68 Free Will: The Scandal in Philosophy Indeterminism

Determinism Libertarianism Agent-Causal Chapter 7

Compatibilism Event-Causal Soft Determinism Hard Determinism Non-Causal Soft Compatibilism SFA Incompatibilism Hard IncompatibilismThe History Soft Causality Semicompatibilism of the Broad Incompatibilism Soft Libertarianism Illusionism

Free WillNarrow ProblemIncompatibilism Modest Libertarianism Daring Soft Libertarianism Impossibilism Cogito Soft Incompatibilism Leeway Incompatibilism Valerian Model (Alternative Sequences) Source Incompatibilism (Actual Sequence)

Two-Stage ModelThis chapter with on the Limitedweb Determinism and Limited Indeterminism informationphilosopher.com/freedom/history The History 69 Indeterminism History of the Problem From its earliestLibertarianism beginnings, the problem of “free will” has been Determinism intimately connected with the question of moral responsibility. Most of the ancient thinkers on the problem were trying to show that we humans have control over our decisions,Agent-Causal that our actions “depend on us”, and that they are not pre-determined by fate, Compatibilism by arbitrary gods, by logical necessity, or by a natural causal determinismEvent-Causal. Soft Determinism

Almost everything written about free will to date has been ver- 7 Chapter Hard Determinism bal and formal logical debate about the precise meaningNon-Causal of philo- sophical concepts like causality, necessity, and other dogmas of Soft Compatibilism determinism. SFA The “problem of free will” is often described as a question Incompatibilismof reconciling “free will” with one or more of the many kinds Hard Incompatibilism of determinism. As a result, the “problemSoft of Causality free will” depends on two things, the exact definition of free will and which of the Semicompatibilism determinisms is being reconciled. Broad IncompatibilismThere is also an even more difficultSoft reconciliationLibertarianism for Illusionism “libertarian” free will. How can a morally responsible will be rec- onciled with indeterminism or objective chance? The standard argument against free will is that it can not possibly be recon- Narrow Incompatibilism Modestciled Libertarianismwith either randomness or determinism,Daring and that these Soft two Libertarianism Impossibilism exhaust the logical possibilities. Before there was anythingCogito called philosophy, religious accounts Soft Incompatibilism of man’s fate explored the degree of human freedom permitted Leeway Incompatibilismby superhuman gods. Creation myths often end in adventures of the first humans clearly making choices and being held respon- Valerian Model (Alternative Sequences)sible. But a strong fatalism is present in those tales that foretell the future, based on the idea that the gods have foreknowledge Source Incompatibilism of future events. Anxious not to annoy the gods, the myth-makers (Actual Sequence) rarely challenge the implausible view that the gods’ foreknowl- edge is compatible with human freedom. This was an early form of today’s compatibilism, the idea that causal determinism and logical necessity are compatible with free will. Two-Stage Model with Limited Determinism and Limited Indeterminism , - - - - Leucippus and , who coined the term physis the term physis , who coined Democritus Anaximander , the philosopher of change, agreed that there were were there that agreed change, of , the philosopher Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free The materialist philosophers philosophers materialist The The physiologoi transformed pre-philosophical arguments arguments pre-philosophical transformed physiologoi The Heraclitus The Greeks had a separate word for the laws (or conventions) of of conventions) (or laws the for word had a separate Greeks The The first thinkers to look for causes in natural phenomena phenomena natural causesin for to look thinkers first The again with extraordinary prescience, claimed that all things, that claimed prescience, extraordinary with again individual with in a void, atoms of made were humans, including events are caused, mental events might not be. This is mind/body be. This not might events mental caused, are events the mind If dualisms. all the of great important the most dualism, own its have it could matter, from different a substance soul) is (or bodies.material for nature of laws the from different laws, Determinism about gods controlling the human will into arguments about pre- about arguments will into the human controlling gods about be problem cosmological The it. controlling laws causal existing events of chain a causal saw Some problem. a psychological came think religious many by taken (later cause a first to back leading all although physical that held be to God).ers Other physiologoi begins with a state of minimal information and maximum dis maximum and minimal information of begins a state with were laws the universal that imagined cosmologists Early order. behind causes the natural explain therefore must all-powerfuland (νοῦς) the mind to the heavens of motions regular all from things, man. of The Presocratics The cosmolo The early rules behind all or (the logos) the change. laws cosmos ordered an produce could their laws that intuition gists’ the universe model of Our current prescient. was chaos of out organized nature, and logos (λόγος), as the law behind nature, in behind nature, the law as (λόγος), logos and nature, organized cosmology. (νόμος). nomos society, (rather than gods controlling events) were the Greek physiologoi physiologoi the Greek were events) controlling gods than (rather (φύσις)physical the behind (λόγοι) reasons The cosmologists. or The phenomena. material governing became the ideal “laws” world was cosmologist first (κόσμος), cosmos as the words combined also(φύσις). likely He 70 Chapter 7 Leucippus make us more responsible for our actions. But ironically, he and wanted to wrest control of man’s fate from arbitrary gods and atomic motions controlled strictly by causal laws. added chanceadded as a fifth -cause an uncaused self-caused or cause clearly reckoned chance among causes. the were “accidents” caused by “chance (τύχη).” In his Physics, he (single) cause” that idea was to come later. Aristotle didnot to simplistic the subscribe “every event has a of sense the multiple the factors or explanations an behind event. tle’s word for causes these was ἀιτία, translates which as causes in four possible causes (material, efficient, formal, and final). chain back to aprime mover or firstcause, and he elaboratedthe determinism was probably Aristotle order to hold man responsible for his actions. humancile freedom with material determinism and causal law, in ing themselves over thousands of years. of events (an borrowed idea from sources) Middle Eastern repeat pletely by determined its past. Some evenargued for agreat cycle cosmosthe for chance. stated firstthe dogma, an absolute necessitywhich left noroom in problemto modern the and of will determinism. free physical determinism andnecessity, logical directly lead which 1 Then, inhis Physics and Metaphysics, The first major philosopher to argue convincingly for some Pythagoreans,The The consequence is a worldwith but possibleone future, com ἀνάγκης μάτην χρῆμα πάντα ἐκλόγου οὐδὲν τε γίνεται, καὶ ὑπ’ ἀλλὰ by necessity.” “Nothing at occurs random, for but areason everything and Leucippus, Fragment 569-from Fr. 2Actius I,25,4 originated two of great the dogmas of determinism, 1 Socrates History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem Aristotle , and Plato . First he described acausal . First he described Aristotle said there also Aristotle might have attempted to recon Democritus Leucippus Aristo in - - - - -

71

Chapter 7 - , - - 3 (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν) 2 argued that as atoms atoms as that argued 4 Epicurus Aristotle, , themselves depend upon us us depend upon , themselves Epicurus argued that these swerves would allow these allow swerves that would argued Epicurus opposed his accidental chance to necessity: to chance accidental opposed his (ἐν ἡμῖν) Aristotle (1935) Metaphysics, Book V, 1025a25 Book V, (1935) Metaphysics, Aristotle Book VI, 1027a29 (1935) Metaphysics, Aristotle III.v.6 Ethics, (1937) Nichomachean Aristotle Aristotle, a break in the causal chain allowed us to feel feel to us allowed chain in the causal a break Aristotle, within us us within - will).” (ekousia voluntary are and “If we are unable to trace conduct back to any other origins than than origins other any to back trace conduct to unable are we “If are which the origins of then actions those ourselves, within be of necessity: that is, if there must necessarily be some cause, be cause, necessarily some must if there necessity: is, be of that destroyed. and generated which is that of accidental, than other otherwise not.” if this happens; Yes, not? this be, or Will “Nor is there any definite cause for an accident, but only chance chance only but an accident, for cause definite any there is “Nor “ cause. (ἀόριστον) indefinite an namely (τυχόν), gen which are causes and principles are there that obvious is “It gen of the actual processes from destructible apart and erable true, everything not if this is destruction; will for and eration Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 2 3 4 One generation after after generation One Some scholars say Aristotle did not see or confront the problem the problem see confront or did not Aristotle say scholars Some For He noted that the early physicists had found no place for chance chance for place no found had physicists the early that noted He Aristotle new causal chains. chains. newcausal if impossible something actions, our for responsible be to us more ians claim that future contingency is logically impossible, and his his and logically is impossible, contingency future that claim ians determinism. material of laws from exempt are animals belief that when they occasions would were there the void, through moved initiating their otherwise from thus determined paths, “swerve” of free will versus determinism. But consider his arguments for for arguments his consider But determinism. free willof versus the Megar against example “Sea-Battle” his indeterminism, some they are no less free nor we less responsible if our character itself itself character if our responsible less we free nor less no they are are and in the past freely developed were habits predictable and in the future. changeable our actions “depend on us” (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν). He knew that many of our our of many knew that He (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν). us” on “depend actions our but character, and based habit on predictable quite are decisions - one he thought happens when two causal chains come together together come chains causal when two happens thought he - one (συμβεβεκός). accident by their causes. among 72 Chapter 7 determinism. sional interventions of arbitrary gods would preferable be to strict actionwascaused. deterministically Forevery and God’s foreknowledge. Augustine quotes Cicero, would break causal the chain of determinism. he could not explain how, that beyond fact the random swerves and his friend rect. We know for billiard and balls planets. atomic physics average to become nearly dynamical certain laws are only forlarge case the very where objects, statistical the laws of of atoms inunstoppable motion. paths Deterministic perpetual with other atoms.tact material Everything inthe universe is made move they swerve, unpredictably are whenever they con inclose necessityscend and chance. Aristotle, that sions. His critics, ancient and have modern, claimed mistakenly 6 5 Cicero Lucretius So Parenthetically, we now know that atoms donot occasionally Epicurus didnot was saydirectly involved swerve the indeci fate; things do not ifall happen according to fate, there is not “If things donot there all is will, happen free according to decrees of fate, [ whence comes will free this not make of by abeginning motion swerving as to so break the es out of old the inorder invariable, and iffirst-beginnings do “If motion all is always one long chain, and motion new aris and it is to that them praise and blame naturally attach.” chance is inconstant; whereas our own actions are autonomous, through our own agency. ...necessity destroys responsibility and “...some things happen of necessity, others by chance, others Epicurus didassume “one -one swerve decision.” Following Epicurus’ intuition of a fundamental randomness was cor Lucretius Natura), Rerum (1982)De 2,lines 216-250 book Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus, §133 Epicurus thought human agents have ability the to tran unequivocally deniesfate, causal determinism, strict saw randomness the as enabling evenif will, free Cicero Epicurus’ work largely from Roman the Lucretius . History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem libera Epicurus, occa the ]?” ]?” 6 5 ------73

Chapter 7 ------10 Their Their 8 9 Epicurus’s Epicurus’s Epicurus be Epicurus argued that that argued moral respon moral , took the edge off off the edge , took Aristotle’s and and Aristotle’s Chrysippus Aristotle, and and Aristotle, Chrysippus Aristotle’s chance as a cause. as chance Aristotle’s Democritus, Democritus, 7 Augustine (1935) Bk V, Ch. 9, Cf. Cicero, De Divinatione BookII, x 25 De Divinatione Ch. Cicero, 9, Cf. V, (1935) Bk Augustine 70 (1980) p. (2000), Sorabji Long 73-76. (1988) p. Sambursky, Sharples (1983) p. 8, Long, (1986) p. 101, Sharples (1996) p. 8. (1996) p. 101, Sharples (1986) p. 8, Long, (1983) p. Sharples

a certain order of causes; and if there is not a certain order of of a certain order not is if there and causes; of a certain order by foreknown things of a certain order there is neither causes, G o d .” Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 7 8 9 10 Chrysippus said our actions are determined (in part by our determined (in part by are actions our said Chrysippus Whereas the past is unchangeable, unchangeable, is the past Whereas The major founder of Stoicism, Stoicism, of founder major The Stoic virtue called for men to resist futile passions like anger anger like futile passions resist to virtue men called for Stoic It was the Stoic school of philosophy that solidified ideathe that philosophy of school theStoic was It he also said correctly that they are not necessitated. Chrysippus Chrysippus necessitated. not they are that alsohe correctly said Epictetus. the Stoic was as be a compatibilist, seen as would today some future events that are possible do not occur by necessity occur necessity do not by possible are that events future some have We us. depend on might but alone, external factors past from action. an to assent to not or assent to a choice but foreknowledge), God’s (because of fated and causes) as selves strict Like determinism. for the argument strengthen to wanted him, he fore from it in particular defending sibility, causes. chance indeterminate and women) were equal children of God coincided with (or was was God (or with of coincided equal children were women) and freed those fields physics logic and Stoic the church. by) adopted deter the of dogmas strengthened but superstitions, ancient from especially modern philosophy, science and dominate that minism denied when they explicitly of God were the laws of Nature, but that God and Nature were two two were God Nature that and but Nature, of the laws Godof were by uni casestrict follows In either determinism entities. different God. omniscient and omnipotent an from Reason (logos) versal slaves men (including all that morality Stoic fine The envy. and of natural laws controlling all things, including the mind. all including things, controlling laws natural of of Most religion. and philosophy in to this day, persists influence because their doc probably lost, are writings Stoic the extensive considered was Nature, whichGod identified with fate, trine of laws the agreed that church The the Christianchurch. to anathema The Stoics The 74 Chapter 7 Aristotle and on Hellenistic Thinking ed humaned inorder will free to absolve an omnipotent of God was favored will free by early theologians. Christian want They Christians Early ligible mystery. Chapter See 4. against continues will free to make human freedom an unintel one sideand randomness on other, the the that actions free are caused directly by arandom event. of randomness for and idea will free confused - the libertarians thinkers have not moved significantlybeyond this core problem than twenty-three centuries of philosophizing, most modern feel responsible for But them. we dofeel responsible. Despite more human reason” (ἀιτιάν ἄδελον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ). freedom. Even withty chance (or an uncaused cause) as source the of human ofwas part Stoic the identification God and of Nature. something. Alexander foreknowledge the denied of events that sible for self-caused decisions, and to can door choose not to do do not have predetermined causes. In particular, man is respon like Stoics, the and Alexander himself argued that some events terms of responsibility, what “depends on us” (inGreek ἡμῖν). ἐφ arbitriumin (liberum or voluntas). libera The discussion was in Greek philosophy had no precise termfor “free will” as didLat ofa view agethe of Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics. Alexander defended 11 A couple of centuries after Caught horns the between of with adilemma, determinism on Actions caused by chance are simply random and we cannot Most of ancient the thinkersobvious the recognized difficul Alexander that believed Alexander of Aphrodisias Aristotle, wrote 500years after

Sharples (1983)p. 21 moral responsibility wetoday. would libertarianism call Plato were rather forgotten minor philosophers in Aristotle described chanceAristotle described as a “cause obscure to History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem Aristotle was not determinist astrict Alexander , the most, the famous commentator Aristotle’s death, at when atime , asubtle argument for standard argument 11 - - - - - 75

