ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol 17, No 3, pp 503± 523, 1996

`AllahuEkber ’,Weare Turks: yearningfor a differenthomecoming atthe periphery of Europe

BANUHELVACIOGLU

If we dissuadeTurkey from becomingEuropean, we willhelp strengthen the religiousrevivalists. Presidentof France, Jacques Chirac, July 1995 1 Fear not!How canthis faith be smothered by that monster called `Civilization’ ! whichhas but one tooth left in its jaw?¼ Independence is the right of myrighteous, God-worshippingnation’ . MehmetAkif Ersoy, from theNational Anthem of the Turkish Republic 2 Republicanlaicism was thereforea Janus-likeaffair: on the progressive side the Caliphatewas eliminatedin 1924, but on the other, platoon practice in of® cer trainingin the1950s still culminated with the storming of a hillwith cries of `Allah, Allah!’ Serif Mardin 3

As earlyas 1954,Howard Reed, among other outside observers, noted the revivedpublic and private interest in Islam duringthe Democrat Party era in Turkey.What he identi® ed as thekey issue inthe 1950s is oneof the main dynamicsthat has beenregulating the politicisation of religion both in the past andat the present moment; that `the revived interest in Islam is posingserious questionsto responsible Turks who are tryingto integrate this natural religious feelinginto Turkey’ s secular,progressive, revolutionary society without usher- ingin an obscurantist reaction’ . 4 In1957, Dankwart Rustow, also re¯ ecting on theDemocrat Party’ s religiousplatform, argued that `whether we can speak of religiousrevival in Turkey today depends largely on how we de®ne that term’ . 5 Thethird outside observer of the political role of religionin thehistory of the TurkishRepublic is GHJansen.Writing in the 1960s, he too noticed that `the averageTurk is deeplyand devoutly Muslim’ . Hisre¯ ection on the Democrat partyplatform in the 1950s summarises Rustowand Reed’ s points.When `the pressure againstreligious observances’ were relaxed, `Turkish Islam came tothe surface onceagain as strong,as superstitious,as mysticand as intolerantas if Ataturkand his ª Revolutionºhad never been’ . InJansen’ s view,religious `revival’is amisnomer.In Turkey `there was noreligiousweakening and hence

BanuHelvacioglu is attheDepartment of Politics, Ryerson Polytechnical University, Toronto,Canada

0143-6597/96/030503-21$6.00 Ó 1996Third World Quarterly BANU HELVACIOGLU therecould be norevival:there was merelya submergenceand a reappearance’. 6 Finally,in 1977 Serif Mardin, who has writtenextensively on the social and politicalconstitution of Islam bothin the contexts of the Ottoman Empire and ofthe Turkish Republic, reiterated one of the enigmatic questions that concerns thepresent conjuncture: `the most striking behavioural characteristic which needsexplanation is thecontinuing intensity of religious belief among large groupsof Turks in the last twenty-® ve years followinga quartercentury of secularpolicy’ . 7 Atthe moment we are facedwith three logically insoluble issues. One,if everythingthat needs to be said about `religious revivalism’ in Turkey has alreadybeen said by `Western’ observers in the 1950s and the 1960s, why is it necessary toaddress Jacques Chirac’s statementin his speech to the European Parliamentin 1995? Two, as observedby some Westernand Turkish scholars, ifreligion is atrademarkof the social and political fabric in Turkey, what explainsthe polarisation between secular and Islamicist positions in Turkey at themoment? Three, considering that the national anthem of the Turkish Republicis ®lledwith both nationalist and religious themes, why is therea ferventconfrontation between Turkish± Kemalist nationalists and Sunni± Islamic politicalgroups in Turkey today? Asimpleanswer to all three questions is historicalamnesia and an oblivious, ethnocentricattitude to the historically, politically and regionally speci® c dy- namicsin the formation of any culture, be it of European,Christian, Turkish or Islamicorigins. Historical amnesia and the condition of cultural/ politicalindif- ferenceto the speci® c dynamicsof the politicisation of religion, ethnicity and nationalismare globalproblems which need to be put under critical scrutiny both insideand outside Turkey. In examining the con® guration of political Islam in domesticpolitics, it