Deliberation As an Epistemic Endeavor: Umunthu and Social Change In

Deliberation as an Epistemic Endeavor: UMunthu and Social Change in

Malawi’s Political Ecology

A dissertation presented to

the faculty of

the Scripps College of Communication of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Fletcher O. M. Ziwoya

December 2012

This dissertation titled

Deliberation as an Epistemic Endeavor: UMunthu and Social Change in Malawi’s

Political Ecology

FLETCHER O. M. ZIWOYA

has been approved for

the School of Communication Studies

and the Scripps College of Communication by

Claudia L. Hale

Professor of Communication Studies

Scott Titsworth

Interim Dean, Scripps College of Communication

ii ABSTRACT

ZIWOYA, FLETCHER O. M., Ph.D. December 2012, Communication Studies

Deliberation as an Epistemic Endeavor: UMunthu and Social Change in Malawi’s

Political Ecology

Director of Dissertation: Claudia Hale

This dissertation examines the epistemic role of democratic processes in Malawi.

In this study, I challenge the view that Malawi’s Local Government model of public participation is representative and open to all forms of knowledge production. Through a case study analysis of the political economy of knowledge production of selected District

Councils in Malawi, I argue that the consultative approach adopted by the Councils is flawed. The Habermasian approach adopted by the Councils assumes that development processes should be free, fair, and accommodative of open forms of deliberation, consultation, and dissent. The Habermasian ideals stipulate that no single form of reasoning or knowledge dominates others. By advocating for “the power of the better argument” Habermas (1984, 1998a, 1998b, 2001) provided room for adversarial debate which is not encouraged in the Malawi local governance system. This study analyzes the departure from the ideals supposed to inform development initiatives by the Malawi

Local Government through its District Councils. Power differential factors continue to undermine lay contribution and participation by considering its input second class. This undermining of local knowledge creates development processes that lack uMunthu1in their approach. A systematic examination of the participatory processes and meaning making in Malawi’s democratic citizenship is used to argue that effective participation

1 Malawian concept that attaches significance to communalism and respect for human dignity. Similar to the southern African concept of Ubuntu—I am because we all are. iii must demonstrate how political knowledge is created through inclusive processes such as public deliberation. I further argue that positive local ways of knowing and best practices in local cultures should be recognized and even internationalized towards general human improvement.

iv DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my father, McArton Isaiah Ziwoya Gama who did not live long enough to witness the fruits of his support, care, and love in me. His immortality is in the spirit that he instilled in all his sons and daughters to keep moving on even in the face of adversity. His courage, hope and sense of humor, even in the last days of his life,

will always be a source of inspiration for our family for years to come. The doctoral

accolade that I receive upon completion of this dissertation is not for me, it is my

father’s, for he remains the first Doctor of Philosophy that I ever knew-RIP.

Those who die are never lost

They are absent with the body but present with the ancestral hosts

They are present in the stories they shared

They are present in the encouragement they rendered

They are present in the works of their hands

Those who die are never gone, they are always present in our hearts

v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe the success of this dissertation to a number of people. The name on the title page of this dissertation may be mine, but I see so many names on every other page of this work. First and foremost, I would like to thank the chair of this dissertation, Dr.

Claudia Hale (Dr. C. H. as I fondly call her). It has been an honor and privilege to work with her, first through my program of study and later during the course of writing this dissertation. She has taught me, both consciously and unconsciously, how good communication research is done. She has instilled in me the discipline of what it takes to be a scholar. I appreciate her contribution of time, ideas and energy to make my graduate experience at Ohio University productive and stimulating. Members of my dissertation committee: Dr. Laura Black, Dr. Ghirmai Negash and, Dr. William Rawlins have contributed immensely to my personal and professional growth at Ohio University. The committee members have not only been professional helpers but have also been close colleagues in various collaborative projects. I am especially indebted to the 2007

Doctoral Cohort for the selfless support rendered to me making my doctoral experience rich and bearable when the going got tough at times.

Sincere appreciation should also be extended to officials of the Malawi National

Archives in Zomba, Malawi, for granting me access to the archives for background information to some parts of this study. I also salute my (serving and retired) District

Commissioner friends in Malawi for the invaluable knowledge passed on to me as I researched my topic. I owe the success of this study to you.

To my wife, Jerra and our children: Dumisani and Daphne-Mavis, I thank you for your love, encouragement and understanding. Without your support, this work could not

vi have seen the light of day. Family friends and professional colleagues: the Lilleys, the

Nyasulus, the Wojnos and Achimwene Steve Howard—all provided a shield of love and care around our family so we could focus on our studies. We will forever be indebted to your generosity. To my mother, Grace Ziwoya Gama, who endured long years without her first born child around—your pain and prayers have paid off. To all, too many to be listed, who supported me in one way or another, I say thank you.

vii TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ...... iii Dedication ...... v Acknowledgments ...... vi List of Tables ...... xi List of Figures ...... xii Chapter 1: Deliberation, Diversity, and Democratic Practice in Malawi ...... 1 Introduction ...... 1 Defining Democratic Deliberation ...... 3 Understanding deliberation ...... 6 The nature of deliberation ...... 7 Statement of Problem ...... 9 UMunthu as a conceptual framework ...... 13 UMunthu and the political practice in Malawi ...... 17 Purpose and Significance of the Study ...... 20 Rationale for the Study ...... 21 Sample choice rationale ...... 22 Key Terms ...... 27 Abbreviations ...... 29 Chapter 2: The Archaeology of Socio-politico and Economic Change in Malawi.... 31 Pre-colonial Malawi ...... 31 The Maravi Confederacy ...... 32 Europeans and Nationalism in Central Africa ...... 35 Federation: 1953-1963 ...... 39 Native Associations and the Rise of Civil Society Activism ...... 40 Struggle for Independence ...... 43 Contextualizing the Deliberative Project in Malawi ...... 48 Chapter 3: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework ...... 55 The Evolution of Democratic Theory ...... 55 The Democratic Project in Africa ...... 65 UMunthu and the Political Practice in Malawi ...... 68

viii Post-Colonialism and Malawi’s Search for National Identity ...... 76 Local-Global ...... 81 Theoretical Framework: Deliberation, Epistemology, and Decision-Making ...... 82 In defense of argumentation ...... 89 Shared learning versus decision-making ...... 90 Chapter 4: Methodology ...... 94 Introduction ...... 94 Deliberation in Malawi as a Case Study ...... 95 Setting the Scene ...... 99 Interview Participant Selection ...... 100 Field Entry ...... 102 Research Questions ...... 103 Data Collection ...... 103 Interviews and narratives ...... 104 Observation ...... 107 Document analysis ...... 109 Field notes ...... 110 Research Procedures ...... 110 Data Analysis ...... 112 Study Limitations ...... 114 Summary ...... 114 Chapter 5: Grassroots Participation, Meaning Making, and Social Change in Malawi ...... 116 Introduction ...... 116 Participatory Practices in Malawi ...... 117 Officials’ reflections on deliberation ...... 119 Characteristics and Policies of Councils ...... 142 Diversity across discourse ...... 145 Meaning Making and Citizenship in Malawian Politics ...... 147 Conclusion ...... 160 Chapter 6: Nationalism, Epistemology, Indigenous Elements of Citizenship, and Political Identity in Malawi ...... 161

ix Introduction ...... 161 Cultural advantage ...... 164 Culture and institutions ...... 165 Epistemology and Democracy ...... 168 The Epistemic Import beyond Resources ...... 178 Chapter 7: Etching a New Political Theory, Transnationalism, and Globalism ... 183 Introduction ...... 183 Culture and the Malawian Self ...... 184 Coming Full Circle: Deliberative Democracy, Shared Learning, and Political Practice in Malawi ...... 188 Deliberation, culture, and knowledge production ...... 189 Suggestions for Further Research ...... 198 References ...... 199

LIST OF TABLES

Page

Table 1: Chronology of East African major events…………………………………….34

Table 2: Council statistics……………………………………………………………..127

xi LIST OF FIGURES

Page

Figure 1: Map of Colonial Africa (1914) ...... 38

Figure 2: Council Seating Plan ...... 130

Figure 3: Deliberative Meeting Participant Demographics ...... 132

xii CHAPTER 1: DELIBERATION, DIVERSITY, AND DEMOCRATIC PRACTICE

IN MALAWI

Introduction

Deliberative democracy has, of late, become the expected basis for designing how democratic institutions should operate worldwide. However, the controversy on the merits and demerits of this political approach continues. Several areas remain that demand further exploration and explanation. From my personal experience growing up and working as a media professional in one of the world’s infant democracies—

Malawi—it is evident that the democratic project in such places has been undermined by a number of factors including diversity in the socio-politico context. Such challenges have, over the years, complicated the task of coming up with a sustainable and contextual framework for effective deliberative democracy. Challenges plaguing emerging democracies, such as Malawi, are not typical to developing countries but common to most democracies. These predicaments include prevailing power differentials and social inequalities at various levels of the society. For nascent democracies such as Malawi, however, ethnic, religious and, partisan polarization compound the problem. Lack of comprehensive and unified approach to deliberative theory and how to measure deliberative processes complicate matters especially when it comes to studying democratic processes in non-Western, multi-cultural settings and, emerging democracies.

We can further investigate increasing diversity and social inequalities, and their consequences for the democratic projects of modern societies in order to produce deliberation that is practical and productive within the contexts of those societies. This need becomes even more imperative for societies that diverge along religious, ethnicn , a d

cultural affiliations. Diverse societies, unlike their homogenous counterparts, deal with unique challenges in consolidating their democratic practice. Malawi is a perfect example of such divided societies struggling to consolidate democratic gains made in the early

1990s. The quest, when it comes to the divided societies, appears to be how to institute an effective and properly functioning deliberative culture in the face of divisions and mistrust that present a deep-seated challenge for resolving differences before an agreement is reached, or indeed finding a common understanding over contentious issues.

The sentiment of contemporary literature on deliberative theory and practice is an argument for a universalist normative framework. This universalist approach does not take into consideration various socio-cultural and political nuances that might affect the deliberative project, especially in non-Western settings.

The underlying assumption of (universalist) deliberative theory is that, for proper rules of engagement in deliberation to be ensured, basic primary elements, such as basic human rights, are to be granted as essential elements. This granting of primary goods has not only been used as a yardstick for effective democratization in deliberative processes but has also been used to measure democracy for societies at large. This caricature of democracy ignores other contextual social nuances that inform the democratic practice, especially in emerging democracies such as Malawi. In short, the assumption has been that an established (Western) liberal political culture is a precondition for the success of deliberative practice.

The wholesale adoption of the Western concept of democracy becomes problematic when applied to the deliberative project in societies which do not yet enjoy a properly functioning democratic culture. The debilitating factor emanates from the fact

2 that, if deliberation demands a well-established, functional liberal political culture, then deliberative theory is lacking in its provisions as to what culturally diverse and dysfunctional democracies can do to improve themselves. The challenge for deliberative scholars, then, is to explicate how deliberation in dysfunctional democracies should be envisaged and implemented. It is evident that there is need to revisit some of the core assumptions of deliberative theory.

Prominent in the underlying assumptions in deliberative theory is the lack of focus on the internal differences among deliberative scholars, and the confusion this creates in the development of a functional deliberative framework, especially for diverse societies. The internal difference issue is primarily connected with the different understanding of deliberation as decision-making or deliberation as a knowledge production process. Most deliberative scholars look at deliberation as a decision-making procedure with the expectation of a decision as a final product. This approach ignores another critical element of deliberation—epistemology and understanding the issue at hand in addition to decision-making.

In line with the aforementioned concern, this dissertation aims at highlighting the importance of recognizing the epistemic role of deliberation especially in diverse non-

Western settings. I argue that, for democratic governance to mature in diverse societies, the knowledge production aspect of deliberation should be treated as equal in importance with the decision-making expectation.

Defining Democratic Deliberation

Before I put deliberation into the Malawian context, it is crucial that I identify and provide the conceptual definition of “deliberative democracy” that I will be working with

3 in this dissertation. This definition is important as it will serve to highlight some of the important positive and normative (Western) elements of deliberation which I believe could be adapted to local scenarios such as Malawi. I must admit that, over the past decade or so, there has been a rapid proliferation of deliberative theory and conceptualizations that have ma de the task of defining the term a rather challenging one.

What is evident, though, is the fact that there remains lack of agreement by scholars on a common conceptual definition of deliberative democracy. Macedo (1999) noted,

the phrase “deliberative democracy” does not signify a creed with a simple set of

core claims. Those who seek to advance the cause of democratic deliberation do

not unanimously agree on what the democratic ideal is or how it should be

fostered. (p. 4)

If this conundrum presents a problem in Western settings, it wreaks havoc in infant democracies where politics is still under the whim of personalities and implemented by weak institutions. The scholastic differences in conceptualizing deliberative democracy present significant challenges for scholarly analysis of deliberation in both Western and non-Western settings. One of the challenges posed is how to design studies that will focus on specific elements of deliberative processes, such as what I call, in this dissertation, “shared learning,” as opposed to the (traditionally) expected product of deliberation—decision-making. I will elucidate more on this in subsequent sections.

The approach that I would like to propose in defining deliberative democracy is to focus on categorizing conceptual definitions of deliberation and deliberative democracy based on their theoretical restrictiveness and usefulness in social interaction. I believe

4 that this classification is critical in shedding more light on the breadth and depth of deliberative theory, as well as possible challenges of translating deliberative theory into praxis. Strict procedural definitions such as those championed by Habermas (1990; 1993;

1995a; 1995b; 1996) and Cohen (1997) lie at one end of the restrictiveness spectrum.

Procedural conceptualizations of deliberation assume that, for “ideal” deliberation to ensue, there must exist a precisely defined or designed set of conditions—ranging from the choice of participants to the agenda for deliberation (Bachtiger, Niemeyer, Neblo,

Stoenbergen & Steiner, 2009).2 Decision-making, as an expected outcome, is a major aspect of a heavily restrictive conceptual definition of deliberation. On the other end of the spectrum are what can be regarded as less restrictive conceptual definitions—called

“Type II” definitions as opposed to restrictive “Type I” definitions as championed by

Habermas and Cohen (Bachtiger et al., 2009). The less restrictive conceptual approach provides some leeway on how procedures can be adhered to in order to maximize benefits (i.e., exploration and learning outcomes) from the process rather than an expected decision.

In this study, I am conscious of the extent to which scholars have disagreed as to what an acceptable conceptual and functional definition of deliberation should be.

Providing a comprehensive recap of the various conceptualizations of deliberation is beyond the scope of this study.3What follows in the next section is an overview of deliberative democracy theory. My focus is on a theoretical definition provided by

2 For an overview on measuring deliberation see Black et al., 2009 3 For a detailed account of existing inventory on these conceptualizations see Dryzek, 2000; Fishkin & Laslett, 2003; Gutmann & Thomson, 1996, 2004; Macedo, 1999; Manin, 1987.

Gutmann and Thomson (1996, 2004), and on an operational definition posited by Jacobs et al. (2004, 2009) and, by Fearon (1998).

Understanding deliberation. Scholars have defined deliberation in terms of its departure from other conceptualizations of democracy. Bohman (1998) observed that, in the early 1980s, formulations of the deliberative ideal were opposed to aggregation and to the strategic behavior promoted by voting and bargaining. He further noted that the supremacy of deliberative over competitive pluralism was established by advancing arguments concerning the distinctive rationality of the process rather than the “market.”

Instead of a simple settlement or bargaining balance, deliberation aimed at seeking consensus and the agreement of all participants in the decision-making process.

Echoing this understanding of deliberation, Chambers (2003) posited that deliberative democratic theory, “claims to be a more just and indeed democratic way of dealing with pluralism than aggregative or realist models of democracy,” and “begins with a turning away from liberal individualist or economic understanding of democracy”

(p. 308). Deliberation has, therefore, been regarded by some scholars to have morphed from voting focused democratic theory to learning focused democratic theory. If voting focused conceptualizations of democratic theory privilege strict procedures and interests toward fair devices of aggregation, learning focused views of deliberative theory should promote the knowledge production of the communicative process that ensues between and among equal citizens.4 What is evident from this communication and learning- oriented approach is that accountability takes priority over general consent as a

4My argument here is that shared learning and knowledge-production, as explained further in subsequent sections, can end in voting if needed but should not be clouded by the need to reach a decision within a given time and space.

6 legitimating factor of process outcome. As democracies mature, public decisions must find their legitimacy through majority vetting in one way or another (Chambers, 2003).

The future of deliberative democratic theory, as I see it, will be grounded in definitions that go beyond focusing on aggregation preferences and more toward democracy theory in which public policy will find legitimacy through common understanding among deliberating citizens5.

As a way of putting this study within the context of functional deliberative theory,

I will briefly summarize what I consider to be the most prominent definition of deliberative democracy being debated within the literature. I will focus on Gutmann and

Thompson’s (1996) conceptualization first posited in Democracy and Disagreement and later modified in Why Deliberative Democracy (2004). I then recap Jacobs, et al.’s (2004,

2009) account of the five conditions of deliberation—a functional rendition partly derived from Gutmann and Thompson’s conceptualization of deliberative democracy.

The two definitions provide a set of common concepts that form the basis of the theoretical discussion of this dissertation.

The nature of deliberation. Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 2004) proposed four characteristics of a functional definition of deliberative democracy: room for a reason- giving requirement, the accessibility of the reasons afforded to all participants, the development of an obligatory outcome, and the presence of a dynamic process (I suppose a process that accommodates and encourages change). In the process, deliberators are expected to substantiate arguments that are acceptable to free and equal citizens in pursuit

5 Citizenship has been discussed in detail in later sections of this dissertation to loosely mean society members inhabiting a locality whether indigenous to the area or not. The understanding here is that people who live together in an area share common concerns and a common desire to make their locality a better place to inhabit whether they are visiting or were born in the area.

7 of fair terms of cooperation—terms that honor the integrity of mutual understanding.

Gutmann and Thompson further posited that the reasons provided must be accessible and comprehensible to all deliberators involved in the process. Another requirement in this conceptualization is that deliberation should produce a binding decision as a product. In the process, participants aim at influencing decisions and actions of public officials through discussion.

The final characteristic in the conceptualization is that deliberation should be an ongoing process—recognizing that a valid justification to develop a binding outcome at one point can be invalid at some other point. Evident in this approach is a feature that provides for the imperfect nature of deliberation—where deliberation develops a binding outcome that proves wrong, unpopulist or less justifiable in the future, there is need for a mechanism to modify or discard the result of the deliberation.

Another conceptualization of deliberative theory is offered by Jacobs et al. (2009) who drew from Gutmann and Thompson to present an extended operational definition of deliberation. Jacobs et al.’s conceptualizing comprises five elements underpinning the legitimacy of deliberation as a tool for decision-making in public policy: universalism, inclusivity, rationality, agreement and political efficacy. The authors stipulated that deliberation must be universal in order to provide room for all those affected by the issue under discussion. Deliberation must be inclusive in that concerned citizens must be not only physically present, but that a wide range of voices and concerns be accommodated.

Jacobs et al. echoed Gutmann and Thompson (2004) that deliberation must support reasoned argument in support of or opposition to issues. Discussion should generate consensus or provide room for disagreements to be mutually resolved through active

8 reflection on personal or institutional values, assumptions and bases for arguments. The last stipulation in the conceptualization by Jacobs et al. was that deliberation in public endeavors should affect public policy in measurable terms, such as specific outcomes through sophisticated and greater internal efficacy, and wider civic engagement.

The two ways of conceptualizing deliberative democracy as presented by

Gutmann and Thompson as well as Jacobs, et al. have one thing in common: emphasis on the need for inclusiveness as a characteristic of the deliberative process. Looking at deliberative democracy as the converse of a results-oriented conceptualization of democracy is to appreciate the significance of promoting reasoned argument among equal deliberators whose legitimacy is grounded in the inclusion of varying voices. The interplay between this deliberative ideal and the everyday realities of political inequality and injustice based on gender, ethnic affiliation, social status, and religion in societies such as Malawi has produced fears that deliberation will simply shift the imbalances of result-oriented democratic conceptions into a new preserve of elitism. This worry, discussed in more detail in subsequent sections of this dissertation, animates the motivation for the critical and appreciative analysis of Malawi’s deliberative democracy in this dissertation.

Statement of Problem

Public processes should find their legitimacy through endorsement by the general public in some form of public participation. Common forms of democratic participation worldwide over the years have included voting, and public deliberation. The responsibility of organizing public participation usually rests with public or civil agencies that are in charge of managing or regulating community projects. For public participation

9 to be as egalitarian and as effective as possible, public agencies must go beyond developing and enacting astute and appropriate methods for including views from the widest possible pool of community members. Usually, the problem in effective democratic participation is not the absence of procedures or regulations on such processes but, rather, the assumptions that underpin the practice.

In Malawi, public participation has included voting for public officers from ward councilors to presidential elections every five years, a referendum to choose between one party versus multi-party systems of politics in 1993, and, of late, public deliberations on local and national issues. Public deliberation has become one of the most commonly chosen modes for soliciting popular opinion on issues in both developed and developing democracies (McComas, 2001). As a normative ideal in a working democracy, deliberation has come to refer to a particular way of decision-making as observed earlier.

My argument in this dissertation is that deliberative processes should also pay attention to the argument aspect of the process without always expecting a definite outcome in the form of a decision. In deliberation, parties come to an understanding and an agreement through argumentation and reasoning as opposed to bargaining and voting (Cohen, 1997;

Elster, 1995). In addition to decision-making, deliberative democracy should seek the inclusion of all those (potentially) affected by an issue offering them an equal opportunity of influencing the final decision (Benhabib, 1994; Bohman and William, 1996;

Christiano, 1996; Dryzek, 1990, 2000; Gutman & Thomson, 1996; Gaus, 1996; Manin,

1987). As a democratic procedure, political decisions are made through a collective process of argumentation, where deliberation consists of exchanging reasons for or against proposed ideas. Deliberation is oriented to the goal of rationally convincing

10 others rather than imposing on others personal political preferences. The approach is ideally supposed to lead groups to rational consensus (Christiano, 1996; Estlund, 1993;

Fishkin & Laslet, 2003; Manin, 1987). Cohen (1997), however, cautioned that the values behind public deliberation processes should reflect genuine attempts to treat democracy itself as a fundamental political ideal and not a mere offshoot that can be explained in terms of how egalitarian or fair the process was.

In his extrapolation of a well-ordered deliberative process, Cohen (1997) provided three features as necessary conditions for an ideal democratic order. The first feature is the need to organize public debate around alternative conceptions of the common good.

Cohen cautioned against fair bargaining among groups with special interests or particular concerns. He argued that, the driving factor behind a deliberative process should be seeking a response to demands that are for the public good. Cohen’s second feature of an ideal democratic order in deliberation is the need for an egalitarian environment acceptable to all participating citizens. Third, he called for a basis for self-respect that promotes a sense of political competence contributing to the formation of a sense of justice creating the foundations for civic friendship as an ethos of political culture. This sense of political friendship is the missing element in Malawian politics, creating deep social and political divisions in the society. This dissertation will further argue that deliberative processes should go beyond providing an avenue for decision-making but must also provide space for exchange of knowledge—what I shall call shared learning

(knowledge) in an attempt to offset conflicts before a decision is reached.

Mainstream literature on public deliberation is replete with analytical studies on certain aspects of deliberative processes. Scholars on the subject have studied facilitation,

11 discourse, outcomes and other elements that comprise participatory processes. Starkly missing in the narratives is what Healy (2009) called “knowledge politics” or the epistemology of public participation, especially in infant democracies such as Malawi. In a study of the Australian Botany Community Participation and Review Committee

(CPRC), Healy identified disconnects between expert and lay knowledge. He argued that, although notions of free, fair and open forms of consultation frame public participation in technical decision-making, in practice the “power of the better argument” means privileging scientific (expert) knowledge. Healy believed that overlooking the takeover of professional knowledge at the expense of local knowledge or concerns created a flawed conception of knowledge production in democratic processes. Analyzing the dynamics that create the gap between lay and expert knowledge based on social stratification is the lacuna that this study seeks to fill.

While research on public deliberation is replete with processes, discourses about, and examinations of the impact of this form of democratic participation, little is known about deliberative democracy’s epistemic role, especially in African settings. Lack of respect on the part of government, and its international development partners, for cultural nuances and local ways of knowing has undermined development processes, especially in areas that are still developing. The focus of this study is on examining the role democratic processes, such as public deliberation, play in political knowledge production

(epistemology) in diverse societies.

I further argue in this dissertation that by sidelining lay opinion and hijacking the deliberative process, state instruments do not only infringe on the local people’s basic right to participation, the state practically strips such processes of the much needed

12 uMunthu that provides a human face to national development. An uMunthu approach to national development does not only consider the mechanics of development but also takes into serious consideration the need to adopt a holistic approach to human development and relations especially between the state and the civil society.

UMunthu as a conceptual framework. Most participants that I talked to for the purpose of this study indicated that the erosion of respect for one another and community-uMunthu is an underlying factor in the deterioration of the democratic project in Malawi. In the guise of (Western) liberal politics, players have ruthlessly pursued personal and partisan interests that have taken a heavy toll on the social fabric of the country. Echoing the concern expressed by respondents, this dissertation, inter alia, will advocate for putting a human face—uMunthu —on politics not only in Malawi but worldwide for democracy to be able to serve the people and not the other way round.

In order to put into context the kind of worldview that the Malawi social actor subscribes to, it is important to explain the concept of uMunthu, a philosophy unique to areas of southern and central Africa among the Nguni (Bamford, 2007; Bryant, 1964;

Kamwangamalu, 1999; Mbiti, 1970; Nkondo, 2007; Sindima, 1995). It is significant to appreciate uMunthu as a conceptual framework in order to understand some philosophical values about the individual and the society in Malawi. The uMunthu worldview presupposes a mutually dependent link involving the individual, the community, and the cosmos at large (Afolayan, 2004; Gyekye, 1998; Musopole, 1994;

Nkondo, 2007; Sindima, 1995). The individual person is a finite being, an end in and of himself; yet, he is also a crucial part of the community and the world in which he lives.

For the Malawian, her community includes her immediate and distant family members,

13 neighbors, clan, and larger society (Biko, 1998; Marks, 2000; Musopole, 1994; Wiredu,

1980; Young, 1937). There is a general understanding that the community cannot exist or flourish without individual members; and the converse is also true that individuals cannot exist or flourish without the community (Gyekye, 1998; Mbiti, 1970; Young, 1937). The

Nguni believe that right from birth, an individual is never alone but constantly surrounded community members who shower the individual with love, care, and support for holistic development (Bamford, 2007; Biko, 1998; Gbadegesin, 1998; Nkondo,

2007).6 The individual grows up knowing that he or she is inextricably linked to the community through family ties and personal relationships (Bhengu, 1996). As a community member, one partakes of the joys, sorrows, gains, and losses as experienced individually or as a community (Bhengu, 1996; Biko, 1998). The reputation of the individual reflects upon the community and the converse is also true (Gbadegesin, 1998;

Prinsloo, 1998); consequently, community members feel it is necessary to contribute to an individual’s positive upbringing and formation.7

In the tradition of the Nguni peoples (which includes most of the ethnic groups in

Malawi), Mulungu (God) is an invisible supreme being who constitutes and controls all of existence; that is, Mulungu is inherently part of all living things, and all living things are part of Mulungu (Greef & Loubser, 2008; Sindima, 1995; Teffo & Roux, 1998). As

Creator and Lord of the universe, Mulungu is beyond human understanding and accessibility (Afolayan, 2004). There is a general belief among the Nguni people that

Mulungu created all individual human beings, and the whole world and that he constantly

6 This community attention is more evident during pregnancy, childbirth, illness or death where individuals enjoy community help without expecting to pay for it. 7 This is where the famous saying, “it takes a village to raise a child,” comes from.

14 provides for them (Greeff & Loubser, 2008). The extended understanding to that belief is that humans are custodians of one another and of the cosmos on behalf of Mulungu.

When individuals are not responsible for one another and their environment, they are ultimately answerable to Mulungu for failing their duty. As Mulungu only creates things that are special and good, a person must therefore be good, to himself and others, and to the environment around him (Biko, 1998; Bhengu, 1996; Buthelezi, 1986; Gyekye, 1998;

Sindima, 1995). A human being as a priceless and irreplaceable being should never be thrown away or killed wantonly (Gbadegesin, 1998). Respect and protection of a person’s dignity regardless of age, gender, creed or ethnicity is a crucial principle of uMunthu

(Bhengu, 1996; Mbeki, 2006). This is supposed to be the guiding principle in all undertakings in politics, business or personal interactions. UMunthu philosophy, therefore, teaches the need to value every human being for the simple fact that he or she is a human being. The aim of humanity is simply to be as Mulungu designed humans to be—living and sharing resources together. In addition to creating individuals, Mulungu also places individuals within the community (Biko, 1998; Wanless, 2007). South

Africa’s late political activist Steve Biko (1998) once noted: “We regard our living together …as a deliberate act of God to make us a community of brothers and sisters jointly involved in the quest for a composite answer to the varied problems of life” (p.

27). In view of this, the individual is not and cannot be detached from the community as both of them are priceless and complementary to each other.

UMunthu also stipulates that, while the purpose of the community (i.e., family, neighbors, and clan) is to identify and provide for the needs of the common good, this cannot come at the expense of individual dignity (Bhengu, 1996; Gyekye, 1998; Marks,

2000; Ngubane, 1979; Prinsloo, 1998). The community (including the state) must not, therefore, pass any kind of laws, or engage in any kind of activities that threaten, infringe on or degrade the dignity of the individual person, since the person is a special gift from

Mulungu to the community (Bhengu, 1996). Essentially, one’s community serves as a milieu in which an individual grows both physically and cognitively. Metaphorically, the community is a large family in which the individual as a member grows. As a member, one absorbs knowledge and life values from other members.

The matrix of the community contains the primary elements of uMunthu, which include: sharing, sympathy, empathy, tolerance, caring, compassion, solidarity, sensitivity to the needs of others, warmth, understanding, and acts of kindness (Marks,

2000; Mbeki, 2006; Prinsloo, 1998). Mkhize (1995) described the major elements of uMunthu as communication, consultation, compromise, cooperation, camaraderie, conscientiousness, and compassion. UMunthu might be viewed as a philosophy or worldview that connects strongly with emotion (Bhengu, 1996; Biko, 1998; Prinsloo,

1998; Senghor, 1962). This need for understanding, communication, compromise, and emotional connection relates to the emotional and affective components of deliberation as a political tool discussed in detail in subsequent sections of this dissertation. In an uMunthu philosophy, therefore, the purpose of an individual is to constantly evolve and find ways of becoming a better neighbor and a productive member of one’s community

(Bhengu, 1996; Ngubane, 1979). As a person grows older, he or she is evolving and becoming something new and better in terms of personal and spiritual development, through his or her interactions and relationships with other people (Bhengu, 1996).

Unfortunately, very little literature on potential applications of uMunthu to the mainstream social policy is available. Most of the studies that have been conducted are in the areas of citizenship (Nkondo, 2007) and religion (Musopole, 1994; Sindima, 1995).

A major study conducted by Enslin and Horsthemke (2004) concluded that, while understanding ubuntu ( uMunthu) is vital for appreciating the culture and values of historically disadvantaged people, ubuntu (uMunthu) alone should not be used as a philosophical underpinning of citizenship education. Enslin and Horsthemke were concerned that non-bantu South Africans might not necessarily relate to the philosophy.

Other studies of ubuntu have been conducted in the area of higher education. Ubuntu was reviewed as a potentially effective tool for performance review of university employees

(Beets & Le Grange, 2005) and also as a conceptual framework to utilize when making decisions about university restructuring (Van Wyk, 2005).

Apart from the field of education, other studies of the applications of uMunthu, on a very small scale, include research in business and government. One example of the practicality of using ubuntu in business is Fourie’s (2008) study of business practices of the South African media. He suggested that managers can use ubuntu values to ensure fair treatment of and equal communication with employees. In addition to its applicability to business, ubuntu is also linked to research on citizenship, civic renewal, and nation- building. Coertze (2001) and Nkondo (2007) each analyzed ubuntu as a potential framework for public policy and nation-building.

UMunthu and the political practice in Malawi. From my personal experience interacting with government officials in Malawi, I am convinced that there is no question that there is an urgent need for African governments to harness their repertoires of social

17 capital if they are to effectively address the myriad social and political needs of their people. Alongside efforts to be recognized as equal global players, African states need to consider tapping into local cultural values and best practices in resolving certain social ills still plaguing the continent and undermining socio-economic progress. Best practices identified in the people’s way of life should be aligned with global trends in the mediation of power and the exercise of leadership in social change projects. Effective leadership understands the significance of societal values and employs these value orientations to create avenues for citizens to meet their aspirations in the modern age.

This involvement of the citizenry can be done through the provision of an enabling environment through deliberate social policy that not only attacks poverty cycles but also empowers people at the grassroots level to utilize local knowledge in the creation of their own wealth towards economic growth and independence. Effective leadership is all about local empowerment, putting people first with the leadership’s self-interests coming last.

This kind of leadership can only be enacted through a genuine spirit of uMunthu.