Chapter 7 - for example, example, for 12 Augustine’s ideas Augustine’s 13 Augustine Cicero, that human freedom freedom human that Cicero, (p.126), Giussani put forward the forward put Giussani (p.126), Studi lucreziani Studi argued for free will, but only as compatible with God with compatible as only free will,but for argued (Morgan) held, with with held, (Morgan) Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will. Book Two, I, 7, Book Three, IV, 38 I, 7, Book IV, Three, Book Two, the Will. of Choice On Free Augustine, 40 Book IV, Three, the Will. of Choice On Free Augustine,

previous movements of sensation, thought, and emotion, prof emotion, and thought, sensation, of movements previous motions, the atomic of the peculiar by libertyits spontaneity or “The complete conception of the will according to Epicurus to of willthe according conception “The complete which movement atomic a complex elements, two comprises from withdrawn is is, that spontaneity, of the characteristic has or then thesensus, and causation: mechanical of the necessity by which the will, in virtue illuminated of self-consciousness foreknowledge is not opposed to our free choice.” free choice.” our opposed to not is foreknowledge “God must needs have given free will to man. God’s God’s free willman. given to needs have must “God Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 12 13 and leads to the mistaken conclusion that the swerves directly that conclusion the mistaken leads to and In his 1896 his In Before we leave the ancients, it will it be see to instructive how the ancients, leave we Before Augustine’s more sensible contemporary, the British monk monk the British contemporary, sensible more Augustine’s idea that Epicurus’ atomic swerves are involved directly in every directly involved swerves are atomic Epicurus’ idea that that in the past somewhere just free action, not human case of goes This determinism. beyond of chain the causal breaks Epicurus. of view Stoics’ was This the actions. cause modern ideas of free will, looking for specificmodern modern free will, for looking ideastheories of libertarianism. I will extreme try and point to compatibilism like obvious. they these where are biases out Giussani Carlo Classicists on Free Will in Antiquity in Will Free Classicists on saying were the ancients what understood have classicists great our by influenced them are of many free will. Unfortunately, about Pelagius of success The foreknowledge. divine prohibited a heretic. Pelagius judge to led the church responsibility for evil actions. This is called the problem of of evil. evilis called problem This actions. for the responsibility Thoseheld omniscient, Godto who be human with compatible was foreknowledge God’s that maintained theologians. most illogical by an stillfreedom, today position held Augustine 76 Chapter 7 Cyril Bailey Epicurus’ of idea actions “up being to us” (πὰρ’ ἡμάς). of individual atomic something that swerves, could constitute not determined, but not also susceptible to pure the randomness mind-atoms that work together to form aconsciousness that is actionswise would necessitated. be imagined complexes Bailey of providesoul abreak continuity inthe of atomic motions, other 16 15 14 In agreed with Giussani 1928Bailey that atoms the of mind- the secure ‘freedom’secure as an occasional breach of ‘natural law’.” hingethe on whole the which of his system turns. He wished to deliberatevery breach creed inthe of ‘necessity’ and is inasense of his principles might havethe contrary On rectified. it was a oversight on Epicurus’ amore which part careful consideration givencan be and no explanation offered... But it was no slip or and effect, for the it is assertion of a force forwhich causeno always pointed out, abreach of fundamental the laws of cause “The ‘swerve’ the of atoms is, no doubt,the critics as have knowswhich no placation’. “ ing gods the by worship, whereas latter the involves anecessity natural philosophers: for former the suggests ahope of placat about gods the than to become aslave to “destiny” the of the ously broke away from him: ‘it were better to follow mythsthe accepted inits by fulness Democritus, but Epicurus conspicu natural law pressed to its conclusion. This conclusion been had tiny’ or ‘necessity’, outcome which is logical the of notionthe of with almost greater horror conception the of irresistible ‘des superstition. But it is sometimes forgotten that Epicurus viewed action of gods the and to relieve so humanity from terrors the of ing laws of nature of falseness the old the notions of arbitrary the orthodox religion, to show by his demonstration of unfail the er Lucretius, intended primarily to combat ‘myths’ the of the “It is acommonplace to state that Epicurus, like his follow translation) Bailey (Cyril to direct or not or inadirection to selected.” seen direct these

Giussani (1896) Bailey (1964) p.Bailey 320 (1964) p.Bailey 318. Studi lucreziani History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem 15 , p. 126 16 14 - - - - -

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Chapter 7

- - Epicurus 17 so as to defend Epicurus from the extreme view theextreme from Epicurus defend so to as Furley (1967) p. 232. (1967) p. Furley Lucretius

if this explanation is correct.” correct.” is if this explanation psychology. It saves voluntas from necessity, as Lucretius says it it says Lucretius as necessity, from voluntas saves It psychology. no is There in every voluntas. act of feature does not it does, but find to action a voluntary scrutinize needto theof psychology The peculiar in it. vulner element spontaneous or uncaused an random seemed fit it to — that freedom Epicurean of ability a myth, — is ones purposive and deliberate than rather actions, “But there is no evidence about the number of swerves. of One the number evidence no is about there “But the that be so not many must there be and enough, would number all; between any at these limits order no exhibits psyche the theory. of satisfy the requirements would Epicurean part in negative purely “The a swerve,plays then, causes, so that the source of an action cannot be traced back action cannot an of the source so that causes, A single the agent. the birth occurring of something to before be would psyche in the individual’s swerve atom a single of the to be to referred this purpose, if all are for actions enough the psyche. of whole tle’s criterion of the voluntary was a negative one: the source of of the source one: negative a was the voluntary of criterion tle’s the in sense himself, that in the agent action is the voluntary himself. the agent outside be traced or beyond back cannot it a succession from be saved must voluntas that says Lucretius needsto Allhe be which can traced infinity. causes to back of of in the succession a break is criterion satisfy the Aristotelian “If we now put together the introduction to Lucretius’ passage passage Lucretius’ to the introduction together put now we “If see can we theory the voluntary, of Aristotle’s and voluntas on Aristo work. do its to supposed was the swerve atoms of how Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 17 In 1967, Furley examined the ideas of Giussani and Bailey and Bailey and and Giussani theideas of examined Furley 1967, In argues for a strong connection between the ideas of Aristotle and and between Aristotle the ideas connection of a strong for argues us.” to “up are that actions autonomous on Epicurus David Furley David theswerve both of in theimportance de-emphasized and swerves. (Bailey random by directly caused are actions our that the swerve.) Furley of interpretation” deniedhad this “traditional 78 Chapter 7 there two problems, main had been will free corresponding to dif discovereroriginal of “freewill the problem.” Huby noted that Pamela Huby mistakenly attribute to Epicurus. thatcaused extremesense inthe some libertarian commentators and uncaused events exist, but never that human actions are un Sorabji argues that Aristotle was an indeterminist, that real chance predecessors and successors, Stoics the especially and Epicurus. tle Richard Sorabji of Democritus. nation and foreknowledge) and physicalthe causal determinism ferent determinisms, namely determinism (predesti theological 18 Sorabji’s 1980 In same the year 1967,Huby suggested that ’s positions on causation and necessity, comparing to them his four kinds of explanation. counts, Onboth he is right. Ithink why we so; must he thinks that his view recall acause is one of sage he maintains that coincidences lack causes. To understand considerations. But argue Ishall that inalittle-understood pas to causal determinism, that on is, to determinismcausal based “It is not always that recognised Aristotle gave any consideration ions on issue this have diverse since been earliest the times... “I representing be shall Aristotle as an indeterminist; but opin tery.” of atoms. the swerve the How he remains didthis exactly amys that Epicurus ultimately still freedom the to of traced will the “...the remains, fact on of evidence the Cicero and Lucretius, could not, like Aristotle, regard as end this the of matter. the to himmanifestly clear that men could originate action,but he there was aproblem. He it because will, infree seemed believed problem Unlike of freewill. Aristotle, appreciated he fully that as arandom, swerve the uncaused event, was as asolution to the main reason Epicurus had for introducing or swerve, the rather “In spite of poverty the of our it evidence, is quite clear that one

Huby (1967)pp. 353-62 18 Necessity, Cause, and Blame History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem surveyed surveyed Epicurus Aristo was the ------79

Chapter 7 - - ’s - - 21 Alexander of of Alexander Alexander 20 19 appeared in 1983. He described He 1983. in appeared Sorabji (1980) p. x. (1980) p. Sorabji 4. (2007) p. Sharples 8. (2007) p. Sharples

“I turn to the overall interpretation. Lucretius is arguing from from arguing is Lucretius interpretation. the overall to turn “I the clinamen; of the existence to voluntas of the existence the opposite extreme from that of Epicurus but an attempt to to attempt an but Epicurus of that from extreme the opposite responsibility.” and determinism combine to compromise, may well seem to us to raise difficulties for human responsibil human for difficulties raise seem to well us to may himself Democritus but seemed soEpicurus, do to it to and ity, problem.” such no felt apparently by Chrysippus expression definitive given position, “TheStoic not represents the school, head of the third B.C.), 280-207 (c. “The mechanistic atomism of Democritus (born 460-457 B.C.) (born 460-457 of Democritus atomism “The mechanistic His account of cause, I believe, is more promising than any of of any than promising more is I believe, cause, of account His coinci denial alsothe justifies that and today, those current causes.” have dences Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 19 20 21 In his 1983 thesis, “Lucretius on the Clinamen and ‘Free Will’,” Will’,” ‘Free and the Clinamen on “Lucretius 1983 thesis, his In Sharples thinks that the problem of determinism and respon and determinism of the problem thinks that Sharples Sharples’ great translation and commentary commentary and translation great Sharples’ Fowler criticized Furley’s limits on the swerve and defended the the defended swerve on and limits criticized Furley’s Fowler proposed Epicurus that - claim mistaken seriously - but ancient mistaken This actions. our swerves causing directly as random Epicurus. of interpretations in current common become has claim Don Fowler sibility was not realized, in the form in which it was eventually eventually was in which it in the form realized, not was sibility in the his late relatively until post-classical thinkers, to passed on Aristotle. after until not least - at thought Greek tory of Aphrodisias On Fate surviving treatment comprehensive the most perhaps as De Fato ἐφ’ (τὸ responsibility of the problem of antiquity classical from on light deal especially of a great shed It determinism. and ἡμίν) make to attempt the Stoic free will on on and position Aristotle’s determinism. with compatible responsibility R. W. Sharples R. W. 80 Chapter 7 Greek and sources. Latin problemwill at length, with references to principal the original to DavidEpicurus Furley), discussed and Long free the and Sedley A. Long andD. N.Sedley Epicurus 22 In great their 1987work This is not an interpretationthat would have acceptablebeen to this trap.”this fortune as well as with necessity, suggest that he meant to avoid on us’ (or ‘that is which up to us’) is contrasted with unstable autonomous. Epicurus’ remarks, where ‘that depends which perhaps more undependable and eccentric but hardly more necessity only to substitute an alternative human mechanism, notoriously unsatisfactory. It promises to liberate us from rigid motion, ‘swerve’. the But inisolation taken such asolution is tem by introducing aslight element of to atomic indeterminacy he fortheDemocritean reason deterministic this sys modified “It is perhaps most the widely known about fact Epicurus that acceptance of determinism. ian approach to contrasted it usefully can be with Stoics’ the what we know as Freethe Will Question. His strongly libertar firstthe philosopher theto centralityphilosophical recognize of Thusposingthe problem becomesof determinism he arguably that we would not morally be responsible for our actions at all. we should as we act do, it cannot up be to us, with result the “Epicurus’ problem along all that isifit this: necessary has been of causation.” clinamen was only an occasional event broke which chain the tion was accompanied by soul-atoms, inthe aswerve but the andtas clinamen the different; was very act of voli notevery “Furley, however, argued that relationshipthe volun between by atoms inthe aswerve of animal’s the mind.” interpretationural of act of voluntas is this that every is caused have acause at atomic the level, clinamen. the viz. The most nat nothing comes out to be of nothing, therefore voluntas must

Long and Sedley (1987) p.Long and 107. Sedley , as Furley had argued. Fowler continues: 22 History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem The Hellenistic Philosophers (dedicated - - - - - 81

Chapter 7 - - - - , Annas 23 , O’Keefe concluded that that concluded , O’Keefe 24 The Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind of Philosophy Hellenistic The Epicuruson Freedom was mostly concerned with defending an open future future open an defending with concerned mostly was Annas (1992) p. 186. (1992) p. Annas 17. (2005) p. O’Keefe

for this is that a necessary condition on effective deliberation is deliberation effective on a necessary this that is condition for determinism and the future, of contingency and the openness necessary.” the future makes “My own thesis is that Epicurus’ main concern is not with justi with not is concern main Epicurus’ that is thesis own “My and preserving with rationality the but blame, and praise fied he although actions, future one’s about efficacydeliberating of reason both. with The incompatible is determinism thinks that “...since swerves are random, it is hard to see how they help to to they see help to how hard is it random, swerves are “...since expect beto ran a there scarcely can free action. We explain of swervesto everyis swerverole dom before free action... The choose to between, volitions for possibilities alternative provide no free will were if there in having be point no would there for between select.” which to possibilities open genuinely Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 23 24 In his 2011 monograph Aristotle’s Concept of Chance, Dudley Chance, of Concept Aristotle’s 2011 monograph his In In his 2005 study 2005 study his In In her 1992 book, her In causes (ἀνάγκη), explain future contingency, and make the future the future make and contingency, future explain (ἀνάγκη), causes in conclusion, says 268). He (p. unpredictable inherently makes it clear that Aristotle rejects determinism. He says that Ar that says He rejects determinism. Aristotle that clear it makes caused. themselves not are that (ἀιτία) causes three offers istotle (συμβεβεκός), accidents (ἐφ’ ἡμῖν), choice free human are These and animals for ταὐτόματον and humans, (τύχη for chance and “necessary” of chain break the causes These uncaused nature). John Dudley the future event is necessitated. is event the future Tim O’Keefe Tim Epicurus about statements the logical of and necessity fatalism against will Monday, there true be is on a sea that it battle If events. future Julia Annas free to explain swerves help can random to seehow hard it finds alterna provide can randomness that sees she clearly action. But the will choose to from. for possibilities tive 82 Chapter 7 Reason toReason establish Truth the Rea used of they Religion. Because Scholastics can always changed be by of acts will. son’s character and values that tend to shape one’s behavior, but embraceGod, human freedom inKarma, includes which a per like Buddhism, donot which have paradox the of an omniscient determinist and Shiathe inclined toward freedom. Asian religions Islamic thinkers hotly debated God’s with Sunni the will, generally and divine foreknowledge that controlled much human action. though in more popular commentaries he embraced anatural law againstespecially of idea the omniscience God, in Christian the Perplexed Kant Enlightenment. inthe arguments again used later Renaissance in the and by proposed by divine foreknowledge, using sophisticated arguments originally by argued that Both Reason. human freedom was compatible with freedom demanded that God’s actions not necessitated, be even of Reason. cessity inGod’s omniscience, by himself that laws was ruled God maintained that man was but free held also there was a divine ne scripture alone, were moderns. they called son, instead of acceptingon faith traditional based views and The ScholasticsThe theologiansto use weretried who medieval 26 25 Great Jewish thinkers like chance, on both.” based can which be starting-point choice afree can be or unusual] a[sc. accident or back to acontingent traced be starting-point. This contingent areon earth final inthe analysis contingent, can all they since exception world, determined inan otherwise but that events all profoundly not only that human choices free are not only the explanationcal for of inadequacy determinism. the He argued minist, but that he provided an epistemological and metaphysi “It may said, be thatthen, Aristotle not only was not a deter

Argument from Free Will inWikipedia, 2010 October retrieved (2011)p.Dudley 15. and and Duns Duns Augustine, that God’s knowing was outside of time, Chapters on Ethics Scotus History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem took opposite the view, that God’s own Maimonides inhis argued for human freedom, 25 Thomas Aquinas Guide for the Immanuel - - 26 - - -

