1 Environmental issue report No 22 Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle 1896–2000 Editorial team: Poul Harremoës (Chairman) David Gee (EEA editor) Malcolm MacGarvin (Executive editor) Andy Stirling (Editor) Jane Keys (Editor) Brian Wynne (Editor) Sofia Guedes Vaz (EEA editor) Project managers: David Gee and Sofia Guedes Vaz European Environment Agency 2 Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle 1896–2000 Layout: Brandenborg a/s Note The contents of this publication do not necessarily reflect the official opinions of the European Commission or other European Communities institutions. Neither the European Environment Agency nor any person or company acting on the behalf of the Agency is responsible for the use that may be made of the information contained in this report. All rights reserved No part of this publication may be reproduced in any form or by any means electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage retrieval system without the permission in writing from the copyright holder. For rights of translation or reproduction please contact EEA project manager Ove Caspersen (address information below). A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet. It can be accessed through the Europa server (http://europa.eu.int). Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2001 ISBN 92-9167-323-4 © EEA, Copenhagen, 2001 European Environment Agency Kongens Nytorv 6 DK-1050 Copenhagen K Denmark Tel: (45) 33 36 71 00 Fax: (45) 33 36 71 99 E-mail: [email protected] Internet: http://www.eea.eu.int Preface 3 Preface To know and not to know. To act or not to act...? The task of the European Environment of precaution is partly affected by confusion Agency (EEA) is to provide information of about the meaning of terms used in the direct use for improving decision-making and debate. This report should contribute to a public participation. We often provide greater and shared understanding about past information in situations of scientific decisions on hazardous technologies and uncertainty, in which the precautionary therefore, we hope, to improved transatlantic principle, enshrined in the Treaty of the agreement about future decisions. It may also European Union, is increasingly relevant. help the dialogue within both the EU and the The growing innovative powers of science United States, where there are healthy seem to be outstripping its ability to predict debates about the pros and cons of applying the consequences of its applications, whilst the precautionary principle. the scale of human interventions in nature increases the chances that any hazardous That we have all acted too late in many areas impacts may be serious and global. It is is now well known. Over the next 50 years we therefore important to take stock of past will see some thousands of extra skin cancers experiences, and learn how we can adapt to as today’s children grow up exposed to the these changing circumstances and improve higher levels of ultraviolet radiation our work, particularly in relation to the penetrating the normally protective ozone provision of information and the layer through the ‘hole’ created by identification of early warnings. chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and other synthetic chemicals. Over the same period Late lessons from early warnings is about the many thousands of Europeans will die from gathering of information on the hazards of one of the most painful and terminal of human economic activities and its use in cancers, mesothelioma, caused by the taking action to better protect both the inhalation of asbestos dust. In both cases we environment and the health of the species were taken by surprise: the hazards of these and ecosystems that are dependent on it, and beneficial technologies were not ‘known then living with the consequences. about’ until it was too late to stop irreversible impacts. Both phenomena had such long The report is based on case studies. The latent periods between first exposures and authors of the case studies, all experts in late effects that ‘pipelines’ of unstoppable their particular field of environmental, consequences, decades long, were set in occupational and consumer hazards, were place before actions could have been taken asked to identify the dates of early warnings, to stop further exposures. to analyse how this information was used, or not used, in reducing hazards, and to The first reports of injuries from radiation describe the resulting costs, benefits and were made as early as 1896 (hence the title of lessons for the future. the report). The first clear and credible early warning about asbestos came two years later The lessons they drew from their histories in 1898. A similar signal for action on CFCs were then distilled into twelve ‘late lessons’ came in 1974, though some may argue that by the editorial team, under the guidance of important clues were missed earlier. Eleven the EEA Scientific Committee. In a separate other well-known hazards are dealt with in EEA publication some implications of the this report. We invite the reader to judge late lessons for the policy process and whether, as in the cases of radiation, asbestos associated information flows will be further and CFCs, the early warnings could have led explored. to earlier actions to reduce hazards, at a lower overall cost to society. The precautionary principle is not just an issue for the European Union (EU): its The costs of preventive actions are usually potential impact on trade means that its tangible, clearly allocated and often short application can have global repercussions. term, whereas the costs of failing to act are The current dialogue between the EU and less tangible, less clearly distributed and the United States on the use and application usually longer term, posing particular 4 Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary principle 1896–2000 problems of governance. Weighing up the sciences, is a necessary condition for being overall pros and cons of action, or inaction, is Homo sapiens. But just knowing enough is not therefore very difficult, involving ethical as of itself sufficient: acting wisely, and in good well as economic considerations, as the case time, is also necessary. It is part of the EEA’s studies illustrate. task to help expand the knowledge base through integrated assessments, thereby A key question arising from the case studies is assisting decision-makers to foresee the how to acknowledge and respond not only to possible consequences of regulatory and scientific uncertainty but also to ignorance, a stakeholder actions and inactions. state of not knowing from which springs both scientific discoveries and unpleasant Knowing enough, and acting wisely enough, ‘surprises’, such as ozone holes and rare across the full range of environmental and cancers. Socrates had a response to this when related health issues seems daunting. The he acknowledged ignorance as a source of interconnections between issues, the pace of wisdom. Our report shows that this is a lesson technological change, our limited from history that many people have understanding and the ‘time to harm and forgotten. Misplaced ‘certainty’ about the then to heal’ of the ecological and biological absence of harm played a key role in delaying systems that can be perturbed over decades preventive actions in most of the case studies. by our technologies together present an However, there is clearly nothing scientific unforgiving context. Some people fear or about the pretence of knowledge. Such imagine that a more precautionary approach ‘certainty’ does little to reduce ignorance, to forestalling potentially irreversible hazards which requires more scientific research and will stifle innovation or compromise science. long-term monitoring in order to identify the However, there are immense challenges and unintended impacts of human activities. opportunities in understanding complex and emergent systems while meeting human Could we have known about, or anticipated, needs with lower health and ecological costs. the hazards any earlier? Are there ways of Many of the case studies suggest that wider ‘knowing more’ or ‘knowing better’ that use of the precautionary principle can help could help justify our self-awarded title of stimulate both innovation and science, Homo sapiens — the ‘wise ones’? replacing the 19th century technologies and simple science of the first industrial Readers of the case studies in Late lessons may revolution with the ‘eco-efficient’ conclude that we have a long way to go. Some technologies and systems science of the third. possible directions are indicated in the chapter ‘Twelve late lessons’, derived from One final and obvious question arises from the case studies. the case studies in Late lessons: why were not only the early warnings but also the ‘loud and A phenomenon that Socrates probably did late’ warnings often ignored for so long? This not know about, but may have suspected, is question we largely leave to the reader, whilst that ‘everything connects’ — or at least, so noting that the absence of political will to many things do react with each other that the take action to reduce hazards, in the face of simple science of linear, mechanistic conflicting costs and benefits, seems to be an propositions needs to be supplemented with even more important factor in these histories the dynamic and emergent properties of than is the availability of trusted information. systems science. The potential systemic However, as Aristotle observed, the way we instabilities of such complex phenomena as perceive the world determines in large part climate change or brain cell behaviour may how we act, and information plays a critical be critical yet unpredictable determinants of role in how we see the world. But whose our fate, whether they be systems that govern information is received? Is it ‘true, fair and the stability of the Gulf Stream or that independent’? And is it understandable to generate the ‘genomic instabilities’ of the politicians and business people who are irradiated cells.