Attributes of the Modern Canadian Officer: Developments Since Unification

ATTRIBUTES OF THE MODERN CANADIAN OFFICER: DEVELOPMENTS SINCE UNIFICATION Maj S.D. Lloyd JCSP 43 PCEMI 43 Exercise Solo Flight Exercice Solo Flight Disclaimer Avertissement Opinions expressed remain those of the author and Les opinons exprimées n’engagent que leurs auteurs do not represent Department of National Defence or et ne reflètent aucunement des politiques du Canadian Forces policy. This paper may not be used Ministère de la Défense nationale ou des Forces without written permission. canadiennes. Ce papier ne peut être reproduit sans autorisation écrite. © Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as © Sa Majesté la Reine du Chef du Canada, représentée par represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2017. le ministre de la Défense nationale, 2017. CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE – COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES JCSP 43 – PCEMI 43 2016 – 2017 EXERCISE SOLO FLIGHT – EXERCICE SOLO FLIGHT ATTRIBUTES OF THE MODERN CANADIAN OFFICER: DEVELOPMENTS SINCE UNIFICATION Maj S.D. Lloyd “This paper was written by a student “La présente étude a été rédigée par un attending the Canadian Forces College stagiaire du Collège des Forces in fulfilment of one of the requirements canadiennes pour satisfaire à l'une des of the Course of Studies. The paper is a exigences du cours. L'étude est un scholastic document, and thus contains document qui se rapporte au cours et facts and opinions, which the author contient donc des faits et des opinions alone considered appropriate and que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et correct for the subject. It does not convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas necessarily reflect the policy or the nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion opinion of any agency, including the d'un organisme quelconque, y compris le Government of Canada and the gouvernement du Canada et le ministère Canadian Department of National de la Défense nationale du Canada. Il est Defence. This paper may not be défendu de diffuser, de citer ou de released, quoted or copied, except with reproduire cette étude sans la permission the express permission of the Canadian expresse du ministère de la Défense Department of National Defence.” nationale.” Word Count: 4910 Compte de mots: 4910 2 INTRODUCTION The Canadian military fought effectively in both the First and Second World Wars. Towards the end of the First World War, the Canadian Corps became informally known as the ‘shock troops’ of the British Forces.1 While numerous reasons account for the success of the Canadian Corps in the First World War, how officers were chosen for service and raised in rank within the Canadian military was important. Raising an army from minuscule levels meant that there were very few officers that had sufficient seniority. The British Army, on the other hand, was not at all a meritocracy; they based the promotion of officers strictly on an “entrenched military class.”2 Without this systemic road block, the Canadian Corps over 4 years of training and war developed itself into a professional fighting force with a trained and effective officer corps. Once again, during the Second World War, Canada would raise an army and its officer corps to professional levels.3 But the end of the Second World War presented new problems to a military that understood only one way of warfare. The advent of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver those weapons internationally meant the ‘total war’ that was fought in Europe and the Pacific could not be fought again without the escalation to the use of nuclear weapons. Some questioned the role for a standing military in the nuclear age.4 However, limited wars and insurgencies quickly justified the requirement for a standing military. It became clear that these standing militaries needed an officer corps that was 1 Pierre Burton, Marching as To War: Canada’s Turbulent Years 1899-1953, (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2001), 208. 2 Erin Weir, "Using the Legacy of World War I to Evaluate Canadian Military Leadership in World War II" Journal of Military and Strategic Studies [Online], Volume 7 Number 1 (14 October 2009):5 3 J. L. Granatstein, Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 311. 4 Andrew B Godefroy, In Peace Prepared: Innovation and Adaptation in Canada’s Cold War Army, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014), 60. 