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Chapter 7 - - - - - and Baruch Baruch exchanged and Pietro Pompon Pietro and were contemporaries of of contemporaries were René Descartes and the Descartes René and Martin Luther Martin Pico della Mirandola Gottfried Leibniz Lorenzo Valla Lorenzo John Bramhall John and questioned the teachings of the church and and the church of the teachings questioned and protestant reformer reformer protestant and . Again, they were called they modern were because they. Again, tried followed the Scholastics and argued that God’s foreknowl God’s that argued and the Scholastics followed Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free Thomas Hobbes Thomas Modern philosophy began with with began philosophy Modern Renaissance thinkers like like thinkers Renaissance saw it consistent with the prescience of God. compati Both of were the prescience with consistent it saw determinism causal with compatible was freedom Hobbes’ bilists, determinism. religious with Bramhall’s and War. They debated Liberty and Necessity circa 1650. Hobbes held held Hobbes 1650. circa Necessity Liberty Theyand debated War. to external impediments of the absence liberty simply that was actions “voluntary” The action”). of action (the modern “freedom deter thus are necessary and prior causes all have will” a “free of God. saw Bramhall of thedecree to necessity equated He mined. but predetermination, and inevitability liberty from a freedom as to Descartes’s freedom. It involves an uncaused cause, which cause, uncaused an involves It freedom. Descartes’s to compatible was freedom Spinoza’s impossible. was felt Spinoza necessity. with Civil the English during expatriates as Descartes in Europe living ing Religion). Descartes found the realm of human freedom in freedom human of the realm Descartes Religion). found ing the from substance a separate was thought which he the Mind, in which mind/bodya dualism advocated He Body. material by free and is mind or spirit body determined and is or matter objected Spinoza indeterminate. and unconstrainable nature its The RationalistsThe rationalists, continental other Spinoza (includ Truth of the certainty use establish Reasonto to azzi humanist The Dutch time. of outside was actions human of edge Erasmus frankly was called “Theof Bondage free will. Luther’s diatribes on I. do nor work, new Erasmus’ in nothing saw He the Will.” The Renaissance The Bruno Giordano to the freedom required that man asserted a perfectibility of fail. to as well as improve 84 Chapter 7 unacceptable. was Determinism obviously required for us to be Locke The Empiricists atoms universe inthe and Newton’s uses equations of motion to intelligent knows who being positions the and velocities of the all thought present to be to mind the of God. scientist events the could who see of just times, are all times as all ism of Greek the cosmologists and atomists. Leibniz imagined a or religious determinism back to physical/causal the determin Thusthe rationale for determinism was shifting from theological heavenly controlled else, including bodies everything our minds. and forces the Surely them. between forces the that controlled the on knowledgethings based of starting points, their velocities, their of motion (classical mechanics) could predict motions the of all minism innatural science. Isaac Newton’s mathematical theory determination. It is man the is who free. was inappropriate itself asis a free. will the Thewill to describe byturbed confusing the debates about “free will”. He thought it responsible for our actions. 27 Locke (1959)s.21 27 Locke Pierre-Simon Laplace The empiricistssaw evidence causality for new strict and deter John of idea the liked Locke Freedom but and was Liberty dis The British empiricist philosophers - prophet future andthe see present in the as inamirror.” circumstancesthe and into them take account, he would a be tion had remembrance and intelligence enough to consider all a sufficient insight into the inner things,parts of and in addi “Everything proceeds mathematically...if someone could have produced great confusion.” way nevertheless, has“This talking, of prevailed, and, as Iguess, aman free.”whether be “I question the think is not proper, free, but be will the whether , and David Hume History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem - all found -all chance or particularized this Leibniz this vision as an particularized 27 George Berkeley indeterminism , John - - - - 85

Chapter 7 , ------G. E. ? The ? The , determin with Moritz Schlick Moritz . and of the scientist the scientist of and , but he thought (cor thought he , but Thomas Hobbes Thomas and John Stuart Mill Stuart John to compatible causality Ernst Mach Ernst A. J. Ayer, A. J. , Chrysippus George Berkeley George 28 ” or self-cause), or a free action generated a free generated action or self-cause), ” or and between Hobbes and Hume. and between Hobbes causa sui Bertrand Russell Bertrand , John LockeJohn in the sense that our will caused our actions, even though the even though actions, will our our caused in the sense that Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 28 Hume (1978) A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 171. p. Nature, Human of (1978) A Treatise 28 Hume Locke’s “Theory of Ideas,” which limits human knowledge to knowledge human limits which “TheoryIdeas,” of Locke’s So what is it that distinguishes Hume’s compatibilism from ear from compatibilism Hume’s distinguishes that it is Sowhat There is no doubt that Hume’s reconciliation of freedom of freedom reconciliation Hume’s that no doubt is There I see Hume as a median between antiquity and the present, per the present, and between a median as antiquity I see Hume Hume was a modern Skeptic. He doubted the existence of cer of the existence doubted He a modern was Skeptic. Hume is often simply regarded as one of the three British empiricists who empiricists British of the three one as regarded simply often is their “primary” with themselves” the “things of knowledge put this is standard It perceptions. our of the reach beyond qualities, phers phers Newton Isaac slate the senses a blank starts (the as through mind gathered that Hume Hume. on influence enormous an ideas) was innate no with Moore like scientists physical as well as from lier compatibilists philoso of empiricist work can be to traced the difference major of freedom pivoted decisively toward physical determinism and and determinism physical toward decisively pivoted freedom of Hobbes. by action allowed of freedom the limited logiand analytic most on influence a great was necessity and through philosophers, cal empiricist randomly with no regard for earlier conditions (“sui generis” or or generis” (“sui conditions earlier for regard no with randomly Hume unintelligible. and absurd considered was self-generated), and betwixt medium chance any of admit to impossible “’tis said necessity.” absolute an a fulcrum which the world on point, Archimedean even an haps rectly, if inconsistently) that our actions proceeded from causes causes from proceeded actions our that if inconsistently) rectly, best will at is Free character. in our ism uncaused An causes. prior of willed the consequence was action (the “ cause predict the future. Laplace’s Demon has become a cliché for physi for a cliché become has Demon Laplace’s the future. predict cal determinism. Hume David questioned and knowledge tain 86 Chapter 7 such concepts “meaningless” and “metaphysical.” notionthe of “causation,” that inspired positivists the to declare ofview Hume, as one denying unknowable concepts, particularly most famous he says.. observation, Passions, not are Reason, capable of motivating us to action.In a on ourbased feelings and moral sentiments. And that only these “is,” but that we naturally hold many of our moral simply beliefs could everproduce reasoned arguments to derive “ought” from ofideas morality on sentiments and feelings. He that denied one sions subject to reason. Hume turned around this his and based “natural” judgments, beliefs, and actions. ative tool only. It is “Feeling” and “Passion” that motivates our is that “Reason” cannot motivate is Reason an our evalu Beliefs. fact. But we have anatural incausation belief and inmany matters of can know “relations the of ideas” such as mathematics and logic. inferencethe of cause and effect. a “regular succession” of Afollowed by B, mind the to leads which ity, as observations only show a“constant conjunction” of events, What he didsay is that empirical could methods not standing Treatise Most earlier and later philosophers make feelings the and pas A major theme of Hume’s work, perhaps his core contribution, Thus cannotwe “know”causation and “matters of fact” as we But Hume is much more complex, as acareful reading of the is imperceptible; but is, however, of last the consequence. For is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change of propositions, is, and is not, with Imeet no proposition that den I am surpriz’d to find,that instead the of copulations usual makes observations concerning human affairs;when of a sud waydinary of reasoning, and establishes of being or the aGod, ways remark’d, that author the proceeds for some or inthe time system of morality, Ihave which hitherto met with, Ihave al may,which perhaps, found be of some importance. In every “I cannot forbear adding reasonings to these an observation, and especially the the and especially shows. Hume didnot deny causation. He embraced it. History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem Enquiry concerning Human concerning Enquiry Under prove causal ------87

Chapter 7 ------. 29 Pierre-Simon Pierre-Simon Peter F. Strawson F. Peter and before Hume and and Hume before 30 , p. 469. , p. , p. 95. , p. R. E. Hobart Treatise Enquiry Abraham de Moivre de Abraham after him. And, following de Moivre, Hume calledHume Moivre, de following And, him. after Hume (1978) Hume (1975) Hume

long to every one who is not a prisoner and in chains. Here, Here, in chains. and a prisoner every to who not is long one dispute.” of subject no then, is verbal... not acting or of power a mean only can then, we liberty, “By the will; of this if we is, the determinations to acting, according also we may; choose move, we to if we rest, at choose remain to be to liberty allowed this hypothetical universally is Now may. “But to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the to regard with project in this reconciling proceed to “But ques liberty necessity; of contentious and themost question will science; it not contentious the most metaphysics, of tion ever agreed all have mankind that prove, to words many require that and necessity, of thein doctrine libertythat in as of well as been has merely hitherto in this respect also, dispute, the whole as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or af or new relation some expresses not, ought or thisought, as explain’d; and observ’d be shou’d it necessary‘tis that firmation, what for be given, should a reason time that thesame at and be can a this new relation how inconceivable, seems altogether it.” from different entirely which are others, from deduction Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 29 30 For Hume, there was no such thing as chance. Human igno Human chance. as thing such no was there Hume, For Hume’s greatest contribution to the free will debates was to to was the free will to debates contribution greatest Hume’s Similarly, we judge a person praiseworthy or blameworthy blameworthy or praiseworthy a person judge we Similarly, What is true in moral thinking is true in our physical true is thinking true is physical in moral in our What abilities - abilities Laplace word. a mere chance rance leads to all our ideas of probability. This was the view of was viewthe This probability. ideas of all leads to our rance prob whothe calculus developed of mathematicians allthe great because we see the causal connection between a person’s charac between person’s a see connection becausewe the causal it and Hobbes, agrees with This actions. resulting and volition, ter, in later up will show necessity. and freedom “reconcile” understanding; we have a natural belief in causality, says Hume. Hume. says belief in causality, a natural have we understanding; not and thus “idea” justified empirically an not is it Although ball billiard one how about feeling a natural have we knowledge, move. to one a second causes 88 Chapter 7 ory and renamedory it “calculus the of probabilities.” (1777-1855). Laplace disliked disreputable the origins of the this (1700-1782), Laplace (1749-1827),and century - pendently by anumber of great mathematicians eighteenth inthe possible outcomes ingames of chance was formally derived inde probability were determinists. The mathematical distribution of chance inhuman affairs, but surprisingly,the majortheorists of ability and statistics theory would have encouraged acceptance of is on some level largely aparaphrase of Cicero’s his favorite was Cicero.. His some kindof agent-causal freedom involuntarist acts. would aseriousobjection to be his theory. looking for. But Hume admits frankly that such acausal chain before our would birth not provide are they kind the of liberty never mention that fact the acausal chain of events going back 32 31 One might naively that think development the of prob modern Probabilists Hume ancients the knew better than most, and of ancients, the To objection, this escape we must imagine that Hume wanted Most compatibilists and determinists since Hobbes and Hume While we we act, are, at same the upon.” time, acted anywheretingency universe; inthe no indifference; no liberty. single volition, humanof to every all of every creature. No con ordained and pre-determined, reaching from cause original the of matter, there is acontinued chain causes, of pre- necessary subjected to samebe the laws of necessity with operations the treated of. It may said, be for instance, that, ifvoluntary actions other objections, derived from topics have which not here been theory,this with regard to necessity and liberty. Ican foresee “I pretend not to have obviated or removed objections all to ion.” on understanding, the and of alike begets or species belief opin ignorance of real the cause of any event has same the influence there be no suchthing“Though Chance as the in world; our

Hume (1975) Hume (1975) 31 Abraham Moivre De Enquiry Enquiry , p. 99. , p. 56. History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1667-1754), Carl Friedrich Gauss Daniel Bernoulli De Natura Deorum De 32 - - - - - .

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Chapter 7 - - - - - as cor as 33 determinism . Our decisions are made made are . Our decisions compatibilism ’s reaction to Newtonian determinism, and and determinism, Newtonian to reaction ’s ’s criticism of obtaining certain knowledge based certain knowledge obtaining of criticism ’s 34 Kant (1952) “The Critique of Pure Reason.” p. 10. Reason.” of Pure (1952) “The Critique Kant p. 9. Reason.” of Pure (1952) “The Critique Kant

f re e .” “We then see how it does not involve any contradiction to assert,to contradiction any involve does not it then seehow “We − in sphere the will, in the phenomenal that hand, the one on and, nature, of the law to obedient necessarily is action − visible to belonging as that, hand, the other on free; and, not in so far, is accordingly, and, law, that to subject not is it in itself, a thing experience, and which cannot be applied to objects beyond this objects beyond to be applied which cannot experience, and ren thus and phenomena, them into converting without sphere I must impossible. reason pure of thedering practical extension belief.” for room make to knowledge, abolish therefore, “I cannot even make the assumption − as the practical − as in the assumption even make cannot “I immortal God, and freedom, − of require morality of terests to pretensions its of reason speculative deprive not do if I ity, use of make must these, it at arrive to For insight. transcendent possible the objects of to only which, in fact, extend principles David Hume David Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 33 34 Kant’s noumenal world is a variation on Plato’s concept of Soul, of concept Plato’s on a variation is world noumenal Kant’s Immanuel Kant Immanuel Descartes’ mental world, and the Scholastic idea of a world in a world idea the Scholastic of and world, mental Descartes’ free will idea of God. the His eye of to present which all times are of form esoteric a most is our determined to appear only time and of outside souls in our of categories a priori built-in our by governed senses, which are time. space and like understanding, and immortality. and determinism. Kant subsumed causality and determinism under under determinism and causality subsumed Kant determinism. a precondi determinism made he Reason. Indeed Pure ideahis of know can we what on set he limits But thought. rational for tion belief in a for room make to Reason, in order speculative pure by God, freedom, includes that world mental) (or noumenal timeless Kant to admit to was sense perceptions, our on only this on set he limits but world, phenomenal or in therect physical 90 Chapter 7 ger inKant’s on Hume data, between sense parallel the and Kant is evenstron David Hume’s skeptical attitude toward knowledge that depends Kemp Smith, to Commentary Kant’s Critique of Pure p. Reason, xxii) Johnson uttered brief this analysis of problem. the other-worldly explanation of his contemporary will, free Samuel suggestion may which present itself.” He his method... described like my mind as involving is condition the for moral the law. noumenal grounding realm whose principle is morality. Freedom Kantso claims that establishes Reason his Practical freedom ina incausalitybelief of because our moral sentiments and feelings, to knowledge of causality, for example, but could have anatural necessity or causality. Where Hume said we could not reason 36 35 “We know is our free, and will there’s an end on’t.” At samethe time that Kant was inventing his most fanciful In an early letter toKant afriend, workings the described of his Hume and Kant sought both a reconciling of freedom and If Kant’s the others.”the standpoint, observations the of verifying eachby means of all ic to auniversal outlook that it conceivable adopts inturn every side, and to so enlargeevery its point of from view a microscop bility, that so it may enabled afresh object the be to view from and diversions must maintain its powers infreedom and mo to any chance suggestion may which present itself. Relaxations its and idle inits favourable moments, lieuninterruptedly open mind, though not constantly on stretch, the must in alike still, thanharmful preoccupation with extraneous matters. The “In mental labour of delicate so acharacter nothing is more tion of moral the law we which know.” (without, however, understanding it), it because is condi the speculative reason of which we know possibilitythe a priori “Freedom, however, is only the one of ofideas the the all

Letter to Marcus Herz, February 21, 1772, Werke, x, p. 127 (cited by Norman Kant CritiqueReason.” (1952)“The of Practical p. 329. Cogito Critique of Pure Reason Critique of Practical Reason 36 model, - “The mind model, -“The must...lie to open any chance chance History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem , and in terms that sound remarkably can be seen as areaction to seen can be 35 .

