C-Jfkl? 2% To: Chief of It'aval Operations

- From: Commanding Officer' C-Jfkl? 2% To: Chief of It'aval Operations . Vid: (1)Comxnder Carrier Division GIG3 (2) Commander aZVdiu'TH Fleet (3) Comndnder Lava1 Forces, Far Zast (4) Comnander Air Forces, Pacific Fleet (5) Corxiander in Chief, U.3. Pacific Fleet 52 Subj: Action heport for the period, 18 liusust 1951 to 21 September 1951 kef: (a) Opfu'av Instruction 3480.4 bOWNGRAbED AT 3 YEAR tNJ"A&' OECtASSIFlED AFTER 12 YEARS Encl: CVG 5 Action-neport for the period 18 Xugu&!f!DOD 1 $&f3 1 to / (1) I 19 September 1951 % 1. In accordace with reference (a), the action report for the- period 18 ++usust 1951 throurh 19 aeptember 1951 is hereby submitted: PAhT I Composition of Om Forces and Ilission:

1. During the period of this repor Task Force 77 wiis com- Y posed of the followirg units: U55 SSbEii cv9 COIiC;imIV 9 nn&; J. PLhkrcY, UaN embarked: USs 3ON FiIcI-Lm w313 : us; GCIXjIi (CV21) : OiXAXliV TFhL2, kAiUi TOHLIaOX, UbN errl- barked: Us2 1; JZRdY (5152 , COT,.S3JjX LT9 VADX H* i.1. iIARTIK2n US?, embdrked; Uaa HzLdKi(C~75); cOi;CIiUDIV TEXd3, hAIJf.1. 3. L. I,13Tf, JaH, embarked: Uaa 'EL390 (C~133): Us3 LO3 XKG3LJS (CA135) and units of Jestroyer Divisions 12, 51,. 13 1329 151, 171, and Lscort Destroyer Division 11 and 21. OT'C w CGr.'X-G-ijlIVONE - 2. During the subject period, the USS ~a,53~(CVS) operated off the eat COdSt of i.orea in accordance with CTF 77 Operation order fio. 22-51, plus supplemental plas 2nd orders issued during the period . PMT I1 CHRONOLOGY 18 August OboOK - Underway fron Yokosuka, Japan for combat operating area ,in accordance with CONG.%iDITI ON..; dispatch 1711542 August. .

During the period 18 to 21 August, 1951, the ship was ma- neuvered to avoid typhoon 111LL3GZ11*Heavy swells resulted in slight danage to the ship. See PAT IV.

21 Algust At OOUK, the ship experienced a roll of 25O, kring the afternoon the Air group conducted familiarization flights. 2O52IC, USS JDEdSGld (DrU7S6) joined the ship as escort.

22 iugust ~o'knedTF 77. ships prescnt included; U~SNJ: J

destroyer divhons. Cormenced conbat air operations, No serious afficultics were encountcrod at this time or subsequen'; %, ly in rneeting the operational com;litni?nts. This is attributed to the training afforded in the Hawaiian area with the ;iir Group e&arked. OTC and CTF 77 was C0I.C .ADIV 01~2, (&,DI~ J, FIW?Y) ir, CSS FSSXJGV~).

Conducted air operations, Afternoon portion of flight schedule cxxelled due to weather. O83OK - Lost first aircraft and pilot, (Pilot LTJG FiQJJTZ) in F4U BuNo. 62920. Filot became separated Tram Flight Leader over enemy territory in vicinity of IJonsan Harbor in instrument weather and was not seen or heard fron thereafter-

Condmted air operations, O&ol+K, 1 AD-4 Bu.No. 123987 lost power on'take-off (Pilot S STdICYLiKG) made water landing ahead of ship. Pilot rescued by helicopter,

25 Aupt Conducted air operations.

. 26 August Conducted zir operations. On pr awn launch, about 5 minutes after take-off, an i",D-IPJ Bu-No. 124051 was ob- semed to burst into flame in the air 'and crash: YilOt and one creman (Tilot XH, P,, ATAN) , we1-e not recovered.

Replenished.

28 August I)ue to weather in target area and weathar conditions, launched only ASP fli

29 August Conducted air operations. m 2 *# y.. J

heckler mission. Filot rescued by screen destroyer. ~ 31 ,+ugust Conducted air operations. 1 septernber Task-Force replenished and conducted i-4 firing practice8 2 beptember Conducted air operitions. Lost 1 F43-43 3.1No. 9753OU Pilot 58S Br,Thdi was forced to bhil out After plane caught fire enroute to tar:;ct area. Filot was recovered by helicopter attachsd to shore bombardment unit in "tonsan ikrbor, F2HPs tzken off all flights except Cn% due to suspected catdpult hook crhcks.

3 aeptznber Conducted ,ir operations. Lost 1 ,3 3u No. 123967 and pilot (Filot LT 5XST;idNL) he to enerny dction. Filot bi&s seen to crash apixoxirnLtely 15 miles inside I enemy territory. Lost 1 IS? I;U Lo. 125122 (Filot Lib -Ji.iATi&I\G). Control. locked, due to enemy LaLi. hl .- Pilot was 2ble to r2gLi.n control of aircraft. sailed ' out over friendly airfield, iL-3. Plane crashed and bu med ..

l+ septernber Conducted dir operations. Lost 2 F9F's Bu No. 125102 and 127136 and pilots (Pilots LTJG ~X,JI?.~SLLand LTJG .h€EOi,D). 20th aircraft crashed and burned in the vicinity of iid4dngsan. 5 September Task Force replenished md conducted AL firing. 6 deptember Conducted air operations. 7 asptember Conducted air operztions. 0730-0830fi conducted AA firing practice. 1 -iD Bu KO 123950 was hit by enemy &iirifire adwas ditched off nsan Harbor. Pilot CilEr. Gh,;k'.r~~asrescued by shor bombardment destroyer. 1

8 September Conducted air operations. Lost 1 F4U-43 3u. No. . 62974 due to enemy Action; pilot LTJG ,.C'F&Ll:G~was rescued by shore bombardment destroyer &ftzr flying his dma5,ed plane from over enemy territory to the vicinity of .yonsan Ydrbor. Lost 1 AD Bu KO, 3.23949 and pilot, LTGG PARS2 due to enemy action. He was . observed making a bombing run when his plano burst into flames, crshed and exploded in enemy territory, CU- 6489. F2HTs reassizned to all fliLhts with no ex- ._ ternal ordndnc e however?; 9 Yeptember Task Force replenished. 16' September .L1 September

12 September Conddcted kr ope 13 September Task Force replenished. At 15001 lcunched recco, strike flights. 14 September Conducted air operations. At 18301 lost 1 ADW EuNo. 124762. Iand- ing hook caught catapult bridle on take-off and bridle wrapped around vertical horizontal stabilizer. . i-koessive vibration set in and pilot was forced to ditch inside the screen. Pilot LT OIBRISN and crewmen were rescued by-helicopter and destroyer.

15 September Air operationswerel~-~teddue to weather over the target area. Weeather recco, 3-F' and ASP only flights launched.

16 September cted air operations. At 18231 F2H SuNo. 124968 (Pilot LTJG KdJ;LL&) with air brakes extended made approach for a deferred .emergency 1mdLng having been in a mid-air collision prior to return to the ship. Wheels touched deck but aircraft immediately b+ came airborne, cleared all three barriers, landed forward on flight deck, and crashed into aircraft parked forward (starboard) on flight deck. Total loss of aircraft: 2 F2H BuNos, 234978, 12&966,. and 2 F9F BuNos 235131 and 125228, destroyed by fire, Personnel casualties included 3 known dead, 4 missing and 16 injured, Damages to the ship are listed in PART IV. However, damages did not prevent continued air operations, but all starboard catapult $launches were discontinued until. inspection and testing of the starboard catapult revealed no dmage,

17 September Conducted air operations.

18 September Conducted air operations in the forenoon. At 11151 joined replenishment forces to 1-eplenish.

19 September Conducted air operations, At 06061 1 AD BuNo 123991 (Pilot LT BXYANT) lost power on take-off, aircraft made water landing ahead, of ship and sank. Pilot recovered by ZSS% helicopter. At 17121 GSEX left formation in company -&th US3 !%LENA, COfiTDESDIV 21 less USS 2-LL,Ld, to proceed to Yokosuka, Jnpn for limited avail-

ability in acco ante with CWi7THFLT dispatch l3W8Z September. I

20 September Enroute to Ilokosuka.. Conducted iLz firing practice with towed FaXT I11 OPLD1JA-nJCE:

1. Fxpenditure of Air 0 See enclosure (1)

2. "qenditure of Ship's Ordnance for training,

20 m 11,968 rds 3If50 Cal 1,478 rds 5"38 CcKL 385 rds

3. Coment on Performance of Ordnznce ihterial md i3quipmen.t.

a. 3 percent of the bomb vanes for 1,000 pound bombs were received with bad spot-welds, The vmes fell apart when tested for tightness. This is considered dangerous in that tail fuzes could be arrned in the air,

%. b, Several bombs of all types were received i~thfrozcn nose cmd tail plugs, making it impossible to fuze then,

c. Nark 6 and &?sk 8 parachute flares are received in doubls suspznsion. Sin- gle suspension must be jury-rigged, The suspension brnd received idth these flues cannot be locked on the wing racks. Zxperienced two cases where aircraft dropped flares on the flight deck, one on an arrested landing, 3rd one during a catapult launch . 1 d. Napalm powder received in lot f!W 5U75 and NY 5884, mznufactured by the \ Ferro Enamel Company, was in a lumpy condition, apparently due to moisture pene- tration, The color had turned a bright yellow. powder in this condition made.- a poor mixture and in most cases hd to be jettisioned. ; %& , x"'--i.---. t\ --- 8. Mark 77 fi ed impractical for carrier use, especiall? when-the reload time is short. These bombs require at least t,hree men to assemble I adconsiderable timE to fuze. During the assembly, the slightest dent or sc,&p? on the conmcting surfaces causes lezks. Jepanese tanks or >:ark 12 Sclly tanks can be hung in 10 seconds, adfilled in 7 to 10 minutes under normal operating conditions, and are inexyxnsive.

f. Bomb skids should co ipped with spare hold-

g. Ships should have a isposal officer md b SPOS?+~team on board.! There havo been several cases of fuzed bomk having fc..llen off aircraft on arrested landings, &itpresent, there are no bomb disposcl personrel assigned. h, X nuinber of 250 poun . bombs hcve Seen recaived with spension lugs that are unsuited for use with the Lark 55 bomb rack installed in the F4U-5NL9 &2, and AD-M aircraft. The top angle of the suSpension lug support bracket was too great to allow the bracket to be received and held by the recessed suspensiofi hook of ths brk 55 rack, 5 I *' PART IV BATTLS fll

tered heavy weather 2nd suffered following damages in the forecastle area:

(1) Seven 3"/50 rwdy service lockers were broken loose when sides Of lock-- 1. ers separated from the locker 5ottom. Gne of these lockers was washed overboard, '

(2) Twenty-two battle helmets were washed overboard. :A TI

(3) Ons protective clothing locker, type llAtr, complete with contents was. washed overboard,

(4) One O.B.A. locker (H-0. B.A. capecity) w;,s washed overboard. This locker had been emptied cand the contents turned ova? to the repair locker. t i I, (5) One-inch stem line (stem heat for secondary conn) was smshed.

(6) hpty cese stowzge bin located under mounts 32 (port side of bow) w2.s ' I caved in, one support member broken and -another badly bent. ??le capacity of this.i bin has been decreased approximately 2G$, .t I (7) bpty case stowage bin under mount 31 (starbom6 side) is caved in I slightly, decreasing the stowage capacity approxiruately 2%. > (8) Two ring-type bcoys washed overboard and one of the stowage brac bent and is not usable.

(9) The catwalk forward of secondary conn wes cwed ind

(10) Gasoline line and support bbreckcts were bent out of line (port side).

(ll) The forward PlK 63 director (n0.31) was slightly damaged and has been repaired by the ship's force.

(12) The two forward 3" mounts were only &amaged to the extent thzt all inspection plates md all junction boxes were filled with salt water ad had to be dried out. One inspction ph+,e on mount 31 (train stop buffer) was slight bent. All discrepancies on the riounts have been corrected by the ship's force.

(13) The MK 25 I4od 1 antenna mounting and the associated pads of 34 Hod 6 radar which is part of the PIK 63 kd 11 gm fire control system was severely danagdd ard requirzd replacement. .t q. , (14) The ladder leading to director 31 w bythz ship’s force

ity, with a11 associzted equ5 port side.

(16) A split seam in the underwater hull in Compartment A-60143 (chcin , locker), about two feet below water line.

C. As a result of tha crnsh on deck 16 September the shi? suffered the be3.q listed dmcges.

(1) AFproldmately 500 linear feet flight deck plcnking burned.

(2) 1500 sq. feet of deck plenking charred.

(3) 8 stanchions on forwxd sterbosrd cetwnlk destroyed.

(&) 24 sq fzet of cctwcl!c dmcged.

(5) 1 inclined ladder d.maged,

(6) 155 feet (vzrious size) of electricd czble dmzged. (7) 2 light, fittings destroyed.

(8) 3 pr sound-powei-ed phones destroyed.

(9) 2 junction boxes destroyed, -. .__ i (10) 6 stuffing tubes destroyed. (11) 150 ft. 1 1/4” gas hose destroy2d.

(12) 1 querter-inch gas nozal destroyed.

(13) 2 ship’s twin 2013: gun mounts with 3X 20 sights destroyed.

d. Dmage inflicted on thc enemy. See enclosure (1).

PART V

1. Performance, a. Performince of duty and morale has been excellent. i *e 4

2. Caswlties.

a, There were no ship's company personnel as a result of enemy action,

b. The plane crash and resultent fire which occurod on the flight deck on 16 September caused the following casualties among ship's company:

Two enlisted rrissing and presuied dead, Seven en!is'i..d injured,

c, Totel personnzl cesunlties (SS3L and Air Group 5)

Dead ;founded Piissing Injured Tot a.l Officers 6 2 1 3 I2 dnlisted 3 0 4 13 20

%I Total 9 2 5 16 32 Of the ?.bow czjuclties, the following occurcd on 16 September when m F2H plme bounced over 211 brrriers and crashed ilitvo par!:cd pknds on the forw*:.rd end of the flight deck:

Deed Wounded Li g sing Injured Tot c?l

Officers 1 .o 0 3 4 Enlisted %2- 0 4 13 19 ' Total 3 0 rc 16 23

Of the sixteen injurios, fourteGn were hurn CESBS adthree were frzc- tures, one case hzving 2 frmture of the femur 2s well 2s extansivc second de-: gcee burns, This cc?.sc end one other burn czse we= clcssificd as critical. Eight cases were serious an? two o€ the rerxaining six Csses requirdd bospitalizetion. All cases were treated on board until 21 Septernbw, tfhm the crieical and seriou: cases were trmsferred to the Nwal HospiLcl, Yokosukz, Jepan. -2Jcases survive( this --eriod,

FAIT VI COISEXTS:

1. Engineering, 1

a. The Xngineering Depxtriient experienced no cmualties during this operational period.

be Steming data,

(1) l.;iles Stcwd 16 August (12001) 19 Septerzber 12,643 (2) i'verirgc speed 15, 8 kt/hP .. .. 8 c (3) Fuel oil received from takers (gallons) 1,871,308 (4) Fuel oil delivered to destroyers (gallons) 457 726 (5) Fuel oil consuxed by BSdX (gallons) 1,830,806 4r

c. Recormendntions. \

None.

2. Supply,

a. ilviation Supply.

(I) Thc current section B allovnnco lists are most useful as guides for quantities to be carried and a bczse of zugmentLtion of itens reqwirzd under wartime conditions. Heavy operating schedulx a-12 -age to aircrzft surfaces from anti-nircraft an6. srnall tlrrcs fire hare necessitcted constent rzvision of high and low limits on the fo1l.owing groups of items:

(a) ill aircraft surfeces.

(b) I4rcTzft paints, w?xes and kydrolvbt.. h (c) Nose xhed, min wheel, md min whccl struts.

(d) 'Axessorius, pumps and reservoir c?ssenblies.

(e) Firing esseciblies.

(f) kark 55 bonb rxks. In addition to the ayove, there arc a nuxber of fleet-controlled items which require A.O.B. priority %Ir procurefiimt .

(2) The .iviation Stores Ship, USS SL121Td1-2, has been able to supply about 71 percent 02 Lbe item requclsted, excluding F2Z-2 parts xhich werequisitioned. - directla from LSO, Ozklmd. Tha logistic support offered by the JU?IT3R is considered to be excellent, Eowever, tke .;VS nlizht be 2ble to provide nore complete replenishments by stocking selected parts not listec? in Uie Sixtion 'r3'l >illowance List, since -most ,,OGfs abonrd the -3;SSZX originzke from e lack of parts not stocked nor intended to be stocked aboard a ccrrier,

(3) A list of high usege and short supply itens thoroughly coordinated would be of value. Howev*r, opdrating experience with C.1G 19 CAaLG5 ad the. receipt of mrked-up allowmce lists from 0th

9 only requisitions of

(2) bhile at sm, 3 few critic*A items of the BuShips and Xlectr spCares have bzcn obtained fron other ships or received from tha carrier delivery' phne (COD) after requisitioning from ComServDiv 31. The W33X has bccn able to reciproccte in furnishing like itcns to the other ships in the Task Forcz. This exchange between ships is most hclpful ?.nd advnntegeous,

C. Shipts Store,

(1) Ship's Stores sales hzve zverzged 20,000 2 month for thc period reported on. The inventory li-nitction of :~l.25,OoO requires grater velocity of turn- %7 over in ths bulk stores md. requires cnreful selection of stocks q.s well ns ex- acting plmning for replenis-hent of ell- item cnrri2.d. ,

(2) The l.?,undqj is now operzting on 2 24-hour basis, 5 dzys 9. week. This work tim has bdan Educed fro3 a seven d2.y round-the-clock work week hnd has re- sultzd in c fresh x?.ter saving of eppraxiriately 35,000 2:.llons a weok.

(3) Hours of operztion of th3 Ship's Storm 2L-e from 0900 until 2030.

. (4) .i systen of cigarette rationing has besn in effect since commissioning dzte, Each mn and officm is re.,uired to licve c cigarette retion cmd which is issued by the Ship's kdr.5nistratior-i Office prior to mking purchL?ses of Tax Free cigarettes, These ration cerds entitle e7ch holder to purch-seone czrton of cigarettes per week.

d, Commissary

(1) No difficulty has been experienced in the Comissrqr Group, The logy istic support in this me3 hs been exellent. Eowever, it is suggested that a. list of anilable 'fresh fmits, veget2blcs, adncw imd mcormon items be furnished the operating forces as 2 basis for the submission of requisitions.

(2) Night rations are being furnished men actually engr?, At present this involves only 8 men, Tha ration consist wiches, one piece of fruit ahd stry rztion. The rction is of the working group ar?d is take at their stations nished by the individud division ffee messes, Rolls, jaw served to one-half hour bef quarters ::hen scrly morning flights are scheduled. Cookies, ccke, o nd coffee c?re served to the flight deck crew for l5 minutes af rs on the evenings of late strikes. 1%is further phnned to h for all flight deck Fersonnd, I ,

.pment . 1 Tha Intelligence Office on the ESSM is well equipped md air-condition- ! ed. iiorking space is adequate but storzge imdequat.e Communic-tions con- ! spzce . 1 sist of one ship's phone, one 2JG sound-powered phone 2nd two intercon units; very adequate, One important change recoxknded is th-h sliding plywood floor to overhead chart bomds rephce the expensive cork pmel on thd after bulkhead.

-4 L high dzgree of -intzlligenee dcta is elassif ied secret. This nacessi- tates m~kcngmost of the file c?.bine%s secret, iiecommend the larg2 size safe be eliminated 2nd two mor13 file mbincts substituted,

Each ready rooin should hare a snaU buiJ.t-in ?x.rtition axl desk in the rear for dejri~fing2nd for thc3 gmcralwsc of tho squadron AIQ. Tiis is neces- i sary even to the extent of rznovin9 SOW rear rec..dy roon seats.

On ESSLY type cr?rriers a window &oufd be cut bctween the Intelligence Office 2.nd iiendy born Three so 2.5 to aablcj ths teletjpia-iter to be se.m by th 'i" A10 I ii space near the ,.ir Intalligmce Offio skiculd be desigmted €or Fhoto Intcrpretation. Print Shop nS0.2 is now being used Tor t3is purpose, 1 file czb- I inet in the &r Intelligence Office cin be set aside as photo fi1c.s. a'i seperat.2 \ sprzce should bc provided for Ennotation. ?apt of tho gunnery tr.ining room is not b&pg used for annotntion of prints.

b. Personnel.

Prior to arrivilig Ct the conii-?a.t;a.rea thc Intelligence Officer should bo assigned two assistnnts. Thd Photd Int re%& should be one of these if his work does not require full-time photo interpreter work. It is not necess:ry Tor the asistnnts to h:v~Ettended m intolliigeme school.

Then in combat, a 2k-hour watch i cossqr in thz Intcllifence Office, This -necessitates r? minimm of three ship's. cnl-is-tcd personncl, 213. of whom mus$ be ;ble to typewrite.

C. Naps, Charts znd Grids. Con;iirPac adCIYCPLC did an exceflant job in supplying m?ps adchnrts. -~ The job of storage should 5e simplified if @I.I&. operztoperat zrm could be predetep- mined at ComiirPx and elbdncte those ma r which obvisously there will be no demmd.

do Sriefings Prior to Entering ComDsltr

Tne best method of obtai combat informtion of intdligcnce operation in th; are is to have one or two &I0 p to the forrnrd are. on TAD orders, . Suxh officers c-n eithr be Group gr ship AIO4s. Thc ZSSZ did this 2nd rmh vsluable informtion obt<:J.ned, fa Targct Dossier.

volved in keeping it up. It is suggested th-t distribution of such should be re- stricted to staff level.

g. Recognition.

The mteri-1 .zvizl?31e is adeqcstc Sut the responsibility of instructing the eppropriate shi?'s prsonnd she-01-d bc: '-ktof' thi, tr?ining officc;r, The i;ir htclligcnce C'fflcer should bc i-esponsihle .'or only gLtiing th.: n-?terir?laboard,

4. 1 Ikvigation.

I~stronomicc?lobscrv-tioms wwe teksn regulcrly with occcsional overcast sky conditions obscuring tht: horizon *?lid celcstir-1 bodiss . kdnr nrvigztiond information has bcon cxcellent. Loran nzvigntion has b\:m us,?ble only during the eve- ning and morning sightings.

5. Comuriicztions,

G3ER-L

Zcporting on station in the opercting arc?., ZSSX inncdietely relieved 88 task

rcg fhgship. Thc: resultant increases in circuit gu;lrd rcsponsibilitics, in ~

sion of cormunic-.tion activities. Hzving obtained valuabl.: informtion from reports distributed prior to arrival in tha combat zonz md receiving excellent-., assistanca and worth-while suggestions from c,xprienced staff -:nd ship co-mdn- icatora .of carriers (on the line aid being relieved), the ship wm prepmod in '/ no smll degree for whnt might be zxpccted of comunic&tions in th;: operat)ing 2 b -. "L .II. '1 4 ':e., 1. Comunications are indicated below.

CW CI*icUITS Ths frequency allocetion for ommications with Join ontr&L, Korez., lexves much to be desired. Under the present allocation, one Cpl frequency (D188) is avdlable. Since this frequency is in the lower range of the HF b?.nd, ' it is not well-adapted to nizht (dusk-to-dawn) mission. &ployment----<---.----- of .--tho high frequency now used for voice cor?munic:.tions with JOC wod.d be ideal for this p1JJ- - ., --._ .r- *a pose. ,

VOICZ CIi-lUITS

&mmnendc?tions have beea mde to the Fifth ;ir Force by the previous tcsk force conmnder for a revision--of- I-._- +the treqwxy. allocation,

recormended th& $he secon~zry circuit3. --1--- pax%iculzr,-_-__- - >gA-~S2ip- It---- is ~____I.LI._ " - t 1 %in ed a scperate frequency for thzt purpose_afone, In the event of feilure of the ' prinary tactical circuit for rzintenance, t5c burden on Cf+,2C bccones too he,?v;r,. often creating confusion on an inportcnt circuit. In Flag Plot it has been necessary to modify the pot-selector switches in order to make anikble in e?,ch of the speaker-amplifiers all circuits which c2n be rercotely positioned in the five stations locatsd in this space.

ki.,DIOT3UTYP%CIXUITS

Wing this period of operd5ons., 2 duplex LTT circuit was set up between the ship md kdio., Tokyo, ,'Xithough tha clear$-nce of the'heavy volume of ship shore 2nd relzy traffic has been erratic on this circuit, thc value of the circuit cen in no way Sc underestbztcd, During thc nest in-port period it is hope that arrangements will be 'made for improving th utilization of this circuit. ' it'iDIO J~WJNG

Considerzble interf erencc has been experienced on all. wive-bands during the thirty dcyst operctions covered by this report, Incidents of suspected,enemy 332- dng hzve becn reported adforwerded to the staff for reley to cognizant comm,lndr Interference on c?. local basis as' 8 result of faulty eqci?nent (including eqJip- '- nent operated on the flight deck and in other prts of the ship) hxs been thoroughly investigted znd corrective ection taken.

._ 13 / "':I. "':I. 4'. ,*v .> ATZI*C?L INST~XL'iTION

Frequent attention has hid t the forwmd and zfter whip ate A schedule has been set up for t

PXiZ3OhWL

Officers: Wing this period the following officer requirements hcve been established; CI-JOfs (3) ; Assistant CI:OIs (3); Cryptographers (6).

Enlisted: Allocztion of personnel h?,s been as follows: ;Cidio (55 Btfs and TLrs -- including postal clerks) ; M3A.n Com?iunic?tions (25 TZts nssigned duties 2s clerks, write-up cen and mssengers) ; Signds (28).

Discussion: h1-y zfter ;? nmbm of changes cnd frequent shifting of personnel has this distribution provzd to '3c the most effic?cious plm, Lhgmentction of the ship's force by three stnff officers ?.nd twelve adisted persolinel hes made this plan possible, Experience is qovin~the best tercher 2nd it is hoped thqt by the time of the nat action regort it will 3i; possiblz to present 2 definite %, and detailed outline ?.ad p2ttern of personml ncids 2x6 t!--G fuLfilL?lei?t of those needs on a carrier-tzsk Eorce flcgship.

6. Aerology.

G3NZfL iL

The period 'bcgan with the opersting aren under the influencc of a southczster- ly circuletion cmscd b;T ths tyyhoon llL~?GE1lwhich hzd Szcone nearly stationary off the coast of Shanghai. On 22 i:ugust, ~1L~G31~begzn to regcnGrF-te 2s 2-n extra- tropical cyclone md aove north-esstward crossing Korea on 23 "iupt, causii?g undesirable flying conditions to prevail throughtout the day.

This began the period of trcnsition from th3 southerly monsoon to thc norther- ly nonsoon. i\Jumerous wezk cold froat or trough passagzs occured but genel-zlb witk little effect on thc weether other thm wind direction end velocity,

Dnly on 27 :'.ug~st, whcn a low pressure spsten devdoped over the Yellow Sea and moved ezstward ccross Korea, xhere flight operations c~~i%~il~dby undersirable flying wzather,

Surface -And velocities zvarp-ge over 10 'mots on 13 or' the 29 da2is in the onerating me3. Generally there was a noticezblo decre "sc in velocity during t afternoon 2nd light and vmi&ls winds Cbi-ing the ?.fternoon prtvailed on 9 diys.; .: . . .: i < S.." S.." . !. , , y. .* ' _, (A) Beception very good during d?.ylight hours 90$ readzbla; very bad at nigh l5$ readEble.

(3) Insufficient uselul weather charts tran tted. '0d.g one surfme chart (1 hours old) and one 700 73 chnrt (13 hours old).

-YU mdcd -2 T°KYc(Frequency shift - shared with it'iTT. - not simultaneous)

(A) Reception very gcod during dqlight hours 90$ rendc.bl-e; very bnd at night 15% readable . Schedule irrzgulcr. (B) Insufficient useful wezther aharts tr?,nsnittec!, KO sui-f?,Ce ohcrts.

AIlrz 7O;ZCd AT TOKYO (9% frequency shift)

( ;L)Reception fair; only about 5@ of chzrts re-,dc'de i1ll FOfZCi .,T TOKYO (Sub-cwrier frequency r=odulztion - lI-TT. and facsimile i, trcnsnitt ed s imlt meous1y)

(A) Unable to copy.