is alsoimportant to note that the increasing support for the WelfareParty (the political representative of Sunni Islam inthe parliament) sincethe early 1990s has culminatedin twoelectoral victories. The ® rst was the 1994municipal election results which brought the Welfare Party to powerin 25 provinces.The second was the1995 parliamentary election from which the WelfareParty emerged as theleading party, with 21% of popular votes. The generalpolitical response to the increasing signi® cance of the Welfare Party in the1990s requires us torevisitsuch claims as `religiousrevivalism’ , thesecular foundationof the Turkish Republic and the political/ culturalpolarisation be- tweenKemalist nationalism and politicised Islam. Inaddressing these issues, myargument is threefold.First, in Turkey there are indigenousvoices in the ranks of industrialists, high-ranking bureaucrats, state representativesin courts, members ofthe military, party leaders, members of parliament,academics, religious believers, self-identi® ed feminists, university studentsand cab drivers, who feign and mime Jacques Chirac’s statement. Accordingto this loosely de® ned category of secular position, Islamicists are fear-enhancingbeings. They are notonly a threatto Turkey’s modern,European identity,but they also threaten Turkey’ s rolein the European Union. 8 Second, thepolarisations between secular and Islamicist positions and between Kemalist nationalistsand Islamic political groups are inpartthe result of aninternalisation ofaeurocentric,orientalist gaze and in part the result of thehistorically speci® c 504 TURKS ATTHE PERIPHERY OF EUROPE politicaldynamics that characterise the political con® guration of Islam in Turkey.In this context, the changing boundaries of Europe after the decompo- sitionof the communist Soviet bloc is partof the enigmatic picture of Islam in Turkey.Third, in an attempt to subdue the divisive and violent polarisation in Turkeyat the moment, it is bothpolitically and ethically necessary toaddress the questionsof howand why nationalism and deeply rooted Islamic religiosity are inseparablefrom one another. Yearningfor a differenthomecoming at the periphery of Europe, in this context,is aninvitation to examine critically the intricate relationship between orientalist,eurocentric and ethnocentric perspectives as differentmanifestations ofa logocentricmode of thinking.

Thelogic ofbipolarisation Logocentrismassumes a®xedpoint, or anoriginalsource from which difference as oppositionarises. Alogocentricanalytical framework, which problematises politicalopposition along the lines of dichomotous choices (eg secular vs Islamicist,secular nationalism vs Islamicfundamentalism) does not address the ambivalenceof thepast and the present. It is foundedon a binaryinterpretation ofhistory, and of the political and cultural formations of oppositional politics. Inso far as theinternal dynamics of political Islam is concerned,the most commonlyheld explanation in Turkey is onewhich identi® es Ataturk’s policy ofsecularisation as theoriginal source of con¯ ict between secularism and religiousopposition. 9 Inconformity with logocentric thinking, Ataturk’ s cultural reforms are analysedin thecontext of anopposition between modern, European identityfashioned after the Enlightenment project of rationalismand secularism, anda traditionalobscurantist, mystical or reactionary religious standpoint. 10 AyseOncu’ s succinctsummary of the nation-building process providesus withinsight about the main opposition between secular nationalism and Islamic religiosity.The foundation of theTurkish Republic was `a genuinerevolution in thesense ofpositinga newª projectedorderº ’ .Its success was `contingentupon policieswhich reinforced Turkish national consciousness, and identity, as distinctfrom a wider,all inclusive dar-ulIslam (thehouse of Islam) ornarrower allegiancesof tribeand community’ . Of®cial nationalism included: `the adoption ofvernacular Turkish as theof® cial language of the State, state controlled compulsoryprimary education using a Romanizedalphabet as opposedto Arabic orthography,of® cial rewriting of the national history, publication of vernacular grammars anddictionaries, commemorative ceremonies and civic holidays in memoryof military exploits, chanting of national anthem, and ¯ agwaving’ . 