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Chapter 7 - - - entropy and irrevers and entropy ’s attempts, starting in 1866, to derive the derive in 1866, to starting attempts, ’s ’s explanation of biological evolution in 1859 evolution biological of explanation ’s Plato’s Timaeus to the middle ages maintained that that maintained the middle to ages Timaeus Plato’s Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free Ludwig Boltzmann Ludwig Charles Darwin Charles The history of the problem of free will cannot of be addressed willfree cannot problem of the history The This is despite three great advances in science that critically in science that advances great three is despite This Since the age of Newton and Kant, very few philosophers have have very philosophers few Kant, and Newton of the age Since ibility) from the classical mechanical motions of gas particles gas of motions mechanical the classical from ibility) treated and (chance) probability introduced he faileduntil (atoms) and important as Being (another great dualism). dualism). great Being as (another important and Thermodynamics (increasing thermodynamics of law second Being” from from Being” the at man through all the smallest organisms, the species - from God to various then through up world, the natural of pinnacle since least all at time, for existed had - angels supernatural typesof real as was Becoming confirmed that work Darwin’s the creation. requires chance to create variation in the gene pool. The alterna in the gene variation create to chance requires which implies change, such controlling law a deterministic is tive all Or per time. all for species existed has about information that of Chain “Great The change. real no is there the idea that haps without being aware of these shocking developments in an eighty- in an these developments shocking of being aware without deterministic classical of period eroded the foundations year that of thought. areas thinking in five Evolution possible future consistent with determinism. with consistent future possible two and thein universe chance real of the existence dependon of the status question that mathematics in logic and developments certainty. philosophical Five Post-Kantian Shocks to Determinism to Shocks Post-Kantian Five human of our sense reconciling newfor ideas genuinely offered also thinkers most which for determinism, physical with freedom theone of predictability and necessity, certainty, causality, implies 92 Chapter 7 in the universe.in the in Germany, of idea the rejected atoms, who letalone real chance atomsthe statistically. He by his physicist was ridiculed colleagues integers. consistent mathematical system complex enough to include the would propositions always true be that could not proved be inany Mathematics centuryfound20th an explanation inquantum indeterminacy. Tychism 1870’s, and as espoused philosopher workthe in1859,explicitly of made by Darwin Boltzmann inthe domness. paths,Boltzmann’s confirming requirement for microscopic ran weparticles could only predict probabilities the for atomic the berg, mechanics for macroscopic (large) systems. Even before Heisen mechanicscal is now as simply seen limiting the of case determinism implied by Newton’s laws, at least for atoms. Classi bybelieved many thinkers to have put an end to absolute the Quantum Mechanics into question. mathematics and found first the paradoxesthe of that logic call MathematicaPrincipia 2000 years until Gottlob Frege in1879and Logic irreducibly statistical laws. Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorem in1937proved there for two original the cases So irreducible randomness, implicit in Werner Heisenberg Aristotle’s was accepted logic asof paradigm the for truth over Boltzmann,After the presumedlaws certain of physicsbecame Max Born Max and and William James had shown in1926that incollisions of atomic in 1910 failed to in1910failed establish basis for alogical History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem ’s principle indeterminacy in 1927 is ’ answer to determinism, have inthe Charles Sanders Peirce Bertrand Russell quantum quantum ’s ’s ’s - - - 93

Chapter 7 - - called them). They maintain that there is there that called them).They maintain ’ “soft” determinists claim that willfree is com claim that determinists ’ “soft” William James William Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free • those who simply asserted human freedom (some even Broadly speaking, philosophers after Kant can be divided into divided into be can Kant after speaking, philosophers Broadly • those who continued to accept compatibilism (or even William James William Libertarians argue that free will is incompatible with any and and any with free will incompatible is that Libertarians argue Many modern philosophers admit to being “hard” determin being “hard” to admit modern philosophers Many admitting chance as a factor), as chance admitting even if our character was itself determined by prior causes. causes. prior determined by itself was character even if our groups, main four determinism), patible with determinism, since if determinism did not hold, they hold, not did if determinism since determinism, with patible which their actions, determine their willthink not could that these itselfcauses our caused, will is Though be random. would them, for freedom this enough is and character, own our include take to be a basic requirement for modern science - for some it is is it some modern science - for for betake to a basic requirement their libertarians admit many And reason. logic and the for basis freedom. human of the source as chance with unhappiness Compatibilists all determinism. Many libertarians still hold a dualist view, with with view, libertarians a dualist still hold all Many determinism. constrain that laws causal circumvent to able Mind immaterial an and call Critics the libertarian view incoherent Body. thephysical which they causality, and denies determinism if it unintelligible without “strict” causality knowledge would be impossible, since since be impossible, would knowledge causality “strict” without truths. deduced and process reasoning our of be sure not could we determinism. the truth of for arguments many are there that Note 9. See Chapter Libertarians Determinists (as ists causal a single is because there primarily future, possible one just that argue Some time. the beginning of from events of sequence 94 Chapter 7 ism” introduced by negatively, tonew form specific the of chance and “ freedom from Nature both and God. itself ( wanted “unconditioned,” Ito the be an undetermined thing in vidual, “I,” the was which Kant’s “transcendental subject.” They Schelling nateness, but inboth.” “Freedom lies neither also in indeterminateness nor in determi “Freedom andare will for us unity the of subjective and objective.” dom that of is awill isacommunity will the He (Being). says, and to become“in the these for itself,” At point, this Hegel’s free itself,” Kant’s “ lightthe of others asnon-being). (the objects He “for the this calls individual the idealism, subject (or on goes being) itself to in see itself,” aconcept following Kant, “ the ing world. He spoke of an absolute freedom of individual the “in downtian ideas from timeless the noumenal realm into an evolv more this-worldly than his mentor mechanism, with its implicit predictability. Just as philosophy was to stress importance the of and time process over inthe19thcentury Germans nothingally of new substance. with lots of philosophical analysis and chopping, logic but virtu 37 Hegel’s colleagues idealist Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel • and those active in recently renewed debates about free will, • those philosophers and scientists who reacted, most of them ficult problem. Freedom is most this the because dif evenwithto respect God, But leave they alone man’s inner independence from his God, independencethe of man from nature, easy. is which indeed defenders “The of Freedom usually think only of showing

unbedingtes Ding an sich an Ding unbedingtes Hegel (1967)Introduction, 8.Two-stage Sect. or model contradiction? wereenthusiastic very about freedom for indi the für sich für quantum mechanics 1920’s, inthe .” Thestage final of his “aufhebung” unites 37 History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem Johann Fichte ). For freedom Schelling,this was Plato, Hegel so brings Kan an sich an ’s greatest contribution to .” But inhis dialectical and and Aristotle was indetermin Friedrich ------95

Chapter 7

- - - 39 did more than anyone anyone than did more liberum arbitrium indifferentiae ’s essay “On the Freedom of the Will” the Will” of the Freedom “On essay ’s Adolphe Quételet 38 Schelling (1936) p. 458 (1936) p. Schelling (1995) p 64. Schopenhauer

exception, but allow this chain to be broken in countless plac in countless be to broken this chain allow but exception, the future... of then all freedom, foreseeing absolute an es by so inconceivable.” and impossible, becomes...absolutely “Under given external conditions, two diametricallytwo opposed externalconditions, given “Under possible.” are actions happens all that of the strict accept necessity not do we “If without all which connects events chain a causal of means by “Thus since man occupies a middle place a middle non- between the man occupies “Thus since Being, God, freefrom is he the absolute and nature being of root independent an God having free from is through both. He is the divine the factthat through nature free from in nature; above is nature of which in the midst in him, that awakened nature.” Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 38 39 Individuals might think marriage was their decision, but since since but their think decision, was marriage might Individuals In the 1820’s the great French mathematician Joseph Fourier Fourier Joseph mathematician French the great the 1820’s In Schopenhauer found this completely unacceptable. unacceptable. this completely found Schopenhauer Arthur Schopenhauer Arthur year, Quételet claimed the individuals were determined to marry. marry. determined to were the individuals claimed Quételet year, mer and statistician statistician and mer determin evidence of were these regularities statistical claim to ism. to year from stable relatively was marriages total of thenumber noticed that statistics on the number of births, deaths, marriages, marriages, deaths, births, of the number on statistics that noticed remarkably had Paris of crimes in the city various and suicides, “normal in a values mean The year. to year from averages stable of the errors”) bell curve of follows “law or that (one distribution” The astrono Belgian a social of law. the prestige on took statistics The Rise of Statistical Thinking Rise The of Statistical won the prize of the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences in 1839. of Academy Danish the Royal of the prize won extensive. is 65-90) (pp. work predecessors’ his of description His - the freedom absolute defined He grounds. prior being determined by not - as 96 Chapter 7 rename “sociology.” his theory ofhis discovery “laws of human nature,” prompting Comte to Quételet used and and responsibilitytake for own their lives. was to teach concept the of probability, to encourage students to architect reform, of curriculum this and tenet acentral secular Catholic religion, ineducation. especially was Exner principal the form of Austrian education aimed at diminishing powerthe of the paid his salary. One outcome of revolution the of 1848was are wereideas anathema to Catholic the Austrian government that a Catholic priest, was stripped of his teaching his because post possibility the of discussed Bolzano,dence will. free they inwhich at Prague 1830’s inthe and 40’s. had afamous They correspon (1781-1848) and averagescal appeared determined. to be events were simply determined actually statisti their because human was nonexistent. will free Quételet and argued also that statistical regularities proved that perhaps asignature of Determiner. the to show mighttermined, expected they be a non-random pattern, humanual events are unpredictable and random. Were de they Itillogical. appears to go something like this: In France, two philosophers, A few thinkers questioned that idea the individual random In England, Quételet might more reasonably have concluded that individ Quételet’s argument for determinism inhuman events is quite •Human events are determined. •Human events show statistical regularities. of large numbers). that become more and more with more certain law (the trials throw of diceingames of chance) show statistical regularities Perfectlyrandom,• unpredictable the eventsindividual (like Alfred Fouillée Auguste Comte Henry Thomas Buckle Franz Exner (1838-1912),argued for human freedom History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem Charles Renouvier (1802-1880)were professors both ’s term “social physics” to describe developed the ideas of ideas developed the Bernard Bolzano (1815-1903) - - - - -

97

Chapter 7 - - - - - Essais Essais moral moral , and made made and , Fouillée denied Fouillée Tyche ’s Origin of Species Origin of ’s , and proposed his own own his proposed and , as espousing absolute absolute espousing as beyond chance and necessity. necessity. and chance beyond Aristotle was deeply impressed by chance as a as chance by impressed deeply was Charles Darwin Charles Herbert Spencer Herbert tertium quid , Renouvier generally followed Kant, but he he but Kant, followed generally , Renouvier La Liberté et le Déterminisme, le et La Liberté 40 Peirce (1958) Vol. 6, p. 28 6, p. (1958) Vol. Peirce

“(1) by external compulsion, or the action of efficient causes, (2) efficient the action of or external compulsion, “(1) by causes, of final the influence or nature, inward an virtue of by absolute by just but cause, definite without irregularly (3) and chance.” Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 40 Peirce (correctly) reads reads (correctly) Peirce Charles Sanders Peirce Sanders Charles Every philosopher after after Every philosopher in clear contrast to the random events of his tychism. his of events the random to contrast in clear a offering and chance ways, in three pass to come events that holds says, he Aristotle, namely associated it with the Social with it associated Darwinist time and his thinking of also rejected the determinis Peirce philosophy.” called a “greed it of scheme ticevolution the laws everything of including theevolution for scheme grand continuity, called term for a coined this synechism, He Nature! of ing on the work of Darwin, Peirce was unequivocal that chance chance that unequivocal was Darwin, of Peirce the work on ing it named He the world. of property real a was irregu of variety, of growth the evolutionary the for basis tychism otherwise including an universe, from mechanical departures lar like did not Peirce But original thoughts. own Peirce’s and life falsely selection. He natural and variation fortuitous Darwin’s exactly chance as a cause could be made consistent with with be consistent could made a cause as exactly chance responsibility. increasingly of (in the form “progress” and diversity bring to way think his modeling Obviously the world. to organisms) complex was affected by the explanation of evolution as random variation variation as random of evolution by explanation the affected was it that found and it, selection. embraced A few natural by followed based the freedom, liber on human their ideas of to support gave how of idea a convincing offered few But chance. of notion ating and based it on the existence of absolute chance. In his his In chance. absolute of the existence basedon and it Générale de Critique realm imaginary noumenal Kant’s from freedom human moved con included Renouvier which for world, the phenomenal into In events. tingent determinism. and necessity 98 Chapter 7 human actions. The Stoicsthat objected cannotwe be responsible to chance (since at least Chrysippus and Cicero) as cause the of and we know he was familiar with ancient the Stoic objection mind. Unlike his colleague Charles Peirce, from whom he learned choices.determined past. There arealternatives undetermined followed by adequately and transforms an equivocal future into an unalterable and simple natives, leading to achoice grants which consent to one possibility decision process, with chance inapresent of time random alter said, chance asdescribed neither of but these, “ minism” in his lecture Dilemma Determinism.”onof “The He Charles Renouvier. was free. He his will believe was encouraged to by dothis reading was free.his As will his first freedom, act of said, he he chose to for chance actions. Peirce agrees, saying 43 42 41 James likely evolution had of model the very Darwinian in James was first the thinker to enunciate clearlytwo-stage a James coined terms the “hard determinism” and “soft deter William James Peirce about is boastful his knowledge of early philosophers, but only one, and that one either one, chosen.” be shall means that Divinity both Avenue and Oxford Street are called home afterthe lecture is ambiguous and matter of chance?...It “What is meant by saying that my choice of which way to walk afterall, only a roundabout name for chance.” admission that any one ofthings may several come to pass is, ofto idea the chance...This notion alternativeof possibility, this stronghold “The the deterministof argumentthe is antipathy produced regularities.” all of generalization, or to tendency form habits, Ihold which has do. Imake of use chance chiefly to make room for a principle it is due to chance would, futile. But indeed,be Idonot this “To to account undertake for anything by saying that baldly

ibid James (1956)p. 155 James (1956)p. 153 . , in The Will Believeto History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem 41 , simply that asserted indeterminism.” He 42 43 - - 99