COLl ms

Number of weether chzrts trcnsni.Lted by r dio photo unit $3 wzs increcsed on 17 Septenber to inclz.de thrze surfcce chqrta mc?. two briefing chzrts, An cddition- iL incrense to four surfme ch?rts, two S5O IG3 chmts ;nd two 700 iB chnrts is desired,

b, ALuIO TXTETT3

Reception of weether reports froii1 LCS Tokyo by r?,.dio tdetypc in the .ier- ologicrl Offico wns considersd good during bylipht hours (853) c?d very bad i?t night ( 50%). hring priod of outc?ges ,LACSGum ies copied trith only fair results

COi2xENTS I The most irqortmt rGports, the ICorezn, ware lost chc to out?@ of the TO~O

LTT zt the most hportmt time, prior to first launch, kter in the d7-y C2.rPicr I Pilot &ports were ZblG to fill this gcp. During tho ex-ly part of the pcriod 3182 kcs (Tokyo) mszbh to b? copied with better thm aver?@ results. hter in the yerid no sigml wcs hcard on tlis frequency,

The overall complement of the vesse prtmcnts is not adequzte under extended conb?,t oper?,ting conditions, It is believzd th7.t ?,n increzse in shipls conpay personnel to t?ugnent thc following dcp?rtment-1 personnel is required to e?fect 2 maxjmurn degrze of efficicn6y during extended opcrations under combct DEG LASS I F IED 41 men for hzndling S. 26 men for gcsoline il . 3 men for catczpult 25 men for amunition replenishment, - 22 men Tor ordnance 2nd bonb brezk out. 8. iir Depxrtment.

During ths ,period covcred by this report, there were 1884 ir.ndings made a- board. The rrrcsting gear oper?-ted normlly in nll rGspects :.nd only routine mzin- tensnce wr?s required. 931 catcpult shots were Fade, 373 on the stnrbozi-d mxhinc md 558 on thc port, Operetion of thcz cc?tzpults was s,-,tisfnctory during this period, however, on thrce occasions launches were held up for 2. period of ,ninutes 6ue to 3 loss of electric power. It is believed tn-k this wcs due to m overloading of the generators th?t fded power to the cztp-pult system, and h2.s been corrected. During noma1 opcrztioii when lzunching jet eircr?,ft, plnncs were l?.unched in s'xr tions, the second pkme b3irig catzpulted ap?roxirn:..toly three seconds c?fter the 1. first. Lxuching in this mniier rsill be increasingly inportmt during periods of poor visibility, whon it will- be espccielly dcsircblc for the sections to rema joined up. ihen lamching night hecklers or -:ST plmx, only one cat-?.pult tas used since the otha half of the flight deck forwzrd could be utilized for parking phncs on th\: bow.

G-.soline md lube oil expenditures were 2s follows: Gesoline, l,r320,507 gd- lows; 1120 lub oil, 8,234 gellons; 1010 lcbe oil, 3,209 g~.llons.

. The handling of two types of jet zircrzft initi2ll.y "resented several prob- lens trhich are in the process of being smoothsd out. The biggest problem Wth thz F2H circraft is in the inability to fold or sprerd the wings with gz,s in the tip tr.nks, This hes required thr?t th,- tip tanks not be g2,ssed until the plc?ne is in v a permanent pzrking spot, re,.-cly to be t&ed out md up to ths catrpult for , lcuqch. It hzs been found thcnt the most convenient spot for pzrlring has been j ' zft of thc number two &xv-tor on th2 port siie, with th; tFdl mglsd outboard and the wings interlocked, In this mnner, tho wing tip trl.nl.-s c-n be gzssed, and nll the plznes sch,?dul?d Tor the launch :mAcGd hith rl. minimu? use of spczcc. In tho case of 2 dud.,aircraft, there are only two things t!i-,t Cr-i? be done if planos are to bc deck lmnchzd cftur thc jets'cre off. If there is only one dud, it oan be pa-kcd fonsxd of th islmd, if the nose is ?.ngled inbozrd -.nd tho tclil perk- ed over the side. Tiis zllows just 'enough roon for thc: prop ?.ircr?ft to bc deck lc?unchod. In th3 czm of two duds, thc second dud must be put on the nmber two ; elcvcttor ,?id tronped to thi: hanger deck level where it mst be lcft until the hunch is completed. Tho tip tanks be dcgcssed, in ordd to fold wings and stow the aircrcft.

il tail tow bar has been developed by flight deck personnel, for recrwcrd towing of the F2H by trcctor, This hzs been xconplished by adding r? cushioned scd- dle to the universd kw ber which supports the after fusclc?.ge of tho aircrafi . I* ', t* .

In view of the recent cp.suslty suffered by this vessel, whdn ;1II F2H nircraft bounced and went over all barriers, it is strongly recozmended that a higher b?,r- ricade be instelled on the flight deck in order to prevent Z-ny repetition of this type accident,

9. Fhotography.

a. .ierial Film Dryers,

. During this first period of oner2tions, lzboratory persome1 sxpcrienced difficulty in dryirg aericll film fast enough to nest'operationpd- requirements,

'iho (2) aerial film dryers (SN E18-d-796 i,ore 1-5) wre being used in the chemical nixing room of the lFWborntory,Thz high moisture content in the air made it almost impossible to dry the aerial fiLq in any recsonabld length of time. The two (2) aerial film dryers were reloceted in on8 ol t5e uptd

b. Photo cnlcrging pper.

Trints b.zing produced on photogrzphic roll pper SN 32&.P-328-503 (for use with Sonnc: printer, Repid desist0 nmufactured by 3zstEn Kodak and. ConpCW) are being xrhd with yellow-brown bloches, These bloches were first noticed during th- first wezk of b?er?hions. The bloches zt first were bdiovGd to be caused from mishandling by photogi*2,rjhic personnel, One roll of pager, half of which was bloched the other h-,lf free of blochcs, wzs found, 9t is now t'ne 0pinio.n of the Photogrzphic Officer th?k the bloches are thd results of poor photogrzphic pC".psr.

i >in RUM4 112s been sv.bmittod. .a detailad report will be sub-nitted on the operatiom of the photographic Lborztory in the next report of the mxt tionil. period, \

Distribution :

CNO (2) direct-sirmil us3 VALZ.1 $OZx (cv45) CINCPXFLT dvnluztion Group (5) U>S 30N HOiSU IUCH;iRD (CV31) C0~LLPi.C (5) USS lSSrI.ZT.'X (CV 36) C OI.ISAT~THFLT CVG 5 C OPX. &DIV THA3.d CVG 15 , COIL~~DIV Frm CVG 101 USS BOXER (CV21) CVG 102 USS PRINCETOW (CV37) From: Comanding Officer Qow1c6RAOED AT INTERVU Chief of Naval Operations 3 YEAR To: AFTER 12 Via: (1) Cormander Carrier Division DEWSlFlED YEARS OiE W)D DIR 5Uw).lQ (2) Commander SEVZSTF? Fleet (3) Cmmnder, Naval Forces, Far East (4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Actien Repart ?or the period 1OctGber to 31 October 1951 Ref: (a) Ophrav Instruction 3480.4

Encl: (1) CVG 5 Actian Report for the period 1 October to 31 October 1951 p ,t/y 1. In accordance with reference (a), the action report for the period, 1 through 31 October, 1951, is hereby submitted. PART I Composition sf Own Fcrces and Hission: 1, At variuus thes during the period of this report, Task Force 77 was composed of the following units: USS ESSEX (CV-9>, CcmCarDiv ONE, RADM J. PER;iY, USN embarked; USS BON HOE~BB HICHtiiD, (CV-jl), ComCarDiv THdEZ, R&N W. G , TOMLINSON, USN, and nUDEi J . J . CLALX, USN embarked; USS BOSd (CV-21), USS xTdTI%T@l (CV-36), USNXW L??Y (BB-62) VADM H. M. MNilTIN, CcmSEVENTH Fleet embarked; USS H%L;ENA (C~i-75)~ComCruDiv THm, PMIh d: E. LIEBY, USN, embarked; US3 TOLEDO (Ck-133) CcmCx$liv FIVE, HdPi F. MOOS&f$GBR, USN, embarked; USS US AKGELES (CV-1351, and units of Destroyer Divisicn 31, 32, 91, 171, 172, and Escort Destroyer Divisicn 12, 21,

2, D:ring the subject period, the USS ESSEX (CV-9) operated off the east coast of Korea in accordance with.CTF 77 Operations Order NO. 22-51, plus supplement& plans and orders issued during the period.

The mission of TF 77 was, primarily, to support the United Nations ground forces in Korea, wbich was advancbg north of the 38th parallel. The support missions included close support, deep support, armed and photographic 'reconnaissance, interdiction of enemy supply Lines, and strikes against enemy installations.

PMl! I1 CHmN0U)GY:

The period 2l-30 September, 1951was spent in yard overhaul at Yokosuka Naval Base , Yokosuka, Japan, b 1Octaber. 0600, pursuant to Com SZVE%TH Fleet confidential dispatch 130008Z of September, 1951, underway frcm Yokosuka, J.span in aompany with USS HEUNn (CA-75), 1100, effected rendezvous wich CortDesDiv 21. Ccnducted AA firing practice and training exercises,

2 October. Conducted flight familiarhatien operations. Csnducted AA firing practice, and training exercises. 5, October Conducted Air OperatXons, 6 October Conducted Atr Oper US?, 1 BD-4, BiJ NO. 1239459 (pilot, WJG 'EMGlJ3) was h kbmm AA fire over CU 5168, Plane was obserired to crash an ode. Pilot presymed MUed iri action.

7 October Conducted Air Operatbns. 1600, iihDM J, J. CJAkX, USN, ComCerDiv THHEE assumed tactical command of Tgsk Force 77. / I

8 Octobes Task Force rsplckfahed, Conducted &A firing exercise. , 9 October Conducted 'mOperations. 10 October Conducted Air Operations .

3. 12 Ocbber Task Force replenished, ,.. ... , 13 October heto poor weather ever 'the target mea, all Air @perations were oancelled with the exception of CAP, ASP, and weather reconnaissance * , l.4 October' Due to poor weathe area, &I Air 0pera;tions were cmcelled witti the CAP, ASP, and weather reconnaissance, Late in the afternoon, ce replenished. 15 October 4hnduoted Oparatio , 3U NQ. l.Zi951, was bit by to crash and explode. Pilot

I d WB firing practice,' 2040, I relieved RdW J. J, GLKNK, USN,

18 October Conducted Air 0

' 19 October Condu Weather over target area caused can- Perm replenished ln the afternoon. ame abosFd'for a short v&s%%wibh

, 22 ‘October Conduuted Air Operatiuns,

24 Octobe’r eonducte

’ 27 Octbbsr Ta?3k‘

.--

dikpatch was, setcefwd 3, Comment on Perfomahce of &dnanae Ma%ek.ia&. -_- ORLASSIRED . a. Parachute Flaresi.

No parachute flares were used as jury rig for single suspension mentioned in previous report was considered unreliable for catapulting and it is usual practice to catapult predawn and nig%heckler aircraft. I

b, Working Sp'ces. \ The ship's aviation ordnance crew is badly in need of work and stowage space to be used as a spare parts and tool' issue room. The .ship's aviation ordnance crew is required to supply the Air Group with all turnover material, yet does not have anadequate space to use as a spare pacts and issue room. 20 MI4 space to be used when 20 MM batteries are removed as indicated in ShipLLt No. 225,

P c8 Hung Ordnanae

\ I, This vessel has experienced many cases of hung ordnance, wherein it has been impossible for the pilots to sqend all bombs or rockets, and have landed aboard with one or more. In sever1 cases, the impact of an arrested landings has jarred the bomb or rocket loose from the rack and caused it to travel pp the deck as far as the forward elevator. This is exceedingly dangerous, especially in view of the fact that generally, there are parked aircraft, forward on. the flight deck, Withdn&e loaded for the next strike,

4. Confirmed effort will be made by this command to eliminate malfunctions in bomb racks. However it has-been noted in kction ileports of other carrier r that difficulties wi$h hung bombs have been experienced by all. units even since the Koreah hosilities commencedo In view af the seriousness of this situation it is recommended that prompt action &ti departmental level be taken to improve reliability of bomb racks provided Naval Aircraft,

PART IV ,BATTLE DANAGE: c 1, Ship -.. 1 No battle, or voyage, damage was eurJt&Snsd by the ship. ' 1 \- 2. Damage inflicted on the enemy See enclosure (1) 3. Damage inflicted on ZSSEX aircqaft, See enclosure (I) -cr'! PART V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CwSUIILTES: I!

1 1, Performance. , i Performance sf duty and morale has been exellent, .i

(2) Gooperation between vessels of the Task Farce on furnishing emergency requirements continws to be good,

(3) The Section A allowance of flight deck clothing is inadequate. Each man concerned requires a 'kinimum of two. jerseys rather than ane, especially during warm -weather &en perspiration necessitates frequent laundering,

(4) Squadrops deploying to the ferward area should make every effort to have a full allowance of Section H,U, and winter flight clothing items before embarking aboard ship, as provided in ACL-2l-5l.

(5) The present allowance of wings, stabilizers, allcrons, and rudders should be increased three times and stowed aboard carriers befere leaving the United States. Damage from enemy anti-aircraft fire and operational losses have created a critical condition on &craft surfacese

(6) Five major Section B allcwances are being carried for aircraft now assigned to CAG-5 (F9F-2; F4U-4B; 0-4; Fa-2; H33S-l). In addition four minor Section B allowances are aboard for the various configurations of basic types (AD-U, N,Q, W; AD-2, 3, 3N; F9F-2F; F.!+U-QJL). No great stowage problem has presented itself, although it has been necessary to unpack ad rebox the major portion ef items received,

(7) Local constmcticn of addition21 tire rLtcks to provide stowage for the wartime allowance was necessary fr? storeroom C-403-A.

(1) The system of replenishing G.S,K, storx in this aria by Mobile Suppcrt 5 considered excellent. The USS CfiSTOii issues stores within one day after the presentation of requistions. By using the GSN Catalogue published by COMSERVIDN 3, only materials carried by the CxSTOh are ordere from this ship. These are either delivered or cancelled, thereby, reducing paper work and duplication of effort, NIS items are re-ordered from PRCO through COMSEBVEIN 3,, To date there have been very few item requiring this action,

(2) The replenishment of Electronic and BGihip Machincry Spare Parts has not been as prompt as others. However, the U3kGUE ISWD, CHINON, and EUCTLIT>N have furnished parts carried with a minimum of delayo The system of replenishment, presently in effect, requires thst all requistions be placed on the kGtsI Approximately 3Q$ of the items required have been furnished. For items NIS on the AGTs, new requistions am cut on Fl-et Activities, Yok- osuka, If still not available, anothar requistion must be prepared and submitted to SERVFON 3, or COMSEFUIIV 31, for farwarding to PRCO, This duplication of paper work tends to delay in the majority of replenishing that must come fmm the States, which because of distmce alone requires considerable pipeline time for the item needed, It is suggested that a catalogue of all spares carried bythese supply ships be promulgated and that stocks be maintained accordingly. ?&en it is %now that a prticular item is not cclrried by AGls in this area, it cwld then be requistioned immediately from P%O,

(3) Exchange of type spares between carriers has helped 'greatly and to date no major equipnent has become inoperative because of lack of spares, (4) The stowage of foul weather clothing has presented 2 definite I problem to this ship, A-3055A (Foul Weather Gear Storeroom) should be equipped with bins and racks similar to a flight clothing storeroom. Under the present stowage arrang.emir& of this compartment, receipt, stowage and issue is difficult and is considered unsatisfactory.

(5) Departmental 3udgets have b.-en established, in accordance with Afloat Accounting Memorandum No, 1, In setting up these budgets, the following departmental percentages were established, 4- Administrztive 6% Ope rat ions 8% Air 15% Gunnery 108 Engineering 33% N avigatinn 7% supply lls Medic a1 .9% Dental oh% I C ,O ,Is Reserve 15% c 4,.-J- (6) Closo,supervision in conformity with regujltions has been .maintained on charges against these budgets and each depzrtment is required to stay within their budgetary limitations,

(7) The conservation of critical items as contained in the Pacific Supply Line Publicat ion of ClhTCPnCFLT/COHS.l3R%TAC of October 1951 has been rigidly enfcrced. All stub requistions for these items are carefully screened by the Supply Department, and requests of unusual quantities are required to be justified.

c. Diskrsing

(1) It has been noted that monetary requirements for pay days are considerably less when at sea than tnose pay days held in prt or just prior +. to entering port. The monthly average of all disbursements fr3 the crew on pay rolls is approximately $275,000,00 of which $265,000.00 was by cash, Total af pay day at sea was approximately $370,~300.30; prior to the arrival in pert, the total was $115.030,00 Cooperatian of all hands has been most favorctble in using the method ef paying an even sum to the lowest five dollars, which speeds up pay lines ard saves many man hours. This method also reduces the chance of error as only the five and ten dollar denominations are required,

(2) While in port, a change station for exchanging Yen for MFCfs is set up each day. The change station for the crew is lbcated at one of the regualr paying stations and in the wardroom for officers. It has been found satisfactory t(P sell Yen in units of five and twenty dollars.

d, Shipls Store

(1) Sales for this period total approxbately $45,000.00+ This is the largest sales vslume recorded in a single month's operation since commissioning, Sales during the forthcoming holiday period are expected to increase this volume. rl 7 'J - i (2) Support received from the USS CASTOR and Fleet Activities, Yokosuka has been generally excellent, All material requistioned has been received with the exception of a few minor items,

(3) Exprience indicates that the following items are in short supply in the forward area and should be stocked to capacity by ships departing continental United States for the forward area:

Buttons Uniform Accessories Chocolate Syrup Lighter Flints Hat Frdmes

(4) The operation of the laund-ry is continuing on a 24 hour basis, 5 days a week. These operating hours are considered superior to %he previous 7 day round the clock hiork week, inasmuch as, a s;vings of approximately 35,000 gallons of fresh water per week has been realized, and time is now available for maintenance and upkeep of the operating machinery,

(5) The system of cigarette rationing mentimed in the previous report has been discontinued,

(6) Hours of o~erstionin the Ship's Store activities have been established-for the purpjse of offering as nearly continuous service as possible. Hours of operations are as follows:

Shipts Store ffl

Monday through Saturday 0900 to 1103 and 1300 to 1600 Sunday 1300 to 1500 Ship's Store.#2 Fionday through Saturday 3.300 to 1600 and 1830 to 2030 Sunday 1830 t3 2030

_Ship's Service Store #l Tuesday, 'Thursday, 'Saturday 1300 tb 1630 M~njay,-Wednesday, Friday A339 ta 1630 and 1830 to 2030 Sunday 1300 to 1530

Shipts Service Stcre, #2 Monday, Vednesday, Friday 1300 t9 1630 Tuesday, Thursday ,S aturdsy 1330 to 1630 and M30 to 2030 Sunday 1830 to 2030

(7) Operating equipent has been running continuously with the exception of a few minor breakdowns in the laundry and scda fountain. In these instances, repairs have bsen effected by Ship's Forue without delay,

(8) The installation of a shirt folding unit in the laundry'is considered highly desirable, A unit cf tinis type was removed during the 274 conversion, The installation of this item would improve the finishing operation and contribute to the saving of man hours. 6 8 ,L 8 (9) Abnormal temperatures in bulk storeroom B-4064 have caused a general deterioration of stock stowed in this space. Laundry supplies have hardened thereby, making them difficult to use. Temperatures recorded in this storeroom during the months of July, August, and September averaged 110' F, Ventilation improvements in this space are necessary before it can be properly utilized as a satisfactory storeroom for Shipls Stcre Stock.

(10) In addition to the security measures prescribed by the BSandk Manual and other current directives the following measures have been inaugurated and are believed to be of value in further safeguarding the stock and monies of the Ship's Store Activities.

a. No money is left overnight in the cash registers of any of the activities. b, Cash drawers are left open when the activity is not in operations. c. Night lights are installed in the Shiprs Stores and Ship% Service Stores and are left burning all night. d, Inspections are conducted nightly by the Duty Supply Officer at 2200 arad 2400 of all Ship's Store spaces. et, Two (2) group 3 locks are installed on each door to the Ship's Store spaces.

e. Commissary (1) Cdssary has been generally satisfectory. Support from the AF's has been excellent, However no infohation as to fresh previsions carried by these ship9 is available, This has resulted in an occasional sh3rtage of fresh provisions in the General, and other messes. In this connection none of these shortages are considered serious.

(2) The fallowing schedule ef meal hours has been maintained in the General Mess.

Breakfast 0545 These hours fluctuate to accommodate 06-45 flight operation schedules.

Experience indicates that it takes approximately 2 hours for all hands to pass through the mess line, be served, eat, and vacate the messing areas, although the standard on other type ships is about one hour, (3) The pactice of serving sweet rolls, jam and coffee one half hour befme flight quarters when early morning flights are scheduled, also the serving of cakes, or toast and jam 15 minutes after late flight quarters to the flight deck crew both have enabled the meal hours to remain reasonably steady yet flex- ible enough to conform to flight operations, This procedure is prcdng to be hi&ly satisfactory to both the Air Group and Ship's Company. Night rations averaged 50 per night for the last month.

(4) Hot soup is now being servgd to all flight deck an& weather deck personnel. This innovstion has also been met with enthusiasm. c1 9 3. Air Department DECLASSIFIED a. Catapult and arresting gear,

(1)'Catapult and arresting gear operation was normal during the period of this re-mrt with the following exceptions:

(a) On shot number 2134, port catapult, five out of the nine bolts which secure the cable tensioner-cylinder to the elbow at the base of the dome, sheared off, It wag neoessnry to rempve the-elbow in order to extract the severed secticns of tbe bolts, replzce them with new bolts and reinstall. Time required was four hours, during which time the c;ttapult was out of commission. Cause of the failure wits apparently due to metal fatigue. Bolts have also been replaced on the starboard catapult, although there was no indication of weakeniqg

(b) On shot number 2225, port cdtapult, the mschine fired and immediately out off. The FW, Banshee, potted on the catapult, received enough powes. te break the tension ring and sta& down the catapult track, but has insufficiat power to take off, The pilot was unable to break to a stop and went over the bow, port side, and in to the watsr, The pilot was actually in the water a total of one minute and fifteen secmds before beirig picked up by the ESSEX helicopter, and wad on deck within three minutes from the time he went ever the bow. The cause of the catapult failure was due to a break in the catapult electrical firing circkit, immediately after the main piston valve opened. The break in the circuit, causad iin immediate cutoff, allowing the crosshead to travel a total of enly thrity-six inches. It is anticipated that all switches on the port catapult will be replaced with new ones,\after which a series of no lad and dead shots will be made prior to lamehag any more aircraft,

b.. Towing Bars.

(1J.I The large variety of aircpaft aboard this vessel requizs several different types of tow bars for handling 8$ airckaft. The standard Universal Tow Bar is used for tail towing AD-3, nD-4, and F4U aircraft, and also for forward towing of all AD,F4U, and F9F type aircraft. The FW can be towed forward only after modification of the tow bar. Since nearly all towing on a carrier deck is from the rear, a special tow bar was necessary for use in tail towing - trEle F9F, and another for the FW. This was accomplished, by modifying the standard Universal Tow Bar. When they were modified, they cm no longer be usad * for towing any other way., Nodification of the FW type was described in the previous action report,

When AD-2 aircraft were received as replacement, ano%her problem arose in that it has a different t5Tpe of tail when assembly which sits lower on the deck and when a Universal Taw Bar was used, interference was experienced with the tail hogk. This required still another type of tow bar. ull together, it has been found naoessary to use three different type of tow bars, in addition to the Universal Tow Bar.

Because of the heavy service the tow bar receive during operations, the attrition rate is high, A maintensme crew of three men is recpired just ' to maintain the tow bars in serviceable condition, Before deployment from the Cwtinental Limits, a vessel of this type should be equipped with a minimum of 45 Universal Tow Bars, and 5 each of %he special types needed for handling those aircraft which can not be hmdled with the Universal Bars,(Total(t;O) -L f '4 & ,.4 *,f

AIR DEPAIZTIJENT Operating Data DECLASSIFIED Arrested landings 1556 Catapult Shots 762 Starboard Catapult 487 Port Catapult 275 Gasoline, (gallons) iy 824,647 LubOil, Symbol 1120 (galione) 4,693 LubOil, Symbol 1010 (gallons) 3,265 4. iiavigat ion

Ship's postion was obtained primarily by celestial observations, Weather conditions permitted sights to be taken seventy percent of the time,

Radar fixes were obtained frequently, This method of navigition proved very effective, and it was found that once the problem of using mountain ranges and kand masses in obtaining radar positions was understood, radar fixes almost coincided with those obtained by celestrialmcas.

Loran wits employed less frequently, but it was proved that this method could be used with a fair degree of reliability at ni&t. 5,, Air Intelligence

Air Group FIIE has been opecating,.in the forward 'area, for two 30 day periods, is still using the original chart issue. HS far as can be determined the charts show all indications of being fully useable for another sperating pericd.

Frisket covering allows pilots to use and erase soft lead or grease pencil markings. Char% not covered by Frisket seldom lasts one eperational period. It is recommended that all charts be covered with frisket paper before arriving in the combat area. 6. CIC The field ateration allowing the search antenna of the SX-2 antenna to be . tilted has been accomplished and the operation of radar is being checked. Al- ready impmved detection of jet aircraft has been noticed and it is hoped that continued and marked improvement in this problem will be realized. Trapping of radar and radio trwsmission continues to be a much noticed &enomena. A recent example was establishing loud and clear communications on the primary GI net (a UHF frequency) between the ES,S!X and the NEW JERSEY at 45 miles.

u. St~kecontrol of returning aircraft is .one of the most important single features of the air control picture in the present operation. Thorough briefing and practice by both AirGroups and CIC personnel prior to deployment will be of real aid to strike control personnel and will eliminate to a large degree needless intercepts ,

The three AN/ARC-lrs installed for CIC use in the 274 conversion have worked very poorly, This apperas to be due to low modula-Lion..ofthe transmitter because of losses in the line from the broadcast through the CIC Comm- unications System, the patchirg switches in Radio I, and the individual adapters in Radio VII,

Ship's fcrce constructed a simple amplifier znd installed it in one of the AN/&IC-l adapters in Radio VII, This amplifying has improved the performance of this kN/ARC,*tremendously and has increased the range of the equipent to that of TDQ, When parts are available, additional amplifiers will be made and hstalled on the remaining two AN/niitlCls. \ 7,. Communications

*. With the experience of one period of operations as the greatest single asset, communications during this second' period produced considerably more gratif,:Jing results. In general, many of the problems of a technical nature remained the same as before. Certain hprovement, however, in this as well as other phases of communications have been rather marked, Close supervision and a continuous iton-th-joblf training program have been directed toward the avoid- ance of repetitious errors and so-cdled communications liBUSTSfl. rZadio supervisors, far example, have through experience and the exercise of good judgement learned to utlize mere fully the facilities and equi@ent avail&ble to them, When regular transmission channels, for the heavy 10dof outgoing traffic h- posed upon a task force flagship, have for some reason been closed to them, supervisors (and operators) have been quick to request special spted circuits with shore stations for the relay of messages..

Procedures for message handling, particularly in Main Communicatians Station, although not fool-proof by any stretch of the imagination, have been reasonably standardized, Routing of high precedence and action traffic has been a great deal more satisfnctory than during the period cwered by the previous action report. Concomitantly, the volume of traffic increased an estimated 15 to 20% overthe volume of the previous priod.