A spirit of uMunthu, as championed by the state, would ensure a morality of not only being but action in the administration of public policy and governance. Acting in uMunthu means that members of society, including its leadership, view one another as equals before the law of the land. Only equal social actors are capable of effectively changing their world for the common good (Battle, 2009; Bukowski & Sippola, 1996;

Rawlins, 2009). The characteristic of this morality would be based on cooperative virtues, such as justice, a spirit of egalitarianism, transparency, accountability for public resources, integrity, and trust (Nkondo, 2007). The lack of these virtues especially in the

18 exercise of power and leadership is what has plunged Africa into a general malaise that has greatly undermined genuine socio-economic and political transformation.

The sad reality of African politics, in the 21st century, is that it has failed miserably to provide the atmosphere needed to nurture social change towards concrete economic progress and national unity. Ideologies, such as those of former South African president Thabo Mbeki’s African Renaissance and Julius Nyerere’s Ujamaa failed to provide specific parameters for how governments could transform modern day Africa into a formidable geo-political player and provider for its people. During his presidency,

Mbeki advocated for the rebirth of African knowledge and the rediscovery of African solutions to Africa’s problems. Mbeki’s African Renaissance, as a response to the malaise that plagued the continent years after independence from its colonial masters, failed to tackle the problem of underdevelopment by offering practical dialectics between the theory and the practice of social change. The failure of Mbeki’s African Renaissance can be attributed to an over emphasis of reconstruction efforts on changing the material conditions of the lives of the people with little regard to matters of the soul and the values that people cherished. This missing of the social change mark characterizes most of the western led development approaches adopted by developing countries around the world.

Addressing Africa’s political and socio-economic problems calls for a revisiting of the logic where alternative political theory is developed as a basis for understanding, measuring, and reorganizing both established causative elements and good practices emerging on the continent. On the need to do away with current ineffective and harmful social practices, Aseka (2005) observed that, “There is need to create a special social policy bonding between government and civil society organizations by way of

19 empowerment programs in this era” (p. 12). Aseka cautioned that African social policy roles should not be influenced by an all (Western) liberal agenda whose execution privileges a few elite political actors at the expense of the citizenry.

Although uMunthu is not a code of rules but a way of life based on the collective wisdom of generations, it can be used as a social practice for how to reflect, choose, act, and speak in a way that edifies the community (Bhengu, 1996; Nkondo, 2007). Effective and fair deliberative processes in Malawi’s political organizing should create the necessary avenues for the flourishing of uMunthu, civic friendship, and a culture that is tolerant and appreciative of the “otherness” of people. There is a need, therefore, for a systematic and comprehensive study and documentation of meaning making and knowledge production when it comes to democratic citizenship in order to understand the nature and impact of participatory processes in Malawi’s democracy.

Purpose and Significance of the Study

A wide range of players, both governmental and non-governmental agencies, are engaged in various types of citizen engagement including deliberation in Malawi. In view of this diversity in both organizing agencies and approaches being employed, there is greater urgency than ever to conduct a comprehensive evaluation and documentation of the epistemic functions of deliberative and democratic processes in the country. At present, no comprehensive study of deliberative methods in Malawi exists. In order to understand the strengths, weaknesses, and varied impacts of such participatory processes, there is a need to examine more systematically the design, process, discourse, and outcome of such endeavors (Black, Bulkhalter, Gastil & Stromer-Galley, 2009; Black,

2012; Gastil & Black, 2008).

In order to comprehensively understand deliberative processes and their outcomes, Black and others (2009) suggested two ways of approaching evaluation: 1) measuring aspects of the conceptual definition (direct measures),and measures that focus on various variables of the deliberative process (indirect measures). The purpose of this study was to undertake both direct and indirect measures although the focus of my discussion will be on the direct measurement of deliberation and its consequence on deliberation in settings such as Malawi. I believe that focusing on conceptual dynamics of deliberation will help to uncover the quality and impact of deliberative processes in

Malawi. This study seeks to initiate dialogue on the nature and efficacy of deliberative processes in Malawi. The findings of the study will contribute to a corpus of knowledge that provides deeper understanding of the dynamics of political participation and political knowledge construction in Malawi.

To achieve this goal, the following research questions guided the investigation:

RQ1: What grassroots participatory practices influence the democratization process in

Malawi?

RQ2: What meanings do citizens attach to civic participation and social change

initiatives in Malawi?

RQ3: What characteristics of institutions and their policies do public officers perceive

as having an effect on the democratic culture in Malawi?

Rationale for the Study

The central argument in this study is situated in Spivak’s (1988) famous question,

“Can the Subaltern speak?” Echoing Spivak, this dissertation asks: years after attaining self-rule from the British, can indigenous Malawians ravaged by colonialism and neo-

21 colonialism analyze their own experience and speak about it from their own philosophical and theoretical perspectives? By identifying ways of stimulating Malawi’s cultural values in relation to national development, this study explores how ancient uMunthu philosophies guided the pre-colonial people of Malawi by providing a workable ontology and epistemology for how to make sense of their world. The uMunthu concept continues to be part of Malawi’s cultural identity although most of these sentiments and beliefs have been eroded by a number of elements over the years. Sad to say that the animation of the uMunthu values which informed ancient political and cultural life was undermined and demonized by colonial administrators. The advent of foreign rule and later neo- liberal politics took a toll on indigenous political and cultural systems and the confidence such establishments once enjoyed. The introduction of liberal politics which is competitive in nature created a double consciousness and divided identity for the

Malawian social actor. Over the years, Malawians have grappled with the question of how to be human (as Africans who enjoy communalism) and be political actors (fighting for popularity and votes) at the same time. This dissertation stipulates that the Malawian social actor can peacefully be both by revisiting the values of uMunthu and aligning them with political practice. An uMunthu approach to politics and national social change would place the individual as the focal point of all development efforts. This study is a result of the conviction that, unless Malawi moves beyond focusing on politics for its own sake and places a human face on national processes, tangible and meaningful social change will continue to be an elusive dream.

Sample choice rationale. The focus on uMunthu as a cultural perspective in relation to the dynamics and politics of public participation in Malawi was a deliberate

22 choice on my part for a number of reasons, partly personal and partly due to the prevailing state-society relations in Malawi. Personally, I have always been intrigued by my people’s heritage and their way of life. I belong to the Maseko Ngoni (Nguni) ethnic group that settled in the Ntcheu8 area after trekking from the South African region in the early 1700s. My last and clan names, Ziwoya Gama, are traced to one of the Nguni army generals—Zioya who fled from the Zulu Chief, Shaka, and trekked north from South

Africa (Philip, 1965). Although the Ngoni were belligerent and powerful warriors, the philosophy of ubuntu (uMunthu) was very strong among them. This philosophy informed all their ways of living, from war ethics to government administration and interpersonal relationships. When the various groups of Ngoni people arrived in Malawi, they found other groups of people, such as the Chewa, Tonga, and Henga in the central and northern parts of the country. The Ngoni conquered these groups to form new settlements. It can be argued that some of the cultural values that the Ngoni transmitted to the subjugated groups included the uMunthu communal values.

As described later in this dissertation, these early people who populated the area now called Malawi soon shared common cultural values and life philosophies. Today, the concept of uMunthu is not only practiced among the Ngoni but by other groups of people who were mainly conquered by the ancient warriors as they sought land to settle on. The irony of the story of the Ngonis, as my mother (G. Ziwoya, personal interview, August

15, 2011) explained, is that the cultural value of uMunthu (ubuntu) is perhaps the only cultural trait that has remained over time, unlike the Ngoni language which itself has almost become extinct. Because the Ngoni were regarded as an elite group, their

8 A district in the central region of Malawi.

23 language was not widely spoken and the conquerors ended up adopting the languages of the defeated sending their own language into extinction.

My field research trip for this study was a mixed feeling endeavor for me. I was going home six years after I had left Malawi for graduate studies in the United States.

Eight months shy of my historic return home, my father died from complications associated with diabetes. He was already diabetic when I left home some six years previously, but it was a shock when his condition deteriorated before passing the year I had planned to go back for fieldwork. I was sad for losing a father, but I was more distressed because I had just lost an informant who held most of the knowledge of my roots and my people’s history. I had been looking forward to his warm embrace after years of separation, his stories, and most of all the encouraging words that he always had for his first born son. When I arrived home in August of 2011 for the field work, I was pleasantly surprised to find a pile of papers that my father had been writing for me on the history of our family. We had discussed this during one of several lengthy telephone conversations while I was in the United States, but I never thought he had taken it seriously or had begun to compile the history. Most of the insights in this dissertation are a direct contribution from my father’s writings.

Because I had missed the opportunity of asking my father questions about his origins and heritage, I decided to visit his home village, our village, to talk to his people, my people. This is where I did most of my personal interviews on the concept of uMunthu and observed the remnants of a typical Malawian village life in action.

This is where I met 89 year old Namilanzi, a great aunt to my late father. As a young boy I had not interacted much with Namilanzi because we frequented my mother’s

24 village more than we did my father’s. Because of Namilanzi’s incredible memory and the oral insight that she demonstrated, she became my main informant on what uMunthu and citizen participation were all about. Namilanzi’s stories demonstrated the role of oral history and personal narratives in the preservation of knowledge and sustenance of culture. She told me that, although the place that my father’s family was now based at was not the original home of my ancestors, my father’s family shared common cultural values with the people that they found in the area. Philip (1965) placed the people found in the Ntcheu area as belonging to the Maseko Ngoni group, descendants of Mputa9.

The other reason for deciding to focus on the relationship between indigenous cultural values and national efforts in social change efforts arose from my concern over the current state-society relations and the accusatory rhetoric flying back and forth in the political circles in Malawi. As described in detail later in this dissertation, Malawi has failed to consolidate the democratic gains achieved in 1994 when the people rejected authoritarianism and opted for political pluralism. A personal observation and analysis of discourse from the media and other sources at the time of gathering data for the study indicated a tense political atmosphere with the state employing every means available to control the public sphere and silence any alternative views. President Bingu Wa

Mutharika, once internationally admired as an economic transformist, had engaged in a number of economic and political misjudgments that plunged the country into severe economic shock. In an attempt to regain popularity and silence opposition, his government had instituted several unpopular laws and regulations displaying an autocratic smudge, a complete antithesis to the 1994 political ideals for which Malawians

9 Mputa’s group was among the three main splinter groups that fled from Shaka Zulu in 1820. Other groups were Zwide and Zwangedaba-see Onani Angoni by K. Dominic Philip (1965).

25 fought. Given this political context, genuine efforts rather than political expediency remained keys to resolving the impasse that continued to undermine Malawi’s national social change progress. The country experienced a serious political stalemate where both the state and civil society accused each other of arrogance and intolerance. Mutharika’s government not only made enemies with local groups within the country but with most of the country’s traditional development partners adversely affecting national budgetary support which is donor-dependent. The saying that “when elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers” came into light where the common person in the country suffered due to misjudgments and poor relating skills on the part of the Malawi leadership at the time.

President Mutharika died on April 5, 2012 after suffering a heart attack. He was succeeded by Joyce Banda who was vice president of the country. Through a government of national unity, President Banda immediately embarked on a healing process to minimize the political and ethnic divisions created by Mutharika’s administration.

Banda’s move, however, has had a double-edged sword effect on politics in Malawi in that by attempting to unite political parties in the country to work together towards national transformation, opposition to her People’s Party led government has been eradicated effectively. A down to earth spirit of understanding and concern for the common good can only be achieved through adherence to true values of humanity as prescribed by uMunthu. In view of these developments, it is my conviction and belief that there is great need to examine the process and meaning of public participation in national efforts in Malawi.

After placing deliberation in its proper context in Malawian socio-economic, cultural, and political setting and after presenting the purpose and what I believe is the

26 significance of this study I will, in the following chapter, provide a detailed historical background on the country of Malawi. This history includes the movements of the country’s early people, the nationalistic fervor that led the country into independence and the contemporary period. This historical backdrop also serves to demonstrate that, in spite of the perceived differences, polarizations and misguided solidarities, the people of

Malawi are one and that they share a common heritage. I strongly believe that the country can utilize this cultural advantage, and social capital to overcome some of the divisions towards national unity and economic progress. With more commonalities than differences among Malawians, the people should be able to deliberate their way into progress and prosperity.

Key Terms

This section provides brief explanations of how some of the key terms in this study are being used. The explanation places the terms and meaning of the ideas in context:

1. Citizenship: Understood as not only a shared national identity but a desired action

that can be expressed through a deliberative act of belongingness in a locality.

2. Civic friendship: Political as opposed to dyadic friendship.

3. Civil society: Local social organizing that forms the basis of a functioning

society.

4. Community: A social group of any size whose membership reside in a specific

locality sharing government and having a common cultural and historical

heritage.

5. Cultural democracy: Localized form of consensus decision-making that takes into

account local challenges and needs for a society to move forward.

6. Democracy: Understood in the Lockean sense with supreme power as vested in

the people and exercised directly by them or by their elected agents.

7. Deliberation: Collective decision-making and knowledge sharing through

argumentation and reasoning as opposed to voting.

8. Deliberative democracy: The art of governing communities through participatory

and collaborative means.

9. Decision-making: Cognitive process engaged for the purpose of selecting a course

of action among several alternatives.

10. Epistemology: The study of the nature, methods, and assumptions in knowledge

production.

11. Government: Lockean understanding of the art of administering public policy in a

political unit.

12. Grassroots: Local community driven.

13. Humanistic governance: Leighninger’s (2006) notion of the art of governing

communities through participatory, deliberative, and collaborative means.

14. Individuation: Used in association with participation (Rawlins, 2009) and

premised upon focusing on differences and drawing distinctions.

15. Neo-liberal democracy: Western style international ideological paradigm seeking

social, cultural and political change through the adoption of free market principles

and competitive politics.

16. Participation: A deliberate choice in friendship where individuals focus on the

commonalities rather than the differences between and among them (Rawlins,

2009).

17. Post-Africanism: A concept advanced by Denis Ekpo (2010) as a way of running

away from African cultural nationalism to intellectually re-align Africa with the

international community.

18. Post-Colonial: Post-modernist intellectual discourse that consists of reactions to

and analysis of the cultural legacy of colonialism.

19. Public: Of popular domain as opposed to being private.

20. Social change: Term used to avoid the term “development” which of late has been

understood to mean linear, western style transformation of people.

21. UMunthu: A southern African social concept that privileges equality,

communalism, and humanness in day-to-day endeavors.

Abbreviations

AFORD: Alliance for Democracy

AU: African Union

ALC: African Lakes Company

DFID: (British) Department for International Development

DPP: Democratic Progressive Party

IMF: International Monetary Fund

MASAF: Malawi Social Action Fund

MCP: Malawi Congress Party

NAC: Nyasaland African Congress

NCC: National Consultative Council

NDA: National Democratic Alliance

PP: People’s Party

UDF: United Democratic Front

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

CHAPTER 2: THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF SOCIO-POLITICO AND ECONOMIC

CHANGE IN MALAWI

Pre-colonial Malawi

The pre-colonial and colonial history of Central Africa establishes the contextual basis for the subsequent discussion of the quest for a sense of collective identity, nationalism, the rise of social activism, and political liberation in Malawi. However, the complex pre-colonial way of life in terms of food production, distribution, and consumption, as well as the interdependence of cultural practices, are the historical realities underlying the Malawian identity. These realities form the characteristics and values that are both shared and internalized among Malawians. This homogeneity shrouded in petty political, religious and ethnic differences has been Malawi’s social advantage and yet none of the country’s political leaders have taken time to build on this commonality towards national progress. Later in this chapter, I will analyze the impact that the colonial legacy has had on Malawi’s contemporary social actors. The impact has had a double edged sword effect on the people’s way of life in that it has had both an adverse effect on nationalistic feelings and national social change initiatives, and a positive spin to it, the exposure introduced the Malawian social actor to the international community complete with technological and intellectual advantages. In short, the following historical account demonstrates how homogenous the socio-cultural matrix is for the Malawian society in spite of the perceived differences.

Three distinct periods mark Malawi’s early history: the pre-Bantu, the proto-

Bantu, and the Bantu periods. These were the times when different groups of people migrated into the area now called Malawi from various parts of the African continent.

Pachai (1973) stated that the differences in the early migrants ranged from physical appearances and languages spoken to the domestic and economic occupations of the people, including food production techniques.

Pachai (1973) dated the existence of the pre-Bantu people, also known as Abatwa,

Akafula or Mwandionerapati (Bushmen) around the late Stone Age which started at about

8000 B.C. Excavations at sites such as Hora Mountain, Fingira, the Livingstonia plateau,

Mikolongwe Hill, and Mphunzi in present day Malawi, show that the Abatwa were short and small in stature compared to later settlers. As hunters, they used bows and arrows to hunt animals for food.

The arrival into Malawi of the proto-Bantu peoples from the northern direction

(probably present day Congo) represented a transition period between the earliest and the latest groups of people to settle in Malawi (Pachai, 1973; Tindall, 1968). Considered as the advance guard of the Bantu-speaking peoples, these migrants were taller and had various names to describe them, including the Pule, the Lenda, and the Katanga (Pachai,

1973). Pachai described the Pule as using spears, shields, bows and arrows and as farmers who had more settled dwellings than the Abatwa. The arrival of the early farmers also marked the beginning of the Iron Age in the area.

The Maravi Confederacy

The Maravi Confederacy is the earliest known settlement in the area of Lake

Nyasa (Lake Malawi). The Confederacy was established by the Bantu-speaking people in about 1480 and continued into the 18th century. The Maravi controlled territory west of the great lakes region to the Luangwa River, south of the Zambezi and to the east coast.

Three paramount chiefs are recorded as having led the settlements of the Maravi,

Karonga, Undi, and Lundu (Pachai, 1978).

As the community grew and disputes over land and other resources increased, the

Maravi began to spread. Splinter groups under Chulu, Kanyenda, Kabunduli, Mkanda,

Kaphwiti and Mwase dispersed around central Malawi (Dedza, Lilongwe, and

Phirilongwe in Mangochi) moving north and south of the country. A group led by Mazizi proceeded north to present day Nkhamanga and settled at Makama. Here, Mazizi is said to have assumed the title of Karonga (Pachai, 1978). Karonga’s followers, such as the

Chawinga, the Mwachande, the Luhanga, and the Mkandawire, spread further north to settle at Hewe, Nkhamanga and Ng’onga becoming the present day Tumbuka people.

Pachai indicated that, after some time, Karonga’s nephew, Kabunduli, crossed the Viphya and settled along the Kakwewa River with his followers becoming the present day Tonga people.

The movements of the 16th century people created interesting dynamics in terms of both language and culture. What started as the Maravi became Chewa of the central region of Malawi, Mang’anja and Nyanja along the lakeshore, Chipeta, Nsenga,

Chikunda, Mbo, Ntumba and Zimba spreading north. Groups under Karonga and

Kabunduli later became the Tumbuka, the Tonga, the Kamanga, the Henga, the Phoka, the Ngonde and the Lambya including a whole host of smaller related groups north of

Malawi. As the languages/dialects changed due to inter-marriages and geographic locations, so did the people’s cultures. The central region settlers maintained Chichewa and Chinyanja as their language and practiced matrilineal family relations while those up north adopted Chitumbuka, Chingonde, Chilambya, and Chitonga, and became patrilineal

33 in their family relations. Pachai (1978), however, indicated that this early period must not be confused with the 19th century period which saw the influx of foreigners from the east, west, south and north Africa: the Arabs, the Yao, the Bemba, the Bisa, the Ngoni and the

Europeans. These are said to have formed their own history at a later period.

Table 1: Chronology of Major East African Events

TIMELINE MAJOR EVENT

8000 BC Pre-Bantu Peoples

600 BC Bantu Migration

1480 AD Maravi Confederacy

1840 AD Nguni Migration

1859 AD Initial Western contact, David Livingstone arrives

1964 AD Sovereign Republic of Malawi

1994 AD Political pluralism in Malawi

The brief history of early settlements in Malawi indicates that the majority of the people who occupy present day Malawi have a common ancestry. The people adopted different languages and a way of life as they spread across the country and came into contact with other people. These people share common cultural traits, philosophy of life, beliefs and traditions such as funerals, weddings, and rite of passage rituals, with slight variations. Also common among the people for centuries is the traditional leadership and clan systems that put equal emphasis on both collective and individual rights (Osabu-Kle,

2000). The traditional systems have hierarchical ranking based on age and family lineage.

Osabu-Kle stated that the highest echelons of society are in charge of the land and cattle, which represent economic power. Minor conflicts, such as land disputes, divorce

(traditional) and petty thievery, are usually initially handled at the village level (in rural areas) before the police or civil courts can hear such cases.

In his discussion of the dilemmas of perspective and representation that ethnographers face when it comes to studying African peoples, Appadurai (1991) pointed out that it has never been an easy feat to study groups of people in the 21st Century.

Appadurai observed that critical issues that scholars confront include the changing social, territorial, and cultural reproductions of group identity. He pointed out that, as groups migrate and form new groups in new locations, their histories are reconstructed, their ethnicities are reconfigured, and “the ethno in ethnography takes on a slippery, non- localized quality, to which the descriptive practices of anthropology will have to respond” (p. 48). I must admit that it was not easy on my part either to study a society that has evolved so much in the past century or so. With the advent of self-rule in 1964 and an influx of international organizations and multi-national corporations an d quite a considerable number of natives leaving for further studies abroad, Malawi placed itself in a liminal10 space between traditionalism and modernity—reality that cannot be wished away.

Europeans and Nationalism in Central Africa

One of the earliest dynamics to expose Africa to the international community was the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, conducted primarily by the Arabs. Slave trade disrupted

10 Liminal space is used softly to mean a transitional state of being.

35 the people’s way of life as families and kings sought to sell off their enemies and their own slaves to the Arabs in exchange for cloths, jewelry, guns and other manufactured products from the east. The trade in humans attracted the attention of the Europeans who sought to introduce Christianity and commerce in goods and not humans. Dr. David

Livingstone, a Scottish missionary and explorer, launched an anti-slavery crusade around

1858. By 1876, Scottish missionaries had established a station in Malawi and named the place Blantyre (after Livingstone’s birthplace in Scotland) as a center from which to fight the slave trade and spread the gospel.

The missionaries were closely followed by the African Lakes Company (ALC) financed in Scotland. Both the missionaries and the company’s employees found themselves in frequent conflict with slave traders. The difficulties that the missionaries and the companies faced with the Arabs and the locals who supported the slave trade prompted the appointment in 1883 of a British Consul to the area to institute a form of administration (Rotberg, 1965).

Rotberg indicated that, by 1891, the British government had taken direct responsibility for the administration of present day Malawi, to be known from 1893 as the British Central African Protectorate and from 1907 as Nyasaland. There was little socio-economic progress over the next half century for Nyasaland. Unlike its neighbors such as Zambia and Mozambique, Malawi had neither substantial minerals nor ports to stimulate economic activity in the country. With work in short supply for the Nyasas, many trekked to neighboring countries such as Zimbabwe and South Africa in search of employment. Some (colonial) government officials in Nyasaland were of the view that

Nyasaland’s economy could only thrive in some form of connectivity with its two

36 colonial neighbors, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). By

1950, the Europeans of Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia started to plan the merging of the two countries into a single independent nation. The idea was that

Nyasaland would benefit from its geographic and economic positioning relative to the two countries.

Figure 1: Map of Colonial Africa (1914) Source: exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu

The idea was met with strong resistance from Africans who felt that a union meant being overshadowed by the strong European culture of Southern Rhodesia which had the largest number of European settlers. The union would also have delayed any prospects of independence under black majority rule (Pachai, 1973; Short, 1974).

Federation: 1953-1963

In 1953 the British government declared the Federation of Rhodesia and

Nyasaland much to the indignation of the local political activists. The design was for a self-governing colony, with its own assembly and prime minister (first Lord Malvern and, from 1956, Roy Welensky). The British had intended to derive the greatest economic benefit from the larger unit while minimizing political tension among the three parts of the federation, each of which retained its existing local government.

The federated colonies were at differing stages in their political and economic development. Common among them was an almost complete absence of any African voice in the political process (Pachai, 1973; Rotberg, 1965; Short, 1974). Southern

Rhodesia had been a self-governing colony for almost three decades, albeit without

African suffrage (a tiny ‘B roll’ of African voters was added to the electorate in 1957).

Northern Rhodesia had a legislative council with, from 1948, two seats reserved for

African members. At the time of the federation, there were no Africans on Nyasaland’s legislative council. Places for five members were found two years later in 1955 (Baker,

2001; Rotberg, 1965).

When world copper prices rose, the anticipated economic benefits from Northern

Rhodesia started to materialize. This did little to suppress increasing political unrest, particularly as British colonies across Africa won independence starting with Ghana in

1957. By the early 1960s, African political activists in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were gaining momentum in their legislative councils. Calls for dismantling the federation increased. In March of 1963, when all three colonies demanded independence, the British

39 government finally conceded. The federation was formally dissolved on December 31st,

1963 (Rotberg, 1965).

Native Associations and the Rise of Civil Society Activism

The present increased social activism in Malawi has its roots in voluntary associations by the natives in what was then called Nyasaland. Rotberg (1965) placed the rise of social activism and fervent expressions of nationalism in Nyasaland around the years between 1915 and 1964. Natives in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) began to fight for improved political, social, and economic conditions for the locals.

The advent of colonial administrators saw the introduction of increasingly arduous hut-tax responsibilities, unexplained restrictions on African activities, and the tendency by many white farmers to use the locals as forced labor. The social injustice perpetrated by the white masters created a conducive atmosphere for messages of liberation by members of the Providence Industrial Mission including Joseph Booth11 and

John Chilembwe.

Sponsored by Booth, Chilembwe traveled to Lynchburg, Virginia, United States of America in 1897 to attend a theological college. In Virginia, Chilembwe was inspired by works of leading African-Americans of the time, including John Brown, Booker T.

Washington, and other abolitionists. In 1910, Chilembwe returned to Nyasaland as an ordained Baptist minister. Working with the American National Baptist Convention,

Chilembwe founded the Providence Industrial Mission in Chiradzulu, Malawi. In 1913, some parts of southeastern Africa were affected by a severe famine forcing a considerable number of refugees to enter Malawi. Chilembwe and his colleagues were

11 An American Baptist missionary who sponsored Chilembwe’s education at Virginia Theological College in the United States of America in 1897.

40 appalled by the exploitation and cruel treatment that his parishioners and the refugees were subjected to by the white farmers. Workers were denied wages for work done and corporal punishment was an acceptable form of discipline.

On January 23, 1915, Chilembwe and some of his 200 followers staged a violent uprising attacking white plantations considered to be oppressive to Africans. Some white farmers were killed including William Jervis Livingstone. When the uprising failed to gain local support, Chilembwe fled to Mozambique. Chilembwe’s 1915 uprising, unsuccessful as it was, marked a dramatic attempt by the natives to oppose colonial rule and was not an isolated incident of discontent. Chilembwe’s failed uprising served as a wake-up call to the Africans that the colonial administrators had come to stay and that the laws imposed on the Africans were not to be removed soon (Rotberg, 1965).

The natives attempted to integrate with the settlers by adopting their language as well as their political and spiritual concepts, but to no avail. What the natives sought was a collective voice in the governing process. To achieve the collective voice, the Africans, especially those who had been exposed to the white man’s ways—clerks, evangelists, and teachers—emulated the settlers by creating associations through which they could make their pleas heard. Of all the prevalent expressions of indigenous protest, the formation of grassroots associations played a momentous role in the development and the eventual appearance of nationalist movements of the 1940s. Rotberg indicated that, for more than twenty years, the associations worked to address grievances suffered by Africans. The native associations were instrumental in countering earlier attempts by settler associations to establish white privilege at the expense of Africans. In a personal letter12 to Malawi’s

12 Sourced at the National Archives of Malawi (2011)

41 first president, Hastings Kamuzu Banda, while in London on March 31, 1947, a Miss

Nicholson wrote the founding president that Europeans had well established associations and were consolidated under the banner of Nyasaland Convention of Associations. The convention was an umbrella body of such groups as the Planters’ Association, the

Nyasaland Tea Association, and the Nyasaland Council of Women. In the letter, Miss

Nicholson claimed that the Convention included not only European organizations but several Indian Associations and the Euro-African Association. She further claimed that

African Associations were free to join as the Convention was non-racial. In his reply letter of 10th April, 1947, Banda observed that,

It is true that…recently Indian and Euro-African organizations have been

admitted to the Convention of Associations. But only those politically blind in

Nyasaland can attach any significance to the presence of one or two Indians or

Euro-Africans in the Convention. (p. 2)

Banda further pointed out to Miss Nicholson that he had credible reports that indicated serious discrimination against the natives including being barred from entering the cinema and not being allowed to buy beer and other drinks from shops.13

Rotberg observed that, even before the Chilembwe uprising, the natives in

Nyasaland had already formed the country’s first “native association” in 1912 with satellite associations in the north of the country. Rotberg described the new organization’s leadership as being of the ethnic groups Tonga and Ngoni and educated by the (Scottish) Livingstonia Mission. These leaders styled their organizations based on the

13 Personal correspondence between Hastings Banda and several people on Nyasaland (Malawi) while he worked as a medical doctor in the United Kingdom. Copies of his letters were obtained from the National Archives of Malawi, August 2011.

European organizational form. They did so mainly in retaliation to the Protectorate

Government’s enactment of the District Administration Ordinance of 1912 which, among other things, stipulated that only the gathering of gazetted principal village headmen be recognized as representing the voice of the people. Denied the opportunity to rightfully play the role they considered themselves competent to play, the educated native leaders formed their own association to create a formidable protest platform in central and southern Nyasaland.

Rotberg indicated that, by 1933, educated natives in Nyasaland had formed fifteen different associations across the country. The associations dealt with issues ranging from registration of unemployed natives to advocating for laws that protected native women from white men who used their power and influence to abuse the women. The native associations gave rise to the first organized political groupings with leaders such as Levi

Mumba heading the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC), a political party that would later play a crucial role in the country’s road to independence. For the purpose of this study, these early native associations form the basis for the earliest forms of political and public deliberation in Malawi. It is the discourse emanating from these forums that provided the impetus for political struggle for independence in Malawi.

Struggle for Independence

Rotberg (1965) placed the initial stirring of African nationalism in Nyasaland around a few years immediately before the federation was instituted. A number of

Africans including leading Native Association members such as Levi Mumba, James

Frederick “Piagusi” Sangala and at least two whites are said to have inspired the

43 formation of one of the earliest political groupings in Nyasaland—the Nyasaland African

Congress.

The Nyasaland African Congress deserves special recognition in the annals of

Central African history for the central role it played towards an independent Malawi. In

September of 1943, Sangala is reported to have called for a meeting of the African leaders of Blantyre and Limbe. Rotberg listed those who collaborated with Sangala to include Charles Jameson Matinga, Ellerton Mposa, Andrew Jonathan Mponda, Harry R.

Tung’ande, and Sydney B. Somanje—all had been active members of the Blantyre Native

Association. Also closely associated with the initial agitation for political organizing in

Nyasaland was a Tswana-speaking teacher working at Blantyre Secondary School, a Mr.

K. T. Motsete. Together with Isa Mcdonald who had been in contact with African and

American “Negro” freedom fighters and Marcus Gurvey, Sangala wrote a circular in

October 1943 proposing the formation of an umbrella “association” that would act as a common voice for Africans. The proposed body was to be called the Nyasaland African

Council.

In May 1944, the grouping decided to replace “Council” with “Congress” in their name to imply a greater organization than a mere association. A western trained medical doctor, Hastings Kamuzu Banda, was invited home to lead a group of political activists.

Banda spoke out against the proposed linking of the three colonies, Northern Rhodesia,

Nyasaland, and Southern Rhodesia. Upon his return in 1958 to Nyasaland from Ghana where he was practicing medicine, Banda assumed the presidency of the NAC to lead a strident campaign against the federation. Resulting disturbances were followed by the declaration of a state of emergency by British administrators and the arrest of Banda and

44 a number of his followers in 1959 (Baker, 2001; Short, 1974). Banda and his followers were sent to Gweru Prison in Southern Rhodesia.

Banda was released on April 1, 1960. Now leading the Malawi Congress Party

(MCP), Banda took part in government discussions leading to political reform. The

British administrators reached a compromise with the Africans. The agreement was that

Nyasaland would remain in the federation but that Africans would have a majority of the seats in the colony’s legislative assembly. In 1961, Banda and his followers became part of the Nyasaland government; he became Prime Minister in February 1963 after

Nyasaland was granted self-rule. Nyasaland attained total independence on July 6th, 1964.

Banda ruled Malawi with an iron hand for the next thirty years.

Effectively killing all other parties through violence, intimidation and a heavily controlled state media, Banda and his MCP became a de facto one party state. There was no distinction between party and state functions and property as most of the major corporations and banks were either owned by Kamuzu or operated with heavy state funding. John Tembo, uncle to Kamuzu Banda’s private partner, Cecilia Kadzamira, was chairperson of several state funded corporations, including Press Corporation with several subsidiaries under it (Stambuli, 2002). Popular opposition was kept at bay through a carefully planned welfare state that provided subsidized farm inputs and controlled pricing on basic goods such as sugar, cooking oil and maize. Within a year of attaining self-rule, almost half of Kamuzu Banda’s cabinet had been either arrested or exiled due to differences with their new leader. Non performing state corporations, high external debt, low national exports, and a withdrawal of international aid due to reports of serious human rights abuse soon affected Malawi’s economy. The resulting economic

45 downturn was followed by a civil unrest in 1992. The unrest was triggered by a pastoral letter issued by the Roman Catholic Church in the country. President Kamuzu Banda was forced to call for a referendum in 1993. That referendum called upon the country to decide between continued one party rule under MCP versus the adoption of a multi-party system of government. The majority of Malawians opted for political pluralism followed by democratic general elections in 1994. Those elections saw Bakili Muluzi and his

United Democratic Front (UDF) emerge as winners.

