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Operating and Financial Information 4 OPERATING AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION 4 PRESENTATION OF CRÉDIT AGRICOLE S.A.’S CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 202 Presentation of Crédit Agricole S.A.’S Consolidated Accounts 202 Economic and Financial Environment 202 Crédit Agricole S.A. Operations and Consolidated Income Statements 203 Crédit Agricole S.A. Consolidated Balance Sheet 216 Related-Party Transactions 218 Internal Control 218 Recent Trends And Outlook 219 INFORMATION ON PARENT COMPANY FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (CRÉDIT AGRICOLE S.A.) 228 Analysis of Crédit Agricole S.A. (parent company) results 228 Five year financial summary 229 Information on accounts payable 229 Crédit Agricole S.A. 2013 REGISTRATION DOCUMENT 201 OPERATING AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION 4 Presentation of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s consolidated financial statements Presentation of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s consolidated financial statements 3 PRESENTATION OF CRÉDIT AGRICOLE S.A.’S CONSOLIDATED ACCOUNTS Changes to accounting principles Changes in the scope of consolidation and policies Changes in the scope of consolidation are described in Note 2.1.1 Changes to accounting principles and policies are described in and in Note 12 to the consolidated financial statements for the year Note 1 to the consolidated financial statements for the year ended ended 31 December 2013. 31 December 2013. 3 ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ENVIRONMENT Global growth declined in 2013. In emerging markets it was stable between 1.28 and 1.38,USD/EUR, trending generally upwards to at 4.5%, although markedly down on the average of 10.7% over the close on a high. A number of factors underpinned the strength preceding decade. Developed markets managed 1.1%, down from of the euro, despite market concerns regarding the European 1.4% in 2011 and in 2012. This was more as a result of the slowdown economy: an expanding credit spread (40 basis points at the in the United States, where growth fell back to 1.8% from 2.8% in beginning of the year, 100 basis points at the end of the year), a 2012, than to the Eurozone, which whilst still in recession, saw -0.5% significant current account surplus in the balance of payments compared with -0.7% in 2012. compared with a US deficit, the abating of concerns as to the viability of the E uro zone whereas the United States on occasion This under-performance of the United States was due to a weak sent somewhat confused messages as to its economic policy start to 2013, following on from a poor end to 2012. The remainder (“tapering”, “shut-down” in October). of 2013 was better there, moreover creating a favourable base for 2014. The performance from the Eurozone was achieved despite With inflation not being a threat, the opposite in fact being true, a slowdown in Germany (0.5% following 0.9% in 2012), thanks to the ECB surprised markets with a further cut in its key rate in a slight improvement in France (0.2% following 0.0% in 2012) and early November following on from the one in June, signalling its particularly in Southern Europe, where the recession affecting intention to keep monetary conditions ultra accommodating with, the four weak countries - Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece - if required, further relaxation in liquidity conditions. This monetary progressively eased in 2013. However, the erratic economic easing went hand-in-hand with less budgetary pressure. The performance in France and Germany throughout 2013 showed the factoring in of extraordinary circumstances due to the weakness of the cycle, as well as the progress made cleaning up public fragility of this recovery. finances allowed the countries in the Eurozone periphery to make The reversal of the long end of the yield curve, which began at smaller structural adjustments that did not have such a negative end-2012 in the United States, continued and strengthened, and effect on growth. Nevertheless, the channel for monetary policy extended to Europe. Contrary to the consensus that anticipated transmission seized up in Southern Europe and the cut in interest a slight decline in its value against the dollar, the euro fluctuated rates failed to encourage credit provision. 202 Crédit Agricole S.A. 2013 REGISTRATION DOCUMENT OPERATING AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION Presentation of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s consolidated financial statements 4 CRÉDIT AGRICOLE S.A. OPERATIONS AND CONSOLIDATED 3 INCOME STATEMENTS 2012 Change (in millions of euros) 2013 R estated(1) 2013-2012 Revenues 16,015 15,954 +0.4% Operating expenses (11,277) (11,624) (3.0%) Gross operating income 4,738 4,330 +9.4% Cost of risk (2,961) (3,703) (20.0%) Operating income 1,777 627 x 2.8 Share of net income of equity-accounted entities 1,074 503 x 2.1 Net income on other assets 116 177 (34.6%) Change in value of goodwill - (3,027) n.m. Pre-tax income 2,967 (1,720) n.m. Income tax charge (140) (391) (64.2%) Net income from discontinued or held-for-sale operations 54 (4,320) n.m. Net income 2,881 (6,431) n.m. NET INCOME GROUP SHARE 2,505 (6,389) n.m. Basic earnings per share (in euros) 1.0 (2.6) n.m. (1) 2012 results restated for the reclassification pursuant to IFRS 5 of Newedge, Crédit Agricole Bulgaria and CACF’s Nordic entities, and reflecting changes in the valuation of a limited number of complex transactions. 