'bi The situation, in regard to CW and voice circuits as described in the previous report has remained unchanged. The same problems exist, although personnel have increased their efficiency in surmounting the difficulties enccuntered, As ~znexample, the stationing of a log-wstch in the pilot house an the seconlary tactic:-.l circuit, has lessened the confusion in ship control that results from merely loud-speaker ilmonitoring,tl In addition, the primary tactical circuit, under the present arrangcment, is the responsibility of the Junior Officer-of-the-Deck, Espt cially during flight deck operations the noise level is of such proportions as to dewand that ,a receiver head-set be worn for both circuits in order to hear the broadcast tactic21 signals. .Chest- sets with extended leads have bean prepared by the Technicians so that the operators of both the primary and secon?ary tactical circuits have freedom sf movement 'en the bridge, h log of traffic cn the primary tactical circuit is maintained in CIC,

R / I J ,. B c L#.* ' '* * c. Although not completely dependable, the shipto-shore radiB- teletype circuit established toward the close of the previous operating period has proved a boom to communications and the clearing of outgaing traffic by a flagship maintam ship-tc-shore guard for the Task Forcer Its performance is not dependable to the extent that atmosphdxs and frequent shifting among the frequencies assigned have interfered with its functioning smoothly and uninterruptedly, In the first place, the circuit has been shared with another Task Force Command; the alldcation deterrent factor. The most recurrent difficulties have occurred from about sunset to midnight in this area4

d. Jamming, (intentional), although continuing in about the same degree as previously report for CW circuits, has appreciably increased on HF and VHF frequencies. k number of reports has been submitted to the force commander concerning fsreign language jamming interference.

t?. t?. Due to the avtrage loss of between two to three hours' transmission time each twenty-four hour period-predominantly cn 2adio I1 trznsmitters, an alteratio request is being prepared far the installation of motor-driven equipment to control remotely (preferably in Radio Central) the rigging of forward and after wbip antennae. At present, this is a rnagual operation performed by flight deck personnel,

f, The ship successfully trmsmitted by facsinile the photo news coverage of CinCPacFltfs 19 October visit to the Task Fcrce, Transmission to Pearl Harbor (Radio photo unit number 4) was successful on the first run, whereas transmission to San Frmcisco (Radio photo unit number 2) was completed only ,after three repetitions of schedules arranged with unit number 2 over a period ef approaately twenty-four hours.

g. The arganization arid assignment of pasonnel during this period has became fairly stabilized. k pclicy of ratating teleman (TE) rates within communications has been initiated. It is inQended to further this program making monthly exchanges within the divisicn to include the psstal clerks as radio and Main Communications personnel. H policy of exchange between signalmen and quartemsters (QM rages) has been in effect for vver six months.

Although the total number of personnel has been reducd by transfers since the last report, sixty-eight (68) ship's personnel in the OR division and twenty-six (26) in the 0s division augmented by twelve (12) staff personnel have been adequate. It hes been attempted to emphasize training so that, if required, adjustm.:nts in the event of minimal losses can be made without seriously affecting the efficiency of communications.

'8, Aerology

a. Communications

(1) Fncsimile. NDT(Radio photo Unit #5, Tok~o)was copied with recepwon as 'noted below.

01001 (l6QOZ) 703 mb chart (03032) Very Poor Surface Chart (060Z) Very Poor 05001 (20002) 700 mb prog chart Very poor Briefing chart NR3 Very poor - --- 09001 (oomz) 300 mh prog chi.*rt Very EQOd 300 mb chart (0300) Very good

Surfzce Prog Chart Very good 700 mb Chart (prog) Very good

Surface chart (OOOOZ) . Vary good Briefing chart NR1 Very good 300 mb chart Very good

a. Little Of tha fLiCShik?f$kta: was used during this pried b. Inteference caused by ship's own trmsmitter and aircraf2 engines was the main problem during the day; atmospheric interference during the night. C. Surface chart (183c)Z), briefing chart NIL!+, 850 mb chart (15002), 700 mb chart (15002) and 500 mS chart (1590Z) if practicable should,be transmitted by NDT. d, The Shi$ dectronics shop is cor,st.mcting n converter which Will enable present facsimile equipent to rdceive A&S Tokyo, d, During the first part of the pericd the 00002 chart and a forecast \ was transmitted to the USS BOK EObFi LZICK~~With excellent results obtained.

(2) Radiotelety-pe l

a, Ths installnticn of another teletype in the kerological Laboratory enabled both H~XSGuarm (dE) and dLCS T&bo YdF) to be copied simultaeously, This acted as insurance ZgainsL outages and resulted in better than reception.

b, Occasionally TaegQ (DIlQ) was copied to obtain Korean weather more rapidly. A time swing of frcm 15 to k.5 minutes resulted, but reception was generally poor (less than 25%) and in ordomot to miss the Korean weather entirely, Toea was always copied,

, (3) Radio (Gni)

a, The radio man stztionid in the Aerological Office kept $he teletype 2nd facsimile tuned

(1) Ships,

\ The hourly weather reprts from ships located along the Korean east caast continue to be very important, Their value could be greatly increased if qualified weather observers were stationed on these ships.

(2) Pilots

Numerous pilot weather report summaries (OOO-04001) from the Kolean area are received via teletype during the mornbg, but too Jate to brief early morning flights, Action has been taken by CTF 77 to have these reports relayed as soon as possible to the oprating carriers,

c. Equipnent and Supplies.

(1) All aerological equipent operat d satisf ctorily during the pericd. (2) A pneumatic tube betweon the Adrologicc 1 Laboratory and Main Communications Staticn is considered a rrnustllto reduce delays =and save man hours ,in h'ardling about 15'3 weather messages kily. An alteration request is being submitted riquesting such installation

(3) An additj?onal mzws of communic:itions with the Open Bridge, Captain's Plot, Flag Plot, CiC, Air Opcrations, and Wain Communications Strztien is considered very desir:--ble. At present, the ship's ser~icephone is all that is Wailable. m outlet on one of the NC circuits is considered to be the most desirable solution. WI alteration rcqu st is being subnitted requesting such an iwtallation. I

(4) Four RHWIN soundings were taken daily to hn average height of about 30,000 feet. The 1323-32/tQY rcf1:xtor (Navy stock R46-ft-358efish ndt- pyramid base, 52 inches square) was used in conjunction with Mark 37 directors and Mark 25 radar, and occasionally the Mark 56 director and Mark 35 Nod 2 radar. (5) There is, at present, no helium in the forward area, and only about 89 gull bottles remain aboard. Daily consumption averages about 2.5 , bottles, I i Typhoon tRuthtl which passed over sou-fhern Japan on the 14th then NorCheastward along the wvst coast of Japan cased overcast skies in the operciting area on the 14th and moderate to rough seas on the 15th ad. 16th with very little increase in the wind, Low ceilings in the target area required cacelling of kir Oprrztions on the Uth. \ This opratjng period saw the first real invasion, of the operating area, of cold dry cir from Siberia,

The first outbrbak occurred late October 18th when a weak cold fl'om with little associated weather passed over the force. Temperaturas dropped to 56 degrees, This front on passing ever the relatively warm water of the Sea of Japan rapidly developcd (2 Wtlve-to Low ceiling3 and rain fl'om this wave moved over the farce early the 19th and continued until early the 21st. Feg developed over the cold water area of northwest sea of Japan early the 19th causing the four early missions to be cacelled, The force was moved south into warmer water, out of the fog, and ope rations were continued . The second outbreak of cold air occurred October 24th with the passage of a weak cold front. Temperatures dropped to the low 50's and westerly winds of 30 to 35 knots were experienced& This primary front developd considerable thunderstorm activity ovcr Korea, and cavered the higher mountains with snow, Considerable shower activity occurred ovcr the force as well as westerly winds of 30 to 40 knots behind the front, CAW weather accurred shortly after passage of the secondary front, Temperatures behind the front fell to the middle l+Ofs4

Low ceilings with rain developed in the southern part of the operating area an the 23rd when the semi-permanent front, to the south of Japan, moved northward to southern J3pn as a warm front, causing widespread cloudiness and rain over Jzpan and southern sea of Japan,

Light winds (4 to 8 knots) prevailed on the 28th, 29th and 30th when high pressure was centered over the sea 3f Japan.

8 9, Photography

a. Personnel

(1) Personnel allowance, on borrd, and squa iron personnel assigned to the photographic laboratory,

filcwnnce On Eoard Squadron Personnel

Chief 1 1 0

1st Class 2 1 1

2nd Class 3 2 1 3rd Class 4 4 3 PHSN 0 1 0 SN 0 3 0

PHdl 0 2 0

AFhN 0 0 1

AN 0 3 1

SA 0 2 0

.4A 0 1 0

TOT& 10 20 7

16 b. Personnel assignments within the Photographic Unit.

Chief 1st Class 2nd Class 3rd Class Seaman TOT&

Office , 1 0 0 1 0 2 Production (3. 1 1 2 2 6 Finishing 0 0 0 1 1 2 Photo Material 0 0 0 1 0 1 K-3 A 0 0 1 0 0 1 C mera Insta lletion 0 0 0 0 1 1 Film Marking 0 1 1 0 0 2 Night Crew 0 0 0 1 4 5 Mess Cook 0 0 0 0 1 1 Compt . Cleaner 0 0 0 0 1 1 Messenger 0 0 0 0 1 1 Chemical Mixing 0 3 0 0 1 1 Flight Quarters -0 -0 -0 -1 2 2 1 2 3 7 14c 27

C. Production Period

(1) First Period 24 August through 19 September 1951 Tatal Number of Photographic Iiissions Flown 73 Totdl Numbtr of rolls filed 122 Averzge number exposures per roll 39 Total Number of negatives used 4,799 Total Rumber of prints made 43 > 201 Running Time fiverage time to develop and wash 67 Min 1 hour 07 Min. hverage time to dry 30 Kin 2 hour 07 !:in. AverLge time for first set of grease pencil marked prints delivered to P.I. 1Hr 30 Plin 3 hour 37 Min. Officer . Average time to mark one (1) roll of film(Computed from time of delivery to 2 Mr 46 Min 6 hour 23 Min. film marking, to time retuned for distribution printing) Average time for set ef marked prints to P.I. Officer (ater receiving marked film 1Hr 52 Min 8 hour 15 Min, from film marking)

dl work completed and ready for mailing by 1000 the following day.

(2) Second Period 4 October through 30 October 1951

Total Number of Photograppic Missions Flown 68 Total Number of rolls filed 191 Average number exposures pr roll 60 Total Number of negatives made 6,280 Total Number of prints made 55,048

17 2Hr20W.n

2 Hr 26 Kin 8Hr&Min '

2 Hr 33 &fin ll. Hr 17 Min

~ from film marking) /

All work completed and ready for miling by lOa0 fol-lowkg day. - Pii?3DNTION liECOlZD FbIz 1st apd 2nd FbitIOCS AUCXIST THROUGH 30 OClBBER 1951

_I 'Total number .of missi6ns flown Total number of rolls filed Totdlnumber of negatives used Total number of prints made Average number of exposures per roil

1bUs Taken 76 / Total posefble expdsures 1,520 I , Total exposures taken 1,161 Total usable exposures 804 , Total unusable exposures 3 59 Total prints filed u3 Rolls not usab2.e due to

improper Cechniqyes. 9 '. ,IC , ' f 'i'T-& : ' I' L I'c ., . i f I &STIN d* FmELOCK . \ DistributAen: . CNO (ivivance, airmaik) (2) USS PEILIPPma SEA (CV-47)

COMdRPAC (Advance, aimiatl) (2)I OSS ViiLIEY FORGE (CV4!+5) ' CfMCPriCFLT (Mmce, airmail) (2) USS BON HOF33 X~QIJ&D(CV-31) COMC&IV ONE USS uNTUThM (CV-3b) COEfSEV3"I'€iFLT cv3 5 tr) COMNnvFE CVG 11 COMCHtZ DIV 'IHR.323 CVG 3.5 C0MCllrlD;IV FIVE CVG bQf. USS BOXER (CV-21) ' CVG 102 USS PRINCETON ((37-37) AXIp TSK GROUP ONE 'r + ..

'rl' '1 ;L U.S.23, Ess

Sen? Francisco, Calif, , Serial: Ol4.7 18 Dec 1971

From: Commanding Officer To: Chief of Naval Operations DOWNGRADED AT 3 ?EAR N?W"TE Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division ONE DECLASSIFIED AfTER 12 YEARS (2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet DOD DIR 5200.10 (3) Commander, Naval Forces, Far Ealilt (4) Commander in Chief, U, 5, Pacific Fleet Subj: Action Report for the period 1Nove&er to U, December 1951 Ref: (a> OpNav Instruction 3480.4 Encl: (1) CamirGrp FIVE Action Report, 1Nov - UC Dec 1951 !k- 1, In accordanoe with reference (a), the action report for the period 1 November to I4 December, 1931 2s hereby submitted.

PART I COMPOSITION OF OWI4 FORmS .MI)MSSION: 1, At various times during the period nf this report, Task Force 77 was composed of the following units: USS ESSEX (CVS), ComCarDfv ONE, RllDM. J. J. PERRY, USN, embarked, USS BC,N HOlQX iUCH;ilcD (CV31), ComCarDiv WfW3 RAN 3. J, CLAM, USN, embarked, USS ANTIETAN (CV36), USS VlUEX FOGE (av45), ComCarDiv FIVE, RdM F, hr. McMAHON, USN, embarked, USWISCONSIN (BB6&), ComSEVENTIiFleet, VUnE'' H. H. WTIN, USN, embarked; USS LOS HNGEUS (CAl351, USS RDCHESTER (CA12k), USS ST. PNL (CA73) ComCruDiv Om, UXlM E. 6, STONE, XEUNH, Cm~ruDivTHIZEE, FUiDH R. E, USN, USN, embarked, US3 (CA75), LIBBY, ' embarked,. and units of Destroyer Division 111, 151, 252, l22, 3%, snd, " Escort, Destmyer Division ll, 12, 2, During the subject period, the USS ESSFX (CV9) operated off the East coast of Korea in accordance with CTF 77 Operadtons Order Nn. 22-51 (First and Second Revisions), plus supplmental plans and orders issued during the period. The Mission of TI' 77 was, primarily, to supprt the United Nations ground forces in Korea, which were advancing north of the 38th parallel. The support missions included close support, deep support, armed and photographic reconnaissance, interdiction of enemy supply lines, and strikes against enemy installations, PART I1 CHRONOLOGY: 1November Enroute to Yokosuka, Japan from UperiLting Area, in accordance with COMSEVENTHFLT conf idential dispatch 25 78162 Oct . 2 November 1542, anchored berth 9,Yokosuka, Japan. 3 Novenrber 0805 moored starboard side to, Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan, 4-11November Yard availability, rest, and recreatim period, Yokosuka, Japan. 12 November 0603 pursuant to Com7tbFlt confidential. dispatch 2508162 Oct, 1951 underway in company with USS HELENA, for operating area. -m 0815 RW with DesDiv 111. Conducted AA firing practice. 13 November Oonducted flight famfliarixation training, Conducted AU firing practie e . 14 .November Conducted large drone firing exercise Joined TF 77, ComCai-Elv THRKE (embarked in USS BOX HOPDE dICHARD (CV--31)) was QTC, Conducted 4A. firing practice .

15 November Launched early morning hecklers and lisp, Rest of schedule cai- selie.3 due to weather, TF replenished in late afternoon an& evmning.

16 November Conducted Air Operations, Cmducted kA f irirrg.practice.

17 November Conducted Air Operations, 0825l, AD3 BUNO, l.23923 power stall&. on take0f.i arid crashed, pilot (LT W, A, BiiYANT Jr*), not recovered, peoun”d

20 November Conducted large drme firing practice. TF replenished.

21 November Conducted Air Oprations. 1630 F4U, RUNO, 97515, was hit by enemy AA fire, pilot was required to ditch his aircraft over Wonsan Harbor,, Pilot (LT €3, C, PRUITT) was rescued by LsMEi 404

22 Novmber Conducted Air Oprations. 23 November TE! attempted to replenish but, due to heavy seas replenishuent was dis continued . 24. November TF replenished,

25 Novenber Due to weather at TF and over target, all Air Operations cancelled: 26 November Due to weather at TF and over target area 811 Air Operations cancelled 27 November Conducted Air Operations. 1206 Lost AD, BUNO, 123974 over Wonsan Harbor, pilot (LTJG E. HWLE) presumed dead. Tail fin came off 250# bomb and carried away arming wire leaving tail fuze armed, attempt to jettison was unsuccessful. Pilot bailed out but disappeared from view shortly after ladning in water. Extensive search by remainder of flight, destroyer, and SAR from Araly proved fruitless,

28 November Conducted Air Operations, 2 a. 29 Nommber Conducted Air Operations. LT D, M#L'IsHALL, VF-51, made 41,000 landing on USS ESSEX, 16301, Iw)W J. PERRY, ComCarDiv ONE, relieved RADM, J.J. CLARK, ComCarDiv THREE as OTC, 1630 USBON HOMNE XICHARD (CV-31) departed from Task Force enroute to Yokosuka, Japan for furtkr routing to CONLUS.

30 November TF replenished, Conducted UB firing practice. 1 December Conducted Air Operations. 0915, FW, RUNO, 62931 hit by me AA fire, ditched in Wonsan Harbor, Pilot (LTJG E. C. GWTT7 was rescued by USS McGINTY DD-365, No injuries were sustained, 0945, F4U, BUNO. 97504 hit by enemy AA fire, ditcrhed in Wonsan Harbor, Pilot (LT N. E. CUttRY) was rescued by SAFt vessel, Pilot was not injured,.

2 December Conducted Air Oprations, 1023, 1 F4U-!$JIl, BUXO. 124554 lost power on launch and landed in the water ahead of the ship, Pilot (LTJG R. S. DONOVAN) was resoued by the ship's helioopter, No injuries sustained.

3 December Conducted Air Operatians. 4 December Task Force replenished, 5 December Conducted Air Operations, The following dispatch received from CTF 77, tlTHE FOLLOWING M!XSAGh FROM COM'7THFLT IS PASSED WITH PLEASURE TO TEOSE WHO REl&LY DID THE WOIiK X QUOTE X TKE QUICK CHANGE FFUM BhCK TO AUE ON THE fN'I%RDICTIONMAP IS A $IXHSING COLOR CHNGE X UNQUOTE, This message was addressed to ESSEX, ANTIETAN, GAG5 and CAG-15, 6 December Conducted Air Operations.

7 December Conducted Air Operations +

8 December Task Force re plenshed I 9 December Conducted Air Operations, 0810, AD4, BUNO, 122342 hit by ene AA fire, ditched over Wonsan Harbor, Pilot (LT F. J. OIKALI+F;Y was picked up by USS EVANSVILLE. No injuries sustained, 1500,7 AD4, BUNO, I22325 hit by enemy 1IA fire, ditched in Wonsan Harbor. Pilot (LT F, J. PENDl3RGfiST) picked up by USS McGXNTY DD-365, No injuries sustained.

18 December Conducted Air Operations ,

11 December Conducted Air 0 per at ions

12 December Task Force replenished, 1558, &DM F. W, MWON, (ComCarDiv FIVE. relieved RAnM J. J. PERBY (ComCarDiv ONE) as OTC, 1600, Pursuant to CoIhSeventhFlt confidential dispatch 060900 Dec. ESSEX in company With ROCHESTER, DESDIV u1 detached from TF 77, to proceed to Yokosuka, Japan for upkeep and recreation, ComCarDiv ONE emban 3 II *r F s f'J' , i* . 13 Decanber Enmte to Yokosuka, 0 r 'b aircraft, flag hoist drill using ACP 175,'voice eJld drill* UC December 1510, Maatred Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan. PART 111 ORDNANCE: 1, Expenditure of Air Ordnance. See enclosure (1) 2. Expenditure of Ship's Ordnance for train-. a. For the period 1-30 November 1951, 511/38 AAC Projectiles 254 Sff/38 Mon Frag Projectiles 130 I

5*/38 Cartridges, non-flashless 384

3It/5O VT Carkridges, non-flashless 686 ' 3"/50 VT Non Frag Cartridges 576

b, For the period 1-li!+December 1951.

There wa9 no exlpenditure of ammunition for training purposes for this period, 3. Coments on Performance of Ordnance, a. Performance of Shipts Ordnance Equipnent. (1)During the period of this report, the ever increasing accent on gunnery readiness has reflected itself in the conduct offvntanti-aircraft gunnery exercises. The performance of ordnance material an such occasions hac been gnerally satisfactory with the exception of a few mjnor casualties in the 3"/33 caliber RFTM battery, Although minor in nature, the following casualtie are considered Worthy of comment because certain functions of a mount are inoperative due to the non-availability of spare prtst

(a) Slide This small machined part, whimh we- lock (Pc 612221-1), ' vents a cartridge from bouncing out of the gun chamber when its is catapulted into the breech, broke while conducting a prefiring check-off routine on on0 mount. Although the ship is authorized to carry 5 spares, the oo&r&on3ing allowance, (due January 15, 1951) has never been received, Besides receiving general mention in the precomissionhg weekly progress reports for a period of 2 mbnths, this item was listed as a deficiency on the spare parts discrepay list submitted prior to the shiprs departure for the shakedown cruise, Follo. up correspondence initiated prior ta departure from owd Naval Shipyar (post-shakedown availabilitg, Zh May, 1951) San for mSPAC,

t # P '1 * +* 0 28 June, 1951) and Tearuarbor (enroute WGSPAC, 8 August 1951) likewise produced negative results. Dispatch requests have ind5cated that spare slide lacks are not available in Task Force 77, Service Squadron 3, nor Fieet Astivities, Yokosuka Naval Base. According to information from the Ordnance shock Office, Washington, ?I.&.,this past was shipped from the Naval Gun Fectwj-,r c):~ 20 Septanber, 19j1. Although the lack of this part renders on barrel cf c3e 3:'/!50 caliber twin mount inoperative for routine firing practices, a reple.ce*. a.nt has been fab-icated by the ship's repair force in accerdance with a?.LJ1-:cL51k rdnance drawings, Since this temporary slide lozk lacks the requisite deq;?ae c rnetal hardness sa';. Purth 5.9. the specifications, At is believed that the wor!cj ir, edge would prematureiy pe2n off by frequent contact with cartridge lips durlrq sxtended operation. "Jonsirjering the calmlated risk in time of action, th? ~a1-1- 02 one more firiag Srrrel wmld logically take pyecedence cver the pocentii!. possibility of a jammed cartrkdge anticipated wit??a complete failure of m in-. provided slide lock. During the previous wa?$ common breakage >arts for ra:-Li firing mounts were far more .in abundance.

(51 Parrillax fol.1xv--q aotor (Pc 4€0'753~+2.: At the present time. the windings of two mokzs m-6 b::nwd auks I;, this Listace also, there are no replacements availa'2lc i-- the %>:ea., A.lthnt7.gh earlier allowance lists authorized the ship ta c.ai*ry 2 q&?e mi.%, the latest modification to the list has reduced the aliowancc? b .deroo Based upn previous service experience, this comand recommended a shi$xard allowance (CV) of 4 spare units (CO USS ESSEX (CV-9) rest airnail Ltr, X35 ser 742 c.f 20 Jme, 1951). This recommen- dation was based upon estiniates considered essential to ensire oFeratioh over a six months period, Actcally, the present si'iuaLiori leaves one mount without corrected horizontal parallax, "his is by virt-,..e of the fact that the parallax follow-up motor in Mount 3'7 is sii?erfluous and thereby available for use as a spre. Inasmmh as this no~mcis located a mere 6 feet from the reference point (MK 37 Direator, No., 2jP the parallax corrector is normally locked on zero. Until recently, the ship was able to keep abreast of 2ailcres in this category by using the unit from Mount 37 while a deficient aoCor was in the shop for rewinding.

(2) It is strongly recommended that adequate levels of spare parts for the 3''/50 caliber RFTM batteses be maintained on service vessels, and at re- par activities in the WESPAC area. In this respect, the sigpificance of the provision of an essentially complete comnissionhg allowance cannot be over- stzessed. It is believed that all activities connected with the original outfit.ting of ships should give this item muah greater priority than it has customarily allotted. In additon to the previously mentioned spares, the following parts are considered critical due to their compartively high breakage rate: (a) Shell support latch, rear FC 611250

(b) Gtud, shell support latch PC 611255

(d) Tray finger mechanism, adjusting end PC 610869-1 (e) Shaft, operating PC 510722-1 5 . immD* 'I.rc , ?? Of the above items, the first four were also recommended for increased allowances in the letter mention in subparagraph (b) of part (1) above. The operating shaft-item 5 above - was last reordered 1 October, 199, and t'ie Ordnance Stock Office, Washington, D.C. has indicated that the tentativs delivery date for this item is 1March 1952,

b. Performance of Aircraft Ordnance Equipment.

(If Bgmb vanes breaking loose from the hold down .:ollars due to poor spt welds emtinva., B:OTI has c5rected using b@$?l?l. 07 ANWAltype vcie. It is strongly reccwwdc6 that this type vane be &ae avsilable in quant?'.'-s:;cs 3s soon as r,ossible.

(2) Dvie to the greek VC?L~E of munitlcns handled to date, banb hmd .J3; equipllent has been subject t,o cons3derable ~1s~.Spare straps for MK 1 sk-Y.~ ard eccentric binders for 250 GP bomb adapte-s are urgent& needed. Requests for these items have been sulnritted, It 5s recommended that a 100% spare su-a!) allowance be established, (3) No, 1 upper :>rz,ge 16,000 lb, bomb elevator has 1,2.U operating hours and requires constc"iit maintenancey The instruction manual received from BuShips lacks the necessaxy drawings and wiring diagrams required for proper maintenance of this elevator. It is strongly recommended that these drawings and diagrams showing incorporated changes be made available a~lsoon as possible. (4) A small percentage of 1,000 lb GP, 250 lb, GP, and 100 lb. GP bombs with bent a& flattened lugs ard broken and frozen noseplugs have been received aboard. It is iripossible to hang or fuze hbs in this condition. More careful. inspection of bombs on the replex'~.&sh.mentship is recommended.

(5) Preheated gasoline (heated by steam heater constructed ahoard) for mixing napalm is being used in cold weqther uith good results. (6) The followfng is a complete list of hung ordnance experienced during this period: 3 - 250 lb, GP bombs on MK 55 bomb racks; cause, defectfve rack. 2 - 250 lb. GP bombs on MK 55 bomb racks; cause, undetermined. 2 - 260 lb FRAG on MK 55 bomb rzcks; cuase undetermined, 3 - 250 GP bods on MK 55 bomb rack; cuase, frosen racks. 1 -ZOO0 GP bomb on MK 5lbornb rack; cause, frozen rack 1 - 500 Ib GP bomb on MK 51 bomb rack; cause, MK 8 shackle release. me&anism jammed by loose desconnected plug. 1 - 250 lb GF on Aero 14A bomb rack; cause, electrical cannon plug inside Aero Uklauncher separated in flight.

6 Q

PART IV BATTIE

I. Ship

a. During the period of November 22-28, minor structural failures were discovered and repairs made by the ship's force. The damage was caused from wnrking of the ship in heavy seaways, and 'is enumer1.3.ed belowt

I (1) Qamage Control Void, A-50-V, developed a 36 'ti1r.h split seam alc.1.: the after top edge of the sea chest.

(2) Ct?ain Locker, X %LE, developed a l4 inch fracture in strake on the port side of the chain locker.

(3) Passageway, A-205-U, developed a fractured butt weld on the lonyi- tudinal beam at frame 27 on the starboard side of the 2nd de&., The beam aia slightly buckled between frames 27 and 28, arxl between frames 23 and 24. (4) The Forward Peak Tanks.

(a) A-1-W had deck slightly buckled between frames 1 qd 4 at the third bottom level.

(b) A-24 had lcngitudhal a& vbrtical stiffners were slightly buckled at frames 7 and 8. (c) A-701-W had the transverse bultthdad slightly buckled betweel) . frames 10 to 14.

I- (5) Bosnfs Stare, A-401-A: and A-501-A had the deck buckled at frame 8. (6) Four (4) roller curtains were damaged on the morning of the 26th when a series of three waves'hit the port side of the ship betwsen frames 70 and 100, while makhg a turn to the starboard. Three of the roller curtains, between frames 83 and 94, were torn from the forward roller tracks but were not ruptured. The roller curtains were shored to prevent further damage until repairs were accomplished.

2, Damage InflSateB. on the Enemy. See enclosure (1) 3,. Damage inflicte on ESSEX aircraft. See enclosure (1)

1. Performance . Under the present heavy worklaad of continuous operations, the performance of all personnel has been excellent and morale has been a factor requiring no special attention 7 7 --- -- 2, Casualties, a, Ship's company.

There were no casualties to ship's em- pePsonne1,

b, Air Group FIVE

Casualties in Air Group FLV3 are as follows:

BRYANT, W. A*, Jr, LT ,!,&481, USN, Lost in crash after takeoff. HU, E. B. LTJG m261 USNR Lost in action, There were no wounded or missing.

1, Engineering

a. The Engineering Department exprienced no casualties during this operational period.

-- . b. Recommendations,

(1) Roller Curtains; shoring of

In order to expedite the shoring ad strengthening of the roller curtains durbg periods of heavy seas, ship's force plans to install clips on the vertical curtain guides to faciliate the installation of shoring timbers,

(2) whip Antenna Counterweights. The counterwei&ts of the forward whip antennas, frmes 48 and 53 starboard, which extend down approximately four feet below the antenna platform, have been damaged by the burtoning lines on several occasions. In order to avoid future damage to these counterweights, ship's force intends to modify the weights on antennas #2-2, and #2-3 so that they can be swung up out of the way during replenishment, This will be accomplished by removing cne bolt from the weight support and replacing it with a removable pin, The weight can then be pivoted around the remaining bolt, and pulled up by B lanyard.

