refutation of the Sfi nya vada of the M adhyamika 3 r un a school of Naga j . Precisely the same fate has over taken the corresponding discussions of the Sftnyavada in the Nyaye and Vedanta Siltras ' Vatsyayan a still interpreted IV 2 25- 33 Vacas ati the former ( , , ) in its true sense , but p M iSra reads into part of it an attack on the Vijfi an avada ;

’ in the case of the Vedanta Sarnk ara turns the whole pass a e 11 2 28—3 2 g ( , , ) into an attack on that school , while

Ramanuj a treats it as refuting bo th B uddhist doctrines . The causes for these vagaries of interpretation are obvious ;

' the Stmyavada in its refutation of external reality Vi fi ana a o used the arguments which the j vad later empl yed ,

1 - - Slo keverttika . 17 67 268 345 . Preka ra n e e fi cika . 141 , pp 2 , p , pp M ana m ff 171 a f a me o cf . N a a ka n ike . 253 ff e o , ( r g nt nly) ; y y , pp , y ' - f V v d f de a . 1 19 2 N a anza rt a ri . 536 f i fiana a a 548 f y , pp 2 ; y y j , pp ( j ) , v d ( Sfi nya a a ) . 1 - a a n e fi l mkara ed . a nd a s . S. Le a s 1907 11 M h ya s tra e , tr n vi , P ri , ’ e m V Se rva da rsa n a s em ra ha ch . I Sa rva s iddh ntas a re ha ch . I g , g , ( ii ) ,

a da rse n as a mu c a e . 40 41 47 . S d c y , pp , , 1 a o b I 1 ff . J c i , XXX , THE WORLD O F REALITY 4 7 but it supplemented the conclusions it arrived at regarding external reality by demolishing the value of our ideas .

' Any reply to the Stmyavada must therefore include an to Vi fi anavada answer which would apply the j , and later authors like K umarila naturally thought that the discussion must deal with the more recent and more i n a va a Vrttikara convincing school of V jii a d . B ut the shows no knowledge of the peculiar terminology of the Vi fi anavada A j , such as its distinction between the laya vi fi an a - j , the quasi permanent consciousness which constitutes a the i n dividual until he attains Nirv na , and the particular

ravrtti - vz n a na presentati o ns which are thence derived (p y ) .

Moreover , the argument from the dream condition is not peculiar to the Vijfi anavada ; on the contrary it is a special a o M a h e favourite of the M dhyamikas , ccurring in the d y mik "il t VI I 3 4 Vrtti a ( , ) and in other texts cited in the on that text . The view of Prabhak a ra is in accord with the Vrttikara ’ Bha e Kumarila s o and the sy , but interpretati n of the passage has the advantage of eliciting fro m him a most interesting Vi fi anavada exposition of , and attack upon , the B uddhist j ' he and Strnyavada theories . T discussion shows the close affinity of the two doctrines , and the form of the argument i s often co mplicated by the resort to elaborate syllogistic a reasoning , but the whole m kes a very creditable effort to refute either the extreme scepticism o f the Madhyamika or Y r T he the extreme idealism of the ogaca as . reality of an external world is vehemently insisted upon as the only o f foundation of the common facts life , including such o distincti ns as those of virtue and vice , teacher and pupil . If there were nothing but ideas , all our views would be false , since they essentially rest on the belief in external reality . Moreover , there is a complete counter argument ; n o the cog i ti ns , we hold , have real substrata in external o world ; this noti n of ours is correct , because it is without contradiction , like the notion of the falsity of dream cog ni i n I f t o . you reply by denying the validity of the pro b ative example which we adduce , then the doctrine that o o dream c gnitions are false would disappear , and you w uld lose the chief argument adduced against the reality which 48 T HE KARMA - MIMAMSA

underlies cognitions as a whole . Moreover , in dream cognitions , which you adduce as examples where there is no o n underlying reality , we find examination that there is r t o always a eal substra um , however much dist rted and If disguised . , again , you argue that the unreality of our waking cogniti ons is revealed by the fact that the o Y gin sees reality far otherwise , we retort by denying the validity of his perception , and citing against him the visions of our Yogins . Nor can we accept the arguments of the as Di na a Buddhist logicians , such g g , who assert that the activity of the mind can Supply the full complement o f 1 to notions , which appear to us reflect reality ; without an external wo rld all these mental concepti o ns would be meaningless , for we deal not with conceptions , but with the facts of li fe . Against the conception that cognition alone exists to the o Kumarila h exclusion of c gniser and cognised , contends wit o s e special energy . The case for this c nception is t out by him with much care a s the prelude to his reply to the

' n It Str yavada . rests on the difficulty of understanding how co ntsed cognition and g can be related . There cannot really o ne o o be two entities , formless and one p ssessing f rm , for in memory , when no object is present , we still have cognition of form , showing that the cognition has form , and rendering s u erfl uit the hypothesis of an external reality mere p y. How , o again , can there be contact between the incorporeal cogniti n and the external Object P An Object can be perceived only i f it has form , but again the form does not exist until it is A perceived , which involves contradiction . gain , even i f contact were possible , how could two things , in themselves o P without f rm , acquire it in this way Moreover , the idea o we have of a double m on is admittedly - erroneous , and So o f therefo re cannot rest on reality . also we use a variety words of varied gender for the stars , and a masculine word

for a wife , which would be impossible i f reality

o . e . . c ntrolled o ur ideas The same thing , g a lovely woman , raises very diff erent feelings in the mind of the ascetic , the

’ 1 R tnak r nti s ea me o f fe e e as e a o Cf . a a asa tr t nt in r nc int rn l nly,

- ix B ddhis t N a a Tra cts . 103 14 Antervyaptisemerthen e ( S u y y , pp )

50 T HE KARMA- MIMAMSA

speculation , which holds that the form of the object is

im pressed on the cognition . The objection to the Nyaya VaiSesika View appears to be that the idea is understood by o the sch ol to be perceived simultaneously with the object ,

and , as the perception of the idea requires that it should be

provided with visible form , that is , colour and extension , there would be no possibility of demonstrating the existence n o of the external object , since , the form bei g c gnised with

the idea , an external reference would be needless . The o o objecti n , it must be noted , is not c gent against the o a developed f rm of the Ny ya doctrine , in which it i s held

' that on the actual cognition ( vya veseye ) there supervenes the mental percepti o n o f the cognitio n the o n m c gnitio thus brings reality im ediately before the mind , while in a secondary act the cognition itself is made the o f o object introspecti n , as in the accepted theory of modern am a n psychology . The Mim s , by ig oring this possible view , renders it necessary to hold that a cognition can never be the object of introspection ; it is an entity which is inferred fro m the fact of cognition ; its existence is known , but not

- as an object of sense perception of any kind . Mental a perception , which the school dmits , is thus restricted to

those forms of mental activity which are not cognitive . o There remains , however , yet another c ntention of the Kum rila It Sfi nya vada which a seeks to refute . is based on l the view th at atoms are invisib e , that aggregates of a toms

are invisible , that all objects , being composed of such e aggregates , are invisible and incomprehensible , and ther fore t void . The weigh of this argument lies in the fact that the Mimamsagives a mo re o r less hearty acceptance to the doctrine Kumarila of atoms , though is careful not to bind himself definitively to it . The conglomeration of atoms , it is urged , is impossible , since atoms have no extension , or at any rate no is parts , and no contact between them , therefore , conceivable .

More generally , it is also contended that no whole of parts If can really exist . it did , it must either reside in its entirety in each of the component parts , which is positively absurd , or it must reside collectively in all the parts ; in this event , even i f it can be assumed that it is something over and above the parts , it would be perceived only when all the parts had T HE WORLD O F REALITY 51

b e ab so been perceived , which would normally impossible , lutely so in the case of a whole of imperceptible parts like ' N e a Sil i ra IV 2 7 - 14 atoms . This dialectic , which the y y ( , , ) t also seeks to face , is met with the argument tha , as there is an interminable dispute between the opposing schools , the

Buddhists who deny the difference of the whole from its parts , a and the Ny ya who assert the distinction , the safe course i lies in the via med a of admitting that a. whole is in one sense different from , and in another sense not different from , A its constituent parts . whole , therefore , is not of a simple and absolute character , and resembles an object with variegated hues , but it is not the less real for I that . nvalidity applies to doubtful ideas , not to ideas of is an object which in itself not absolute in character . The an stock argument of the Buddhists , that i f y composite thing is investigated no whole remains after deduction of the com

e. is posing parts , g. the threads of a mat , met by the rejoin a i der , in harmony with the Ny ya , that the same result s a v a chie ed on the Ny ya view , which regards the whole as different from the parts ; the whole , in their View , only exists

- when there is an agglomeration of parts ; i f , mentally , you take away the parts , naturally the whole , despite its difference from the parts , disappears also . The further hypothesis , that what is really seen is merely atoms without real unity but visible in numbers , though singly invisible , o is naturally rejected as dev id of cogency . Finally , the argument is used that the attempt to ask i f a whole resides i n in the parts , as an entirety each or collectively in all , is is mistaken . The whole impartite , and the idea of its relation to its individual constituents in whole or in part is a question which arises only in respect of the individual 1 to elements , and is meaningless as applied the whole . ’ The value of Kumarila s refutation of the Buddhist schools is not inconsiderable ; he brings out fully the grave difficulties which meet any effort to account for the facts of ob life without accepting some permanent entity , and the j ec tions to the effort to evade this problem by creating the fi g

‘

Slo kava rttika . 6 3 34 vv . 7 cf . N a mert a i 2 5 a r . 5 0 , pp ( y y j , p 5 ;

Ava a i vi ni rakara na Si x Bu ddhist N a a Tra cts . 78 y ( y y , pp 52 THE KARMA-MIMAMSA

ment of an unending series of ideas , each of which must be supposed to take upon itself in some form the impressions of the whole previous history of the series . He insists , also o f rightly , on the impossibility accepting any purely subjective idealism , but he does not seem to have appreciated the possi b ilit y of discarding th is attitude , but accepting an objective A t o f idealism . sugges ion t this e fect was implicit in the doc 1 D i n a trine of knowledge adduced by g ag , which insisted that inference and other mental acts dealt with ideal contents , but Kumarila was able to reply to this d o ctrine that the whole scheme was meaningless , as it assumed that there was nothing truly real beyond the unreal play of ideas in the o mind . No true bjective idealism was , therefore , before his o of mind , and he is content to assert abs lutely the reality an b ut external world , which is not the product of intellect , which is kno wn by us , the relation of knowledge to reality being of a peculiar and unique type , involving an activi ty on the part of the cogniser which does not , however , create the object . In their positive doctrines as to the n ature of the universe there are considerable differences between Prabha 1 K m ri a u a l . kara and The former admitted , it is clear , no fewer than eight categories , while the latter accepted five only . T hey agreed in regard to substance , quality , action Pra b hakara or motion , and generality , but , while accepted

- Va i e ika the category of inherence from the Nyaya S s , and o f sekti added the three potency or capacity ( ) , similarity and number Kumarila rejected the itiohs Pra bhakara three add of , and also , in this case o in agreement with his predecess r , the particularity - Va iSe ik a a . ( viseso ) of the Ny ya s Finally , inherence was also rejected by him . On the other hand , the texts ascribe definitely to him the acceptance of the category o f non a h ava o existence ( b ) , with a fourfold divisi n of prior u negati o n , subseq ent negation or destruction , absolute nega

1 d f d l k arttike . 258 . 167 T he a o a ll b ut in eter S o a v , p ( v ) inv li ity

s ass ed a dda rse n a s a mu cco e . 41 . mina te perceptio n i ert in S y , p ‘ 1 M ana a llinath a arkika ra ksa . 164 Pra meyapa raya n a in M T , p ;

a a . 65 114 ff Pra ka rana a ii cika . 1 10 1 11 o e meyod y , pp , ; p , pp , ( v r

a bha r S hool . 89 loo ked ia Pr ka a c , p ) THE WO RLD O F REALITY 53

n sub - tion , and mutual egation , divisions which , of course , are

- simply transferred bodily from the Nyaya VaiSesik a doctrine . Non- existence stands in definite opposition to the other four ril as categories accepted by Kuma a ; though regarded real , it is nevertheless admitted to be essentially relative to the four

ave . Prabh kara categories of being ( bh ) a , however , rejects - re ec non existence , as might have been expected from his j tion of non - existence or non - apprehensi o n as a means of proof . The only reality , in his view , in the absence of a pot from a spot of ground is the spot of ground . The - VaiSe ika particularity of the Nyaya s , which serves to differentiate such things as the ultimate atoms and selves , h as a difi erentia no foundation s a separate category , as the tion can be based on the ordinary qualities which these things possess . S 1 Prabha ubstance is that in which q"ualities reside , and kara reckons the number as nine earth , water , air , fire , ether , Kum rila atmen . a the self or soul ( ) , mind , time , and space is credited with admitting also the substantiality of dar k ness and sound , while others accept gold as a twelfth . Of o these earth , water , air and fire all p ssess colour and ‘ tangibility , and accordingly are the objects of the senses of

- sight and touch , but only when in non atomic form , for some Prabhakara degree of magnitude is recognised by , as by the a - Vai e ika later Ny ya S s , as a necessary condition , along with s arse touch ( p ) , of proper sense perception . The other five substances cannot be regarded as perceptible , since they cannot be seen or touched , and therefore are only inferred to In is exist . the case of ether the apparent whiteness of it s due to particles of fire in it , while the darkness of night i not a substance , nor is it a quality ; i f it were a quality it w ould be perceptible by day also , and therefore must be deemed to be merely absence o f light . A variant of this doctrine in the schoo l of Prab hak ara declares darkness to be the absence of the kno wledge o f light . Kumarila claims . s darkne s as a substance , because it is blue in colour and moves , these two facts being necessarily attributed to some

1 ‘ P re ka rene a ri cika . 24 54 77 84 141 ff M an em p , pp , , , , ; eyo da ya , H if l ‘ . S 66 78 ft S oke va rttike . 404 . Tarkikara pp , , ; , p ( v ksa,

. 13 134 . pp 3, 54 THE KARMA -MIMAMSA

a substance , but the Ny ya denies these facts . Pointing out in li ht that a colour can be erceived only , and darkness is p ' g no ridhara experienced when there is light . S again suggests that darkness is the impositi o n of blue colour on something else . The necessity of inferring ether arises from the nature of sound , which must be provided with a substratum ; unlike Kumarila Prabhaka ra , sees no sufficient ground to give to n o sou d the rank of a distinct substance , a p sition which has obvious difficulties in a system which allots so pre- eminent a place to the word . ’ Air Prabhakara s , in view is neither hot nor cold , the apparent heat being due to fire particles , and the coolness to Kum ri water particles diffused in it . a la also regards it as perceptible , but does not claim that it has any colour ; he a o rejects therefore the Ny ya view that it can nly be inferred , colour being necessary to perception , and adopts the later Nyaya opinion which admits of direct perception through o In the sense of t uch . this and in many other details his school , i f not the founder , clearly largely assimilated the

- t e ika i Nyaya Va s s physics , though it is clear that Kumar la himself was not prepared to accept the atomic theory as absolutely essential to his principles . Some of his followers and went further , and claimed that ether , space time were directly perceptible , but on these points the doctrine of both schools seems never to have been developed .