Bakili Muluzi was elected president. The UDF won 82 of the 177 seats in the

National Assembly and formed a coalition government with Chakufwa Chihana’s

Alliance for Democracy (AFORD). The coalition was short lived and was disbanded in

June 1996, with some of AFORD members remaining in the UDF government. The

Muluzi administration saw unprecedented liberalization of trade, the media, and politics with several political parties being represented in the National Assembly.

On June 15, 1999, Malawi held its second democratic elections. Bakili Muluzi was re-elected to serve a second five-year term as president, despite an MCP-AFORD

Alliance that joined against the UDF. The aftermath of the 1999 elections brought the country close to the brink of civil strife. Disgruntled Tumbuka, Ngoni and Nkhonde

Christian tribes dominant in the north were irritated by the election of Muluzi, a Muslim from the south, for a second term in office. They alleged his government had neglected the north. Conflict between Christians and Muslims of the Yao tribe (Muluzi’s tribe) ensued. Property, valued over millions of kwacha, were either vandalized or stolen and about 200 mosques were torched throughout the country.

By 2001, UDF held 96 seats in the National Assembly, while AFORD held 30, and MCP had 61. Six seats were held by independents representing the National

Democratic Alliance (NDA) opposition group. NDA was not recognized as an official political party at that time. Malawi saw its first transition between democratically elected presidents in May 2004, when the UDF's handpicked presidential candidate Bingu wa

Mutharika defeated MCP candidate John Tembo and Gwanda Chakuamba of the

Mgwilizano Coalition, a grouping of opposition parties. The UDF, however, did not win a majority of seats in Parliament, as it had done in the 1994 and 1999 elections. It successfully secured a majority by forming a "government of national unity" with several opposition parties. Bingu wa Mutharika dumped the UDF party on February 5, 2005 citing differences with UDF, particularly over an anti-corruption campaign. Mutharika formed his own Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Mutharika and his DPP won a second term in the 2009 general elections.

Mutharika’s first term up to 2009 was marked by a remarkable growth in the national economy, increased food sufficiency, and an initial reduction in corruption. The economic gains of the first term, however, were undermined by increased nepotism, cronyism, gross abuse of public resources and a disregard for human rights. The public discourse was soon marked by calls for mass demonstrations by the civil society to express displeasure with the lack of basic necessities such as adequate water and power supply, foreign currency for international trading and travelling, and fuel, especially in the main cities (The Malawi Democrat, 2010). Mutharika became the first president in

Malawi to institutionalize tribalism by promoting fellow Lhomwe14 kinsmen to almost all key positions in government from the central bank to the national police service. Bingu

Wa Mutharika died on April 5, 2012. He was succeeded by his Vice President, Joyce

Banda, who had been thrown out of the DPP and had formed her own party, the People’s

Party (PP).

This research was conducted at a time when historic political revolutions (the

Arab Spring) were taking place in North Africa, beginning in Tunisia where the masses called for the removal of leadership deemed as having failed the people. The mass revolution that moved into Egypt saw the removal of long-time leader Hosni Mubarak. In

Libya, after months of in-fighting between forces loyal to the Ghaddafi regime and those who had rebelled against the regime, Tripoli fell into the hands of the “rebels” ending over 40 years of Ghaddafi’s rule over Libya. Today, national leaders ignore the suffering and oppression of their people at the leaders’ own peril.

Contextualizing the Deliberative Project in Malawi

The research reported in this dissertation is a critical and appreciative enquiry into the epistemic effect of grassroots participatory practices (which include deliberation) in

Malawi’s democratic processes. To better understand participatory practices, I examined a number of elements: the influence of grassroots participation on democracy in Malawi; meanings that people attach to democratic participation; and how policies and practices of democratic institutions affect the democratic culture in the country. These elements also constitute my research questions in this study.

14 Lhomwe group of people are found in the southern part of the country and they entered Malawi as late as 1914.

The focus of analysis in this study is on the political economy of epistemology

(knowledge production) vis-à-vis Malawi’s democratization process. The study examined the disconnect between efforts underpinning social change and political initiatives as championed by the Malawi Local Government and other service providers and the channels employed to implement the initiatives. In this study, I challenge the view that

Malawi’s Local Government model of public participation is representative and open to all forms of knowledge production. Through a case study analysis of the political economy of knowledge production of selected District Councils in the Southern Region of Malawi, I argue that the consultative approach adopted by the Councils is flawed. My contention is that, although most public participation projects in Malawi are based on the

Habermasian ideals of fair, free, and open forms of debate and consultation, in practice the Local Government system has hardly been able to define and protect “the power of the better argument.” For most District Councils in Malawi, the Habermasian ideal has meant only favoring professional (expert) and ruling party (forms of) knowledge at the expense of local (lay) knowledge and concerns. This state of affairs is due to the fact that consultative processes in the Malawi Local Government are result-oriented and do not promote deliberation for the sake of common understanding before a decision is reached.

This disregard for local concerns and the knowledge production aspect of deliberation has stripped the people and the deliberative process of uMunthu (human dignity) in national social change efforts in the country. The lack of uMunthu in government processes, policies, and discourse has disrupted the Malawian ontological order and, thus, affected the people’s way of (political) knowing and political practice.

Participatory democracy is not a new thing in Malawi. As I will further elaborate in other sections of this dissertation, African people, including Malawians, had traditional ways of conducting public consultation way before the advent of European Missionaries or British administrators on the continent. Consultative processes in pre-colonial Malawi included bwalo15 proceedings, majiga16 discussions, and chieftaincy selections.17 Osabu-

Kle (2000) presented a picture of deliberative mechanisms among the Ovimbunda, Zulu,

Ashanti, and Ga political systems in Africa before colonization. Osabu-Kle stated that these processes not only helped to hold the people’s leaders accountable, they facilitated the creation of a balance in the justice system. Christian Missionaries who arrived in the country in the 19th Century discouraged and demonized most of the African way of doing things and introduced new Christian values that people were supposed to follow. The demonization of African values stripped the people of their identity and made them feel that their local knowledge was not adequate in dealing with day to day life challenges.

Malawi as a modern day country has its present form of governance largely styled after the western representative form with constitutional stipulations that safeguard the people’s basic rights. The re-introduction of political pluralism in the country in 1994, after thirty years of authoritarian rule under Hastings Kamuzu Banda, has seen a proliferation of non-governmental organizations. These non-governmental organizations

15 Translated as “circle” in English, this was a village gathering to hear and resolve issues such as land disputes, and common village concerns with the village and his/her indunas (counselors) presided 16 Usually where roads intersected bringing all sorts of trade activities and a meeting place for people to hear current issues. Anyone with a common issue of concern would bring a discussion for public input. 17 Although chieftaincy was inherited from one’s uncle (among the Chewa) or one’s father (among the Ngoni), women’s input was usually solicited to gauge whether the heir to the throne was well liked by the people and whether people thought the new king/queen would be a good leader. There are examples of apparent heirs (among the Ngoni) who were not installed on the throne due to public vetoes (see Onani Angoni by Philip. 1965). Most of this information was also collaborated by my mother and Namilanzi in personal interviews and story-telling sessions as part of this study.

50 have contributed to increased civil society participation in democratic processes in

Malawi. In addition to voting, participation in public deliberation has, of late, become an inevitable element of the democratic process in the country. Over time public deliberation processes on national issues have, ranged from pre-budget consultations by the Ministry of Finance to civic debates on working conditions for primary school teachers.18

Democratic participation should be a function of multi-sectoral and historical processes in which statecraft and cultural dynamics interact in the context of the transformation of political and economic norms and practices. In a country where voter apathy is on the increase due to disfranchisement based on empty promises from politicians, even the proponents of participatory democracy lament the lack of information and engagement in the process of deciding major public issues in Malawi

(Patel, Tambulasi, Molande & Mpesi, 2007).

Rather than providing citizens with opportunities to actively participate in public decision-making processes on issues that affect them, most of the traditional avenues, such as the pre-budget consultations, have been dominated or hijacked by professionals or politicians, leaving the average Malawian little or no space to contribute to the political process. The ideals of a democratic polity that Malawians fought for in 1993 have been wrenched away from people at the grassroots by political forces and elite seeking partisan or personal fiefdoms. Efforts to create an inclusive democratic culture, it seems, are often undermined by a limited form of representative government that is designed to privilege those in power or the elite connected to them. Yet Malawi, in some

18 Information provided by primary and secondary school teachers interviewed in the southern region of Malawi in August, 2011 when asked to provide examples of public deliberations they had attended.

51 international circles, has been recognized as an exemplary model of local participation in democratic and development processes.19

By critically examining Malawi’s success story and potential cultural advantages, this research explores the underlying assumptions and practices of the country’s deliberative democratic processes. Political practices and procedures followed by the selected District Councils are documented and presented as evidence of a hegemonic drive by local and international elite actors seeking to consolidate their individual and collective interests at the expense of the common person in the country.

The broader context of the deconstruction of Malawi’s success story is the hidden agenda of Africa’s (Western) development partners who provide development assistance to Malawi with conditions that are not usually favorable to the people they are supposed to serve. Both multi-lateral and bilateral cooperating partners have sought to impose neo- liberal conditions and Western values on recipients of their generosity. Mainstream commentary on democracy in Africa is replete with evidence of the international donor’s policy of pushing for a neo-liberal agenda based on simplistic conceptualizations of state- society relations (Ndegwa, 2001; Osabu-Kle, 2000; Sandbrook, 2000). These attempts at

Western influence not only frustrate local participation but also create confusion in identity construction, political practice, and knowledge production. Western-style epistemologies have exhibited serious signs of impotence when it comes to dealing with the existential questions of the African people.

An examination of the Malawian case, specifically the state-society and cultural dynamics discourse, becomes even more intriguing. The prevailing participation narrative

19 Supposedly successful World Bank funded Malawi Social Action Fund projects during the Muluzi administration and fertilizer subsidy programs under the Mutharika regime are some examples used

52 dissects public social change initiatives against a background of local social actors’ willingness to direct their own fate when it comes to national initiatives. The enthusiasm of these local social actors is derived from indigenous and religious norms, practices, and institutions of governance and political economy based on collective identity. Malawi’s democratic participation success story remains a social construction, rhetoric produced and reproduced by privileged actors for their own benefit. The contested nature of these social constructions becomes evident when we examine the practice and implementations of selectively manufactured local, state, and international social change initiatives in contemporary Malawi.

A field visit in August of 2011 to examine Malawi’s deliberative forums revealed a growing number of avenues. Deliberative sessions are sponsored by both government and civil society as a means of soliciting input concerning various public projects, including the national budget. Of particular interest to me were deliberative sessions regularly conducted by the Ministry of Local Government through District Councils in the country. I have described in detail, later in this dissertation, how these councils operate and the kind of atmosphere that prevails during such sessions. This opening up of public processes to public participation is a milestone in the history of the country given its thirty year pedigree under the autocratic rule of Malawi’s first president, Kamuzu

Banda who was both judge and prosecutor of those who did not agree with his government’s approach to national development. As mentioned earlier, although the opportunities for open participation are becoming more and more available compared to before, the heavy hand of politics and elitism is still visible and that undermines all the efforts to create practical knowledge to transform the country.

Consequently, most Malawians play a limited role in public participation in spite of efforts by some civil society organizations to promote active input. Under the microscope here is how people create their political knowledge and attach meaning to civic participation. This study challenges the epistemology of political practice in Malawi and examines its consequences for national transformation in the country. To clearly comprehend the discursive nature of democratic reform in Malawi, the process and legitimacy of political authority must be critically appraised. This is what this dissertation will attempt to facilitate.

The following chapter presents the theoretical framework within which deliberation in Malawi is being analyzed in this study. The chapter also provides a brief history of how the concept of democracy has evolved over the years from the time its initiators, the Greeks, used it to the present day when not being “democratic” appears to be an anathema to the new world order.

CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Evolution of Democratic Theory

The fate of deliberation is tied in to the fate of democracy. Unless a society allows its democratic values to mature and provide an enabling atmosphere for socio-economic progress, effective deliberation cannot occur. It is for this reason that, in this section, I elucidate how democracy, as a polity, has evolved over the years from when it was first invented to the point when places such as Malawi get to participate in it. My main purpose in this section is to demonstrate how the various perspectives and conceptualizations of the term by various scholars and thinkers have affected the use of the term “democracy” over time.

Mainstream literature on Africa’s democratization process has been somewhat overly simplistic in its focus on formal institutions and protection of basic human rights rather than people’s needs. This misdirected focus has completely neglected the dialectics within which the rights and needs of the people function. The reality on the ground in most African countries, including Malawi, indicates that it is fallacious to perch definitions of functional democracy on electoral transitions and the existence of multiple political parties only. Genuine democratic institutionalization should be assessed in terms of how the state delivers not only political goods in the forms of freedom, equality, and fair representation, but also basic amenities that support life and cognitive development for its people. In short, states should provide for deliberate plans to build capacity and promote cognitive development for its citizens to be able to effectively participate in matters of national interest. The reality on the ground has been deliberate control of

55 resources such as the public media as a way of controlling self-expression and access to information in order to push for the government or ruling party agenda.

Before I delve into the reality of the democratic practice in Africa in general and in Malawi in particular, we will examine the evolution of the democratic concept over the years. It is also proper to establish the theoretical framework within which this study discusses democracy. I will present a common meaning of the term as deduced from various scholars and tie in the meaning to contemporary understandings and practices.

Democracy is a very old idea rooted in ancient Greek life. The Greeks, however, abandoned it in favor of other forms of governance before returning to it much later. It was the Protestant Reformation that stimulated renewed interest in democracy centuries after the Greeks (Plamenatz, 1973). There has been constant debate on whether to think of democracy in procedural terms only or to also include the philosophical undertones that the concept carries with it. “Process democrats” contend that democracy is nothing more than a procedure by which decisions are made, while “principle democrats” argue that democracy is more than a formula for making policy (Johnson, 1949). For the principle democrats, democracy also includes certain basic assumptions about people and their ways of life. Among these assumptions are the beliefs that the individual is of primary importance in the society and that each individual is basically equal to all others.

This equality should ensure that each individual has a set of rights that are inalienable

(Cohen, 2010). Central to both approaches to democracy is the basic idea that, in a democratic polity, political power emanates from the people and that governments are legitimate only as they enjoy the consent and support of the governed. The act of popular consent to government is best explained by the theory of the social contract (Cohen,

2010). Both Calvinist and Jesuit theologians believed that, in the past, people had deliberately come together and agreed to form a government. This idea led to the theories of popular sovereignty and the social contract, both of which were opposed to the divine right of king’s theory.20

Seventeenth century England could be considered democracy’s decisive moment.

This was when an assertive parliament and an aggressive monarch collided on how political power should be exercised. It is against this collision background that the works of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke were produced. Almost a century later when the momentum had shifted to France, Jean Jacques Rousseau also made his contribution to democratic thought.

Almost all of these thinkers agreed on the importance of freedom and human equality. However, for different thinkers, freedom and equality meant different things.

For classical liberalists, equality meant only moral equality, which is the minimal equality. Most democratic theorists, on the other hand, demand more equality than the minimal (Johnson, 1949). On the other hand, thinkers such as Rousseau and Marx did not condone inequality. They defined freedom as the ability to realize one’s higher aspirations such as free and equal participation in political activities. For people to have the ability and opportunity to attain these aspirations, society ought to create necessary conditions for everyone regardless of race, gender or religion. One of the critical conditions according to Rousseau and Marx, is equality.

20 Political and religious doctrine of royal and political legitimacy. It asserts that a monarch is subject to no earthly authority deriving his right to rule only from the will of God. The kings is therefore not answerable to the will of the people but to God directly (Figgs, 1866)

Rousseau is credited as the father of the modern theory of democracy. He is considered to have astutely articulated the subject of moral philosophy and politics. It is

Rousseau who categorized inequality into two forms: natural inequality (such as physical differences) and moral inequality (such as differences in wealth and social status). He posited that inequality developed and evolved from natural to moral.

Rousseau advanced three stages in the development of human society. He stated that, in the first stage of development, humans had no language and people lived in a state that was similar to other animals. In the second stage, humans developed simple language and basic family relations. According to Rousseau, modern society emerged in the third stage. Of the three stages, Roussseau claimed that the second was the best. During this stage there were some basic community structures, and people lived a simple, independent, transparent and happy life. Rousseau posited that it was impossible to stay in the second stage infinitely. People's envy and vanity in competing for resources and power ruined the second stage and gave rise to the third, corrupt, stage. Rousseau argued that natural inequality in strength, talent, and appearance eventually led to moral inequality in wealth, social status and political power. For Rousseau, people are not happy in the third stage. They are alienated from their true selves. They are ostentatious, envious, and are controlled by their own lowly desires. No better picture describes

Malawi’s contemporary politics than Rousseau’s depiction of the third stage of human development.

Rousseau presented two solutions to the problems of the third stage for the human race. The first is personal or therapeutic, which focuses on family education and social nurturing. Critical views to this claim have expressed concern about the limited power of

58 the family to effect substantial transformation. Rousseau proposed a second solution which is political in nature emphasizing a social contract and focusing on eliminating alienation through collective forces. This political solution is the subject of Rousseau's third discourse, The Social Contract.

Rousseau and John Locke differed in what they considered characteristic of social contracts. Rousseau did not agree with Locke that social contracts are purely voluntary

(i.e., through voluntary consent people create societies and states to protect life, liberty and property). Rousseau asserted that social contracts should be formative. In Rousseau's opinion, people are transformed and bound by social contracts in order for them to realize the "general will," representing a higher good for which an ideal society should strive. In other words, people are "forced to be free" by the social contract. The formative, or even coercive, aspect of social contracts is crucial to an understanding of Rousseau's theory of politics (Cohen, 2010).

Cohen shed more light on how to reconcile the two aspects of Rousseauian and

Lockean social contracts: the voluntary and the formative. He suggested that one possible way to reconcile them is the realization that an absolutely voluntary consent to a social contract, as advocated by Locke, is impossible. Social contracts are not wholly voluntary since people might not be aware of the value of the contract. A person might have agreed to the contract because of other people's suggestions, or because of some social norm or custom. Therefore, there exists a formative and coercive aspect of social contracts: one can be "forced to be free."

Rousseau further observed that one aspect of the formative strain of social contracts lies in the fact that people in general are short-sighted and easily controlled by

59 passion, envy, and vanity. Because of that, it is hard for ordinary people to see the true import of the "general will" of society. As such, it is a significant task for legislators to educate ordinary people.

What, then, is the significance of the social contract to human freedom? In classical liberal political thought, freedom was synonymous with the liberty to satisfy one's desires without the arbitrary interference of government or other coercive forces. In contrast, freedom had different meanings to Rousseau: independence and transparency.

Independence means that one is not led by one's own lowly desires or by other people's opinions. Transparency requires that the subject of liberty is one's real self, as compared to the alienated self. Compared to classical liberalism that stresses the significance of fulfilling one's desires without arbitrary interference of government, Rousseau's freedom is more positive and affirmative. In addition, Rousseau was a student of the human heart, which helps explain the importance of transparency to the philosopher.

Rousseau considered inequality to be the major threat to freedom. Due to people's natural tendency to compare and to envy, inequality creates jealousy, vanity, injustice, and alienation. The development from natural inequality to moral inequality is a process of moral corruption, through which the freedoms of independence and transparency are lost. People's miseries in the third stage of human development are a symptom of the lack of true freedom. To regain freedom, Rousseau observed, a political solution is needed

(since a personal and therapeutic solution is regarded as insufficient). In Rousseau’s political solution, coercive social contracts are used to transform people so that they can see and behave according to the general will of the society. Rousseau pointed out that social forces are needed to enforce freedom, equality and justice. He considered that

60 negative freedom alone, without collective restrictions, is harmful. If there is no restriction on negative freedom, natural inequality will lead to moral inequality and corruption.

Central in Rousseau's critique of liberalism is the argument that people are better off with a sense of community and higher good (in addition to their individual freedom); liberalism alone is not sufficient for the emergence of an ideal socio-political system.

However, Rousseau's theory easily leads to tyranny. The idea that people can be, and should be, "forced to be free" by social contracts is very worrisome to liberals, who are suspicious of any paternalistic use of the coercive force of the state. In addition,

Rousseau's definition of freedom has the problem of infringing on individuals’ privacy as it puts too much emphasis on transparency. Finally, a Rousseauian regime of the general will can bring about extreme conformity and kills diversity and creativity.

Its illiberalism notwithstanding, Rousseau's theory of social contract became the foundation of the modern theory of democracy. To many democrats, Rousseau's critique of inequality provided a major justification for democratic equality, and the Rousseauian notion of social contract and general will also helped to justify the democratic process.

The earliest advocates of the social contract theory emerged from two unlikely sources. The Calvinists in France, called Huguenots, were unhappy under the oppressive

Catholic rule. Abandoning John Calvin’s policy of passive obedience, they adopted a doctrine that justified resistance to the Bourbon monarch. The foundations of this theory are found in the writings of Francis Hotman (1524-1590) and of Theodore Beza (1519-

1605), a protégé of Calvin himself. Other basic writings are also found in the pamphlet

Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos.21 Although each of these sources took different approaches on the rights of the people in relation to their king, they converged on the basic thesis:

Spiritual doctrine and truth come from God, but political power emanates from the sovereign people. The people elect a king to serve them. This thinking led to two contracts being entered into. The first, between God and society, requires that all people maintain spiritual truth. The second, between the king and people, provides for civil order. The first agreement requires that both king and people abide by God’s law and calls for punishment of either for any failure to do so. The second contract binds the king as well as the people to the laws of the state. If the king governs justly, the people are bound to obey him; but if the queen is unjust, the people can—and indeed are obliged to—put her out. The ouster of such a king/queen must be a last resort, however.

Although the democratic implications of this theory are clear, the Calvinists did not have democracy in mind. Popular overthrow of the monarch was completely discouraged. Only the people’s representatives: local magistrates, the Estates General, or

Parliament were charged with the responsibility of doing such an act. Although the

Calvinists were opposed to absolutism, they believed in a limited monarchy or aristocracy.

The Jesuit Order, established by Ignatius Loyola in 1534, led the Catholic Church in reforms that arrested the progress of the Protestant Reformation. The Jesuits believed, however, that all spiritual power and authority should derive from the Pope. Hence, since

21 Defense of Liberty Against Tyrants, printed in 1594 is thought to have been written by Hubert Languet or Philippe Duplessis-Mornay. It was published under the pseudonym Stephen Junis Brutis in an obvious and successful attempt to avoid the penalty of sedition in sixteenth-century France.

62 the absolute monarch wanted the state to control the Church, the Jesuits were opposed to the king.

No more in favor of democracy than the Calvinists, the Jesuits contributed greatly to the concept of popular government as well as to the notion of the separation of church and state. Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621), Juan de Marisna (1536-1623), and Francisco

Suarez (1548-1617) were the most important Jesuit writers who contributed to the notion of natural law, which would later be used by the classical liberals in their statement of democratic principles in western democracy.

Like the Calvinists, these three Jesuits did not entirely agree on details but did agree on a basic theme. Generally, they distinguished between God’s law and natural law, which was subordinate to God’s law. Political organization and government, two natural phenomena, were granted to a ruler by the people; God did not grant such authority. God directly invested power only in the Pope. Thus, the Pope was chosen by God and was superior to all. By contrast, the king was chosen by the people and was therefore inferior to them. The Pope could overthrow a tyrant or grant the people the right to resist an evil ruler.

John Locke (1632-1704) is believed to have articulated the theory, nature, and function of government as we know it today. Although he believed that government ought to have limited influence on its people, he agreed that it performed a vital function.

However, Locke championed the idea that the purpose of government was to serve the people. The Lockean understanding of state-civil relation was that some things could be done better when people were left alone and that other things were done better by society as a whole or by society’s representatives. He believed that mostly people could act fairly

63 and efficiently by themselves and insisted that government should not interfere with the individual in such cases. Locke’s central theme could thus be: Government functions solely to increase the individual’s rights. He expected government to be limited. He never thought of government as being more than the sum of its parts. Unlike some political theorists, Locke believed that the state or government should never become more powerful than the individuals it serves. The government is created by society; society is created by a contract among all the individuals who want to join the society. In making the contract, the people agree to accept the arbitration of the government. Since th e power of the government is derived from and therefore dependent on the power of the individuals in the society, the government cannot impose its authority on an unwilling individual (Cranston, 1965).

Locke was also very particular about the structure and form of government. The underlying assumption in his thinking was that what was good for the society as a whole was good for the individual as well. He further posited that people were rational and capable of knowing what was good for them. Consequently, he assumed that the society could use the will of the majority as a formula for deciding correct policy.

So, what is John Locke’s legacy in democratic theory as we know it today? In his essay, “Politics and the English language,” George Orwell (2010) posited that there was no single agreed upon definition of the term “democracy”. Orwell alluded to the fact that each regime claims their system of government is popular and refuses to be tied down to any one meaning. For the sake of this study, I adopt the general assumptions as underpinning Locke’s sentiments: government by consent.

The Democratic Project in Africa

In his examination of the democratic project in Africa, Stephen Ndegwa (2001) challenged scholars of African politics to adopt a holistic approach to the study of democratization, especially in Africa. He urged theorists and students of democracy to move beyond the study of political and legal issues and focus on social norms, generational and social change, class, and gender issues. In other words, it is a call on cultural theorists to examine the role of culture in democratic participation and social change. Unfortunately, the role that culture plays in democratic processes, especially in

African contexts, remains largely unexplored. The desire to fill this lacuna animates the discussion in this dissertation.

Ndegwa observed that a number of decades after transitioning from authoritarian to democratic dispensations in the early 90s, most African countries have not institutionalized democracy. It is a fact that most post-authoritarian governments have merely morphed into “hybrid regimes” that do not meet the minimal standards of the liberal democratic polity that they seek to emulate (Joseph, 1999; Monga, 1996; Ndegwa,

2001; Udogu, 1997). Critical among the conditions that form the essence of the African nation (state and society) is the lack of fundamental socio-economic and political change since the 1990s. While the conditions were fertile ground for mass uprising against autocratic regimes, the elements have been inimical to the advancement of the democratic practice on the continent (Ndegwa, 2001).

Democratic regimes are expected to be inclusive, rights-enhancing, non- oppressive, economically performing, and, hence, commanding legitimacy. However, the reality in most African countries has been a contradiction of this expectation. Most post-

65 authoritarian regimes on the continent must prove their legitimacy and earn the trust of their electorates. Ndegwa (2001) tied regime legitimacy to a state’s ability to manage uncertainty and how it fulfills the duty of protecting and extending the rights of its citizens. Most post-authoritarian regimes in Africa are plagued by chronic economic crises, weak institutions, corruption, nepotism, cronyism, and patrimonialism. Ndegwa observed that Africa’s institutional weakness has been particularly problematic because, in contrast to Latin American authoritarianism or communist dictatorships that characterized Eastern Europe during the cold war, autocracy in Africa was built around personalities and not state bureaucracies. The result of these political fiefdoms in Africa has been a creation of feeble institutions that struggle to operate as government machinery. Decades after independence, most state institutional structures in Africa are incompetent, corrupt, and operating at the whim of individuals in power. The business of running the state is reduced to serving an individual and, thus, the creation of personality cultism in most African countries including Malawi. Hero worship in Africa has created autocratic leadership at the expense of the general masses. The question that lingers in the minds of most scholars is whether liberal democracy is a failed project in Africa.

Daniel Osabu-Kle (2000) commenced his treatise on the need for a compatible cultural democracy for Africa’s socio-political transformation by observing that “Africa has never danced well to the tune of alien political music” (p. 9). Osabu-Kle contended that Africa’s political dilemma has not been about democracy per se, but rather, the brand of democracy that is appropriate for Africans in the modern era. He wondered which type of democracy Africans had embraced on the continent: the British type, the French cloning, or an imposed American type. Styled after the Jeffersonian polity, a neo-liberal

66 type of democracy has largely been adopted by most African countries. Over the years, however, democracy has come to mean different things to different people on the African continent. For most African countries, and sadly the international community has joined the band wagon, democracy has meant the conduction of elections and the participation of multiple political parties in such processes. Missing in the equation are critical appraisals of the quality of participation and the assumptions underpinning such processes.

Ozor (2009) stated that the classical view of democracy has been modified by pluralist concepts to mean a structure where, rather than having a single sovereign power, multiple centers of participation form the decision-making mechanism. Ozor asserted that, where multiple centers of power take charge of the social change process, public decisions and actions must be legitimated by genuine negotiations (deliberation) and compromises on the part of all stakeholders. Interested parties must come to the negotiating table with equal veto power over public policies. The context in which the concept of democracy is used in this study is Ozor’s (2009) understanding of democracy: multiple centers of decision making regardless of the brand of democracy in use. Ozor’s understanding of democracy builds on John Locke’s stipulation that we cannot talk about democracy without popular inclusion and consent. The sad reality of current politics on the African continent is that the contemporary African politician has become not only a power-hungry patriarch with authoritarian tendencies but has also been predatory on national resources. These self-styled elites seek to re-invent and entrench their political, social, and economic power at the expense of the common person.

To accord Africa a tune with which she is familiar, Osabu-Kle (2000) proposed a return to the mass deliberative model and the incorporation of local knowledge that seeks general understanding before consensus in decision-making processes. He posited that this is a superior and more amenable approach for Africans than purely Western models that tend to privilege the state, its institutions, and the procedures that need to be followed for democracy to be deemed working.

The greatest challenge of African leadership today is to cultivate a democratic polity that allows, in ways that authoritarianism could never do, dialogue and understanding of new collective identity, culture, and relationship between state and society (Ndegwa, 2001; O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986). What kind of democracy then does Africa need to be able to propel the continent and its people forward towards progress and prosperity? This dissertation proposes human faced politics (uMunthu) as the starting point to the creation of a society that takes time to understand one another before political expediency.

UMunthu and the Political Practice in Malawi

In a discussion of how social initiatives can assume a participatory approach in

Africa, Gessler Muxe Nkondo (2007) suggested grounding public policies in the African social concept of uMunthu (ubuntu). UMunthu is a Chichewa (Malawi language) word for a southern African way of life that privileges the inescapable mutuality of the human race through equality, communalism, and humanness in day-to-day endeavors. UMunthu, also known as Ubuntu in some parts of southern Africa, is not only an African philosophy but a way of life that creates a common bond and destiny for humanity among people in most of southern Africa. UMunthu’s ontology derives from the African concept of

68 oneness with the community: “I am because we are” (Battle, 2009; Bhengu, 1996;

Brooke, 2008; Nkondo, 2007).

Approaching national social change in a spirit of uMunthu is to reappraise equality and friendship as a political sentiment (Kaplan, 2007; Rawlins, 2009). When friends come to a negotiating table, they are more likely to come as equals and, thus, to work toward and expect to develop an agreement that reflects common interests. Rawlins

(2009) provided a blue print for the conditions governing friends’ negotiations: a benevolent attitude with mutually accepted standards. In spite of the recognition of individual differences and uniqueness (individuation), friends meet on a level playing field seeking common interests, and addressing common concerns (participation).

The sad reality of African politics is that it has failed miserably to provide an atmosphere conducive to social change towards concrete economic progress and national unity. Ideologies, such as those of former South African president, Thabo Mbeki’s

African Renaissance, have failed to provide specific means for how governments can transform 21st century Africa into a formidable geo-player. During his presidency, Mbeki advocated for the rebirth of African knowledge and the rediscovery of African solutions to Africa’s problems. The African Renaissance, as a response to the malaise that has plagued the continent years after attaining independence from its colonial masters, failed to tackle the problem of underdevelopment, crime, and disunity. Mbeki’s philosophy did not offer practical dialectics between theory and practice on how to transform the South

African society into a productive nation. After years of neglect by the white minority government, the majority black South Africans were not offered a workable blue print on

69 how to create jobs, send more people back to school, and how the economic gap between the wealthy and the poor could be reduced.

While the South African economy has always grown steadily as foreign investors find the country attractive to investment, the growth has not translated into improved livelihood for the majority of people in the country especially women. Most South

Africans have remained largely the least skilled and, the lowest paid. A number of economic policy programs championed by the Mbeki administration, such as the Growth,

Employment and Redistribution Economic Strategy (GEAR) and the Accelerated and

Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA), were seen as objects of contestation not only because of their foreign origin but because the programs did not offer a clear social contract with the people of South Africa (Pambazuka, 2007). The failure of Mbeki’s African Renaissance can be attributed to over emphasis on reconstruction efforts, and changing the material conditions of the lives of the people with little regard to matters of the soul, culture, and the values that people in the country cherish.

Addressing Africa’s political and socio-economic problems calls for a revisiting of the logic where alternative political theory is developed as a basis for understanding, measuring, and reorganizing both established causative elements and good practices emerging on the continent. On the need to do away with current ineffective social practices, Aseka (2005) observed that, “There is need to create a special social policy bonding between government and civil society organizations by way of empowerment programs in this era” (p. 12). Aseka cautioned that African social policy roles should not be influenced by a liberal agenda, whose execution privileges a few elite political actors

70 at the expense of the citizenry. Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002) had noted earlier that unless national development policy process is thoroughly consultative and inclusive, it would remain an elite exercise removed from the people it is supposed to serve.