C. Steaming Data.

(1) For the period 1 November to 30 November, inclusive. Miles steamed 79 59 Fuel Oil received from tankers 1,631,134 gal* c Fuel Oil delivered to destroyers 153,172 gal. - Fuel Oil consumed by USS ESSU (underway) 1,631,134 gal.

8 IL QECLASSIFIED.I

(2) For )bte 7, Beembe Mixes steam Fuel ,091 rec

a. Ccrtaplt and Arresting Gear.

decks. During the ltatbsr part of the pried this prticular problem was alleviated somemat by hum 17 jet aircraft and an average of 12 to Id+ propeller aircraft, The requi that the ship be able to recover six planes besides its complement could nat be met withqt parking three aircraft on the No. 5 and No, 6 barriera. While! maintainjn$ a tlready deck1' with 77 plmes aboard, the hangar deck was two blocked and maintenance of aircmft, especially. $?%at, suffered due to the aircraft being spotted very close together 5n all ban. Replacement of kiD-4 vtith AD-2 aircraft has resulted in maaufactur5ailg of six type tow bars during this period, There are now a total of twelve aboard, six on the hangar deck, and iix on the fli@t deck, During this perid, it has become necesq to increase the number of t3,edowns on aircraft because af h;fgher winds and heavier seas. Hurricane cables are Ft 011 the planes abet every night in additim tor the mwdl 16 point tiedown. It has ban necessary to order additimal lmosring a8senbl;ies (come-almgs) in order to faciliate,securing cd aircraft * m DECLASSIFIED C. Operating Data for November and Decerriber 1 1951 1-30 November 1-l.4 December

Arrested Landin s 702 771, Catapult Shots f starboard) 156 22 5 Catapult Shots (port) 179 219 Gasoline, (gallons) 3 58,63 5 462,504 LubOil, Symbol 1100 l9800 2,513 LubOil, Symbol1010 1,528 4,586 3. NAVIGATION

A series of radarpepeaternoope photographs were taken during the ship's departure from Yokosu;!.,, -4pan. k study of these photographs revealed numerous targets especially suitable for radar navigation, These photographs, properly notated to identify the targets, wlll be used when planning to make an entry or departure under low visibility conditions 4, AIR OFEliATIONS

a. Racon

One change was made to the wiring for the &con (AN/CaJ-6) gear. Since the controls for starting and stopping were located, along with the oquipoent, at the 010 level, there was considerable delay in assuming the guard and no assurance thst the gear was operating, Two of the four (4) unused wires in the YE control box, which is located in AirOps were connected to a switch and light and mounted on the YE controlbox.in AirOps. The upper ends of the wires are connected to the Racon. It is now possible to turn on the Racon from wir Bperations, and the glowing light indicates that the gear is operatbg. b. Radio Homer Steps are being taken to construct an automatic keying device for the "Bird Dog*' or radio homer, There appears to be no device furnished to ships for this prpose. $hip's in the past either constructed their own, or were forced to have a radio man available the entire day for this purpose. If this device proves successful, Air Operstions will have control of the YE, Racon, and the Radio Homer, the three required for navigational purposes, all centrally located In Air 0p;rations Spaces, 5, COM~IChTICNS

a. CW Circuits. During the third period for the ESSEX in the Korean operating ama, no new comiccitions problems were encountered. The situation in regard to radio ckb circuits has remained unchanged. This command forwarded a re- conmendation via the Tuk Force corxnander suggesting that the area commander reassigi frequencies for bath the CW and voice circuits with JoirtOperations fo - 10 DECLASSIFIED

Center, Korea (guarded by 5th AF' HQ, Korea). It was recomended that another daylight frequency for Cts (retaining the present frequency for ni&t transmissions), and a new night frequency for the voice circuits be assigned, b. Tactica1' Circuits.

The disadvantage of em loying, the secondary tactical (radio-telephone) frequency for other purposes P screen common, administrative, and gunfire control has continued to lessen the effectiveness of this circuit, particularly when the circuit has had to be used in lieu of the primary tactical frequency as during periods of operational maintenance. c, Interference

During this period, attempts have been made to eliminate interference on both tactical circuits as a result of "SplCSh-OVer" of the VHF frequency employed for air strike control, By interchanging receiver equipnents, and thus shifting associated receiver antenna ledds, some improvement has Been- noted. Interchanging crystals within (TCQ Efodel) transmitters has also been effective in reducing a portion of the interference, This problem is a part in reducing a portion of the interference. This problem is a part of the over-all program of shipboard radio interference reduction to be completed prior to the ship's next yard availability.

Encouraging results have been obtained in radiotele type communications for this priod. DUPUX operations with NDT and Com7thFlt have been very satisfactory for the first time since the ESSEX reported to the Operating Area, The circuit assiged exclusively to the task force flagship for ship/shore radioteletype has proved highly satisfactory, although it appears that in the near future this drcuit will be shared again with another task force command (CTF 95 when at sea). For a carrier flagship, sharing the circuit has one outstanding disadvantage of limiting time on the air to the extent that, combined With outqes due to atmospherics, the value of rtidioteletype for clearing the. heavy volume of&ip/shore tarffic is consider bly reduced-. The disadvantage arises primarily from the loss of transmitting time resulting frw, periods &en antennas must be lfde-energizedll for flight, fueling, and arming operations.

e. Fachile Facsmile whedules with the Radio Fhoto Unit stationed at NFC were highly satisfactory during this pcriod. Prints of photo coverage of the visit of front-14ne G.1.t~ to the ship over Thanksgiving have been returned to the ship and help to establish the value of this type of transmission for public information and morale puqoses.

f. Personnel,

With the release to inactive duty and trmsfer of both officer and enlisted personne1. cornmications will be hardest hit in the cryptoboard and For ships reporbhg to the operating sea, ll 9

it is again emphasSzed that personnel needs must be anticipated as far in advanct as possible. In any event the training program must be of such a nature as to provide replacements for key pereonnel who are for one reason or another transferred from the command, 6. LOOKOUTS The Lookout Division has been undergoing vigorous training. In additson to regular classes in recognition, sound-powered telephone talker procedures, and duties and responsibilities of lookouts, the men are also studying for rates which they will strike when transferred to a division of their choosbg, The prooedure has been established for the majority of seamen and seamen apprentice reporting aboard to be assigned to the Lookout Division, By doing this, the men have two to three months in the division during which time they can observe the duties of various rates on board and decide for which division they would be best adapted. This procedure is followed insofar as possible.

All men assigned to the division undergn eye examinations prior to assignment, All must have 20-20 vision and normal color perception to qualify for assignment. This requirement was made necessaqr because too many man were found with defective vision when the Lookout Division was first formed.

The FO equipnent has bet-n used to advantage to give the ship's CIC a bird's eye view of the Task Force and surrounding arez. Surfsce conttcts consisting of three or more ships have been detected at ranges of over 99 miles from the ASP aircraft, Single ships to a sli&tly lesser range have been detected depending upon ASP atitude and atmospheric conditions.

The FO picture has also been used to determine wind direction, as well as to show a plane view of wezther build-ups in the Cask force area,

At times, the relayed kN/APS-X)A FPI picture has been able to supply excellent information on air contacts. Despite the low altitude of the ASP aircraft it has picked up returning strikes and jet CAP at altitudes over 20,000 feet as a result of reflection fromthe water,

8. AIR INTZLLIGENCE,

Air GroupFIVE has now completed three full months in the Korean Operating Area using the original charts issued covered with frisket paper, As far a3 can be determined the charts show all indications of being filly useable for another operating period.

9. PHOTOGRHFHY. a. K-25 Strike Photography, K-25 damage assessment photography posed several prob&ems. J2 12 These have been ironedyout, in part, through pilot orientation and through continued maintenance. Pilots, understandably, have a tendanq to use a mounted oamera much the same as a gun. Use of the K-25 must be much more precise than gunnery in order to achieve clear sharp pictures. The aircraft must, at the time the camera is energized, be completely free of any forces acting upon it, The target must be sighted dead 6n and approached directly along a tangent whlch will render the camera less efficient, Maneuvers such as rlpull outs" sweep the ground area across the field of view at a high rate. This coupled with the forces acting upon the camera creates undesirable results. Acaeleratio; in a dive also creates a negative force which acts directly against the cameras * weakest point.

The pressure plate in the K-25 is the primary weak spot when the camera is mounted in an aircraft, It is forced downward by cam action to hold the film flat and free of flutter. Flat .springs act as a buffer to the cam sotion and also distribute the action evenly upon the plate. The springs, while of sufficieot atrength under free operation, are not strong enough to oppose the afore mentioned forces.

The shutter mechanism is a closely arranged mechanism and poses another problem, that of maintenance, Vibration of the aircraft when the canera is tripped bounces the parts so that their swing is not always 900 from their pivot pobts. When this occurs, breakage is almost certajn to result.

It should be noted that guns must not be fired :'ulTLng caera operation. The laboratory has had to repair at least one camera a day and usually 'two ox"" three, During the first month of usage the ameras showed m tendency toward breakages. The second and third month breakages at an increasing rate, The follavlng is recommended: 1, Maintain close contact with the pilots using these cameras. Their comp&ete understanding of the problems and techniques is of primary importance.

2, Carry spre mrts for the K-25 shutter.

3. Make sligbt machining alterations on shutter parts. 4. Include a qualified camera repairman in ship's company. RECORD OF ~~25STRIKE PHOTO VF-54 16 NovemQes through 11 Decerriber 1951 Rolls taken 58 . Total Possible exposures 1375 Total Exposures taken U-32 Total. usable exposures 694 Total unsuable exposures 407 Total prints fiEed w 13 Rolls not used due to poor techniques 4 Prints made 8 x10 1736 DECLASSIFIED b, COVrJWQt ,USl??G PHPGS WLGATIVES A large number of copies are being pmdwed by the use of paper negatives. Sensitized material used for the paper negatives is standard stock enlarging paper, contrasts 0 through 4* Forthe reproduction of photographs and outdoor photografis contgasts No, 2 has been found satisfactory, For reproduction of charts, line maps, and drawings contrast No, 4 has been found satisfactory, Outdoor exposure in bright sunlight , with contrast No, 2 is approximately 1/50 sec at F 4.5, Copy work with two No. 2 photo-fzood lamps is apprwmtely 25 sec. at F 22. After the paper negative is developed, fixed, and washed it is dried on the glossy print dryer the dotlventional manner as S.W. glossy prints4 Since recommissioning the photographic laboratory has Peen required to produce a large number of reproductions, Many of these reproductions required only a few copies with no use for the nekatives, A large number of these reproductions have been of charts, drawings and sheets of figures aereby computations would have to be checked if produced in any other manner. A paper negative may be made, developed, fixed, washed, dried ard ready for printing in approximately 30 minutes. Regular negative material requires a much longer time for processing unless given special handling. Paper negatives are easy to handle, inexpensive and have been found vesy satisfactory for training photographic strikers in the operation of various ground cameras, The material may be handled under a yellow safelight whereby the beginner may follow the process. The major difference between the paper negatives arvl film is the sensitivity or speed.

C. mommy PmnucTIoN RECORD

Third operating period 17 November through 11 December 1951 Total number of photographic missions flown 41 Total number of rolls filed h9 Average number of exposures per roll .> 70 Total number of ne gativ es used 3,647 Total number of prints made 37,924 Running Time Average time to develop and wash film, figured on 52 rolls. 65 Min 1 Hr 5 Min,

Average time to drg film, figured on 52 rolls 36 Min 1 Hr W Min.

Average time for first set of grease pencil marked prints delivered to P.1, Officer. 60 Min 2 Hr 41 Min,

Average time film (computed from time of dellvery to film marking, to time returned for distribution printing) 4 DECLaSSlFlED Average time for set of marked prints to Flag (after receiving marked film from film marking) 124 Min 8 Hr 22 Hin Average time for set of marked prints to P,I. Officer (after receiving marked film from film marking) 133 Min 8 Hr 31- M.fr All mrk completed and ready for mailing by loo0 the folldng day.

PElOIlUCTlON ciECOiiD FC)R lst, 2nd and 3rd ORHATING PEElIODS, 24 AUGUST TIROUGH 2.3. DEWER 1951. I Total number nf missions flown 171 TOM number of rolls filed 260 Total nunlber of negatives used Up726 Total number of prints made 1.7 6,173 Average number of exposures per mfi 563

cow to: CNO (Actvance, airmai 1) (2) CONAXHPAC (Advance, airmail) ( 2) CINCPkCF'LT (Advance, aixmail) (2) COMcARDIV ONE COMSEVIN'I'HFLT COMNAVFE COMCARDIV THREE COMCARnIV FIVE USS BOXER (CV-21) USS FRTNCETON (CU-37) USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) USS VALJEY FORGE (W45) USS BON HOW iELCHAElD (CV-31) USS ANTIETAM (CV-36) uss KEARSEE (cv-37) CVG 5 (5) CVG U, CVG 15 CVG 101 CVG 102 AIR TASK GriDUP ONE '. . ' .' 4.

~/dFleet Post Office San Francisco, Calif. Serial: 021

iN DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR IfJTERVALS: m L DEWSSIFIED AFTER 12 X&@j From: Commidir,,g Officer D-OP 018 5W To: Chief of HaVal Cyeratioils Via: (1) Com,ar,der CaErier Division CITE (2) Comzcder SEVTNTH Fleet (3) Commr.der Naval Forces, Far East (4) Corrxmder in Chief, U.S. Paclfic Fleet Subj: Action Report for the perid 13 Decezbez 1'751 to 3 February 1952

Ref: (a) OpNav Instmetion 3420,4 h iSnc1: (1) Carrier Air Group FI'v% Action Report, 13 Decea'cer 1951 - 3 February 1952. p <) / t' 1, In accordance with reference (a), the actior, reFort for the period 13 Teceaber 1951 to 3 February 1752 5s here?>- sutrittecl,

a. At various tixes during the period of this repor',, Tzsk Force 77 was conposed of the following mits: USS ESSEX (CVS), Cor.CarDiv CUE, RdM 2. FEPSY, USN embarked, I?SS V.iiL,LEY FORG (CV45), ConCar1i.v FIVE, KG14 7, -d. KC- MAEON, USN ezharked, C'SS MTIhT& (CV36), USS 3DCYESTE.K (CKLa),USS ST PAUL (c.;i73), ComCixniv CNE, RAEN E, E. STUS, USTI, ezkarked, css M~CHZSTEI~(cLG-~) and mits of Dest,royer Civision 12, 31, 72, 91, 92, ILL, 122, 132, 131, 151, 152, 171, 172, and Escort Destroyer GivLsion 11, 12.

b, Furing the scbjezt Feriod, the YSS ESS3X (C'V'v) oFerated o.ff the EasO coast of Korea in accordar?ce with CTF 77 0;7erations Crder 22-51 (lst & 2nd rerhloris), 'plus suFplemental $ar,s and orders issued dux%& the period.

The rnission of TI' 77 was pri iarily to suFport the 7:r,ited Nations ground fkrcp b Korea. The supprt missio~sk.clxded close su~por-t, deep support, amed .ad photog. ay,hic recorriaissmce, interdiction of enerny supply lines, and strikes against enexy hstallatl' ocs

FAXT I1 CIL?NC)LCGY: 13 Cecexber Enronte from operatirg area to Tokosqka, Japan in accordance with CTF 77 dispafch lOO5rCCZ rec. '

Ilb December 1510 inoored port side to, Piedmont Fier, Yokos-cka, Japan,

15-25Eec. Yard availability, rest, and recreation period, training ad u&eep, Yokosllka, Japan. ,I ,... 26 Decern'cer Underway Yokosuka, Japan for opratixg area in' accorrlaxce -&th cT% 77,I)4 dispatch 23040Z I?sc,

27 Decexker Proceeding to operating area. - 23 Decexber CoKducted refresher Air Opera5iom. Joined Task. Force 77 RdM J. FEFSY, USN, Corraander Carrier Division OLE, relieved HkCM F. t.6. FcYPXR, Cormknder Carrier Division FIE as OTC.

29 necexber Gopducted Air Operatl-I OKs.

30 Eecenbar

31 necember

Conducted Air Operat5ons.

Conducted Air Cpera5ions.

k 2On;m gun 5nstalled in a F2Y Rwshee sccider-tally due to a broken breech block lock and air pressue xen were xomded when the high explosive sh'ell hit 2nd exploded, Four en tjere listed as cot serious Listed as critical. . 'ic Jaicary Force replenished. Task -.

7 Jznuary

8 January

9 Jauary 2.0 JanClary Task Force replenished. U. January Conducted Air Ope ions, 1235 - AD RL?NO, 122339 was Seen to spin and crash shortly after takeoff,. After a nom.!al carrier takeoff.

plane .jettisoxed l-or,e thousand polad bonb then ciirrbed abruptly I to zn exbirrated 900 feet, sade three shallow tumx to th.= right, the last turn steepening into a nose down divkq spiral, ';he Flsne sank i.mediatel~after stri&-g the water. Two helicopters condusted a fruitless search for the. pilot. KO radio trmsmissions were received frox the Filot at 2rq the. Cause w&xown. Pilot (LTJG J. H, i;OUJ3:R)listed as killed in the line 02 Zuty. 12 January Conducfed Air Operations .- 13 January

Il+ Jahary

15 January

3 4. !ZXJASSIflED

16 Jariuary Conducted Air Operations -17 January Task Force replenished. 18 January Cmhcted Air Oprations

19 January Conducted xir Cperztions, 1350. F2H BLXC. 124945 crashed ovDr exemy terrltory - exploded on iTpactr Probable cause ii.4 fire, Filot (:vl!i:Oli F. No ?tcCiGLLu!l, iJS-kF exchange pilot serving in W 172) listed as killed h actiori.

20 January Task Force replenished,

22 January Sonducted -4ir Cperatior-s, lOC5 F4U K?NO, 63033 hit by enmy >LA fire, Pilot CLTJG J, fi2G'i'T) bailed out 20 niles South of l!ur,gnm, w3s picked xp by 2OCHESTSR helicopter ad trzsferred to Yokosuka Naval Hospital for treatment, 1015 F4U EUNO, 62943 crashed in ecemy territory, Tilot (LTt't E. V. L-LTEY) in attexpting to drop a life raft, to EiC.CHESTER helicoFter creimm in water fouled tail of Flae wit'n raft causing crash - pilot picked up by ~c%S~

23 J anuarj Cor.diicted Air Cperations

24 January Task Force replenished,

25 January Air Operations cancelled dxe to weather.

26 January Conducted Air Operations. F9F 5UNO. crashed in i4or.szn Harbor. Probable cause'meny 6.4 fire. Pilot (1,TJG L. R. CHZSIIIiE) Listed a8 k;flled in, action.

27 January Cor,d;lcted Op-ratio~s.

28 Jaiuar;y Task ?one replenished.

29 Jvluary Conducted Air Operations

30 Janvtary Conducted Air Operations. 1025, 13 FUKO, 122325 ditched in Tdomaq Harbor, Probzble came prop failure, Filot (Cgd p. h?. GkTAY) picked up by the USS TWINIKG (G9 540), r,o injuries sustahied. The folloicing 11 message was received fron Cocnander SLTGl1Th Fleet "TI OUTSTAGIING 7 I%FCFOhM&JCE OF ESS%X hND Hi3 ALY GWUP DMXCNG THE PAT OPAATINZ FEHIO'I HAS 4IZNDEilED TELLING GIDb.3 AS~NST'iRh EWKf X :.ELL DO?E Y VHDM FiiiiTIN'

31 January Conducted Air Operatfons,

1 Pebruaq Task Force replenished. 1-5 hADM F, W. McMCK, USN, CoIcCiirDiv ,-.--d1r&Y, USid, CorcCarEiv OH? as 77, FIVE, relieved Xdh J. CTF 1330 Took departure TF '// proceedihg ta Yokosuka, Japan with Com- CarEiv OXE embarked3 in accordance with CTF 77 2909382 FEB,

2 February Proceeding to Yokosukaa Japan,

3 February 0445. Arrived Yokosuka, Japn for rest,

1, Expenditure of Hir Crdpance, See enclosure (1)

2, Experxiitwe of Ship's Ordnmce for training. l a. For the period 13-31 Eecenber 1951: None b, For the period 1-31. January . 1952: None c, For the period 1-3 February 1752: NoRe 3. Com,ents on Perfomance of Ordnance,

a, Ferfomsnce of Ship's 3rdnance Equip.ent: The perfomacce of ship's ordnance equipent was satisfactory,

a. On 26 and 27 Cecember enroute to +he coxbat zone the ship sastahed minor structural daTages as a result of hemy seas as follows:

(1) Three 3"/50 ready boxes h7ere torn from their bases on the forecastle, All were recovered.

(2) Four life rafts were carried aw2y off the port side forward,

(3) The starboard foxward boat boom was broken; only eight, feet re- rezained .. '. (4) Fra,ning on the nain ard second decks (frme 20 to 26) was distorted due to heavy seas hitting the flare of the shi?.

(5) Indentations were made in the ship's hull on the port side at frame /--* ' 'j' ad the deck depressed at frame' 6 (Compt A-4121-A). J .C

h, On 4 January a wellled seam opned ix the sea chest of ;i-jOV, flo0dk-g thz void wfth 22 feet of water. This saxe sem. ha sen opened on 22 XoveEber 1-951, 3eFairs were made‘ k7’Ship’s Force,

2. Damage Inflicted 011 the Enerry, See enclosure (1)

3. Damage Inflicted on ESSEX aircraft, See enclosure (I)

Under the heivy workload of contir,uous operatiocs, the perfomace of all

I personriel has been excellent ad norale has been a faotor requiring no specrial attention.

2, Casualties.

a, Ship’s Company

Cn 3 January the foilowing me2 were as a of shrapnel 1352 womded result 4 and flyir,g debris Caused by the accidental discharge of a 2CbN automatic gun 5.n a 7% Banshee aircraft, FEA3?IE3, G.- L, $26 99 80, SN, USSt, Multiple shrapel wounds, back with tramattic section sFinal cord, Flaced on sick ad critical list,

CLZCKLEY, A. D. 422 32 57, AA, liSN, Shrapnel womd, left leg, Wound dressed and returned to duty, -. ;T, G. D. 571 78 en,\ SA, USN, Shrapnel wounds, left e1bor.r m.d right buttock, Placed on sick list, not serious.

InLAA-EY, 14, F, 797 73 85, Sd,USM, Shrapnel womd, right foream,’right buttock and right bee, Flaced on sick list, r-05 serious.

IKODSICE, J, R, 342 83 27, ~02,USE Shrap;el wounds zuitiple right leg from hip to ankle, Placed on sick Ifst, Not serious,

b. Air Grosp FIVE See enclosure (1)

1... ., .I b a Recommendations. \

None I

C. Steaming Data 15-31 Dec 51 1-31 Jan 52 1-3 Feb 52 YLles steurierT 2,502 11,30? b8 U34e2 fie1 Oil 2eceivefi 776,192 7d. 1,588,469 243521: Fuel Oil Delimred EEf? ' F2,536 :al. 163,651 28,644 fie1 Consur;.ed (underway) 427 9 7;C ,~al, 1,&-l.,000 194,45C Fuel Oil consurned (anchored) 73,650 gal, -c- LII P.vera3.e Speed 18,2 knots 15.2 hots 19.4 Eours Undermy 132 74.4 57b8

2, Air Denartrrent

a, Catapult and Psresting Gear

Wing the period of this repcrt Catapult and. Arresting gear operations were nomal with the follodng exceptions:

The platforn €or No, 5 barrier air cylinder, located within the island structure aft (Renair v1ll locker) was reinforced kith whldec! 1/4 inch 'plate. The platforin, constructed ef two l/4 inch plates, is welded boxlike at the deck-bulkh6ad. sem. 'Jith movement of the air cylinder both the bulkhead and &ck plate would work, csusin.7 a torsion of the platform, and cant- ing the air cylinder so ->hatthe pist-% rod we2Zed. on the side of the cy- linGer. As a resul% the harrier r*ena,nod approximately 10 to 12 inches a- bove the 6eck. With additional bracing fcre and aft, the twisting action was eliminated.

.. hiny the, t six months of onera ions it has been ?ete-minec! con- clusively that the jet startin? imits, instd2d undw 3he edye of the fliyht +eck a;j-icent to the catxxlts, hmE not, justified. the space and mintavncs require? by' them. At the beginninq of this period the starter. i' unit? 7~e-eused, ho:ievm, sever& times planes c0tiJ-d- not be startee vhen the Fiqnal wao ^r;ivFn, but im ely aftc,r the !.nun& Tjere 3.it of? satis- factorily with c? sSarter jeen, e use of the units 'Jar; discontinue? due to their extreme unrelizhilit il therez.fter %he c'ud riroblsm 1m.s 74atly re6)ucd. Starter jeeps have since been ussd exclusively and there is .rarely any clifticult:y -.ii kee3inq the crttm:?Its r'fsc'r' in spite of the fact that the efore launch time, en? "hat during a 4 to 2.r enTines have to bc startd. 3 ha@ paid biq 4ividsrrd-s 5r1 better Lezdewhip ~zndhi:her morale.

b. %€rntfn-g data for DedrnbGr lQ51 and Jznmry Febkmry 19-52. 15-31. &c 1-31 Jan L3 Feb, Arrest& Li;slndinw 224 1,929 Catanult Shots {starboard3 62 543. None Catamlt Shots (qortJ €33 559 Sasoline, (gdlons) 131,762 gal. 1,0?4,6Q37 7al LubOil Symbol 1100 1, u7, sal . 4,583 gd LuEOU Syrrbol 1010 .%8 gal. 5,X" &ruboil Symbol. 1120 300 Sal, 2,&5 ~a3. Alcohol A-&.4-24 15 :ale ---- Al coho1 AN-A-1 ' 27 <'a, 43 7al. 3. SupDlg Department_ for the period 15-31 Decenber 1951,

a, Aviation Stox (1) No particular difficulties were experi8ncbd in obtaining aviation stores material. , (2) Approximately 150 tons of aviation stores representing the last major replenishnent of stock in this ares were received.

b, Gensral Stores I (1) Services rednered Sy the CISWR, CLECqO 1, Flsst Actiuitiesj and CTS 92.5 vere excellent o'uring this neriod, The CI?S"O,9 Vas particularly outstandin: he to ths short period of time i? required to screen and fill requistions.

(2) Approximately 75 tons of "JSK materials vere receive.?. "m 8 \ . "'f

0. Ship's Stores

(1) During tte inpo riod of 15-26 CeceEber, stores received frorr! the afloat activities were 39% of those ordered. The availability of cobbler, tailor, arid laundry supplies appears to be critical in this area, A fair assortment of other standard items is still available. Additional requiremer-ts placed on Fleet htivites resulted in 6% conpletion,

('2) About 6 tow of stores were received dwi.~gthis Feriod. d, Clothha aad SKaU Stores

(I) Very few C&SS items were ordered during this p3ricd.

(2) kll iterrs were received with tie exception of marks ahd service stripes, size dungarees, and gloves, / 32 work s: e. Cormissary Gfficer

(1) Xo conments on services while in ~,oi-t, 3eFlen5shrcent at sea is clecidedly preferable to replenishnent 21 prt ,

(2) Received 46 tons of Frovisions fron VSS GiZri?FI& ad 16 tons from Fleet wtivities, Yokosuka for a total of 62 tons,

f. . Disbwsinp, (1) X2, iOA0 and lO.4OA tax f0rn.s were ordered but not proccred from sources in't:his area. No receiFt transfers of cash while in port, Fifteen deposit record books wers received by transfer fron Fleet Activities Disbursing

. (2) Tonnage not applicable, For the period 1 Jmuary to 15 Jarxziry 1952

a, tiviation Stores

The period 1 January 1952 was critical for the kviztion Stores Group. The 180 day kitial allowace of spare parts (approxirr.ately 18,090 itens) insofar as high usage ad critical itas were concerned, stocks were fairly well e-xhausted by the end or" November, 1951, dthough stocks were reordered as low IiriLts were reached, 510 requistions were pending on 15 Jamary, representing about l2CO item due. these 1200 item 19 wre pending on a Priority A basis for AOG aircraft. ' Euring the first two weeks of January, 5 of the Priority A iterrs were recei-red by CCDFISH delivery, The oldest pending Priority A requistioz is dzted 29 Novmber 1951, lor a nose assembly for an ~3-4r\JLflS-31 radome, stock nmber %32-PG-53SO.L+66-5OD Delivery is indefinite due to inability of ccntractor to meet requirements beczuse of toolirig redesign. stock Ember I?B7-A!!DcFl000 .made ox the SSSEX XI aircr

r be of great value. No ship has failed to send over an dJG part, 2f available. 'The irr.portance of khi3 infom21 sourae of supply cannot be ov~-en;~h2sized. ' The last time the Aviation Stores GrOUF was replecished at sea by the USS . Jl'PITEil (AVS-8) wzs on 27 October 1951, ar,d we do not expct to replenish at sea again mtil 31 Jancary 1752, EeFle,rLishent at sea Is advantageous and greater -2tilization of this method would improve deliveries of sviation &arts hrt'.ich are aost r,ecessary at this tbe, particularly ir: v5ew of the present extended Feriod of deF1oymnt of this ship.

b, Gaeral Storm

.u. (I) The system of fhrnishing skn3:ard stock contiimes to be excellent, ?'here has been no shortage of i-prtat item,

(2) Electronic 2nd Rachinzry spare parts are the most difficult to replace Alt3oiigh r3rlenis5;r.ent furnishd available sources have / only about 30% of the itms required CX-I be obtaimd in NAWZ ar merit fron rilOC0 is comparasively slow with the resilt that stocs din!iJli s htn g pro g res s ive iy I

of spares,

(4)Gurhp the Ferlod which is covered by this report, the ship has been- operatArg in a very cold cliinate. Expriencs dwing this the has proven that alll of the type of wtnterization eqcipznt as allowed has been adequate,

while in stock.