The account of qualities which inhere in substances , Prabh akara and are distinct from motion , given by both 1 ri i ika and Kuma la shows obvious Obligations to the Va Ses . Prab hakara gives as objects of perception the qualities of indivi colour , taste , smell , and touch ; number , dimension , duality , conj unction , disj unction , priority and posteriority ; pleasure , pain , desire , aversion , and effort , and , like the i e ika ac Va S s , distinguishes conjunctions and disjunctions cording as they are produced by the action Of one or both of the things concerned , or rise mediately through another Kumarila Pra éasta ada conj unction or disj unction . , like p ,

- enumerates twenty four qualities colour , smell , taste ,

‘ 1 - n a ri ika . 54 151 M dna me oda a . 99 111 Pra ka ra a p c , pp , ; y y , pp ;

eksa . 164 . Tarkika r , p THE WORLD O F REALITY 55

touch ; number , individuality , dimension , conjunction , o disjunction , priority , posteri rity ; gravity , fluidity , viscidity ; cognition , pleasure , pain , desire , aversion , effort , impression

(covering velocity , elasticity , and mental impression ) , tone dhveni ( ) , which is a quality of the air , revealing sound , rako o to manifestation (p ty ) , a quality common all sub

l . stances , perceptib e and determining them , and potency P o tency is reckoned by Pra b haka ra as a distinct catego ry ; its o " y existence is pr ved by inference fire burns normall , but under the influence of some spell it ceases to h ave that n effect there must , therefore , be somethi g of special charac ter in the fire by virtue of which it burns . Words also have i n nitum n so a d . the potency to denote meani gs , and on fi It is n n eter al in eternal thi gs , but transient in transient n n things , coming into bei g with them and disappeari g when n sams they disappear , and thus differi g from impression ( k i are s . ) , which even in eternal things evanescent The Nyaya view is sensibly opposed to the recognition o f any n o f such conception , since , strictly speaki g , the number a s potencies in any object might be regarded very numerous , negating the possibility o f accepti ng potency as one quality o r Prabhak ara a distinct category of being . Number , which 1 e Kum rila makes a s parate category , in the list of a falls to o f the rank of a quality . The classification qualities and their assignment to substances follo ws generally the classifi in Pra a a a cation first given infinite detail by S st pad . From his list Kumarila departs only in the substitution of tone f o r and o f o o r sound , mani festation and p tency f merit and

. PraSasta ada demerit Unlike p , he denies that cognition is o the object of mental perception , th ugh admitting this for o the other special qualities of the self. Fr m the sch o ol of Pra bhak a ra that of Kumarila differs in asserti ng that indi vidualit to y applies both to eternal things and products , while the former asserts that it applies to eternal things o alone . Pri rity and p o steriority appl y to both sp a ce and time the later Nyaya wisely rejects both a s general quali ties , since they are essentially determinations of space and

1 ’ In Proka ra ne enci ke . 54 a ea s as a u a m p , p , it pp r q lity i pressio n 1n its a o us fo m is efe ed to 80 81 as fe ed o v ri r r rr ( pp. , ) in rr nly ; the full ea me o cu ed the miss Pra me a ara a n a s tr t nt c rr in ing y p y ( ee ibid . p. 111 ) 56 T HE KARMA - M IMAMSA

M aname oda e time , or , as stated in the y y , are special quali

ties of these entities . A 1 ction as a category covers only , as in the Nyaya Va iSe ika i s , the restricted field of motion , with ts traditional fi ve- fold divisions , as throwing up or down , drawing towards n Prabha or expandi g , and motions other than these . But

kara maintains that it is only an object of inference , while Kumarila holds that it is perceived . The argument of the ee former rests on the fact that , when we think we s motion ,

we only see conjunction and disjunction with points of space, these contacts subsisting only in outside space and not in the

moving thing , in which the activity of motion must reside . ’ The reply of Kumarila s school is that it could only be inferred as the i mmaterial cause of the conjunction and

disj unction of a thing with points in space , which would

mean that it must subsist both in space and in the thing ,

. ee whereas it exists in the thing only We really s motion , which is in the thing and which brings about conjunction

and disj unction in space , a doctrine which has now excellent

modern support . Generality both Prabhak ara and Kumarila admit as real set and as directly perceptible by the senses , and thus them selves at variance with the B uddhist denial that there is any

such thing as generality . The first B uddhist argument rests

on the impossibility of the existence of any whole , which m both schools of Mima sa deny . B ut further difficulties If as are raised . generality is perceptible and is eternal , m claimed in the Mima sa, the absurdity arises of perpetual A indivi perception . gain , how is generality related to the 2 it "If so duals ; is present in its entirety in each , then

there are as many generalities as individuals , and there is If mere duplication of names . not , then it must exist in all an n collectively , d therefore be entirely u known , since one can never know all the individuals which make up a I f generality . it is eternal , and exists before the individuals ,

’ 1 - e n e a ricika . 78 81 M ana me o da a . 112 1 13 Pra k ar p , pp ; y y , pp , ;

ew is a e lo kavarttike . 707 . a wider vi t k n in S , p ( v ‘ 1 - - re na a ncika . 17 32 Slo kava rttika . 545 65 614 Pre ke p , pp ; , pp ,

- - me o da a . 95 99 cf . N a eme fi a ri . 297 324 so a 39 ; M ana y y , pp ; y y j , pp ; A k , ’ - a k res ar ta x Bu ddh s t N a a Tra ts . 94 102 Semanya dfi sa n di p i ( Si i y y c , pp )

58 THE KARMA -MIMAMSA

and in some cases by action also , in places where the duties o f Pra bhakara the castes are duly supervised by the king. , o f however , declines to admit generalities such as Brahman K atri ahood Kumarila hood and s y , which accepts . Prabhakara also differs from Kumarila in his use of the category of inherence as a means of explaining the relation of the individual to the generality . When a new individual n of a class comes into bei g , what is produced is not the existence of the generality , which is eternal , but of the relation of inherence between the individual and the class . Inherence differs from contact in that it does not presuppose n the previous existence of the thi gs affected by it , and , a - Va iées ika Prabhaka ra unlike the Ny ya , does not hold that n i t is ecessarily eternal . This affords an easy reply to the question of the fate of the class character on the destruction o of an individual ; it does not go away , as it has no m tion ; it no n does not subsist in the individual , which is longer in bei g ; fo r o it does not cease to exist , it remains in ther individuals , but the inherence between the class and the individual 1 Kum ril n t t comes to an end . But a a rejects i o o the idea of inherence as a true category ; a relationshi p, he argues , can exist only between things which are established as distinct entities , and , as inherence is supposed to be a relation between things which , like the class and the individual , are inseparable , it is a contradiction in terms . ’ Kumarila While s school admits , as usual , the existence of Pra bhakara generalities of substance , quality , and action , declines to accept the last two or a summum genus of o n existence as a real generality , the ground that , as each generality rests on the fact of actual perception , the genus existence must be disallowed , as we do not in fact perceive o f things as merely existing . The true sense existence is merely the individuality of things ( svarfipasattd) ; it is not a true class character . 2 Prabhakara Similarity as a category is asserted by , who holds that its existence is proved by our consciousness in

’ lo ka a rtti ka l 1 4 W . 146 55 cf . so a s Ava a vin ird fi v , , , , ; A k y '

i Bu ddhi t N a a Tra cts . 78 ka ra na ( S x s y y , pp ' 3 - a n a n ikd . 1 10 1 11 Slo k avdrttika . 438 4 1 P ra ka r pa c , pp , ; , pp

W . 74 77 Tdrkika ra ksd . 164 . ( W . 18 565 ( ) , p THE WORLD OF REALITY 59

It precisely the same way as every other category . cannot be held to be substance , for it exists in quality and motion I a s . t well as in substance cannot , in view of its relation to motion and to quality , be a quality ; motion has no qualities , It nor can a quality have a quality . is not generality , for I no comprehensive conception of it exists . t is quite other n t than the relation of i herence . I is not particularity , which in any case is not a true category , since it is no more It than the quality of individuality . must , therefore , be a distinct category , which is perceived in the apprehension of qualities , motions , or parts of two things as common to both . ’ Kumarila s rejection of this category is based on the fact

e. . that similarity admits of degrees , g the resemblance of a f cow and a buf alo is considerable , that of a cow and a boar is slight ; i f there were a true category there could be no o Prabhakara degrees . He agrees , h wever , with in regarding as I t hi similarity directly perceptible . consists , in s view , in the fact of the possession by two objects of the same

arrangement of parts , and he attributes the erection of a special class of similarity to a misunderstanding by the Va i e ikas Vindh v s in é s of the doctrine of ya a , which merely asserted that generality consisted in possession of un ity of drfi a form ( s py ) , which was taken to mean likeness 1 The same author is elsewhere cited by Kumarila as denying the doctrine of the existence o f the subtle transmigrating Kumarila body , a view accepted from him by , and as u en nciating the principle of the genesis of inference , which lo kav rttika Wh o is accepted also in the S d . this author was is o sva rakr n a not apparent ; he cann t , it is certain , be I s , nor is there any plausibility in identi fyi ng him with the Vindh avasa Sam y who plays a part in the history of the khya , 2

I svara kr n a . whether or not he was really s He may , of course , am a have been an older teacher of the Mim s school itself . C ause is not reckoned by either school as a category , a fact significant of the curi o us failure of Indian

1 P . 7 p 04 ( v . 393 ( v . 3 ‘ ’ ‘ Sa nz kk a S ste m . 62 69 . G un a ra tna a d y y , pp , ( S da rs a na s a mu ccaya

. 104 es a S o a o f Va ndh a vasin l who was ea his ew p ) cit l k y ( ) , cl rly, in vi , no t Isvarak n a b ut is ha d to sa o f wha a ue his e de rs , it r y t v l vi nce is , o r to who m he e e s r f r . 60 T HE KARMA - MIMAMSA

philosophers to find a due place for this issue , even when , as a - Vai e ika in the case of the Ny ya é s , they by no means ignore

its importance . B ut there seems no evidence that either Prab hakara or Kumarila contributed anythi ng of novelty In or value to the doctrine . his discussion of perception , v as we ha e seen , the former makes use of the doctrine of the division of causes into the material or inheren t ( sa mavdyi kdran a non - a sa mavd i ) , and immaterial or inherent ( y ) , a ' 1 o N zi a- ai e i distinction , doubtless , taken fr m the y y V s s ka . The denial by Ku marila o f the co nception of inherence would have precluded him from adopting such a distinction of

causes . a f Kumarila Caus tion , however , a fords an argument in 2 his - favour of thesis of the reality of non existence . That

- entity he classifies as prior , as the non existence of curd in

non - milk ; subsequent or destruction , as the existence of milk

- in curd ; mutual , as the non existence of the horse in the cow ‘ and vice versa ; and absolute , as the non - existence of a horn o on the head of the hare . With ut the recognition of the first

two kinds , he contends , there could be no idea of causation i n its prior negation lies the character of the curd as effect , in a s E its destruction that of the milk the cause . verything has " two aspects it regards its self , it exists , as regards anything else it is non - existent ; and both these aspect s are real and

necessary to each other . It is only through this fact that we ” s a no on n can y, There is j ar the grou d , or th at we can f w ever dif erentiate things , hich is possible only on the ground — It m of a real existence of non existence . is i possible to u ex i perceive this entity , for perception m st deal with the s o m tent ; the process of intellection is , theref re , purely ental ; u the ground is seen , the j ar remembered , and then ens es the n a on w purely mental cognition styled eg ti , hich must be disti nguished from inference or any other form of know ledge .

a b e o ed ha Sa lika natha co mme ed o n the Prasas ta It m y n t t t nt ,

B dleia n Ca ta lo u e . pa da b hdsya ( o g , p - M a na m oda a . 8 64 1 k va rtti ka . 473 92 e 5 14 18 Slo a , pp ; y y , pp , ; ’

d a ma n a ri . 49 63 Sa dda rs a n as amucca a . 295 cf . Ny y j , pp ; y , pp D MATTE GOD , THE SOU L , AN R

THOUGH the Mimamsa is so deeply concerned with the no sacrifice , it has belief in the doctrine that the rewards of off eringare to be expected either from the deities to whom the offerings are directed to be made , or from a God as creator or apportioner of reward and punishment . The sacrifice generates an unseen potency , whence the goods desired by s acrifi cers are obtained ; the Vedanta Satra ’ III 2 4 aimini s ( , , 0 ) expressly negatives the idea that in J view there was divine intervention in this regard , and the atheism of the true Mimamsa is regarded with such unani 1 a mity s to render it impossible to explain it away . The full development , however , of the doctrine is , as usual , to u Prab akara Kumarila be fo nd in h and , who adopted from the Nyaya- Vaiéesika the groundwork of their views of the o its world , but declined to f llow that school in speculations 2 o f on the existence a creator . a - Va i e ik a The Ny ya s s , accepting the doctrine of atoms on the one hand and of the periodical creation and destruc o tion of the w rld on the other , had found it necessary to introduce the conception of a creator , in order to secure in some measure a mode of bringing about the renewal and destruction of the combinations of the atoms and their n Pra h ka r Kumarila co nection with souls . B ut b a a an d alike deny absolutely the validity of the belief in the periodic creation and dissolution of all things ; they accept a con

1 M a M u e - As do es x Six S s tems . 75 79 cf . K . L . Sa ka ll r , y , pp 2 ; r r,

Ta ore Law L ectures 1905 . 508 . g , , p

- - Pra k a ra z a a fi cikd . 137 40 Slo kavarttika . 639 80 z p , pp , pp ; M an a me da - - o a . 70 74 cf . N a a mafi ari . 193 204 a y y , pp ; y y j , pp ; S d r a a mu c f t n sa c a a . 8 f da y , pp 2 4 . 62 THE KARMA-M IMAM SA

stant process of becoming and passing away , but they find no ground for the systematisation of the process , so as to Ex eri produce cycles of evolution and involution of souls . p Prabhakara o ll ence , urges , sh ws us the bodies of a anim als being produced by purely natural means ; we can argue hence a nd to the facts of the past the future , and need invoke no

. v o extraneous aid Moreo er , the whole conception f God supervising the merits and demerits of men is idle ; God m o cannot perceive erit or demerit by percepti n , since they are not perceptible , nor by the mind , which is con fined to the body

. S which it occupies upervision also is impossible , even had God the necessary kno wledge it must take the form either of contact , which is impossible as merit and demerit being qualities are not subject to contact , or inherence , and ’ If plainly a man s qualities cannot inhere in God . the argument is adduced of the analogy of the carpenter , it may be replied that on this basis the creator would have to be an o an S emb died spirit , d no embodied pirit can affect such a subtle things s the atoms or merit and demerit . Nor is it conceivable that the atoms should themselves act under the us will of God , for no parallel to such activity is known to , and , if i t were possible , it would follow from the eternity of the will of God that creation would be unceasing . The only true case of supervision known to us is that exercised by its the soul over the body , which it occupies by virtue of merit or demerit , and there is no need to hold that the world is more than an ever- changing sequence of things affected by the souls in it . ’ Kumarila s treatment includes both an elaborate attack on the whole conception of creation and a Special refutation i ik ex is of the Va ées a views . He ridicules the idea of the tence of Praj apati before the creation of matter ; without a If a body , how could he feel desire P he possessed a body , then matter must have existed before his creative activity , and there is no reason to deny then the existence of other bodies . Nor is there any intelligible motive for creation ; granted that , when the world exists , conditions are regulated was by merit and demerit , originally there no merit or demerit , and the creation of a world full of misery was i inexcusable , for it s idle to argue that a creator could only AND A 63 GOD, THE SOUL , M TT ER

i his produce a world in which there is s n and pain . Yet , i f If action is conditioned , he cannot be omnipotent . , again , it is alleged that the creation was for his amusement , this contradicts the theory that he is perfectly happy , and would is involve him in much wearisome toil . Moreover , there no possibility of establishing the reality of his creative activity .