Although uMunthu is not a code of rules but a way of life based on the collective wisdom of generations, it can be used as a social practice for how to think, choose, act, and speak in a way that edifies the community (Bhengu, 1996; Nkondo, 2007). Effective and fair deliberative processes in Malawi can create the necessary avenues for the flourishing of uMunthu, civic friendship, and a culture that is tolerant and appreciative of the “otherness” of people.

Central to the examination of the quality of the process, outcomes, and impact of deliberative democracy is the resolution of intent and the ideals of the system with the praxis of that system. In this case study, the system under investigation is participatory democracy. Democratic governance is by no means a new term. However, of late, the term has acquired new meanings worldwide. There is need to define what is understood by democratic governance in the 21st century, identify its goals, and find a way to measure whether these goals are met in deliberative processes. Leighninger (2006) defined democratic governance as the art of governing communities through participatory, deliberative, and collaborative means. The key word in Leighninger’s definition is “participatory,” insinuating that people at the grassroots have the power to co-govern their locales. The heart of inquiry into deliberative processes is identifying whether this self-governance is taking place and examining the assumptions that underpin its politics and its implementation.

Leighninger asserted that the era of expert governance has been overtaken by an era of grassroots people taking charge of their own affairs. Pondering public participation and political epistemology, Stephen Healy (2009) argued that the nature of tensions and disconnects between lay and expert knowledge as an epistemic factor has become a significant issue in participatory democracy. Healy asserted that, while most deliberative efforts adopt the Habermesian assumption of freedom and egalitarianism in framing their activities, the common problem with most approaches is that trust deficits and asymmetries of power usually impede the deliberative process. Experts get caught in what Healy called a “deficit mode,” specifically the belief that lack of public participation is a result of knowledge deficits only and should be resolved by more expert mediated enhancements in information dissemination and project implementation.

How citizens construct their knowledge of how to run their locales is also tied to how citizens behave collectively as a necessary condition for self-governance. Burke’s

(1969) notion of identification sheds light on why and how individuals come together in a collective identity. He asserted that human interactions in the contemporary world have become so complex that we need to understand them communicatively. Burke further contended that the need for humans to belong is a result of division or separateness. He asserted that people are born as separate individual beings, but they find their commonality through shared ideals and aspirations expressed through communication.

Burke’s notion of identification needs to be understood within the context of his understanding of language as symbolic action. Through language, humans find a way of acting in the world, a defining characteristic for humans. Through this concept, we understand citizenship as not only a shared identity in a locality but a desired action that

72 can be expressed through deliberative action and discourse which can be observed and analyzed. Burke’s elucidation of the concept of collective identity and shared ideals was meant, obviously, for a western society. This western notion, however, finds a contemporary in the southern African concept of uMunthu that privileges the individual’s social situatedness. In uMunthu, an individual finds completion and acts through belonging to the community (Makgoba, 1996; Marx, 2002; Nkondo, 2007).

It has never been easy to define the term uMunthu, a derivative of ubuntu in

Xhosa (a language in South Africa). Mnyaka and Motlhabi (2005) posited that trying to define an idea like “uMunthu” is the same thing as trying to give a definition of “time.”

Everyone knows how to (mis)use time but cannot say what it is. The concept is rooted in the African belief that a person is the center and end of everything. UMunthu recognizes the value of human life, regardless of the person’s social or economic status, gender, or race. Anything that prevents the holistic development and respect of the human being is frowned upon in uMunthu.

Nkondo (2007) argued that, although uMunthu is not a code of rules, uMunthu can be mainstreamed into government public policy to create a participatory element in public administration efforts. African governments can link democratic enterprises to people-centered national social change through their policies. The objective is to bring about a new political order and to facilitate democratic consciousness. The uMunthu approach in national social change initiatives would be a new political understanding with human compassion and caring for others as the center piece of government’s discursive actions. A government that has uMunthu as its guiding principle uses this compassion and concern for the value of human life and good neighborliness at various

73 levels of its administration, such as the protection and genuine adherence to the republican constitution, respect for the doctrine of separation of powers, transparent public sector administration, and the use of security forces in the service of the people and not as tools of intimidation and oppression.

The question to ask in this analysis is how people know what they know in political organizing in Malawi. In his study of what a peace curriculum and pedagogy might look like in a Malawian classroom, Sharra (2007) concluded that Malawi misses out on inculcating peaceful approaches to politics and interpersonal relations in its design of the curriculum for schools. As Musopole (1994) observed—African students know everything about the world around them except themselves. Sharra believed that the concept of uMunthu could be used to facilitate the analysis and understanding of what lies at the root of Malawi’s contemporary problems of institutionalized violence, injustice, and political intolerance. Sharra further posited that the absence of uMunthu in social actions and people’s daily lives has had an impact on practitioners, such as primary school teachers, and their interaction with pupils. Based on Sharra’s postulations, we can conclude that the political intolerance and predatory tendencies that characterize politics in Malawi emanate from the classroom, and how Malawians are educated and socialized as social actors.

Africa’s wholesale adoption of a western values and style of governance create the expectation that there should not be a significant difference between African democracy and western democracy because of their underlying principles. Most national constitutions in Africa, with their appeals to egalitarian values, have all the marks of liberal democracy. The republican constitution in Malawi shares a Lockean stipulation of

74 separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. The constitution also provides for the protection of a wide range of human rights, including freedom of religion, freedom of association, freedom of expression, and the right to basic education. How these liberal interests are met in Malawi’s democracy can be regarded as deliberative since Malawi’s constitution provides for public consultation at both the national and local levels to include opinions on proposed legislation. Similarly, government communicates its intentions through a plethora of means, including policy documents (Iannantuono & Eyles, 1997).

Deliberation, which is gaining ground in Western democracy, shares some commonality with African political traditions whose legal instruments provide room for talk that should lead to understanding, and consensus, as opposed to unilateral endorsements of executive decisions. Public deliberation as reasoned agreement, then, legitimatizes liberal democracies. To be truly legitimate, this deliberation must be completely egalitarian with the discussion agenda accommodating all affected in the discussion initiation, and the discussion procedures (Benhabib, 1996). In deliberative democracy, all must have equal rights to participation. Deliberation must be able to accommodate a diversity of views, and communication channels with criticism being crucial to public reason. This accommodation will only be possible if the common people are allowed a voice to express themselves and to decide what is best for their locales.

That is the crux of uMunthu conscience.

Although efforts have been made to mainstream uMunthu in practical political organizing in some countries in Africa, such as South Africa, the analytic process that is demanded to demonstrate how the social concept would work as a political ideal has not

75 been given the rigorous attention it deserves. In the absence of that rigor, it is difficult to prescribe uMunthu for political action (Nkondo, 2007). This study fills that knowledge gap and provides a step-by-step guide as to what could be done to incorporate uMunthu as a public policy conceptual framework for not only Malawi but other African countries.

An uMunthu-centered approach to public administration would create the necessary foundations for civic friendship as an ethos of political culture. Rawlins (2009) discussed how friendship can contribute to the moral practices of larger social systems.

He extended the Aristotelian assumptions of political friendship by outlining the ethical obligations that go with authentic participation in friendship. Rawlins asserted that each friendship practice takes place within a context in which friends voluntarily negotiate limits. Rawlins argued that ethical elements of dyadic friendships can inform people’s practice of political friendships. His notion of individuation and participation is a central guideline for how difference and opposing views are handled in political friendship.

Rawlins argued that, in spite of individual differences and uniqueness

(individuation) as humans, we find our connection and share a common identity with others through participation. Rawlins further posited that individuation and participation shape our perceptions, thoughts, communication, and action as social members.

Post-Colonialism and Malawi’s Search for National Identity

Contemporary Africa faces a difficult but very significant quest: identity search

(Wiredu, 2004). To comprehend the dynamics and assumptions that are at play in the continent’s construction of identity and efforts for social change is to examine the relations that exist between Africa’s past and what is happening now. The search for understanding factors that make Africa what it is today is grounded in the context of the

76 difficulty of placing the continent’s identity when it comes to socio-political and cultural issues such as music, arts, religion, morality, and media.

A Malawian theologian, Augustine Musopole, presented one of the well argued notions of what it means to be African. In his 1994 treatise, Being Human in Africa:

Toward an African Christian Anthropology, he contended with the existential dilemma for the African brought about by the collision of African and Western values during the colonization period. Writing from a theological perspective, he sought to examine how the African formulated her identity in the face of foreign influence. Musopole (1994) stated his quest as the need for, “the development of a relevant theology of the African church” (p. 63). Central to Musopole’s pursuit for a meaningful theology for the local church was the discovery of theological meaning in indigenous religions and cultural practices. For Musopole, functional theology understands the people for whom the theology is developed.

Musopole posited that the search for an African theology had been a consequence of Western Christianity’s rejection of African culture and all things African. Early

Western Christian missionaries taught their African converts to reject their African traditional practices in favor of western ways of doing things. Musopole noted that, consequentially, African Christians have lived with a burden of double-consciousness, torn between two opposing world-views, “two traditions, and two ways of being human, that is, African and Christian, which had been presented to them as antagonistic to each other” (p. 65). Musopole further posited that, by rejecting African cultural values, western Christianity forced on Africans an alien perspective toward life and thus denied the Africans their sense of humanity which was grounded in the Africans’ expression of

77 cultural and historical consciousness. He called for a theology that would overturn the contradiction that had been created by the cultural collision through the salvaging of

African traditions to reproduce Christianity that is germane to African way of life.

Frantz Fanon and Edward Said provide a shared experience when it comes to the relation between Africa’s colonial past and its present identity. As members of an oppressed and dispossessed people, they looked at the process of colonization and decolonization as not only affecting the physical in terms of resource control but as a battle of the mind too (Fanon, 1967; 1968). From Fanon’s and Said’s own personal experience, the two believed that the physical interference of the colonizer can be removed but the mental presence is difficult to take away. Colonialism becomes incorporated into the consciousness and culture of the dominated people to the extent that they adopt it as their own identity. For Fanon and Said, it was the pervasive and insidious character of the colonization of the mind that makes it so difficult not only to eliminate but to recognize (Fanon, 1967; 1968; Gibson, 2003; Said, 1978).

For Fanon, what distinctly represented the colonization of the mind was the way in which the national identity of a people could be subverted. Writing about Algeria, his adopted country, he noted how the people were robbed of their history and the view of themselves as capable of independent action. In The Wretched of the Earth, Fanon (1968) wrote about how the settler consciously makes history. He noted how the history of the colonized is merely one aspect of the history of the metropolitan colonial power. The colonized people do not possess an independent history until the process of decolonization takes place.

For Said, the tragedy of colonization is not only the debasing of the mind, but also the loss of self-representation and lack of recognition of the colonized as an independent entity. Said’s project was an attempt to reverse the western ethnographer’s gaze and compel the Orientalists to examine themselves. For Said, the significant aspect of

Orientalism had its roots in questions of power and knowledge that always determine representation (Said, 1978). This is where Freire (1997) suggested a humanizing pedagogy where revolutionary leadership facilitates dialogical structures with the oppressed. Freire urged that the effort towards humanizing pedagogy, and indeed, national social change must not be purely intellectual but must be followed by action that includes serious reflection.

The common argument by Fanon, Freire, and Said is that the resumption of history or defeating the colonizers was/is not enough. The scholars called for a new consciousness, embodied in a new national political culture. This call for a new national culture was in sharp contrast to earlier calls for the glorification of “blackness” by intellectuals such as Aimé Césaire, Léon Damas, and Léopold Sédar Senghor in

Négritude. Fanon’s conviction was that Négritude had missed the point in its approach.

Négritude, as an intellectual and cultural movement flourished in the early 20th century in Paris, France. With the aim of undoing the racial denigration of the colonizer,

Négritude declared unequivocally the beauty of “blackness.” The movement proclaimed the virtues of blackness, of being African. Négritude glorified the African culture and its values. Césaire and the others sought, among other things, to celebrate an African past, a past replete with richness and abundance before the arrival of the colonizer.

The attempt to revive an African culture founded on the claimed glories of the past, as a way of responding to the colonizers’ racialism, turned out to be a fruitless endeavor (Ekpo, 2010; Fanon, 1967). Ekpo believed that Négritude, which was centered on cultural nationalism, was not effective due to its lack of depth on issues such as race,

African emotivity and fatal errors on cultural-nationalistic self-comprehension and fear of modernity. Ekpo separated Négritude into two categories: cultural nationalism and

Senghorism. He stated that it is cultural nationalism that experienced demise but that

Senghorism was well and alive. Ekpo believed that, “central to Senghorism is the question of what to do with an Africa suddenly brought by Europe to the gate of world history” (p. 179). In his reconstructive review of Senghor’s thoughts, Ekpo believed that

Senghor desired to re-introduce Africa fully into the modernity whose doors had just been slightly opened by colonization. Contemporary Africa should be understood in the light of Ekpo’s musing: “How might Africa, gutted and brutalized by colonization, manage to become part of the modern order?” (p. 179).

Ekpo believed that cultural-nationalism—the ideological effort to remodel Africa in its own cultural self-image through the decolonization of the mind—with which

Senghor’s name has always been associated, is a worrying misunderstanding of

Senghorism. Ekpo posited that, although cultural nationalism vented its hysterical anger at Europe’s colonial plundering of native tribal cultures, it covetously desired modernity.

He further argued that cultural nationalism did not desire modernity at the expense of nativism but as an appendage to things African. Ekpo further explained that pre-colonial

Africa lacked a shared, homogenizing culture that could catapult the continent into modernity. Ekpo concluded his postulations on Négritude by stating that Africa has

80 suffered grave consequences by misunderstanding Senghor’s Négritude to mean a return to “obscurantist, hubristic and vengeful neo-traditionalism” (p. 181).

As a way of looking forward, Ekpo suggested not only redeeming Senghor from

Négritude but delivering Africa from “too much Africanism” (p. 181). Extending this caveat of re-aligning Africa’s intellectual power and political ideology, Ekpo advocated for what he called “Post-Africanism” as a form of political nationalism. Ekpo’s outward looking in the form of political nationalism is in contrast to Négritude’s inward cultural nationalism. He defined Post-Africanism as, “a post-ideological umbrella for a diversity of intellectual strategies” (p. 181). These intellectual strategies seek to etch newer, more ingenious political organizing beyond the obsessive thinking characterized by racial- cultural worries not only of the Négritude era but also the very post-colonial thinking.

Post-Africanism differs from post-colonialism in that the later has been obsessed with confronting imperialism and decolonizing the mind. In Post-Africanism, Ekpo called for learning, copying and understanding the machinations and skills of imperialist domination with a purpose of fast-tracking economic growth and socio-political change in the former colonies. Ekpo’s postulations bring us back to the reality of neo-liberal democracy as a widely adopted political system in Africa. To echo Ekpo’s thoughts, we can only ask as to whether Africa needs to stay on its knees and keep on lamenting the great tragedy of colonization, slave trade and neo-imperialism or move on and modify

(western) democratic governance to suit its present needs.

Local-Global

As might be gathered from the above, specific normative commitments animate this dissertation. Without falling prey to the “village cult” privileging local knowledge

81 above all others, I subscribe to calls for contextualizing transnational (Western) knowledge and best practices, and transnationalizing local knowledge and best practices towards improved political systems worldwide. The prescription emerging from this project is the interfacing of the professional and the lay, “global” and “local.” This is an attempt to bring the African self into the global trend of affairs and conversation, and invite the world into local African politics, and cultural values. It is imperative that the concept of democracy be expanded to include the African view of humanity as the two elements enter into a dialogue as a way of establishing a truly African democratic polity.

This argument for linking the local with the transnational is elucidated further in subsequent chapters.

Theoretical Framework: Deliberation, Epistemology, and Decision-Making

As stated earlier, deliberation is generally regarded as a measurable decision- making process with emphasis on the procedures and outcomes of such endeavors (see

Benhabib, 1994, 1996; Bohman & William, 1996; Cohen, 1997, 2010; Dryzek, 1990;

Gastil & Black, 2008). I would like to extend this approach by arguing that this perspective of looking at deliberative efforts in terms of process and end product fails to appreciate other roles of the deliberative process, especially in contexts where power

(looked at broadly) differentials are at play. Looking at deliberation as a procedure that seeks outcomes is failure to appreciate that deliberation also acts as a social field where opinions are formed and are publicly traded. Deciding the person or group of people whose opinions should carry the day for various reasons becomes an issue of social and political economy. This power element goes substantially beyond the decision-making aspect in terms of its structural, cognitive, and capability aspects.

Deliberation, as a field, covers an immense area of human democratic undertaking. Operationally, however, deliberation is conducted through one channel— cognitive (dis) abilities of the participating individuals. Participants in a deliberative exercise employ an array of logical schemas to the various phases of deliberation depending on the objectives and structure of the deliberative activity at hand. The deliberators express opinions with various underlying assumptions based on their position and background in society. Such processes have two aspects to them: knowledge- production (epistemology) and decision-making (product).

Deliberation as knowledge-production compels participants to attempt to establish shared meaning and understanding of issues under discussion reflecting their various world-views, training (or lack of training), and power. Establishing shared meaning is the first obstacle that participants have to overcome in a deliberative process. A genuine deliberation process will demand that participants acknowledge that they are interacting with representatives of different traditions, backgrounds, and orientations. The function of deliberation at this point should be appreciating and appraising perspectives advanced by others. Consequently, making sense of individual differences should become the focus of deliberative practice in its earliest stages. The knowledge-production phase of deliberation functions as a hermeneutic exercise mainly aimed at sense-making cognizant of the fact that arriving at an agreement should not necessarily be a priority during deliberation (Anderson, 2006; Butterfield, 2008; Healy, 2009; Vandenbergen, 2007).

The quest for learning and understanding demonstrates that knowledge building processes function at a particularly different level in terms of logic and underlying assumptions in addition to institutional design. At the knowledge-production phase of

83 deliberation, participants engage in a hermeneutic practice in an attempt to reach an understanding of diverse positions. This “fusion of horizons,” (Gadamer, 1975) brings together traditional and new knowledge, lay and expert knowledge to produce a new point of view or appreciation of the issue under discussion. At this stage of deliberation, individuals are not expected to completely abandon their biased views. They are, however, expected to mentally arrive at a new level, through an appreciation of alternative views, before a rational agreement or rejection is reached. Deliberation that accommodates a sparring of knowledge bases is not concerned with the restrictions of procedures or ground rules in order to arrive at a popular final decision. The setting for this kind of deliberation is, therefore, egalitarian, informal, and an open-ended process.

Because the knowledge appreciation aspect of deliberation is oriented to deepen the scope of understanding it operates horizontally. Gadamer’s assumption in “the fusion of horizons” is a setting that defies hierarchy with information and knowledge flowing and shared among equals.

A question might be asked whether there is merit in deliberation if participants fail to reach a consensus. Rehg and Bohman (2001) observed that, “in the first place, we come to understand perspectives other than our own; in the second place, we often learn from them” (p. 313). Elster (1998) contended that deliberation, as discussion, has value even if the process ends at the exchange of ideas. He argued that deliberating issues lessen or overcome the impact of restricted rationality by uncovering various possibilities for resolving an issue. Elster further posited that the quality of discussion helps to increase the legitimacy of the final decision in the eyes of the participants, and if handled well, facilitates group solidarity. In a similar vein, Bohman (1996, 1998) maintained that

84 an open public dialogue increases the democratic quality of decisions as it takes into account all opinions expressed. Deveaux (2003) posited on the benefits of placing the basis of democratic legitimacy beyond formal political deliberation observing that effective democratic polity did not only mean formal political procedures. Deveaux argued that democratic processes should take into account “cultural dissent,”

“subversion,” and new thinking/ideas within a social context.

In underscoring the significance of public discussion, Fennema and Maussen

(2000) portrayed public discussion as a knowledge-production process and argued that public discussion should be as unrestricted as possible so as to allow different positions to be publicly expressed. The two authors posited that while inclusiveness could not be the only positive factor in the overall quality of final decisions, it could offset the cynical arguments that deliberation favors the articulate.

Contrary to the shared learning role, deliberation has mostly assumed a decision- making task aimed at specific rational agreement as an end product. Generally a formal process, deliberation is designed to facilitate making of decisions within specified time and space setting. Given these restrictions, the process usually ends in a decision, whether through voting, consensus, or some other kind of conformity. The typical flow of information and knowledge in this kind of setting follows a vertical pattern towards the attainment of a final product in contrast to the horizontal flow in the shared learning kind of deliberative practice. Consequently, due to spatial and temporal limitations, the impact of deliberation has a hierarchical consequence in that the horizontal development of knowledge and shared learning among participants is subjected to the pressure of producing a product. In short, the necessity of reaching a decision propels feelings

85 towards forming an opinion, consequently blocking a widening of the extent of room for shared learning.

In this kind of atmosphere, the hermeneutic effect of shared learning stops its functioning and is relegated to the background as deliberation advances into another phase. Following this, the assumptions and the atmosphere of deliberation are transformed. This alteration in priority and goal can be looked at as a paradigm shift from shared understanding to decision-making. The focus of my argument here is that the direction adopted towards reaching a final verdict exerts pressure on the whole process.

Another equally significant outcome of the move from shared learning to reaching agreement takes place at the level of the personal encounter between and among participants. Decision-making objectives, usually advanced by the gatekeepers of society, undermine the role of mutual interaction by triggering a tendency towards protecting the existing arrangement of interests. This tendency leads to a critical power struggle among participants. Decision-making processes can be seen as aggravating power differentials and creating identity contests among various players in the deliberation process. Clashes of identities, affiliations, or knowledge bases rather than constructive interaction would unquestionably result in a detrimental effect on the quality of the whole process (Dryzek,

2005). Another school of thought, however, suggests that, participants would only take deliberation seriously if they believe it would culminate in some kind of decision (Fung,

2003). Fung observed that such processes are mostly front-loaded because they aim to sway rather than encourage learning.

Sunstein (2002) provided another calculated use of deliberation within decision- making processes and argued that, under the pressures of decision-making, participants in

86 a deliberative session tend to polarize towards extreme points of arguments, rather than progressing towards agreement. When this happens, there is high probability that shared understanding and learning will not be promoted as an ideal. Consequently, this shows that if participants are subject to peer pressure and group normative culture they are less likely to interact with the aim of understanding others. Mackie (2003) pointed out that people who belong to and/or act as part of an interest group do not readily change their minds during a deliberative process. The same people, however, find it relatively easy in other forums to embrace change with different individuals.

Sunstein admitted that his findings contrasted sharply with Fishkin’s (1991; 1995)

Deliberative Opinion Polling (DOP) conducted in a number of countries. The DOP, in which small groups of participants drawn from highly diverse backgrounds were asked to deliberate on various issues, found no methodical tendency toward polarization, although polarization was observed in some cases. In an analysis of the differences between his cases and the DOP’s, Sunstein (2002) concluded that the difference emanated from the institutional design of the deliberative procedures. In the case of the DOP, a substantial pool of information, including participants from different backgrounds, were available.

Critical in this observation is that there was no pressure to reach a decision at the conclusion of the deliberation. Sunstein posited that those factors considerably reduced the possibility of group polarization in the DOP cases.

The significance of the difference between shared learning and decision-making aspects of deliberation are fundamental in relation to deliberative theory. This missing link in the theory is decisive in designing and studying deliberation not only in Western but in non-Western settings. Mainstream literature’s conceptualization of deliberative

87 democracy as a decision-making process has serious consequences when it comes to designing and understanding deliberative processes in emerging democracies. The general conceptualization has confined deliberation to the formal structures developed by

(elite) governing bodies tuned to reaching decisions. If deliberation is a two-sided effort, an unclear treatment of this fact definitely leads to a dilemma undermining the integrity of deliberative design adopted by most deliberative theorists.

I will elaborate more on this caveat in subsequent sections. For now, it suffices to acknowledge that the lack of recognition and appreciation of the epistemic side of deliberation leads to confusion. Inquiry of deliberation related to shared learning is examined through the eyes of decision-making. Most of the aforementioned scholars have relegated the shared learning stage of deliberation to the whims of decision-making with serious consequences. Although they offer valuable insights in connection with shared learning, hence broadening the scope of deliberation, the effects of their initiatives are flawed by the fact that their arguments are generally constructed based on decision- making.

There is a need for scholars to expand deliberative theory to accommodate the internal differences of deliberative practices in order to analytically and systematically distinguish between the two sides. This distinction not only entails identifying in what sense deliberation as shared learning differs from deliberation as decision-making, but also formally allocating the epistemic effect in its own sphere and for its own sake.

This recognition of the epistemic role of deliberation will not only resolve the confusion articulated above, but will also facilitate the revitalization of the otherwise subordinated capabilities of deliberation. I believe that this repositioning of the epistemic

88 role of deliberation can be effected without pitching shared learning and decision-making against each other. These two aspects of deliberation could be aligned in a dialectic unity and treated as such in a theoretically coherent way.

The significance of this kind of development becomes immediately evident when studying societies such as Malawi where social, political, religious, and cultural differences run deep across society. For such diverse societies to begin resolving their social issues, society problems can initially be conceptualized at the level of shared learning in deliberation to create understanding. As my study of deliberation based on the

Malawi Local Government demonstrates, the desire of grassroots groups to engage in dialogue with public officials and other service providers could only make sense within the atmosphere of deliberation as a shared learning process. This initial stage in the process would be critical in settling conflicts and ensuring mutual social cooperation.

Instead of looking at a deliberation process as a war zone, participants would take advantage of the opportunity to discover the potential connections with others in seeking the common good.

In defense of argumentation. Recognizing the two aspects of deliberation as established above has several advantages. Some of the benefits to approaching deliberative frameworks based on their different stages include the fact that such an approach recognizes that members of collective bodies develop an appreciation of their differences on the issues common to them.

To consider shared learning as a perspective in deliberation is to appreciate the inter-subjectivity of deliberation, that is, individuals learn how to make sense and use the advantage of diversity in society. Social actors develop reciprocal relations with others.

This reciprocal relationship facilitates a type of interaction in which participants recognize the fact that their action carries a dialogic effect.

It is vital to appreciate this action mode in order to understand the dynamics of deliberation designed to facilitate shared learning. Elster (1998) asserted that the concept of deliberative democracy is founded on argumentation, not only because it proceeds by argument, but also because it can only be warranted by argumentation.

In The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas (1987) introduced a critical concept in refocusing the inter-subjective nature of human communication. This theory is useful in our attempt to draw conclusions on a functional democratic polity. To consider deliberation as a dialogical process is to appreciate Habermas’ framework which has its basis on the presuppositions of dialogue as linked to human utterance. The framework as presented by Habermas highlights significant insights on the shared learning aspect of deliberation, especially on the nature of the role that learning fulfills in human communication. Analyzing the conditions within which dialogue in deliberation takes place becomes vital in distinguishing it from other deliberative elements created otherwise.

Shared learning versus decision-making. Another significant contribution to deliberation as shared learning experience was provided by John Dryzek (1990, 2000).

The value of Dryzek’s framework can be looked at in two ways: the recognition of the shared learning aspect of deliberation as distinct from decision-making by highlighting the various ways in which deliberation functions; the suggestion that decoupling these two phases of the democratic process is a viable alternative for reconciling different views, particularly when identity issues are involved.

Through what he calls “discursive democracy,” Dryzek presented democracy as a dynamic, open-ended project in which discourses engage each other in a timeless and spaceless fashion. Envisaging the democratic process as a contestation of discourses enables Dryzek to devise a framework based on the dialogic qualities of deliberation.

Dryzek echoed Habermas’ “the subjectless form of communication,” in that discourses do not possess agency of their own and should not be reduced to a personal set of values.

He argued that, instead, discourses reflect various dimensions of individuals depending on discursive circumstances. He further posited that discourse is a shared process of making sense of the world embedded in language. Any discourse, therefore, will always be embedded in assumptions, prejudices, contentions, dispositions, capabilities, and possibilities.

Dryzek also noted that these shared stipulations of reference oblige all those who are party to a specific discourse to perceive and compile bits of sensory information into comprehensive stories (narratives) or accounts that can be shared intersubjectively in meaningful ways. Thus, a discourse will generally revolve around a central story line containing opinions about both facts and values. In view of this, Dryzek’s discursive model appears to be broadly inclusive in that the contestation of discourses is not restricted only to reasoned argument. Instead, many other kinds of communication, including gossip, jokes and rhetoric, are allowed to take place in the process as long as they are reflective, non-coercive, non-pejorative, and capable of linking the particular experiences with some more general point or principle.

Discursive democracy in this case becomes the sum of inter-subjective communication across discourses within the public sphere and is not restricted to

91 decision-making or the need for an end product procedures alone. Consequently, for

Dryzek, the idea of reciprocity grows out of not the decision moments of democratic practice, but out of public deliberation construed as group learning. He emphasized that, under the pressure of the need for decision-making, especially when a decision is agreed upon by voting, the democratic process turns into a contestation of identities or

“membering”. Therefore, in diverse societies, “the game becomes one of ensuring that the state is tuned to make sure that one’s popular identity will always and inevitably win key votes” (2005, p. 7). In other words, the battle of identities, instead of the battle of discourses, takes control of the process of deliberation in the form of “a raw clash of identities,” making a reflective attitude less possible. Here, Dryzek presented a solution.

He suggested focusing on deliberation to operate mainly within the boundaries of the public sphere, and removing deliberation from decision requirements of the democratic process. He emphasized that reflection was necessary as a diffusing mechanism in the face of competing discourses over time. This state of affairs, Dryzek asserted, “is less fraught than that in hot deliberation, where reflection can only take effect in the choices of individuals under the gaze of both opponents and those with a shared identity” (2005, p. 9). What is evident is that people do not agree that they can change their minds in deliberative forums, yet at another time and place with different participants admission becomes easier and more likely (Dryzek, 2005; Mackie, 2003).

For Dryzek, therefore, separating decision from deliberation goes together with decoupling the public sphere from the state instruments and the formal bodies of decision-making in order to maintain the legitimacy of deliberation. He sought a loose

92 connection with the state while warning that the emphasis on the public sphere as the best venue for argumentation does not necessarily mean a complete shunning of the state.

Although the State-society struggle is easily discernible at the macro-level, the dialectics of hegemonic influence where individuals, at the micro-level, access the state for personal gains are difficult to isolate. The separation of patron and client, emerging as ruler and ruled, is changeable, as persons navigate from one status to the other, and move back and forth. This state of affairs (and its consequential dynamics) is hardly of any good to the general public and a nation at large.

After looking at the socio-historical and political factors that have shaped Africa’s thinking and political organizing, and having situated the conceptual context within which deliberation is discussed in this study, the next chapter deals with the methodology and procedure of data gathering and data analysis. The methodology employed in this project is a statement on the centrality of the participant and the need to co-create knowledge in modifying present political practices to serve present concerns. The methodology section also includes references to important literature on paradigmatic approaches to research in communication studies.

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

Introduction

This chapter presents the method employed in this study. I outline the perspectives informing my approach to the research. These perspectives are grounded in postmodernist, critical, collaborative, and lived experience approaches categorized as qualitative research (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002). The first section provides an explanation of the fundamental assumptions and epistemological ideals underlying qualitative research. I conclude the chapter by providing a description of the kinds of data collected in the study and an explanation of how data were gathered and analyzed.

The theoretical framework informing the investigation of Malawi’s democratic participation processes places this study within discursive practices. Under investigation in this study were processes of public participation, assumptions, and meanings attached to participatory democracy as communicated by social actors in the locality under study.

Findings are based on data gathered in a variety of ways, including in-depth interviews, participant-observation, examination of archival materials, and analysis of contemporary newspaper articles. I obtained and analyzed, from various sources, documents that outline governmental and non-governmental efforts in Malawi’s democratization process at national, regional, and council levels. Such documentation, together with interview responses, provided an adequate triangulation of data and background information on

Malawians’ experiences and understandings of their democratic participation in political, economic, and social contexts. Most importantly, is the active presence of myself as not only as a researcher but as an instrument for knowledge co-creation with the people that I interacted with during the study.

Deliberation in Malawi as a Case Study

Quite a number of experimental studies of sm all-group political discussion have been conducted worldwide with rather disappointing results due to the artificial nature of the conditions under which those studies were conducted (Levine, Fung & Gastil, 2005).

Chambers (2003) observed that most empirical studies have turned to “real world” test cases for theoretical claims about deliberative democracy. In such cases, Chambers reported the following methods as being predominant: participant-observer methods, qualitative analysis, surveys and questionnaires of participants, and different forms of detailed discourse analysis. Whilst many scholars report on cases in a journalistic manner, Levine et al. (2005) promoted a rigorous case study method: “If we want to observe how interest groups, politicians, and citizens deal with one another in public deliberation, then we need to study practices embedded in politics, not experiments with predetermined topics and controlled structures” (p. 281). Consequently, to better understand the deliberation project in Malawi, I conducted a case study of three local government democratic participation processes in the country.

Babbie (2004) defined case study as, “an in-depth examination of a single instance of some social phenomenon, such as a village, a family, or a juvenile gang” (p.

293). Babbie noted that focusing attention on a specific instance of something is the main characteristic of the case study. Other scholars suggest that a case study is less of a methodological choice than, “a choice of what is to be studied” (Stake, 1995, p. 435).