C. Corm5ssar-y

hehutxired and sixken ton FGLLdIG (AFLI) i.n less than t-do ho to raintain adequate stock levels, arid at present are at the low limits.

Trouser, Cungaree, Sizes 31 and 32. - cc Socks, Black, Cotton, Size lo$.

Service Stripes, Blue % Erar,ch Narks f, Ship's Store

Ey the use of sev2ral disFl2y tables at schedluled store has been able to present souvenir item to ship's c has been necesssry sime these item can not he displayec! nierchmdise because of the inadequacy of show spa'ce in t

4. Administration

The complement of this vessel uthorized level of 2060 enlisted personnel in orde the present type of depl mtil the change Officer Fersocnsl contingntal United States, Corrective measures fiave teen taken to cover the

to be a Froblm. Th three or four timed to b ns a result of imp-ovements in cornmications effected durLng the fourth period of oper<-tioris, ESS3X was able to cerry wit tesk force coi:muiccltions responsibilities mi.re, expGditionsly tlix a:y Fre’ci-ms pzrind.

CW Circuits

Following requests hitiated by this cor;m;S,d, a reassipect of fre uencies W~Smde by the area comimder for the Tzcticd --ir hLdnistrative Let ?Joi..r~t Operation Center, Korea -ns ontrol station) Two additional daythe frequencies (designatsd Z-29 in thz currmt edition of 5th Ar Force Comxnication Operating Icc’cructsn #29) have greztly benefitted conditions on this circuit, Circuit S-65, used-m a contbuous 2k-hour basis ,prior to the nex asslgnlr.ents is i.,~q eni$ojred Frharily as the Light frequency,

*heuse of the Task Force Cornon CW circuit (designated C4.3~in J.LJtiP 195-8) has been extended and its value increased by the relczy through a destroyer in TF 77 of traffic to and frm Task Force 95 - specif., TG 95.2 urits (with the screen cormander htth ‘xxe designating the guardship), ’I?lis destroyer,closes down on CA.3 to tr ?snit to TF 95 units on C4.3a. On zn experhental basis, this arrvlgement -1,s proved hi&* satisfactory.

All other C’d circuits have been operated as before Experience ksF~O-J~’ that the “re?lenishment“ circuit (C2e) is best guarded by the flagship, w-d tke guardship of the wea-rec compaly .

Radio t eletype Circuits shore XIiTT circuit with Y3T, To’lyyo this nethod for clezrhg S/S traff n f5-day test the flagship was in telet plus hours daily, Excel qwncy in the VLF 03-d (123 kc,) for dusk-to-dawn Fox broadcast as well as for Duplex purposes with this corxmxad (hbn acting as flagship).

Vnise Circuits:

The conditions on the circuit with JCC, Korea, cor-tinue to leave room for irr.p-oveir.er,t; this con;rr,,wd's reqwst for n change, p.x%ir,ulzrly in the frequencies assigned to the circuit, at night, has cat been zctd upon to date. \. With the receipt of ED trw.smitters on bozrd, the testing of this new equipent on circuits scch as the Flag Ccr,ferer,ce xet is plmaed. Cn the last day of this reprt the frequmcy for tyis circuit was chnged from 386.6 mc iT5) to 307,4 ac (T3). NOTE: The first TED fully hstalled has been used successfully on the Task Group Cormanders net (LkTT); designated circdt T6 - although a full evaluation is not possible at this tim.

Antersa lnstallatiocs :

X letter to EuShips is being prepared requesting a clarification of the conditions requiring the rigging ad unrigging of whip antenna:(5 forward, and 8 aft). ESSEXf average daily loss of transmitting time on the forward xhips has been zbout 3$ hours; on the after whips, about 45 ninutes. Primary cause of this loss ~ESbeen the @me-gassing operatiox for hhich %he "de-energizing" of TAips has been required.

Tcaf f ic:'

Cue to the fact that si to remain on board until th TCTxL 85 15 - 100 -* Inclxdes 4 Marine -Detachrotfit fiersonnel s&id.ag..as niessengers.

N.R,- The total of 100 personnel is believed the x.S.r,5xw nmher with wkich a flagship can fclfill its com,unicatior,s obligations,

7, kir Intelligence 5, a. Fnoto interpretztion

The xajority of photo interpretations during the period were devoted to the prep?rZtior,. of flak xnsaics for distribition to all carriws oprating with the force, These niosaics were prepared lor the najor strilles as well as routine rail tatting kid were well received by the Air Groups ercbzrked. Cn particularly intense flak concentrdiions it was found that new positions were hstall.ed 5x1 a rnatter of 48 hours or less and therefore reqired photo coverage aF,Frnximately every 2 or 3 dqs. The eneiry has utilize& previously ur-ccuppied positions which mke it iqerative that photo interpreters wnctate all prsitions, occupied or urococpied, in order that the pilots will be awwe of their presenne, These rmsaics, occe prepared, were aopizd, printed, acd assembled in book fvin for ezsy reference on the pilots' kqe pBdS or chart

Fnr the latter pnrtiqn rf this period, the F2Ui-ZF have been operated to supplement the cnverege cbtained by the F9F-2P. krrmgements with the Air Force fcr twq K-38 36" cameras were successful; the cmeras were installed in the FW-2Fls which enabled them to phrtngraph the Eagh intensity ,flak areas at 15000 fee6 and still r,bta.in scaes suitabls for flzk analysis. The K-38 photography is far supcriw tc the K-17 in that one run is required to cover an area which heretnfore required three runs.

In view of the ab e, it is highly recommended that futu FhDko detach- ments deployed ti. WesPac be ecuippd f accrjI?Jnnda.ting K-38 cameras.

khGroup FI-@$ hss nmv crmpleted - e IkJre= operating area using originc5 charts covered with frisket far a3 can t33 detersriixd the charts Show all irtdicntiw 9f Sein rviceable for another period.

u, 8, Fhqtoaraphs

a. Aerial Film Dqcinq The fih4Syhg problem was t prarily solved dwing warn weather by installatinn nf twa aerial fih-dryers in one of the heated uptake spaces. Curing the past tw xnnths nf cold weather operations this uptike space lost a cnnsidereble amwnt cf its heat-hg power. During the warm weathar the aerial film dryers (E-U-3-794 Mnrse A-5) were operated in the uptake space zt the maxirrum speed cf five feet per ainute, During cold weather it has been operdxd at appr~ximatelytm f.:et per mbute. OFZLTIIU'G SPJEIS ~33DEYIN'J TI: 3s

Operating Speed of Dmer TIne re;uired for drying 200' r?ll

5 feet per minute kO airst es h

4 feet per minute 50 rrixutes 3 feet per mkixte 1 Hr 7 rr6nutes

2 feet per rr.inute 1h'r 40 mimites

1 foot per minute 3 Hr 19 minutes

WAXIMJN CFEd2III;G SPEEDS OH DZKLtS Oi'l BOdCl

Nith the xlditinn of a heater unit (E-l&-H-3L+8-3CO) for the Nodel "J" aerial film dryer the rr,axirr,Um speedrezz'ine.?' three (3) feet per mimute.

b, Matte Print Dryer

The matte print dryer (E-18-D-8?0), used for Saline print drying,. has heen operated at the rate of three feet per minu5e requiring one m-an to operate capzble of drying either we nr tt.P-1 mils at a the, period the matte print dryer was speeded up t:, the ra requirixg two men for d g one roll or three men fn simultaneously,

The faster drying was accnmgphed by installtrig reels in the overheed for hanging approxhately 4O 1 of Some ' pa then adv'vced over the reel$ Fntn the necessary to rem six feet a &,-at a smaller-sized pulley. Speed of matte print The req. to five eq. No, men req. dryer dry 1200' roll 2 rolls .zit to c?sy 1 roll to dry 2 mlk rqll a the. at a time. at ci time.

3 feet per minute 67 xin. 34 Min, 1 1

0 feet per xinxte 34 IJ&* 18 Jin, 3 3 12 feet per millute 1€3 Kin, 9 Nin, 2 3 Thqp:.lity cr type nf Sonne paper has been a naJnr fector in the drying prcblem, Experience has proved the dryer em be nperated very satisfact,-,rily at 6 feet psr dnute when the Some paper does not kre:ak down, It has been fwxd that, the rnajcrity nf the Sonne Fapr being used, (Kodak Resistn Rapid, Navy S/N E-l&.,P-328 Cxt. XQ. A.F. 33-038-15597 Spec. !Yo, 67) has broken down processing, allowing the snlut,ions to get to the paper base md resulting in 5. in slnwer dryixg to rexwvc? misture,

An F-56. 20" czlr,era has been used during this cperating period in the FPF-2F aircreft fnr shi-nting aerial oblique phntographs , This inste'llation w2s made r)rin;iarily to shvt colnr transpzrencies. Tkis -as dcze to ctilize F-56 coler film on bomd 2nd to ~-ir3b%ethequankity of sclutioris required for processing. Hmdling of the 7" width fih has been ezsier than for 9Il fih, Prsvicasly , cnly K-17 12" or K-17 61' cculd be mcwii;ed in the Eznshee in the oblique postifin, Braciteh were installed on trunnicns for attazhent to the caxera, The handles of the czmra were removed, and the handle 'colts were used to secure the trunnions to the cmera bodies, The forward trunnion on the camera was fitted into nne of the mounting slots in the aircraft c&%era munt which is used for installation of the K-17 6"; while the rear tru-nlor, 3n the camera (fitted in place of the reh.d handle) was fitted into me of the nount- ing slcts used for installation of the K-17 12". Mmmted in this rnzrxer the camera Rman approximate depression angle of 10 degrees, The oamra czn be mounted with ths aperture and shutter sceed knobs at the tor, for cmvenience in xaking the desired settings,

Fourth Operating Perind 23 December 1951 throuEh 31 Janua~1752

Totalnmber of photographic xhsions flown

Total number of mlls filcd

Averzge number expsures per roll 73

Total number of 9 x 9 R/N negatives ussd j ,,, 6659

Total nmber of 9.x 1Ef B/W aegatives used 1271

Total number of ? x 9 mlor transparencies used 188 Tqf,al nmber of

TotiL nurrher of

Total number of prints made 9 5,l-60

Rur,nir,p, Time

Average t;jr,e to Frccess & wzsh cce' rc.11. 71 Miri 1 Hr ll Ilk.

Average tixe to dry one roll cf film. 69 Min 2 Hr 19 Min,

Average the to m&e first flash Frht zr.d deliver te f iL.n narkir,g, 84 Min 3 Hr 43 Xlin,

Average f,isr,e tc icimtify, xrzrk (gresse Fwcil) and delivir flash pr5it to F.1. Officer,

Awrrage tine to mark one roll of fi.h(corquted frorr tine of delimry to film markir,g mtil tine returned to laboratory for distribution printing). 124 IvSn 6 Hr 57 Min.

Average t5me fnr one set of marked prhts to P.I. ', 2 Hr 20 >En 9 Hr 1-7 Nin, (This Frint made frcm marked negatives) The caquted frnn time of delivery of fiL.n to laboratnry from fih markirg until cnrnpleted set cf prints delivered to P.1, Officer.

.. .

Total-number or" missions flown 263 ~

Total nmber of S/'d rolls filed 3 69 Total numb& of colhr rolls filed 4

Total nmber of 9 x 97 B/li negatives used 21,335

Tntal number of 9 x 18 B/'W negatives used 1271 .. Total nlunber, of 9 x 9 c&r trmsparencies used 188

Total nurrber of 9'x 9 E3/bJ prints made ' 216,081'

Total nw-ber of 9 x 18 B/d prints made 5,252

Totalnunber of all prints made 231,333

Average eqosures per roU(for lst,2nd?rd- -' 4th i' operating Frriod) 61 Rolls taken- 75 Total possible eqosures 1586 Total expsures taken 1067 Total usable exposures 786 nlotal unusable exposues 31-5 Total negatives filed ll8 Rolls .not used due to poor techniques 2 8 x 10 prints nade 17'70 (3C, 33D, AD 4TH CPER=iTLFIS PFHIOG.) 4 OCTOB~1951 '~H~~GC'SH-31 J,SI~~

Rolls taken 20 9 Total possible excosures 4483 Total exposure taken 33 60 Total usable expo,:cures 22g4 Total musable exposures 1081 Total negatives filed 355 iialls cot used due to pnor techiques 15 8 x 10 prints rriade 5325

Rolls t czken 7 Total Fa.Cc-ible expnsures 2RO Total exposures taken 280 Total usabls exposures 90 Tot a1 unus&ble exposures 1-90 Total negatives filed k5 Rolls not used due 50 Fmr techiques 0 8 X 10 FI'htS n;ade 675

GVN CAE~IAFOOTxGZ

1, Gun oanera footr2,ge has been hiandled in the follodag nanner;

a. The unexpnsed magazjxes have been drawn fron: the ship's photographic. laboratory by the I'etty Officer in charge of the K-3-x processing machine,

f b, The magazines have then r, ti-tled with pilots' ams ad squadrons on each individual roll (zagazbe) of gmcmIera fikn before installation in the aircraft. The magazizes then have been delivered to thi? squadron ready rooms ad placed in the pilots' boxes. F n 18 C. Loading nagazines in gun czner;?s has been the Filots' resp-nslbility with actual installation made by their plme captains,

d. Setting of the lecs and the nwnbsr of fra?-,es per second has been done by the Petty Officer processlkg the fih, Special attention has been given to quality of film and necessary lens adjustnsnts.

e, Following each flight the plane captains have removed exposed film frmn the aircraft for delivery to the rea+y mms.

f. At 1800 daily the Petty Officer in chzrge of Frocessing has obtained all fiL?in the ready roomsfor delivery to the K-3-k processing rnom, The fih has been processed m-d editedthe szze Right in order to have the finished fi1.n ready for de1Lver-y to the shipls FhotograFhic lzboratoq-, The squadron

repesentatives have then called for the firiid-ied fil-n for eventual assessment, \I

freater latitude in exposures, rilots have difficulty distinguish- ing objects for identificrtion, ' For? film Frocessable without chmging solutirxs.

Little upkeep required on tanks since solutions contain1 no strong acids.

AE V fiN TAGE S Filots have little difficulty -sxposure is very critical, ideritifying objectg, Solutior,s must be renewed frequent 17.

, Tanks require constant cleaning and maintenace due to the use ' of dulphric ac2d and sodim h:idroxide used in the reversal solutions,

2. Footage Processed.

1st Period 2nd Period 3rd Period 4th Feriod TOTAL

BGq Negative 6900 1 @00 I --- 26,rn' 13,ooo 13,000 I. '.

Processing Frobleas

a, Spots ad streaks on the film apparently cmsed by potassium bichromate notthnroughly dissolved before use, The bichromate settles to the bottom md forms on the sides of the bleach tank adhering to the film prior to re-exposure , b, The film does not drywhen machine operated at 13 feet per minute 2s recormended T, C. 10-10-25.

3, Viewing md Evaluation of fih. Due to the high speed of Banshee aircraft gun cmera'footaga obtained has left much to be desired, Frame rate of the present cameras has not been fast enough to keep pace with strafing runs over target area, The jet aircraft do not begin to pull out of their dives at sufficiently low altitudes to enable the focal length of camera lenses to produce an image large enough for satis- k fadtory evaluation, K-17 STilIYd FHOTCGHxPhY A K-17 camera was used during this operating period for strike photographs in conjunction with K-25 strike photography. It was desired to obtain a useable size image of bomb dvnege from a higher altitude than the altitudes fron which K-25 (f/l 63/P strike photographs have been made,

A canera capsule w~sdesigned by VF-54 personnel to accommodate the K-17 24" camera, This capsule was suspended from the wing in the same manner as the K-25 except it was hung at stub wing station left. The camera was electrically operated; vacuum was supplied by a venturi tube. Instdlation 2nd photography proved very satisfactory; however, the capsule with canera was lost in action on 15 January 1952,

W. F. XEEE

COFy to: CNO (Advance, alrmail) (2) USS dJTIET&i (CV36) COEMRPHC (Advance, airmail) (2) uss KE;IKSrnE (cv33) CINCPACFLT (Advance, airnail) (2) CVG 5 (5) CCMCkRDIV ONE CVG 11 C OMSEVENTH FLT . CVG 15 CGMNAVFE cvs Lo1 GCjl4CDIV THRKE CVG 102 COMCiiRDIV FIVE AIR TASK GXOUP Oh3 uss aoxEi3 (cv21) CONSilVFE EVALUATION G%IUP USPBINCETON (CV37) (CDR w. ~nl, B~~HM) USS FHILIPPIhi SEA (CV47) USS BAILEY FOdGE (CV45) USS BON HUhE EiICHii8.D (CV3l) ,' .<..."' 1. -'4

Fmm: Commanding Officer To: Chief of Naval Operations Via: (1) Comnander Carrier Division ONE (2) Commancler SEEXTH Fleet (3) Corrnander Naval Forces, Far East (4) Comander in Chief, 1J.S. Pacific Fleet Subj: Action Report for the period 4 February 1952 to 7 M lief: (a) ???xA+ Icmtx;$isr- ?~EY?J+ 022849 Encl: (1) Carrier Air Group FIVE Action Report, 4 February 1952 to 7 March 1952 gx%$ * 1. In accor.3mce with reference (a), the action reprt for the period 4 February 1952 to 7 March 1952 is hereby submitted.

PmT I COMPOSITION OF @hW FORCES &IIIISSION:

a. At various times during the period of this report , Task Force 77 was composed of the following units: USS ESSEX (CVS), CnrnCarDiv ONE, 3HOM J. PERhY, USN, enbarked, USS VDYFORGE (CV45), ComCarDiv FIVX, rLFDM F. 'VJ. F&IMCN, USN, embarked, USS ANTIETAN (CV36), USS PHILIPPINE SEX (CV47) , USS WISCONSIN (BB64), Com SEVENTH Fleet, VADM H. N. IQRTIN, USN, embarked, (Relieved by VkDPl RI P. BRISCOE 3 brch 1952), USS ST PAUL (CA73) ComCruDiv ONE, 3dM E. E. STONE, USN, embarked, USS LOCHESTER (CA124), and hits of Destmyer Division 52, 71, 72, 92, and 111, - b. During the rated off the East coast of Korea in accordance with CTF 77 Operations Order 22-51 (2nd revision), plus supplemental plans md orders issued during the period,

The mission of Task Force 77 was primarily to support the United Nations ground forces in Korea; the sdpport missions inclc3ed deep support, arned and

PART I1 CHRONO

Februery rest and recreatioE.

_' " . - 21 February Conducted fir Operztions ,. 1037 AD, BUNR, 123533, ditched at EA 4509 due enemy 14fire, , Pilot (LTJG F. S. JUTEAS) picked up by USS THOWdON (DD760) Pilot sustained minor injuries. 1630 74~.BUNIZ. 97475 crashed at sea in the Vicinity of K-50. \ Probable c-~use,p;io$ (LTJC F.a*G, GEaGSN) disoriented in snow storm, Not recovered; fisted as killed in line of duty,

22 February Conducted Air Operations, 1433 AD, BUNR. 123947, ditched inside iiSW screen. Probable cause loss of oil pressure. PFlnt (LT I,!. B. KUNCIE) recovered by ships '* helicopter; no hjuries sustained.

23 February Conducted Air Operctinns.. 24 February Force replenished.

/ 25 February Conducted Air Operations f arenonn. Air Operations cmcelled in afternoon due tn weather.

26 February Task Force replenished.

27 February Air Operations -. 28 February Conducted Air Operations.

1March

March

5 March

6 March so en3ed the first cmbat tour of the USS ESSEX (CV9) (274 conversion). The wwk dme by the ship md Air Group can best be told by the follnw- ing dispatch received frnm Co,NavFe zddressed COMC&DIV ONE, USS ESSEX, AIFL GROUP FIlrE: GCEADER NAVAL FORCES F& EAST IS D-;E;PLY AYPZCIHTIVE OF EX SPLFXQID $f~VIdEiiIN WICH ESSEX PILOTS BnCKZD BY THS ESSEX crad HJ~SCGGEDLY STEUCK DAY fi~~:iDJ AT m COEWNIST TRJJSFO~ITATIOXIEFK'i?.?? IN NO2THEtST KO,SA X THE COMEINLD EFEY)LtTS OF Tf;,E AIii GYOUP AND THE SZIPS COMTAIIY GUI3ED BY TIG IXAGIN~TIONKND Cm- FUL PLANWING OF THE CnDIV ON3 STIXFF HAVX BEE13 A FXNE FxCTOR IN TKE CWkISN TO KEEP TH3 EhE1-E INEFFZCTIVZ X tiLL CGI) SFZELi AND TH! BEST * OF LUCK ALWAYS X V--&M C T JOY

11 March 0600 pursuvlt Adnin CodavFe OgOOlQZ the USS ESSEX (CV9) with CnmCar Div ONE enbarked, underway for San Diego via Pearl. PART I11 OiLDNA?CE:

1, Expenditure of Air Ordnance, See enclosure (1)

2. Expenditure. of Ship's Ordnance far training,

a, Fcr the Period 4-29 February:

- 25' rounds 5"38 - 107 rounds 3"50 .\

, 1. Ship

jdnts of the longitudinal strength nanber and web almg the overhead of the secmd deck.. Repairs were made by ship's force by chipping out the old weld and bevelin? the crack bcfore rewelding,

The locations of these cracks w.2~as follows: Frm,e 67 Stbd. - Cnmpt. A-215-L Frzne 101 Port - Compt, B-208-L Fr,me 104 Port - Cmpt, B-208-L Frqme 106 Port - Compt,. B-208-L Frame 124 Fort - Cnmpt,. B-212-L .n . Frame 128 Port - Compt. B-2.12-L Frame 137 Pprt - Ccnpt. B-214-L 2, D-amaged infUcted on the enmy, See enclosure (11, 3. Danage inflicted on ESSEX aircraft, See enclodwe (l),

PART V F,?SOh%TEL P3RFORMdiCE iIND C.rSU.GTIES

1, Perfnrmance, rk lo d Qf cnntinums operation all p6rsnnnel has been excellent, Ihde has been a factor requiring no , I

*. g. In port, smokers and bnsket-ballgaxes were scheduled with other ships and shore activities,

h, Sightseeing and amera tnurs were arranged fw the men during eech Ifinport" period.

i. Japmese Variety Shnws were arranged for abard ship, h At Christmes the ship cntertained 100 Japanese Orphans. j. , k. Cub Scouts froin Tnkyo and Yckosuka were entertained,

' 1, At Thanksgiving while in the operating area, the ship entertained six GI's from the front lines in Korea as guests,

m, Geman, Japanese and Spanish clnsses 8s well as cmrses in Bible and inus Instruction were held weekly.

n, Divine services were held regularly fnr Protestants, Catholic a7 Saints adChristian Scientists. 1, Engineering Departnent

a. The Engineerhg Departnent experienced no casualties during this operatima1 period. b . Re cormendat ions. Nnn e

c. SteaTing Cata 21 kug 1951 1k-29 Feb, 1-7 %rch March 1952 k Miles Stcaned 4583 3 2494.8 47,593.6 Fuel Oil received 560,208 386,442 10,743 j 023 Fuel Oil Delivered ED’S 0 0 1,424,016 Fuel consumed (undewzy) 696,380 370,270 8,995,795 Fuel wr,smed (x,chnred) k2,440 8,480 378,950 Average Speed 16.3 16.7 16-2 Hours Underway 281.1 144 36S4.8

d, Euring the period 24 August 1951 through 7 Narch 1952 the USS ESSEX fueled 32 destroyers, at a-~sverage rate of f?5,500 gallons per hour, The USS ESSF

2. Air Intelligence

a. F’hntn Interpretation

Fhotn InterpretLtim, like a heavily loaded freight train, got off to a slow start at tha be;inning of the first tnur of duty in the Korean Theatre,. During the first nperaJing period, many mistzkes were made and corrected. In order tn enable future c2rriers to avoid scme of the pitfalls these suggestions

are qffered. -I should be maintained with a tickler system showing the last photo coverage ad status of ezch field. X scparste alphzbetiiss1:file should be maintained of other Korean fields, These established phntographs can be readily located and the status of the fields quickly determined,

(3) Complete and current 1:50@,000 INS L 751 series maps should be available in sufficient nmbers in order that strike leaders, briefers, photo pilots, and film-marking perscnnel have a? edequate supply. A ;nir,imUm of 10 copies of each ohart should be on band, The Far East Air Force Material command located at Tachikzwa AFB has these maps instock ,available fnr distrLbutinn to Naval Forces, 5

(4) All photography shhuld be msrkzd an4 checked by the photo pilots prior tn its delivsry to the Photo Interpreter. The ir.-portance of correct coordir?.ates mnnot be overenphasized. The additional time required by the photo pilots and filmmarkbig persnnnel in accurately locating photography will later pay off great divedends in speeding up the actual interpretation and dissemination of the P.1, Report,

(5) During 5ke early porticin of corcbat operations, the primary targets were rail 2nd highway bridges, Pictures of these bridges should be filed alphabetically by area and numerically within each area. This enzbles rapid. locatinn of desired bridges- as wsll iis other targets. As $he /LA defenses. increased, more arid nore tirne was devoted to flak analysis. The original concept was t? prepare flak rnnsa$ts of bridges or other targets including commanding

- ~ terrain. Thesg mosaics proved t@ b operation was cknged and 12-16 ml targets, 'Flak mosaics were then F llel runs at l:5,OOO were requ AA encnm$ered Ln this of 'drirlri Nar 11, is mobile in ever one day Will nr cabe moved the f wheneverthey ar2 present, No att than small am,s including nachine guns,

(6) Each ship should have a min photo interpretatw in carrying o a?, PH, or i'3, strikers or petty offi *one of the photoi Barbers Pnint ,

Ccmmariclcr Air Force, Pacific Flee of 14 February 1952 should be utilized as the bas50 operating procedures. a, At the beginning of operztinns in the area the Photographic ‘ Korean Officer began recording infcrmation necessary to determine the mdAmwwking 5 load nf the photographic 13bnr3tvy an3 the tb.es required to complete various steps of processing through the laboratnry, To obtain this ihformation one man was assigned the task of naintaining account of all aerial. film recording the tines aerial rolls entemd the laboratcry and this time required for processing through the varinus steps to completim,

All information ccncerning t for process printing 2nd delivery has been taken faom these records. Negatives and ~rir,tswhich were prncessed and later disc-rded have not been included in the production figures as only material which was satisfzc ly completed and delivered have been used,

’ Since asrial phctographic re

5 March 1952,

8-24-51 10-4-51 cnmpleted, for- 35i warding letter 0900 1000 1000 1100 0800 093 6 written and

Ist 2nd 3rd 4th 5th TOTKLS 227 Rolls Taken 0 74 58 75 is Total possible ev3ures* 0 1520 1375 1588 5383

Total expsures taken * 0 a1 usable exposures * 0

qr techniques.

8 x 10 prints made. Ke.ia:krme forwarded 10,595 10,595

TZTfiLS 11,000 17,495 8,900 13,000 397OO 54,095 c= The r"ollm5ng is a record of the number of prints and negatives in addition to the aerial recnnnaissmce work. ThJse figures are for the quarterg ending 30 Szp l-951: :)l 3ec 1951 and 31 March 1952 (figures fcr the quarter ending 31 Mx-ch 1352 icdudes wnrk performed up and including March to 15 1952,) Ir B&N B&W h>g i? tive s Prints

Quarter Quarter &uarter Quarter Quarter Quarter ------Misc. 35m I. D, 520 352 0 829 544 120 23 x 3% Etc, eight hours the maximum nmber which may be dried is sixteen - provided the drjjer is drying cnntinunusly. If the laboratory were required to process six rolls nf aerial film a day and mzke nine prints frnm ench mil-- the time required for drying the prints alone wuld'amcunt to twenty-seven hours.