It could only rest on reports of the first of created men , and they could have no power to testify effectively to a state of things existing before they were brought into being . They could his only rely on what they were told by the creator , and is assertions might be mere boasting . Nor it at all satis factory to accept the belief in the creation of the Veda , which by no means enhances its value ; still less to hold that it resides with the creator during the periodic dissolu tions of the world , for which , again , there is not a shred of evidence . Against the Vaiéesika View of creation exception is j ustly taken to the diffi culty involved in holding that in some manner the action of the Supreme Lord brings to a at stand one time the potencies of all the souls , and then i awakens them all when a new creation s imminent . Against this view it is contended that the activity of men arising is from their past deeds can never cease , and it absurd needlessly to complicate matters by assuming both the force ’ of men s deeds and the intervention of the desire of God .

Moreover , it is impossible to explain why this desire should ever arise , and unintelligible to elucidate the mode in which the creator can act without a body or acquire a body . Kumarila no t , however , does content himself with refuting the Ny aya - Vaisesika doctrine ; he attacks equally 1 a is the Ved nta , on the simple ground that , if the absol ute , as is r it asserted to be , absolutely pure , the wo ld itself should be absolutely pure . Moreover , there could be no creation , for nescience is impossible in such an absolute . If , however , we assume that some other cause starts nescience to activity , then the unity of the absolute disappears . A gain , i f nescience is natural it is impossible to remove it , for that could be accomplished only by knowledge of the

1 - . N a a mafi ari Cf y y j , pp. 525 31 . 64 THE KARMA - MIMAMSA

self, which , on the theory of the natural character of nescience , is out of the question . Nor is the Samkhya doctrine of many selves and nature any more tenable as a theory of creation . The beginning of creation is held to be due to a disturbance in the equilibrium of the three constituents which make up nature . But how can such a disturbance take place at a first creation , when there are no potencies due to men ’ s actions demanding fruition " E ven at subsequent creations , how do latent potentialities by themselves become fruitful without any consciousness "And to direct them , i f . they do attain fruition , the Samkhya theory of liberation by knowledge is without n value , since the potencies will remai able to come again into activity . Knowledge , it must be recognised , can never give freedom from bondage , which can be attained only by n the exhaustio of action , for which the samkhya metaphysics affords no adequate possibility , owing to the infinite potentiality of nature .

Though the existence of a creator is denied , the Mimamsa accepts without reserve the doctrine of the 1 ab a ra sv min existence of the self or soul , and S a elaborates the case for its existence ; Prabh aka ra and Kuma rila both develop the theme in close accordance with his views . The necessity of the existence of the self for the Mim amsa rests on its fundamental assumption that the sacrifices are performed to secure , in many cases , a reward not in this li fe .

There must , therefore , be an eternal entity , distinct from the body , the sense organs , and cognitions , which is both the It doer of actions and the reaper of their reward . is not unn aturally objected that there is a strong presumption against claiming eternity for something which suffers change , but the more serious objection is made that men do not realise , when they reap results , the actions which brought these about , thus invalidating the value of the u assumed contin ity , and that there is nothing unnatural in a man determining to do an act which will lead to evil results in the future , secure in the knowledge that , when

‘

M z ma ms d fi tra . 18 24 Pra ka ra na a ri cika . 141 S , pp ; p , pp - lokava rttika 689 728 Ma na me o da a . 78 84 S , pp. ; y y , pp

66 THE KARMA - MIMAMSA

then they would possess intelligence , and rebirth would become impossible , since on their destruction intelligence o o w uld g also ; further , the share played by the organs in developing the idea would contradict the Buddhist do ctrine that the idea arises from a preceding idea only . Nor is there any evidence that the first cognition of the newborn child is due to a previ o us idea ; we hold that it arises fro m t the func ioning of the sense organs . There must , therefore , o o f is be something which p ssesses the potentiality ideas , is eternal , and capable of transmigrati o n . This need o furnished by the s ul , which is immaterial and omnipresent , u and thus , witho t motion , is able to connect itself with one o body after an ther .

The soul , then , is essentially active , for , unlike the Vaise ika o am a o s scho l , the Mim s d es not , according to Kumarila , deem that motion is the only form of action , and it is through its superintending activity that the motions of the body are achieved . We must , therefore , conceive the soul engaged from time immemo rial in the work of directing o a body , the acts d ne in each life determining the character of the body attained in the next , a process which will cease only , if ever , when the soul ceases to obtain a bodily h abitation . A gain , from another point of view the B uddhist conception e o o f a series is imp rfect . Granted that it is imp ssible to establish a so ul merely on the gro und of such attributes of the soul as pleasure , desire , or memory , adduced by the V i e ika o o o f a s s sch l as indications of the existence the soul , o n since these might be explained the theory of impressions , n o such explanation is available to dispose o f the cognition In two I of the self. the case of the j udgments , knew

I a o . and know , the theory of ideas bre ks completely d wn

The first idea cannot , as past , know the later idea , nor can It the later idea know the first . is useless to appeal to a series , for the series was not present at the first cognition , No r nor is it present at the last . is there any unity in the o to two cogniti ns , for the Buddhist refuses recognise any N o r classes . can it be argued that similarity would suffice ,

o e . . for in cogniti ns of different objects , g a horse and a cow , there is no similarity of cognition . The bare fact of each THE AND A GOD , SOUL , M TT ER

being in one aspect a cogniser would at most give merely s the bare recognition that there wa a cogniser , but no A personal identity . true permanent substance is , therefore ,

essential , and such a substance explains far more effectively a s than any other hypothesis such phenomena desire , is memory , and pleasure and pain , while it the indispensable

basis of merit and demerit .

This permanent entity is quite distinct from the body ,

the senses , or cognition . The elements of the body are

seen to be without intelligence , and the combination of If such elements cannot produce intelligence . , again , one

element alone had this nature , the others could not coalesce A n with it to form a body . dead body , which co sists as of precisely the same material the living body , contains is no intelligence . On the contrary , the fact that a body an o rganised whole s uggests irresistibly the fact that it serves

the purpose of another which directs it , namely , the soul . I ” “ I ” Such phrases as am fat , or go , are merely natural “ ” transfers of use . On the other hand , the phrase My body

shows clearly that the ego and the body are different . The same argument can be applied to the case of the

sense organs , but others are also available ; thus the fact that I feel with my hand what I see with my eyes shows

is . A that there something beyond the sense organs gain , a blind man remembers what he sa w when his eyesight r emained , which would be impossible i f the organ were the

self. More generally the analysis of any cognition reveals to f I i us the act that the s not the body , nor the sense organs

nor the cognition itself, but something over and beyond . Many people can have the same cognition as far as content h as is concerned , but each cognition an individual refer

ence , as is seen also with perfect clearness in the facts of memory ; if there were no I how could we have the fact

that one , who has learned half a lesson at one time , can later on resume the task at the place at which he left off P ff The objection , that the terms My soul indicate a di er I ” ence between the and the soul , is met by holding that in the word “ soul ” the meaning “ cognition is to be

understood , cognition often being inaccurately described as h t e soul . The result can be confirmed by the evidence 68 THE KARMA—MIMAM SA

S m a a of the a hit s and Br hmanas , the former of which implicitly , the latter explicitly , recognise the existence of the eternal soul .

There must , however , be something to mediate between the eternal and omnipresent soul and the world , else its em ha i knowledge would be eternal and omniscient , as p t cally it is not . The mediator is furnished by mind , whose contact with the soul is the essential condition for its con sci u ness o s in all its forms . For this contact it is necessary that mind should , in contrast to soul which is omnipresent , be atomic , and possess the capacity of extremely rapid motion , a fact which makes our experiences , even when s truly successive as they are , appear on occa ion to be simul

taneous. o Mind , however , can exist only in a b dy , which the soul must ensoul , and then through it the soul comes into contact with the outer world by means of the sense organs . Through the conta ct of external objects with the sense organs , mediated by the mind , the soul appreciates the outer world the mind directly conveys to it knowl edge of plea" o s ure , pain , desire , aversi n and effort , which are among its I " qualities . t possesses further qualities cognition , which is Prabh kara self cognised in the terminology of a or , as rila Kuma has it , inferred ; merit and demerit , which are inferred ; and impressi on which is produced o o by apprehension and results in mem ry , fr m whose opera tions it is inferred . The principle of impression , more to over , really applies merit and demerit , for these exist in the form of impressions of past activities , and can hardly be said to be separate qualities , since they merely sum up in terms of moral value the nature of the accumulated t impressions hence , though they appear as dis inct elements - a i esika a ttri in the Nyaya V S lists , one list of qualities buted to K umarila more logically leaves out merit and o o demerit . Further , the s ul possesses the comm n qualities of number , namely , unity ; individuality ; dimension as o r omnipresent as opposed to atomic , of the same size as the body as held by the Jains ; and conj unction and o o disj uncti o n with mind . N thing is m re obscure than It this relation between the soul and the mind . is said to be brought about by merit and demerit , but it is obvious S AND A 69 GOD , THE OUL , M TT ER

is that it is also affected by the activity of the soul , which never regarded as merely passive in its attitude to mind . The impossibility of expressing the relationship intelligibly is inherent in the effort to bridge the gulf between the material and the immaterial worlds . But it is curious that , a —Va ise ik a as in the Ny ya s , there is no real attempt in the M imamsa to explain in what way mind is active in the It processes of reasoning . is obvious that inference , and the other means of proof apart from sense perception , must be d due to the activity of min in contact with the soul , but insistence on the part of mind in the direct perception of pleasure , pain , desire , aversion , and effort has apparently resulted in obscuring the essential part which it must be deemed to play in the higher mental activities , i f for no other reason than that they all rest , save verbal cognition as and negation , on sense perception an ultimate basis , and even verbal cognition and negation must be mediated to the soul by mind . T he u so l , then , with the aid of the mind , is the enjoyer of all experience ; the sense organs the instruments ; the objects , external or internal , the world and the qualities of the soul ; and the body is the abode of the sense organs and has ex i the mind , through whose instrumentality the soul per Prab hakara ence . Of bodies recognises three kinds only — - - o - womb born , egg b rn and sweat born omitting, with some a - Vaise ika Ny ya s authorities , the vegetable body , on the is ground that its possession of sense organs not established , despite the Jain views on this topic . None but earth bodies Prabhak ara a - Va i e ik are accepted by , though the Ny ya s s a o accepts the existence in other w rlds of water bodies , fire a bodies and air bodies ; this excludes the Ved nta View , which finds in the body five or three elements or the variant which u admits of fo r only . The body , however , in any event is essentially subservient to the soul , which acquires a body in accordance with its p a st deeds ; in what manner this is Prab hak ara K umarila us accomplished neither or tell , for in truth the problem is incomprehensible . So far the views of Prab hak ara and Kumarila seem to be in general harmony , but there is a distinct discrepancy , . if not o i a very important one , in their view f the manner n 70 THE KARMA-M IMAMSA

n which the soul is cognised . I the view of Prabhakara the is - cognition self illumined , but this doctrine is not applicable

. a o f to the soul The Ved nta view , course , insists on the doctrine of self - illumination in the case of the cognition and the soul as consciousness alike ; Prabhakara objects that in this case the soul must be present in consciousness during the state of deep sleep no less than during the waking , t dreaming and fourth s ates , and , as all our consciousness can be explained by hypothesis of the self- illumination of

- cognition , it is needless to assume any other self luminous o . a bject The Ny ya view , which makes the soul to be the o o Vaise ika bject of direct perception , as opp sed to the s

‘ doctrine of the inferring of the soul , which is also found in a Pra k older Ny ya , is rejected by bha ara on the ground that it serves to make the perceived also the perceiver , which is o in his view absurd , a p sition for which there is clearly much better ground than in the cognate case of the denial of the mental perception of cognition . The theory which he adopts is , then , simply that in every cognition the soul enters into the cognition as a necessary element , and , therefore , in a sense the soul is cognised by the same means of valid cognition as the objects which it knows . B ut , while the o soul is thus cognised , it is not cognised as a true bject ; it is cognised as the agent in cognition , just as a man who walks is the agent of walking , not the object . The soul , therefore ,

- is the substratum of the self illumined cognition , into which it I ” enters in the element of , and this fact explains why in

- deep sleep there is no self consciousness , since at that time there is no cognition , and the soul can be known only along o with a cognition . But the fact that there is no cogniti n " does not mean that there is no soul consciousness is not , as a in the Ved nta , the essence of the soul , but a mere quality of it , and in the state of liberation the soul remains eternally existent , though by ceasing to h ave cognitions it ceases to be cognised . While this view of the knowledge of the soul in

- as self consciousness is ingenious and not unhappy , laying it does due stress on the necessary implication of the self in Prabha consciousness , it is a little difficult to see why u - kara did not admit that the so l was self illumined , which is certainly the natural interpretation of the Sa barabhasya S AND A 7 1 GOD , T HE OUL , M TT ER

