PHY Covert Channels: Can you see the Idles? Ki Suh Lee, Han Wang, and Hakim Weatherspoon, Cornell University https://www.usenix.org/conference/nsdi14/technical-sessions/presentation/lee This paper is included in the Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI ’14). April 2–4, 2014 • Seattle, WA, USA ISBN 978-1-931971-09-6 Open access to the Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Symposium on Networked Systems Design and Implementation (NSDI ’14) is sponsored by USENIX PHY Covert Channels: Can you see the Idles? Ki Suh Lee, Han Wang, Hakim Weatherspoon Computer Science Department, Cornell University kslee,hwang,
[email protected] Abstract ers [20, 28, 34, 35], and, thus, are relatively easy to de- Network covert timing channels embed secret messages tect and prevent [14, 19, 26]. Network timing channels in legitimate packets by modulating interpacket delays. deliver messages by modulating interpacket delays (or Unfortunately, such channels are normally implemented arrival time of packets). As a result, arrivals of pack- in higher network layers (layer 3 or above) and easily ets in network timing channels normally create patterns, detected or prevented. However, access to the physi- which can be analyzed with statistical tests to detect tim- cal layer of a network stack allows for timing channels ing channels [11, 12, 16, 32], or eliminated by network that are virtually invisible: Sub-microsecond modula- jammers [17]. To make timing channels robust against tions that are undetectable by software endhosts. There- such detection and prevention, more sophisticated timing fore, covert timing channels implemented in the physi- channels mimic legitimate traffic with spreading codes cal layer can be a serious threat to the security of a sys- and a shared key [24], or use independent and identically tem or a network.