Aerial Film Dryers werz fnund unsatisfactnrJi for drying Sonne prints, \hen used. fnr Snnne prints the drive ohnins cn the machines cnnthucusly broke, requiring cmstant repair and maintenance. Additional equipment and space were made the subject of separate correspondence (USS ESSZX serial 2097 of 26 Nnvember 1951) ,

e. Develminrr Outfit- fnr 73t x LOO' % It Is recommended that item 443 HSO Catalog Sectinn 1801, Developing Outfit, type B-6 SN E12-D-163-325 be a?ded to the Section "P" Allowance List. The K-18 Magazine (MA-,!+) S/N El8-M-469-100 ad390' Aerial Film S/N ElGF, 31485-160 can not be used without the above developing outfit for processing, During oper.?tinns with the two FW-2P the K-38 Aerial Camera could not be fully utilized because developing oiltfits were nnt zvailable for processing 390' rolls.

4, hmmnications

a. During the fifth and final period for ESSEX-b the operating area, task force cnmunications reached a level of performance more stablilized and reliable than for any previnus period during the ship's seven months' tour-,

as ariy other circuit,

o E? daily averages of 23 hnurs. The situation with regard to JOG, Korea has improved markedly with the allocation of frequencies as revised during the past seven months. Night voice % cmmunicatinns can still be impmved; howevcr, thc vrlme of traffic on the net during the dusk-to-dawn period has been at'a minhum,

e. Radinphctngraphy; three sc les with I?K3 were arrvlgcd with NPG3 during the two wceh nf this period, Twn were unsuccessful du.e to heavy in- ' terference repwted byNFG3. Shifting nf frequencies had no effects Hours

and frequencies assigned for the third sked, which was successfully conducted, ~ were nqt changad,

f. Traffic: a comparison of messag ounts for the ffrst and fourth periods-ezch ccvering a full month's operating-follows4 crease of apprcximately 47% nutgning md 17 g Otedc

USS ESSEX (CV9) Simplex yanual to G~~-Pu+Series

Guam Prim. Broadcast -B5 "JIG" Brmdc ast - - - - 154 Hionm Broadcast -B32,2 & L23 KC, -. 5780 - 6851 Gum Prim. Gen1,Bdcst. -BIB - 66. - 409 Visual (F/L & Sema.) 577 932 k48 827 h

Mail (Esth.) 50 80 60 70 TOTxLS 11038 20297 5940 23688 , i 5. Gunnery a, During the period that this vessel operated in the forward area, the zt, sea.

loss or casua during retrnctipn, and nil tcl escape past the camstatpressure vdve spindle the gravity tulk. Tlghthing the blts resulted. in satisfacthry retractim

.;. bliFUahtcDeck

(1) Cnmplement of Aircraft

During the past seven mnntkS of npt7ratims in the Korean area, the aircraft cnmplenent aboard this vessel has fluctuated between 60 and 77 planes., This variation in complement has given flight deck personnel and excellent npportunity tn determinei the opercztfng cc?..pi?cityc.f the CV34 Class &-oraft carrier, &en operating under war time cnnditims. With 77 aircraft aboard %he fdlnwing difficulties were ncst appzrent:

(a) Efaintenance suffered bec2.use aircraft could nnt be moved to the hangar deck immediately fnllnwing recovel?;, nr if already below, could not be mnved to a spct for turn up, xing spread, drnp check or engine cbange. (Thirty- t6n is the maximum number of mixed types which-cm be splltted on the hangar deck).

(e) 2ecc.veries which craft wliich cwld not fcld

ting visiting .ereraft ahea

aft which had over the apex of the tnwbar nn backs of_each trmter, The oenter bf th pad remained under the center cf $he fuselage regardless of tractor turns. If the towing rings nn the F2H were horizontal instead of vertical the universd towbar cnuld be used without any modification. No Banshees were damaged while using this method of rearward towing,

c, Operating Data 14. Feb - 1 FIar - Total in 29 Feb 7 Mar Korsrm Area

Arrested lmdin s 666 Catapult, shots $Starboard) 180 Catapult shots (Port) Gasnline (gallons) . Luboil Symbnl llM) 2,877 Luboil Symbpl 1010 1,192 LubOil Smbnl 1120 0 AlcOhPl ANrA-24 0 Alcnhol AN-A-18 oo 20 5 eended by ESSEX Air Gmups -

* (3) Tqtal landingsI ESSEX. from

Aviation Stnres fcr new aircraft types and

(2) m-2,3,4Lj4NL (3) F4U-0 (4) F4U-5NL

(2) Actual flight nperatims , (with resultant maintenance of Arcraft onboard) cnmenced in April1951 2nd cnntinued practically uninterrupted for eleven nnnths. During this time 2152 requistions, representing apprdmately 12,900 items, were submitted to fill allcwances cf those items which reczched the low limits established on the stock recnrd cards. Supply support hzs been gwd, The USS JUPITER, primary snurce of aircraft parts in Japm - Knrea area, was able tn fill abnut 75% nf the items required. Those items that could not be filled were obligated (if NIS) or passed tn AS3 Ynkosuka or iSD Oakland for action (if NC). Material which h:?d to be shipped from the cwtinental U.S. took on the average nf 20 days to reach the ship if sent by air - 50 days by surface. Copperation between aircraft carriers and delivery service by "COD" aircraft nfsV;?-23 greatly assisted in decrensing LOG'S end kept aircraft utilization high a

(3) The perind 1-15 January was the most critical period during the entire cruise, The' nriginal 180 days allowance (apprqximately 18,000 items) was exhausted insofar as high usage ad critical items wers cpncerned, and stock md requistinns mailed off weekly, 510 requistions were pending on 15 Janunry, representing abnut 1200 items due, Of these 1200 items 19 were pending on a Priority llH1l bzsis fnr xOG aircraft. Between 15 January and 18 February apprnziina'cbly 800 of these items were received. When %he ESSEX departed from Ycknsuka nn 18-February, the remainder of the unfilled Priority IrC" requistions were c?.ncelled, and during the lzst two-week operating period Cmly Pricrity "A" items fnr AOG aircraft were nrdered. It has been determined that 90% of AOG requistinns stemmed frnm items not in allowance lists. Where such items were required mnre than *-rice, usage data was forwarded to the JUFIER with a re'west that she stpek thcse items, Usege reprts to &O,-Oaklmd knd submissinn nf stubs tc, FA>.G (for tzbulatim by iiS0) Will sene' 2s a basis for

nut one c'r t

be met, The procedure used in the Wediterrmean of flnating engines in steel containers is undesirable in this task fnrce during wartime operations as the replenishment program is mrried m while cnderway. a full aliowmce nf Section md "U1' material and winter Wight clothing as previded in fiCL 21-51 prinr to embarkkg nn the parent carrier. b. Gene'ral Stcres

(1) The system of replenishing GSK stores in this area by Mobile support is cmsidered very g,*nd, The USS C&TOlI issucs stqres within me dcy after the presentrtim nf requistinns, Pcper work is greatly reduced by ordering only materials carried by the CASTOR as listed in the GSM Catalclg, published by COIEETiV2C)N 3,

(2) Critdcal GSK items that cmnot be supplied by the CtSTOiZ may be nbr tained frnm cther ships i?t sea or in prt, frqm Flzet Activities, Yoknsuka or frnm FRCO, Uaklhnd via CTr; 92,f. or CTG 92=J, Only Frlorilty and "B" requisitions shpuld be placed rll Fleet Activities when items are NIS frcm support- ing supply ships, because the mission of this shnre'activity does not include support to combatant vessels. During the entire cruise the ESSEX has had a negligible amnunt of GSK material forwarded directly from Oakland.

(3) Experience t9 date regarding the replenishment of Electrnnics and BuShips Machinery Spare Parts has been fairly gnod, How-ever, the logistic support nf these hard tc get items is neither as prompt nor as expedient as that of GSK, Nevertheless, service was excellent from the supply ships CHIMON, LEAGUE ISLAND, SUCTFON and PSOTON, Items-NIS or NC are forwarded tn PRCO, Oaklmd; As aprrnximately seventy per cent of the electrcnic and mxhinery spares are items in this area, ships for the NkVFE area shrvuld concentrate on having on boarci-all allowed ior to departure from the United States.

(4) The General Stores Grnup has plxe3 requistinns for GSK, Electronics and Spare Parts material during the cruise just c d with the follcwing results:

Placed with CAST02 ' Accomplished by CAS Placed with nther activities Completed with nt Tntal number of P Total number of Pri kccomp1ishe.d by IE 7% Shortages of the fc! quistinns:

(a) Bearings (b) “V” Belting (c) Gaskets (d) Winterization Equipent (snow shovels, pushers , rock salt, stoddsrd solvent, etc.) , (d) Intelli ence materials (bristle board, mpping tacks, frisket paper plifilmk (f) Automotive spares for jeeps, peeps, fork lifts, etc,. (6) Hurricane tie dnwn equipent for eireraft (l$” 21 threLd manila rope, wire rope, clips, etc,) (h) Electrnnics spares (5) Fli.gh$ deck repir equipent (metal, lumber, studs, etc.) (3) Webbing for strap nn b.-mb skids. (k) Valves and parts (1) Batteries (all types) (m) Duplicating machine materials (master sets, paper, fluid, etc.) (n) Machinery spare parts

Intra-ship transfers and csrrier pn board deliveries (by CODFISH) have aided grately in our record nf experiencing nn major machinery or electronic shut dnwn,during the nine months since leaving the U.S,

(5) The allowance of seventy-five per cent foul weather clcthing has been n adequate tn neet the demands of the rigournus winter months. in the nrea area, 2nd-this allcwanee is cmsidered liberal, It is recommended that the ESSEX carry approximately ten per cent’more that the quantities om as issued, This will conserve critical mzterials and give the ship aMitinna1 space tp cerry other essential stores.

A comparison of clothing is ad clothbg zllnwed is shorn below:

Drawers, hTbter ’

Jackets, Vinter Face Masks Prcm the figures it cc?n be readily seen that the allowznce grated is excessive. . From now nn, the ESSXX plms to carry approxim-?tely 10% over the quantities shnm as issued.

This will result in full utilization cf and and alleviate the cramped cmditirn of the storerooms, .

(6) Departrnental Budget6 have been established in xccrdance with Afloat kccounting Mexnor,.yldum No. 2. In setting up these budgets, the following departmental percentages were established:

Per Cent, Dzify %?.get Quarterly mcunt

Iidminist rative 4.55 $ 22.22 $ 2,000.00 Ope rations 8 38.88 3 9 500 ,OO Air 16.5 83 .33 7,500m Gunnery 10 50.00 4,500*00 Engineering 33 13;6,66 15,000 ,oo Navigation 1 3.33 300.30 5,000.00 'Ezed'icalSupply boo ,oo Dent21 Paint C,O. fieserve Totals

(7) The cnnservat

c1 Ships Service (2) k monthly bre of sales is listed behw for period beginning July 1951 and terminating February 1952:

July $19,12 5,OO November $4.4,647.O0 Aupst 26,549,oo December 28,853.00 September 30,112 00 Jmusry 31,582.00 0 c tober 4I-,117*QO February 22,?49,00 L Total Sales $244; 934-00 . Mrnthly Average 30,167,oo %. High mcnth in sales wczs Nwenber 1951 when Ship's Service acbivities sold $~,OOO,OO worth of merchandis6, The combination pf Japanese items and the Christmas buying seasnn were factnrs in mzking this wnth the leader. The lnwmmth was July, the' first month away frnm the United St2tes. It was also interesting to nnte that the nverzill. percentage nf ssles was th2rty-three per cent gre&er during the opcrzting periods than during the inport perinds,

(3) The support received from the USS CnST07. and Fleet Activities, Yoko- suka during the cruise was-verv good. Of a total of one hundred and seventeen requistiws submitted, one hundred and niqe were cmpleted or partially accom- i plished. Scarce items during the eight months period were.oobbler, tzilor, ! fountain ,and laundry supplies. Cnbbler items shnrt wcre full soles, nails of all sizes, rubber heels and smd paper; tailor shop shortages were white striping, ten and white buttcns; fountain items difficult to obtain were ice cream mix and chncolate syrup; laundry item shnrt in the area were.press coversj mangle covers, spare parts for extractors, and occasionally soap, During the last several months in the Far Eastern Area basio ship store stock ' was mnre difficult to obtain than in the earlier stages of the cruise. It is therefore advisable to have all ships leaving for the fnrward area ccrry to full cnpncity a complete supply of Ship's Service stock,

(4) Abnormal temperatures in bulk strremcm B-4.06-X have caused a general deterinratinn nf stock stowed in this space, Laundry supplies have hardmded, thereby mzking them difficult tr, use Ice cream powder m~ipast quired survey as being unfit fpr hum cqzsumption. Temperature %ugust and September averagzd llO' F. During the last five months of the cruise they have averaged 9$O F, Ventilatiqn improvements in this stcrernom are ne-

cesspry before it can be pmperly utilized twer@cln* I 'I

(5) Operation of t laundry nn a twmt fnrward area has proven very successful, These operating hou superior tn the cnntinunus seven day week schedule because th of zbwt 35,000 gallpns of fresh weter per week m4 time is available fcr rcutine maintenance md upkeep cf the operating machinery. (a) hTn mwey is left overnight in the cash register of any of the activities. (b) Cesh drzwers are left open then the activity is nnt in Dperation.

(c) Night lights are installed in the Ship's Store and Ship's Service Stnres mcl are left burning all night, (d) Inspecticns are cmhcted nightly Cy the Duty Supply Officer at 2200 an? 2430 of all Ship's Stme Spzces. (e) Twn (2) group 3 Pcks ere installed ':n each dnw to the Ship's Store spaces . (7).The mwthly mmetary 1ir;litati.m frr Ship's Store stock for this ship is $125,000,00. It is believed a4visable that the limitaticn be increesed

curity of required quantities. ifwm during the oruise, in January 1952 due'to

' Octpber 1951 . MtTnthly Average ems nrdered repeatedly yet difficu in qumtity and sizes require

-1TEY.i -. NO, ~%C&TISTIONED Drawers, Cotton Sncks; Cotton, Black

Service Stripes I 800 Trwsers, Dungarees 4,388 Glcves, Leather, Thrk 378 None Socks, Cottnn , White 8,&%0 840 (4) Slow moving items during the cruise included Teacoats, Undress Jumpers, and Dress Blue Jumpers, A cqmplete sellout of whie cottnn socks was experienced during the one mclnth stay in Pearl Harbor at the early portion of the cruise. e. Cnmmissary

(1) The operatinn and lozistic support Ff the Cnmissary Group has been generally satisfactnry during thc :i&t mc:iYns cruise just completed, Support from the pmvisinn ships during replenishment in the operating area has been excellent. iin occasimal shortage of desired fresh prwisions has resulted from the tn time, and it is believed that a list of these provisions prepared and delivered in advcmce of the provisinns replenishment day would aid materially in reducing this shortage. Srne difficulty w2s experienced during the last npersting period in receiving dry provisions,

ahxt .fifty tons ef provisicns were needed during rt period to maintain

line, Eehandling of prcwisinns would be reduced to a mininum which would in.

per ton of stqres to nff load, Enct fifty men lclw on this ship. Rigid enfmcenent nf these hours was przctiiced ad all hmds, moperated in meeting the schedule, .

f, Disbursing (1) Tjisbursing activities in the fc,rward area proceed along mutbe lines with minor variations, The bigrest problem is the use of Filitary Payment Certificatesb Conversion of TJ, S, Currency to FTC upn arrival and recnn- version nn departure is difficult tn accc?mplish srn?r\thly without running the risk of distributing U. Sb Currency in Japan nr remrwixg MPC frDm the desig- natcd area. These ccnversicn operatiom nust therefnre be accomplished as k near arrival an? departure the as pnssible, It is therefore recnrnended that the official exchanee activity f--T afloat activities (U, s, Fleet Activities, Navy Ik. 3923) provide exchznge frcilities until departure time in order tn Evni4 cnmplic2tiors which arise when ship's persmnel spend time

(2) On the pay line it has prove? necessarj to eliminate the one dollar MPC ride because of its sxk.onrd size, Paymnts were made to the nearest lnwer five dnllar increment, This has the further advantage nf speadbg up the pay Cine which helps ~vidcnnflictim with ship's operations. The total Militaly Pay 3011 for the period cash payroll of $244,0oO -00

fied by the fact that frm order business; the ex-

(I) Replenishmen (2) Pertinent facts and averages concerning Navy Special Fuel Cilj Aviation Gasoline and Prnvisicns receipt during the replenishment perinds nf this crese are. :?s fnllcws:

Nwy Special Fuel Oj1 kvera?e time per 100,000 gallons 45 minutes Average gallnns per hour received 132,650 gallons Highest mow,+., received in gallons per )Imr nn a single dzy qf replenishnent.. 191,600 gallons Lowest amount received in gaUons per hour c\n a sin,?le day of replenishment , 73,850 gallons

Aviatinn Gasnline

Average time per 100,000 gallms 1 hmr 29 minutes Average gallons per hmr received 62,100 gallons Hiaest mrunt receive.l in gallons per bur nn a single day of replenishmnt. 137,750 gallons Lowest mnunt received in g:Jlnns per hnur on a single day of replenishment. 22,459 gallons

Prnvis ion s

Average prcvisinns tmnage received per hour '35.tons Highest tonnage per hmr on a single day of replenishment. 77 tnns

The- low amnwts listed abcve wsre in all cases' attributable to replenishment during rwgh weather.. Hpwever, in spite of the weather, .the replenishxnt perinds during the entire cruise were relatively smeoth in cperation aid are preferred tn r

copy tc: CKO (k?vnce, . COMAI~ZPHC (Advance, aim CINCP~CFLT(A~vance,.airmnil COMC tJDIV ONE CO3ISEENTHFLT CO15I~AVFE COMCA'EIIV FIVE COMCZDIV THDX USS BOXEX (CV21) EiIii TASK GiDUP ONE DOWNGRADE0 AT 3 YEAR INTERVAL5: From: Commanding Officer DECUSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS TO: Chief of Naval Operatians DO0 DIR 52OO.N Via: (I) Commander Carrier Division THREE (2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet (3) Comander Naval Forces, Far East (4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet Subj: Action Report for the Period 18 July 1952 to 4 September 1952 Ref: (a) O@av Xn-Mm 3480.4 Encl: (1) Air Task Group TWO Actian'Report, 18 Jdy 1952 to 4 Seflder 1952 1, In accordance with reference (a), the action report for the period 18 July 1952 to 4 September 1952 is hereby suhnitted, PART I aOMpoSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION.

a. During the period 1&126-J_Uly 1952, USS ESSm (CV9) was a unit Of __ Sscial Task Gro~p-56~~8.This group was composed of the followbg udts4 USS ESSEX (CV9>, CTG 50,8 and CmCarDivTHREE, RADM A. SoUcEK, USN, embarked, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV4.7) and screening units. b. During the above period USS ESSEX (CV9) omrated in the South China Sea, the Formosa Strait and off the East Coast of Formosa in accordance with CawSEVENTHFlt Operations Plan 75-52 and CamCarDiVTHREE Operatias Order 1-52, The mission of TG 20.8 was to make a show of force off the China Coast \i as B deterrent to Communist Chinese agressive actions against Fomosa and to bolster the morale of Nationalist Chinese Forces on Formosa in suppol't of United Nationa Policy on Formosa. \ C. hring the period 27 3uls-4 September, USS ESSEX (CV9) was a unit of Task Force 77 at various times comped of the followfng units: USS ESSEX (CVS), CmCarDivlMREE, RADM A. SOUCEK, USN, embarked, USS BON HOMME RIO(CQl), ComCsrDivONE, RADM H. E. KEGAN, USN, embarked, USS BOXER (CVZ3.), CaaaCarDivTHREE WMA. SOUcEiC, US, embarked, USS PRINCETON (CV37), USS IOWA (BB61) ComsEvENTH Flt, VADM J, J, CLARK, USN, embarked, and various heavy support, and screening ship*

d. During this latter perhi, USS 3SSEX (CV9) operated off the East Coast of Korea in accordance with CTF 77 Oper&ims OMer 22-51 (2nd Revision), plus aupplementdl plans and orders issued during the period. The mission of TF 77 was primarily to support United Nations ground forces in Korea. The support missions included close support, anned and photogmfiic reconnahsance, interdiction of enemy supply lines and strikes 0. The ESSEX Air Group flew acrose Korea twice to make aoordlnated large SCb8trikeS ath the Air Force ard other United Nations aircraft; the first Of these on 20 August was against a suppls area in the vicinity of YD 1058 and the other on 29 Auqst was against related targets in the general area of the capital city of Pyongyang. During the month additional heavy attacks were noun against pasJer plants at Kyosen #1, Kyosen #2 and Chosen #loThe increased antiaircraft fire encountered at these targets, particularly Chosen #1 indicates their value and importance to the enemy, Other large scale strikes were made against Chongin by three carriers on 2 August and again on 1 September and against the Hoeam-dong synthetic 00plant on 1 September. f, The shift of emphasis from the rail interdiction program to importent industrlal and military targets has been, it is beueved, an increased contribution to the overall United Nations effort. It has also been more 5.n keeping with the inherent ability of a carrier task force to utilize SWprise and keep the enemy off balance, The success of these attacks and the very considerable decrease in losses of pilots and aircraft is proof of the wisdom of the present program of operations,

g, The value of coordinated intelligence fran all sources cannot be over em#asised. Recent high quality photographs of asswed targets increase the accuracy of attacks and are of great assistance in avoiding heavy flak areas and in flak suppression.

h, The coordination of flak suppression flights by jets with 8trike8 by propeller aircraft contributed effectively to the Success of attacks and certainly was a major factor in reducing losses and damage from eneqy anti aircraft fire. The necessity for3thefaster jets after the prop strikes and recoverg before the strike aircraft returns complicates scheduling but is well worth the effort and it is rocommgMthat it be continued, PART 11 CHRONOIDGY: 18 July 063 5 Departed Subic Bay, Philippine Islands enroute Formosa Strait, in accordance with ComCarDivTHREE ONrder 1-5a OTC, CmCarDivTHREE (WMA, SOUCEK), embarked,

19 July Conducted Air Operations enmute Formosa Strait, 20 July Enroute Formosa Strait. During refueling of USDUNCAN (DDR874), DUNCAN lost steering control. 1119 Dl3CAN slid into the side of the ESSEX, breaking the after fueling boom and extensively damaging mount 311. I'luNCkd sustained major damage after 5 inch gun mount,

21 July Air operations cancelled due to bad weather. Conducted Air Operations-mass air parade over Fomosa, Conducted Air Operations-rnass air parade over Formosa Strait, 25 Jurs Enmute Yokosuka, Japan. 26 July 1700 Moored Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan, 27July . Moored Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan, 28 July Moored Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan. 29 July 0600 Pursuant to CTF 77 confidential disptch 2703002 July, underway for Area Sugar.

30 July Conducted refresher flight operations enroute Area Sugar. 1340 Rendezvoused With USS STICKEL (DD888). 31 Juls Conducted refresher flight operations enroute Area Sugar, 1 August 0530 joined Task Force 77. OTC, CemCarDivONE (RADM H. E, REGAN) in EON HOW RICHARD, Task Force replenished. Conducted First Combat Air Operations against the enemy to camnenc8 second ESSEX Korean tour. 2 August Conducted Air Oprations 0603 AD BuNo l29OU, crashed ahead of the ship. Pilot (LTJG L. ADDICOTT) rescued by helicopter. No injuries. 0608 F4U BUN0 96951 suffered a similar accident, Pad (LTJG W, RALSTON) rescued by helicopter.- minor bjurhs.

3 August Conducted Air Operations. 4 August Task Force replenished. 13 52 ComCarDivTHREE (RADM A. SOUCEK) in BDXER relieved CmCarSioONE (RADM H. E. REGAN) as OTC, BON HOMME RICHARD departed for Yokosuka, Japm, Conducted AA firlng practice.

5 Au$ust Ccmduc ted Air Ope rat ions. 6 August Scheduled air operations cancelled because of major fire on BOXER, Received eight BOXER personnel, rescued by helicopters,

7 August 1328 CamCarDivTH~E (RADM A. SOUCEK) and Staff transferred via high line from BOXER to USS WALKER (M>E507) to ESSEX. 8 August Conducted i ir Operat ions. W8 ADWJ BuNo I24710 ditched near Yangdo due to loss of oil pressure. Pilot (LT J. C. NORTON) and 2 crennan picked up uninjured by USS OZBOURNE (DD846) and returned via high line. BOXER departed for Yokosuka, Japan, 9 August Task Force replenished, BON HOW RICHARD joined Force. Condwted AA firing practice. 3 'Tj EC MSSl Ft ED 12 August 13 August Task Force replenished. 16 August Conducted Air Operation3. 15 August Conducted Air Operations. 16 Awst Conducted Air Oprat ions 17 August Task Force replenished, Conducted fir- practice, 18 August Scheduled air operations cancelled because of bad weather preceding typhoon Karen. I$ August Scheduled air operatjons cancelled because of bad weather accampanying typhoon Karen.

20 August Conducted air operations, participating in coordinated UN strike on supply areas, West Coast of Korear 21 August Conducted lib? Operatians. 22 August Task Force replenished. 23 August Conducted Air Operations, - 24 August Scheduled air operations cancelled because of bad weather, 25 August Scheduled air operations cancelled because of bad weather, BOXER rejoined Task Force. 26 August Task Force replenished, ComCarDioTHREE (RADM A. SOUCEK) and staff transferred via high line to BOXER. Conducted AA firing practice ,, 27 Auguet Conducted air operations,

28 August Bad weather cancelled morning flights. Conducted air operations in afternoon. 29 August Conducted air operations, participating in coordinated UN strikes on Pyongyang,

30 August Task Force replenished. 31 August Scheduled air operations cancelled because of bad weather, 1 September Conducted air operations. ESSEX and PHINCETON acnductsd joint strikes against oil refinerg near town of Hoeam- dong, northeast comer of Korea. EOXl3R conducted strikes against MUS~. DECLASIFIED 4 X CONGRATULATIOIVS FOR THE INDSVI'IXIAL OUT- OF THE PIWTS AM) WEU DONE TO AU HANDS X VADM CLARX SENDS X 'I 2 September Conducted air operation8 , 1l21, Captain Paul D. STROOP, USN,wlgev&Captain Walter F, RODEE, US?, as Commanding Officer USS &SEX (CV9). 3 September Scheduled air operations cancelled because of bad weather.

4 September Pursuant to CTF 77 Conf. dispatch 3012262 Aug. underway for Yokosuka, Japan in company with USS BOXER (CVZm) ,and . USS PARKS (DD884). PART- 111 ORDNANCE: 1, Expenditure of Air Ordnance. See enclosure (1)

2, Expenditure of Ship's Ordnance for training. a. Period 18-31 July 1952

None b. Period 1-31 August 1952

104 rounds 5'98 AAC 74 rounds 3"50 FCL (VT) 437 rounds 3"50 FCL (VT) Non-Frag c, Period 1-4 September 1952 None

3. The parformance of ship's ordnance equipnent was satisfactory, PART IV BATTLE DAMAGE:

1. Ship a. On 20 July, USS HUBBldXD DD748 pulled away from along side during fueling operations before the fueling hose was disconnected resulting in loss of one 50 foot length of four inch hose.

b, During the same fuellidg operations on 20 July, USS DUNCAN DD874 had a ateering casualty. Before steering control could be regained, the DUNCAN scraped the ESSEX on the starboard side. .The ESSEX suffered no personnel loss or Injury, Material damage and loss of equipnent was sustained,

5 DECLASSIFIED Mount #37, frame 105 starboard, was the'next pint of contact: "he floater net basket housing, two (2) floater nets wire knocked off of the splinter shield. Two small holes wen? fierued In the shell plating on the under side of mount #37 gun sponson and an additional 250 sq, ft, of plating was damaged. As the destroyer drifted aft, the fbeling born at the after fueling station was badly twisted with fittings and four (4 x 50 foot) lengths of fueling hose being lost over the side. One length of (4 x 50 foot) fueling hose was lost at the forward fueling station, The safety rail around the walkway at frame 94 main deck level was dmaged by the fueling hose as it was torn from its cradle and the fueling boom gave way, The propeller guard of the DUNCAN made contact with the ESSEX at frame 157 starboard at about the 3rd deck level hitting the protective pipe covering of the gasoline filter drain line. Only slight damage was caused.