( p. That term seems to apply more readily to the soul o o o than to cogniti ns on his own theory , in which the c gniti n h seems really to be inferred , as it actually is eld to be by rila the school of Kuma . How far Kumarila really differs from Prabhak ara in these views is not clear . He certainly is credited by such 1 /e 10 1 Sam a siddha nta texts as the Sa st a dapt a (p. ) and the s a m ra ka I I I 3 7 g (V , ) with the view that the self IS the object of direct perception by the mind , a view ascribed by the 1 N a m n a r 4 2 to Au avarsas a a i . 9 y y j (p ) the p , and this is o perhaps a legitimate deducti n from the doctrine , which he certainly held , that the existence of the self is established “ ” I o through the notion of . The s ul he holds to be the “ ” 1 o substratum of the element in c gnition , and this ’ appears to be practically identical with Prab hak a ra s View that the so ul is the substratum o f the self- illumined cogu i “ ” K m rila o I . u a tion , and the element in it , h wever , '' 2 adopts in the Tantrcwcz rttika the doctrine that the soul co ni is pure consciousness , though he distinguishes it from g

tion , but this characteristic is hardly more than a verbal w Prab h akara a s deviation from the Vie of , as far practical

results go . Prab hakara and Kumarila are agreed as to the fact of m there existing a multitude of separate souls , as is the eces o f B a sary supposition the Sutra and the theme of the hasy . o f is The perception another soul obviously imp o ssible , but

one sees the activities of other bodies , and infers thence that ’ they must be ensouled , j ust as one s own body is ensouled . h as l Thus , if a pupil learned ha f his task in one day , the fact that he continues to learn the next half the next day

is a good ground for assuming that he possesses a soul . The same result can be arrived at from the fact that merit

and demerit are infinitely various , and not one , as they

must be i f there were one soul only . T he objection that

pain is felt as localised , though there is but one soul in the o b dy , is met by insisting that in reality the feeling is in the

soul , and it is only the cause of the pain which can be said

1 Cf . M a na me o da a . 80 . Bu t Slo kava rt tika vv y y , p in , p 525 ( . 142 he seems to a e se f- u m a o f o th e B as , cc pt l ill in ti n r m h ya . 2 ° a s . . 5 16 so Sl aeartti ka . 187 Tr n p ok , p 72 THE KARMA - MIMAMSA

. a n to be localised The further Ved nta co tention , that the sun , though one , appears by reflection in different substances

to be endowed with diverse qualities , is also rebutted by the o n observation that the qualities , which appear different , d ot

really belong to the sun but to the reflecting medium . On this analogy the different qualities appearing in connection with o the soul would belong to the bodies which are ens uled , and

this conclusion is manifestly contrary to fact , since cognition , we It etc . , are qualities , as have seen , of soul , not of body . a is characteristic , however , of the tendency to import Ved nta

’ conceptions into the M imarns a that the Sarvasiddhdnta s am ra h a I II 39 g ( V , ) asserts categorically that there is one

real supreme self, of which the individual selves are unreal

differentiations . S uch being the nature of the soul of man , his normal lot n is to continue in an unending cycle of lives , each determi ed o from the outset by his acti ns in previous lives , unless he adopts the path which leads to freedom from this round of

existence . The process of this liberation is sketched by Prabhakara ; first the man becomes disgusted by the troubles which attend this mortal life ; then he realises that even the

pleasures of this life are inseparable from pain , both in their attainment and in their disappearance ; accordingly he devotes his mind to seeking final release from all worldly

things . To this end he abstains from all prohibited acts ,

which lead to punishment hereafter , and also from all acts which are undertaken for the purpose o f attaining some a cumu worldly o r heavenly guerdon . He also exhausts the c lated store of his merit and demerit by undergoing the

experiences which result thence . Finally he destroys the receptacle of experience by the knowledge of the

soul , together with such concomitants as contentment ,

- o self restraint and s forth , all things enjoined by the scriptures to prevent the return of the soul . When all this is accomplished , then the achievement of release is brought about . Prabhak ara insists that , as the texts enjoin the know ledge o f the soul for no ulterior purpose , it must be understood that the absence of rebirth is the reward of this knowledge . Liberation thus co nsists in the cessation of the operation of

a d d o d . merit or demerit , n in total free om fr m the bo y

74 THE KA RMA - MIMAMSA

without cognition or feeling of any sort . This view , though ‘ M imarns a in entire harmony with the , has suffered the usual 1 fate at the hands of the later texts , in which it is asserted o that the final c ndition of man is a state of constant bliss . I n what manner then does the performance of sacrifice operate as affecting the soul "The Mimamsa in both schools is confident that there is no question of re wards coming from the deity to whom the off erings are made ; no o deity is either eternal or mnipresent , and there could be no assurance of it ever receiving the numerous offerings made o by diverse votaries , apart fr m the difficulty of the deity conferring rewards . There must , therefore , be a capacity , which does not exist prior to the sacrificial action , either in the princi pal performance or in the agent , but which is generated in the course of the performance; Befo re a man o to perf rms a sacrifice , which will lead heaven , there is an incapacity in the ofi ering and in the man himsel f to secure that result , but , when he has performed it , he becomes , as a result of the action , endowed with a potency , styled

’ A ti rva p , which in the course of time will secure for him the end desired . The existence of this potency is testified to in the scriptures ; its necessity is apparent by the means of proof known as presumption . We find in the Veda assertions that sacrifices produce certain results , and , as the see operation of the sacrifice , as we it , is transient , the truth o f the scripture would be vitiated if we did not accept the theory of Apurva . Nor is there anything illogical in the doctrine ; every action sets in force activities in substances or agents , and these come to fruition when the necessary auxili aries are present . The action specified is called into existence by the injunction contained in the form of an optative in a sentence in the Veda . Prabh kara F rom this doctrine a dissents , elaborating instead a theo ry which is o bviously a refinement on the simple view which Kumarila accepts from the older writers ’ ' 2 ms tra In o f the school and which best suits the Mima a Szt . his opinion the inj unction rests in the sentence as a whole ,

M a e o d a . 88 . na m y ay , p 2 II 1 1 ft P ra ka ra a a a fi cika . 85 ff Ta ntravdrttika , , ; p , pp 1 ; , - ll , 1 , 1 5 . AND A 75 GOD , THE SOUL , M TT ER

not in the optative verb , and he denies that from the action r there arises directly the Apurva . On the contra y , the y process is that the injunctive sentence la s down a mandate , o Niyoga ; this excites the man t exertion , and thi s exertion pertains to some form of action , indicated by the verb of the inj unctive sentence . The exertion produces in the agent a result ( karya ) to which also the name of Niyoga i s given Prab hak a ra by , on the ground that it is this which acts as an incentive to the agent to put forth exertion to wards the performance of the action denoted by the verb of the in 1 o is n j unctive clause . The N yoga h wever , u able to produce its alikan atha result , unless aided by something which S styles fate , nor is it apparent that either in his terminology or ’ in his view of the process Pra bhakara s doctrine is any K ril superior to that of uma a . It seems as i f primarily it arose from nothing mo re important than the observation that the result produced in the agent was in one sense his motive to action as much as the sentence directing the action to be done , leading to a transfer of the term Niyoga , naturally applicable to the sentence , to the condition in the agent to which the

' more orthodox name of Apti rva was usually applied . In simple sacrifices there is only one Apurva produced , but in more complicated sacrifices there may be several , as a rule o f ur . Thus in the new and full moon sacrifices , consisting of two sets of three oblations at new and full moon respec

’ tivel An a ti rva r y, there may be distinguished the g p , pe taining t att a urva to the minor acts of the several oblations ; the U p y p , the result flowing from each of the three oblations in either Samuda a urva o f set ; the y p , the result of each group three ; Phala urva re and the p , the result of the whole performance garded as a unit . But it is not every action which brings A u about an p rva ; those actions , which are devoted simply to l some material resu t , though a part of the sacrifice , such as the appointment of priests or the threshing of corn , are not credited with any such effect , as they serve an immediate purpose and need no further explanation . In the view of both schools there is a clear relation b e tween the inj unction and the action of the agent ; the former ‘ p ossesses a verbal energy ( sabdi bh civana) in its tendency to b the f produce action y the agent , while latter puts orth 76 THE KARMA - MIMAMSA

' actual energy ( arthi bhava na) towards the end indicated in 1 the inj unction . It is significant of the theistic tendency of Indian thought

'

. M im that even the arnsa was not exempt from transformation . Despite its emphatic denial of the existence of a Supreme Sarva siddhantasam ra ha I II Lord , the g (V , treats the end of man as to be obtained by meditation upon , and wor S S 15 i n ship of , the upreme_ pirit which manifested each man , A adeva Lau a k i and authors , such as p and g s Bhaskara , declare that i f the sacrifice is performed i n honour of Govinda or Isvara it the creator , , leads to the highest good , basing this o Bha ava i asserti n on the authority of the g dg ta. Hence it is easy to explain the tendency of such works as the Setvara mi mafnsd Vehka eéa a of the polymath t , where Ved nta tenets

am a. Gun aratn a o are grafted on the Mim s , in his c mment 2 on the Saddarasa nasa muccaya (p . 98 ) similarly attributes to aimini J acceptance of the M aya doctrine . n The question , however , arises , how far , in accepti g views o f the future of the spirit , which are rejected by both Prabhakara Kumarila and by , and in imparting a theistic tinge to the doctrine , later texts relied on earlier authority , I edanta now lost to us . t must be remembered that in the V SzZtra there are attributed to Jamini not merely views in w IV entire harmony ith his principles , such as insistence ( , 1 1 , 7 ) on the fact that works bear their due fruit without any divine intervention of any kind , but also opinions which i n Vedantin show him the unexpected light of a true , though not of the orthodox doctrine of Samkara Thus he is credited with the view that the order in which a man must pass through the various stages of life ( asramas ) is fixed as vice versa from lower to higher , and never , and as explain ing away as metaphorical the assertion that the highest spirit i s a span in size . More precise light is thrown on his doctrine by the fact that he adopted the view of the fate of the soul on departing , by which it is ultimately led by a S 1s pirit to Brahman , in the sens e that the absolute B rahman meant , though Samkara argued , apparently against the

’ ' 1 - - M i es . 18 5 114 . mdfits a n d a ra ka ta ed. Be a 22 1 y y p ( n r ) pp 1 , 2 ; i ' ' - rhsa a ribh sa . 2 0 . ma p a , pp 5 3 GOD THE S AND MA T R 77 , OUL , T E

anta fi tra IV 3 7 - 14 intention of the Ved S ( , , ) that the refer ence is to the lower Brahman , the soul passing to the higher state only on the occurrence of the absorption of the lower In Brahman . its final condition the soul possesses , accord a imini ing to J , all the qualities of the Brahman enumerated Chando a a ni a I II 7 omni o in the gy Up s d (V , ) together with p tence and omniscience , and further possesses a body and senses , having the power of assuming many diverse forms . Though amkara IV 4 5 1 1 this is not the view of S ( , , , ) it can hardly be imagined that Ja imini really regarded this condition as pertaining to the soul merely preparatory to final absorption in the Brahman ; we may rather suppose that o n this topic his R m nu a a a , views , were akin to those of j and perhaps B dar an of a ay a himself . I f we were to hold that the Ja imini of the Karma Mimamsa and the Jaimini of the Vedanta must be regarded a s enunciatin one g body of doctrine , we would be forced to the admission that the later school of Mimamsa departed from the principles of the founder of the doctrine by igno r ing the fact that the t dms a Satra represented o nly one i side of h s thought . B ut to accept this would probably be to lay far too much stress on the traditional allocation of doctrines ; it is far more plausible to assume that the views expressed in the Mimamsa do not represent one aspect of the thought of an individual sage , but are the expression of the r ai i i doct ine of a school , which appealed to J m n and Badarayana only so far as it thought fit to adopt or discuss views of theirs . It would otherwise be altogether too remarkable that of two authorities , who covered much the same ground , we should have preserved the Sutra of one on o the doctrine of action , and the Sutra of the ther on the nature a nd u i of the absolute , in both cases the form of the S tra s decidedly unfavourable to the View that it is the prod uction of one definite author . The shadowy personalities of Ja imini and Bada rayana can hardly cl a im much more eff ective a reality than those of Gautama or Kan da , or even than

Kapila himself . If , on the one hand , there was a tendency to adapt the am a Mim s to theistic or pantheistic views , there was on the other a steady process of degradation of the deities to whom 78 THE KARMA- M IMAM SA

o It the offerings were supposed t be made . can hardly be assumed that these deities were not believed to be real by

' M imarns And the founders of the a. there is nothing to show aimini that J did not accept their existence . But the later D evatasvarfi avi doctrine , as evinced in such works as the p i m a eva a of Ap d , does not accept. the validity of the descriptions of the deities given in the Puranas as showing the existence of such beings ; these passages rank as mere Arthavada ; the deity is merely that to which offering is made , and has no existence beyond the Mantras addressed to it . THE RU LES OF RITUA L INTERPRETATION

WE have seen that Prabhakara and Kumarila establish by their elaborate epistemological and metaphysical em quiries precisely the same results as were more simply aimini accepted by J , the fact that duty or righteousness is incul cated by the Veda in the form of injunctions , which are to be carried out on the strength of the authority of that text aimini as uncreated and eternal . The task of J , in all save h a a I is o the first Pada of Ad y y , , theref re , to lay down the principles which will enable men rightly to perfo rm the actions which the Veda enjoins , but which the vast extent of the Vedic literature renders it difficult to determine . The task falls essentially under two great heads ; it is necessary to determine precisely to what texts and in what degree s stemati authority attaches , and it is requisite to classify y cally the various forms of injunction with reference to the actions which they enjoin . Both duties are performed , though occasionally in somewhat haphazard manner , in the Su e tra ; the more important one , the investigation of injun tion , forms the main topic of many later works , while the compendia usually cover more or less adequately the whole

field . The details of the discussions have necessarily little general value ; they deal with incidents of sacrifices , which flourished only in the early days of the history of the i am a M m s , and in many cases the labour devoted to their i - investigation cannot but seem to us m s spent . On the other hand , the principles of interpretation developed are often a s both valuable and interesting examples of logical analysis . Of the Vedic texts the Brahmanas afford the immediate material for the extraction of the injunctions which are the 80 THE KA RMA- MIMAM SA

essential part of the Veda , but they contain also passages which cannot be treated as dealing with either positive or negative injunctions , and are classed either as explanatory Ar h t avada Namadhe a . r a matter , , or name , y The A thavad I 2 1 - 30 ( , , ) at first sight seems not to be entitled to authority , Kumarila Prab hak ara but and alike defend its validity , the latter against the charge that such sentences are inexpressive , since they are not construed with inj unctive verbal forms . Arthavada The value of the , both hold , lies in it either extolling desirable , or censuring forbidden , acts ; it thus comes into immediate connection with injunction or prohi b ition . w Hence it follo s that , in cases where it might be Arthav da possible to extract from an a an inj unction , it is so needless to do , the passage being adequately explained i f it remains eulogistic of some action already enjoined . Arthavada s may be variously divided , but the simplest division is into three classes "the first is where in contradic tion of some other means of proof a quality is asserted to exist , “ ” sun as in The post is the , which serves to extol the brilliance of the post . Or it may merely reiterate a truth