Chapter 7 ------44 also had no doubt that cau that also doubt no had (1806-1873) did great work on probability probability on work did great (1806-1873) , in his “Time and Free Will,” argued that time that argued Will,” Free “Time, in his and Bertrand Russell Bertrand A System of Logic, VI, Ch of II, Of Liberty Bk Necessity and A System

phenomena, by antecedents, but determines itself; that our voli our that itself; determines but antecedents, by phenomena, at least or speaking,of causes, the effects properly not, are tions obey. implicitly and which they causes uniformly no have of former the that ‘apparent’ sufficiently it made already have “I the true one.” which I consider that is these opinions ebrated controversy concerning the freedom of thewill: of the which, freedom concerning controversy ebrated divided both has Pelagius, the time as of back far as least at from opin affirmative The world. the religious and the philosophical asserting as called the doctrine commonly a Necessity, is of ion The be to necessary actions inevitable. and and volitions human other like determined, the will not is that maintains negative which, if not removed, would be fatal to the attempt to treat hu treat to the attempt to be fatal would removed, not which,if human of the actions Are science. of a subject as conduct man laws?” invariable to subject events, all natural beings, like other in the same applies of causality “The whether law the question, thecel is phenomena, other to as actions strict sense human to “At the threshold of this inquiry we are met by an objection, objection, an by met this inquiryare of we the threshold “At Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 44 Mill’s godson godson Mill’s Bergson Henri John Stuart Mill Stuart John in the mind (he called it dureé or duration) was different from from different was duration) or called (he in the dureé mind it living evolving were because minds particular, In time. physical sality and determinism were needed to do science. “Where de needed “Where do science. to were determinism sality and in find not could Russell said. he science fails,” fails, terminism call‘will’.” I could specific occurrence that “any himself Hume-Mill thesis. Mill accepted Hume’s view that human actions actions human view that Hume’s Mill thesis. accepted Hume-Mill sure as nature human of laws by be explainable day some would feared he so, not this were If nature. physical of laws Newton’s as science itself. for much about chance, James accepted Darwin’s explanation of of explanation Darwin’s accepted James chance, about much evolution. human mathematicians the continental like Logic, of but System in his recon Hume’s of endorsement His determinist. a confirmed was the as be to free known will came determinism of with ciliation 100 Chapter 7 ries, so minds were so ries, not subject to deterministic laws. treatedbe as collections of mechanical atoms with no such memo things with memories could not they of past their experience, all discovery directly to purediscovery chance. He says and his main subject was sis was onor discovery the invention of mathematical theories of Invention in the Mathematical Field Hadamard science, mathematics, and poetry. The mathematician delivered on inventions of various kinds, including experimental comparison, but says directions,all like a“swarm of gnats.” He apologizes for crude the likens to around 1907.The firststage is random combinations, which he discoveries,cal inhis lectures to Paris the dePsychologie Société and again inhis vision of an return. eternal choice has evengreater weight it because would repeated be again claimed that as overmen we must to make choose ourselves. This to fathom. and Nietzsche will evenmore the denied both strongly writing makes style hispolemical real position hard on will free istic paths that eventually repeat themselves. His aphoristic and consistent with microscopic (atoms) particles following determin includingfor everything human affairs. His “eternal return” is ibility. He may have impressed been by mechanistic explanations debates universities German inthe about probability and irrevers 45 Hadamard assures us that Poincaré’s observations do not impute In 1937,at Paris the Centre deSynthése, aweek of lectures was Henri Poincaré Friedrich Nietzsche sence ofsence discipline and to disorder of born chance.” I would liberty, call ifone could give name this to mere the ab ness. In subliminal the ego, on contrary, the there reigns what demand[which] discipline, and will, consequently “the right combination isfound to be by calculations strict

Poincaré (2003)p. 60 Epicurus’ “hooked atoms” ploughing through spacein described the conference the described inhis book describes atwo-stage process describes inmathemati History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem Henri Poincaré knew Darwin and perhaps of Darwin knew knew the (1949) Hadamard’s empha . The Psychology 45 conscious Jacques ------101

Chapter 7 , - - - - 46 Ludwig Ludwig Pascual Pascual quantum , and and , William James William 48 Werner Heisenberg Werner , (1882-1936) was a founder of the great Vi the great of a founder (1882-1936) was in its early years. Like Wittgenstein, Schlick Like Wittgenstein, years. early its in MaxBorn 47 , formulated their matrix mechanics version of of version mechanics their matrix , formulated Hadamard (1945) pp. 29-30. (1945) pp. Hadamard 30. (1945) p. Hadamard Schlick (2008) Ch. VII.

thought that in this way alone can anything be done to put an an put to bedone anything can alone in this way that thought scandal.” that to last at end “this pseudo-problem has long since been settled by the efforts been since the efforts settled by long has pseudo-problem “this all...— exceptional with above and, persons; certain sensible of scandals the greatest of one really is it Hence Hume. by clarity print and paper so much again and again that philosophy of only say course, of I shall, thismatter... to ink devoted is er’s the with myself better; said already consoling have others what ing.” ing.” “Invention is discernment, choice...it is clear that no significant significant no that clear is choice...it discernment, is “Invention the will find of without take place can invention discovery or “Indeed, it is obvious that invention or discovery, be it in math be it discovery, or invention that obvious is it “Indeed, ideas.” combining by takes place else, anywhere or ematics to a place, takes operation this first that be avoided cannot “It hardly is chance of the role so that random, at certain extent, we see that But process. mental of the step in this first doubtful occurs the unconscious.” inside chance of the intervention Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 46 47 48 In 1925 In Poincaré is apparently the second thinker, after after thinker, thesecond apparently is Poincaré Schlick Moritz The first step is only the beginning of creation, for the following following forthe creation, of the only beginning is step first The Jordan Quantum IndeterminacyQuantum enna Circle of Logical Empiricism, which included which included Logical of Empiricism, Circle enna Wittgenstein logical analysis. by be could dis-solved problems some thought of “the so-calledproblem of which pseudo-problems, were They one. old an was the will” of the freedom to see random combinations of ideas in the unconscious mind, mind, ideas in the unconscious of combinations seeto random consciously. made choices willful or by decisions followed step, says Hadamard, Hadamard, says step, 102 Chapter 7 with emission or absorption of photons accompanying jump. the random “quantum jumps” of levels, electrons energy the between theory. Matrix mechanics confirmed discrete levels energy and mechanics as asuperior formulation of uncertainty, connotes which lack of knowledge. The Heisenberg name for his principle. It is abetter name than more the popular greater than or to equal Planck’s constant h/2π. its. The product positionthe of error theand momentum error is of an atomic can particle only known be (sic)lim within certain tum mechanics, it states that position exact the and momentum disprovedtheory causality. velocity of atomic and particles, declared that quantum new the ciple mechanics. andalize much to easier calculate than Heisenberg’s own matrix level to another. Schrödinger’s wave mechanics wasto easier visu “transition probabilities” for electrons to jump from one energy probabilistically.ic particles ministically, it only predicted positions the and velocities of atom that Schrödinger’s while wave evolved function over deter time even deterministic, theory. disliked abrupt the jumps. His wave mechanics was acontinuous, an alternative formulation of 49 Heisenberg, W(1972)p. 119. Indeterminacy ( More popularly known as the In early 1927,Heisenberg announced his Heisenberg Schrödinger’s used wave functions to calculate the Within months of wave new the mechanics, In 1926, rather than that.” next,the or what causes it to emit an electron direction inthis plain atom why aparticular decay at will one moment and not “We cannot -and here is where causal the law breaks down -ex limiting our knowledge of simultaneous the position and Erwin Schrödinger Unbestimmtheit 49 History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem

ΔpΔx ≥h/2π quantum mechanics. Schrödinger Uncertainty Principle in developed wave mechanics as ) was Heisenberg’s original Neils Bohr indeterminacy prin indeterminacy Max Born Max ’s old quantum showed quan ------103

Chapter 7 ------quantum . They were con were . They quantum mechanics that that mechanics quantum , Schrödinger, and other lead other and , Schrödinger, Ludwig Boltzmann Ludwig (son of the 19th-century educator) had had the 19th-century educator) of (son Max PlanckMax , 50 Planck (1981) pp. 154-5. (1981) pp. Planck

“This means that the postulate of complete determinism is determinism of complete the “Thispostulate that means psycho of the progress for a necessary as accepted condition logical research.” “the assumption of absolute chance in inorganic nature is is nature in inorganic chance absolute of assumption “the science. physical of principle the working with incompatible Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 50 Why did Schrödinger switch from an indeterminist to a deter to indeterminist an from switch did Schrödinger Why Just a few years earlier, in 1919, Schrödinger and his mentor mentor his and Schrödinger in 1919, earlier, years a few Just Schrödinger argued vociferously against the random quantum quantum the random against vociferously argued Schrödinger Einstein Albert Later in 1927, Bohr announced his complementarity principle principle complementarity his Bohr1927, in announced Later for his probabilistic interpretation of the wave function. the wave of interpretation probabilistic his for because his work now put him in the company of Einstein and and Einstein of in thehim company put now work because his physics theoretical of chair his from down stepped Planck Planck? the who won Schrödinger, to it Berlin gave of and the University at another and years thirty nearly more took in 1933. It prize Nobel Born theprize Max gave committee the Nobel before war world been strong disciples of of disciples been strong a micro kinetictheory gases required of Boltzmann’s vinced that motions. atomic chaotic and random of world scopic Perhaps life? his of the rest it to then adhere philosophy, minist Franz Serafin Exner Serafin Franz mechanics was probabilistic and Heisenberg’s claim that strict that claim Heisenberg’s and probabilistic was mechanics was reaction famous Einstein’s tenable. longer no was causality said, Planck dice.” “The play God doesnot Lord jumps of Bohr and Heisenberg and for a return to his easily visualhis to a return for and Bohr Heisenberg of and jumps physics. continuous and deterministic, ized, assertion that Born’s at appalled were physicists ing principle is an ontological and real lack of information, not merely merely not information, of lack real and ontological an is principle ignorance. human of a result lack, epistemic an of the Copenhagen interpretation and particle aspects and for wave of combination a dualist for argued electrons. and atoms 104 Chapter 7 than deterministic.” tion of any kindof law or other causal be sequenceshall which himself as unablehad described “to form concep asatisfactory and likened to them subjective and objective views: in 1929,but he spoke vaguely, with his vision of complementarity, there is “no chance medium betwixt and an absolute necessity.” domness and determinism, reluctantly concluded there is no house” “halfway ran between Philosophy of Physical Science possibilities, achoice. then later, Adecade inhis 1939book Poincaré apparently unaware of work the of time, that chance could not identifiedfreedom.with be He was indeterminism with freedom of will. the to a scheme of deterministic law,” advent of quantum the that physics theory is no longer pledged WorldPhysical Eddington his lectures revised for publication as Einstein’sfirmed general relativitytheory. measurementscal of light bending as it sun the had passes con preter of relativity new the and quantum physics. His astronomi 55 54 53 52 51 Niels Bohr But Eddington lefthimself the to open charge since A year later, inresponse to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, Eddington had already established himself as leading the inter In his GiffordLectures of 1927, ject which forms which ject core the of problem the of knowledge.” indispensable elements relation inthe subject and between ob feelingthe of volition and demand the for causality are equally ception by we which reduce our impressions sense to order... our psychic life, causality may considered be of as amode per “Just as freedomthe ofis an category will the experiential of

Bohr (1936) p.Bohr Hume (1978)p. 171. Eddington (1939)p. Eddington (1928)p. Eddington (1928)p. 294. to make deliberation atwo-stage process -first random . There he announced “It is aconsequence the of mentioned and will causality free the discussions 51 History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem 53 an echo of , just afew years before his death, he 52 Arthur Stanley Eddington and enthusiastically identified William James David Hume The Nature of the ’s claim that or or Epicurus 55 Henri - - The The 54 - - - - - ’

105

Chapter 7 - - - - , indeterminism indeterminism was close to many of of many close to was 56

59 Determinism Indeter and 57 58 indeterminism.” indeterminism.” Ernst Cassirer Ernst , Cassirer made the case an ethical one, the ethical case made an one, , Cassirer , 73, 653, June 19, 1931. , 73, 653, June Science quantum mechanics, as they as been had the mechanics, to quantum had been first to see that chance and probability probability and chance to been had see first that Cassirer (1956), p. 209. (1956), p. Cassirer 127. Born (1964) p. Argument.) Standard 209.(Note: p. (1956), Cassirer Original source, C. G. Darwin,

neither way does there remain open that sphere of ‘freedom’ ‘freedom’ of sphere that open remain doesthere way neither ethics.” by claimed which is subjective and objective aspect.” objective and subjective of in the form regarded is in nature causality “whether laws...In statistical merely of or laws ‘dynamical’ rigorous “I think that the philosophical treatment of the problem of free of the problem of treatment the philosophical think that “I distinctionbetween the insufficient an from often will suffers into the arms of a limitless limitless a of the arms into “all truly ethical action must spring from the unity and persis and the unity from truly spring ethical action must “all it us that shows itself in This ethicalcharacter. a definite of tence itself fling were, it as and, to ethics tie itself to be for fatal would Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 56 57 58 59 Some biologists quickly objected to the idea of physical uncer physical the idea objected to of quickly biologists Some Born approvingly quotes Cassirer, from the last chapter of of chapter the last from Cassirer, quotes Bornapprovingly Max Born The German philosopher philosopher The German tainty in the human mind because large amounts of matter ensure ensure matter of amounts because large mind in the human tainty laws. the statistical of regularity adequate Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics Modern in Indeterminism and Determinism who said “we cannot do away with the guiding concept of deter of concept the guiding with do away cannot who “we said dialectically free somewhat will Born that concluded minism.” phenomenon, a subjective just was were essential to to essential were Born Unfortunately Boltzmann. since physics of laws statistical philosopher non-scientist the by Cassirer, influenced strongly was minism in Modern Physics Modern in minism saying the physicists in this debate and had a profound influence on some on some influence a profound had and in this debate the physicists deterministic predominantly also the influenced them. Cassirer of who in physics, untrained themselves philosophers, other views of quantum of the implications tried understand to 1936 book his In their philosophies. for 106 Chapter 7 dom events. allow microscopic random events to produce macroscopic ran Eddington suggestion, of with idea the an amplifierthat would Wimmer Lecture of 1968,he said, but that there were “more steps” to explain needed freedom. In his Margenau but perhaps significantfraction the synapticof gap or cleft. knob. He found it 20Angstroms to be in1second, arelatively tiny positional the Eccles calculated uncertainty of tiny the synaptic stroms). In his 1953book drite of another neuron across a narrow gap (less than 1000 Ang apses, where axon the of one neuron communicates with den the quantum uncertainty might important. be He on decided syn the suggestions seriously and looked for places brain inthe where two-stage process of chance preceding choice. of chance. said, we men’s should expect actions to follow (sic) rules certain principle. If physics were source sole the of our information, he that human freedom was adirect consequence of uncertainty the Man of Compton defended amplifier the book in his 1935 can not responsibility take for random actions caused by chance. sive switch amplifier. It was the to open ancientthat criticism we microscopic randomness. pointed out that natural was just selection such an amplifier of 64 63 62 61 60 One other scientist and sometime philosopher, John Eccles Much later, inthe This naive camemodel forknownfreebe will to the as mas But physicist ditions and is thus himself determining what occur.” will addingself afactor not supplied by [random] the physical con “When one exercises freedom, by of his act choice he is him

, but like Eddington, to later show he was denied trying Atlantic Monthly Eccles (1953)pp. 271-286. The Human MeaningScience, 1940 of Lillie, Ralph A. H.Compton, 62 , saw quantum for uncertainty aswill, free necessary 60 Four years earlier, biologist the had Lillie Ralph , the great, the neurophysiologist, took Eddington’s Science Arthur Holly Compton , October, 1957;reprinted in Compton (1967) Science Atlantic Monthly , 66,139,1927 History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem , 74,1911,August 14,1931. 61 The NeurophysiologicalBasis of Mind of 1957,Compton saw the defended the The The Freedom 63 Henry 64 ------, 107

Chapter 7 , - - - 67 ’s 1977 adaptation of of 1977 adaptation ’s indeterminism as just just as indeterminism

65

Karl Popper Karl 66 ’s view “that it would be fatal for eth be for fatal would it view “that ’s Einstein’s Space and Van Gogh’s Sky Gogh’s Van and Space Einstein’s quantum mechanics leaves our body, our our body, our leaves mechanics quantum Ernst Cassirer Ernst