11 Thereare twomain consequences of this national(ist) projected order. First, `closingthe door on the Islamic± Ottoman cultural heritage [created] a nationof forgetters’. 12 Second,`urban educated Turks were socialized to view Islam asa majorthreat to the Republic, progress and development’ . 13 Onboth issues Ayse Kadiogluraises aspeci®c dimensionof thisbinary opposition. Drawing attention tothe deepened chasm between`political Islamists andWesternised, native secularistsin the Middle East’ , she arguesthat `while the former are absorbed inthe myth of asr-i saadet andprofess areturnto the golden age of Islam, the 505 BANU HELVACIOGLU latter,viewing Islam as ananomaly or an antithesis of modernity, try to erase itfrom their history by unleashing a process ofvoluntary amnesia in the name ofmodernization’ . 14 Theanalytical model, which is premisedon the bipolar dynamics of the foundationof the Turkish Republic, is alsoused in explaining more speci® c dichotomouscleavages in Turkey. The most notable binary oppositions are betweenthe modern± urban± European formation in education,politics and econ- omyand the rural± traditional± peripheral formation in religious education, tra- ditionalforms ofreligious beliefs, rituals and folklore. 15 Adichotomous interpretationof socialdifferences leaves two areas outof consideration.One is theyet untouched area ofrichregional differentiations in folklore, linguistic and religiousrituals and traditions in Anatolia. 16 Theother ® eldwhich needs to be furtherinvestigated is theinteraction between modern± urban± secular± centre and peripheral±traditional± religious formations in everyday life and in politics. Withoutrepudiating these bifurcated realms inthe political and social forma- tionof the Turkish Republic, I investigatethe current polarisation between secularismand the politicisation of Islam inrelation to two issues. The® rst is theambivalent nature of the National Independence War (1920± 23) in relation toIslam andEurope. The second is theparadoxical convergence of modernity andtraditionalism in the politicisation of Islamic groups today. In terms ofthe relationshipbetween orientalism, eurocentric vision and binary thinking of oppositions,I problematisethe current searches forthe historical roots of Turkishand Islamic heritage as aheritageof logocentrism. In this analysis I do notaim to surpass thelogic of searching for an origin, but instead I tillthe historicalsoil in order to loosen the entangled roots in the formation of Turkish Muslimheritage. Thisrequires putting the political and cultural construct of Europe under scrutiny.If weassume that`Europe’ is theoriginal source of oppositionbetween Eastand West, then political Islam emerges inopposition to Europe, modernity andeurocentrism. This form of logocentric thinking fails to explainthe pervasive in¯uence of the orientalist gaze both in theory and in practice. In this day and ageof the commodi® ed global networks of news channels, print material and high-techvisual communication and information mechanisms, no-one, not even theradical Islamic groups critical of European culture and civilisation, are immunefrom the effects ofEurocentric,orientalist constructs. 17 Thisis particu- larlyimportant to note because, in speci® c contexts,a critiqueof eurocentrism andorientalism either converge or come very close to agreeing with political movementssuch as Islamicfeminism, or revolutionaryIslamic groups. The point ofconvergence lies in a search forhistorical roots which are presumedto be untouchedby the histories of colonialism, Judeo-christianity or other Western theological,theoretical, cultural in¯ uences. 18 Ratherthan viewing `Europe’ as thesource, the centre of culturaldomination, oras theoutside in¯ uence on theindigenous political/ socialformation in Turkey, themain premise of this analysis is toview the cultural/ politicalconstruct of `Europe’as amobile,political and cultural construct just as Islam,Turk, Turkish Islam andTurkish nationalism are. In this context, my objective is totill the historicalsoil of the National Independence War in anattempt to loosenthe roots 506 TURKS ATTHE PERIPHERY OF EUROPE thatde® ne binary oppositions between inside and outside, Europe and Turkey, dominationand marginalisation.