A . known otherwise , as in gni is a protection from the cold

Or it merely may refer to something which has happened , neither contradicted by other means of proof nor already known . I 4 1 - 16 The case of name ( , , ) is far more obscure ; dis eussions regarding it usually turn on one or other of the “ udbhida a eta asukamah sentences y f p , he who desires ’ cattle should sacrifice with the u dbhz d citraya yaj eta ’ ’ “ asukamah citra a mkotra m u hoti p , with the g j , he offers ” A nihotra s enen abhica ra n a eta the g ; and y y j , he who ’ It practices witchcraft should offer the syena sacrifice . seems at least plausible to suppose that the subdivision owes its creation to the practical necessity of dealing with a limited number of obscure sacrificial terms , but was later 1 In extended into a wider area . the developed theory , the j ustification of the classification of name is given as follows . Each word in the inj unction must be brought into eff ective

' T hib au Arthasa m ra ha . x i i iii Mimanzsan a a ra kasa t , g , pp , x y y p ,

8 ft. pp. 5

82 T HE KARMA - MIMAMSA

Mantras were recorded in long paragraphs , with no obvious mechanical dividing marks . These principles are that o f syntactical unity ( ekavakyata) ; those words must be taken so together which , when united , form a single idea , or , as k ara to Prab ha puts it , suit his theory of inj unction , express o a single purp se , and which , taken apart , are not expressive

. S h of any idea or purpose econdly , there is admitted t e o f v ak a bheda principle syntactical split ( y ) , which permits us to break up what else might be taken as a single sentence n into parts , each of which must contai a single idea . B ut this expedient is permissible only when there is a clear o or con Vedic inj uncti n to make the split , when no other struction is really possible , for otherwise the error is com A fi rvas o mitted of multiplying p resulting fr m M antras . None the less it is a necessary procedure in cases where it is made clear in any way that there are distinct acts to be accompanied by Mantras ; Pleasant I make this seat ”

o T . B . I I I 7 5 2 o rima a i for thee sit up n it ( , , , ) w uld p f c e to be one Mantra , but , as it is intended serve the double purpo se of accompanying the act of making the seat for the o cake , and setting it d wn , it must be taken as two . Thirdly , o f a nus aiz a there is the principle extension ( g ) , which denotes that it is o ften necessary in the case o f Mantras to supply with several sets of words a clause which follows the o last of these sets nly , and which might thus be deemed to belong to it alone . o to S m Autho rity , however , is not c nfined the Vedic a hitas I mr i . t S t s and the Brahmanas is extended to the , in which 1 il Itihasa s term Kumar a includes primarily the , Puranas , i and the Smrt of M anu , these being works which claim Itihasa s a universal application . The and Pur nas he deems to co ntain inj unctions based on Vedic auth o rity and much a o Arthavad , but he admits that there are als inj unctions o arising from mere w rldly considerations , passages useful o only to give pleasure , and other extrane us matter ; the hymns to deities serve to secure a transcendental result . They serve as wholes the useful purpose of instructing men

1 - a nt a varttika a s . . 25 1 12 ft 244 . T he Sfi tra I 3 1 7 T r , tr n pp , , ( , , , ‘ 11 - 14 ) never mentio ns the word Smt ti and the co mmentators differ s o s widely in their v er i n . RULE S O F R ITUAL INT ERPRETAT ION 83

In of very various capacity and knowledge . the case of the Smrtis proper only five alternatives are available "either they is o are completely erroneous , which impossible , as these w rks are obviously useful and men are not so foolish as to believe

nonsense ; or they are due to personal observation , which

cannot be accepted ; or they rest on tradition , which would give no assurance of validity ; or they are deliberately is intended to deceive , which incredible for lack of motive

and probability of success ; or , finally , they represent lost o Vedic traditi n . For this decision there can be adduced a certain corroboration in the fact that for certain statements mrtis in S we can find confirmation in Vedic texts , whence we

can assume that other statements were also derived from texts , T mrtis no w unhappily lost to us . hus part of the S is derived r and from the Veda , part from ordina y motives of life , the ‘ Arthavada the I tihasa s a story material is , as in and Pur nas . 1 The View of Pra bhaka ra is n ot essentially different ; he

also accepts the inference of Vedic authority , but expressly negates it in the case of Smrtis which do not prescribe

or prohibit any course of action , for example , statements

that plants have souls , which contradicts his own denial o f

o . o I 3 1 1 vegetable b dies Both scho ls again agree ( , , 5 , 6 ) in accepting as valid the Smrtis of such authors as Vasi s ha Baudha an a A astamb a n Gautama , t , y , p , Sa kha and Harita , despite the occurrence in them of passages laying

down certain customs as practised by persons in the east , so o and on , a fact which apparently c ntradicts the universa i ‘ l ty of the Vedic inj unction . The decision of the schools is u that their inj nctions are truly universal , and even the Veda lays down certain practices as to be perfo rmed by certain Ra classes only , for instance , the j asuya is a sacrifice fo r

kings only . ’ Vedari as r The g , or subsidia y treatises bearing on Vedic rono unciation o o p , ritual , grammar , etym logy and astron my ,

are also admitted to rest in part on Vedic tradition , and the Mimamsa and phi10 50 phic treatises generally are permitted 2 to share in Vedic authority ; thus Kumarila assures us that

1 Pra ka ra na afi cika . 100 10 1 p , pp , , 150 . 3 l ka vartt ka . 26 S o i , p 7 ( v . 84 THE KARMA - MIMAMSA the B uddhist denial of the external world was not really meant to be taken as a serious contradiction of its reality , t ’ i but to diver men s m nds rom undue attention to it , and o s with other apparently erroneous tenets . In the case of the ritual Sfi tras the claim is made by some that they must be treated as true Veda themselves , but this is denied , for they Smr is have human authors , and are merely , like t , based on In Vedic authority . the case of grammar , however , a really s Sa I 3 4 - 3 interesting discus ion is raised on the tra ( , , 0 ) by those who deny that it can be made out to rest on Vedic so authority , and who go far as to challenge the validity of the claims of the grammarians to be authoritative . The argument o f these unorthodox persons runs "words ’ avi o f a uk like g , in lieu the grammarians g , for cow are perfectly correct ; they are fully expressive , they are percept n ible by the ear , they are as eternal as any word is , and o T beginning in time for them can be traced . he science of grammar , too , has no Vedic connection ; it differs in no way from the process of explaining vernacular words for eve ryday use ; it does not deal with acti o ns which are the sole business no of the Veda ; i t serves useful purposes in relation to duty , as we do not need grammar to tell us the meanings of words ; nor is grammar the source of usage , since , on the contrary , it rests upon and follows usage . The reply of the Mimarnsa is not convincing ; it maintains that synonyms are not a u t permissible , unless enjoined by Vedic use ; as g l expresses exactly the meaning cow , any variant of it is wrong and undesirable , and has such power of denotation as it may actually possess , merely because of its similarity to ga uh and not in its own right . The science of grammar also is essential to set out in orderly deri vation the vast masses of words in the Vedas ; moreover , not usage alone , but usage and grammar determine whether a word has the correct form to co nvey the meaning , and grammar in the last issue is more authoritative than mere usage . That correct words produce , when used , a transcendental result is proved by the fact that the Veda enjoins their use , and forbids the use of barbarous expressions ; moreover , truth leads to supreme

. bliss , and the use of correct words is truth in speech Fortunately this disquisition does not prevent either Prabha RULES OF RITUAL INT ERPRETAT ION 85

K m rila 1 kara or u a ( I , 3 , 0 ) from agreeing that , when the

Veda uses a barbarous word , it is to be interpreted in the sense barbarian usage accords to it , in lieu of attempting to 1 foist upon it an etymological sense .

The relation of Smrti authority to the Veda , in cases to where there appears be conflict , is the subject of rila divergence of Opinion between Prabhaka ra and Kuma . In the view of the former , which is apparently that of

’ ’ Mi mdnz sa fi tra I - 4 Smrti o the S ( , 3 , 3 ) if a c ntradicts a Vedic passage , the former loses all authority , while , even in the mrti case of S passages which do not thus offend , it may be impossible to accord their injunctions any spiritual value , as i f they seem to be due to the avarice of the priests , when the giving of the cloth from the sacrificial post to a

mrti . Kumarila priest is enjoined by S authority , however , as as with his greater regard for tradition , reduces , far possible , cases of contradiction to mere instances where Sfttra alternatives are permissible , and only holds that the recommends in the case of such alternatives the adoption of

in ferred Vedic . that which has direct , and not merely , authority Below the Smrtis in value comes the practice of good I 3 8 - 9 I 3 15- 23 men ( , , ) or custom ( , , ) on the simple u gro nd that , while both must go back to Vedic authority to be valid , the former goes more directly to the fountainhead . In Smrti addition , however , to and practise must be reckon ed as sources of knowledge of duty the implications contained in Vedic texts , which may be deduced by us from them , even se mrtis o i f not already t out in S or by traditi n . The essential function of all these sources is to give u s knowledge of inj uncti o ns ( vidhi ) and injunctions are en cite A ments to actions . ctions may be classified in various ways ; is there a clear distinction between Vedic and worldly actions , am with the former alone is the M im sa concerned . Actions e rati e of this type may be class d as positive , as negative ( p s dha ) or as partaking of both characters as in

1 K u marila enlivens the discussio n by giving a lo ng list o f erro rs in a mma o mm ed e e b amma a s and s m a d e s f es gr r c itt v n y gr ri n , i il rly iv r i i I 3 7 his e o s o o f the i o f th d b ( , , ) xp iti n pract ce e goo y an acco unt o f ‘ mes a b u ed to o ds and s a O amm es . a cf . N a 1i i cri ttri t g g n gr r, y yama j a r , 41 - pp. 2 26 . 86 THE KARMA -MIMAMSA

o the case of a vow not to l ok at the sun taken by a student . 1 Of actions the sacrificial are the most important , falling under the three main classes of Yaga , the offering to a deity o f a substance ; Homa , the offering of a substance in fire or a ’ water ; and D na , the waiver of one s ownership of an object

. S in favour of a third party acrifices , again , can be divided n A accordi g as they serve as archetypes only , like the gni f vikrti M sa nihotra o r ho ra , or as derivatives ( ) , like the a g , o A on new as b th , like the victim for gni and Soma , based the and full moon sacrifice and itself a model f or the offering S D a rvihoma at the oma pressing ; or as neither , like the , for u special reasons given in the S tra . More important is the division by purpose ; the Nitya sacrifices must constantly be perfo rmed at the due seasons ; the N aimittik a must be per o n o o f formed certain special occasi ns , as the Jyotis fering i Kam a o f on the approach of spr ng , while the y f erings are optional , being undertaken by a man who desires some Kariri i o special end , as in the case of the st perf rmed to obtain rain . The direction to perform an o ffering is laid down in an ’ originating inj unction ( utpa ttimdhi ) or an injunction of vi ni o avidhi application ( y g ) , according as the matter concerned In is a principal or a subordinate offering . either case , it is frequently necessary to ascertain precisely how many actions are prescribed , and six rules for this purpose are rn a I I 2 laid down by the M ima s ( , and Difference in words is one clear indication , especially in the case of the in verb , which is the most important part of a sentence of j unction ; the repetition o f the verb indicates distinct off er ings ; the mention of a definite number of oblatio ns is clear evidence ; o ther sources are the difference of names ; of In materials to be used , and of context . the case o f the last item it is agreed that the occurrence of the same offering in two different recensions of one text , as in the case of the a ina ata a tha Brahmana K nva and M adhyamd texts of the S p , does not constitute a diversity o f context .

The originating inj unctions are few in number , relating as they do to the principal Vedic offerings only , such as the

1 ia a . 17 ft. i la ra kasa . 8 1 11 Mimdrhs a aribl M marhsaba p , pp ; p s , pp RULE S OF RITUAL INTERPRETAT ION 8 7

A nihotra S g , the new and full moon sacrifices , the oma

so . I sacrifice , and forth t might have been expected that there would have been made some effort to systematise these f is of erings , but no trace of any attempt to effect this end am a seen in the Mim s , which accepts the sacrifices from the It sacrificial tradition . is true that there is a certain degree of order of progress from the simpler to the more complex , o but this order is not absolute , being br ken by the necessity of performing the Naimittika offerings on the occurrence of S the pecial occasions which evoke them . Nor is there any principle discernible in the rewards attainable by these offerings ; they include such material things as wealth , usually in cattle , children , long life , rule , and , most frequently is w of all , heaven , which held , on hat is known as the Vi va IV 3 1 - 16 S jit principle ( , , 0 ) to be the reward promised i in any case in which no specific boon s laid down .