Smith (1978) stated that the “what” in a case study is a “bounded system,” a single entity, a unit around which there are given boundaries. The case, then, has a finite quality about it in terms of time, space, and/or components comprising the case (for example, number

95 of participants). In this study, I mainly sought a thick description of the phenomenon and an idiographic understanding of the deliberative processes as used in the Malawi Local

Government setting.

Because a case study focuses on a specific unit or instance, issues of generalizability emerge larger than with other types of qualitative research. However, a number of scholars have pointed out that much can be learned from a particular case (see:

Baxter, 2008; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Merriam, 1998). Readers can learn vicariously from an encounter with the case through the researcher’s narrative description

(Stake, 1995). Erickson (1986) argued that, since the general rests in the particular, what we learn in a particular case can be transferred to similar situations. It is the reader, not the researcher, who determines what can apply to his or her context. Stake (1995) further explained how this knowledge transfer works: “Case researchers, like others, pass along to readers some of their personal meanings of events and relationships…They know that the reader, too, will add and subtract, invent and shape—reconstructing the knowledge in ways that leave it…more likely to be personally useful” (p. 442). The choice of case study approach provided a rare opportunity for me to interact with participants and documents to learn how District Councils operate in their contribution to Malawi’s democratization. My interaction with the social actors in the local councils also allowed for an opportunity to co-create knowledge and make sense of the deliberative proceedings with the participants.

Black et al. (2009) posited that the challenge for scholars when measuring deliberation is translating normative concepts including analytic rigor, equality, respect, and consideration, into variables that can be measured. The authors, however, noted that

96 in the absence of a universally agreed definition of small group public deliberation it is hard to come up with a consistent set of empirical measures for public deliberation. Black et al. (2009) present a working definition. They define small group deliberation as “a combination of careful problem analysis and an egalitarian process in which participants have adequate speaking opportunities and engage in attentive listening or dialogue that bridges divergent ways of speaking and knowing” (p. 398). Based on the working definition, two approaches to measuring group deliberation emerge: (1) direct measures directly measuring aspects of a theoretical definition of deliberation, and (2) indirect measures examining variables that can be seen as indicators of deliberative processes.

In a study of group processes, Witteborn and Sprain (2009) utilized an

Ethnography of Communication and Cultural Discourse Analysis approach to examine social interactions among deliberating participants. The approach shed light on how social actors establish social places and enact social and group identities. The two authors found out that by aligning themselves to various social identities, and by deliberating from such identity corners, the participants engage in “membering” (Philipsen, 1992). My study employs the Cultural Discourse Analysis within the Language and Social

Interaction (LSI) approaches (Witteborn & Sprain, 1992) to analyze proceedings of council deliberations in Malawi.

This study employed a case study approach to conduct a direct measurement of deliberation in selected district councils. Using a combination of methods for data collection, the case study examined the following normative concepts: analytic rigor; respect and consideration of diverse points of view (and others’ way of knowing);

97 opportunities for participants to speak and; recognition and appreciation for diverse approaches to speaking.

The choice of an approach where researcher and participants co-construct knowledge was a deliberate one on my part based on review of documented limits to other approaches, such as a positivist approach (O’Keefe, 1975). Positivists assert that, for truth or knowledge to be authentic, it must derive from sense experience and positive

(scientific) verification. In the late nineteenth century, however, there was increased criticism leveled at positivism due to the limited nature of the approach’s ability to articulate phenomena that could not be counted or measured statistically. As a way of ensuring that the intricacies of lived human experience are captured, researchers looked to interpretive or hermeneutic approaches to social inquiry (Cheney, 2000; Giddens,

1976, 1993; Patton, 1990). Geertz’s (1983) proposal for a new, interpretive social science approach provided one of the strongest cases for rethinking the natural sciences approach when studying social phenomena. Geertz observed that the interpretivist and hermeneutic approaches to study a phenomenon commit to understanding the meaning of a text

(discourse or phenomenon) by empathically imagining the experience of its author and by employing circular movement alternating between textual features and context to come up with holistic knowledge (also see: Lindlof & Taylor, 2002).

Guba and Lincoln (1985) identified two factors that distinguish different forms of scientific inquiry: 1) the extent to which phenomena under study can be manipulated by the researcher before the study, and 2) the constraints placed on output measures, or the extent to which predetermined categories or variables are used to describe the phenomena under study. Guba and Lincoln described “naturalistic inquiry” as a “discovery-oriented”

98 approach that reduces investigator manipulation of the study and its setting and where there are no prior limitations on what will be studied and what might be the outcomes of the study. The main difference between naturalistic inquiry and experimental research is that the investigator, in the latter, attempts to regulate the conditions of the study through manipulation or holding constant peripheral influences with a very limited set of outcome variables measured.

Since agencies and organizations use varied approaches to achieve deliberative citizen engagement, the need to critically evaluate approaches to deliberative processes has become even more urgent. As a way of better understanding the strengths, weaknesses, and varied effects of deliberative endeavors, systematic evaluation of the design, discourse, process, and outcomes of such projects is urgent. Under scrutiny in this study were questions, claims, narratives and reflexive talk portraying values, and the nature of turn taking, interruptions, and any references to others and their ideas during deliberations as a measure of the quality of deliberation in selected district councils in

Malawi. These elements of deliberation could be a measure of an egalitarian atmosphere, comprehension, consideration, and respect in deliberative processes (Black et al., 2009).

Setting the Scene

This study focused on familiar yet unexplored questions concerning the role, nature, and meaning attached to democratic participation in Malawi. In essence, the study investigated a highly contextualized phenomenon of social situatedness and identity construction (Burke, 1969) in Malawi’s political organizing. The study has to be understood against a diverse ethnic and political community that characterizes the nature of politics in Malawi. Overall, elements of apathy, fatalism, and lack of national

99 conscientization (Freire, 1997) are assumed to underpin the ethnic selves in meaning making in Malawi’s politics. From my personal knowledge of the Malawian society, it can be argued that the parameters of both meaning making and action are laced with prejudices, a history of social injustices, and a lack of collective consciousness due to political polarization and ethnic solidarity. Malawi’s colonial history and thirty years of dictatorial rule after independence from Britain have created distrust and a tendency towards violence among political players. In this study I posit that Malawi’s politics lacks humanness (uMunthu) in its approach and that has resulted in various negative consequences. Such consequences include political expediency at the expense of the common good and genuine socio-economic progress. This is the context within which political actors meet at the District Council to deliberate local government development projects.

Interview Participant Selection

To give the study a comparative sense, I conducted observations and in-depth interviews in three locations in Malawi: The first area was my home village populated mainly by Ngoni (majority Christians) people. The area is in the central part of the country. The Ngoni can be regarded as the custodians of the uMunthu (ubuntu) concept.

Not surprisingly, though, I found the concept to be widely practiced in the other two locations where I conducted interviews.

The second location was a district in the southern part of the country mainly populated by the Yao (majority Moslem). Between June 2000 and August 2004, I lived and worked in the area. As obwera (stranger), it was not easy to work in the area.

Suspicion and politics always clouded developmental efforts in the district during my

100 time. It is some of these people and a person who was once the District Commissioner of the place that I decided to approach for some of my in-depth participant interviews. I also engaged in participant-observation of one District Council meeting in two other areas in

August of 2011.

Based on my past experience working in one of the areas, respondent selection focused exclusively on traditional and religious leaders, NGO workers and, teachers.

These people are regarded as social actors integrated in a larger socio-political project of

“democratic transformation” and the formation of citizen consciousness. These are the custodians of culture entrusted with the task of passing it on to generations that sit at their feet to learn.

I conducted open-ended and semi-structured interviews with 15 individuals from the grassroots (traditional and religious leaders, primary and secondary school teachers, and business owners) and 15 officials representing the local government (District

Commissioners-DCs, former DCs, and Council secretariat members). The respondents were selected not only in terms of their position within institutions, organizations, or broader social contexts, but also for the “democratic pedagogy” that these respondents represented. These respondents were my “key informants” and contributed significantly to my study with insights, personal narratives, historical background, and access to policy documents that provided the necessary context. Even more prominently, because of the position of some of the respondents in various social and professional spheres, (rural, education, government, NGO, Islamic Schools), their viewpoints were as good as a stratified sample across various social classes, providing diverse and illuminating views. I included District Commissioners to provide current thinking and practice of development

101 initiatives in local councils. The government officials provided “raw data” of the discursive positions reproducing democratic pedagogy in Malawi.

Taking advantage of relationships built over the years as I worked in the Malawi media, I had access to social actors who can be regarded as hard to access, such as

Islamic educators, government officials, NGO representatives, chiefs, journalists, and headmasters of primary and secondary schools. These actors presented a wide range of local contextual knowledge that was vital for my research. These respondents were purposively selected, providing not a representative sample, but specific views held by a particular segment of the population.

Interview questions were informed by the prevailing state of affairs in the country

(political and ethnic intolerance, economic downturn, general decline in the provision of basic services, high rate of unemployment, lack of respect for basic human freedom).22 I tailored all questions for the specific institutional context or population group with the aim of soliciting respondents’ definitions of terms and meanings for actions while carefully observing signs of gaps or links between and among concepts. Respondents provided insights into abstract terms of reference (e.g., democratic participation, patriotism, freedom, human rights, development) and articulated these in relation to current events and their experience.

Field Entry

Although most areas of the southern region of the country are dominated by people who speak languages that I do not understand well, there are large pockets of people who still converse and transact day to day business in Chichewa which is my

22 The study was conducted during late President Mutharika’s administration which was characterized by gross mismanagement of public resources and a highly charged political atmosphere.

102 mother tongue and is a common language in the country. By virtue of living in one of the areas in the south for some time, I had acquired some knowledge of the language and that facilitated the interview process. Knowledge of Chichewa and Yao played a big role in my entry and acceptance in the field. There was no doubt that, right from the start of the field work, knowledge of the local languages and culture was sine qua non for acceptance and effective interaction with the participants. My knowledge of the two local languages became a vital element in the interpretive and “thick description” of the phenomenon observed and the ‘webs of meaning’ that are part of the cultural nuances not open to

“total strangers.”

Research Questions

Once again, the research questions for this study are:

RQ1: What grassroots participatory practices influence democracy in Malawi?

RQ2: What meanings do citizens attach to civic participation and social change

initiatives in Malawi?

RQ3: What characteristics of institutions and their policies do public officers perceive as

having an effect on the democratic culture in Malawi?

To ensure that the questions were clear and made sense to my respondents, I conducted three trial interviews in Blantyre district (which acted as my base). These pilot interviews gave me an idea as to how to further develop questions or the kind of thought line to pursue with specific questions (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002).

Data Collection

The study employed four main methods of data collection carefully chosen to extract varied data and input: oral histories (narratives); in-depth open and semi-

103 structured interviews; district council meeting observation; and document analysis. These data sources provided an understanding of the system, framing, and epistemic effect of

Malawi’s democratic participation as reflected in various participatory processes.

Interviews and narratives. The goal of the interview for this study was not to seek representative views on the subject matter at hand but, rather, to listen to stories and understand individuals’ experiences and insights into their own lives and their interactions with others (Merriam, 2002). In qualitative research, interviews are used to enable the researcher to explore more deeply the phenomenon under investigation.

Valentine (2005) described the interview as “a conversation with a purpose” (p. 111).

The purpose of this technique is to understand why people do what they do amidst the chaos of social interaction. The interview prompts informants to talk about their lives, their aspirations, and their fears.

In most of the interviews, I began with an initial question and let the rest of the

“conversation” develop freely from unfolding information and through probing questions.

Interviews remain the best way for probing and clarifying issues under discussion (Baxter

& Jack, 2008; Merriam, 2002). Britten (1995) observed that interviewers must ensure that they understand the meanings coming out of conversations with respondents and avoid clouding meaning with their own assumptions and prejudices. I must admit that keeping this clear distinction between researcher and a fellow citizen was not an easy feat for me.

Interviews, therefore, have remained one of the most effective ways of initiating special field conversation with informants as I came to discover during my study. Various informants, ranging from local villagers to government administrators, were able to share

104 their experiences with me to shed more light on what public participation in national social change in Malawi was all about.

My encounter with the informants was not without a wrestle with self- consciousness and positionality as a researcher as already mentioned. Most of the challenges recounted by the informants were déjà vu for me from my personal experience working as a journalist in Malawi. I, therefore, took deliberate effort to watch my role as an insider-cum-observer. Although in most instances I was just a young man coming back to his roots, I often sought the necessary empathic distance to understand the issues as an outsider would (Gorden, 1992; Merriam, 2002).

Life narratives have become another popular form of qualitative research.

Merriam (2002) defined “narratives” as “first-person accounts of experiences that are in story format having a beginning, middle, and end” (p. 286). Most scholars agree that, although the technique is grounded in many disciplines and theoretical perspectives, all forms of narratives enable the sharing of experience and meaning (Chase, 1995; Merriam,

2002; Smith, 1981). My interest in utilizing this approach was to examine how people make sense of their day to day live occurrences.

Of all the data collection methods employed in this study, I must confess that I enjoyed the personal narrative method most. Growing up as a young boy I learned of uMunthu and the Ngoni way of life from listening to stories from my mother, Anachanza.

My conversation with one of the matriarchs of our family, Namilanzi, for the purpose of acquiring data for this study yielded quite unexpected results. Namilanzi confided to me that knowledge of the Ngoni sacred historical events has been preserved for the Maseko23

23 An offshoot grouping of the Ngoni that settled in Ntcheu, central region of Malawi.

105 descendants through songs, poems, drumming, works of art including paintings and artifacts. She added that Ngoni cultural values continue to be functional as an organizing principle for the people even in present day Ntcheu. The values, she observed, encompassed the people’s collective identity and instruction for living through observance of traditional customs, rituals, by-laws, and, reverence for “Chisumphi or

Mulungu.”24

In Namilanzi, I found the embodiment of what Holstein and Gubrium (2000) called the “contemporary self in practice.” The two authors contended that narrative analysts not only view storytellers as divulging unmediated experience but also as products of socio-cultural conditions that shape the social actors. It was evident in

Namilanzi’s story telling that she was not only carefully picking events in her life that were experientially available but that she was also actively drawing on what was culturally available in a self-conscious construction. Researchers, such as myself, are able to participate in the ancient Ngoni cultural values through stories: a communicative meaning-making device (Merriam, 2002).

Merriam (2002) observed, however, that although there has been increased popularity in the use of narrative as a means of tapping human experience over the years, there has been concern as to the position of the researcher in the process, and the authenticity of narratives as a genre in terms of validity and reliability. The question of representation comes to mind here. Scholars, such as Mishler (1999), contend that stories are not found; they are made. To read Mishler’s mind: the role of the researcher is not to recount an informant’s narrative, but rather, the researcher’s task is to critically analyze

24 Namilanzi insisted that even before the western missionaries arrived with the Gospel, the Ngoni had a concept of “The Great One” who provided rain and healed the land from epidemics and disasters.

106 information through theoretical sensitivity. Merriam (2002) added that researchers are storytellers, too. Through their research design and data analysis, they co-construct knowledge from the stories and their meanings. It is through the processes of interviewing and analysis that the story is co-authored between researcher and informant.

My encounter with Namilanzi, as explained in detail in subsequent sections, provided insight on meanings that she, as a citizen, and an individual attached to uMunthu and civic participation in Malawi.25

Observation. The goal of analyzing observation is to take the reader into the setting that was observed. Patton (2002) stipulated that the description must be accurate and capture relevant details. Researchers record what they see by describing the context, the activities taking place, and the conduct of people being observed. Meaning is derived from what was observed against a background of those observed (Patton, 2002).

Patton categorized observations as naturalistic because they take place in natural settings such as clubs, homes and other community gatherings. Observers have an advantage of direct and first-hand access that is personal in the study of a phenomenon.

Because the researcher becomes part of the activity under observation, the observations have been termed participant-observation, direct observation or qualitative observation.

Participant research has been defined as research that involves social interaction between the researcher and informants while data are collected. These direct observations are also known as in vivo or ethnographic studies (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002; Taylor & Bogdan,

1984).

25 Citizen meaning in civic participation is Research Question 2 in this study.

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To understand how members of the community interact with district officials in deciding development projects in their areas, I conducted three in vivo observations at three different district councils in the southern part of Malawi. District Councils, as they are now called, have two main types of development meetings: District Executive

Committee (DEC) meetings that take place every month, and District Consultative

Meetings that occur quarterly. The District Consultative Meeting is a policy-making body that attracts membership from traditional chiefs (especially Traditional Authorities),26

District Council officials, Members of Parliament (MP), representatives of non- governmental organizations and other interest groups. For the purpose of my study, I observed one DEC meeting and two Consultative meetings. Although these meetings were observed in three different Councils, I treated the proceedings of the meetings as a case study shedding light on one phenomenon. Under investigation in the case study were the mood, discourse, conditions, and facilitation style of the sessions.

Following Babbie’s (2004) definition of a case study as an in-depth examination of a single instance of a social phenomenon, I was able to appreciate the culture of deliberative processes within the selected District Councils. The foci in the investigation were the shared learning effects of the processes of deliberation as observed and the meanings of the events as communicated by participants. The main purpose was to produce a thick description of the idiographic understanding of the particular case under investigation. The District Councils observed were selected based on convenience of both access and entry and not as a representative sample. Observation of the meetings shed light on the nature of participatory practices and how those practices influence

26 Traditional Authorities are paramount chiefs in charge of several village heads in a district

108 democracy in Malawi. Interviews and discussions with the participants who form membership of the meetings provided information on the kind of meanings citizens attach to civic participation and social change initiatives in Malawi. The nature and process of the meetings revealed the dynamics and politics of lay versus expert knowledge when it comes to project implementation and problem-solving. This clash of knowledge has a bearing on the overall quality of democratic culture and the kinds of meanings people attach to such processes as discussed in subsequent chapters.

Document analysis. As a way of placing the findings of the study in a proper socio-historical context, I also accessed information from archival documents on the history of Native Associations,27 District Council session transcripts, and official communication in relation to the deliberative sessions and general local democratic participation. These documents, which included personal letters written by Malawi’s first

President, Hastings Kamuzu Banda on native organizing ahead of self-rule, shed light on the kind of characteristics/policies that shaped present day deliberative institutions.

Findings from the document analysis formed part of the response to Research Question

Three: What characteristics of institutions and their policies do public officers perceive as having an effect on the democratic culture in Malawi? Policy documents analyzed in the study also provided a comprehensive history of public deliberation in Malawi. A study of minutes of previous Council meetings focused on the communication taking place during discussion sessions. I examined speaking turns, thought units, stories, responses, and arguments advanced in the discussion to understand the mood within which the meetings took place (Black et al., 2009; Ryfe, 2006).

27 Native Associations and later Native Authorities were a precursor of the present day grassroots and local representation.

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My study frames the Malawi government as a discursive construction that can be studied through its discourse, actions, and artifacts. An organization’s communication embodies cultural meanings that can be studied to shed light on institutional make up and guiding philosophy (Fairhust & Putnam, 2004). Among the items that I included in the investigation were policy documents on public projects implemented by government and cooperating non-governmental organizations. By examining public policy documents and the language in the documents, such things as ideas, values, and interests that dominate the public sphere are exposed. Iannantuono and Eyles (1997) stated that, when formulated in a consensus document, such as a policy document, the dominant ideas themselves create another text open to interpretation. Through studying this new meaning and interpretation, we come to understand how people or organizations construct and deconstruct reality.

Field notes. After each deliberation observation, and participant interview, field notes were taken to record and clarify what was observed in the various interactions. The field notes helped not only in the retention of memory of what transpired during the day but also acted as my initial reaction to the data. Field notes also helped in the formulation of initial emerging themes and general ideas in the discussions and interviews.

Research Procedures

I conducted interviews in locations where the informants felt most comfortable.

Informants were asked to choose spaces where privacy and safety could be maintained. I met most of my informants at their homes where they could control the environment. The biggest concern for most of the informants was the recorder I had in my hand. All but one, were relaxed and agreed to proceed when I assured them that the recording was to be

110 used for the sole purpose of capturing ideas verbatim and not for the purpose of broadcasting or any form of public consumption.28 All but two interviews were conducted face-to-face, and I talked to each respondent one at a time. Interview sessions took a minimum of thirty minutes but other interviews took longer than that.

The sessions started with a brief explanation of the purpose and aim of the study.

Some of my informants could not read or write so I had to read and explain the consent form stipulations. Then procedures and details were explained. Informants were allowed some time before and after the interview/discussion to ask any question or provide comments on the subject matter. The interviews were recorded using a digital micro- voice recorder. For analysis, audio data were downloaded onto the computer directly by plugging the digital recorder into the PC. Translations and transcriptions of recordings in

Word then followed. Throughout the study, I took field notes as necessary and the notes were used to make more sense of the recordings and observations. To avoid distractions and scaring off my informants, I took most of field notes immediately after the interview or discussion.

Other sources of data for the study included a review of archival documents on the history of Malawi as a country. A number of personal letters by Malawi’s first head of state Hastings Kamuzu Banda, and minutes of meetings by Malawi’s early form of grassroots organizing—native associations, provided much needed historical and contextual background to the present form of citizen participation. These documents were accessed at the National Archives of Malawi. A couple of months before I headed back to

Malawi to collect data for the study, I initiated contact with the administration at the

28 One informant did not allow his voice to be recorded so I took detailed notes instead.

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Archives for permission to access records. After a number of correspondences, I was given the permission. Most of the documents obtained from the Archives, including the president’s letters, were read as background information without any rigorous analysis.

A rhetorical appraisal of Malawi’s communications policy provided a backdrop to understanding government’s values regarding freedom of information. The issue of (lack of) information access and dissemination came up several times in people’s comments as contributing to the indifference adopted by people towards citizen participation. Most people at the grassroots do not participate in development projects not because they are illiterate, but rather due to lack of information on what is going on in their area and how they can effectively contribute to development processes.

Data Analysis

The study employed qualitative, case study methodology. The main aim of the research methodology was to attain a rich, thick description of the deliberative case in

Malawi, with data obtained from various sources and in a variety of ways. Qualitative methodology is considered to be the most appropriate methodology for this study, because it provides the ability for a descriptive nature of the research problems and presents the best picture of the deliberative environment studied.

Qualitative researchers have adopted various approaches to analyzing data (see:

Bryman & Burgess, 1994; Coffey & Atkinson, 1996; Dey, 1993; Lindlof & Taylor, 2002;

Mason 1996; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 1993; Strauss, 1987). Mason (1996), proposed three approaches: literal; interpretive; and reflexive. Literal approach to qualitative analysis focuses on such elements as particular use of language or grammatical structures in text. Bakhtin (1981) posited that language embodies a distinct

112 view of the world. Through language we can examine sense making, social relations and intentions. Interpretive approach deals with making sense of social actors’ accounts of their experience, and meaning concerning phenomenon under study. Finally, the reflexive approach to analysis is concerned with paying attention to the researcher and his or her contribution to the creation of the data and the analysis process. In this study, I employed a combination of all three approaches at various levels of data analysis as I sought to understand citizen participation and knowledge making in Malawi’s selected District

Councils.

The approach to data analysis employed in the study was in line with the interpretivist research paradigm as the epistemological framework of the study. In addition to the anecdotal narratives obtained from personal interviews, the study also analyzed discourse/conversation as recorded during deliberative sessions in the selected councils. The narratives produced from council deliberations were analyzed using the

Cultural Discourse Analysis (CDA) approach. The CDA approach examined how participants in the deliberative meetings interacted in the processes as they displayed trust or mistrust of one another (Drew, 1994; Schegloff, Koshik, Jacoby & Olhsher, 2002;

Witteborn & Sprain, 1992). The CDA approach provides an opportunity for linking group communication and language, and social interaction in understanding deliberative meetings which act as sites for connection, civic participation, and social change (Drew,

1994). The CDA approach in this study is used to demonstrate discourse of mistrust and

(perceived) divisions and “membering” during deliberations.

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The need for a holistic approach to narrative analysis and a strategy that could be termed “reflective-interpretive” fits well with hermeneutic approaches to analysis of research findings.

Study Limitations

Perhaps the most significant limitation to this study was my age. In Malawian culture, younger people are expected to show respect and reverence to their elders and are not expected to ask questions that could be embarrassing or too probing. My interviews and questioning could have been considered disrespectful or too probing, which might have led some participants to act differently from how they would normally behave in my absence. Most of my informants were older than I was and sometimes the dynamics did not play out positively.

Another challenge in the study was the fact that I conducted most of my interviews in Chichewa (one of Malawi’s vernacular languages). I obtained some good insights and expressions that could not be effectively translated into English. Some expressions and idioms will remain lost in translation.

In view of these limitations, I use the term “believability of the narratives and conclusions” rather than “validity and reliability,” terms that are not believed to be appropriate for qualitative research studies.

Summary

It can only be hoped that findings of this study will help inform and prepare both designers and participants of deliberative meetings in Malawi to produce better and effective meetings as part of citizen participation. Some of the desirable post deliberation changes expected are: reinforced deliberative habits; increased sense of democratic

114 citizenship; increased analytic and communicative skills vital for productive political reasoning and; increased feelings of political efficacy (Black et al. (2009).

Although it would be a little too much to expect that a society’s morality and practice would match perfectly, we still can envisage some best practices from the district councils in Malawi that express the people’s desire to be truly human (Musopole, 1994;

Nkondo, 2007). An uMunthu framework for social and political practice would promote responsibility, accountability for both individuals and institutions in promoting deliberation for its own sake as a way of amicably dealing with differences. The Malawi deliberation project has also demonstrated that there are certain best practices that could be shared with the rest of the world in adding strength to the shared-learning aspect of deliberative democracy. Interviews, personal stories and observations of the social actors in action yielded interesting dynamics that have proved to me that Malawi’s divisions are artificially created by partisan affiliation while a deep yearning for nationalism and national unity exists in the people’s conscience.

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CHAPTER 5: GRASSROOTS PARTICIPATION, MEANING MAKING, AND

SOCIAL CHANGE IN MALAWI

Introduction

The purpose of this research was to conduct a comprehensive evaluation and documentation of the politics of democratic participation in Malawi. A number of ways, including deliberation, have been used in the country to encourage the citizenry to participate in affairs that affect their day-to-day life. A wide range of players, both governmental and non-governmental, are engaged in various citizen initiatives in

Malawi’s development efforts. In view of this diversity in both organizing agencies and approaches being employed, there is greater urgency than ever to conduct a comprehensive evaluation and documentation of the politics of citizen participation processes in the country. This study sought to go beyond understanding the strengths, weaknesses, and varied impacts of participatory processes. The research examined more systematically the design, process, politics and outcome of such endeavors to understand the epistemic value of democratic processes in the country.

This chapter presents key findings obtained from a critical and appreciative phenomenological study of selected sections of the Malawi society. Data for the study was collected in four main ways: (a) in-depth interviews with 30 Malawians ranging from local villagers (grassroots) to District Commissioners (public officials); (b) life story narratives; (c) participant observation of three deliberation sessions (District Council meetings), and (d) document analysis of government policies on development, personal communication of selected public figures, and archival material that provided a historical context to the general discussion at hand.

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To this effect, the following key research questions guided this investigation: (a)

What grassroots participatory practices influence democratic processes in Malawi? (b)

What meanings do citizens attach to civic participation and social change initiatives in

Malawi? (c) What characteristics of institutions and their policies do public officers perceive as having an effect on the democratic culture in Malawi?

Participatory Practices in Malawi

This section is part of the answer to the first research question: What grassroots participatory practices influence democratic processes in Malawi? I observed deliberative sessions at three district councils in Malawi and conducted interviews to understand how people at the grassroots participate in issues that affect their daily livelihood. As mentioned earlier, the selected councils are not representative of the local government system in Malawi, but they provided an opportunity for me to access and understand them for the purposes of this study.

Although deliberation has assumed a pivotal role in citizen participation worldwide, there is still a substantial lacuna in general literature on how deliberation works, especially in non-western cultural contexts when it comes to power differentials and other factors. Most commentators have analyzed and documented the positive effects of deliberation in democratic processes (mostly in western settings). However, deliberation in certain contexts can create conflict or tension when issues of class, power, and knowledge construction are involved (Mansbridge, 1983, 1990, 1996).

My analysis of deliberation as a participatory process goes beyond looking at the process and procedures followed during such sessions. In this study, I examined the epistemic elements of deliberation and their consequences. In the summer of 2011, I

117 conducted 30 in-depth, open and semi-structured, face-to-face interviews with District

Commissioners and participants who attend District Council meetings in Malawi. The officials were selected for participation based on their previous experience in organizing deliberative sessions. The officials conduct deliberation meetings both as individuals and as government officials. I knew some District Commissioners from the time I worked as a media professional in the country. More names of participants were provided through word-of-mouth referrals. I sent out letters and emails to initiate contact and to introduce the research. The letters and emails also provided assurance concerning confidentiality.

Upon my arrival in Malawi, I followed up the mailed and emailed messages with phone calls to confirm appointments and to provide more information as to the purpose of the research. Of the 20 proposed District Commissioners, only 13 were available and willing to engage in an interview. Two other officials interviewed were not at the rank of DC but senior members of the secretariat at the council. The interviews were projected to last 30 minutes. A couple of interviews lasted longer than 50 minutes, depending on the individual’s enthusiasm and emergent issues.

Most of the informants agreed to be taped, so some of the interviews were recorded using a digital recorder. The recordings were helpful in recreating expressions, sentiments, and quotes, all vital elements in transcription and initial processing of the data. The informants were asked to sign consent forms after being assured of the confidentiality and security of the recordings. Most of them wanted to know how the information would be used and whether it would be shared. I assured the participants that the information was to be used solely for my research purposes and that the recordings would be destroyed after data analysis and completion of the research study.

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Eleven open-ended and semi-structured questions for participants, and six set of questions for public officials comprised the interview protocol for the study. As a new concept in Malawi’s democratic process, the first question in the protocol asked the officials to define “public deliberation.” They were also asked how many of this type of meetings they had attended/conducted and in what capacity. The second question asked what made a public deliberative meeting successful. Other questions to the officials asked about the kind of challenges they met in designing and conducting such meetings and how they thought the meetings could be improved. Lastly, the officials were asked about the extent to which they were satisfied with deliberation as a mechanism for involving people at the grassroots in social development decision-making processes.

Officials’ reflections on deliberation. The 13 District Commissioners and two senior council secretariat officials who were interviewed represented a wide range of experience with deliberative meetings. Two of the Commissioners said they had been working for the Local Government for over 30 years and had attended well over 50 deliberative meetings. The two also observed that they had been chief executives of more than three districts in their careers. The other Commissioners were relatively new to their positions, having worked as Commissioners for less than ten years. All of the interviewed officials were professed career civil servants who (claimed) did not have any political leanings to any political entity in Malawi. All of the District Commissioners interviewed had a Bachelor’s degree as their minimum academic qualification. Two of the officials were female.

As District Commissioners, they were responsible for convening and presiding over the deliberative meetings at the district level which come in two forms: (1) the

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District Executive Committee (DEC), and (2) the District Consultative Meeting (DCM).

The DEC is a technical arm of the District Council charged with the task of advising the chief executive, designing, implementing and monitoring all development projects in the district. According to the officials, this is not a policy making body. The DEC only implements resolutions passed in the second kind of deliberative meeting—the District

Consultative Meeting. The Consultative Meeting is more encompassing with representation ranging from traditional chiefs to members of parliament to non- governmental officials representing interest groups in various areas.

The officials had varied renderings of what they considered a deliberative meeting. Some of the officials provided examples as a way of explaining their points and their illustrations of deliberative meetings. The officials’ examples included Council meetings, government ministries’ consultative meetings (which include annual pre- budget consultations by the Ministry of Finance), issue meetings by non-governmental organizations, and village hearings (usually used for dispute settlement on land, animal issues, and petty crimes). One official confided that he did not consider District Council meetings as public deliberative meetings because the meetings are technically not open to the general public due to space and other logistical reasons.29This official went on to observe that he did not consider the Council meetings true deliberative meetings because the secretariat always has a set agenda that is usually implemented regardless of the outcome of the discussions. He pointed out that, on several occasions, consensuses from the consultative meetings were overruled by the local government secretariat due to conditions and stipulations of local and international development partners that support

29 This official explained that participants in the Council meetings are given a sitting allowance and that they do not come on an individual capacity but as representatives of various entities.

120 local government projects. The official further confided that when the policy making body is ignored or overruled, it was always a source of frustration and caused tension between the body and the council secretariat. This information was corroborated by a number of participants who felt that the council meetings were just a sham since government implemented projects with or without the people’s participation.

Asked about what made a deliberative meeting successful, most of the informants agreed that how a meeting was conducted (the process), was as important as the actual intended outcome. Here, the officials were quick to point out that politicization of issues often derailed discussions and created unnecessary tension during discussions.

The officials noted that the politicization of issues often affected the outcome of discussions. The narrative analysis of both the officials’ interviews and meeting proceedings supported the allegation of the politicization of development processes. A number of politically charged expressions and words were identified from the data with very high frequency. Some of the political expressions and words have been analyzed in detail later in the chapter. Important elements that were common among responses on what made a deliberative process effective included:

. Clearly defined and communicated agenda before the meeting.

. De-politicizing of issues to better serve deserving communities.

. Encouraging open dialogue and equal participation between officials and the

public.

. Less emphasis on procedure and process to allow free flow of ideas.