Which Islam? Which Islamicists? WhatChirac refers toas religiousrevivalists are alsonamed as Islamic,radical fundamentalistsby leading popular news networks in Europe and in North America.In its current use inTurkeythey are knownas Islamicists( Islamcilar). As notedin the Appendix, in so far as theologicaldifferences are concerned, Islamicistsmake up political parties, movements and groups within the Sunni tradition,which is thedominant religious tradition in Turkey. Moreover, in the contextof thehistorically speci® c cleavageof urban±modern and peripheral± ru- ralpolitics, Islamicists are aproductof the modern± urban setting, which is characterisedby economic and cultural patterns of domination over rural settings.In regional and political terms, there has alwaysbeen an East± West splitinside Turkey. `East’ denotes the main themes of marginalisation:economic underdevelopment,neglect in the provision of social services, persistence of ruraltraditions, and lack of political and cultural representation of its own. Atthenational level, those who have become political spokespeople of Islam are organisedin metropolitan centres, especially in Ankara and Istanbul. They use modernchannels of communication, notably TV, videosand the print industry.They have bene® ted from the introduction of neoliberal policies since themid-1980s, and started operating private hospitals, schools, student resi- dences,private radio channels and a TVnetwork( TGRT).Theyhave also launchedmany pro® t generatingventures and investments in ® nance,construc- tion,foreign trade and so on.As partof the global tendency of revived interest inmysticism (aka the `new age’ ) andan orientalist appetite for exotic religious rituals,in Turkey too, numerous religious leaders as wellas charlatanshave turnedthe mystic traditions of dervish orders and idiosyncratic religious rituals intopro® t generatingventures. TheIslamicist discourse of the marginalisation of Islam andof the dispos- sessed needsto be reconsidered with caution in this context of pro® t-based, globaltendencies. By the same token,it is alsoa truismthat the Welfare Party is renownedfor distributing scholarships to poor students, and providing free food,clothing and health services inpoor metropolitan districts. Without denyingthis, it is necessary toexamine the speci® c mechanismsthrough which theseservices are provided. Inmetropolitan districts of Istanbul where the Welfare Party is inpower, a recentstudy claims that, under the rubric of privatisation, there has beena transferof the local/ municipallyowned services toreligious foundations which haveties with the party. In conformity with the discourse of helping the dispossessed whohave been neglected by the Turkish state, the Welfare Party of®cials exempt their voters from paying their public utilities bills. All the same, thosemunicipalities under the control of theWelfare Party do not pay their debt tothe state. The ® nalpoint about the performance of the Welfare Party at the municipallevel is thatthere has beena consolidationof a cadreof party supportersat all levels of administration. To that end, they use suchtechniques 507 BANU HELVACIOGLU aslayoffs,internal exile and constructive dismissal (assigning jobs for which the civilservant or worker is overquali®ed) of public employees who are identi®ed as in®dels and/ oras politicallyactive militants. 19 Thesespeci® c techniquesare notunique to the Welfare Party. They are indicativeof the predominant norms ofpower relations. InTurkey, the central source of power emanates from the state. In this regard, themode of organisationof Islamicistgroups is regulatedby thesame principle whichapplies to the organisation of any political group and movement. The raisond’ etre ofpolitical groups, be it secular or religious, is subjectto the approvaland the constant scrutiny of the state. During the military regime in 1980±1983, `the military recognized that Islam whenviewed as aprogressive faithand moral teaching could play a criticalrole in combating the ideological extremismof the left and the right and in promoting social unity’ . 20 In the immediateaftermath of the military regime, Turgut Ozal’ s MotherlandParty combinedreligious, neoliberal and nationalist elements under its roof and residedover numerous state-sanctioned policies with regard to building new mosques,opening religious lycees and lifting the ban on the organisation and mobilisationof religious activities. 21 Thecoalition government of the True Path Party and Social Democratic Party (laterknown as theRepublican People’ s Party)continued the same tradition. Accordingto the 1995 budget, approved by the government, `TL4.8 trillion is allocatedfor religious education which is TL161.8billion more than the grant givento 37 [secular] universities. The share thatis allocatedto the Directorate ofReligious Affairs [ DRA],TL12.3trillion, is equalto the budget of ® ve ministries:Tourism, Environment and Industry, Transportation and Energy and NaturalResources Ministries’. Thereport also points out that `with cuts in the share forscienti® c research inthe 1995 budget, it isallthe more striking to see theincrease in the share forreligious education’ . 