The originating inj unctions , however , do no more than excite in the mind of the hearer the desire to perform the i o action wh ch they enjoin , generally in the f rm of a f o r o f a li sacrifice it remains other injunctions , those pp to itikar cation , denote the exact manner of procedure ( tav a ta y ) , by specifying the numerous subsidiary actions requisite , and the materials and other necessaries for the performance . The discrimination between what is principal and what is subsidiary ( Sesa ) occupies the greater part of ‘ Mimarnsa the attention of the , and it stands in a close relation to the motive for the performance of the various A o actions . cti ns may be undertaken according to the Sutra IV 1 l ff Sab a rasvamin Pra bh k r ( , , ) , followed by , a a a , and Kumarila uru , either for the sake of the agent ( p sartha ) or krat artha for the sake of the offering ( v ) , while P artha sarathi adds a third class of those which are neither for the one purpose or the other , giving as an instance the A n adhana g y , or piling of the sacred fire . This innovation seems to be without warrant the original distinction corres ponds roughly to that between principal and subordinate actions the new and full moon ofl erings serve to benefit

- man by producing a due reward , while the fore offerings , which form part of them , are merely subsidiary to the a s crifice materials normally are subsidiary to the sacrifice , 88 THE KARMA- MIMAM SA

any go o d results mentioned being treated a s merely Artha a o n v da , though occasions a thing like curds , which serves as fi an element in offerings , may be used to make ef cient the sa crifi er sense organs of the c , and thus to serve for his benefit . The last instance shows that the co rrespo ndence between actions for the benefit of the agent and principal

actions is by no means complete . The question of what things can be subsidiary is the ’ subject of an elabo rate investigation ; acco rding to Bada ri s Mi mams a Satra I II opinion , cited in the ( , the only 7

subsidiaries are substances , accessories , namely . the Mantras urifi ca to r and the deities , and p y actions , such as the thresh T o a imin i io o r ing o f corn . this list J adds act ns sacrifices generally , results , and agents . The distinction between the o Vrttikara w Sab arasvamin two sets , acc rding to the , hom cites , is that the first three classes are essentially in their nature subsidiary , while the latter three are in one sense principal , in another subsidiary . Thus the sacrifices are principal with reference to the materials , but subsidiary to the result ; the result is principal with reference to the sacrifice , but subsidiary towards the agent ; the agent , again , is principal with regard to the result , but subsidiary to such o acts as the measuring of the sacrificial post , which is t be related to his height . From another point of view the agent may be said to be subsidiary to the sacrifices , since it is to perform them that he acts . k 1 Prabha a ra divides the subsidiaries into four classes , fl i to ati accord ng the heads of class (j ) , quality , substance , rthatm ka bhava a . and actions , denoted by verbs ( ) The last head he divides into those actions which are directly co n ducive to the fulfilment o f the sacrifice ( samnipatyopa ka ra ka ) and those which are more distantly conducive to this k result ( aradupa kara a ) . The former he classifies in four divisions ; the bringing into existence ( utpa tti ) of some n object , as the production of dough by kneadi g the corn ; the obtaining (prapti ) of a substance already in existence , ' vikrtz as such as milk ; the modification ( ) of a substance , of

’ 1 a fi cika . 202 if cf . M imafhs an a a rakasa . Pra ka ra zza p , pp ; y y p , pp

- he e the d s o is wo fo d siddha a nd kri a . 62 67 , w r ivi i n t l , y

90 THE KARMA- MIMAMSA

syntactical connection is of value ; thus , in one passage

- SB. IV 4 6 16 18 e ( , , , ) we are able to decide that R and Ya us R veda Ya urveda j mean the g and the j , and not , as might else be thought , metrical and prose Mantras , because of the syntactical co nnection with the immediately preced

. ra ka ra i a ing words Fourthly , context (p g ) is of great importance ; we have the general injunction that o ne sho uld perform the new and full moon sacrifices , and the inj unction to offer to T anfi n apat; this principle enables us to find a purpose f o r the latter offering in connection with the former sacrifices ; mere syntactical connection would not here help , as the sentences stand apart and are in themselves quite kra ma sthana complete . Fifthly , order ( ) or position ( ) i s

T . S I 2 4 of service ; thus in one passage ( . , 6 , , ) occur three

M antras without indication of use ; we can , however , by finding that elsewhere three offerings are enjoined in connection with these M antras , assume that the order of the o ne sacrifices and the Mantras is to correspond , being used s amakh a with each offering in order . Finally , names ( y ) o may supply informati n else wanting ; thus Mantras , not Hautra otherwise identified , by being styled are known to E fall within the sphere of the Hotr priest . ach of these means for adequate reasons is deemed to be of more value than the p receding, and in working out the principle in am a detail the Mim s shows both skill and acumen , even when we admit that in many cases its reasonings were guided by the fact that a certain usage had become regular , and therefore that the sound conclusion was already given by customary practice . While these injunctions of application determine the exact mode in which the ceremonies prescribed in the origi nating injunctions are to be performed , the order of the actions is prescribed by inj unctions of performance ( viniyoga vidhi) . On this point , however , there is a difference of view Kum rila bet ween Prabhak ara and a (V , the latter admits readily the existence of injunctions determining the order of performance by the process of extracting such Prab haka ra directions from inj unctions of application . , n however , insists that an inj u ction of application cannot be deemed to deal with order , which is a matter of indifference , RULE S O F RITUAL INT ERPRETAT ION 9 1

o a i S long s an act s performed , but even he admits that a few cases occur in which the order of o fl erings is specially As defined . a rule , however , the order is left to be deter it mined by minor indications . Thus may be directly enjoined , or the order of the mention of the offerings may o f t be decisive , or the order the natural ac ions may be resorted to ; thus the gruel must be cooked before the Agni

h otra . is offered , although the text mentions the latter first A o f o gain , the order c mmencement is of importance ; in the Vaj apeya there are seventeen victims to be immolated ; the

offerer may begin with any one , but the different acts must o be done to each foll wing the initial order adopted . Posi A ni oma tion , again , is of importance ; thus in the g st there are to A S three animal victims , one gni and oma offered on the Savani a day before the sacrifice , the y on the day of the o f pressing the Soma , and a barren cow on the final day . In Sad a skra A nis o ma the y , a modification of the g t , the o fl ered three victims are to be on one day , that of the press o Savani a ing ; hence , as this is pr perly the day of the y f or A victim , it is to be offered first , followed by that gni and

S . oma , and the barren cow Lastly , the order of the principal actions prevails over that of subo rdinate actions ; thus at the new moo n sacrifice the preliminaries for the offering to Indra are performed before those of the offering A A I " to gni , but the offering to gni comes before that to ndra

accordingly , in the performance of subsequent rites , it is those connected with Agni that take precedence over those I In connected with ndra . cases where none of these means

give a clear result , any order may be resorted to , and so with

offerings performed independently to obtain worldly goods . Nor is there any fixed order between the Soma sacrifices and a I i the simpler rites known s st s . There remains the question of the right to perform

sacrifices , which forms the subject of a set of injunctions adhikaravidhi aimini relating to qualification ( ) . J , it

seems , took a generous view of the position of woman , con tem latin VI 1 6 - 8 p g ( , , ) her as a performer of sacrifices ,

though , in the case of her being married , both she and her co - husband must operate in offering , and the Vedic Mantras

would be recited by him only . Sab arasvamin already 9 2 T HE KARMA - MIMAMSA

emphasises the disability of women arising from their aimini ignorance of the Veda , which is not asserted by J , fi r who doubtless reflects the older usage . S d as are excluded VI 1 i n r ( , , from sacrificing for this very reason of g o

ance of the Veda , and in the later texts the admission of women even to a qualified share of the sacrifice is thus o o f anomalous . Some small am unt means is also requisite sacrifi cer in a , and he must not be incapacitated by disease . Srauta Su Further details are given in the tras , which recog a imini nise , like J , the case of certain classes who can take t some part in sacrifice hough not of the three higher classes , R t r In such as the a haka a . the case of Sattras only Brahmans of the ViSvamitra family studying the same Kalpa Su sacrifi cers an tra are qualified to act ; all act as , d each a individually obt ins the whole benefit of the sacrifice , instead

' i b in t e o . of g shared c llectively Moreover , while the death sacrifi cer of an ordinary destroys the rite , in the case of a Sattra the place of any one incapacitated can be taken by t another priest , who , however , ob ains no share of the result . o Only Brahmans again can eat the remnants of sacrifice , s K a tri a a So f or that , i f a s y has ma sacrifice performed him , f o r he must be given to drink a substitute Soma remnants .

On the other hand , the threefold duty of sacrifice to the s R is gods , of Vedic tudy as payment of debts to the s , and of d incu the begetting of children as a ebt to the Fathers , is m on bent all these classes , not merely on those who may wish o VI 2 A to attain the benefits of these acti ns ( , , gain he ViSVa it VI 7 only may perform the j ( , ) who can afford a fee hidden of gold pieces , but , when he is to give up all in

e . . it , that applies only to his riches , not to , g his parents , and

of his riches there are excluded lands , horses , and slaves in

personal attendance , while the years of performance is

interpreted as so many days . In addition to these divisions according to content injunctions can be classified on the basis of the knowledge already possessed by the agent of the mode of performance 1 a art m or actions possible . Thus an original inj unction ( p

1 am I 42 Arthas arh ra ha . 17 Ku marila o n Mini ams a S , , 2 , ; g , pp , - 8 Mi 10 12 41 . 1 mafii saparibhasa, pp. ,

94 T HE KARMA -M IMAMSA

prohibition would not be wh at was desired , since , owing to the equal validity of all Vedic sentences , the only result o would be to make the action opti nal . Thus , instead of a o Pa r u pr hibition , we have what is technically styled a y dasa , “ HO and the sense of the rule is that the words , , we ” sacrifice , which are uttered with the sacrificial verses , are to be uttered with those verses only which do not occur in nu a as A y j .

These are the main topics , which , with numerous excur a II- IV Adh a a sions into subsidiary detail , fill P das of y y I Adh a as I I- VI M i mams a tra and y y of the Sil . The next two Adhyayas deal with the transfer of details from the archetype to sacrifices wh o se form is derived from it , a discussion rendered necessary by the fact that in the, Brahmanas there are many cases in which it is presumed that the details of one offering will be supplied

- I su from another , as in the often quoted case of the offering which is based on the Syena . The transference a ti a ( des ) applies not merely to the mode of performance , 1 I but to materials and other details . t is regulated by c o ntext (prg ka ran a ) or p o sition ; thus the I su offering S follows the yena model , because they are enjoined in the The same context . rule of position again lays it down that the deity of the original offering is to take the same place f in the transferred of ering, and the offering material is also to be transferred . T ransfer takes place by express I u injunction , as in the case of the s offering ; by implied Sfi r a inj unction , as in the case of the offering to y , which is based on the new and full moon offerings ; by mention of M asa ni the name of a sacrifice , as in the case of the g h tr A nihotra o a , which is made in accordance with the g ; or sa mskara by mention of the name of a purification ( ) , as Avab hrtha Va runa ra hasa when , the being mentioned at the p g , v hr ha it is performed like the A ab t , or concluding bath , of the Agnistoma where the rite is purifi cato ry.

The process of transfer , however , frequently involves modifications ( fi l m) in the Mantras used to accompany the rites , in order to adapt them to the change of circumstance .

1 ’ Pra a ra a a a fi cika . 227 . k p , p ( v RULE S O F RITUAL I NT E RPRETAT ION 95

Elaborate rules are accordingly given in Adhyaya I" ‘ of the Sti tra on this head . Nor only Mantras are altered , but also Samans ; thus at the VaiSyastoma the K anvara than tara replaces the orgin al Brha t and Ra tha ntara samans . In some cases pu rifi cations are modified ; thus the wild rice u ra Va a e a ( i va ) used at the j p y offering , in place of the ordinary rice , is subjected to the processes of purification In applicable to the latter . other cases Mantras are not

o f o . altered , but the number of times their use is m dified In other cases the transference must be accompanied by the annulment of details which are now inappropriate . Adh a a The cases in which this occurs , enumerated in y y X , are numero us and complicated ; thus an a ct may by change Pra a at a be rendered useless ; in the j p y rite , based on the new and full moon sacrifices , grains of gold replace rice grains , and the operations of husking and washing are A Ya us n therefore annulled . gain , i f j Ma tras are given to Ni a das o be recited as g , which are invitati ns and therefore o f Ya us must be said aloud , the normal rule muttering of j Mantras is annulled in favour of the necessary loud A utterance . nnulment , again , may be parti al or complete , and the later text books take special pleasure in developing the diverse forms in which it may appear . Opposed to annulment is combination ( samuceaya ) in which the new details of the derivative form are only added to the details of the original offering . In Adhyaya "I the question is raised of th e relation of subsidiary to principal offerings as regards repetition of In performance . certain cases a single performance of subsidiaries gives effective aid to more than one principal A n dhana action , as in the case of the g ya , which need only once be performed , the s ame consecrated fire serving for all subsequent sacrifices ; this aid is styled T antra .

On the other hand , some subsidi aries must be repeated with each principal offering ; thus the subsidiaries of the rites performed at new and full moon respectively in those offer ings are nearly the same , but the lapse of time between the two rites renders the repetition of the subsidiaries essential a this case is styled Avap . But in some cases where a sub sidiary is merely performed for the purpose of aiding one 96 THE KARMA- MIMAMSA

principal operation , it may nonetheless aid also another principal Operation ; thus the fore - offerings for the victim to Agni and Soma at the Soma sacrifice serve for the cake offering also , and , i f an altar has been made ready for a ‘ S sa crifi cer I oma sacrifice , the may perform an sti with it , if Prasan a he will . This form is termed g . Adh a a "I I o vikal a Finally , in y y the topic of Opti ns ( p ) 1 is disposed of ; options are of many kinds , indicated by o r reasoning , by direct declaration , or depending on the wish of the agent ; nineteen subdivisions of each type are made , of which eight depend on the Option furthering the o n performance of the rite , and eleven its bringing about f o r so me benefit the agent . By another principle of divi sion options are classed as limited o r fixed ( vyavasthita ) m av ava sthita and unli ited ( y ) , each class again being sub divided according as it rests on reasoning or declaration . O ob B ut ptions as a rule are open to many jections , though o O this defect d es not apply either to fixed ptions , or to those e which d pend on the will of the agent . The subjects to

- which options may apply are most varied , the use or non use on of certai n Mantras , preference for e colour or ano ther , the choice of kinds of grain , mode of action , and so forth .