Margenau (1968) Margenau 71. (1968) p. Margenau 240. (1982) p. Leshan and Margenau indeterminism,” Margenau embraced embraced Margenau indeterminism,”

argue that only the mind can make the choice by selecting (not selecting (not by the choice make can the mind only that argue courses.” future the possible among enforcing) energetically “Our thesis is that that is thesis “Our its (because of numerous with in a state moment any at brain, each futures, possible innumerable) say might we complexity com two involves Freedom probability. a predetermined with and alternatives) set of a genuine of (existence chance ponents: shall we and the chance, provides mechanics Quantum choice. the gaps of physical causation, but he fails to tell where else it else it where tell to fails he but causation, physical of the gaps all.” them, if at build should philosophers who see the autonomy of ethics threatened when ethics threatened of who see the autonomy philosophers august between exist that to sort assumed is any of a relation science.” and discipline in nests its build to be forced not should Cassirer, says “Ethics, “forces us to part company with many distinguished moral moral distinguished many with part to company us “forces “Freedom cannot appear in the domains of physiology and and physiology of the domains in appear cannot “Freedom lodged in physics...embracing already not is if it psychology in indeterminacies by possible made is freedom thebelief that permits only freedom...it of the problem solve will not nature its solution.” towards step first one Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 65 66 67 We note sadly that Margenau does not cite the earlier work of of work the earlier cite does not Margenau sadly that note We Then in his 1982 in his Then book Margenau clearly means his longtime mentor. longtime his means clearly Margenau Margenau lamented that his position position his that lamented Margenau Ιnstead of Ιnstead for mainstream scientific journals, he felt no need for rigorous rigorous needfor no felt he journals, scientific mainstream for Compton (or the philosopher the philosopher (or Compton a topic because free will not was - see Perhaps below). Compton Margenau condensed his model into a single paragraph, with two two with paragraph, a single model into his condensed Margenau choice. and chance - Compton’s components ics to tie itself to and, as it were, fling itself into the arms of a limit arms the itself into fling were, it as and, to tie itself ics to less freedom. human of problem of the a solution toward step the first 108 Chapter 7 sophical interpreters could not reconcile price, his own work not does get referred to by later thinkers. references and scrupulous priority of But ideas. Margenau pays a Mind Matters he says he large needs numbers of neurons to cooperate: neurons are playing an important role inside deep brain. the But mind. Eccles, he Like speculates that single-quantum sensitive Mind might help explain how some of more the mysterious properties of “quantum reality” Quantum Mysteries or phenomenal world. that determinism not was certainly for strict case the physical the uncertaintythe principle with human freedom, concluding only 69 68 David Hodgson Penrose Roger We should mention afew bizarre suggestions by scientists on Most other Nobel-prize-winning scientists and philo their interdependent.” terial’ and non-local, and that perhaps mind and matter are quantum mechanics shows that matter is ultimately ‘non-ma mind’s] indeterministicand character; suggested has also that “My discussion of physical conditions are right” tive) is reached - which would presumably the onlywhen occur achieved as one-gravitonthe criterion (or appropriate alterna ably not solution best) the to minimizing the problem must be tum computer...The selection of an appropriate (though prob taneously in linear superposition perhaps a little like quanthe different combined arrangements of atomsbeing ‘tried’ simul andtum-mechanically; way the that is this done is by many “Such co-operation, Iam maintaining, must achieved quan be

that non-locality and quantum gravity are involved inthe Hodgson (1991)p. 381 Penrose (1989)p. 437 . He claims that 69 consciousness and will. free claims, inhis 1989book

extended Penrose’s in his ideas 1991 book quantum mechanics has confirmed [the History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem 68

quantum mechanics and The Emperor’s New ------109

Chapter 7 , - - - -

con - - - 70 , Stapp , Stapp argued that wave wave that argued Shadowsof the Mind . John Eccles John .

71 Henry Margenau Henry Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics Quantum and Matter, Mind, is another physicist employing quantum strange quantum employing physicist another is downward causation Shadows of the Mind, p. 349. p. the Mind, of Shadows 357-370. p. the Mind, of Shadows

(p. 349) (p. be likely to be adopted, either explicitly or implicitly. Perhaps Perhaps implicitly. or explicitly either be to adopted, be likely influence to be able might mind’ ‘external an of will’ the ‘free non-deter such from actually result that choices the quantum the through presumably is it this On view, processes. ministic ‘mind- the dualist’s that R-process theory’s quantum action of brain.” ofthe stuff’ onthe behaviour its influence have would “With the possibility that quantum effects might indeed effectstrig might quantum that the possibility “With have people some the activities brain, within larger much ger inde quantum circumstances, in such that, the hope expressed to the mind for opening an provides terminacy be what might would dualistic viewpoint a Here, brain. physical the influence Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 70 71 Henry Stapp Henry Penrose provides considerable evidence for correlated states states correlated evidence for considerable provides Penrose The idea that mental processes or even just macroscopic entities entities macroscopic just or even processes mental ideaThe that Penrose went further book his in 1994 in went Penrose iors over large regions of the brain. Resembling Penrose’s argu Penrose’s Resembling the brain. of regions large over iors says: Stapp reference), any (without ments chemical evidence for connecting the microtubules and and the microtubules connecting evidencechemical for in anaesthesia. sciousness 2003 his In ness. can efforts” “mental strong and intentions mental that argues behav correlated produce and functions wave quantum influence energy and are thus an ideal vehicle for the interaction between the interaction for ideal an vehicle thus are energy and this idea thought Eccles matter. physical and mind non-physical by suggested first was then describes cytoskeleton, the cell’s within in the microtubules can “influence” quantum events (e.g., by changing probabilities) probabilities) changing by (e.g., events quantum “influence” can calledis nor matter neither be are theybecause influenced might functions calculating that tens of thousands of neurons could exist in a exist could neurons of thousands of tens calculating that a of one-fortieth for states of superposition correlated coherent the idea of cites He rate). alpha-rhythm (the fundamental second with choices” “quantum “mind-stuff”a dualistic the influencing will.” “free its 110 Chapter 7 include elements that doarandom among walk options for action. not simply Cartesian stimulus-response mechanisms. mals andcan They unicellularoriginate bacteria. actions,so are dence for acombination of random and lawful behavior inani berg Behavioral Freedom 73 72 In organisms, higher Heisenberg findsthat the brainmay still In neurobiologist 2009,the and geneticist ate possible their short-term and long-term consequences. ly preactivate, discard and reconfiguretheir options, evaluand is adaptive. Their brains,kind ina of random continuous walk, informed and short of time, animals have to findthat a module lawfulness brain. inthe Insufficiently equipped, insufficiently onioural modulesinterplay isthe based chance between and As with abacterium’s locomotion, activation the of behav rightthe temperature. receptors,by sensory enabling bacteriumto the find and food phase of forward motion. This ‘random walk’canbe modulated thatso it ends up facing directionin a new ready for nextthe bacteriumforward,the other the causes it to tumble at random around its longitudinal axis in either direction: one way drives terium coli Escherichia moves. It has aflagellumthat can rotate found— can be inunicellular organisms. Take way the bac the from reaction it because not does upon depend stimuli external Evidence of randomly generated action—that is distinct quasi-stable macroscopic brain activity.” von Neumann Process I,effectivelygraspswhole as a an entire ofparts brain. the Aconscious thought, as represented by the thatfunction] coordinates and integrates activities in diverse is associatedact with aProcess Iaction[ to,expected cover large regions of brain. the conscious Each must they cal: over act extended regions, can, which and are “It should mentioned be here that actions the Pare nonlo

, son of quantum physicist Nature, 14May 2009,p. 165 Mind, Matter, and Quantum Mechanics, p. 252. History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem Werner Heisenberg 72

collapse of wave the Martin Heisen , found evi 73 ------111

Chapter 7 - - Adler Adler Erwin Erwin 74 circum self- and . The two were were two . The freedom freedom freedom of of freedom acquired indeterminism. compiled a massive two- a massive compiled . It covers at great length length great at covers . It indeterminism. Max PlanckMax John Eccles John natural (freedom from coercion, coercion, from (freedom Plato to Kant that we are only only are we that Kant to Plato had a famous collaboration over over collaboration a famous had , rejected Mortimer Adler Mortimer self-realization Karl Popper Karl The Idea of Freedom Ideaof The (making decisions for moral reasons rather rather reasons moral for decisions (making David Bohm David (the normal freedom of the will). of freedom (the normal , who along with major thinkers like Einstein, Louis Louis Einstein, like thinkers major with , who along The Idea of Freedom, v. 1, p. 461-466. v. 1, Freedom, of Idea The freedom of of freedom determination covers the classic problem of free will. Do of problem the classic covers determination Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free self-perfection The philosopher philosopher The Most of Adler’s freedoms are actually compatible with classical classical with actually compatible are freedoms Adler’s of Most Sinners, they say, do not have this free will, presumably to make make to this free will, presumably have do not they say, Sinners, Self- Self-perfection the idea is from In an attempt to classify types of freedom, Adler invents three three invents classify Adler freedom, to types of attempt an In In the late 1950’s, 1950’s, the late In

Karl Popper decades the neuroscientist some with 74 physics. In his over 1400 pages, Adler devotes only six pages to to six pages only devotes Adler 1400 pages, over his In physics. mechanical quantum on comments brief of thethoughts on dependsheavily Schrödinger and de Broglie, sinners responsible for evil in the world despite an omniscient and and omniscient an despite evil in the world for responsible sinners God. omnipotent chain? they a causal part of are will, or our determine choices our free when our decisions are for reasons and we are not slaves to to slaves not are we and reasons for are decisions free when our theologically minded phi many also includes Adler passions. our divine a free when following only is man that who argue losophers a stone of freedom Hegel’s led to have whichmay law, moral gravity. of law Newton’s to according freely” “falling political end economic freedom, etc.), the etc.), freedom, economic political end of the and passions), and desires than determination as well as the central freedom of the individual will to choose from will choose the individual to from of freedom the central as well as necessary predictable. not or are that possibilities among - the neutral” “dialectically are hopes he that categories stantial Philosophers Specializing in Free Will Free in Specializing Philosophers Mortimer Adler history of volume external constraints, from freedom and political freedom ideas of 112 Chapter 7 and later to reconsider them. brain. considered They quantum initially effects, to dismiss them, mind more to be than amere “epiphenomenon” of material the ormind/body mind/brain dualists hoped towho discover the evolution, Popper says, determinism and evolution? later remarks and Compton’s 1931references and to Lillie Ralph Canwelection. doubt were these directly inspired by Compton’s a two-stage decision process natural on modeled Darwinian se quantum uncertainty amplifier. Butthen he goes on to describe question of human freedom, including insufficient the ideathe of and Clocks in his 1965 scientific and communitiesphilosophical to utilize quantum indeterminacy.” Popper replied, 75 Any intelligible explanation for must will free include both To point, this Popperthe reflects overall negative reaction the of In X,Eccles said, dialogue their “It is not to possible Ithink there operates akindof procedure selective eliminates which were - of possibilities brought forward by brain. the Onthese and quantum mechanically of characterized set proposals, as it to say, arange of possibilities is brought about by aprobabilistic cess and withto ideas respect decisions. new to free-will That is propriate mutations. Now we could conceive of a similar pro subsequently operates natural eliminates which selection inap (including indeterminacy cal radiationtherethem On effects). “Mutations are, it brought seems, about by quantum theoreti “New have ideas similarity to astriking genetic mutations,” a chance affair.Second, givesit us only doesn’t help much problem, with free-will the is which not just is twofold. indeterminacy ical First, it is probabilistic, and this are just probabilistic affairs. The trouble withquantum mechan laws, and we donot wish to say that such things as decisions free cannota sense help, merely leads this because to probabilistic “I doof course agree that quantum in theoretical indeterminacy

Popper and Eccles, 1977, , Popper celebrated Compton’s contributions to the Arthur Holly Compton memorial lecture adequate determinism, resembling biological History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem indeterminism.” indeterminism. But 75 Of CloudsOf

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Chapter 7 ------77 standard argument.. standard determination to the mind (his (his the mind to determination indeterminism; and in discussing in discussing and indeterminism; Natural Selection and the Emergence Emergence the and Selection Natural 76 . In it he said he had changed his mind (a rare admission admission (a rare mind his changed had he said he it . In Popper and Eccles, 1977, pp. 539-540 1977, pp. Eccles, and Popper a as online available are this lecture Darwin of Parts (1977) College Lecture,

“I have changed my mind on this issue. A choice process may be may process A choice this issue. on mind my changed have “I reper some be from the selection may and a selection process, This turn. in its being random without events, random of toire most our of one to solution promising a offer to me seems to causation.” downward by one and problems, vexing indeterminism I have often regretfully pointed out that quan that out regretfully pointed often I have indeterminism the amplifica for us; indeterminacy seem does help tum to not processes radioactive disintegration say, like, something of tion only action, but even animal action or lead human to not would movements.” random to “The selection of a kind of behavior out of a randomly offered offered randomly of a out “Theof behavior of a kind selection act be of an may repertoire those proposals and those probabilities which are not accept not which are those probabilities and those proposals the mind.” to able indeterminism directly causing our decisions. Note Popper’s Popper’s Note decisions. our causing directly indeterminism Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 76 77 http://www.spokenword.ac.uk/record_view.php?pbd=gcu-a0a0r2-b Karl Popper is thus the third thinker (or fourth, if we liberally if we fourth, thinker (or the third thus is Popper Karl This is the randomness objection of the objection is randomness This the In 1977 Popper gave the first at DarwinDarwin the first gave Lecture, Col 1977 Popper In rare audio recording of Popper. Popper. of recording audio rare (his “World 1”) and the realm of the of realm 1”) and “World (his Kant to ancients the dualism from 2”). The traditional “World determinism phenomenal body of the the realm material made God, freedom, and of realm the noumenal spirit or the mind and immortality. interpret Compton) to describe a two-stage mental process, after after process, describe mental to a two-stage Compton) interpret the problem also solves He Poincaré. Henri and James William of bodymaterial to the chance of realmof the shift so subtle not by a philosopher) about two things. First he now thought that nat that thought now he First things. two about a philosopher) by unfalsifiable an it made that a “tautology” ural selection not was and variation the random accept to come had he Second, theory. free will. a model ideas of as selection of lege, Cambridge. He called it He Cambridge. lege, of Mind 114 Chapter 7 Thiscaught the attention of Wittgensteinscholar ton-style Geiger-counter event followed by abomb explosion. Elizabeth Anscombe in post-war Oxford. “Schoolcalled of Language Ordinary Philosophy” under the leadership of J. L. Austin determinism. even for as pessimists about whom libertarians, he described Buttrue. he was concerned to salvage reality the of our attitudes accepted of facts the determinism. He felt that determinism was oncile determinism with moral obligation and responsibility. He impossible by Hume Skeptic. the p. See 86. problem deriving Ought from Is -something shown logically ofticism and logic thought. critical Hume Naturalist the had no that our moral sentiments are simply given beyond skep facts the praise and blame, gratitude and resentment. asue to ifpersons act were morally responsible of and deserving But evenifdeterminism were he argued, true, we would contin or truth the falsity of determinism, of Strawson P. F. Strawson where she said Anscombe 79 78 Strawson himself was optimistic that compatibilism could rec Strawson was following In his 1962 landmark essay The physicist moral responsibility. when Iwaswhen an undergraduate. mon now among people at large, and among philosophers, than son learned. Ifind to deterministic be assumptions more com conception;this but as far as Ican judge it for time takes les the Feynman’s example of bomb the and Geigercounter smashes presupposition or perhaps aconclusion, of scientificknowledge. ratherthe common dogmatic conviction that determinism is a It has inventions the taken of indeterministic physics to shake

Strawson, P.F. (1962)Apupil of H.P. Grice, Strawson belonged to so- the Anscombe (1971)p. 24. changed subject the fromitself to question will the free inher inaugural lecture at Cambridge University, Richard Feynman 79 History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem Strawson said he could make of no sense David Hume Freedom and Resentment 78 indeterminism, or will. free also proposed also a Comp ’s naturalist arguments Elizabeth Elizabeth , Peter F. ------115