2013 was marked by the on-going refocusing and by the fact DVA and DVA running. In 2012, revenues included a -€1,471 million that the business lines held up and then recovered well. Crédit charge associated with own debt revaluation and loan hedges. Agricole S.A. thus disposed of portfolios, interests and subsidiaries Operating expenses were down 3.0% in 2013 compared with that were no longer considered core: completion of the disposal of 2012, a reduction that was largely due to the cost savings achieved Emporiki, Cheuvreux, and CLSA and Bankinter shares, reduction under the MUST programme, which should generate savings of of its interest in Eurazeo, preparation for the disposal of Newedge, planned disposal of the Nordic entities of CACF and of CA €650 million on IT costs, procurement and real estate. €351 million Bulgaria, disposal of the bulk of the CDOs and of the portfolio in savings were achieved in 2012 and 2013, compared with 2011, with US residential mortgage underlyings. At the same time, the including €226 million in 2013 alone, €31 million ahead of scheduled increase in its stake in Amundi (+5 points to 80%) is being finalised. operating plan set by the Group in 2011. At 70.4%, the cost/income ratio was up by 2.5 percentage points over the year. Business remained satisfactory in the retail banking networks with, in particular, on-balance sheet deposits up 4.5% over the year Gross operating income was thus up 9.4% in 2013 compared with and outstanding home loans up over 2%. Asset Management and 2012 restated, at €4,738 million. Insurance saw assets under management grow by €47.7 billion, The cost of risk totalled €2,961 million in 2013 compared with including €13.1 billion in net inflows in 2013. The business lines €3,703 million in 2012. The improvement was mainly due to that saw an active reduction in the scope of their activities, such the reduction in the cost of risk at Agos Ducato in Italy. At end- as Specialised Financial Services and Corporate and Investment December 2013, impaired outstanding loans (excluding finance Banking, experienced a limited decline in their revenues and leases with customer s ) amounted to €15.2 billion, close to the rebounded at year-end. end-2012 level (-1.4%). This represented 3.9% of gross outstanding This resilience resulted in a slight increase of 0.4% in Crédit loans to customers and credit institutions, compared with 3.6%(1) Agricole S.A.’s revenues to €16,015 million in 2013. This included at end-December 2012. The ratio of impaired loans covered by a negative impact of €846 million from own debt revaluation individual provisions was 53.3% at end-December 2013 compared resulting from the improvement in Crédit Agricole S.A.’s spreads, with 57.3%(1) at end-December 2012. Including collective provisions, loan hedges, Day 1 impact of the application of IFRS 13 on CVA/ the coverage ratio of impaired loans was 71.7%. (1) Restated for the reclassification pursuant to IFRS 5 in 2013 of Newedge, CA Bulgaria and CACF’s Nordic entities. Crédit Agricole S.A. 2013 REGISTRATION DOCUMENT 203 OPERATING AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION 4 Presentation of Crédit Agricole S.A.’s consolidated financial statements Net income of equity-accounted entities amounted to increase of €24 billion compared with 31 December 2012. Long €1,074 million in 2013, including a €1,064 million contribution from term funding sources increased by €10 billion in 2013, amounting to the Regional Banks. For reference, in 2012, this included the impact €871 billion at 31 December 2013. Long term applications of funds of the impairment of SAS Rue La Boétie and SACAM international amounted to €800 billion at 31 December 2013, down €14 billion shares and the adjustment to the valuation following the merger compared with 31 December 2012. of Regional Banks (impact of -€208 million in 2012). It also included a €267 million impairment of BES and the impact of the Liquidity reserves after haircut rose by €9 billion in 2013, reaching deconsolidation of Bankinter in August 2012 (-€193 million). €239 billion. They covered 168% of gross short term debt in both the fourth quarter of 2013 and the fourth quarter of 2012. Net gains (losses) on other assets of €115.8 million in 2013 primarily included gains, booked under the Corporate centre, on The various issuers within Crédit Agricole Group issued €31.7 billion the disposal of a property in Paris and of Eurazeo securities.
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