’ 1 r ma a i a - i afii dbala a kasa . 15 Mima s r b a . 41 4 M m s p , p 2 ; p h s , pp 4

98 T HE KARMA - M IMAMSA

' k ara Sarn . with which his father , Bhatta , had dealt The parallelism , indeed , of the two enquiries only became the more salient as with the course of time the number of Smrtis and other texts claiming authority increased , and the ideal of reconciling their conflicting views was more and more All strongly held . the devices necessary for such an end

' Mim rn a existed in the a s , and we can understand from this reason why it was not thought necessary or desirable to develop a distinct science of legal interpretation . Thus the essential doctrine of injunction in civil law is based on the principles adopted in the Mimamsa, and in the interpretation of the various kinds of injunction the civil law adapts to its own special needs the maxims of the sacred law . The distinction between injunction proper and a restrictive inj unction ( niyama ) is applied in the sense that the latter is reduced to nothing more than a maxim or rule , which ought to be regarded , but which , i f violated , ’ does not render the action affected invalid ; thus Manu s rule as to marrying an amiable and healthy girl is not an injunction , the violation of which renders void the marriage , but a counsel of prudence . The case of an ' a ris amkh a inj unction of limitation (p y ) raises difficulties , as there arises in regard to it the question whether or not it is the to be deemed to imply a prohibition ; thus , when injuncti o n is laid down that the sons may divide the . family the imutav hana s property on death of their parents , J a put the question whether it is to be inferred that they may do so only on the death of their parents , a view which he rejects . Negative inj unctions also raise a point of legal impor e tance in the relation of prohibition proper , and a mer ar udasa exception (p y ) . Thus the general law of the succes sion of a son and other heirs is subject to the exclusion from succession of persons impotent , outcaste , lame , blind , and to suffering from incurable diseases , who are entitled maintenance merely . The negation in their case is essen tiall y to be treated , as an exception to the general rule of so succession it , therefore , applies only to persons circum stanced at the moment when the succession would normally so vest , and , therefore , i f successors become afflicted after becoming entitled to the succession , the rule does not in any THE MIMAMSA AND H INDU LAW 99

a as a w y affect them , , of course , it would do i f it were 1 prohibition proper . In the interpretation of the Smrti inj unctions the same principles are applicable as in the case of the interpretation of the inj unctions of application in Vedic texts . Thus the express declaration of a text must be held to override any conclusion which might be deduced from it by suggestion ’

l k a i a lirz a aimini . decla ( a s g ) , corresponding to g in J The “ I"1 4 r ration of Manu ( , 0 ) that after the death of fathe f or and mother the sons should divide the paternal property , w ” they have no po er over it while their parents live , is an absolute declaration that they have no such power ; it is impossible to read the rule as forbidding partition during ’ s the parents li fe , but acknowledging the power of the son h a over the property . The power of suggestion , however , s its a also own place thus Nanda Pandita in expl ining how , although the word substitute was first applied Specifi cially to five kinds of sons , it becomes applicable to all the twelve Pranabh t kinds legally recognised , adduces the r maxim 2 Pr n abhrt 8 ) as his warrant . a originally denotes a M antra used in consecrating a brick in the fire altar ; thence it passes to be the name of . the brick , and from denoting the Special bricks used applies more generally to vak a any brick . The principle of syntactical connection ( y ) Anva a its reappears , usually under the title y superiority to ’ context (prakaran a ) is illustrated by Raghunandana s discus ’ M ann s "I 2 sion of rule ( , 0 9 ) that one who assaults a If B rahman must undergo the Krcchra penance . the context is the invoked , this may seem merely to refer to the case of has o new and full moon sacrifices , and therefore n general i or civil application , but the sound view is that it s to b e treated as a single independent proposition . A hav a so a The term , rt ad , which plays important part am a i in the Mim s discussions s dropped in legal terminology , but the legal texts recognise the existence of such p assages mrti fi in the S s and deal variously with them . One dif cult problem is handled in the light of the maxim of Ja imini I 2 19 ( , , dealing with declarations which have the

1 Ta w u 190 . gore La Lect res , 5 , pp. 332 , 333 1 00 T HE KARMA - MIMAMSA

appearance of being inj unctions but are not really so 1 vidhiva nni adadhika ra i a h n ( g z ) . Thus Jimfi ta va a a is “ o enabled to h ld that the text which provides that , Though o imm vables or bipeds have been acquired by a man , no gift ” or sale of them without the assent of his sons , is to be ” completed by the words , should be made , and not by the “ ” words must he made . This interpretation reduces the o o sentence to a mere pious Opinion , and av ids c ntradiction

- with the well known inj unction , which allows a man absolute power of disposal over property acquired by his own o exertions , as opposed to ancestral p ssessions . The same

maxim , however , has been interpreted as supporting the general rule that an inj unction for which a reason is d to Arthavada so adduce is merely equivalent an , that ’ Vasistha s rule against the adoption of an o nly son is to o O reduced a pious expressi n of pinion , because it is followed by the explanati o n that a son is one who saves

from hell his natural father , a fact which makes the n son am a adoptio of an only undesirable . The Mim s rule ,

however , goes no further than to hold that , i f for a rule which has no known Vedic sanction a selfish motive can be

seen , it is impossible to postulate for it the authority of

a Vedic text , and the supposed rule of law is clearly too

widely stated . The obligation of law to the Mimamsa extends to every

department of the topic , and it not merely in matters of interpretation that the legal writers borrow matter from the m M i ma sa, but they Show repeatedly traces of influence by the po sitive doctrines o f that school in their hea ring on the religious aspect of property and family rights . The doctrine o f to o the three debts of man , sacrifice the g ds , study to the R is and u s , the begetting of a son for the Fathers , en nciated a imini o by J , aff rds three presumptions which , more or less

o . In effectively , are taken into account by the scho ls of law a v h ana treating the principle of succession Jimut a uses , as a guiding principle in reco nciling the conflicting statements Smrtis o f the , the principle of securing as far as possible spiritual welfare , and in interpreting the rules regarding

1 Da a bha a a s . o eb o o ke II 29 30 . y g , tr n C l r , , ,

1 02 T HE KARMA - MIMAMSA his all , his children are excluded from the gift . The same passage is also employed to express the limited character of the ownership of a king or a feudatory ; his actual owner s hip is restricted to whatever property he has acquired ; his position towards the territory is one of sovereignty or suz er nit a y, entitling him to a maintenance but not to true owner S hip when a king is said to give a village , he does not trans Of fer the ownership the land , which is not his to give , but a ssigns to the donee the right o f drawing a maintenance f rom the village . The Mimamsa also affords guidance to Vijfi aneSva ra II 136 ( , ) in a variety of details in connection with heritage n o a d partition . The claim of w man to inherit is q uestioned on the ground that , as property is intended for s acrificial purposes and as save along with her husband a l s ta n i sa rifi cer woman has no ocu s d as a c , on the interpreta Mi mamsa Sil tra VI 1 1 7- 2 1 tion of the ( , , ) adopted in the n c ommentators , there is no grou d for her having the right of i nheritance . This illiberal doctrine is disposed of by appeal Mi mamsa Satra III 4 26 t o another passage of the ( , , ) in which it refers to ornaments of gold worn by the priests and i i acr fi cer . the s , though serv ng no sacrificial purpose The e xact share o f a wife raises difficulties in view of the con in fi ict g interpretation of the two main texts , the first of which s provide that , if an owner divides property in his lifetime , h e should make his wives have equal shares with his sons ; o f a nd the second , that on partition after the death the h usband the wi fe should have a share equal to that of her T s ons . hese passages are interpreted by some authorities to mean that , if the property is extensive , she is to have a mere a is s ubsistence from the est te , while , if it small , she is to t h ave an equal share . This view is rejec ed on the strength aimini VI I 3 19 - 25 o f the principle upheld by J ( , , ) that , so o e is long as a text can yield a single c her nt meaning , it not right to treat it as broken into two incongruous parts . Simi am V 1 4 - 7 l a rly it is on the Mim sa rule ( , , ) of following the o rder of things mentioned in a certain order that is based son the claim that , when the parents of a childless succeed to his property , the mother has a prior claim , because the term parents (pitarau) is explained in grammatical treatises T HE MIMAMSA AND H INDU LAW 103 as mother and father and not as father and A am is mother . nother appeal to the Mim sa doctrine made a n ’ II 126 in regard to Y j avalkya s doctrine ( , ) that a coparcener , who at the time of partition withholds part of the property , must give it up for division . The question is is arises whether the action reprehensible or not , and ffi m a VI 3 2 decided in the a rmative because in the Mima s ( , , 0) it is ruled that a man who substitutes one form of meal for another , even if acting under a genuine misapprehension , still does wrong , so that , even if the coparcener had some right his to the property and regarded it as his own , conduct is imutavah ana censurable . J , as often , differs in part from

Vi fi aneSVara . j , and extenuates the action On a strict t am a is in erpretation by Mi m s principles again , it not impossible to argue that Jimfi tavahana does no t allow the disposal by will by a father of inherited property without provision being made for the maintenance of the sons ; the conflicting view of the Privy Council is clearly hard to 1 reconcile with the principles of Mimamsa. A n doptio , like inheritance , affords a fruitful field for the , m 2 application of Mima sa principles . The right of a Sfi dra to is uddhiviv ka adopt , which denied in the S e , on the ground that adoption must be accompanied by Vedic Mantras and a Su an oblation which he c nnot as a dra have performed , is vindicated on the ground of the occurrence of a certain offer Ni adastha ati VI 1 5 1 ing for a s p ( , , ) in the Veda , although a Nisada is normally as a Sfi dra excluded from any Vedic

. T he A rite Mantras can then be recited by an ryan . A woman , again , can only adopt with the permission of her she husband , as cannot by herself perform Vedic rites and A ceremonies gain , a child when adopted cannot ’ hi inherit his father s property or perform s Sraddha , accord M an n ing to ; this rule , though restricted to these two facts , must be understood to apply generally on the analogy of a ntarvedi i am a II 1 terms like in the M m s ( I , 7 , 3 , which means not merely at the centre of the altar , but anywhere within it . By another maxim Nilakantha decides that

1 Ta ore Law Lectu es 1905 0 - g r , , pp. 4 5 11 . 1 V ava harama fi kha ed . Bo mb a 0 y y ( y, pp. 4 if . 104 THE KA RMA - MIMAMSA

’ S 5 aunaka text , which asserts that the son of a daughter and i the son of a sister are adopted by Sudras , s to be read to mean

that these adoptions are generally permissible , and that they are specially so in the case of Sudras "the maxim used 1S the M a itravaruna , which rests on the interpretation of the

two sentences , He hands over a staff to the M aitravaruna ” o r priest ; he initiates invokes by means of the staff . The accepted opinion is that the handing over of the staff is a o i distinct injuncti n , the initiat on or invocation subsidiary , and so here the part of the Sudra is only subsidiary to m . S hi an established rule a kara Bhatta , s father , whom Nila kantha cites , expressly applies to the Sudra the duty

of paying his debt to the Fathers , which is asserted of the

Brahman as an instance in the Mi mamsa Sfi tra . Similar use of the Mimamsa is made in the same con ‘ nection by Nanda Pandita in the D atta kamimani s a 1 . 60 0 Va i va e ( c Thus on the analogy of the S d va , I 4 13 - 16 which is a maxim ( , , ) laying down that in the case of such a word as that the conventional sense is to be fol I 2 lowed in lieu of the etymological , he holds (V , 7 ) that the term sapip da used of relati o nship is not to be restricted to n n the exact mea ing suggested by the word as a compou d . O M h ti hi S also , in order to meet the objection of ed a t to an adopted son on the ground that the duty of man is fulfilled I 4 1 x only by begetting a son , he adduces ( , ) the ma im VI 3 3 1 u S ( , , ) of the substitution of the P tika for the oma In plant . determining the value of substitution the mode in is which the substitute originated unimportant , the question

( is whether it can serve its purpose adequately , and this an A adopted son can easily do . gain , the objection to the rule that an adoptive father must perform the birth ceremony for u an adopted child , though adoption is permitted p to the use 4 5 - 14 fi fth year , is met by the of the maxim (V , , ) that , when a difficulty arises as to the order of performance of offe rings , reason and necessity must be consulted , whence it follows that the performance of the birth ceremony is in order D attakacandrika though tardy . The author of the similarly am doctrine IV 1 2 2 - z 4 of appeals to the Mim sa ( , , ) the relation of the principal and incidental aspects of an action , in order co - to support his view that , i f one of two widows adopt , the

106 THE KARMA - MIMAM SA

o ther occasions reduces a plural to its bare meaning of

three . Even more interesting is a case in which the law of evidence is influenced by the Mimamsa doctrine of the self Y v k . a fi a al a I validity of cognitions j y lays down ( I , 80 ) has that , i f a man brought forward witnesses , yet i f at a later

period he can produce more satisfactory testimony , the

evidence already adduced is to be discredited . This pro cedure b , at first sight drastic , is j ustified y the adduction in ‘ the M ita ksara of the arguments adduced by the Vrttikara in

- support of the self evidence of cognitions . Evidence is rima aci e p f valid , unless it can be shown that the witness his could not have known the facts , that means of knowl e karan ado a dge were defective ( s ) , or his evidence is i displaced by other evidence , that is , the first cognition s I Vi sublated by a second cognition . mmediately after , jfi anes I I 8 t o a vara ( , 3 ) has recourse the Mim msa to provide a suitable pen a nce for the witness whom he enjoins to with

hold evidence or testimony , where the proof of the charge would result in the infliction of the capital penalty ; in

these cases the usual punishment of a fine , or in the case

o f a Brahman banishment , is not in point still , to do away with the sin of the deviation from the truth the perfo rmance rasvate i m of a special offering , the Sa st , given in the Mima sa, i s prescribed . As 13 h natural , t e obligations of the law books to the Mimamsa principles are still more marked In those parts of ' v avahara those treatises which deal , not with civil law ( y ) in m the narrower sense of the term , but with religious custo and penances . Even in the civil law , however , there is one point on which the law books differ in essentials from i i i his Ja m n ; it was necessary for the latter , in support of V doctrine of the eternity of the eda , to maintain that its m Smrti co mands are universal , and thus he treats even texts which contain inj unctions expressed as local practises In as really laying d o wn general principles . the practical w needs of the law , however , the utmost value is al ays o attached to local cust ms , and the practice of good

men , which thus in effect comes to outweigh maxims in

mrtis . S , i f in any place these are not followed Yet T HE MIMAMSA AND H INDU LAW 10 7

’ Jaimini s insistence on the supreme value of the Veda in all questions was not without effect ; the tendency in the Sm is d rt is , in harmony no oubt with a common practice , to allot in the case of partition of property a larger share to n the eldest so than to the others . B ut there is Vedic authority for the statement that Manu divided his property in equal shares among his sons , and this doctrine has finally prevailed in the law , despite the efforts of some of the compilers of digests to compromise the matter in order to i l In obey the clear directions of the Smrt s. the legal schools , again , it has been found necessary to assign relative mrtis weight to Puranas and S , a distinction which is not Kumarila a found in , who accepts the Pur nas on the s ame i basis as the Smrt s . I n the case of a divergence between Smrti and Purana the former should prevail in the view of V asa a y ; the Pur na represents no more than custom , while 2 the Smrti is a step nearer to Sruti . While the Mimamsa thus stands in close relation with I n ndian law , in its enunciation of pri ciples in the form of n a a brief maxims ( y y ) , comparable with the headnotes of modern law reports , it stands in equally close relation with the popular vogue” of maxims3 framed on the model whence ' Mim rnsa the a use is doubtless derived . Such popular — maxims are freely cited by the text books of the school , and it was presumbly on their analogy that the Adhik a rana headings were deri ved ; the remarkable divergence of the ‘1 ' commentators in allotting SIItra s to Adhika rana s indicates

' that the latter were not a primitive constit uent of the StI tra text .