Three of the officials stated that the success of a meeting depended on the objective. They observed that better meetings had a purpose that was clearly

121 communicated to all involved. One official observed that deliberative meetings tend to delay processes, especially when public input is not quite necessary. “Sometimes, as

Council, we want to move fast and get a project done before the rains start…or to beat a donor deadline. Some donors require that you return unused funds after a project cycle and that puts the Council under pressure to move fast,” observed another.

Four of the officials expressed concern that when technical issues are on the agenda, factors such as language and level of “technical” comprehension become debilitating elements towards effective participation by some members: “actually, sometimes, we ask partners who come to brief the meetings to do presentations in both

English and Chichewa,”30 one observed. One official explained how a potential controversy was averted by allowing a more open and informal setting than was usually typically employed. Th e Council had an issue in one of the villages—a health service provision project that sought to extend an existing district hospital. The project involved clearing a piece of land—an old cemetery for the extension. The DC knew the project was going to be a hard move to undertake due to traditional beliefs and the reverence accorded to graveyards (even old and unused) among Malawians. Instead of having an official present the ideas to the villagers, the Council let the traditional chief for the area lead the discussion and suggest pieces of land where the hospital extension could be. The chief is said to have suggested the old cemetery, convincing the people that they would rather have a life-saving facility than hold on to a piece of land which was no longer in use. The DC told me that, instead of following strict procedural rules, the said session provided more time and room for an amicable understanding and discussion of the issue

30 Chichewa is one of Malawi’s main languages widely spoken in the country.

122 without worrying about reaching an agreement. The suggestion coming from a traditional leader had been more convincing and reassuring. The DC confided that the same suggestion coming from a government official (usually not native to the area) would have drawn fire from the locals, sinking the whole project before it even started.

Asked how satisfied they were with deliberative meetings as a democratic participatory method, seven of the fifteen officials were positive in their assessment, with the other officials observing that the process is too restrictive and unnecessarily politicized to achieve intended objectives.31Those who said they were satisfied cited reasons such as: it is an opportunity for local villagers to participate; it is an opportunity to seek a mandate from the people before a project was implemented; and the process encourages local ownership.

On how the meetings could be improved, all the officials agreed that less politics and more “people power” could immensely improve the way the Council operates and implements development projects in the country. One official suggested that another way of improving how district councils operated in the country was to allow some development partners to deal directly with the councils rather than going through the

Ministries of Local Government or Finance. He observed that, of late, district councils had the capacity to undertake large scale projects due to increased and well educated staff members, most of whom had been recently recruited by the councils. Another official suggested conducting civic education for members so that they understand the benefits of deliberative processes as a form of democratic participation. The official observed that

31 As an insider and someone who worked with some of these government officials before, I understood that although some of the officials answered in the affirmative, they had concerns about deliberative approaches which they could not divulge as public officials. The one official who expressed concern about the process did so in confidence to me because he is a very close colleague.

123 the civic education would not be for local villagers only but for politicians as well—so called elite circle as they are the ones who cause trouble when it comes to collaboration and working with those deemed as being in the opposition.

Evident from the officials’ responses is the fact that, while deliberative processes in the local councils were fulfilling their role in providing a forum for consultation on public projects, the processes would be more effective if some procedures and policies were changed to allow wider participation. Also evident from the responses was the element of intimidation by politicians especially from the governing party and their tendency to bulldoze their way into projects. By assuming a governing status, the members feel entitled to undue respect. Another significant observation from the comments was the folly of giving in to development partners at the expense of general consensus. In short, the present characteristics of the local government as an institution of democratic participation in Malawi are not quite conducive to equal participation and the growth of the democratic culture in the country. Consequently, lack of comprehensive grassroots participation has rendered council meetings less effective in dealing with development projects and championing democratic growth at district level.

Council meetings. My expectations for these council sessions derived from deliberative theory and from research on democratic processes. The suggested normative concepts by Black et al. (2009) provided the yard stick for measuring the quality of the meetings observed: analytic rigor; respect and consideration of info diverse points of view; opportunities for participants to speak and; recognition/appreciation of diverse approaches to speaking and ways of knowing. I examined the actual process, the discourse, and the politics prevailing at the meetings against the stipulated expectations

124 by Black and others. In addition to measuring the quality of the deliberative proceedings,

I further posit that the stipulated elements are also vital in deciding whether ample room is provided for shared learning. I member checked what I observed during the sessions with what the district officials had told me about the meetings and the process in general.

I then drew implications on the epistemic role of deliberation in democratic processes in the local councils.

Bachtiger and others (2009) present a number of standards used in evaluating the normative quality of political processes. The standards cover the two types of deliberative processes: Type I which examines rational discourse and Type II which focuses on measuring alternative forms of communication such as story-telling. The standards are:

1. Equality: considered a fundamental precondition for normatively appropriate

deliberation requiring that participants engage in dialog as equals.

2. Justification rationality: considered a key criterion for high deliberative quality in

type I deliberation by examining the ideal speech situation.

3. Common good orientation: drawing on Rawls to examine whether arguments are

presented with partisan interest.

4. Respect and agreement: key elements in type I deliberation recognizing the merit

in the opponents’ claims.

5. Interactivity: how participants engage with one another.

6. Constructive politics: based on the key principal of type I deliberation to arrive at

a consensus.

7. Discourse ethics: based on the Habermasian notions of sincerity and truthfulness

to ensure the absence of deception in expressing intentions.

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8. Story-telling: a significant component of alternative forms of communication.

9. Deliberative-negotiations: an incorporation of deliberation and negotiations, and

bargaining.

Utilizing the Conversation Analysis approach to studying participants’ language and interaction, I attempt, in the following section, to build links between group communication and language in relation to social interaction. Deliberative meetings are rich social sites for the creation of connections, civic engagement, and social action. CA allows for the study of deliberative meetings, group decision-making, group dynamics, and how trust and mistrust are displayed by participants (Markee, 2000; Sacks, Schegloff

& Jefferson, 1974). Trust is a critical element in ensuring that the stipulated normative concepts are adhered to in facilitating an atmosphere for shared learning.

In this section, through the CDA approach I examine how participants in deliberative meetings involved in not only decision-making but also engaged in shared learning, communicated and displayed trust or mistrust of one another and of the process itself. From a CDA perspective, I examine participants’ observable behavior and discourse to better understand how elements of trust or mistrust are enacted and how other participants respond to such displays. Diversity elements such as power differentials, social class, education, political or religious polarization, ethnicity, and whether facilitators of the deliberative meetings attempt to control the agenda become vital moment-to-moment factors that can be empirically studied to contribute to the knowledge of deliberative meetings, particularly in non-western settings.

First, I discuss the composition of district councils and the context in which deliberative meetings take place. This composition provides a social construction of not only being but of action too and what is expected of the participants. I then elucidate how

126 the participants utilize the wide range of communicative resources available to them to manage and negotiate their roles as speakers and social actors as they seek to understand one another. Finally, I conclude this chapter by suggesting how CDA findings can contribute to practical applications for cultivating trust, uMunthu, shared learning not only in deliberative processes but in general politics as well.

The various behavior traits by the social actors involve an ecology of observable actions including speech, movement, gaze, touch, and a whole range of multimodal communicative resources as they relate to one another through time and space (Atkinson

& Heritage, 1984; Boden & Zimmerman, 1991; Goodwin, 1981). Before we get to the actual analysis, we will take a look at the composition of the councils.

Table 2: Number of Councils in Malawi featuring population Local Authorities Population % Region Districts Cities Townships (Census 2008) Rural (Councils) Northern 6 1 1 1,708,930 85.9 Central 9 1 3 5,510,195 84.9 Southern 12 2 4 5,858,035 84.1 TOTAL 28 4 8 13,077,160 84.7 Largest 1,228,146 669,021 41,074 Smallest 10,445 128,432 10,751 Source: (Malawi) National Statistics Office, 2008

Constructing the district council in Malawi. District Councils in Malawi fall under the Local Government enshrined in Chapter XIV of the Republican Constitution.

Article 146 (3) of the constitution stipulates that, “parliament32 shall, where possible, provide that issues of local policy and administration be decided on at the local level

32 National Assembly

127 under the supervision of local government authorities” (p. 64). The principle piece of legislation governing the work of Councils in Malawi is the Local Government Act of

1998. The Act provides a framework for decentralized administration. This piece of legislation also provides for the Council’s composition, powers, functions, and financing.

The legislation does not distinguish between urban and rural councils and what their responsibilities should be. In practice, their functions are influenced by their urban or rural characteristics. Each council has autonomy within its designated local government area. Decision-making is done through committees at various levels. The Local

Government legislation does not specify any executive committees or cabinets nor does it specify sub-district government structures. Practically, the District Executive Committee

(DEC), led by the District Commissioner, exercises executive and technical responsibilities. The DEC is supported by a lower level entity—the District Development

Committees (DDCs), followed by the Area Development Committees (ADCs), and down to the Village Development Committees (VDCs) which are headed by traditional leaders at the grassroots and are mainly community-based.

The DEC is comprised of (public) sector heads such as the ministries of agriculture, water, health, and trade and commerce.33 The DEC is a highly professional and technical arm of the Council. The Committee meets every month and meetings are open to selected (public) representatives to discuss proposed or on-going development projects at the district level. The DEC acts as an advisory body and does not make any policies. The body fulfills most of the planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of projects at the district level.

33 These sectors are government ministries represented at district level

128

Another type of deliberative body at the district level is now called the District

Consultative Meeting.34 When Malawi had functional local government structures complete with ward councilors and city mayors, the meetings were called Full District

Assemblies. The Consultative Meeting which has a much broader membership is a policy making body with veto power.35Members of the Consultative body include traditional chiefs (at Traditional Authority level),36 Members of Parliament, District Council secretariat officials, and representatives of special interest groups. The Consultative

Meeting is convened quarterly by the District Commissioner who also acts as its chairperson.

The composition of members at both levels of deliberative meetings is an interesting dynamic and crucial to the kind of ‘poetics and politics’ at play in such sessions. In an initial analysis of the deliberative forums, I found a number of factors worth paying attention to: (a) differing levels of education among the various members of the audience; (b) political polarization,37 and (c) whether the members were indigenous to the district or were posted as professionals to work in their specific fields. These factors had varied influence on the deliberative process.

34 Information provided through interview with one of the District Commissioners. 35 Information is from an interview with a District Commissioner in the southern part of Malawi. 36 Traditional Authorities are paramount chiefs with smaller village/area heads under them 37 The main political parties in Malawi at the time were: Malawi Congress Party (MCP); United Democratic Front (UDF), and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) which was in power at the time.

129

Figure 2: Seating plan for council deliberative meetings in Malawi. The District Commissioner and members of the Secretariat sit at the head of the table with Members of Parliament, traditional leaders, and members of interest groups franking both sides of the meeting hall.

My analysis is based on three meetings in three different District Councils.38The meetings were conducted mainly in two languages: English, which is Malawi’s official language, and Chichewa, which is one of the majority languages in the country. The DEC meeting was about an hour long, and the Consultative Meeting was about two hours long, providing more than five hours of discussion content for the study. I have used an interpretive analysis and illustrative quotes to analyze the proceedings of the three meetings (Delli Carpini & Williams, 1994).

I took part in the proceedings as a participant observer/insider. As a journalist, I worked in one of the districts for over five years before leaving for the United States for graduate studies; therefore, most of the faces and processes were quite familiar. The

38 I observed one DEC meeting and two Consultative Meetings in three different districts.

130 demographic breakdown of participating members at the three District Councils is provided in Figure 2. It is clear from these figures that participants with education higher than secondary (high) school are a small percentage and might not represent majority views. About 150 members attended the three Council meetings. About 125 participants spoke or made a comment during the deliberations.

The District Commissioner (DC), who normally presides over both types of sessions, opens the sessions by telling the participants that the meetings are an invitation by the local government to the participants to express their opinions on a number of issues concerning development initiatives in the district. An agenda for each meeting is circulated at least two weeks before the meeting.39 After minutes of the previous meeting are read, and participants have been asked to endorse the minutes as being an accurate reflection of the discussions in the previous gathering, the DC reads the day’s agenda and asks if there is any other business to be included during the day’s discussion. A half minute of silence to allow members to speak up is followed by the DC’s announcement that speakers have five minutes to respond to the issues under discussion.

39 Information from an interview with a District Commissioner.

131

90 80 70 60 0-5 yrs (of education) 50 40 5-10 yrs 30 high school + 20 10 0 Council A Council B Council C

Figure 3: Demographic characteristics of participants and speakers. Percentages for participants are approximate and are based on self disclosure slips passed before sessions as part of the study

To understand the epistemic role of the deliberative forums, I examined a number of aspects, including power differentials arising from disparate levels of education, political party affiliation and polarization as demonstrated by action and discourse, and whether a participant was attending as an indigenous person from the area. First, academic and professional standing was a likely implicit subtext in all discussions. A clash between “lay” and “expert” “governing and opposition” opinions was evident throughout all discussions. A perfect example was a verbal battle between a Council official and a traditional chief over where and when to construct six teachers’ houses in an area. The village head was of the opinion that what his people needed urgently was staffing and medical provisions for a health clinic which had been constructed under

MASAF40 some five years previously and had never been fully operational although

40 Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF)—a World Bank program aimed at providing infrastructure in rural areas through active local participation.

132 people in the area continued to die from simple ailments such as diarrhea. The chief observed that, “no one ever came to ask us as to what we really needed in our area in terms of development.” District Council officials, on the other hand, were under pressure to spend funds that a development donor had provided with an implementation time limit and specifically targeting the education sector. The donor’s focus was provision of teachers’ houses and not medical supplies for a health clinic. Evident here was lack of recognition and appreciation of diverse approaches to the issue. The council in this particular case failed to collaborate with the people and respect their needs.

Language was a factor that played a role in not only shaping the direction of discussions but also creating an atmosphere of either trust or mistrust or whether adequate critical information was furnished to enable participants resolve issues during the meetings. A number of specific terms and phrases were frequently used in at least two of the three meetings. The terms created tension between people indigenous to the areas and public officials posted to head various sectors in the district.

30:03 Man: You (obwera),41 do not understand, do you?

---

30:15 Man: Ok, I wanted to show who the rightful

owners of this place are…(motioning with

hands indicating possession)42

A close look at the language used demonstrates that participants created or maintained divisions that they believed existed among them, in this case, that some of the attendees of the council meetings did not come from the district but were there to execute

41 Meaning stranger or new comer to an area as opposed to those indigenous to the area 42 The speaker on 30:15 is the same one speaking at 30:03

133 official duties and therefore did not have the area’s best interest at heart. Other connotations of ‘otherness” referred to differences in political affiliation. By employing the grammatical features ‘you’ and ‘us’ speakers indicated the distinction between the in- group and the out-group. Using the CDA approach, here we can see elements of discourse not only as informational, semantic, but we can also identify how the utterances get relational work accomplished throughout the course of the conversation. What is clear here is that the use of the pronoun ‘you’ was a powerful denotation of difference, separation, and a sense of some belonging versus the exclusion of others.

Hopper & Glenn, (1994) observed that language features should not be separated from the specific context and particular-in-moment usage. In the excerpt above, the man is also using his hands to indicate that (according to him) the gathering had two groups of people: those that belonged to his group and ‘others’ who did not. In addition to his voice, the man embodied his action to delineate the sub-groups present by motioning with his hands. In addition to the use of pronouns and gestures, other local communicative resources such as gaze, facial gestures, and speaking tones were observed being used by the participants to distinguish themselves and create new alignments when necessary.

The term “obwera” was the most often used by some quarters as an argument against ideas or proposed projects that the indigenous participants felt were not priorities and were being imposed on the local people. Every time a speaker used the term or insinuated its meaning to demonstrate opposition to an idea, it tended to elicit cheers from some sections of the audience. At least four of the speakers who used the term elaborated on what it meant— obwera were individuals who did not have the local people’s best interests at heart. One speaker observed, “I strongly believe that most of the

134 officers here are only trying to do their job without actually caring about how we feel as owners of the projects.” Other speakers used the term without elaboration while still others insinuated the meaning in their presentations. For example, one of the traditional leaders at one meeting openly declared that he, “will do everything in my power to ensure that (the local) people have the kind of development assistance that they need and not an imposed project by the government.”

Although “obwera” is not a derogatory term in itself, and while, on the surface, it is a legitimate and a universalist argument, the term is loaded with discriminatory meaning and is often used without considering relevant facts. The fact was that most of the administrative work in most public and private entities was done by “obwera” and not the locals due to a variety of socio-historical reasons.43 A total of ten speakers at all three of the meetings expressed the view that “obwera” had no business telling them the kind of development they needed. One traditional leader spoke at length (more than five minutes) using the term more than seven times challenging public officials to take more interest in the affairs of the people they claimed they served, “Obwera” should not be allowed to dictate to us the kind of development we want, that is wrong and unacceptable,” he said drawing a loud round of applause.

Another term that added tension to discussions of development projects in the

District Councils was “ otsutsa,”44 frequently used by governing party politicians, followers, and sympathizers who attended the meetings. Such an utterance, insinuating that anyone opposed to government proposed projects was sympathetic to the opposition,

43 In one of the Districts, the dominant group of people in the area had been resistant to education for some time before and after Malawi’s independence because most schools were established by Christian missionaries. Parents did not send their children to school for fear of losing them over to the new religion. 44 Translated as “those in the opposition” to the governing political party

135 drew thunderous applause from governing party supporters and sympathizers. The

“otsutsa” rhetoric, just like the “obwera” term, divided the audience into camps and cliques forcing participants to choose sides. A CDA approach helps to trace language used by interactants in deliberative meetings by exhibiting the indexicality of language

(Firth & Wagner, 1997; Jacobs, 1986; Silverstein, Blommaert, Caton, Koyama &

Tsitsipis, 2004; Stivers, 2001). Specific utterances and sequences display sequential references to something like a problem. Utterances might also invoke or refer to other interactants’ earlier utterances regarding a position or stance on alternative possible solutions to the problem. To use Sacks’ stipulations (1992), earlier utterances can be pulled back into the conversation for revisiting, and participants can resume discussion on the topic. Almost all the three council meetings offered such instances.

For example, towards the end of each meeting, the “obwera” and “otsutsa” rhetoric was condemned either by the council secretariat or some traditional leaders who did not agree with the views that all professionals sent to work in the areas were not performing in the best interest of the people. In one instance, a female traditional leader stood on a point of order to challenge the manner in which comments by a Member of

Parliament on why the secretariat had not moved as quickly as expected with some projects were handled. Her challenge framed the MP’s behavior as distrustful and not tolerant of opposing views.

Council officials who are supposed to be non-partisan and professional in their dealings with the people were left in a dilemma as to the side with which they should identify. Statements such as, “ife siife andale koma…” (we, as public officials, are not

136 supposed to be partisan but….) were issued as the officials tried to clarify positions and lead the decision-making process.

A specific example of this attempt by public officials to reach across the

‘indigenous’ sub-group was demonstrated by the District Commissioner of one council.

At the peak of a discussion on whether government should go ahead to construct teachers’ houses in the area, the DC left his designated place which was in front of the assembly hall and walked over to where the traditional leaders sat. Standing right beside them, he emphasized the need to look at the issue as one group looking for the best interest of the village in question. By crossing the imaginary boundary created by the seating arrangement in the hall and entering ‘their’ space, the DC sent across a message that was hard to reject: we are all one regardless of the differences being portrayed here.

In Figure 3, we observe how basic physical proximity and seating of the council meeting works to create a display of sub-grouping and alignment within the gathering. At the head of the table in the meeting hall would be a team of secretariat officials in business attire, usually suits and casual jackets with business folders, and expensive cellular phones. On both sides of the secretariat table would be Members of Parliament, traditional leaders, members of interest groups, and other participants usually seated on opposite sides depending on whether or not they align themselves with the governing

(national) administration.45Although alignments are negotiated and demonstrated through

45 The seating plan resembles the arrangement in the National Assembly where Members of Parliament are seated depending on whether they are in government or opposition. (Even when independent, some members still identify themselves as being either pro or against the ruling political party.) I must mention here that this type of seating was observed in one of the councils observed. The other two council meetings adopted a simple classroom arrangement with the council secretariat in the front and everyone else silently assuming their territories in the group.

137 interactions, all three council meetings demonstrated a firm maintenance of lines between and among the various groups and sub-groups.

In addition to verbal and embodied actions demonstrating trust or mistrust, other interactional practices that enacted trust or mistrust were observed in all three district council meetings. Turn-taking, analytic rigor, respect for opposing views, and time allowed for participants to express themselves were critical not only to the efficacy of the meetings but whether shared learning would be encouraged. Evident in some sessions were how some participants used an array of communicative resources to manage and negotiate their roles and rights as speakers. Participants who held government or

(governing) political party positions46seemed to use their advantage to intimidate or discredit other participants. Guttman (2007) noted that the agenda for deliberative sessions can invariably be imposed by those in positions of power subjecting the deliberative process to manipulation and subconscious bias. In terms of procedures followed in all three council meetings, expectations and underlying assumptions, were actively and interactionally demonstrated by the participants consciously and/or subconsciously. A specific example is how participants took turns to speak, and the control of the speaking floor in relation to other participants.

The DC’s use of time reminders and the verbal booing that went on especially when a member seen as in the opposition held the floor, are of interest from a CDA perspective as enactments of power and control over opposing views. A CDA critical examination reveals an attempt by powerful members of the meeting to suppress emergent views not seen as directly contributing to the decision-making process. Whether

46 The governing political party at the time of data collection was the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of late President Mutharika.

138 consciously or subconsciously, one DC constantly cut off opposition members by reminding them that their five-minute allocation was up. Rarely did this particular DC cut off one specific cabinet minister who spoke at length mostly accusing the opposition camp of derailing and delaying the development process in the district.

Another tool utilized to undermine contributions by those deemed to be in the opposition was what West and Garcia (1988) called unilateral topic changes where powerful participants either introduced new threads of discussion or made contributions without acknowledging comments of the persons who spoke before them. The DC and some members engaged in what can be considered an act of deletion of ideas by either cutting short speaking turns of some members or avoiding to acknowledge their contribution.

45:10 Woman: Could the council, please, let us know whether after

constructing the teachers’ houses, we will also have

the opportunity to receive health personnel to work

in our two clinics…What we have observed is that

government is good at introducing projects but it

fails to follow up on progress and quality of

services.

45:11 DC: I will let the MP for the area to respond to that….

45:12 MP: (Standing up rather than speaking while sitting

down as expected) The DPP government is

committed to developing all corners of this country.

Recently, His Excellency the President Professor

139

Dr. Bingu Wa Mutharika embarked on a number of

projects that will benefit rural areas of this country.

Some of the projects lined up include roads, bridges

and …

Instead of responding to the woman’s line of discussion, the Member of

Parliament in this instance went on a different tangent praising the president and outlining the various development projects he considered were more important than ensuring that there were health officers posted to the rural community health center.

Participants to the council meetings displayed trust and mistrust of one another and of the deliberative process through a number of interactional resources with varied results. In one meeting, deliberations were almost interrupted when a Member of Parliament became confrontational threatening arrests for those who were planning to sabotage government’s development agenda:

50:05 MP: We have intelligence reports that some members of

the opposition are working with civil society groups

to plan demonstrations and damage property. Be

warned that the police will be on alert to arrest any

law breakers…

50:06 Man: Point of order, Mr. Chairman…the Member of

Parliament is creating a hostile environment by

bringing issues that are not relevant to the topic

under discussion….

50:07 MP: Of course…this is relevant…how can development

140

take place when people are demonstrating, breaking

shops and looting property? You will be

arrested…we know who you are…or may be some

of you are right here in the chamber…

50:08 Man (different one): Bwana DC, this is unacceptable…we

are not here to discuss demonstration…if

government is looking for people to arrest…let it

look somewhere…

Here, a number of members both on the government and ‘opposition’ sides stood up and started to exchange strong words with one another. The council clerk, security officer and a number of secretariat members had to move in to convince the members to take their seats and stick to the topic under discussion. Participants in this meeting demonstrated acute mistrust of one another by not only verbalizing the different groupings to which they belonged but also threatening physical violence.

The identification and analysis of group members’ use of communicative resources, such as sequential deletion and control of speaking turns, contributes to our understanding of how participants interactionally construct power, trust and mistrust, elements that would affect shared learning during deliberative meetings. A CDA examination of the selected excerpts from the council meeting recordings indicate sequences of alignment, preference structure and distinction of sub-groups that usually created tension and undermined the learning aspect of the deliberation process (see

Brown & Yule, 1983; Lerner, 1991; Pomerantz, 1984; Ochs et al., 1996;).

141

In this brief CDA approach of the utterances and actions of participants to deliberative meetings in three purposefully selected councils in Malawi, I have demonstrated how grassroots participatory practices influence the democratic culture in

Malawi. Through a demonstration of hostility, distrust, and alignment to sub-groups, participatory practices reify the belief that the people are different, divided, and work towards pulling one another down. For the sake of identifying with various affiliations whether partisan, religious or place of origin, participants were seen to be willing to refuse to respect and recognize diverse points of view. These CDA findings can contribute to the applications for identifying ways to promote trust, and unity in deliberative processes to allow the appreciation of difference and learning to occur.

Recommendations for cultivating an amicable shared learning, group decision- making, and healthy deliberation practices could be informed by understanding some of the conversational and interactional structures identified. In her study of citizen participation and satisfaction, McComas (2003) observed that “citizens are more satisfied when they believe communication at meetings is inclusive, participatory, informative, and meaningful” (p. 171).

Characteristics and Policies of Councils

The third research question in this study sought to probe the characteristics and policies of democratic institutions in Malawi and how their nature affects the democratic culture of the country. Using a case study of three District Councils, I examined the conditions under which such institutions performed in their efforts to contribute to developmental governance. Data were obtained through communicated perceptions of public officials working in the selected councils. Effective democratic institutions are

142 judged by their ability to formulate coherent policies, engage in effective public administration, and limit corruption. Institutions are also judged by how they carry out consultative decision-making processes (Brinkerhoff & Crosby, 2002).

Most of the council officials interviewed acknowledged that council activities and processes in Malawi were hampered by undue influence from political circles. One of the officials remarked, “the unstated expectation is that councils, as government agencies, should always do the bidding of the political party in power.” The official further noted that the lack of separation between partisan and government business not only compromised council activities but also created divisions among civil servants and between civil servants and people at the grassroots. One District Commissioner provided an example of unnecessary tension that a Member of Parliament created in his area almost grinding a multi-million kwacha47 project to a halt. According to the DC, the said parliamentarian did not like the contractor who was offered a tender to undertake a project in the area. The legislator had dubbed the contractor an opposition sympathizer and, therefore, not worthy of a government contract. Demanding that the contract be cancelled and that a new contractor, suggested by the parliamentarian, be brought in, the project was delayed by over half a year. The DC confided that he managed to emphasize the council’s policies on contracting and convinced the parliamentarian that the contractor was duly appointed through a legitimate process. The DC mentioned that he knew a couple of councils, facing similar situations, who had failed to do what he had done and ended up compromising their tendering processes and policies regarding projects. The officials observed that the fact that politicians could influence or exert

47 Malawi’s currency

143 undue pressure on council processes indicated that there was need to tighten up some policies and how such institutions were managed.

Another policy area that all of the DCs pointed out was the need to institute strict language regulations to ensure that all participants take part and understand the proceedings. They suggested adopting local languages, specific to districts, as official languages of communication in all council undertakings to accommodate those who did not speak or understand English. An observation of council meetings in session confirmed lack or minimal participation when the subject matter was being presented in

English. Some participants were seen dozing off and indeed others struck mini conversations with their neighbors indicating that they were not paying much attention to what was going on. On partnerships between Councils and development agencies, one official suggested that non-governmental and international development agencies should consider dealing with district councils directly on development projects rather than going through the central government.48

The officials that were interviewed were unanimous on the need to revise participatory approaches adopted by the councils to ensure wide inclusion and genuine input from all stakeholders. The officials observed that although councils are mandated to make independent decisions on some developmental issues under the decentralization program, continued interference from the central government and ruling political parties affected local government operations. Of interest from the officials’ observations was the fact that the way the council deliberative meetings were designed (constant war-like

48 The District Commissioner was referring to a current situation where some international agencies such as USAID and the British DFID had withdrawn their budgetary support to the Malawi government due to some diplomatic disagreements and human rights issues. The official argued that sanctions such as those only tend to affect the poor and not those in power.

144 setting between government and the opposition), participants are forced to choose sides and toe the party line regardless of consequences to the common good.

Diversity across discourse. Examples of discourse and attitudes presented in the previous section demonstrate some significant patterns across the political and social landscape in Malawi. The collected data, however, could facilitate mapping out possible ways of reaching a common understanding between the various opposing fronts to all the deliberations: the state (sponsored by the governing political party) against the

“opposition,” local residents against public professionals (usually from other parts of the country), and grassroots people versus technocrats. A mutual understanding could be reached by identifying the various areas in which participants share or disagree upon— the points of convergence and divergence. There are areas of convergence across all three fronts and their discourses. Thus, as Malawians, all three groups share unique similarities and aspirations. For example, there are certain striking similarities among the participants regardless of the group or ideology they represent which only become clear by looking closely at the discourses.

This section, therefore, will highlight the various discourses that came out as emerging themes from the analysis. I have attempted to identify discourses that are converging and diverging points in order to present a better understanding of how, under the contemporary conditions of Malawian society, a framework for mutual understanding

(shared learning) could be developed. Only examples of convergent points are shared below. The comparison of discourses will be achieved by looking at the participants’ attitudes towards the topics that appeared in various meeting agenda: community-based

145 projects, separations of church and state, self-help projects, food security, education, and democracy. Some examples of mutual discourse include:

Meeting # 1

100: Participant 1: I urge everyone to, please, …find out things that are common

among us rather than focusing on differences. For example, we have to emphasize

the importance of education at the secondary school instead of arguing about

where the teachers come from.

110: Participant 2: Obviously, the solution is mutual understanding. Groups, who are

opposed to each other should try to understand each other. What we all want is

for the project to be implemented in our area.

113: Participant 3: The important thing is to start from somewhere. If everyone could

start showing respect and tolerance to each other this would force the government

to do the same.

114: Participant 4: We have no other choice to solve our problems, but dialog.

However, we have to be careful of the language we use in these discussions. Let

us avoid antagonistic terms.

115: Participant 5: I understand where Mr……….. is coming from. He is a

………sympathizer and I am sure if he were not defending his party he would

have agreed to my point here….

What is evident from these examples is that dialog oriented to mutual understanding and respect for other people’s views and differences emerges as the main issue upon which an agreement across discourses seems to be possible. It shows that all parties recognize benefits of dialog and mutual understanding for their areas to benefit

146 from various proposed projects. Some individual differences, obviously, appear when issues are discussed in more specific terms, however some discourses do not display a strong divergence. Other speakers, such as participant number five, acknowledged that it was the partisan affiliation that made some participants appear to be antagonistic. There are several statements that emerge as potential consensus points across discourses.

Statement (110) focuses on what is common among the various groups rather than on differences. That recognition is a strong indication of the tendency among the discourses to strive for a common understanding rather than dwelling on controversial issues.

Based on the examples provided above, we can conclude that these discourses share a more common concern than is usually appreciated in the country. From the point of the deliberative framework presented, the first section as the shared learning model of deliberation, these common concerns present the setting for a prospective dialogue among opposing groups in local government development programs. Evident here, is the fact that the participants have more in common than they actually can perceive. They are only divided because of their various partisan affiliations. An attempt to promote dialogue among Malawians would want to emphasize these commonalities so as to argue for the importance of the shared learning stage of deliberation.

Meaning Making and Citizenship in Malawian Politics

As a way of triangulating my observations an d interviews with public officials, I also conducted in-depth interviews with some grassroots people and community leaders on what sense they made of citizen participation. The interviews shed light on the kind of struggles, frustrations, and aspirations that citizens of Malawi have regarding the political

147 process in their country. The general sense from the interviewees was that partisan politics in Malawi was more alienating than uniting for most Malawians.

One of the interviews I had was with Namilanzi, a great aunt to my late father. As one of the guardians of our family’s history and knowledge, she provided some insight on how she regarded her citizen participation. Her story represented the nature of the self and its agency in Malawian culture. In her narratives, Namilanzi “restoried herself”

(Holstein & Gubrium, 2002) and provided a vivid picture of my people’s way of life and the life values that created their identity and worldview. Economic and political conditions in Malawi have created frustrations and reasons for many to lose faith in elected officials. Inter-party and intra-party fighting and hatred characterizing Malawi’s politics do not help matters. During my visit as I collected data for this study, I sensed a fatalistic spirit among the people. Namilanzi’s storying of herself and my people conjured a number of significant questions for me: Is the ‘self’ disintegrating and losing its agency in Malawi? Can the people speak, provide solutions to their problems, and govern themselves? These questions are also central every time societies look up to deliberative meetings as a channel of participation in democratic processes.

In a bid to reconnect with my roots and understand the kind of meaning people in

Malawi attach to citizen participation, I had a four-hour session with Namilanzi. The interview took place at her home which is located in my village (on my father’s side) in

Ntcheu in the central region of Malawi. Ntcheu is a rural area without most of the basic infrastructure needed for healthy and productive life. I was born in the district but did not grow up there as my parents moved to the commercial city of Blantyre a few months after

I was born. Ntcheu district, and especially my father’s village, could be considered a

148 microcosm of the status of most rural areas in the country—with no running water, no post office, long distances for children to go to school and no functional health center to cure simple ailments such diarrhea.

