The Meaning of Hell Exploring the Meaning of Life Through the Lens of the Afterlife
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Department of Theology Studies in Faiths and Worldviews D2, 15.0 c Master’s Thesis (One Year) Spring Term 2021 The Meaning of Hell Exploring the meaning of life through the lens of the afterlife Author: Henry Englund Supervisor: Mikael Stenmark i ABSTRACT In this thesis, I take a closer look at the meaning of life from an eschatological point of view. More precisely, the question at hand is whether and in what sense the existence of Hell would impact the meaning of life. The thesis primarily makes use of Joshua Seachris’s theories on what ‘the meaning of life’ denotes, dividing ‘meaning’ up into the subcategories of ‘intelligibility’, ‘purpose’, and ‘significance’. Three different answers to the research question are proposed, which crystallizes three different positions: Hell-optimism, which denotes the view that the existence of Hell would contribute to the meaning of life; Hell-neutralism, which denotes the view that the existence of Hell would have no effect on the meaning of life; and Hell-pessimism, which denotes the view that the existence of Hell would detract from the meaning of life. Arguments are given for each position, most appropriated from the broader meaning of life-discourse. On the basis of the evaluation of each argument, Hell-pessimism is considered the most probable of the three. KEYWORDS: eschatology, hell, meaning, life, intelligibility, purpose, significance. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................. 1 1.2 PURPOSE ............................................................................................................................. 2 1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION ..................................................................................................... 3 1.4 DELIMITATIONS................................................................................................................ 3 1.5 THEORY .............................................................................................................................. 5 1.5.1 OPTIMISM, NEUTRALISM, AND PESSIMISM ....................................................... 5 1.5.2 THE TRI-OMNI-PERSPECTIVE ................................................................................. 5 1.5.3 THE MEANING TRIAD ............................................................................................... 8 1.6 METHOD............................................................................................................................ 12 1.7 PREVIOUS RESEARCH ................................................................................................... 15 2. ANALYSIS ............................................................................................................................... 17 2.1 HELL-NEUTRALISM ....................................................................................................... 17 2.1.1 GRATUITOUS EVIL .................................................................................................. 18 2.1.2 WHAT ABOUT A GRATUITOUS HELL? ............................................................... 21 2.2 HELL-OPTIMISM.............................................................................................................. 23 2.2.1 MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY ................................................................................... 23 2.2.2 MORAL MOTIVATION ............................................................................................. 25 2.2.3 FREE WILL ................................................................................................................. 28 2.3 HELL-PESSIMISM ............................................................................................................ 31 2.3.1 PURPOSE AND SUCCESS ........................................................................................ 32 3. CONCLUDING REMARKS .................................................................................................... 36 3.1 DISCUSSION ..................................................................................................................... 36 3.2 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 38 4. BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 39 1 1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 BACKGROUND What is the meaning of life? This is perhaps the most fundamental question in the field of Philosophy; perhaps, even, the most fundamental and profound question one could ask, period. Even though the question is rightly regarded by many as notoriously multi-faceted and vague, modern attempts within the analytic tradition to pin down and analyze the so-called (lower case) meaning of (upper case) Meaning have been somewhat successful. For example, many contemporary analytical scholars have opted to primarily treat the question of the meaning of life as a question regarding meaning in life – what are the inherent conditions that make a life meaningful? The modern (and perhaps existentialist) insistence that meaning in life is something that one can, and indeed must, subjectively define for oneself, could be said to be a branch in this line of thinking. Others, still, argue that a case can be made for the existence of objective meaning in life (such as, for example, Susan Wolf and Robert Audi). Another (according to me) successfully confined approach lies within the field of Philosophy of Religion. Scholars of this bend are often engaged in discussions about the implications of theism on the meaning of life – is it necessary for God to exist if there is to be any objective meaning to life? What does, or could, God add to the equation? Unlike the more exclusively immanent approach mentioned above, philosophers of religion have a stronger tendency to treat the question of the meaning of life as regarding over-arching and cosmic meaning, and furthermore to view said meaning as being contingent upon the existence of God. Indeed, it seems to be the very question of life’s meaning that drives many people into religious faith to begin with. Christian philosopher William Lane Craig has argued that without God, life lacks both meaning, value and purpose.1 For him, not only the existence of God but also the broader Christian narrative provides a viable way to make sense of meaning, value and purpose in life. But what is it about Christianity that satisfies this seemingly universal human craving for cosmic meaning? And could it be that, after carefully disserting the conditions for cosmic meaning-making, not all Christian ideas are found to be satisfactory in this regard? 1 Craig, William L. ‘The Absurdity of Life without God’. In: Seachris, Joshua W. (ed.): Exploring the Meaning of Life: An Anthology and Guide. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2012, pp. 153-172. 2 T.J. Mawson mentions, in his survey of recent work on meaning of life-questions within the philosophy of religion, that there seems to be reason to question whether variants of theism that hold to the traditional doctrine of Hell can be said to positively influence the meaning of life.2 Even though the prospect of salvation is often mentioned in, for example, the formulation of theodicies,3 many theologians and philosophers fail to adequately consider the prospect of damnation. The suffering of a Jew in Auschwitz whose life culminates in eternal misery is difficult, it would seem, to characterize as meaningful. A life that starts with despair, progresses in despair, and ends in eternal despair seems no more meaningful (and certainly not more valuable) than a life that ends with the naturalistic ‘nothingness of death’. Perhaps, then, there is a case to be made that the truth of theism, combined with the truth of the doctrine of Hell, detracts from the overall meaning of life. The reader who sympathizes with this sentiment might be surprised to learn that there are thinkers, including the aforementioned William Lane Craig, who argue that the existence of Hell, far from detracting from the meaning of life, substantially contributes to it. According to Craig, the existence of Hell is a necessary condition for the significance of our choices, in that it guarantees final justice for right- and wrongdoers. I believe that these two plainly contradictory proposals call for further investigation, and it is indeed my intention to contribute to this largely untouched academic soil. 1.2 PURPOSE The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the implications of the existence of Hell, understood as a place of eternal misery and separation from God, on the meaning of life. More specifically, the question of whether a Hell of neutral impact is acceptable from a Christian standpoint will first be considered. The proposition that the existence of Hell would have a positive impact on the meaning of life will subsequently be put under scrutiny, in order to lastly assess the case for an understanding of the existence of Hell as detrimental to the meaning of life. 2 Mawson, T. J. ‘Recent Work on the Meaning of Life and Philosophy of Religion’, Philosophy Compass, Vol. 8, No. 12, 2013, p. 1142. 3 Take, for example, John Hick’s soul-making theodicy, postulating that the purpose of suffering is the cultivation of moral virtues. 3 1.3 RESEARCH