Chapter 7 ------for action. The action. The for without which there which there without alternative possibilities possibilities alternative 80 changed the debate on free will on and the debate changed done otherwise,done alternative possibilities alternative alternative possibilities, but leave the agent the agent leave but possibilities, alternative Harry Frankfurt Harry Strawson (1962) p. 10 (1962) p. Strawson moral responsibility. moral

what possibilities lie formally open; and then perhaps we shall we then perhaps and open; lie formally possibilities what exactly knowing without be can answered the question see that is.” determinism the of thesis what knowing exactly what the thesis of determinism is? Well, there there Well, is? determinism theof thesis exactly what knowing of thesis a coherent is there if do know; we thing that one is such be ‘determined’ a sense of must then there determinism, deter is whatever true, is thesis then all if that behaviour that, least at consider can this, sense. we Remembering mined in that would, or should, the acceptance of the truth of the lead thethesis truth of of the acceptance should, or would, or Would, attitudes? all such of the repudiation or the decay to forgive and resentment, gratitude, of the end mean it should, all per the essentially of loves; adult all reciprocated of ness; antagonisms? sonal without pose,even this question or answer, I can how “But “What I have called the participant reactive attitudes are essen are attitudes reactive called the participant have I “What the ill good to will indif or reactions or human tially natural and in their attitudes displayed as us, towards others of ference or would, effect What is: ask to have we question The actions. deter of thesis a general the truth of of the acceptance should, specifically, More attitudes? these reactive upon have minism Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 80 Frankfurt posited a counterfactual demon who can intervene intervene who can demon counterfactual a posited Frankfurt In 1969 In Strawson felt that the truth of determinism would in no way way in no would determinism the truth of that felt Strawson ferent from what the demon wants the agent to do. Frankfurt’s Frankfurt’s do. to the agent wants the demon what from ferent will any block demon the demon. by desired possibility do the one to choose” “freely to lenged the existence of of the existence lenged free will requires for argument traditional have could agent an so that no is dif do something to about is if the agent decisions agent’s in an “objective” attitudes. “objective” Harry Frankfurt chal that experiment thought a famous with responsibility moral repudiate such attitudes, even the feeling of resentment, unless resentment, of even the feeling attitudes, such repudiate by replaced universally were attitudes called he “participant” what 116 Chapter 7 the demon,the but obviously should false agent the disagree. In that agent’s choice. free thewhen agent’s Thistrue is choice agreeswith anisms blocking Frankfurt claimed existence the of hypotheticalthe control mech terms of afuture “sea-batttle.” that denies propositions. It was the determinism thatical results from conditions truth the of certain “Fatalism.”tled It was not about fatalism exactly, but about log the wrote atongue-in-cheek articleinthe Richard Taylor’sFatalism version of will. free ments, entertaining are, as they cannot establish compatibilist the such demons are not possible and an agent’s decisions -until that information comes into existence, of knowing information actual the about future events -such as Since Frankfurt’s demon, much like Laplace’s demon, has no way one possible future. “Alternative sequences” out. would ruled be admit that there is only one “actual sequence” of events leading to dom.” Without alternatives, virtual these Frankfurtwould have to Fischer his counterfactual intervening demon to block. ine ian free will. like Strawson, argued for haps generated by in part random events, did not exist. Frankfurt, Frankfurt’s examples as actual that knew They bilities, in order needed that agents “could have done otherwise.” would surely notice. demon the case, would have to block agent’s the and agent will the In agent-causalist 1962,the philosopher libertarian Taylor Note, however, that assumes Frankfurtactually that genu Compatibilists had long bothered by been alternative possibilities doexist. If not, there is nothing for causal chain of events - and were delighted to get behind called these alternative these called possibilities “flickers free of future contingency determinism alternative possibilities would irrelevant be to the Master Argument History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem proofs moral responsibilitymoral allows only asingle future -just one that that , also discussed by discussed , also Frankfurt-style thoughtFrankfurt-style experi alternative possibilities, per Philosophical Review of of Diodorus Cronus alternative possi without libertar John Martin Aristotle enti in ------

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Chapter 7 ------of if 81 in freein proof David Foster Foster David indeterminism 82 , he proposed an influen an proposed , he ’ “swerve” of the atoms? He He the atoms? of ’ “swerve” indeterminism in free will that has has in free willindeterminism that near suicide in 1869, and may have have may in 1869, and suicide near Brainstorms Epicurus at all [my emphasis].” emphasis].” all [my at , perhaps the leading spokesman for Com for the spokesman leading , perhaps William James William , who wrote an undergraduate philosophy thesis in 1985 in thesis philosophy undergraduate an who, wrote indeterminism in the right place for the libertarian, for place in the right indeterminism Wallace (2011) Wallace 295. (1978) p. Dennett

“puts “puts place is a right there Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 81 82 And after giving six excellent reasons why his suggestion is suggestion his why reasons six excellent giving after And But does Dennett, following James, Poincaré, and Popper, see Popper, and Poincaré, James, does following Dennett, But Daniel Dennett Daniel Wallace was arguably deeply discouraged by the deterministic the deterministic by discouraged deeply arguably was Wallace Taylor had five years earlier explained correctly that Aristotle Aristotle that correctly explained earlier years five had Taylor ar Fatalism Taylor’s being so popular, philosophy Determinist ated pseudo-random number generator. He says says He generator. number pseudo-random ated what libertarians are looking for, Dennett then suggests that the that then suggests Dennett for, looking libertarians are what been a computer-gener have well as might generator randomness mined choices. of the problem this solves that since philosophy plagued model his that sarcastically, a bit says, patibilism, is a strong critic of any genuine genuine any of critic strong a is patibilism, 1978 book in his will. Yet free of account a two-stage with making” decision of tial “model They They Say Libertarians What Giving “On chapter his will. In deter from possibilities random separates clearly Dennett Want,” fatalism promoted by academic philosophers. This This viewhad driv academic philosophers. by promoted fatalism en the young in 2008. tragic death Wallace’s the young to contributed Daniel Dennett determinism. One of those taken in was the young those the taken young in was of One determinism. Wallace sym elaborate an with argument, Taylor’s disprove to attempting professors. his of one with developed bolic logical argument did not deny future contingency. Statements about future events events future about Statements contingency. future deny did not indeterminate is word false. true The neither nor occurring are the future. open about be to a many taken by and anthologized, widely was ticle 118 Chapter 7 times called “ called times sophical community that two-stage models for are will free some sayboth thatThey exists that Poincaré’s work inspired was infact by picked up at 1937Synthése the conference. now Some evidence tions; other the one chooses.” imagines two agents (inone mind?) Dennett quotes Paul poet the Valéry (as Hadamard quoted), who evolution.cal Another source was win’s random variation and natural for model selection biologi ing computer. two-stage “generate and test” for model acreating problem-solv quantum trand Russell Wiggins Evolves Wanting Worth Will it inhis later works, such as ism may just acompatibilist’s be straw man. He not does pursue universethe origin! But Dennett’s then argument for libertarian domness that breaks causal the chain of pre-determinism back to 85 84 83 Nevertheless, Dennett’s influential articleis so the in philo But as we have was this Poincaré’s seen, Valéry which idea “It twotakes to invent anything. The one makes up combina Dennett’s was model inspired by many sources. One was This completelythe libertarian’s misses point, which ran needs process?” ministic generation process as with acausally undetermined human deliberation can doas well with arandom-but-deter “Isn’t it that case the improved new the proposed for model

(2003). Dennett (1978)p. 293,Hadamard (1945),p. 30. Simon (1981) Dennett (1978)p. 298. ’ indeterminism. Another was Towards aReasonable Libertarianism 83 Valerian.” Chapter See 25for more on Dennett. 84 Simon’s is model itself acomputer version of Dar and alternative possibilities (Dennett, 1984)or more the recent

Arthur Stanley Eddington History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem 85 Elbow Room, The Varieties of Free Jacques Hadamard Herbert Simon “present themselves.” , which cited, which William James as suggesting Freedom ’s book. ’s 1969 David Ber ------. 119

Chapter 7

------liber . , . It is the is . It moral moral alternative alternative . Van Inwa . Van Epicurus determinist Peter van Inwagen van Peter Consequence Argument (James’s name for this was “soft” deter “soft” thiswas for name (James’s is true.” true.” is standard argument against free against will argument standard 86 compatibilist Van Inwagen (1983) p. 223. (1983) p. Inwagen Van , and , and

terminism.” terminism.” “the free-will thesis and determinism are incompatible. That is, That incompatible. are free-will determinism and thesis “the incompatibilism of the existence the free-will deny to is thesis deny “To reject de should we absurd...Therefore, which is responsibility, Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free Van Inwagen replaced the traditional dichotomy determinism- dichotomy the traditional replaced Inwagen Van 86 This has been obvious to libertarians since has This beenobvious in the free will a new called position debates for Inwagen Van In short, if compatibilism traces the causes of our actions, in the actions, our of traces the causes if compatibilism short, In Van Inwagen caused a stir by arguing that compatibilism is is compatibilism that arguing a stir by caused Inwagen Van In his 1983 “An Essay on Free Will,” Will,” Free on Essay 1983 “An his In libertarian (with the reconciliation position compatibilism). His His compatibilism). position libertarian the reconciliation (with incom with - incompatibilism, compatibilism was new scheme he called “Incompatibilism.” It is more than just saying determin saying just than more is It calledhe “Incompatibilism.” free will of and interdependence the assumed is false. is It ism two are there false. is Unfortunately, claims he that determinism determin the the libertarian hard and be to incompatibilist, ways together. these opposites lumps Incompatibilism ist. first half of the half first called Argument. gen Mind half the his second cludes that that cludes in what has come to be to called come his has in what then existed, we before events to back events, of sequence” “actual those events earlier of the consequences simply are actions our con he a logical Speaking as philosopher, us.” to up “not are and traditional view handed down from Hobbes to Hume to Mill to Mill to to Hume to Hobbes from down viewhanded traditional Schlick. denial of Frankfurt’s false, even admitting demonstrably events), of sequence” “actual one only (which implies possibilities Peter van Inwagen van Peter the previous For free will of positions. the taxonomy changed - basically positions three were there century, tarian a usually described following were as compatibilists The minist). 120 Chapter 7 Robert Kane Robert ism and -strange libertarians p. bedfellows indeed.See 60. patibilism amessy category that lumps together hard determin responsibility have shown been wrong by Kane. ism necessarily destroys kindof the control for needed whichever way decisions the go. say Critics who that at indeterministically, provided there reasons exist good equally claim final moment of choice,the decision in itself. stage of atwo-stage model, Kane locates mainthe reason for failure is sive switch amplifiertradition Compton of Gomes.and Kanesays: ity bubbles corresponding to domizer brain inthe -aspinning of wheel fortune with probabil Kane proposed an ambitious amplifier model for a quantum ran byals Eccles, Popper, and Dennett, but working independently, determinism. compatible with determinism, or perhaps impossible of because problem.” Most philosophers and scientists thought was will free losophers had largely as a“pseudo- will free libertarian dismissed Before Kane, late inthe twentieth century, Anglo-American phi 88 87 Kane’s major accomplishment is to show that an agent can still Unlike Kane was not satisfiedearlywiththis model. He explainsthat In his 1985book Robert Kane must are theories iflibertarian to succeed.” of developed creatures cortically like ourselves, but it Isuspect tion...We donot know ifsomething similar on goes brains inthe “locating master the switch and mechanism the of amplifica responding to relevant the R-alternatives.” of into wheel the equiprobable segments (red, blue, etc.) cor domizing activity of spinning the and wheel partitioning the “neurological processes must exist corresponding to ran the

moral responsibility for “torn” decisions that were made Kane (1985)p. 168. Kane (1985)p. 147. Daniel Dennett is leading the spokesman for Libertarianism. Free Will and Values History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem , who put, who randomness first inthe alternative possibilities , aware of earlier propos 87 88 indeterminism inthe

, in the mas, inthe indetermin moral ------121

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. - - - - Self- Self- . Kane . Kane Kane’s 89 ? alternative alternative Kane requires that that requires Kane 90 John Martin Fischer Martin John choose do otherwise or Mortimer Adler Mortimer moral responsibility than than responsibility moral and is Adler’s third freedom. third Adler’s is same circumstances same A Contemporary Introduction to Free Free to Introduction A Contemporary Self-realization Harry Frankfurt Harry to include Kane’s own “self-forming actions” (SFA) (SFA) actions” “self-forming own Kane’s include to in the exact same conditions, and ignoring the fact ignoring and in the conditions, exact same alternative possibilities are very unlikely to repeat, very repeat, to unlikely are possibilities alternative . to include the arguments of the many “New Compati “New themany of the arguments include to never Kane (1985) p. 59. (1985) p. Kane 122. (1961) p. Adler

, a comprehensive survey of the recent positions on free will, on positions survey the recent of , a comprehensive Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free 89 90 Self-formation is a variation of Adler’s natural freedom of of freedom natural Adler’s of a variation is Self-formation In 2005, Kane published published 2005, Kane In of freedom acquired Adler’s on a variation is Self-control But this was not Kane’s main interest. He says it is the agent’s the agent’s is it says He interest. main Kane’s this not was But Apart from the fact that information-rich systems with a his with systems information-rich the fact that from Apart Kane claims that the major criticism of all indeterminist liber all indeterminist of criticism the major that claims Kane that are a subset of self-determining actions. self-determining of a subset are that form helps that “will-setting action” indeterministic an is SFA an perfection about concerned more who are bilists” as freewill, such determination Will since comprehensive the most perhaps categories. three Adler’s to classifications freedom more two adds interested alternative. Kane says that indeterminism might tip the tip might indeterminism that says Kane alternative. interested another, of in favor and fail, it making option, one scales against the successful choice for cause the main But succeed. it making effort the agent’s is It Kane. be says the indeterminism, not should about brought is the successful choice since cause, the main is that effort. the motivated that desires and reasons the for effort, that by choice, for the same reasons, from the same set of set the same of from reasons, the same for choice, possibilities prudential and moral of in cases cause main is the that effort a self- and between a moral “torn” is the agent where choices irrational. But he disagrees he But irrational. tory are random that determined the will very same make might likely adequately an tarian models is explaining the power to to the power explaining is models tarian ratio calls he “dual something conditions,” the same in “exactly one can how choice, the rational A is that Given nal self-control.” exactly B under the doing defend and capricious, arbitrary, is power” “dual a such that say critics 122 Chapter 7 those actions, tothose extent the back to earlier traced can SFAs. be they acter, but “ultimate we assert can still responsibility” (UR) for our character. Later, other actions by determined can be our char determinists). one could not have chosen, according so to compatibilists (and But since “fixed the past” couldbe different never (in retrospect) had chosen to do so and compatibilists over abilitythe to Two Otherwise ClassicistsonDoing says is this impossible: “dual with rational ability” control. otherwise to choose But he Will Richard Double level noise brain inthe that adds enough indeterminacy. amplified by thatchaos triggers adecision, butthe low-general solution problem. to will free the It is no longer aquantum event ofporter quantum indeterminism playing amajor role inthe becoming more common, and insightfully notes that 92 91 Thererich is ahistory of linguistic andquibbles logical among Richard Double We inChapter see shall 24that Kane remains an ardent sup Indeed, today it is determinism that is “metaphysical.” Kane cites turns out incoherent.” to be incompatible. Hence, despite libertarianism, its intuitive appeal, control,wise, and rationality] is that conditions the are logically three conditions canall satisfy view [ability-to-choose-other “My conclusion is that reason deep the why no libertarian have turned away from determinism.” ences -once stronghold the ofto determinist -seem thinking persist at twenty-first inthe all century,thewhen physicalsci “One may legitimately wonder why worries about determinism , agrees with Kane must that will free libertarian have the

A. J. Ayer Double (1991) p. 222. Kane (2002) p. 7. Elizabeth Anscombe Elizabeth said that one could have done otherwise, , i.e., different. ifthingspast inthe had been , in his 1991 book , inhis 1991book History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem 92

do otherwise do ’s remark that determinism is 91 The Non-Reality of Free . G. E. Moore if one - - - -