In order to make Namilanzi relaxed and focus on her story telling and not on my digital recorder and note taking, I arranged for several other people, including her other grandchildren and others from the household to be present and listen to her stories on condition that they would not interrupt the narration unnecessarily. I was impressed by her sharp memory and her long-forgotten art of story telling.

I began by asking Namilanzi if she participated in politics or development projects in the area. She assured me that she had voted in all the elections including the recent one, which was in 2009. She also indicated that she was a member of the village development committee (VDC), a branch of the District Council. Other development projects that she had participated in included various MASAF projects and other projects by non-government organizations such as World Vision Malawi and Care International.

Namilanzi, however, pointed out that there was a serious lack of the uMunthu spirit in all these development initiatives and how political parties involved the local people. She observed that,

What is common nowadays is the desire by government and every political party

to be seen as the best, the most powerful, the most popular and this is done at the

expense of the local person. Most of the efforts are not about us, the people, they

are about them and their popularity. That is not an uMunthu way of dealing with

people.

149

I asked Namilanzi what the term “uMunthu” meant to her. She observed,

“uMunthu uli pawiri” (meaning there are two sides to uMunthu). There is the good uMunthu which is learned and developed as one grows up in a family or society. Good uMunthu is behavior that is acceptable in community, having a feeling for others as you would want them to feel for you.” Namilanzi observed that the good uMunthu formed the basis of most ancient communities’ social justice, family and community values and the protection of the environment. She went on to observe that uMunthu called for caring and being responsible for the world around you because you do not exist apart from the world in which you live. She said, “I am Namilanzi, mother, grandmother, sister, wife and leader of the community because you all call me as such. Without you all, I am nothing.”

She further pointed out that an individual with a genuine uMunthu as a guiding spirit would not kill, hate or slander anyone because, by doing so, the individual is not only reducing others around him/her but also slighting himself/herself in the community.

Namilanzi pointed out that, in olden days, serious crimes, such as manslaughter, armed robbery, and witchcraft in society, were punished by expelling the villain from the society. She explained that expulsion was the ultimate punishment and that there was no greater or more painful punishment than to be banished from one’s own village and family. She observed that the fear of excommunication was enough to deter many would- be offenders.

Namilanzi, who is spiritual, was quick to point out that there was a dark side of uMunthu as well. Bad uMunthu, is the depraved nature of the human being after sinning against God.49Because of the original sin, humans have the predilection to act wickedly

49 In reference to Genesis Chapter 3-the fall of man

150 and selfishly. Namilanzi further observed that, “to be a good person, one must learn what is acceptable in the society in which one lives. We had stories that taught morals and acceptable manners in society.” Namilanzi went on to tell us the story of Kalulu (rabbit) and nyani (monkey):

Kalulu and nyani went on a journey to look for work after the country they lived

in was struck by severe famine. Kalulu was a wicked animal and least liked by

friends. After a two-day journey into the forest, the two friends came across a

village where the people had enough food to share. After stating the nature of

their business, the two friends were invited to join their host family for dinner.

Before the two could sit down to eat, Kalulu started to groan. “What is the matter

dear friend?” Nyani asked, concerned to see his friend holding himself by the

belly. “I have a terrible disease that affects me every time I want to eat after a

long period of being hungry. Right now my belly is in such a pain I cannot eat

without some medicine,” Kalulu said groaning even louder. “So, what kind of

medicine do you need to be able to eat, my friend?” Nyani asked with concern.

“Did you see that white and purple flower on our way here? Please, rush back and

bring me both the flower and its root so that I can eat together with the food

for me to get better.” As Nyani rushed back to the place where the two had seen a

white and purple flower, Kalulu was busy eating the food alone. When Nyani

returned, the food was finished and Kalulu was deep asleep. The following day,

Kalulu apologized to his friend, saying he had forgotten that he had some

medicine with him from the last time this had occurred.

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After another day of walking, the two friends came to another village where they

were also offered a place to sleep and some food. Before the two started eating,

Kalulu asked Nyani if he was going to eat the food without washing his hands

first, “you need to wash your hands abwenzi (friend) because, unlike you, I do not

use my hands when walking. Nyani went out to look for water to wash his hands

only to find Kalulu in a deep slumber after eating all the food again. In the

morning, Kalulu apologized to his friend, “you took too long to come back and I

was about to die from being too hungry.”

At the next village, when the two friends were offered food, Nyani made sure to

wash his hands well in advanced. When Kalulu saw that Nyani had already

washed his hands, he thought of another way to trick his friend into going away,

“Abwenzi, this time I really need the white and purple flower for my belly before

I can eat. “Oh...don’t worry abwenzi, I knew you would need your medicine

before eating again…here is the white and purple flower I plucked up on our way

here,” Nyani said producing the herb from his goatskin bag. Kalulu was ashamed

and had to apologize for his selfish behavior.

Namilanzi observed that these and many other stories were told as moral lessons to society to always be honest, faithful, kind, and dependable. She pointed out that it was through stories, proverbs and sayings that the people obtained rich African knowledge and wisdom in the absence of books or other written records. Africans, as religious people, had most of their stories based on religious teachings. Such stories were a source of religious beliefs, ideas, morals and admonitions against unwarranted behavior. In the

152 stories, children were taught about Mulungu (God), about the world around them, about growing up and becoming of age, human relationships, social justice, and responsibility.

Set within the people’s cultural and social environment, the knowledge was critical for survival and acceptance in society. Because the stories are brief and funny or silly, it was easy to remember and re-tell. Namilanzi was quick to observe that even the ability to use these stories as a pedagogical tool was a status symbol in society. She posited that the whole idea behind this knowledge was to produce well rounded individuals who were not only productive in society but responsible towards their fellow humans and the environment in which they existed: “that is the essence of uMunthu—living for others,” she observed.

Namilanzi’s insinuation here takes as back to the theme of friendship and communalism (Kaplan, 2007; Rawlins, 2009). Friendship, or lack of it, has its ethical consequences in society. As Rawlins reiterated, friendship calls for mutual concern for others and their well-being. Genuine concern and care for others is considered a moral strength and a defining ethical requirement of authentic friendship. Rawlins introduced a fundamental element in the friendship equation—giving without expecting to receive or be praised. This kind of arrangement defies “the logic of economic exchange” (p. 177).

Namilanzi echoed Rawlins’ sentiments when she observed that, “here, politicians only want us for the votes that we cast when it comes to election time s. When elections are over, you don’t see them around anymore. They spend most of their time in the city.”

Based on my own personal reminiscences and observations as a Malawian, this lack of spirit of friendship in the political process is not limited to the relationship between politicians and the local people. Intense and unnecessary animosity can be sensed in how

153 various political players deal with one another at various levels, starting from the grassroots through the National Assembly up to the Executive Branch itself. The political bickering and hatred that characterize most of administrative processes not only delays national progress but is divisive and detrimental to national unity. The consequence of this state of affairs has been both political polarization, where followers only toe the partisan line regardless of the principles under discussion, and ethnic solidarity where the homeboy syndrome rewards or punishes people depending on where they come from in the country.

Five other people50 collaborated with Namilanzi to point out that uMunthu was a moral and ethical principle that stressed collectivity and social responsibility towards fellow humans as well as nature. As a local concept uMunthu provided an African worldview and guide for life practice. In a book, Readings in African Traditional

Religion edited by Uka (1991), the interconnectedness of the African worldview was referred to as being ancestor-centered because of the intergenerational nature of the knowledge transmission. Uka observed that the concept was a heritage for the African people—a changing heritage that adapted to the changing world in which it existed.

African ancestors produced knowledge and imparted skills that helped in the survival and continued existence of the human race. Undeveloped as their knowledge might be considered, they sought to make sense of the regularities and irregularities of the world in which they lived. African ancestors recognized that there were many unseen forces at work in the various elements that formed the order of the universe resulting in new

50 Personal interviews in my village and in the commercial city of Blantyre

154 composition of relationships forming the essence of life and diversity in the world

(Goduka, 1999).

UMunthu, which is a southern African concept, has its equivalences in other languages and cultures in Africa. UMunthu is known by different terms and vocabulary in reference to the relations among the dead, the living, the yet-unborn, and the supernatural forming part of the African worldview. Uka (1991) observed that, in Ghana, various discourses on ancestor-centrism are evident in indigenous terms such as Saakumnu in

Dagaari, Nyaaba Itigo for the Gruni, and Amaamere for the Akans.51

In the African ancestor-centrism worldview, the ancestors, in liaison with

Mulungu, form the apex of the ontological order. All knowing emanates from the fore parents, and knowledge is recreated by the living depending on their present needs and circumstances. This knowledge is passed on to future generations who make necessary changes to adapt to present needs. Several spiritual institutions are charged with the duty of safeguarding the interests of the people and mediating between the ancestors, the living, and Mulungu. Before Christian missionaries arrived in Africa in the early 1800s, the African people already had a concept of a supernatural being in charge of the cosmos.

Everyone was ultimately answerable to that being (Makumba, 2007; Uka, 1991).

Traditional institutions and ceremonies that have sustained traditional belief in some parts of Malawi included: Gule wamkulu,52 traditional worship to Mulungu, and food offerings to the ancestors.

51 Ethnic groups in Ghana 52 A form of traditional dance that represents spirits/ancestors. Dancers are covered in masks and disguise and they are not supposed to be known as to who they are in their representation of the spirits.

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The strength of the African worldview lies in the interconnectedness of the various worlds and knowledges that make up an African human being’s ontology—the world of the living, the world of the dead, the world of the spirits/ancestors, the world of

Mulungu, and the world of the un-born. Individuals are constantly mindful that they do not exist for and by themselves. They exist for other others and for their environment.

Individuals are reminded that they are not only answerable to themselves as individuals but to their fellow humans as well as to the whole creation. I found this to be a significant lesson and perspective if adopted into politics or public policy administration.

Namilanzi’s narratives put this ontological connection into proper perspective. As a member of the community, she knew what she knew because indigenous skills, knowledge, technologies, and values that had ecological consequences had been imparted to her from parents and neighbors making her a Munthu (human). She described the concept of uMunthu as rich intergenerational knowledge that informed cultural patterns and traditions such as how to relate to others, food preparation, medicinal practices, arts, crafts, and rituals that removed one from one’s mother’s household into the society. The shared knowledge was not for commercial purposes but was utilized communally for the common good. She observed that an individual who lacked such characteristics and values as expected of him/her in the community was considered “opanda uMunthu”

(inhuman).

Namilanzi went on to point out that the kind of politics that Malawi was practicing lacked uMunthu as its players were bent on exploiting others for their (the players’) own personal or partisan benefit. “There is so much hatred and bickering we cannot do anything constructive anymore; there is no accountability and some people are

156 not respectful of the law anymore,” she observed. Namilanzi also pointed out that, in her days, everyone, regardless of class or gender, was a welcome member of society. She acknowledged that, like in every society, they had their social injustices and petty crimes against one another, but no one was “mdani” (enemy) unless they came from an external, antagonistic tribe. “Today, we have enemies within the same camp and within the same country. Actually, the term ‘otsutsa’ (opposition) is synonymous with enmity when it comes to politics and that kind of language has divided our efforts to work together even here in the village,” Namilanzi observed.53

Namilanzi further observed that, as a citizen of her village and of the country, she would like to go to the District Council and participate in development projects as an individual who wanted to have clean drinking water, adequate health care, schools, and other necessary amenities within walking distance. She pointed out that it did not matter to her who would provide those services whether they were in or out of government. For

Namilanzi, participating in development projects in her village was a way of investing in the future so that her children and grandchildren do not have to live the way she had lived. She cannot read or write, and she observed that she did not want that kind of life for her grandchildren.

At least eight of the fifteen people with whom I spoke indicated that an uMunthu approach to politics and development in Malawi would ensure that players had the common people’s interests above everything else. “What you see nowadays is political expediency at the expense of the common person. How can you explain spending millions of Kwacha to change the national flag claiming the country was so developed it

53 Namilanzi’s observation on the connotations of the term “opposition” was collaborated by at least five other people that I interviewed including a District Commissioner.

157 needed to change the independence flag when schools and hospitals do not have basic necessities to function?” observed a secondary school teacher in one of the districts visited. Another secondary school teacher in another district observed that most political leaders in the country were just too arrogant to be able to work with the people: “just listen to the radio and take note of the names they call us, from drunkards to chickens…all because we question their decisions and complain about socio-economic conditions,” he lamented.54

An ordained pastor of a church in Blantyre observed that there was urgent need for the cultivation of trust between public officials and the citizenry.55 He observed that there was lack of confidence in government, and government in return does not trust lay citizens to arrive at informed decisions on issues affecting their livelihood. The public, on the other hand was frustrated by the lack of genuine opportunities to participate even in so-called multi-stakeholder processes. “There is frequent disregard of our concerns as

‘emotional’ and even after comprehensive discussions, we do not feel like government incorporates our concerns in the final outcome,” he observed. The pastor noted that the consequence of this lack of trust between government and the people was the creation of a pool of political players who are not committed to the development of the country but eager to please various political or religious sides with which they are affiliated. Renn et

54 This teacher was referring to the late President, Bingu Wa Mutharika who when asked why his government did not consult before deciding to change the national flag, shot back at the people asking where the people were when government went around doing the consultation (nobody remembered to have heard anything like that going on in the country). The President concluded that whoever did not hear of those consultations must have been too drunk to notice. Later, when the country was hit by an acute shortage of foreign exchange resulting in shortages of fuel and other basic necessities such as power and water supply in the country’s main cities, the president observed that Malawians were making noise like chickens over simple things. See Nyasatimes, The Nation (Aug 2010-Feb, 2012). 55 The pastor leads one of the largest non-mainstream evangelical churches in Malawi.

158 al. (1995) suggested that trust between public officials and grassroots citizens could be promoted through:

. Interaction that takes place face-to-face over a reasonable period of time;

. Participants being able to secure independent expert advice;

. When participants are free to question the sincerity of involved parties;

. When parties are involved early in the decision-making process;

. When all available information is made freely accessible all involved;

. A transparent process of selecting options;

. When citizens are given some control over the format of the discourse,

and;

. When the decision-making body seriously considers or endorses the

outcome of the participation process. (p. 95)

UMunthu in particular, or the African worldview in general, can be summarized as follows: It is an indigenous concept with no historical founder. UMunthu owes its existence to human experience of the mystery of the cosmos. In a bid to solve the mystery of the universe, indigenes asked questions, and searched for answers. The

African worldview is a social value and practice that is grounded in and originated from the indigenous people’s oneness with themselves and their environment. UMunthu is neither preached nor imported to anyone. This African worldview permeates the private and public lives in daily activities. Indigenes are not converted to their spirituality. Each person is born into it, lives by it, practices it either in public or in private life. UMunthu has no written literature, sacred scriptures or creed. UMunthu is an essentially oral tradition passed on through mythology and legends, stories and folktales, songs and

159 dances, liturgies and rituals, proverbs and pithy-sayings, adages, and riddles. Some of these oral forms are preserved in indigenous arts and crafts, symbols and emblems, names of people and places. Thus, the African works of art are not merely for entertainment or for pleasing the eye. Rather, they usually are a means of transmitting cultural and spiritual values, sentiments, ideas and indigenous cultural truths (Uka, 1991).

Conclusion

As Kaplan (2007) argued, modern national identity cannot be understood unless the role of friendship as a political sentiment is redefined. Strong civic friendship at national level would facilitate strong feelings of loyalty, responsibility, and accountability for the general well-being of fellow citizens and one’s country. Kaplan believed civic friendship is critical to the growth of modern nationalism. Extending Kaplan’s argument I posit that the study of aesthetics of African political organization would be a research worthwhile pursuing in understanding the role of friendship in politics.

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CHAPTER 6: NATIONALISM, EPISTEMOLOGY, INDIGENOUS ELEMENTS

OF CITIZENSHIP, AND POLITICAL IDENTITY IN MALAWI

Introduction

The overall aim of this chapter is to tie up the loose ends regarding the epistemic effect of the democratization process in Malawi and what I consider anti-democratic elements in the country’s socio-politico dynamics. I approach this analysis from a critical and appreciative perspective—post-colonial and post-Africanist. I analyze the disconnect that exists between grassroots people and professional/political officials when it comes to political and social knowledge productions adversely affecting democratic participation in the case under study.

I begin this chapter by echoing Musopole’s (1994) question: What does it mean to be human in Africa? In this dissertation I ask: What does it mean to be a political being in

Africa? Musopole observed that Africa’s education system trains intellectuals and professionals who understand everything else but themselves. Crucial to understanding the role of the Malawian citizen in national social change is the unraveling of the existential dilemma created by the collision of African and western cultures and ways of doing things. The clash gave rise to the need for a search for a relevant political theory to suit the Malawian’s identity as both an African and a political being. The findings in this study indicate that Malawians continue to struggle with their new found double identity—as political beings fighting and divided due to the adoption of foreign ideologies and yet feeling the need to be united and one based on their communal African worldview.

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Central to the search for a practical political theory for the Malawian citizen is the scrutiny of the sense that people attach to political participation in the country. The sense making can be studied through Malawians’ way of life—people’s myths, rituals, beliefs, punitive systems, rite of passage, and governance, elements that become text open to analysis. The initial step toward a working political theory and practice is to capture the spirit of the people for whom politics is practiced. For a Malawian, it is consequently futile to practice politics without first understanding what he/she is as a person. To understand oneself as a Malawian and as a political actor is to deconstruct one’s socio- cultural and, historical knowledge and one’s worldview.

I echo Musopole’s positing that the search for new spiritual and political identity for the Malawian is a catalytic effect of the west’s demonization of African culture and administrative systems. The west’s portrayal of African culture as evil and insufficient for human governance presented a difficult choice for Africans. Consequently, African social actors have lived with a contradictory double consciousness, torn between two worldviews, two cultures, and two ways of being human: being African (communal and living for others) and being political beings (competitive and brutal).

Musopole posited that, when the west slighted African values and the African way of doing things, it forced on the locals an alien culture. The new culture that the

Africans were forced to adopt deprived them of their humanity and identity which were grounded in the expression of their cultural and historical consciousness—their ontology.

Musopole further pointed out that the essence of the traditional humanization process is one aspect of the African culture most affected by western value imposition. Western values, including legal systems, governance systems, administration, and religion were

162 imposed with little or no regard for indigenous ways of conceptualizing what it means to be human in Africa. Can the two identities be reconciled? Is there need for strengthening democracy and governance in Malawi? The answer to both questions is yes but the question is how that should be done.

Ostensible cultural advantages for the strengthening of democracy must be seen in light of historical syncretism in Malawi and most of Africa. The struggle with double- consciousness must be examined in the context of the consequential contradictions of western (neo-liberal) democracy and communitarian-indigenous values in citizenship

(Musopole, 1994; Osabu-Kle, 2000). The reconciliation of the two forms of identity is key to forging new political thinking and practice in places such as Malawi.

Scholarship on Malawi’s democratic process has the propensity to focus on the institutional and elite elements over political and cultural nuances that give rise to political culture and practice in the country. Some African cultural theorists (Musopole,

1994; Osabu-Kle, 2000; Uka, 1991) have posited that there still remain substantial, key indigenous and religious structures in Africa including Malawi that can be drawn upon to deepen democracy on the continent. The trust (outside politics) that Malawians have in one another, closely knit family and social structures, and fundamental humane values, demonstrate the significance of a unique political culture that might have provided

Malawi with a democratic advantage over other African nations. Malawi has had its share of political and social tensions but it is a country that has never seen civil war let alone war with a neighboring country. Any efforts to consolidate Malawi’s political gains should focus on maximizing on the people’s peace-loving and laid back nature.

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Cultural advantage. Although some elements of the Malawian culture provide the country with essential democratic leverage, other aspects of the Malawian traditional systems are inconsistent with democratic citizenship. Prevailing negative traits include patriarchy and patron-client solidarity. Furthermore, most forms of social organizing, including traditional government (Traditional Authority), have promoted asymmetrical interdependence and power-sharing between and among various social classes. Such patterns of asymmetrical reciprocity reify particularized rather than generalized trust and tend to limit political pluralism through ethnic or partisan solidarity. The analysis of data obtained for this study indicated that there is a tendency to identify with one particular religious, partisan or ethnic clique as opposed to another. The consequence of this kind of mentality is a divided and less progressive society.

In view of this cultural ambivalence, legitimization of democratic gains in Malawi faces a significant challenge. The challenge to any democratic progress in the country is moral legitimacy across social divisions. The state of affairs is a sad elder-superior- professional arrangement dictating the terms for popular consultation. The adoption of western liberal politics has not helped matters. Commentators on the democratization process in Africa have expressed serious doubts about the West’s commitment to facilitate and sustain a deep democratic role on the continent. The West’s foreign policy during the cold war—propping up dictatorships and supplying arms—and the role of the

Bretton Woods institutions in the Structural Adjustment Program for African countries in the 1970s, and the continued conditionality of development aid extended to African countries raise eye brows concerning the West’s commitment to popular democratic culture on the African continent.

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The consequence of the West’s self-interest involvement in Africa’s democratization process has been the promotion of neo-liberal values at the expense of local values. The wholesale adoption of this foreign polity has resulted in the creation of loose coalitions of relatively privileged individuals agitating for so called “democracy” only as a means to protect their privilege and power. The result has been an unhealthy competition among the political elites at the expense of the masses. Furthermore, supposedly egalitarian and inclusive discourse is employed to emphasize electoral participation, and civic responsibility as opposed to activism, dissent, and protests

(Cohen, 2010). Public institutions such as the local government become social sites where power, social status, and education differentials are at play and can be observed.

My contention in this study is that how the political economy of such institutions, and indeed any democratic process, is manipulated has an influence on how political knowledge is produced and practiced among people.

Culture and institutions. Institutional epistemology, a branch of social epistemology, helps to shed light on the study of the epistemic powers that political institutions hold (Hayek, 1945). A case study of Malawi’s District Council development processes conjures questions such as these: How do democratic institutions and their policies affect democratic culture in Malawi? What meanings do people attach to their democratic participation, and what grassroots participatory practices influence democracy in Malawi? Critical here are concerns on the epistemic powers that such institutions yield.

Anderson (2006) astutely elaborated on the epistemic role that democratic institutions play in decision-making processes. Anderson posited that questions as to the capability of institutions to resolve public concerns become significant wh en the social

165 problems we need to solve demand the utilization of knowledge that is widely dispersed across society. A power factor in the equation complicates matters even more. For social problems to be resolved effectively, somehow, knowledge and expertise from various actors must be consolidated. Democratic institutions differ in their capacity to mobilize and respond to required knowledge for solving social problems. Anderson (2006) and

Hayek (1945) posited that the problem of efficiently allocating resources cannot be resolved by centralized state administration because a central body might not be able to consolidate into itself all of the widely dispersed knowledge needed to solve social problems.

Anderson and Hayek’s stipulations raise questions as to what specific problems state democratic institutions should solve. Beyond this issue, institutional epistemology demands an assessment of the epistemic role of democratic institutions. In this study, I demonstrated the epistemic role of selected democratic institutions in Malawi as affected by various factors both internal and external. I argue that current procedures followed by the Malawi Local Government create a flawed understanding of knowledge construction of public participation in the country. Although most public participation initiatives in

Malawi are based on the Habermasian ideals of fair, free and open forms of debate and consultation, in practice “the power of the better argument” favors professional/powerful forms of knowledge construction at the expense of local (lay) knowledge and concerns.

This disregard for local concerns has stripped the people of their uMunthu (human dignity) in national social change efforts in the country.

I agree with Anderson (2006) that John Dewey’s (1976) experimentalist account of democracy offers a better model of the epistemology of democracy compared to other

166 models such as the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT), and the Diversity Trumps Ability

Theorem (DTAT). Anderson posited that one of the advantages of Dewey’s model is that it provides room for dissent. Dissent should not only be accommodated during discussion but even after a decision has been made. Difference of opinion should be treated as epistemic, not merely a matter of discord. Following Dewey’s model,

Anderson proposed elements of the multiple epistemic roles of dissent at different points in democratic decision-making process. Based on Anderson’s extrapolation of Dewey’s model, I will address questions of democratic design as demonstrated in the case study of selected District Councils in Malawi. Through the Ministry of Local Government, the government of Malawi aims to manage common grassroots projects. My study demonstrates how the exclusion or undermining of diverse opinion in the discussions undermines the epistemic powers of these Councils. By privileging expert and

“powerful” opinions, in effect, the Councils exclude the situated knowledge locals have of the problems facing people in their areas. A Deweyan epistemic analysis of democracy thus provides a powerful tool for advancing the reform of democratic institutions.

Anderson advanced that the epistemic needs and powers of any institution should be assessed relative to the problems it is capable of resolving. She added that democratic states grapple with diverse social problems at various levels of society and these include problems (a) of public interest, the efficient solution to which requires (b) collective action by citizens (c) through the law. She observed that the latter two conditions justify why the solution cannot be left up to the unregulated, voluntary choices of individuals or private associations. The first category sets a constraint on what problems might be legitimately assigned to state action.

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The necessity for a problem to be handled by democratic institutions, especially those of public interest, helps explain why votes and deliberation are the appropriate form of information to which states should be responsive. Deliberation is needed to articulate proposals to make certain concerns a matter of public interest; votes are needed to endorse such proposals.

The description of the problems democratic institutions need to deal with helps us devise criteria for the success of democratic entities. Scholars have argued back and forth over democratic theory when it comes to accounts of success that are internal and those that are external to the democratic decision-making process (Estlund, 1993).

Internalists, or proceduralists, posit that, to vindicate a decision-making process, one needs only show that the procedure was fair. This position does not take into consideration the instrumental functions of democracy.

Epistemology and Democracy

Given the sketch of the type of problems democratic institutions need to solve, and of the internal and external criteria for judging the success of the proposed solutions, we can now turn to the question of how to model the powers of democracy to gather and deploy the knowledge necessary to craft effective and popular solutions to social problems. Anderson (2006) proposed three models to help conduct epistemic analyses of democratic processes: the Condorcet Jury Theorem, the Diversity Trumps Ability

Theorem, and Dewey’s experimentalist account of democracy. She assessed these models by the following criteria: (a) do they exhibit the epistemic functions of the constitutive institutions of democracy? (b) do they disclose the epistemic merits and demerits of these institutions? and, (c) do they provide guidelines for improving their

168 epistemic powers? Of the three models, Anderson argued that Dewey’s offers the best model of the epistemic role of democratic institutions. The model also suggests ways to improve the epistemic success of institutions.

The most popular epistemic account of democracy emanates from the Condorcet

Jury Theorem (Condorcet, 1995). This theorem stipulates that if voters (a) face two options, (b) vote independently of one another, (c) vote their judgment of what the right solution to the problem should be (i.e., they do not vote strategically), and (d) have, on average, a greater than 50% probability of being right, then, as the number of voters approaches infinity, the probability that the majority vote will yield the right answer approaches 1 (and rapidly approaches 1 even with modest numbers of voters). Anderson noted that given the strength of this kind of result, it is no wonder that many epistemic democrats have championed the Condorcet Jury Theorem as the key to vindicating the epistemic powers of democracy (Anderson, 2006; Cohen, 2010; Gaus, 1996; Grofman &

Feld, 1988). The favorable results of the Condorcet Jury Theorem have been generalized to cover plurality voting over multiple options (List, 2001), supermajority voting rules

(Fey, 2003), and even some cases in which individual voters have less than 50% chance of being right (Estlund, 1993).

Anderson observed that, in spite of these elevating results, the Condorcet Jury

Theorem is inadequate when it comes to shedding more light on the epistemic role of democracy. She pointed out that first, the Theorem works even if the composition of voters is epistemically homogeneous.56 However, a significant part of the epistemic case for democracy is based on the epistemic diversity of voters. In the case of the local

56 The Condorcet Jury Theorem assumes homogeneity

169 government in Malawi, most of the problems such institutions are required to solve are complex. These challenges have asymmetrically distributed effects on individuals according to their social class, occupation, education, gender, age, and so forth. Indeed an important part of the case for the epistemic merits of democracy depends on its ability to pool this asymmetrically distributed information about the effects of problems and policies so as to devise solutions that address the majority’s concerns. There is a need for a model of democracy in which its epistemic success is a product of its ability to take advantage of the epistemic diversity of individuals.

Second, the Condorcet Jury Theorem assumes that voters vote independently of one another. While the Theorem does not rule out all influence of voters on one another

(Estlund, 1994), it is unclear whether the Theorem is sufficient under the actual patterns of influence and efficacy characteristic of modern democracies (Estlund, 1993). More importantly, a free press, public discussion and, hence, mutual influence prior to voting are constitutive, not by-products of democracy. Without access to public forums for sharing information and opinions beyond their immediate knowledge, voters are uninformed and often helpless. It is clear that, given its stipulations, the Condorcet Jury

Theorem puts the two forms of knowledge pooling characteristic of democracy—votes and talk—potentially at odds with one another. An adequate model should show how these two elements of democracy work together. Obviously, discussion is needed prior to voting in part to facilitate prioritization of problems that are genuinely of public concern.

In the absence of such discussion, voters depend on subjective and private preferences.

However, uninformed private preferences are not the best input into democratic decision- making simply because they do not constitute a public interest, even in aggregate

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(Herzog, 2000). Hence, besides failing to model the epistemic functions of core democratic practices, the Condorcet Jury Theorem also potentially pits the internal and external criteria for success of democracy against each other.

Third, the Condorcet Jury Theorem fails to capture the dynamic features of democracy’s epistemic functions. Often, majorities converge on an ineffective solution because they do not foresee certain outcomes of the policies they adopt. Democratic decision-making ought to acknowledge its own fallibility. Democratic institutions need to institute feedback mechanisms by which they can learn how to improve their decision- making processes utilizing new information emerging from consequences of implemented policies. Periodic elections are one vital feedback mechanism often utilized. The Condorcet Jury Theorem does not indicate the necessity of such mechanisms. Since it assumes that majorities are nearly infallible from the start, why would they ever need to reflect on their initial decision? The Condorcet Jury Theorem’s emphasis on voting undermines the need to investigate how to improve the epistemic role of democratic institutions beyond the voting process.

The Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem (DTA Theorem) helps to resolve some of the deficiencies of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. The DTA Theorem is based on the premise that understanding diversity helps to appreciate collective intelligence, which is the essence of “crowd sourcing”. This theorem assumes that if (a) the problem is hard,

(b) the problem solvers tend to agree on a finite set of solutions, (c) the problem solvers are epistemically diverse, and (d) there are many problem solvers who work together in moderate sized groups, then a randomly selected collection of problem solvers out- performs a collection of the best problem solvers. Anderson (2006) and Surowiecki

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(2004) offered more support for the general assumption underpinning the DTA, that diverse collections of non-experts do a better job than experts in solving many problems.

The DTA Theorem augments the position that democracy, which allows everyone to have a hand in collective problem solving, is epistemically superior to technocracy, or rule by experts.

Anderson further postulated that, the DTA Theorem, although initially constructed to model problem solving within firms, represents many of the epistemically relevant features of democratic decision-making that are neglected by the Condorcet Jury

Theorem. First, she observed, the DTA Theorem explicitly represents the epistemic diversity of citizen inputs into democratic decision-making as an epistemic asset.

Second, the DTA Theorem models some of the epistemic functions of citizens’ associations and political parties. Parties organize citizens’ diverse concerns into issues, agendas, and platforms, and thereby hone down the list of available solutions to a manageable number. Parties also help diverse citizens work together in smaller groups to work on proposed solutions to problems. Third, the DTA Theorem assumes that deliberation is epistemically productive, not merely something that potentially interferes with the epistemic virtues of vote aggregation. Finally, Anderson observed that the DTA

Theorem focuses on such problems as we would expect democracies to be superior in solving—complex problems. She observed that it was conceivable to suppose that autocratic governments can solve relatively simple problems, such as rounding up criminals, as well as democratic governments. Autocratic governments would be expected to perform worse than democratic governments when problems and solutions are complex. Effects would be asymmetrically distributed, hence creating asymmetrically

172 distributed information and knowledge about those effects. State decision makers cannot respond to diverse effects of which they are unaware. It is obvious that it takes input from diverse citizens, along with an accountability mechanism to ensure that these inputs are taken seriously, for states to be responsive to such effects. Democracies are supposed to be responsive to such inputs; autocracies generally do not.

Anderson further posited that despite these virtues, DTA Theorem fails to model two other features of democracy: the non-instrumental importance of universal inclusion

(i.e., a universal franchise and free speech for all), and the dynamic aspects of democracy. The DTA Theorem, she observed, represents epistemic diversity as instrumentally valuable, and universal inclusion as potentially so, only when it ensures the inclusion of whatever epistemic feature (knowledge, heuristics, and perspicuous representation) might be central to the solution of some particular problem. However, universal inclusion is also essential to ensuring satisfaction of the internal criterion of success for democratic decision-making: that the decisions are a fair collective representation, and thereby represent an object of public concern. Anderson concluded that, even more importantly from an epistemic point of view, the DTA Theorem does not model the epistemic functions of periodic elections and other feedback mechanisms designed to change the course of collective decisions in light of information about their consequences.