22 The1995 budget indirectly helpsto strengthen Islamicist groups. The government, presumably in an effort tokeep the politicisation of Islam underthe state’ s control,allocates money to theDirectorate of Religious affairs. By starving other secular institutions, notablypublic schools, universities, scienti® c research institutions,and centres forart, it leaves the public space openfor Islamicist groups, most which are alreadyoperating under the logic of privatisation. Giventhe problematic relationship between Islamicist groups and the state on thequestion of Shariah,forthe time being it suf® ces torecall that Islamic religiosityis anintegral component of Turkish politics and it is thespeci® city ofthe social and political conjuncture that de® nes therevitalisation of Islamic motivesand themes. The present phase of thepoliticisation of Islam `originates’ fromthe military regime that was inpower from 1980 to 1983. The military coupwas legitimisedto safeguard the principle of democracy in the midst of a conjunctureof `anarchy’ caused by left and right wing groups and by the instabilityin mainstream party politics. Remember, 1980± 83 was alsoa period ofunpredictableturmoil in the neighbouring Soviet Union, `the centre of World Communism’. Theabove-mentioned anarchy was theresult of the violent confrontation betweenMarxist revolutionary groups and two youth movements on the right. 508 TURKS ATTHE PERIPHERY OF EUROPE

Oneof them was calledGray Wolves and was af® liatedwith the Nationalist ActionParty; the other was calledRaiders, af® liatedwith the National Salvation Party.Today the two political parties and some ofthe youth organisations which are playinga keyrole in the mobilisation of Islam, `originated’ from the 1970s conjunctureof `anarchy’ . TheWelfare Party, the vocal spokesman of political Islam `originated’from the National Salvation Party and the Great Unity Party `originated’from the Nationalist Action Party. Although not much research has beendone on the internal composition of Islamicist youth movements, it is knownby word of mouth that they contain elements not only from two of the leadingright wing movementsÐ Gray Wolves and RaidersÐ but also from Marxistrevolutionary groups of the 1970s. 23 Thecatchall phraseÐ militant, radical IslamÐ in this setting reminds one of theHegelian Synthesis of Opposites.Marxists and Gray Wolves who used to kill eachother in the 1970s are nowtransmuted into Raiders (of perhaps the lost Ark ofundiluted, pure, Turkic, Islamic origins emancipated from the poisonous, imperialisteffects ofthe West). The relationship between this synthesis in the Islamicistyouth movement and the state has notbeen researched. What is known byword of mouth is thatthere might be a suspiciouslink between the state secret securityforces andmilitant Islamicist groups in atleastone area: political intimidationand violence against Alevi neighbourhoods, cultural centres and intellectuals.Even if this is aconspiratoryrumour, unsupported by `facts’ ,the factof thematter is thattwo incidents of violence,one in Sivas in 1993 and the otherin Gazi Osmanpasa, a districtof Istanbul, in 1994, resulted in the deaths ofAlevi civilians and intellectuals. Thebinary logic which views militant, radical Islam as anundifferentiated blocin opposition to Republican secularism produces a politicalsilence on the differenceof Alevi beliefs within Islamic traditions, and their politics of differencein repudiating violence. In conformity with this logic, there is much confusionoutside Turkey about an undifferentiated conjuncture of violence attributedto `Islamic fundamentalists’ or `Islamic Revivalists’ . Inthis context, it is importantto reiteratetwo points. In theAppendix, I give apartialcon® guration of politicalgroups within the Sunni tradition, which uses mosques.Mosques, both in the past and at the present, have been public spaces forboth religious worshipping and political opposition and mobilisation. Alevis use theCemevi, a collectivepublic space usedin everyday life for communal andreligious purposes. Second, within the Sunni tradition there are numerous differentforms oforganisation, including dervish orders, tarikats, tekkes and theirsplinter groups organised around mystical leaders. In so far as the relationshipbetween the state and these different Sunni religious organisations is concerned,the emphasis has beenon the continuity of political repression fromthe Ataturk era ofRepublicansecularism. From the 1930s to the1950s the projectof secularisation included such policies as banning tarikats, tekkes and dervishorders, penalising religious leaders advocating anti-secular beliefs and establishingreligious institutions under the control and supervision of the state. Thisform of secularisation legitimised mosques as publicplaces of religious worshipping,along with state-supported religious educational institutions and state-sanctionedreligious holidays nationwide. The net result of this state- 509 BANU HELVACIOGLU sanctionedsecularism has beento reproduce cultural religiosity in the domi- nantSunni tradition. Alevis who are supportersof secularism, nevertheless, werenot given an opportunity to enjoy their religious and cultural differences. Forexample, Nevruz, a cultural,religious celebration in Alevi tradition is not anationalholiday. Moreover, it has beenpoliticised in conjunction with the Kurdquestion. As partof the national amnesia and the general political