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Chapter 7 , ------, look conscious for action, for , by simply de simply , by David Sedley David and incompatibilism , namely a “voluntarism” in a “voluntarism” , namely provided randomly by atomic atomic by randomly provided compatibilism alternative possibilities which possibilities alternative 93 alternative possibilities alternative Anthony LongAnthony determinism ’ swerve of the atoms might be limited be limited might ’ swerve the atoms of , the major spokesman for “Hard Determinism,” Determinism,” “Hard for spokesman , the major Epicurus quantum mechanics, neuroscience, and and neuroscience, mechanics, quantum alternative possibilities alternative Long and Sedley 111. and Long (1987) p. Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free

“It does so, we may speculate, not by overriding the laws of phys of the laws overriding by not speculate, may we does so, “It between the choosing by ics, but open.” leave physics of the laws 93 Honderich does not claim to have found a solution to the prob to a solution found have to claim does not Honderich Nor does Honderich go down the path of of the path down go does Honderich Nor Ted Honderich Ted specializing colleagues his freein will, Honderich of most Unlike Long and Sedley assume a non-physical (metaphysical) ability of of ability (metaphysical) Sedley and a non-physical Long assume In 1987 two classicists, classicists, 1987 two In though not eliminating - our “life hopes.” “life - our eliminating not though fronted the problem of the consequences of determinism. He is is He determinism. of the consequences of the problem fronted give we that requires because determinism the truth of “dismayed” - restricting future, open an of promise its with “origination” up lem of free will or determinism, but he does claim to have con have to does he claim free but will determinism, lem of or with ideas of brain mechanisms amplifying quantum mechanical mechanical quantum amplifying mechanisms brain ideaswith of actions of “origination” the uncaused with help to indeterminism decisions. and ing for non-physical substances, dualist forms of agency, or simply simply or agency, of forms dualist substances, non-physical for ing scientists many have as chance, Epicurean with freedom identifying completely consistent with with consistent completely events. prior by caused willwhich completely our is did not succumb to the easy path of of the easy path to succumb did not is Dennett) says want, should (and the free will have that we claring excursions into into excursions ness. Ted Honderich Ted Theorywith The of Determinism, 750-page his in 1988 published from among Sedley. and Long to indeterminacy plausible - is the volition to affect the atoms, which is implausible. But ideathe But is implausible. which atoms, affect the to the volition adequately and with chooses - (consistent volition a physical that feelings) and desires its and values and character its determined by reflects character and values, desires and feelings. and desires values, and character reflects to providing undetermined undetermined providing to that choose a way in could volition of power whichthemind’s from speculated that that speculated 124 Chapter 7 when hewhen follows his reason to acceptof truth the determinism. characterizes it as a“black thing.” He passionately feels real the loss, the brain.the notpossible the 5), evenifhe location does see of sequence poral others as a“modest libertarianism.” wonders how it physically could be possible, he offers the idea to he himself has made no commitment to such low final stages of deliberation are (adequately) determined and al only mostly following Dennett, that should libertarians admit that the Alfred Mele “near-determinism.” He says, pletely dismiss ing inphilosophy. scandal the right. Although not it he does ascandal,Honderich call is describ he faults simplistic their that idea one or other the of must them be show “free” and “determined” are compatible. logically And third, “proofs”cal nor by linguistic analyses of propositions to designed responsibility. problems Second, these can not resolved be by logi of knowledge, and rationalizing punishment withof ideas limited is at stake, there are personal feelings, reactive attitudes, problems three counts. First, he says that 95 94 Alfred Mele And some unlike of his colleagues, Honderich not does com Honderich faults Compatibilists both and Incompatibilists on Though he is determinism’s foremost champion, Honderich where internal indeterminism is, for we know, all areality, and ism deliberative inthe process as arequirement for autonomy, “Where compatibilists have reason no good to insist on determin of particles small ourthe bodies.” only at micro-level whatthe isof called our existence, level the of ters. It allows that there is or may some be “Maybe it should determinism-where-it-mat have called been indeterminism early inthe stages of decision the process. While

Mele (1995)pp. 211-220 Honderich (2002) p. 5. requirements Chapter (see for will free libertarian indeterminism and considers suggestionthe of , in his 1995 book , inhis 1995book History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem moral responsibility is not that all 94 95 Mele’s satisfies model the tem Autonomous AgentsAutonomous indeterminism but indeterminism, and indeterminism in , argued, ------125

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, ------97 . - , and , and Alfred Alfred Randolph , and indeterminism indeterminism 96 Mark Balaguer Mark and independently developed developed independently Peter Van Inwagen Van Peter Laura Waddell Ekstrom Waddell Laura , , Daniel Dennett Daniel indeterminism in processes lead processes in indeterminism and other “event-causal” libertar “event-causal” other and Frankfurt-style examples, in defense in defense Frankfurt-style examples, indeterminism in the direct production of the of in the production direct indeterminism Libertarian Accounts of Free Will Free of Accounts Libertarian David Widerker David Robert Kane Robert . , also in 1995, suggested that the location of the of the location that also, suggested 1995, in Randolph Clarke Timothy O’Connor Timothy , Laura Waddell Ekstrom Waddell Laura assessed suggestions of of assessed suggestions Mele (1995), p. 235 (1995), p. Mele (Nonde “Incompatibilist entitled awkwardly article, SEP Clarke’s Randolph Cf., . He found them inadequate. His work, he says, was carried was says, he work, His them inadequate. found . He Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free

where such indeterminism would not diminish the nonultimate the nonultimate diminish not would indeterminism such where the even on their deliberation exert over agents real that control that — deterministic internally are agents real that assumption libertarians — may these locations three of theintersection at is, libertar Modest indeterminism. ultimacy-promoting for plump this intersection.” try their viewians at out stake to 96 97 They include They include As we saw in Chapter 4, recent libertarian philosophers defend defend libertarian philosophers 4, recent in Chapter saw we As In his 2003 book his In Paul Russell Paul terminsitic) Theories of Free Will” Free of Theories terminsitic) Kane’s strong 1985 criticism of of 1985 criticism strong Kane’s (libertarian) free will. incompatibilist of Carl Ginet Carl Wiggins David of how, when, and perhaps most importantly, where where importantly, most perhaps when, and how, of random. purely actions our making - without the picture enters “incompatibilism” (note that they usually mean libertarianism) they mean usually that (note “incompatibilism” account “intelligible” an on agreement general reached not have but decision,” as does as decision,” as such ians, sibly detracting from what we want. In a 2000 article called “Modest a 2000 article called In “Modest want. we what detracting from sibly indeter early-stage of suggestion Mele’s ignores he Libertarianism,” “places and minism ural science. At best, he concludes, concludes, best, he uralAt science. and pos of value nothing adding superfluous, is actions our to ing Clarke Mele nat specialized no of knowledge required and thinking alone by out Randolph Clarke might be uncaused, and actions, which would be This determined. which would actions, and be uncaused, might Russell but “will,” sense the word useof the common goes against “will.” a final before “free” something puts correctly break in the causal chain might be put between willings, which be put might chain in the causal break Paul Russell Paul 126 Chapter 7 intentions, undefeated authorization of preferences as causes, non sation, event causation, non-occurrent causation, reasons as causes, subtle(sometimes obscuring) differences - agenttheirviews in cau “unintelligible” problem of will. free losophy - entitled tor, 1300+ pages compendium of articles on incompatible. Fischer recently edited afour-volume, 46-contribu determinism, but his main interest, ism Fischer John Martin moral responsibility impossible. attitudes about Sir Peter says that of truth the determinism would not change our right on grounds the that a Peter’s son, telligible” problem will free to problem the of Peter F. Strawson appendixthe for some clarification this dense of terminology.) narrow and broad incompatibilism. of our Terms Glossary (See in compatibilism, revisionism, restrictivism, semicompatibilism, and sequences andactual alternative sequences, source and leeway causal accounts, dual control, plurality conditions, origination, 98 In it, Fischer explains that his colleagues are setting aside the John Martin Fischer Not afew compatibilist/determinist philosophers have, following Unfortunately, works their are of adensejargon full defining sponsible. involved inchoosing or insuch acting away as morally to be re such philosophers, “freedom” refers to whatever conditions are content (separate from analysis the of tion of freedom; notion this of freedom is not given independent with notion the of moral responsibility. Put abit more carefully, tend they to begin Some philosophers donot distinguish freedom and between . Fischer may says will free or may not incompatible be with

Fischer (2005),Vol.1, p. xxiii. series (Routledgeseries 2005). Free Will Galen Strawson 98

moral responsibilitymoral , areference work inthe , turned conversation the away from “unin the moral responsibility, and “work back” to ano History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem calls his position calls causa sui causa , is one. He accepts determinism out , his says son Galen it makes is simply impossible. Where moral responsibilitymoral moral responsibility). For Critical Concepts in Phi moral responsibility. moral responsibility semicompatibil , is not ------127

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------100 and Galen Galen I was a I was Daniel Daniel 99 101 free will free , and the psychologist the psychologist , and describes the “free will describes laby the “free . So their questions are really really are . So their questions and his colleagues created a pop created colleagues his and and define free will as the “control “control define willfree as and the stories have proved fertile ground for phil for fertile ground proved have stories Robert Kane Robert surveys attempted to establish the “folk” the “folk” establish to surveys attempted Saul Smilansky Saul , X-Phi moral responsibility is impossible. is responsibility moral moralresponsibility . Unfortunately, experimental philosophers fol experimental philosophers . Unfortunately, that John Martin Fischer Martin John follow many earlier thinkers and say that libertarian free that say and thinkers earlier many follow agencyandresponsibility.typepad.com/flickers-of-freedom experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com John Martin Fischer Martin John Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free gfp.typepad.com 99 100 101 One of the of One Experimental philosophy consists of opinion polls on common common polls on opinion of consists Experimental philosophy Jorge Luis Borges’ Luis Jorge Derk PereboomDerk sees in Honderich Ted that the “dismay” share may Smilansky pletely determined and others assumed to have libertarian free will. have to assumed others and determined pletely condition” for for condition” those com agents, of kinds two of responsibility the moral about intuitions on the classic philosophical question of of question philosophical the classic on intuitions determinism low “folk psychology.” Experimental philosophers have a blog. have Experimental philosophers psychology.” “folk philosophical questions, intended to quantify the positions of the of the positions quantify to intended questions, philosophical of the so-called public, “folk” untrained or naive philosophically action. Experimental Philosophy of the bloggers created a new blog, with a more restricted member restricted a more a new with blog, created the bloggers of Freedom.” of - “Flickers name a Fischer-inspired too has It ship. of philosophy and the responsibility focusesmoral newblog on The rinth” and and rinth” Paths.” Forking of free will on called blog ular the “Garden 2010. Some closed was in early it until the GFP blog to contributor osophical metaphors. metaphors. osophical probably even morally necessary. even morally probably Paths of Forking Garden The illusions about free will, Smilansky thinks that we need to maintain maintain need to we thinks that free will, Smilansky about illusions Kames, free will, did the 18th-century as of Lord illusion the public and positive, libertarian free of will arguably because is the illusion the apparent loss of control implicit in determinism. But unlike the But determinism. in implicit control of loss the apparent of public the disabuse to andtherapeutic uplifting it who find others will is incoherent and an illusion. Pereboom agrees with with agrees Pereboom illusion. an and will incoherent is Strawson Wegner 128 Chapter 7 opposite, that folk the have compatibilist intuitions. true.” notably Later surveys, by participants inagent believed causality, that “incompatibilism was Phenomenological Research Phenomenological connections or plaintiff. the to accused the persons. It is reason the jurors are from selected persons with no one judging action.This the result is quitebelievable for normal responsibleally is of afunction how action is their to hurtful the blame and punishment seek for action.Holding the an agent mor judgingthose an actionare more likely to reactwith an attitude of feelings about praise and blame, gratitude and resentment. Peter F. Strawson “compatibilist” intuitions, makes which interpretations difficult. Peter van Inwagen mined. heldto morally be responsible, agent evenifthe was clearly deter emotions person judging inthe agent action,the the was more likely provide mitigating circumstances. But stirred as crime up the strong (bydetermined any number of determining factors) was enough to one to close personinterviewed. being the itbecause heinous is aparticularly or crime it because harms some raises crime the emotions,for when especially crimes, their either wantinterviewed to hold agents determined eventhe responsible et al., “Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?” 103 102 What The results littlesay aboutfreevery will, but alot aboutwhat Sadly, philosophers results experimental their describe using In relatively abstract situations, that idea the agent the was The experimental philosophers establishedthat many those of Note convoluted, the van post Inwagen, titles like that of Nahmias earliestThe by surveys,

Eddy Nahmias etal. (2006).Is Incompatibilism Intuitive? Nichols (2004)Folk Psychology of Free Will X-Phi has shown is that emotions their when up, rise knew, that we would not give easily up natural 73(1):28-53. ’s “incompatibilist” distinction between or History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem Shaun Nichols Eddy Nahmias Mind &Language , 102 tended to show that , 103 tend to show the , 19,473-502. Philosophy and - - - 129

Chapter 7 - - Forking paths in the free will paths debates. Forking Free Will: The Scandalin Philosophy The Will: Free determinism. Objective chance would make us random. There random. us make would chance Objective determinism. yet determined, are we that students teach can compatibilists fore, determinists).” hard for not, (or responsible still morally “Science can never prove that indeterminism exists. Quantum Quantum exists. indeterminism that prove never can “Science logically deny So cannot scientists be wrong. may physics The The Scandal Today philosophy of history the over philosophers most of viewThe Figure 7-1. Figure We conclude our historical review with a diagram identifying identifying review a diagram with historical our conclude We seems to be something like this... like beseems to something responsibility in the one possible actual future. possible in the one responsibility from liberty, from freedom, more particularly away from indeter from particularly away more freedom, from liberty, from open in an possibilities alternative from away chance, and minism moral about but directly, freedom about not questions to future, some major turning points in the history of the free will problem. the free will the in historyof problem. points turning major some away turned have philosophers many see to that disappointing is It Major Forks in the Garden Paths Garden in the Major Forks 130 Chapter 7 And in a breakthrough of admits Searle sorts, that he could never problemwill inphilosophy to seems me something of ascandal.” 2007 book indeterminism and limited determinism. for two-stage models of combinations will, free of some limited many(actually determinisms), and libertarianism, compatibilism. sible and two-stage practical for model will? free followed by an adequate if not determinism is mostthe strict plau andvince Searle other philosophers that quantum discussions of untilsee, now, point the of introducing Herman Melville, ChapterThen in look 12, will we at a number of suggestions In next the few chapters we more look closely at determinism Indeed it Despite does. a century of attempts, failed can we con Now he says we know two things, As we noted inChapter 2, 105 104 featuring blow at events. thus prescribed to by chance both, by either, turns rules and has last the of necessity, and sideways inits motions directed by though will, free threads; and chance, though restrained inits play within right the lines only tending to free to ply that; still her shuttle will free given between from itsswerved ultimate alternating course -its every vibration, indeed, weavingly working together. The straight warp of necessity, notbe to - aye, chance, and will, free necessity incompatible -no wise inter -all mechanics must enter into explanation the of putably established of as afact nature...it follows that is only the indeterminacy form of indeterminism and rationality...Second we know that quantum “First we know that ourof actioncontain experiences free both

Thanks to Robert Thanks KaneRobert to forthis 1850insight into as a thewill (2007)p.Searle 74-75 Freedom and Neurobiology, consciousness and will. free Moby-Dick History oftheFreeHistory Will Problem , Ch. 47,p., Ch. 213.Melville his knew John Searle indeterminism that is indis “The persistence free “The the of quantum mechanics into recently wrote inhis consciousness.” Aristotle indeterminism tertium quid tertium quantum quantum 104 . 105

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