The poht of greatest damage was at the gun spanson on the after starboard quarter. Gun mount #3llwas badly damaged by the after %Win five inch gun mount on the DUNCAN, The DUNCNNVs after mount w%s trained aft and slightly elevated and as contact was made between the ESSEX and the DUNCAN, the 5tt gun barrela pierced the under side of the gun mount. Approximately 400 sq, ft. of sponson plating is badly danaged, 12 ft of the splinter shield is defonned, but can be repaired and the deck outboard of the gun was torn up. A detailed report of damage sustained was submitted to CNO. PART V PERSDNNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES: 1. Performance The performance of all personnel has been excellent and morale has been a factor requiring no special attention,

2, Casualties

a, Ship's Company (1) NELSON, Jr., Clarence W, AN, USN, sustained a simple fracture of the right tibia, while unhooking a tow bar frm an airplane, Starboard wheel ran over right ankle. b, Air Task Group TWO (1) LTJG Donald H, HOWARD, USNR, received minor lacerations of the face when his aircraft was hit in the canopy by enenly-projectiles while flying over (2) Them w~reno casualties sustained by Air Croup enUnted men. (3) NO flight time was lost due to illness of flsing prso~~l. (4) There were no man hours lost due to psychriatric disOrdeX7j.

(5) There were no deaths,

(6) There were no venereal diseases reported.

( 7) The morale was good,

C. Other Ships On 20 July 1952, SWARD, P.W. GM3 was received aboard via heUcopter from USS LXTNCN DDR874 With lacerations of left foreann received as result of collision between USS DUNCAN (DD874) and USS ESSEX (CV9) ., Eight survivors were received aboard on 4 August 1952, as a result of a fire on US5 BOXER (CV21). They were admitted to the sick list for approximately eight hours and returned bc dvty,

1, Engineering Department a, Engineering maintmance has been seriously hindered as a result of reduced upkeep availability. The combination of curtailed navy yard overhaul availability and subsequent continuous operation has allowed Uttle pre- ventative maintenance, During the one month availability at hget Sound Naval

Shipyard only work of a known or emergency nature was accomplished, Since + leaving the yard the ship has had three periods of 4, 3, and 10 days in san Diego, three periods of 20 hours, 17 hours, and ’73. hours in Pearl Harbor, one period of one day in Subic Bay, and one period of 60 hours in Yokosuka out of a total of ll.5 days. The lack of opportunity for the ships force to prOperly hspect worn machinery since the ships return from tb first tour of duty is now manifesting itself in machinery failures. b. Recommendations None c. Steaming Data 1% 1 Jul 1-4 Sep 52 Oil received w ;gL252 0 Oil delivered 382021 549389 75552 Oil consumed underway 867900 lsU.930 278410 Oil consumed at anchor 30470 0 0 Hours underway 268.8 744 96 Hours at anchor 66,2 0 0 Average speed 18.9 15.9 1’7.2 Miles steamed 5080 US29 1651 ~EC~~IFIED 7 ~ ~~ -- ~ - - ae Catatnalt

During the period of this report the catapult operatian was considered normal With exception of the following minor discrepancies: (1) On 5 August the port catapult cable tensioner jammed. Investigation revealed the ram was pitted, scored and the lips on the female follower turned under. The follower was machined down and new chevron packing installed.

(2) On 12 August the port cataplt dones of the cable whip dampers required new llOIT ring seals,

(3) On l.4 August the port catapult main oil supply line to the firing valve developed a leak. Investigation revealed that the reducer bushing threads were damaged. New reducer bushings were lodlgmanufactured and installed,

(4) On 17 August the starboard catapult cable tensioner ram stuck at about two (2) feet from the "full in" position. Investigation revealed that the ram packing follower was out of round. This was corrected by machlnhg the follower down to .005 I.D. and installing new packing.

b. Arrestina Gear Arresting gear operation during this period was considered normal. and satisfactory. The lowest the required for rerigging jet barricade was 4.5 minutes.

The port barricade stanchion has become distorted inboard and the base plate distorted outboard, possibly due to jet barricade engagement. This causes scoring of the ram qylinder. The barricade is still operational and will be repaired upon entering port. A report is being submitted to Naval Shipyard Bremerton,

C. Aircraft Ordnance

The aircraft ordnance division shortage of personnel continues to present a problem. With the present number of personnel it is impossible to properly man all anning control stations during rearming of aircraft. Loading schedules have been met however, at the expense of tiring zrming crews by working exces- sively long hours.

6. Xaintenance (1) General:

The first operational tour found the aircraft maintenance division workhg hard to meet the needs of the embarked group. Five (5) QEC*s, six (6) propellers, one hundred sixteen (ll6) tire and wheel assemblies, and 1274 spark plugs were drawn from supply and/or cleaned, built up, or otherwise prepared for installation by the squadrons. Thirty three thousand (33,000) cubic feet of oqrgen were delivered by trafler during four hundred seventy eight (478) aircraft servicings*

8 Some difficulty was experienced by lack of Wnow howff in engine buildup. Three AD ratings had been sent to Jet Engine School on a returnable quota,* to deployment, but were not returned to the ship.

(3) Facilities, Equipat, and Material: It is noted that the RB l9RZ plugs are falling far short of the l80 hours specified by GEB 136, R,U.D.M,ts should be forthd;oming, Considerable time was spent by the division metalsmiths in fabricating a combination engine build up and installation stand for 534 engines which are used in conjunction with a universal tail jack. The 534 engine overhaul stands (R85WXT-243265-Sl) furnished by the section "Gft allowance are entirely unsuited fcr carrier maintenance.

The one hydraulic test stand provided for hydrolube by section Wtf allowance has proved inadequate, partly due to drop check requirements pram- ulgated by ComAlrPac dispatch 3020122 of April 19%. One test stand should be provided for each F9F squadron embarked, and one has been ordered "in excessft by this vessel, A jack shortage, likewise developed, due to frequent drop checks of F9F A/C . The section rrGIt allowance specifies six (6) 7.5 ton jacks but this vessel has pcured jacks in quantities and for reasons shown: Two (2) 12 ton for ADIS - 7.5 ton jacks too light fur carrier jack-. Four (4) 5 ton for F2H - 7.5 ton jacks too high. Four (4) 7.5 ton jacks for F4Uts and F9Fts. Two (2) more 7.5 $an jacks have been ordered to expedite jacking of F9Fts. A preservation machine is badly needed and, although a section ItGtt allowance item; this vessel has been unable to obtain one. DECLASSIFIED

9 The twelve (12) fifty (50) foot Jumper cords (28 volts) prodded by sects-in "GIt have proven inadequate in length and number, No ricks were nroVi4er! for their stowage, APUfs were used almost entirely for 28 vcit A/C pwar an hangar deck to the exclusion of the ship's installed system, until 100' cords and stowage racks were installed on or adjacent to each of the eight (8) deck edge %.volt Outlets cn the hangar deck,

One hundred (100) foot cards and stowage racks are now being installed adjacent to flight deck outlets in anticipation of cutting down on APUqMw snd usage on short lived, easily breakable APUfs.

Wide separation of 117 volt ship service receptacles precluded the use of this current in the UPM-8 for checking APX-~ at all aircraft locations on flight and hangar decks. This difficulty was overcome by rn0diP-g B cable assembly, furnished in accordance with C,A.P, S/L Ser. 70/1295, to take a single phase of the numerous I20 volts, 3 phase, 400 cycle aircraft electronics service power outlets, Suitable shop fzcilities are not currently provided on 27A conversions for aircraft engine work. Work benches and stowage cabinets for the material and equfpnent used in this work, especially engine build up, are currently being installed on the hangar deck aft of frame 196, H Ship dt. Will be submitted covering this installation,

Hangar deck stawage facilities are not provided for stowing APS-19 radomes and sonobuoy dispensers when removed due to use of aircraft for other .nissfons. An eight (8) radome rack has been installed on the after hangar deck for the radomes and torpedo dollys are preelwlt-ly used for .the dispmsers.

Propeller changes are now made anywhere on the hangar deck with the uae 7f a light block and tackle and a beam clamp obviating the need for a special 3pt beneath a chain hoist. If the aircraft is not centered under a overhead )earn two clamps and tackles may be used to give a varying suspension point.

3. Gunnery Department, a, During the period 18 July - 31 July seven destrcyers were refueled at sea. ?en (10) destroyers amalongside for highline transfers of personnel and freight. ?wee persons we= transferred by highline. b, During the period 1 - 31 August, this vessel replenished ammunition at sea e%gM (t?) times, receiving a total of lQ4L2tons at an average rate of 76.4 tons oer hour. The greatest tonnage received in one hour was 90 tans. Provisions kre replenished at sea three (3) times with this vessel receivhg a total of 242.5 tons at an average rate of 50.4 tons per hour and the fastest hmly rate being 69 tons. Thirty-nine destroyers came along side for highline transfers of personnel and freight, andtqf@v&&destroyers were refueled at sea.

10 DECLASSIFIED Raw 4. Supply Department a. Aviation Stores

(1) The ESSEX commenced this operating period with approximately 90% Of BuAer allowance Ust items on board. Those shortages which caused most trouble during the period were: (a) F9F-2 Nose Wheels (b) AD4 Propellers (c) AD-4 and F4U4-4 Tail Wheels (a) F9F-2 Nose Struts (e) Aircraft clocks ( f) F9F-2 Fuel Pumps (g) F4U-1, Fuel warning transfer switches, (h) Red and Green flight deck jerseys. (2) Supply sources utilized for aeronautical matedal were (1) MB, Fleet Activities, Yokosuka; (2) ksu, Naval Supply Depot, Grram; and (3) ASD, Naval Sup* Center, Oakland, Since departure of the USS JUPITEII, kVS-8, the Aviation Sup- Branch, Yokosuka, has taken over support of aircraft carrSers 3n the Japan-Korea area, ASB has been able to furnish approximately 655 of items requested; the re- mdnder were passed to BSA, Guam, or SD, Oakland, for action only if ordered on a Priority A or B basis, As ASB is not making any obligations, all ttNISftOF ltNCtl items not ordered on a Priority A or B basis have been cancelled. This has brought about a large number of Priority B requests in order to insure dellvery of high usage items prior to depletion of remaining stock on hand, (3) It has been dete-ed that the time required to receive material "on the beti in the following categories is as follows: (a) From ASB, Yokosuka via COD - approximately 4 or 5 days, (b) From ASB, Yokosuka via fleet freight - approximately 20 days. (c) Fmm Continental U.3, via government a;ir - approxbately 20 days. (d) From Continental U.S. via surface shipofnt - approximately 45 to 50 days.

(4) Squadrons being deployed to the forward area are advised to obtain a full allowance of sections IrBtl and ffUffmaterial prior to embarking on the parent carrier as subject items are exceedingly difficult to obtain in the forward area. (2) In several instances apty gas cylinders have been received in place of full ones, resulting in extra handling of bottles and a more Umited stock of desired gases on hand,

C. Comissary

(1) Receipt of provisions during replenishment on the line has been stepped up approximately 20 tons per hour by the additional use of the high line. 5, Administration a. Personnel Count: During the period of operation the average on-board count was as follows: Officer Enlisted. Total Ship's Company 126 1944 2070 Marine Detachment 2 60 62 Air Group 130 622 752 &z66ESEk EA Transfers: 3 7 9 11 10 1 Receipts: 5 3 1 5 26 46 Petty Officers: Pay Grade mowed On Board Percent E-7 74 76 102% E-6 171 72 57.8% E5 265 l3.8 55.5% E4 374 450 120515 There continues to be a shortage of petty officers in the following ratings: &My FC, MPI, BT, EM, ICY AO, M/AN, HAm, and YN, b, The delivery of mail during this period has been slightly below average in comparison to previous periods, This may have been caused by the nature of operations just prior to reporting to ComNavFe and the relatively short period in port,

C, This vessel requested special services hotel reservations for the period 6-3.4 September for 100 officers and 300 enlisted, The reservations assigned were 50 officers and 53 enlisted for special services hotels. Ninety percent of the reservations for enlisted covered only two day periods, including travel time. Ninety reservations were allawed at Camp Yokohama. The majority of these special ser9.ice resemtions were assigned pilots and aircrewnen, These will be auamented by three (3) day leave privileges. - 7. Opratlons Department.

a. Air Operations

(1) After more than a year, an automatic keyer for the low frequency homer has been placed in operation, fi MC ELROY HIOTO TUBE KEXER and a tape puller were located in Naval Reserve Stock and authority to draw this equipnent was granted by Buships. A continuous paper tape, coded with India Ink, is employed, giving identification every thirty seconds with a twenty second dash on each side. Connections are made directly to the transmitter at a remote telegraph station located in Air Operations. The Keyer has been highly satisfactory in operation and it is recommended that the equipat be furnished to all CVts until such time as specially designed equipent is available for this purpose.. Cteratisn 8ubmitbd,

(2) The controls for the YE, Racon ad Hamer are now installed 5x1 the Air Operations space, This makes a convenient working arrangement. (3) It is recommended that an AN/ARC-l radio be installed in Air Operations to replace one of the Remote Radio Statims. Commitments on the TDQ- RCK equip& prohibit guarding two other carriers l&/launch and a helicopter circuit. One AN/ARC-l and one TDQ-RCK would eliminate this difficulty,

(4) 1929 eortlea were fXow durfng the period totalling 4J.lO.6 hours, 34 sorties aborted,

(a) After much trial and error, the newly installed AIOA aero fUm dryers have been found to be efficient machines. It is important that only qualified personnel be allowed to operate themshowever, The machines must be observed constantly to assure that the film is properly centered and feeding freely, The operator must learn to tell by the curl of the film whether the film is coming through too brittle or too wet. Lack of vigilence on his part can ruin several feet of film host immediately.

(b) Only two mechanical difficulties have been experienced with the AIOA dryers. The solenoid cut-out switch for the film take-up spindle often fails to actuate properly. It wits found that this was due to damage sustained when the heavily weighted spool had dropped on the actuating lever. This weighted spool has been replaced with a lighter one, thus decreasing chances of damage to the cut-out solenoid, and also exerting less force on the film, allowing it to ride against the feed rollers inside the dryer and clear of the heat louvers.

13 MCLASSI FI ED (d) Spwe $8 &All a pmbb, Om dzyer is installed eamadd3Y WrLthh the main photo laboratmy. The other fa InaWlecl In the fiLn atomgo room directly across the passageway Pram the laboratory. The latter space is too small to allow proper operation.

C. Aerology,

(1) It was found by using the metalic screen reflector instead of the tin foil reflector for obtaining RAWINS that higher altitudes could be tracked and the target returns were larger.

(2) It is recommended that carriers havfng facsimile equipnent no longer I be required to transmit surface analyses to the OTC, When transmitting, the facsimile transmitter cuts out the ship communication equipat with heavg interference, Dispatching a verbal analysis is considered adequate, (3) haring the reporting period nine days of flight operations were cancelled due to bad weather,

d. Communications , (1) The ship began the period with a relatively new and untrained Corn- mication Section.

(a) Only two CM)!s had any previous experience in this type of work. Enlisted personnel were equally inexperienced. Only fifty percent of the allowance of rated men were on board, Close supervision and continued on-the-job training for the enlisted men and a nightly comunication class for officers has improved tNs situatfon somewhat, A continued rQorous tr&hg program should bring about desired results,

(2) During the time CTF 77 (ComCarDiv 3) was embarked the BOXER loaned the ESSEX three rated Radiomen and three rated Telemen to assist in the added workload, while the Flag was aboard traffic jumped from an average of three hundred dispatches per day to an average of nine hundred eighty-two per day. During the reporting period on the line the Codcation Section processed a total of 26,770 messages. (3) Keeping in operation the two CSP 2900's belonging to the ship and the one belonging to the Flag, proved a problem, CTF 77 requested and received anothez machine from the RFTO in Yokosuka. No qualified CRF personnel were available however. This situation will be improved when the minor CRF is set up and qualifie CRF personnel made available.

e, Photogra&ic Interpretation. (1) The major portion of the Photographic Interpretation durfng this period consisted of target searches with the flak studies of the rail routes being of next importance. The flak studies of the rail routes changed in format from the

U+ ITECLASSIFIED of the-photo interpreter, It saves-many man hours, but for uae in n-ak auppressior strikes the moaaic type is of much more value, It is recomenaed that a system be instituted whereby pexiodic photographic touraids are distributed by the photographic interpretation unit at Atsugi and implemented by current flak studies on the 1/50,000 charts by the carrier photo interpreters.

(2) All interpretation was accomplished from fully annotated some prints rather than from flash prints. This pPaved to be more efficient in the combined teamwork between the photographic labcratory, the photo interpreter and the photo detachment, Inasmuch as the interpreter and the photo pilots did not work in the same spaces, the use of annotated prints speeded the job of identifying the area photographed. By not printing I1flashf1prints the photo lab was able to deliver rolls of film somer to the photo pilots for annotation and allowed them to complete their wrk sooner.

(3) The interpretation unit operated under the slogan of I1a picture for every pilotf1on allstrikes, The attack pilots had individual annotated photos of each target while the flak suppression pilots also had individual photos to pinpoint eaeh gun position. Prior to each strike the latest photography waa interpreted for all possible flak positions which were duly noted on the individual photos and on the larger briefing mosaics,

(4) The K-25 damags assessment camera was soon shelved upon the de- velopnent of an excellent F-56 camera installation for the AD aircraft. The larger plate size and longer focal length pruved to be a great improvement over the K-25, Further details are being submitted in enclosure (1). (5$ The photo interpretation unit of the ESSFX consists of one Lieutenant, graduate of the Photographic Interpretation Center, and three enlisted assistants, graduates of the Barbers Pnbt and Almeda PI schonlSE This number is considered ideal, and it is considered important that at least one of the assistants be either an experienced assistant or a first or second class petty officer, (6) The photo interpretation unit operated in the flag intelligence space at such times when ComCarDiv THIiEE was not embarked on the ESSEX, So long as the flag intelligence space is available the interpretation working conditions are considered excellent. when the ship's PI is relegated to Print Shop #2, the Ozalia rocrn, the working space is considered inadequate and the filing space negli- ble. In either working space the problem of filing the 9'' x K-l8 and K-38 photography is still unsolved, As the cruise progresses and the Banshees fly more coverage, this problem will become increasingly complicated, Added experience should bring about a solution to this problem. f. Air Intelligence (1) Material, Maps and Charts

(a)Cance*&effcrt was made to obtain all the necessary intelligence materials and supplies prier to deployment. It is estimated that about fifty thousand (50,oOO) maps, of various scaleq, ndth a total weight of approldmately two and one-quarter tons, were brought aboard during this period, - A discussion of the services obtained fran various fir Navigation officer I8 being subdtted by separate correspondence as being of possible assistance for future deployments ,

(b) The use of 1:50,000 Male maps has increased to a marked degree 1 over the first Korean tour, and it is felt that this is due largely to the type of operations now in progress where the fhes attack widely separated areas and diversified targets, whereas previously emphasis was placed on the rail and bridge interdiction program. Unfamiliarity of sme of the pilots with the area ma also account for the unusual rate of consumption of 1:5O,OOO scale map, De- tailed aomments on the attrition rate of these maps WlU. be submitted in sub- BeqyMt action reports.

During the first tour on the line of the second ESSEX Korean cruise the CIC operated with a total complement of 50 enlisted men and 9 officers. Under the circumstances It is consMered that the personnel were adequate to handle the assigned tasks. However, the pinch was felt during the time that ComCarDiv THREE was aboard. It is considered that a minimum of 56 to 60 enlisted men be assigned to CIC (with staff embarked) to properly handle all aspects of CIC work, Due to the fact that there were 15 stations to be manned each watch the men were divided into three duty sections. The officers stood watches as follows; Five (5) were on the regular CIC watch schedule and three (3) were assigned 3 duties as Air Controllers both strike and CAP, Five (5) of the total a$&% (8) officera mentioned above have had 22 months aboard and it is anticipated that they will all receive orders to other duty within a one or two rronthsperiods. If possible it would be better if fewer Qfficers (especially experienced) were rotated in so short a time. Replacements for these five (5) oificers have just cone aboard.

Indoctrination in ATP-1 proceeded smonthly. Lectures were scheduled for all officers in the Operations Dspartment, any others who wished to were WelcDme to attend. Each chapter was assigned to one of the officers in CIC who was responsible for the presentation thereof. These lectures were also attended by the OODfs who were asked to make constructive suggestions and infonn all attendants how some particuler point effected this ship when operating with !IT-77. Each lecture was given twice daily $0 all who needed to could con- veniently attended.

It is recommended that tilt. 3Cofficers of the various ships in the Task Force be called together at Lhc ccnvznience of the staff to standardized details of CIC operations of a routine il:kirSa

PAIR, D. SrnP 6

16 CINCPACFLT (2) Advance CINCPACF'LT EVALUATION GEEDUP WAVFE (1) Advance COMNAVF% EVALUATION GEDUP COMSEVEN'IHFLT (1) Advance CTF-77 (1) Advance ComCarDiv 1 ComCarMv 3 ComCarDlv 5 COMAIRPAC (10) COMSEKVPAC COMFAIRALAMEDA COMFAIRJUAN NAVAL WAR COLLEGE USS BOXER (CV21) USS EON HOMME RICHJUID (CV31) USS VALIEY FORGE (CV45) USS HIILLIPINE SEA (CV47) USS PRINCETON (CV37) USS ORISKAMY (CV34) USS KEARSARGE (CV33) CVG2 CVG-5 CVG-7 CVG9 WG-11 CVG-15 CVG-19 CVGlOl CVG102 # mG-2 (5) *. f f 'i \.I .r .a .I .I ' #*, .- USS ESSEX (WAS) c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California CVh9/&6-13 Ser 0175 1November 1952

OOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVAW. PECUSStFtED AFTER 12 YWS From t Cnmman!ttng Officer M3D OlR 5200.10 To: Chief of Naval Operations Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVZNTY S3VEN (2) Commander SEVXlWH Fleet (3) Commander Naval. Forces, Far East (4) Commander in Cnief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Qeport 'foT the period 4 September to 1November 1352 Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 34.80,4

Encl: (1) Air Task Group Two uctinn lieport for pericid 5 September to 1 November 1952 I, In accordance with reference (a), the kction keport for the period 5 September to 1November 1952 is hereby submitted.

X CONPOSITION OF OhN FOBCES i-ND NISSU

B.. During the period 5 September to 1 November, U.S.S. ESSEX (CVA&) was a unit of Task Force 77 at various times composed of the following units: U.S.S. 'SSEX (CVAg) U.S.S. 6oH HOMNE MfiikxD (CVUl), ComCarDiv ONE, PAM H, E. REGAN, USN, embarked, U.S.S. PImaToN (CvS7), U.S.S. KE;ihst~cGE (CVk33), ComCarDiv FIVE, RADM R. F. HICKEY, USN, embarked, U.S.S. IOWA (BB61), and U.S.S. MISSOUiiI (BE@& ComSE'lQU'HFlt, VQM J. J. CLa, US, embarked, and varinus other heavy - support and screening ships, b, During the subject period, U.S.S. ESSEX (CVA9) operated off the Ehst Coast of Korea in accordance with 2°F 77 Operations Order 22-51 (2nd revision), plus supplemental plans and orders issued during the period,

C- The missicn of TF '7'7 was primarily to support United Nations ground forces in Korea, The support missions included close and deep support, armed and photographic reconnaissance, interdiction of enemy supply lines and strikes against enemy installations. d, The ESSSX Air Group on three occasions joined with the Air Forces in coordhated strikes against K-rean targets; the first of these on 5 October was against vehicle, supply and personnel shelters in the vicinity of HOEYhNG; the second on 7 October against supply and storage areas at YONGPYONWI and the third on 8 October against the railway znd highway bridges at KOWON. From 12 October through 16 October the ESSEX dr Group joined With those of the carriers PZNC3TQN, BON HOMME RTCMRD, and KEHiisD in support of forces under Ccmander ,

c .' *I

--rP.Y~.ious Group TI-iFi.523 in training manuevers in the vicinity of KOJO in accordance with CTF 77 Operations Order 2542.

e. On 24 October the ESSEX and BON HOMME RICH;rRD joined in strikes on mining, railroad and other facilities at I.IYESI~~~.,a stone? s throw fran Manchuria. Thrmghout the pwiod strikes were made against personnel, vehicle and supply areas at the bombline. Assessment of damage can be evaluated only against the ability of the enemy to mount Tuture offensives.

1, Expenditure of Air Ordnmce. a. See enclosure (I.)

2. Expenditure of Ship's Ordnance for Training.

5"/38 ;wc 192 191 5If/38 (VT) Non-f rag 0 85 51t/38 BL & T 0 83 3"/50 FCL (VT) 98 45 3"/50 FCL (VT.) Nan-frag . 477 597 311 150 BL & T u 0 3. The performance of ship's ordnance cquipnent was satisfactory.

I. The ship received no battle damage. Enclosure (1) contains damage to A%-2 aircraft and damsge inflicted on the enemy.

1. The performance of all personnel has been excellent. There were no casualties to personnel of ship's company. Personnel casualties sustained by liZ'G-2 are listed in enclosure (1).

1. Air Department. a. Catapult (1) On 16 September 1952, while firing test no load shots, the port catapult failed to retract. Subsequent investigation revealed the cause to be an expansion of the braking cylinder which prevented the passage of the crosshe& over that area. (2) On 18 September following the ordering of a new cylinder, the ESSEX sailed to rejoin Task Force 77, operating with the starboard catapult alone, After three (3) days of successful operations, on 21 September, CTF' 77 ordered the ESSEX to proceed to Sasebo, Japan, arriving there 24 September. The new braking cylinder awaited the ship's arrival and necessary material and personnel. were made ava.i',c?de there.

(3) By ths mon-,t,i;ig of 26 September, installations and necessary parts had been restored to cpe-Zzional condition and test np load &lots were conducted throughout the aftercoon, A runway shot resulting from a parted towing bridle prevented completion of the tests until the morning of the 27th after which the ESSEX got underway to rejoin Task Force 77 again. Following these repairs, boy? catapults were in operstitnal condition throughout the remainder of the cruise, except for short periods when minor repzirs were necessary.

Arresting Gear operations have been routine With the exception+ of the re-reeving jcb that was required ~n the number one (1) arresting engine, following the discovery of breaks on the purchase cable on 30 September, On 8 October, the 50,oOO th arrest-d landing aboard the ESSEli was made by LT. Robert BEA3GNER, in his w)-4N Night Fighter.

(2) Barricade and Davis 3arrier Rerigging: The ESSEX left CONUS on 16 June 1952 for the Far East. Since that date there have been appxsirncztely seven barrier engagements by jet type craft. kfter each of the first three engagements it took in excess of ten minutes to set a ready deck. It became apparent that this was unacceptable because of critical fuel supply of the F9F. MI intensive program of drills was initiated utilizing all arresting gear ad flight deck personnel. Drills f are held just prior to returning to the operating area and at two week inte vals during an extended operating period, The result of this program was a .$ reduction of 50% in rerigging time over previous times. The tine required to Ic set a ready deck after each of the last three engagements have been six, fid and seven minutes respect5vely. Kfter eaoh of these engagements the barricade was rerigged in five minutes or less. It is felt that the m aximum acceptable time for rerigging the barricade and berriers shculd not be over six minutes after a nmnzl engagement. (3) Value of Bmicade:

Since the barricade has been installed there has been one barricade engagement during which the Davis Barriers were not engaged, The barricade had a runout nf apprw5mately 65-70 feet. If the barricade had not been installed, there would have been a flight deck crash similar to the one that took place in September 1951when an F2H jumped Over the Davis Barriers and crashed into the planes parked forward on the flight deck.

3 3

A &LASS I FIED

cw lilRcrn0rnNrncE

(1) The Air Depertment Ordnance Division shortage of personnel continues to be a problem in that personnel have been transferred without rep: lacements, 'This situation will beacme more serious as the operating schedule becomes more difficult to meet due to cold weather conditions.

(2) Difficulty has been experienced in procuring 2Omm aircraft cannon driving springs, %-.s item was ordered in quantities to replenish the ships allowawe, but inste*.i: of receiving the items requested, aircraft gun charger inner and outer Errings were issued as substitutes for driving spr bgs. These sp;.ings cmlcl ncrt be utilized an3 are now in excess. To alleviate a critical sit-datim of hc,;xng aircraft guns out of commission, fifty (50) driving springs were procdr.ed fran the U.S.S. PRINCETON prior to her departure frqm the operating a;-<,a,

d, M"ENANCE.-. (I) Equipnent :

k new type of e1?@-".2 bttld up stand. fcr reciprocating engines has been dzveloped and is iri c.w_ pd.tting clfS hading of the conventional allowance type a Brief;jr GCS :r.y.'ml; the stad consists of three vertical legs, - one under each side of thc e:igits mount End one under the propeller shaft.