conjuncture of the 1970sand 1980s, the only access toIslam was eitherin the private family domain,or in the public domain of the state. Now, in the `open’ democratic space,there appears to be more access toIslamic heritage and culture. This `free’ access is underthe domain of political parties and movements in urban centreswhich promote a politicsof opposition, rather than opening the space ofIslam as apoliticsof difference. In this regard, although Alevi communities refrainfrom entering the public space, their mode of organisation, beliefs and ritualscome closer to what might be called the politics of difference; different fromthe nationalist and Islamicist projects of change from above, different fromusing violent gestures, different from xenophobic hatred, and different in stayingout of the space ofthe power mechanics of the state. Inlight of these reminders, if we go back to the argument that the present phaseof the politicisation of Islam is aproductof the modern± urban setting, thecrux of the matter is that,despite a seemingopposition between the secularstate tradition and political (Sunni) Islam, this opposition too is an exampleof the Hegelian synthesis of opposites. The predominant thesis is that thestate control of religion suppressed and marginalised Islamic groups. In thisformulation, political Islam, which is viewedas theantithesis of the state, emergedin opposition to the secular state. The resulting syntheses of this oppositionare theleading cadre of political Islamic groups has beeneducated inboth secular, modern educational institutions and in religious institutions of thestate, the legitimacy of the Islamic political parties and the mushrooming ofIslamic journals, movements and orders have been recognised by the state; andpresidents of the Turkish Republic since 1983 are orwere devout Muslims. PresidentKenan Evren, the leader of the military coup in 1980, on the one handreintroduced Islamic motives and on the other hand promoted a very strongstate-centred Kemalist ideology. Both religious and nationalist motives wereused in the political conjuncture of an internal and external communist threat.The late President Turgut Ozal, who came froma religiousfamily, ®lledthe party cadre and bureaucracy with both Islamicists and aspiring yuppiesfresh fromIvy League universities. He (re)presented Islam inthe contextof a neoliberal`open’ `free’ marketeconomy. The current President SuleymanDemirel (1993± ), alsoa devoutMuslim in the Sunni tradition, resides ina conjuncturecharacterised by two main political issues. Onthe one hand,as was notedby Reed in 1954, `responsible Turks’ try to integrate religiosityinto the secular agenda in an attempt to offset the in¯ uence of Islamicistgroups. On the other hand, both self-identi® ed Turkish± Kemalist nationalistsand Sunni± Islamicists use Islam as apoliticalmotive in the con- textof the war in Bosnia. 510 TURKS ATTHE PERIPHERY OF EUROPE

Withthis conjuncture in mind, we can now turn our attention to the great dividebetween seculars andIslamicists, between nationalists and supporters of Shariah.Thisgreat divide is conceivedand lived in fear andviolence.

Return¼ InDennisWheathley’ s novel, TheEunuch of Stambul ,writtenin 1935,the main plotis tooverthrow Ataturk and to reestablish an Islamic regime. 24 Right now thereis averythin and ¯ uidline separating ® ctionfrom reality. Thecurrent polarisation between secular and Islamicist positions is founded ontwo fundamental issues: theindivisible integrity of the state, and preserving theheritage of Ataturk’ s reforms,which elevated the Turkish culture and identity tothelevel of Western,European civilisation. The secularist position defends the indivisibleintegrity of the state as prescribedin the speci® c articlesof the constitutionconcerning the foundation of the Turkish republic on the principle oflaicism,and the state control of religion. Although the Islamicist side does not speakwith one voice, there is themuch vaunted threat of ShariahÐ the law of IslamÐthat aims tochange the political regime in Turkey. The political record ofIslamicistgroups falls short of deliveringthis objective. Yet the manufactured threat of Shariah is reproducedin domestic and foreign policy issues bythe representativesof both secular and Islamicist positions. Indomestic politics, the Welfare Party is themost outspoken and the least consistentsupporter of Shariah.Inspite of its inconsistent platform to change thepolitical regime from above, the Welfare Party has asigni®cant in¯ uence in bothmunicipal and national politics. As aresultof the1994 municipal elections, theWelfare Party is inpower in 25 provinces, including the metropolitan and mostof the district municipalities in Ankara and Istanbul. Mayors from the WelfareParty try to deliver their promise of Shariah bybanning local restau- rantsfrom selling alcohol, prohibiting the sale ofturkey during Christmas, and controllingthe self-indulgent activities of youngpeople in discos,bars andnight clubs.In Beyoglu, one of the most central locations in Istanbul, there has been anongoing struggle between owners of restaurants and bars andWelfare of®cials on the question of serving food and alcohol on patios. Onforeign policy issues, thewar in Bosnia triggered Islamic identity in Turkey.The Islamicist groups use adiscourseof