3 flexible enough to participate in operations ranging from forming a conventional force in a nuclear war, presenting a strong deterrent force, limited wars such as Korea, to stabilization forces, and peacekeeping missions. Developing the framework for an officer corps within a military is a challenge. This is especially true when this effort is attempted while the organization is conducting operations internationally, and when the government had only recently re-defined the military’s role.5 The military needed to adapt to the requirements for National Defence, laid out by Minister of National Defence Brooke Claxton in the 1947 White Paper.6 Developing and enhancing an effective officer corps for the Canadian Military was only one of the major challenges facing the leadership, but it would be a critical step. Reorganization, financial constraints, and international and domestic crises made it difficult to define what aspects were critical to officer corps development. During the post-World War Two period, what aspects of officership did the Canadian Forces attempt to develop or impose? Over several decades, finding the solution was neither smooth, linear, nor incremental, with many missteps along the way. Despite the disjointed, delayed, and reactionary methods the Canadian Forces (CF) have used over the past 50 years, the CF incrementally defined the attributes required for officers in the modern military. Today, the military has a better understanding of the elements needed for the future of Canadian Forces’ officers, enabling them to lead operations in the increasingly complex combined and interagency battlespace. 5 Douglas Bland, Canada’s National Defence: Volume 1- Defence Policy, (Kingston, Ontario: Queen’s University, 1997), 20. 6 Ibid. 4 Post-Second World War the Canadian military consisted of separate services until unification. Unification was an organizational change that had mixed results but had some unintended consequences. Several reports through the 1970 and 1990’s discussed aspects of officership and the professional development of officers. The challenges of the institutional crises and the implications of large sustained operations and challenges in creating a consistent development model all had significant effects on the understanding of the modern requirements for Canadian officers. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF UNIFICATION In the 1960s, the Canadian government decided to integrate the Canadian military and unify it under one structure. As the three services had conflicting concepts of priorities and how to implement them, the Canadian military was spending substantial amounts of money on personnel in three separate services and very little on much-needed equipment. 7 Most agreed that an organizational change was needed since the military could not keep up the personnel expense while bringing in new equipment.8 The organizational change offered by Liberal Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer, in the 1964 White Paper, outlined the objective of unifying the forces under a centralized chain of command and the increased emphasis on research and development.9 Savings from personnel, Hellyer proposed, would be directed towards operations and new equipment so that the Canadian military could remain operationally relevant. While the White Paper never directly dealt with the development of leadership, it did comment on 7 Granatstein, Canada's Army,353. 8 Ibid. 9 Hon. Paul Hellyer, and Hon Lucien Cardin, White Paper on Defence, (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, March 1964) 5 the increased opportunities for officers and members of the unified organization.10 Structurally forcing separate elements to train and work together was meant to increase the knowledge and experience of CF officers.11 Significant improvements in the organization and combined training of officers resulted. However, despite the good organizational development, Hellyer’s implementation of unification damaged the officer corps through unintended consequences.12 These problems helped to define elements needed for officers in a modern force. Specifically, unification adversely affected the morale of members of the Canadian Forces. Loss of identity to a fighting force is very significant. Any successful military force requires a degree of fighting spirit, sometimes referred to as esprit de corps. This fighting spirit is largely supported by a strong sense of identity, in both themselves and their unit. Identity is closely linked to customs and traditions and it cannot be altered by enforced legislation alone. Identity Unification potentially damaged traditional identities and, as a result, the morale and fighting spirit of the Canadian Forces. Hellyer’s plan entailed loss of distinctive uniforms, a common rank structure and neutralization of many customs and histories that supported the single services.13 This loss of identity had negative impacts on the performance of officers, soldiers, sailors and airmen, and airwomen. The hard-won identities of the Second World War and Korea were lost, and the esprit de corps that goes 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 These concepts have been expanded upon in the Master’s Thesis by Scott Lloyd, "The Effects of Unification on Joint Warfare in Canada.” (American Military University, 2016) 13 Geoffrey Shaw, "The Canadian Armed Forces and Unification." Defense Analysis 17, no. 2 (2001): 160. 6 with them were devastated. Canadian historian, Jack Granatstein, states that Hellyer went “that one step too far” in trying to force a single identity on the Canadian military.14 It is the morale, or esprit de corps, supported by a strong identity that allows the military to push through adversity. It is also those aspects that allow a force to remain cohesive in confusing situations. When unification saw the loss of distinctive uniforms, badges, and rank structure it forced military personnel to question who they were, struggling to identify with those warriors who came before.

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