On canpletion of the hild up; the eaghe is stored vertically on the same stand,

Hangar deck spme fcr z. additional ercraft has been gained and three tons of tapsiGc we5 &TI; s5k tracted,

Preper marking of flight clothing can now be performed with a newly obtained gold print machine, a popdar additbn to the Ship'6 eqdFagb.

Difficulties in moving owgen trailers to filling locations among closely peed aircraft hare been alleviated by installing 50' filler hoses, fabricated from 30GO P,S.I, hydraulic hose.

Contrary to the reports of other carriers, the oxygen trailers have been used during twq Korean tours and have proven satisfactory,

4 -. , f

11 1, MCLASSI FI ED

A simple effective tester for the bntteries of CRC-7, VHF, search and re8cue transceiver, carried in parcrafts has been fabricated dn board. Both tbe and llBrt sides may be checked under load with one instrument and one aUg qC The much needed, long awaited preservation machine finally arrived and is considered an excellent piece of equipnent, (2) Material:

The 180 hour RB 19R-2 spark plugs are only averzging 69 hours. Cause of the difficulty has not been determined,

542 engines are being received minus the TJC's and high pressure pumps. This situation is not critical as long as the Supply Officer ean furnish the llmissingll quantity above the normal usage,

Spare F&J Kings are still being received withotit FW Change No, 432 hcnrpwated, Because it is impractical for carrier9 to make this change, the Wing must be off-loaded. (3) Personnel:

The psrsnmel situstion has been satisfactory, h training program, underway since deployment, recently paid off with fifteen (15) men' , out of sixty four assijped, being advanced in rate on 16 October. + 2, Supply Department.

a. Aviation Stores

(1) Installed cargo nets in the overhead of aviation engine store- ~nnmC49-A fnr the storage of damaged aircraft surfaces, thereby reducing additional dmage and providing additional deck storage space. b, General Stores,

(1) Replenishment while in port from the USS POLLUX (wKS-4) and the USS CASTOR (AKS-1) was ccnsidered highly satisfactory, about 85% of items requested being supplied.

(2) The most critical itans in the area are: lumber metal (bar and plate) standard forms bottled gases (3) Electronics spare parts have been supplied in an excellent manner - 90% of requests have bem filled.

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(4) Ordance and BuShips spare parts are in short supply, resulting in high priority requisitions fqr stateside supply action. 3 Administratim

a. Personnel Count

During the period of operation the average On-bOLrd count was as follow:

Officer Enlisted Total 7 Ship's Company 127 2054 2181 Marhe Det&hmcnt 2 62 64 Air Group 130 624 754 Ed E-6 EA EA Ed EA Transfers : 57525 7 0 0 Receipts : 0 3 2 61 22 1

Pay Grade Allowed On-Board Per Cent Petty Officers: E-7 74 73 $9 E-6 171 .72 43 EL-5 265 132 30 E-4 374 k83 129 Three officers and nineken (19) enlisted men are on emergency leave;

The on-board ccunt is considered adequate for the ?nission assigned and type nf operations conducted, There continues to be a shortage of petty officers in the fobowing ratings: QM, FC, NM, BT, EN, IC, AO, and YN. b. Morale

Despite m extended tour of operutions cin-thft-line, the morale of personnel continued to be high. During the latter part of the period there were indications of fatigue of pilots, loading and fUght deck crews and watch-standers, The delivery of mail during this period was below average in comparison to previeus perbds. This was due tn an extension of the operating period. HS a result, this vessel received no mail at the last three consecutive repleni&ments.

4. Operations Department a. Air Operations No comment

b. Aerolo~y

(1) Weather in the Korean Operating area was norm&.

(2) One md me half days of flight operatims were cancelled due to weather, This was caused by active cold frets passing through the arear

. .- .I . 1L

(3) One replenishment day was cancelled due to heavy weather when a deep low pressure area developed in the Sea of Japan, c. Communication

(1) Since the first-period traffic has continued to increase, putting an added load on the alreedy overburdened circuits. hring the secnnd perio4 the ship handled a total of 28,858 dispatches,an average of &Ll per day, Of this number I394 were originated by the ship and 2546 were addressed to the ship. The rest were relays, transmitted and received, over the circuits guarded for CTF 77, George FOX ad NDT FOX messages.

(2) During the second peric>d the rigid training program has been continued. Close supemisifin, on the job training and classroom instruction for the enlisted men arid an afternoon conrmunications Chs$ fW Officers has improved the communication section considerably, (3) The slowing down of the NFN FOX tn approximately 22 WFM no longer necessitates placing the best available operators on this circuit. This indicates that complete reception of first transmissions, although slower, is far better than requesting the already overburdened transmft&hg station tn repeat messages gr sections qf messages missed.

During the period of ?,Ma report GIG operzted with an average of 53 men and 10 officers. This complement is considered to be adequate. Three significant programs were undertaken during this period as follow (1) O.O.D. Training Syllabus,

An 0,O.D. training syllabus for d1 line officers on board who deslred to quuas 0.O.D. underway, with particular emphasis on the qualifying of CIC officers,,was established. Lectures were given by the Na-ator, the Engineering Officer, and other department heads at specified times. ALL CIC officers were required to attend these lectures. To date two (2) CIC 0fffGeZ-a have qualified and another will be qualified in the near future. All O.O.D$; and J.O,O.Ds were required tn stand observation watches in CIC tn better familiarhe themselves with the functions of CIC, Gunnery Liairm, and Air Operations. This program prcved very effective in a better co-operation and understanding between cqmkt and the bridge,

(2) CTF 77 Air Control Train- and Qaalification Pmgram. CTF 77 has recently commenced a program for the training and qudLifying of officem from destroyers as '*Air Controllers, Daytt, by having these officers report to TF' 77 carriera on TAD orders fcr training. This is considered to be an excellent program however, it should be realized that the training and

7 "' J? .

qualifsing of an officer who has never been to CIC School, Air Cuntroller School or has never been in control of an aircraot before is a long pmces8. Concentrating on these trainees in order to get them back to their ship is a serious hindrance to the training of the officers permanently attached to the carrier#. Proficiency fif the carrier personnel must be kept up, CIC qualified one (1) offiaer and two (2) more were far enough along so that mother three days of air contrnl work would have qualified them also, On the recommendatinns of VC-U, the trainees are also given a short rJ3urse in ASP Air Contml work. The pilots 9f VC-U. felt the ASP Controllers of the + Icl destroyers were not using pmper techniques addid not know the capabilities of the planes or the eqdpnent Snstzlled. The instructims given to trainee8 thus far has already improved ASP Hir Control. (3) AEW/MW/Asw/CIC Trabing Program On 26 Octpber 1952 CIC and VC-11 Unit ITEM established a c-perative training pmgram. The object r\f the pmgram was:

(8) To acquaint certain CIC personnel with (1) the capabilities and limitations nf the AD&.W, the HN/APS-~O)A, and other airborne equfpnent used for AEM and ILSW: (2) Techniques .If airbnrne eir eontrol; and (3) the problem of the airborne controller and technicians.

(b) To acquaint VOll Arbome c:mtrfillcrs, technicians, and pilots with CIC, its problem, technkpa, and the cepabillties and Wtatims of its equipent. It is intended that the above objectives be carried nut by a oeriear nf nEw/hsw training flights, CIC instructims watches, and lecturee, The pmpwed pmgram met with a great deal of enthusiasm. A t0P~3.3. of 24 persons (including twn (2) officers, twenty (20) rated men, and - twc (2) non-rated men) volunteEed to participate. Moat .of these people have put in a good number of hcurs as shipboard HSP Controller wing both the Po presentatim and regular shipboard radars, In the four (4) operating days during which this pregram has been in effect twelve (12) people participated in &T/d training flights totdine 25.4 hours. The schedule for these flights were arranged nn a nnn-interference basis with VC-11 Unit ITEM. dso, during this period thirteen (13) VC-U personnel were scheduled for a total of 96 hours of hstruction watch in CIC, Both the instruction watches and the trainhg flights have proven tq be very effective. Personnel who have participated have learned much which will benefit them in performance of their normal duties. Ehthusiastic respmse to the training program and a new interest in &W and airborne &W has been demonstrated by CIC personnel in persondl interviews. It is felt that this program will be of immeasurable benefit to the men and units involved,

e. Photographic Intsrperetatinn

photogra&ic Snterpretation during this period continued to be primarily target search and damage assessment, The "tnuraid" of a rail route is practically a thing of the pst. Flnk s+,ud%e~cc-n+,im4 ta be n hd. -3s'- . 8 most often centralized to a specific target area rather than a general mute as had .been the pra.*:tice in the past. Flak studies point up the need for greater empfA,ssison flak interpretation. Photo interpreters do not agree among themselves in the interprekion of various types of gun positions. The FJ& need for a SppoSiUm on the subject of flak in the Korean theatre is indiCa$ed. Towards the latter portion of this operating period the hours of daylight and, tnus the hours for acceptable phohography diminished. SeveraJ. schedulings of late aftec-loon or early wrning f!.ights in mountainous areas produced motographic results difficult if not impossible to interpret. ~3.1 such missions should be scheduled closer to midday *en the sun is near its zenith.

An attempt was made to coordinate photograMic interpretation with ECM rep0rts.h the search for enemy radar; however, no positive results were obtained. An expansion of this wrk during the next operating period is anticipated,

The F-56 20” camera capsule was continued in use on the AD aircraft in place of the K-25 for strike photography, Continued excellent results were obtained.

The interest of the air Group pilots in wotogra#y and photographic interpretation was aroused by a demonstration of stereoscopy involving the various types of targets peculiar to Korea. For the first time many pilots were able to see some of the camouflaged supply areas they had been attacking nearly in the blind. This aroused interest led to a steady stream of jet recco leaders peA.using photographs of a soheduled mission so they might be betfer prepared fnr lucrative targets along the route. The phntographic pilots many times returned from an incomplete mlssfon with a sense 3f frustration because their time had run out. Time , has proved to be a much mwe critical item on Motogramic missions than h either aircraft endurance or film capacity, This is particularly true in the case of targets at a considerable distance in from the coast.

f. Air IntelliEence (1) Comments on Services of Air Navigation Offices (a) Air Mavigation Office, San Diego The conperation of the COWURPAC Intelligence Officer and the Air Navigation Officer was outstanding in all respects. After consulting the Air Navigation Officer all maps and charts remaining from the first Korean tour. were off lcaded, After the necessary inventory was taken by the Air Navigation Office, approximately half the maps had to be destroyed due to @bsoleecence, The ohip was then pwdcbd with a ww aL1nwmce of maps and charts . .- amnD 9 .

On one occasion, maps kere requested from the Air Navigatim Office in the morning and the charts were loaded aboard ship that same afternoon. This particular order was placed on a Saturday morning, and yet the Air Navigation Office needed only five hours to deliver some 15,OOO maps aboard neatly boxed and indexed, Their services could not h&ve been more outstanding.

(b) Air Navigation Office, NUS Barbers' Point The Air Vavlgation Office at Bsrbers' Point was requested to supply certain items in which the ship was deficient, Subzequen"vy, the ship was notified that sll tho L'ierns had been delivered, However it was learned after the ship had gotten mmderway for F!ESPfiC that soma of the items were not aboard, This oversight was undoubtedly inadvertent, but nevertheless the ship relied upon the inventory sheats received fram th~kiir Kavigation Office until the material itself could be unpacked and inventoried. Hence the shortages were not disclosed until after the ship had departed Pearl Harbor, and then it was to? late to notify either Bzrbersl Point or forward a speedletter request-ing delivery of the missing items in Japan, Except for this incident, the cooperation and services of the Air Navigation Office at Barbers' Point was satisfactory.

Although most of tht. intelligence material required was aboard prior tovarrival in Japan, members of COMFwIMAP staff rendered the ship invduable service. The major deficiencies concerned various types of survival gear and AMS L-751 series 1: 50,OOO scale maps. The urgently needed survival gear was requested both by dispatch and by a speedletter delivered by the first aircraft flown intc Atsugi on 26 July, The ship arrived in Yokosuka on a Saturday afternom and the survival gear was delivered on board Sunday afternom. A scant thirty six hours elapsed between the receipt of the request by COMFUIRJAP and tle delivery of the items to the ship, Such prompt action is no small tribute tc, the coordination and efficiency of the Air Navigation Officer and the CCMFAIPJAPIntelligence, Material, and Supply Offictrs, Their efforts were mmewhat hindered by the fact that the items were obtained Over a weekend pericd, and where certain items cquld not be readily obtained, acceptable substitutes were provided, The timely delivery of the survivalmzterial alleviated a critical shortage and provided an immeasurable bo-st to the mcrabof the pilots in general. Prmpt actgon by COMFAIRJAP in the matter is deeply appreciated.

(2) The high consumption of 1: 50,000 scale maps in the Navy area of responsibility has canthued throughout the second period on the line. The estimated attrition rate has been about twelve percent, but the prhqdiff- iculty has been caused by the fact that any sector c\f the Navy area mw be selected for cmcentrsted strikes.

Hence, the supply of maps available on any particular area is soon exhausted, and on ..one occasinn depleted stocks were partislly replaced by maps m 10 received from another carrier which had just returned

B, i3, C. MVETT

copy to:.. CNO (2) Advance CINCPACFLT (2) Advmcc; CINCPACE’LT EVi 3JJk7 ‘I: OF GF? JF COMNlirn (1) Ackxlsa ? comm-n EVALUATTON cmv 1 KWSEVEVTHFLT (1) Af37~m~,a CTF-77 (1) Advance ComCarXv 1 COmC~~JiV3 ComCarDiv 5 COMAEPAC ( 10) COYSERVP&C COMFkIWllL~Dk

~ - COMFAIRJAPAN NwVW, ’kYr& C05LEGE USS IXXXER (CVA.21) USS BON HOW FJCFLBD (CV~311 US’ VALIEY FORGE (CVk45) uss HIILLIPIhI SEA (CVii47) 1JSS FRIh’CETON (CVS3’7) TJSS OFUSKMY (CVc~34) 1JSS KEABSARGE (CVfi33) CVG2 CVG-s CVG7 CVG9 CITE11 CVGl5 CVG-19 CVG-101 CVG102 hTG-2 (5)

A c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California cv~9/u16-13 Ser :. 203

Frm: Cornanding Officer To: Chief of Naval Operatims Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEXEN DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INIzR\M& (2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet DECCU\SSIFIED ARER 12 YEARS (3) Cnmader Naval Forces, Far East DOD DIR 5200.10 (4) Commander in Chief, U.5. Pacific Fleet Subjt Action Report for the period 1November through 24 November 1952 Ref: (a) OWAV IXYlTWC'KON 34.80.4 Encl: (1) Air Task Group TWO Action Report, 1November to 24 November 1952, 1. In accordance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period 1-24 Ynvember 1952 is hereby submitted.

a, During the period 1-24 November 1952, USS ESSU (CVA-9) was a unit of Task Force SEXENTY SEVEN which at various time included the following additional units: USS BON HOMME KKCHdfD (CVii-31), ComCarDiv ONE, HUDM, W, D. qJO€WSON, USM, embarked; USS KEARSARGE :(CV&33), CcmCarDiv' Fp, Mh.d. F. HICKEY, USN, embarked; USS MtSSOUfiI (ss-63), Cor;l$EVENTFIFlt, VUJ. J. CL.Ai-4 I USN, embarked; USS ORISKANY (CVA-34), and other support and screening ships.

b. During this period ESSEX operated off the East Coast of Korea- in accordance with CTF 77 Operations Order 2-52 plus aupplemental plans and orders issued during this period,

c, The mission of this force was as seti forth in CTF TI Operations Order 2-52 PART I1 CHRONOILIGICAL OFDER OF EVENTS

ESSEX departed the operating area for Yokosuka, Japan on 1November, arriving 3 November. The ship remained in Yokosuka until13 November for upkeep, rest and recreation, rejoining TF 77 and commencing operations on 16 November. The morning of 17 November ESSEX aircraft joined with those of OiUSKANY in a coordinated attack on Chongjin while KEARSkKCEE aircraft were striking Kilchu. In the afternoon, KEjBSARGE and OEISKANY aircfaft attacked Chongjin while ESm alanes concentrated on supplies and warehouses at Kyongsong, On 18 November the planes from ESSM and KEARSARGE joined in a raid on the border city of Hoeryong, causing heavy damage to bridge, rail and billeting facilities. Through- Qut the remainder of the period ESSEX Weswere executing heavy attacks on enem fmntlhe facilities and other supply and troop areas. On 20 November, the port catapult suffered a major casualtr while launching an F2H-2P. On 24 November, ESSEX left the force to return to Yukosuka for repairs to %his catapult. .-

PkRT TI1 ORDBJilNCE 1, Shipts Ordnance Expenditwee for training wa$ as follows: 74 rounds 5"/38 AAC 1 round V/38 (VT) none frag

10 rounds 311/50 FCL (VT) Service 317 rounds 3"/50 FCL (VT) non frag 2, Air Ordnance. (See enclosure (1)) PART IV BATTLE D&LGX Rattle damage sustained by ESSEX aircraft and damage inflicted on the enemy are listed in enclosure (1). The ship sustained no battle damage, PAHT V PERSOIWEX F'E;ifzOWd'XE AKD CiIsUALTI3S The performance of all personnel has been excellent and morale has been a factor requiring nc special attention, ..ctim casualties Were three pilots of fir Task Group TKO; details are included in enclosure (1). There was me psychiatric disorder: PATAEX30N, Cecile Lay, RD3, 231 88 58, USN was admitted tn the sick list from CIC at 2200, 23 November 1952 with Schizod phrenic Reaction. PART VI SPECIAL COWENTS 1, Opratims Department.

a. Intelligence, C0YCkr'U)IV FIVE; has originated a method of distributing flak data which appears tn be the best system used so far in the Korean b!W. Flak is plotted nn l:25O,OOO maps, duplicates of which are run off on OzaUd foil transparencies, and distributed tc the carriers in the force. This works in vary well With the ESSEX flak system where all flak is plotted by shiprs UOfs on transportable maps which are then used by the squadron XOts for their briefings. The 1:250,000 Ozalid foil transparencies are issued appmximately every two weeks and are taped over a 1:250,000 map, which is used in briefing all reconnaissance flights. Strikes are briefed from 1:50,000 maps, the data for which is taken primarily from the index of flak issued by CTF 77 staff simultaneously with the transparencies. "qaps are corrected daily fmm the data published in the TF Plan. The omblem of delection of the flak positions has been partdally solved by is- &g lists of positions to be removed both in the Daily 4.r Plan and in the Bi-weekly Flak Summaries.

2 *

The plotting of machine gun postions ha.s proven useless. The guns are to easily moved, too hard to spot exactly eit,her by PI or pilot repdrts, ad too numerous to keep plotted. b, Photographic Interpretat$nonDamc=ge assesment assignments in the front line area brought out the continued necessity for pre-strike photography. Small targets such as artillery positions iind personnel bunkers are very difficult tn detect after having been bombed end require previous photography for accurate comparison. Continued distributirrn of photography between Car- riers is considered imperative fnr accurate and complete photographic interpretation, Cornparisim of photos is necessary f,r bcth damge assessment peed* ures and routine surveillance.

2. iiir Department

a. Catapult. On 20 November 1952, while firing a FW-2P from the port catapult, maohinery failure resulted in the planets loss of the towing bridle, The resultant runway shot caused major damzge to the sheaves and cable system of the engine. The plme was unable to stop before reaching the end of the flight deck and crzshed into the water. The pilet WLS rescued. The reason for failure ?,as not yet been ascertained; however, ncm-functioning the runaway shot preventer is ettributed to a broken CRP switch. The ship maintained scheduled operations thmugh 23 November with the sterboard catapult, b, liSrcraft Ordnance Handling Eauipent, till lTd5 2,090 lb bomb skids are in p""r condition. Eight (8) of these skids have been on order for apprcximately ninety (90) days and tr, date only one (1) has been received. Due to the critical need fqr these skids for operations, the ship's force is attempting to manufacture parts for repairs. 3 iiir Task G~up!WO. (See enclosure (1))

B. B. C. LoVfiTT copy to: '=NO (2) d*'d vmce CDJCPLICF'LT (2) Advance *7TNCFd-CFLTFXzLUaTIOhT GROUP COY"NIVFE f 1) tLdvance COVN iAVFEEV;;LUt.TION GROUP CCMSEVEMTHFLT (1) Advance CTF-77 (1) Advance ComCarDiv 1 CmCarDiv 3

CnMSERVF'i C CWFAIGU2%Ds colJ!FhIRJA'2.m

3 USS BOXER (CVA-2i) USS BON HOm IUCHARD (CVA-31) uss VALTXY FORGE (CVfi-45) USS BILLIPINE SEA (CVA-47) US3 F'RINCETON (CVA-37) USS ORTSKANY (CVA-34) uss lcEuRSKilcEE (cvu-33) me2 CVG-5 CVG7 CVG-9 CVGll CVG-15 CVG19 CVGlOl CVG102 hTG-1 lm-2 (5)

t Ser 052

JAN23 19%

OOWMGRAMb AT 9 YEA?? Coxnanding Officer INTERVkHk From: %€CLASSIFIED ARER 12 YURS To: Chief of Naval Operationo NDAMR52WdI Via: (1) Conrmander Task Forse SWTP SEWN (2) Comander SEVENTH Fleet (3) Comander Naval Forces, Far East (4) Commander in Chief, U,S, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for tke period 25 November 1952 through 13 January 1953 Ref: (a) GPNitV INSTWCTIOR 3480,4

Encl: (1) Air Task Group TW lictian Report, 25 November 1952 through 13 Jan- uary 1753 1. In accordance with reference (a), the itctjon Report for the period 25 November 1952 through 13 January l'j53 is hereby submitted.

a, During the period 25 November 1952 through 13 January 1953, USS ESSEX (CVii-9) was a wit of Task Force. SEVENTY SEVflh' which at various times included the following additional units: USS BON HOW3 RICKd (CVl=-31), ComCarDiv O,XE, RADY W. D. JOHKSON, USE, embarked; USS KEARS~G~(CVd-33), ComCarDiv FIVE, ll,L2r R,, F. HXCEqX, UYJ, eplf.,s@wd,;: USS VIILZEY F38GE (CVa-45), ComCarDiv THm, 11 JXvI A. SOUCEX, USN, embarked; USS OiZISKMY (CVA-34); USS HISSOUIiI (BB-63), CwSEVEKTHFlt, VADM J. J.' CM, USN, embarked, and other support and screen- l;rg ships.

b. During this priod ESSEX operated off the East Coast of Korea in accordance with CTF 77 Operations Older 2-52 plus supplemental plans and schedules issued during this period,

C, The mission of this force was as set forth in CTF 77 Operations Order 2-52. PART If CHFOWOLOGIC& Oi3DYi OF EVEVTS ESSEX c?eparted the operating area for Yokosuka, Japan on 25 November, arriving 26 November, The SSFremained in Yokosuka until 6 December for emergency reDairs to port catapult, rejoining W-77 and commencing operations on 8 December. On the morning of 9 December ESSEX aircraft raided railroad facilities at P*myu~. This was the nori.hern-n;ost raid of the Korean War. Si- cniltanwbsly BON HOWF RICI-!;ltJ: aircraft were raiding the Musan iron work8 add

k -- I OilISKANY aircraft\the rail facilities at Iiy;esanjin. On that ssme affm?Iq ESSEY aircraft raided iishltn rail facilities, Qn 22 December ESSEX aircraft -I joined with those of %he KE&,5B;iE and ORISKJJY to destroy billeting, vehicle shelters and construction- facilities at the Kwangsuwon d/F. On 27 December ESSEX and K;EAIIS.~&E aircraft’briefly revived the all-out main supply route interdiction program smashing strategic rail and highway bridges and other fecilities. On 30 December dashin rail fsciUties again felt the blows of RSSEX and KF,;iHSdiGE aircraft, Throughout the remainder of the priod %SEX aircraft were employed in close air support ad heavy attacks on enemy front- Line Fositioris, troop and supply areas, OA .10 January ESSEX departed TF-77 to rettlrri to Yokosuka for further muting to CONUS, arriving in Yokosuka 13 ,Tanuarg,

1. Shipts ordnance expenditures for training were as follows: 104 rounds fill38 1 round 311/50 FCL (VT) Service 390 rounds 311/50 FCL (VT) Non-frag 2, Air Ordnance, (See ~nclosure (1))

Battle damage sustained by ESSEX aircraft and damage inflicted on the eneq are listed in enclosure (1). The ship sustained no battle damage. PATZT V FEHSONV3L F%RFDiX~CXAiD Cr.SU&TIES The performance of all prsonnel has been excellent and morale has been a fac- -Lor requiring no special attentior,. There were no action casualties sustained 1,)- shipis company personnel. T1iex.e was a minor epic‘.smic of common colds and u;?per respiratory infections duri-.g the first two weeks of this period. There were no psychiatric disorders. Personr,el performance and casualties of Air Task Group TJJO are included in enclosure (1). PI,RT VI SPECIAL ColrWJTS 1. i,dministrative, hlic Xnfom2tion. ESSEX concurs in recommendations made by other carrLk-be a minlmun of two full-time rated journa3ists assigned to FIO, ESSEX has good facilities for transmitting newsworthy photo- Gaphs-. but was handicapped in having to send dispatches to ComNavFE to arrange transmission schsdule8. It is believed a regular schedule should be set ‘up I for radio transmission of Motographs, In this way, photos of immediate pub- I ’3.; .infamatior, value can be assured of rapid delivexy. 11 ‘L*r I....* - -- 2 - -= ~ - ~ r------a. To give CIC watch officer8 a bettea understanding of the dunctiond performed on the bridge, a program ha8 been in effect to qualify them as OffiCeMl qf the Deck underway. This has been accomplished by having two of the CIC watch aificers on the deck watch list until qualified, and then replacing them with tw others. The exchange training of CIC enlisted personnel and VC-ll Detach- mat enlbted airborne controllers has been continued. The personnel involved aiail-e been been very enthusiastic about this training and considerable mutual ben- fit hes resulted.

3. Air Department. w1 catapllt operations were normal. In the previous actm reporta. i was no ed that the port catapult received extensive damage from a runaway shot. During the ship.% &.v at Yokosuka, new sheaves, cables, shuttle, instruments and #ping were installed by the ship's force and SRF Yokosuka. Re- pairs and- tests were successfully completed on 5 December 1952. -Arresting Gear. All arreating gear operations were rartine with the exception of three barrier crashes. d.1 crashes were caused by material failure of the F9F-2 arresting hook shoes, which split upon engaging the arresting pen- dant. The maxim- number of landings on these hooks was twenty-one and in all cases the hooks were carefully inspected after every landing.

c. Mdntenance. Some trouble was experienced with the TS-2% range cali- bratQr during this period due to crystal failures, but in general electronic maintenance was very satisfactory. A new shielded cage was fabricated of alum- inum sheet for the ~~&,~~direction finder loop. This cage greatly bproved the signal to noise ratio aver the previous wire mesh cage, Difficulty has been experienced during this period in keeping the Model X- U10 -md X-U39 oxygen pumps in an operating status, The high pressure wtpt required of the pumps to recharge the Spen oxygen servicing trailers caused the \igh and low pressure cylinders to require renewal of Wl pxkings after five hours of operation, "he Oxygen-Nitrogen syatem to be installed during the forthcoming Navy Yard period should rectify this situation.

d. Ordnance, The shortage of senior rated personnel continues to be the greatest operating problem, This problem has existed sbce the beginning Of ' this Korean tour and has made it necessary to put lower rated personnel in responsible billets. These men have neither the experierce or training requfred to pmperly carry out their assigned psitiom ?Without close supervision.' This createm an added work load, longer hours anl hardswp on the few higher rated men. 4. kiF Task Group TW. (See enclosure (1))

B. B. C, IXlVETT -- cow to: ;:‘.7 (2) Advance CTFCPrWLT (2) Hdvance CTNCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP CWNL.VFE (1) Advance 1 COYNAVFZ EVALUATION GmUP COVSEVENTHFLT (1) hdvance CTF-77 (1) Advance ComCarDiv 1 ComCirDiv 3 ComCarDiv 5 C0~’AIRPHC (101 PAb’SERVPL-C COl‘Fl~lRLLMDA CWF’~IRJI~P!~’ NAVAL WAR COLLEGE USS BOXER (CVi-21) USS BON HOYl’E XWi~(CVA-31) USS €SMSA.8GP, (CVA-33 ) ‘JSS ORISKHNY (CVii-34) TTSS ?M!’TCETON (CVA-37’ USVLLLEY VOW (CVA-45) USS WILTPPT” SEA (CVA-47? CVG2 CVG-5 CTTG7 CITG-9 CVGll CVG-15 CVG-19 CV El01 CT’G102 ,T“-1 tiTG-2 (5)