Philosopher John Dewey offered an experimentalist account of the epistemic role of democracy. He depicted democracy as the use of social intelligence to solve problems of practical interest (Dewey, 1976; Putnam, 1990). Practical intelligence embodies an experimental method (Dewey, 1976). Here, Anderson argued that, deliberation is a kind

173 of thought experiment, in which social actors rehearse proposed solutions to problems abstractly. Through discussion, participants attempt to envision the consequences of implementing various suggested solutions, including favorable or unfavorable reactions to them. She further advanced that participants then put the policies they decide upon to an actual test by acting in accordance with them and evaluating the results. Unfavorable results—failures to solve the problem for which the policy was adopted, or solving the problem but at the cost of generating worse problems—should be treated in a scientific spirit as disconfirmations of the policies. The results give decision-makers reasons to revise their policies to make them do a better job of solving social problems. Anderson stated that practical intelligence, then, is the application of scientific method to practical problems. She suggested abandoning dogmatism, affirming fallibilism, and accepting the observed consequences of resulting practices as the key evidence prompting participants to revise them. She observed that Dewey took democratic decision-making to be the joint exercise of practical intelligence by citizens at large, in interaction with their representatives and other state officials. Anderson called Dewey’s approach—

“cooperative social experimentation.”

Anderson concluded by declaring Dewey’s model to be the only one of the three that represents the epistemic powers of all three constitutive features of democracy: diversity, discussion, and dynamism, and I add dogma—the resulting shared knowledge.

Dewey emphasized the significance of democratically bringing citizens from various sectors together to define, through deliberation, what they considered to be problems of public interest. Through deliberation, the participants consider proposed solutions

(Boydston, 1981). He saw that universal inclusion of diverse citizens was critical to

174 satisfying both the internal and external criteria for success of democratic decision- making. Anderson observed that exclusion of certain participants or opinions casts doubt on the claim that problems and solutions as defined by those allowed to participate are truly in the public interest—responsive in a fair way to everyone’s concerns, insofar as they legitimately lay a claim on public action. She further posited that exclusion also undermines the ability of collective decision-making to take advantage of citizens’ situated knowledge. Citizens from various professional and cultural backgrounds bring to the table different experiences of problems and policies of public interest, experiences that have evidential import for devising and evaluating solutions. Universal inclusion makes maximum use of such situated knowledge, which can be seen as critical for solving the kinds of complex problems modern democracies face. Collective, democratic discussion and deliberation become a means of pooling together this asymmetrically distributed information and knowledge to enhance decision-making.

Anderson further pointed out that Dewey’s experimentalist model of democracy provides a better understanding of the epistemic import of several democratic institutions that sustain its dynamism and its capacity for change. Common elements include: periodic acceptable elections, a free press skeptical of state power, petitions to government, public opinion polling, protests, and public comment on proposed regulations of administrative agencies. In Dewey’s model, these are mechanisms of feedback and accountability that function to institutionalize fallibilism and an experimental attitude with respect to st ate policies. They urge governments to revise their policies in light of evidence—public complaints, as expressed in both votes and discussion—that they are not working, or expected not to work. Also, in Dewey’s model,

175 votes and talk reinforce one another. Voting helps to insure that government officials take citizens’ verbal feedback seriously, and deliberation helps to define and articulate the message conveyed by votes.

Dewey stressed that, for democracy to work, it was not sufficient to simply institute legal arrangements such as representation and periodic elections. Perhaps the most poignant element of Dewey’s model is the insinuation of the need for culture to change too. Effective democratic participation requires that citizens at large, interacting with one another in civil society, should welcome diversity and deliberation, and take an experimental attitude toward social engagements. Dewey’s experimentalist model enables a fairly astute assessment of the epistemic powers of social arrangements, both legal and cultural. Diversity and discussion need to be embodied and promoted in the institutions and customs of civil society. If a social arrangement has a systematic and significant impact on some social group, information about that impact needs to be conveyed to decision makers. This usually calls for people to organize into an effective association or party, so that the members can share their experiences and, through discussion, articulate shared complaints and advance proposals to address those complaints. Where such associations or parties in civil society are weak or dysfunctional, the state acts blindly to the consequences of its policies. Decision makers become immune from accountability for these impacts, even if the formal apparatus of democracy is in place.

When citizens are organized into diverse, cross-cutting organizations, they need access to channels of communication with one another and with government decision makers. For this communication to be effective, media must be open and accessible to

176 all. Media concentration, especially if it enables public officeholders, or a handful of private media owners, to effectively censor dissent, undermines the epistemic powers of democracy. Additionally, effective communication of complaints and proposals demands not just that people be free to speak their minds, but that they be open to listening to others. If people smear, look down upon, or abuse those who disagree, or regard diversity as a threat, the words of the excluded, if they dare to talk, will fall on deaf ears.

Intolerance, abuse, calling of names because of differences of opinion about

religion or politics or business, as well as because of differences of race, color,

wealth or degree of culture are treason to the democratic way of life. For

everything which bars freedom and fullness of communication sets up barriers

that divide human beings into sets and cliques, into antagonistic sects and

factions, and thereby undermines the democratic way of life. Merely legal

guarantees of the civil liberties of free belief, free expression, and free assembly

are of little avail if in daily life freedom of communication, the give and take of

ideas, facts, experiences, is choked by mutual suspicion, by abuse, by fear and

hatred. (Boydston 1981, pp. 227–228)57

To realize the epistemic powers of democracy, citizens must follow norms that welcome or at least tolerate diversity and dissent. They must recognize the equality of all participants in deliberation by giving all a respectful hearing, re gardless of their social status. Systems must accommodate and institute deliberation and reason-giving, rather than threats and insults, as the basis of their communication with one another. An epistemic analysis of democracy helps us see that it is not just a matter of legal or process

57 Quoting Dewey (1981)

177 arrangements. It is a way of life governed by cultural norms of equality, discussion, and tolerance of diversity.

The Epistemic Import beyond Resources

In his book, Deliberative Democracy, Political Legitimacy, and Self- determination in Multicultural Societies, Jorge Valadez (2001) discussed the challenges of epistemological egalitarianism in a multicultural setting such as Malawi. Valadez argued that certain characteristics of culturally diverse democracies create challenges in arriving at an agreeable resolution to social and political problems. He further posited that a prerequisite to understanding political equality in deliberative democracy was the need to investigate beyond the equality of resources and capabilities. Valadez encouraged investigators to look into the motivation and assumptions that underpin political engagement. As seen from the District Council scenario in Malawi, political participation can be influenced by an array of socio-cultural, economic, and political factors. An important observation made by Valedez was that the provision of basic primary goods, such as wealth and basic liberties, was not a sufficient factor to enable effective and equal political participation. He argued that scholars should consider actors’ capacity to utilize available resources which could be affected by factors such as level of education, access to information, and political power differentials.

Evident in Malawi’s local government political participation is the issue of capabilities by some social actors to utilize resources effectively. Far from being ignorant and indifferent beings, most social actors in the villages in Malawi are passionate and active players invested in transforming not only themselves but their localities too. It is

178 their lack of proper education to comprehend technical concepts and hegemonic gate- keeping that undermines their performances in most democratic processes.

A water project saga in one of the district councils that I visited for this study provides an excellent case in point of how a Deweyan experimentalist model of democracy can inform efforts to facilitate the epistemic powers of democratic institutions. One of the DCs that I interviewed shared an incident where one of his villages benefitted from a multi-million Kwacha water project to alleviate an acute shortage of clean and potable water in the area. Under the project, over 50 shallow bore holes were sunk. According to the DC, the project was hastily planned and implemented without proper consultation with the locals because it was a campaign year and the process was highly politicized.

Although life in Malawi is slowly changing with most people adapting to new ways of doing things, division of labor remains highly gendered with women mostly responsible for fetching water for their households. According to the DC, it was this section of society that was neglected with very drastic consequences. The DC confided that, out of the 10 boreholes sunk in the area, only a couple of them were in use.

Professional and political strangers are said to have “invaded”58 the targeted village and surveyed possible locations to sink wells. The chosen sites were scientifically sound and the project commenced. More than five years down the line, only two of the 50 or so wells are usable due to various reasons including claims that some of the wells had salty water, some only produced water in trickles and was not enough for everyone, and other wells were sunk in sites where traditional birth attendants buried umbilical cords when

58 The DC shared that that is how the people felt when the officials arrived in their village to implement the project

179 women gave birth. In short, women in the village were not happy with the selected sites for the wells and ended up shunning them and opting to trek miles and hours every day to where they believe there was good water for their families.

Having to walk long distances to collect water, the women spend most of their time collecting water at the expense of other equally important household chores.

Sometimes the women even ask their daughters to miss school so they can assist with fetching water for the homes. This water project incident is a classic example of situated knowledge that is naturally (in a Malawian setting) engendered. Unless tapped into, men and professional development agents are bound to miss out on this knowledge to maximize benefits for targeted groups.

Based on my observation of a deliberation session at this specific council, women representation was minimal. As an Islamic area, women are supposed to be seen but not heard. Most of the women who attended the council meetings remained quiet for most of the sessions. For women’s knowledge and input in solving problems affecting them, the deliberation forums need to be reformed to allow more women to not only join, but to be active contributors to the proceedings. The ideal situation would be the opening up of the structures to increase the institutions’ epistemic capabilities.

Valedez posited that it was vital for democracies to understand the need for political equality in deliberative processes based on ability to utilize social resources. He argued that the significance of considering capabilities as a prerequisite in conceptualizing political equality was based on the fact that differences in capacities to use available resources could lead to inequalities in how citizens are able to defend their needs and concerns in public deliberation. He urged that to create parity in

180 epistemological resources and capabilities, it was necessary for the state to ensure equal access to resources such as sources of information, information technologies, and formal education. A study of the Local Government in Malawi has shown that with increasing complexity of social issues, information dissemination, and need for critical thinking and technical capabilities, capacity building will play a critical role in fostering political advocacy in the country. Specialized information and cognitive abilities have now acquired greater prominence in deliberative processes (Benhabib, 2004; Valadez, 2001).

Although villagers in most of Malawi’s districts cannot read or write, they possess critical traditional and social skills that help them make sense of their world and survive in it. For these social actors to be productive in democratic processes especially in deliberative settings, there is need for the state to increase their capacity. As communities in a collective culture, social mobilization and community-based projects were not problems in Malawi until the issue of political affiliation and payment for participation was brought in by both government and non-governmental organizations working in rural areas.

The main lesson from the study of District Councils in Malawi is that the current design of the deliberative democracy being championed by the Malawi government is flawed. Public deliberation which is employed by government to solicit input from people at the grassroots into social and development projects, has been hijacked by elite factors undermining the very input the system was designed to acquire. Brinkerhoff and

Crosby (2002) observed that, having the right technical details down on a piece of paper is only part of the process in achieving policy results and sustainable impacts. In order to provide an equal and transparent space for participation, the two authors suggested the implementation of what they called “open policy process” and the creation of multiple

181 venues for dialogue, debate and decision-making. They observed that where policymaking and implementation is contracted and restricted to few hands, access is problematic. Malawi current system remains elite-dominated leaving few alternative centers of decisional authority. The professional setting, the heavy political presence of members of parliament and the use of the English language in certain topics, all act to alienate rather than include some sections of the participating individual in the Councils.

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CHAPTER 7: ETCHING A NEW POLITICAL THEORY,

TRANSNATIONALISM, AND GLOBALISM

Introduction

As pointed out in earlier chapters of this dissertation, scholarship on deliberation and democratic processes is replete with analyses of processes, procedures, and outcomes of this form of political participation. Starkly absent in the debate on public deliberation is the place of culture and the political economy behind the epistemic role of such processes, especially in non-Western settings. Some commentators (see, for example,

Anderson, 2006; Benhabib, 2002; Valadez, 2001) have touched on theoretical assumptions of deliberation in multi-cultural settings, but presently, no studies exist that focus on the dynamics affecting deliberative processes in non-Western contexts, especially Africa where democracy is still in its fragile state. As deliberation gains ground as a form of citizen participation worldwide, the need to understand how such processes affect national development in African settings becomes even more urgent.

With the advent of political pluralism in the late 1990s, deliberative democracy has become a normative tool of public participation in Africa. To be able to understand this increasingly popular method of participation, I was guided by three questions: How do grassroots participatory practices (including deliberation) influence democratic processes in Malawi? What is the nature of the political economy at play in the epistemology of deliberative processes in African contexts? This chapter will attempt to summarize the study’s findings and suggest a way forward for the political practice in

Malawi. I will do that by reconstructing the local cultural capital that I believe Malawi, as an emerging democracy, can take advantage of to create a localized democratic polity to

183 inform its political practice. Finally, I will demonstrate how the neo-liberal democratization project and elite political hegemony highlight the political cleavages in contemporary Malawi.

Culture and the Malawian Self

The Malawian social actor can best be understood only in relation to his or her positionality at the intersection between cultural traditionalism (based on a strong sense of affiliation to cultural tradition) and modernity (based on the opening up of the country to global economies and technology). I want to argue in this section that the contemporary Malawian is in a liminal space where his/her self has become the other and there is a constant struggle to blend the two. My focus in this endeavor is the transition of the Malawian subject, in particular, and the African, in general, through what Gikandi

(2001) called the “anatomy of colonialism” into the narratives of self-making. Through a study of Kenya’s founding president, Jomo Kenyatta, Gikandi sought to understand how

African subjects can privately pride themselves in sticking to their cultural identity while seeking to master the modern life that colonialism brought to their doorsteps. Gikandi observed that, in his public life, Kenyatta was an advocate of things African, and yet, in private, Kenyatta unapologetically enjoyed what he considered to be the best modernity could offer. Central to Gikandi’s quest is how Kenyatta’s narrative of self could be balanced between the mastery of Englishness and the earnestness of desires of nationalism.59 In Gikandi’s study, Kenyatta becomes a good example of how subjects who embrace influential doctrines, ideologies, and institutions of colonial modernity become the most powerful champions of nationalism. Gikandi concluded that colonial

59 Kenyatta was educated and lived in Britain for a greater part of his life before returning to Kenya to fight the British and lead Kenya to independence.

184 subjects exercise agency by mastering modern life and technology. He argued that

Kenyatta’s ability to maneuver between the two identities was not based on hybridity or a game of differences, but a deliberate deployment of a set of values acquired from both worlds: the colonial and the African institution. Gikandi noted that Kenyatta was “a product of the structural ambiguity inherent in the modernity of the African” (p. 374).

Gikandi’s observation of Kenyatta echoed sentiments and stipulations by postcolonial theorists on the divided self, which they called “double-consciousness” and hybridity (Benhabib, 1992a, 19992b; Bhabha, 1995; Du Bois, 1903; Spivak, 1988). The revolutionary psychiatrist and writer Frantz Fanon (1925-1961) put it this way: “The black man has two dimensions: one with his fellows, the other with the white man. A

Negro behaves differently with a white man and with another Negro. That this self- division is a direct result of colonialist subjugation is beyond question.”(1986, p. 17).

Drawing on Bhabha’s postulations of identity dialectics, I will establish, in this section, that Malawi’s sense of cultural and political identity is unstable and, more so, in a state of “becoming” rather than “being” (Bhabha, 1995, pp. 1-18; Hall, 2003, pp. 233-

249). Bhabha’s positing of hybridity and the liminal subject is critical in understanding

Malawi’s contemporary political situation when we mull over the different cultural and political identities characterizing the present day country. Bhabha observed that cultural hybridities “emerge in moments of historical transformation” resulting into an “in- between” or “liminal” space that is transient in nature. He further posited that hybridity is a result of “the emergence of the interstices—the overlap and displacement of domains of difference—that the inter subjective and collective experiences of nationness, community interest, or cultural value are negotiated” (p. 2).

185

Stuart Hall (2003) agreed with Bhabha’s ideas by positing that cultural identity is not permanently fixed in some essentialized past, but is prone to the continuous influence of history, technology and power. This observation becomes pertinent to Malawi’s socio- political transformation over the years. Malawi, like most African countries, is a nation that was brought to the doors of the international community through colonialism. In the years following independence, the country endured neo-colonialism at the hands of political elite that swallowed Western ideology wholesale as a conceptual framework to develop the country. Competitive liberal democracy was introduced to a people who were culturally bound by communitarian traditions that shunned individualism. To be recognized as an equal player in geo-politics, Malawi, like most African countries was required to embrace (Western) democratic values in the form of multi-party politics. To echo Musopole’s (1994) concern: Malawians were presented with an existential dilemma of what it meant to be both African and political animals. Contemporary Malawi cultural and political identity therefore “belongs to the future as much as to the past” as it

“undergoes constant transformation” in tandem with historical changes (Hall, 2003, p.

236).

Through a complex interplay of history and power, Malawian culture has transformed into a culture that is many things at the same time. Malawians, both in the rural and the urban centers, have sought to imitate and adopt Western practices, plunging themselves into a state of “double-consciousness”—conscious of their rich traditional past and an awareness of their servile present condition requiring that they eschew their old “self” and fit in within the (international) democratic community. The obligatory appropriation of supposedly “universal” democratic norms has resulted in their

186

“becoming” Western and quickly shedding their Malawian “being ” My contention here is that the “becoming” for Malawians has not been a smooth transition from one culture to another. The transformation has placed the Malawian social actor in a liminal cultural identity that is a mixture of Malawianness and Westernness complete with their subjectivities. According to Bhabha (1995), Hall (2003), and Musopole (1994), this is the dilemma in the people of colonized and postcolonial nations.

The desire for ideological conservatism in Malawi must be understood within its proper context as not merely seeking consensus that suppresses pluralism, but as a political culture threatened by real and perceived threats (of division, political conflict, and increasing social decay). The transition from British dominance in the late 1960s to an authoritarian regime in the 1970s subsequently transformed into ideological divergence prompting the rise of the ruling class and its hegemonic attempt to manipulate social divisions for its own benefit. Is it wrong then for the Malawian social actor to seek the best of the two worlds: Malawian traditionalism and Western social style and politics?

Musopole rightly observed that the communitarian ethos for African people should be extended to an explanation of the historical and cosmic interrelatedness of beings. Musople called this interconnectedness “ontological/life relationality.” It is proper, here, to posit that the humanizing process that Musopole sought is not restricted to individuals. Nor is it restricted to Africans. The interconnectedness of humans compels cosmic forces to ward off evil elements that threaten personal, communal, and cosmic harmony. Malawi’s contemporary liminal state can best be summarized through

Bhabha’s (1995) musings that “these ‘in between’ spaces provide the terrain for

187 elaborating strategies of selfhood—singular or communal—that initiate new signs of identity, and innovative sites of collaboration, and contestation, in the act of defining the idea of society itself.” (p. 2)

Coming Full Circle: Deliberative Democracy, Shared Learning, and Political

Practice in Malawi

While Musopole sought an African doctrine of Christian anthropology/theology, I seek a Post-African Political Theory that will help elucidate not only the process of becoming human in Africa, but more importantly, the role the Malawi self will play in the democratic process bearing in mind the challenge of protecting the local as the country embraces the international. There is a need for a working African political thought that would help facilitate the contextualization of western liberal democracy to fit local situations and concerns (Barge, 2001).

To be a productive human in Africa is to embrace one’s own roots and the principles of maturation into society. What Musopole called “preparation evangelica” I call cultural foundations of a contextual democracy. A productive self will, therefore, have an indigenous preparation as a prerequisite for international exposure. I choose to differ, though, with Musopole when he said, “in order to recapture our human dignity, integrity, and wisdom, we do not primarily need an education; rather we need a reconciliation to our essential humanity (p. 179). Musopole’s postulation ended in an anti—climax without quite responding to the central question of his thesis: how do we resolve the existential dilemma that African humanity finds itself in after western contact?

188

Deliberation, culture, and knowledge production. I will attempt to provide an answer to Musopole’s existential question by drawing from the insights of two scholars I believe connect the two hemispheres into which the world is divided—the northern and southern: Ekpo (2010) and his idea of Post-Africanism, and Rawlins (2009) and his elucidation of civic friendship. I will then conclude this chapter and this dissertation by suggesting a name for the liminal state in which Malawi and most African countries have found themselves after their inevitable contact with the West. It can only be hoped that this new concept presents a practical framework for a post-post-colonial engagement of

Malawi, and indeed Africa, with the world at large.

In an attempt to salvage one of the post-colonial concepts that explained Africa’s relationship with the Western world— Négritude —Ekpo dissected the concept into two doctrines. According to Ekpo, the first doctrine is the widely publicized—Négritude, a movement which Leopold Senghor (1906-2001) co-created with Aimé Césaire (1913-

2008). Ekpo observed that the once popular Négritude was founded on cultural nationalism, a performative translation into politics and art, and laced with radical

Afrocentric power bordering on unconditional race pride.60 Ekpo wrote that, “it was

Césaire who taught us to rejoice and be glad, though we (Africans) had invented nothing, explored nowhere; not to condemn the cannibalistic past, for it was proof of Africa’s counter-European manliness.”61 (p. 178)

The second type of Négritude, as presented by Ekpo, is a “crystallization” of

Senghor’s most prolific thoughts on politics, culture and modernity, and he said this

Negritude can be characterized as a political concept prescribed for Africa’s

60 Ekpo pointed out here that this element of Negritude was more championed by Césaire than Senghor. 61 See Aimé Césaire, Cahier d’un retour au pays natal, Presence Africaine, Paris 1956.

189 modernization. According to Ekpo, Senghor’s notion of Africa’s modernization was not a rejection of everything Western but was a concept, “centered first in a self-reassuring re- description of Africa and Africans and second in a politics of friendship and collaboration with the European holders of modernity’s powers and skills” (p. 178). I would add here that this act of self-reassuring and being open to (civic) friendship and collaboration should not only be limited to the outside world but be practiced within various local contexts to create mutual alliances across divisions towards a common goal. As I will later conclude in this chapter, this would form a basis for a contextual and functional framework for democracy in African settings. This recognition and acceptance of

“otherness” to complete the whole is the essence of uMunthu.

Ekpo distinguished the second kind of Négritude from the first by calling the second “Senghorism.” Ekpo’s contention was that the widely proclaimed Négritude or cultural nationalism, like most post-colonial concepts, faced demise mainly due to their lack of clear elaboration and practicality in the face of critical issues such as race and globalization. In short, Ekpo argued that the initial Négritude was too inward looking

(Afrocentric) that it ignored international trends and nuances doing so at its own peril.

My focus in this section of the chapter and dissertation is on Ekpo’s rendition of the second Négritude or Senghorism. Rightly presented by Senghor and recently reiterated by Ekpo, Senghorism (the second type of Négritude) presents a glimmer of hope for not only divided societies such as Malawi but for most of the African continent which shares similar traits albeit with a few cultural, socio-economic, and political differences. The second Négritude which Ekpo argued is well and alive, deals with issues that are still facing Africa and the world at large. Ekpo, through Senghor, posed, perhaps,

190 one of the most pertinent questions in the history of the African continent: what to do with an Africa suddenly brought by Europe to the gate of world history.

Reconstructing Senghor’s views and initiatives before and after decolonization,

Ekpo posited that, underlying the captivating poetry of lost old pagan peoples complete with their romanticized naked native women, Senghor’s thinking was preoccupied and animated by an existential agency—the urgency to locate Africa properly and entirely into a modernity whose door had just been “casually, almost inadvertently, half-opened by colonization” (p. 179). Musing over the double consciousness dilemma, Senghor is thought to have wondered as to how the African continent, devastated and exploited by the colonial encounter could position itself in the new world order of modernity. I contend here that this age-long musing still presents the niche for contemporary political thinkers such as South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki and Nelson Mandela, and several others who believe that the African continent can assume its rightful role in geo-politics.

Senghor, therefore, went beyond advocating for a glorified Africa for its own sake to the realization that, for the continent to modernize,62 it had to become something other than what it had always been. Senghor must have been convinced that Africa’s ancestral past, endeared to and respected by its people as it was, was not tangible enough for the kind of unparalleled challenge it faced in integrating into a modern community. Ekpo observed that, in line with this feat, Senghor had employed the use of aesthetics—art, poetry, music—and promoted it for the conservation of the African pride, honor and history. Ekpo’s contention was that, as soon as the demonized past had been aesthetically

62 Loosely used to mean opening up and embracing the good of the external world while protecting the local good. The term “modernizing” has raised contentions of linear progression of human development in certain quarters (See Communication for Development in the Third World by Mekote & Steeves, 2001).

191 reclaimed, Senghor had moved on to seek practical ways of positioning the African continent as an equal and formidable player on the international scene. In line with this effort was Senghor’s functional political thinking beyond Césaire’s Négritude —his policy of engagement with the West, especially Europe in a spirit of collaboration, strategic friendship and creative alliances. Central to Senghor’s efforts was his acknowledgement that resources and tools of imperialism and later neo-colonialism could be used strategically to accelerate Africa’s transition into the new world order.

The subsequent step to Senghor’s desire for Africa to consolidate the best in its ancestral culture while tapping into the best of the West forms Ekpo’s and my argument—the repositioning of the continent in a conceptual framework called

Post-Africanism. First presented in his 1995 essay, Towards a Post-Africanism:

Contemporary African Thought and Postmodernism, Ekpo defined Post-Africanism as,

a post-ideological umbrella for a diversity of intellectual strategies seeking to

inscribe newer, more creative moves beyond the age-old fixations, obsessions and

petrifications of thinking that had crystallized in and around the racial-cultural

worries not only of the Négritude generation but also the so-called postcolonial

zeitgeist. (p. 183)

Elaborating on the background to the idea, Ekpo pointed out that it was as a result of a painful recognition that Africa’s cultural-nationalist ethos, reflexes, and discourse that informed the continent’s philosophical, political, and social change efforts had not only pulled Africa and the African mindset back into a disabling Afrocentric cycle, but had also cluttered most of Africa’s modernization projects. Post-Africanism was, therefore, presented in an effort to, first, realign the “disaster-prone emotionalism, hubris

192 and Paranoias” present in most African conceptual frameworks evident in the people’s art, politics or social change discourse and, second, according to Ekpo, to identify more favorable conditions for a more functional and all-encompassing local intellectual engagement with Africa, modernity and the West.

In Post-Africanism, Ekpo deplored the wasteful and depressive use of intellectual prowess on settling vain scores with imperialism. He posited that Post-Africanism embraced the idea of total acceptance of the consequences of colonialism on the African continent. This new thinking does not believe in continued blaming of the West for

Africa’s misfortunes but, rather, finds Africa’s present condition an opportunity to rediscover a new standpoint, a freer, bolder approach to reclaim the colonial past and the neo-imperialist present.

Africa not only needs to find a way to reconcile with its former colonizers and once captors (the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade), it also needs to be at peace with itself. The normative understanding of politics, as argued earlier in this dissertation, is that where systematic procedures and the right environment are provided, democracy is supposed to run smoothly to the satisfaction of all parties concerned. As demonstrated in this dissertation, there are several other cultural and socio-politico nuances that have to be taken into consideration in order to understand the assumptions and aspirations underpinning democratic efforts, especially in fledgling democracies. I would like to place such cultural and social extras under what can be called the aesthetics of politics. In his recent book, The Compass of Friendship, William Rawlins (2009) elaborated on what

I consider an aspect of the aesthetics of politics—civic friendship. In order to remove the deliberative process from simply being a decision-making channel to an environment

193 where learning can occur, participants need to engage and regard one another as equal and mutual friends and not enemies simply because they belong to different camps or ideological backgrounds.

Discussing the dialectic of individuation and participation, Rawlins (2009) presented poignant contributions to the understanding of the potentials of political friendship. Rawlins presented two questions which I believe are central to our understanding of the role of friendship in politics: (1) How far can the practices of friendship extend into public life to facilitate social justice and achieve social change? (2)

What is the potential of political efficacy of friendship? Four elements of what it means to be friends were presented, which I believe are pertinent to the creation of not only a vibrant political atmosphere but a functional deliberation process that would provide room for learning for its own sake without the pressures of decision-making as a product.

The four elements are:

. Friendship as an ongoing voluntary achievement

. Friendship as involving mutual concern for the other’s well-being

. Friendship as a need to focus and pursue special practices such as equality

. Friendship as an ethical requirement involving ongoing learning about

each other

As I argue, most of these basic elements, all of which would facilitate a mutual environment for learning, growing, and unity as citizens were missing in the deliberative sessions that I studied. Despite the fact that, although most of the participants involved in the deliberative processes are native Malawians, participants adopted belligerent stances in discussion based on homes of origin, political party or religious affiliation, and

194 educational level. The political discourse from leaders in the Malawian society has poisoned the people’s minds in such a way that, even before an attempt to understand the other person’s point of view is made, speakers are accepted or rejected because of their party colors, religious symbols, and indeed their accent when they speak.63 This general malaise in the political practice as observed at the district level can be regarded as a microcosm of the nature and culture of politics in Malawi.

Extending what he considered to be ethical potentials of friendship from private dyadic relationships to the public realm, Rawlins argued that, to some extent, the substantive ethical elements of personal relationships can inform the politics of friendships. He further posited that genuine interest in the well being of others through personal friendships and collaborations could provide a critical matrix for more encompassing political activity. Without overly romanticizing the idea of mutuality among political players, Rawlins acknowledged the existence of differences and diversity in various forms. Addressing this area, he pointed out that the “edifying” individuation present between and among friends—“their recognition of the meaningful differences shaping their distinct possibilities” (p. 185)—could facilitate genuine fairness. Quoting

Deneen (as well as Bukowski & Sippola), Rawlins further indicated that justice, when fully embraced, works as a tool for appreciating individual differences which, when looked at positively, ceases to be an impediment but, rather, is an opportunity to create moral (shared) learning and empathetic understanding.

Arguing from the Aristotelian point of view, Rawlins observed that seeking to achieve political objectives in a spirit of common interest should be the ideal aspiration of

63 Some people have distinct accents based on where they come from in the country-south, center or north.

195 political mutuality. The ideal for common interest, however, does not negate the existence of deeply held rivalry and power differentials that, if left unchecked, cause unnecessary human anguish. Rawlins further observed that the actual implementation of the common good is the second of Aristotle’s ethical positing of how dyadic friendship guides the practices of civic friendship. He argued that the process of seeking the common good can be used as a channel to eliminate limited, self-serving opinions in political pursuits. Rawlins was quick to draw attention to a possible set back in

Aristotle’s idealist postulations—who decides what the common good is? The annals of history are replete with incidents where hegemonic influences have hijacked the processes victimizing vulnerable members of the society. What is evident here is that what civic friendship is to the Western society as advocated by Rawlins, uMunthu is to the Malawian society. Rawlins summarized by indicating that pursuing political friendship ethics can work to prevent such overbearing undertakings of the “The Good”

(quoting Deneen; Pakaluk; Swanson). Rawlins brings us full circle to why deliberative pursuits, not only in Western settings but in places such as Malawi, should provide room for mutual understanding of differences and issues before the need for a decision is prioritized:

Aristotle suggests that agreement, arising simultaneously from different

perspectives that are nevertheless subordinated to a willingness to engage in

conversation, is precisely the kind of friendship that will characterize the best

relations between citizens… Aristotle did not propose to separate people from one

another and thereby guarantee political stability, but rather recommended an

alternative and explicitly political theory of friendship based on a goal of common

196

good that even citizens motivated by different interests might achieve. (Deneen as

quoted in Rawlins, 2009, p. 187).

Conclusion

I will conclude this section and this dissertation by presenting more questions than answers: Is the postcolonial agent’s double consciousness a curse or an opportunity? Can the Malawian social agent be both a traditionalist and an international citizen? The postcolonial agent’s liminal nature presents a rare opportunity for the exercising of agency towards the creation of better localities and a better world. By employing the best from the two worlds,64 the Malawian social and political actor can identify safe common grounds for inclusive rather than exclusive political culture and practice. The role of democratic institutions, such as local councils, government agencies, judicial and legislative structures, would be the creation of social spaces where members come together in a spirit of mutuality (friendship and uMunthu) to appreciate difference and use it as a strength rather than think of difference as an element that should irreparably divide societies.

This mutuality can best be created through what Valadez (2001) called epistemological egalitarianism. Valadez posited that epistemological egalitarianism ensures that deliberative processes accord all participating members equal access to knowledge creation resources required for productive public deliberation. Although, most members of the local council meetings in Malawi have brilliant contextual observations towards local problems, they are hampered by lack of adequate conventional education,

64 Liminal spaces are not limited to two worlds but for the sake of this argument I am restricting the liminal space to two—the western world and the indigenous traditional cultures that formed way of life before western influence.

197 technology, and information to make informed contributions and decisions on issues affecting their lives and their communities. If the Malawi government genuinely wishes to nurture democracy in the country, it should provide the resources and opportunities for capacity building so that multicultural societies have equal opportunities for participation in the analysis and assessment of public policy. Democratic tools, such as deliberative processes, would then not be restricted to decision-seeking but act as social spaces for knowledge exploration.

Through a spirit of mutuality and respect for difference and human dignity, the heart of uMunthu, the Malawian self can be both (African) human and a political actor towards a better society. By salvaging the best traditional practices that characterize the

Malawian people and embracing western democratic values that enhance communitarian values and the respect of law and order, postcolonial agents, such as Malawians, can enjoy a contextual polity to govern themselves. This polity does not necessarily have to be called democracy, but for lack of a term I would like to call this—Contextual

Democracy.

Suggestions for Further Research

Evident in my findings is the lack of information and capacity by most council meeting participants to engage in professional dialog without personalizing or politicizing issues. Comprehensive research on how new media could be used to promote information dissemination, education, and capacity building for citizens in Malawi to engage in productive deliberation is warranted. The role of the media in this respect could also extend to broadcasting deliberation exemplars that demonstrate best practices in citizen participation in the country.

198

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