1 Cf . M andlik a s . o f V ao a hara ma h i k a . 4 . , tr n y y , p 1 , n . 1 1 Ta o re Law Lectu res 1905 . 234 235 cf ho we g , , pp , ver,

d . cit . M an lik, o p 1 ’ See Co l. a o b s L a n kika n a afi a li nd d 2 c . . J c y y j ( , 3 parts ) 1 bo e . So m the Vedanta Satra A v pp . INDE"

’ ‘ C I ION 56 66 Bh Dina k a ra , , atta , o s o o f Bh t S m Acti n , classificati n , at a a kara , ‘ Bha t a bha kar t s a , 13 do o 103 104 Bhatta cin tama i i 12 A pti n , , r , , 97 Adh ik a ra n a 4 1 1 Bhattala mkara , , 3 , 07 , 13 53 54 B hatta ra ha a Air , , sy , 13 i ta sa a n a 4 Bh a dasa A y , a v , 7 Ala a v i ii an a 47 Bh a v a n ath a M § 12 y j , i ra , o 32 33 Bh av a n a 5 6 An al gy , , , 7 , 7 An a nd a iri 11 B o dh a a n a g , y , 8 A n a n t a d ev a 13 B o d 67 69 o f o 62 63 , y , , creat r , , A n a u rv a 75 B ahm 36 n . 39 76 77 g p , r an , , , , u m o f e 95 B ahm Mimafns a 1 re Ann l ent rit s , r anas , in , ; A n u b h fi ti 17 o s o u 68 o of , c gni e s l , c ntent s , A nu - m ana , 30 79 81

A n u sa n a 82 Erke 9 101 . g , ti, , n An u v a vas a a 22 50 Bu ddh v 6 7 14 30 4 0 y y , , ist iews , , , , , , A n v a a a nd ee Vi n n a da y , 99 s j a a v A a sta mb a 2 a n d Sun a v ad p , y a A d 13 8 pa ev a , , 76 , 7 A o h 40 a , 2 p ATEGORIES , 5 , 53 A a a Diksita 12 pp yy , u 23 24 59 60 Ca se , , , , h o d o f 17 - 20 n i n , v li it , an do a U a ni s ad Appre e s a y Ch gy p , 77 r 1 A a ma, 7 p Cidana n da , 28 u 36 73 74 5 89 , , , , 7 , o o f w o d 39 Ap rva Class signifi cati n r s , A rth a a tti 33 34 p , , ss o o f o 85 86 Cla ificati n acti ns , , ‘ Artha s a ni ra ha 1 3 - g , o o d o f 17 20 C gniti n , v ali ity , A rt da 80 83 88 99 100 h a v a , , , , , o d f h s o o f 20 m e o appre en i n ,

Ar a dev a , 7 2 0 7 1 y 2 , 45 , 46 , 49 , 50 , 68 , 7 , ; n 4 g , 6 of o u 7 0 7 1 u l o f Asa a s l , , ; as q a ity A§va h 7 g osa , ou 67 s l , m 1 th i , 6 Co o u 54 55 A e s l r , , o m h o 0 54 61 62 t ic t , 5 , , , u o 4 55 A e ry C o nj ncti n , 5 , in percep At r a 4 ey , o 23 26 35 ti n , , , A u a va rsas 7 1 u o u o f 8 1 82 p C o nstr cti n , r les , , ,

A v a a , 95 p 86 , 87 , 89 , 99

s o , 54 , 55 , 68 o b o f la n Aver i n Co nventi n , as asis u 36 g age , DA A A 4 5 35 77 Co - 103 A R YAN , , , , partners ,

Bad 4 88 o o f d d , ari , , Creat r , existen ce enie a fi a 43 61 - 64 B a u dhaya n a D ha rm S tr , 97 36 , ,

a a va d ita Cu o m u o f 85 106 . 107 Bh g g , 7 3 , 7 6 st , val e , , m a ti B hd , 16

Bh a rtrh a ri 11 36 n . AN 86 , , D A , itr 8 D k ss 53 54 Bh a rtrm a , ar ne , , fi 32 Da tta ka candri ka 104 Bh as a rv a j a , ,

1 10 T HE KARMA - MIMAMSA

ABUKAYANA 4 Mo o n 5 , t i , 6 , 66 L a o r L n 89 99 aksan i ga , , L n u o o f 36 37 A GARJUNA 6 44 a g age , rigin , , , , La u ak i Bh as 13 76 N m 80 81 g s kara , , a e , , ' L a w Mimarns a i es in N d 99 104 , pr ncipl , an a Pandita , , ' - k a 97 107 N a ya a r tna , 12 L b o 7 2 - 74 N 14 i erati n , arayana , L n o w b k 23 N o f K 14 ike , k n y li e , arayana , erala , i 14 17 -43 n a i r h a M u 13 L o g c , , . Na raya t t ni , Nes 63 64 cience , , ADHAVA 3 4 12 i a da s 95 , , , , N g , Madh m s 46 47 N h m 6 7 44 45 46- 52 ya ika , , i ilis , , , , , M a habhara ta nth 1 , 5 , 7 Nila ka a , 97 , 03 , 104 M a habha a 5 . irn a 4 sy , n N a y , M h ad Vedantin 12 Nisada sth a a ti 103 a eva , p , Ma itrav a ru n a N a 104 Nisedha 93 , a y ya , , Mana deva 14 N m 98 , iya a , M aname o da a 14 N o 7 5 y y , iy ga , d MiSra 1 16 on - s 34 35 5 2 53 0 Man ana , 1 , N exi tence , , , , , 6 M 81 82 Uh a o f 94 95 No n - o n 34 35 60 antra , , , , percepti , , , M u 8 2 97 98 103 Nu mb 52 68 an , , , , er , , M 67 69 N a m n o f 2 107 atter , , y ya , eani g , , ' Ma ii khamalika 12 N a h o ol 14 17 -20 22 26 y , y ya sc , , , , , M o o f t o o d 30 32 33 34 36 40 eaning , relati n w r , , , , , , ,

35 , 36 55 , 70 '

h i 8 104 a ii tra 14 24 29 37 n . Medh atit , 9 Nyay S , 5 , , , , , mo 19 20 25 66 67 68 44 46 51 Me ry , , , , , , , t l erce t1on 20 50 a nd N a - Va iSe ik a oo 14 Men a p p , , ; y ya s sch l , ,

s ee mi d . 23 50 52 53 56 57 58 60 n , , , , , , , , 55 62 67 61 63 68 69 Merit , , , , , , , h s s 44 -78 N a a ka i i ka 11 Metap y ic , y y z , am a 1 N a a ma fi a ri 14 Mim s , y y j , i mams a Sfi tra 3 - 7 37 con a a ra tnaka ra 10 M , , n Ny y , 79 - 96 N a a ra tna mala 12 ten ts , y y , k sa M i mams abala pra a , 13 N yayas u dha , 10

k 3 5 . N a ava lidi dhiti 12 Mimams a a , , n y y , ‘ ' ka u u bha 12 a tika 4 M imams a st , Nya yav rt , 1 ' ' a a eka 12 M i manzsan y viv , M ima msa n u kra ma ni 12 B E TIVE d sm 52 , O J C i eali , m d n d a ra kdta 13 O o o 44 - 60 M ima s y y p , nt l gy , ’ ima fi udma ka ra n da 14 O d o f 90 91 M , r er s acrifices , , u ka M imams apad , 14

’ ’ s 73 M ima nzsapa ri bha a, 13 AIN, 68 ,

a tna P a fi ca ta ntra 5 n . M imamsar , 13 ,

r a rii ra ha 13 a . M imarii s asa a s g , P nini , 5 n ‘ d 23 69 7 0 a nd s ee Pa ri s a rnkh a 93 98 Min , , , ; y , , MiSr 10 1 1 12 o n . Parth a sara thi a Ment al Percepti , , , , 21 M itaksara, 9 , 106 , 87 o o f o u u 52 59 M o de o f appreh ensi n c g i Partic larity , , o 20 -22 49 50 68 s h 105 ti n , , , , , Partner ip , 0 1 o f ou 7 0 7 1 Pa r udas a 85 86 94 98 7 , 7 s l , , y , , , , INDEX 111

o 22 -27 54 63 o f u m ou as Pra man a 43 Percepti n , , , ; R r , a , ‘ m o i o 5 o f r 59 uvima la 9 t n , 6 ; simila ity , Rj , h 2 30 P ala , 7 , Phala u rva 75 ABARASVAMIN 7 8 9 10 p , S , , , , , u 54 66 67 68 73 39 44 64 87 88 91 Pleas re , , , , , , , , , , u o f o u 1 2 S b d f o m o f b o u 36 Pl rality s ls , 7 , 7 a a , as r a s l te ,

o o 54 5 . a nd s ee o d . P steri rity , , 5 n W r o 32 55 S 22 73 74 76 P tency , , acrifices , , , , Pra b h a n d a da rsa n a sa mucca a 15 ca ra , 11 S d y ,

ra ak r Salik n ath 9 17 60 n . 75 P b h a a , 9 , 10 , 14 , 15 , 17 , a a , , , , 19 20 22 25 27 28 30 34 s am 8 1 , , , , , , , , an , 4 4 S m a n b h a dra 11 0 , 1 , 52 , 53 , 61 , 64 , a ta , 69 70 7 1 72 74 5 9 80 Sa mb h a v a Pra ma n a 43 , , , , , 7 , 7 , , , as a , 83 85 0 S m ti 4 , , 9 a ga , Pra k n S fnka r 9 46 6 a ra a , 94 , 99 a a , 6 , 7 , , , 7 Pra ka ra ta a fi cika Saf nka ra Bh 12 98 104 r p , 16 atta , , , Praka a a rhka ra vi a a 11 ty , 55 S j y , ‘

ma 17 Sani kh a Sfi tra 5 36 38 64 73 . Pra , y , , , , , ’ Prama a 27 u mb o f 3 4 Sa rnSa a 3 n , n er , 5 , 3 y , Prame a ar ap a mu da a fi rv a 75 a 9 16 55 . Sa y p y , , , n y p , ' Pran a b h rt N a Sari ra ka b ha a 10 , a y ya , 99 sy , P ra sa fi a a r a da rsa n as am ra ha 15 g , 96 S v g , Pra Sa s ta ad a 15 2 2 30 S a rva s i ddhanta sa m raha 9 15 p , , 7 , 9 , , 54 , g , ,

55 60 . Sa Pra ma a 35 41 , n stra , as a n , , Pra tise a i ka 2 dh a , 85 , 86 Sastr d pi , 11 , 1 Pra t a b hi fi 1 S a ttra s 92 y j a , 7 , u m o 33 34 S u 104 Pres pti n , , ; as pro o f a naka , of A fi r tik a 49 p va , 74 S a u t ran , o 54 55 f - o s ou s 20 - 22 Pri rity , , Sel c n ci sne s , Pu u h o Of 2 8 S f - d o f o n o n 17 rana , a t rity , 8 , 3 , 107 el evi ence c g iti s , P fi rva a ksa 3 20 106 a nd s ee Id . p , , eas S 23 54 55 enses , , , UALITIES S o 23 67 69 , ense rg ans , , , Q o f d s 49 65 66 Series i ea , , , S e 87 sa , AGHA VANANDA S S eSv a ra mima msa 14 76 R a r a s , , i 12 S ddh a 4 vat , i nt a , Ra h u nan da na 99 105 S m l 32 33 52 58 59 g , , i i arity , , , , , hu n ath ka Ra g a , 13 Slokavartti , 10 Rama k a 12 Sm 54 55 rsn , ell , , Ram a k sna Udi c a Bh Smrti 82 83 107 r y atta , , , a 13 10 c rya , SomeSv a ra , Ramanu a 12 46 77 S ou 64 - 72 j , , , l , Rammv a ra 12 So u d 37 38 39 53 54 , n , , , , , ' Ra za ka 10 S 53 54 55 z , pace , , , Ra th a kara 92 S h o a 33 , p t , Ratnak i ara sant d l of 48 . S s ee So u . , i ea ism , n pirit ; l o o 17 id r 1 4 Rec gniti n , Sr h a a , 5 , 5 m mb 17 a nd see u b o dhini 12 Re e rance, S ,

M mo . Su b 53 54 e ry stance , , 1 12 T HE KARMA-MIMAMSA

S uca ri ta MiSra 10 Venk t , a adh v a rin , 14 u ddhiviveka 103 Vefi ka a n ath a Venka eSa S , t , t , 10 , S ‘ ti dra , 103 76 ’ Sfi n a vada 6 7 44 46-52 Verrk a teSv r y , , , a a Di ksita , 14 Su reSva ra 11 V d 36 42 43 63 , e a , , , , Sv a ta ramau a 7 V dan 83 hp y , e ga , S 94 V d a h o o 36 46 3 yena , e nta sc l , , , 6 , 64 , S lo m 29 30 69 0 2 yl gis , , , 7 , 7 Vedanta Sfi tra , 5 , 6 , 7 , 44 , 46 , 61 , NT 95 105 76 77 TA RA , , , Ta ntra vartti ka 10 Vi fi ana vada , j , 5 , 6 , 7 , 20 , 22 , 46 Tarkika ra ksa , 14 52 ' T 54 55 Vi fi zi neSva ra 1 1 aste , , j , 0 Ta tto a bi ndu 1 1 V dh s ee I u , i i nj ncti o n . Ta ttva cin tama ni 15 Vi dhi ra sa a na , y , 12 commen T h m 76 a nd s ee God Dei o n 12 eis , ; , taries ,

. Vi dhi tra a a ri trana 1 ties y p , 4 T m 53 54 55 Vidhi viv' eka 11 i e , , , , To u h 53 54 55 Vi d ana nda 1 1 c , , , y , T d l on 27 Vik a l a 96 ranscen enta percepti , , p , 2 r 2 8 Vik ti , , 86 T f o f mo 94 95 Vifidh a v asin 9 65 rans er cere nies , , y , 5 , T sm o 65 66 V 3 ran igrati n , , isaya , u ti ka 10 V d 55 T p , isci ity , ViSv a it N a 87 10 1 j , a y ya , , B Y N 14 32 Vrttik ara 7 8 20 22 27 29 A A A , , , , , , , , , Udd o ta ka ra 9 30 32 34 35 42 8 10 y , n , , , , , 8 , 6 h 94 95 V a ti 27 U a , , y p , U s 20 V as a 107 n een principle , y , a kra ma a rakra ma 13 a va hara ma fi kha 101 1 3 Up p , Vy y , , 0 mana 33 34 V a vas a a 22 50 Upa , , y y , , a rsa 7 8 U pa v , , ‘ a ti rva 75 TE 53 54 Utpatty p , A R , , h o a nd 50 51 W le part , , ; - ACA SPATI M s 11 14 c f . 56 58 i ra , , , ’ 15 24 46 f o f h u b nd ro n , Wi e , share s a s p id n ath a 12 102 V a ya , perty , iée ika s h o o 32 35 36 42 o m h to 9 1 Va s c l , , , , W an , rig t sacrifice , , 3 92 102 66 , 7 0 , 7 , a ise i ka Satra 5 o d o r b l mo n 35 V s , W r , ver a testi y , a iSva dev a N a 104 43 V , a y ya , h da 82 v akya b e , V d o f o d 17 -20 AG 86 ali ity kn wle ge , ; Y A , o f o 25 26 Ya fi a v a lk a 103 106 percepti n , , j y , , Ac ar a 13 Ya u s 8 1 V a lla b h a y , j , da ra a 14 16 Yu ktis n eha ra fi ra ti 12 V a ra j , , p p r , ' ' ik ha ra ta Yo a Satra 5 Va rtt a b r , 10 g , Yo acara s 47 v arttik a kara , 9 g , h Yo o of 27 N a su b a nd u , 46 gins , percepti n , ts a a na 24 46 48 v a y y , ,