a commonIslamic bond and unityamong all Muslim sisters andbrothers around the world. Apart from Bosnia,the main factors which keep the Welfare Party’ s discourseof Shariah aliveare Turkey’s pendingmembership of the European Union, the signing of theCustoms Union as aprerequisiteto this re-union, and the strategic± military locationof Turkey in the post-cold war conjuncture. Onthe one hand, the media outside Turkey uses theexamples of theIslamic regimein Iranand the terrorist activities of Islamicgroups in Algeria and Egypt asthenew international threat after the great scare ofcommunism.These images are transmittedvia private and state-owned TV channelsin Turkey, where there havebeen rumours that Islamicists have been receiving funds from outside sources.On the other hand, as iftolegitimise the orientalist construction of the threatof `fundamentalist Islam’ ,theWelfare Party, among other Islamicist 511 BANU HELVACIOGLU groups,has launcheda discourseon Shariah as partof an anti-European campaign.In opposition to Turkey’ s membershipof the EU, andthe signing of theCustoms Union agreement, the so-called Islamic heritage has beenput forwardin mobilising support for an `authentic’ , non-Westernidentity. In both domesticpolitics and foreign policy formulations, the secularists, speaking from thelocation of the central authority of the State aim to keep politicised Islam undercontrol by juridical and extra-juridical means. The latter refers tothe revitalisationof Kemalist ideology, mixed with different nationalist themes and symbols. Onthequestion of Ataturk’s culturalreforms, the polarisation manifests itself atmany different levels. The most divisive issues concerncriticisms directed fromthe ranks of Islamicists against Ataturk’ s personality,his cult of personal- ity,and his coercive policies at the time of national independence in 1923, and againstthe dress codewhich has beenpoliticised as aresultof the increasing visibilityof women in different Islamic guises. This polarisation takes place in aconjunctureof violence and it is reproducedby a viciouscycle of symbolic representations.The unidenti® ed cases ofbombattacks targeting secular intellec- tualsenforce the vengeance against the cult of Ataturk in Kemalist ideology in full.The event which shook most modern secular professionals and intellectuals was thedeath of Ugur Mumcu in 1993 as aresultof one of those unidenti® ed bombattacks. Mumcu was asecular,progressive journalist critical of political Islamicgroups. His employer, the daily, Cumhuriyet,organiseda strongKemal- istcampaign after his death. Mumcu’ s funeralbrought many apolitical and politicalindividuals to the streets ina publicprotest. A fewmonths later, there was anotherunidenti® ed violent attack, killing more than 30 artists, authors and culturalcritics in Sivas. The collective killing aimed to halt the politicisation of theAlevi issue andto prohibit the celebration of Alevi culture. In spite of differentmotives in these two cases ofviolence(one aimed at anindividual and theother intimidating a religiousminority group), they are rememberedas violentincidents of `radical Islam’ . Inthis conjuncture of violence, the revitalisation of Kemalist ideology ® llsa lacunaon two issues. One,in the post military era ofthe 1980s, there was a concertedcampaign for the depoliticisation of the left. To counter the `commu- nistthreat’ , Kemalismwas promotedas theof® cial, national ideology, inscribed inthe 1982 constitution. A decadelater, faced with violent attacks targetting progressivesecular intellectuals, those apolitical individuals who now feel the urgeto protest, reach to what is madeavailable to them in the symbolic realm ofpolitics: Ataturk. Second, although the `Republic of Turkey is ademocratic, secularand social State governed by the rule of the law’ (Article 2 ofthe Constitution),there is abig,black hole in the way in which juridical process is operationalisedwith regard to murder mysteries. Faced with this black hole, whilesome progressivesecular intellectuals identify the state as oneof the culpritsin unidenti® ed cases ofviolence,others grab the state and the Kemalist spiritas anationalexpression of protest against politicised Islam. Thecurrent phase of the politicisation of nationalism and Islamicism takes placein the realm of diverse symbols, secular and religious rituals, and public protestmeetings. The nationalist side uses thesymbols of the Turkish ¯ ag,the 512 TURKS ATTHE PERIPHERY OF EUROPE postersand mini-busts of Ataturk, and car stickerswhich pledge to follow Ataturk’s footsteps.The most common rituals that are performedin schoolsand publicof® ces are singingthe national anthem and visiting Ataturk’ s mausoleum. Theserituals express nationalsentiments of resentment against Islamicist re- marks whichare anti-TurkishRepublic and anti-Ataturk. Onthe Islamicist side, given the heterogeneity of political groups and movements,the construction of symbols does not have a coherentpattern. To counterposethe Turkish ¯ ag,some groupsuse analternative ¯ ag,which has threewhite crescents againstthe background of green. In opposition to the nationalanthem, Islamicists insist on having public prayers, and citing verses fromthe Quran at public protest meetings and in government of® ces. Such religiousrituals as fastingduring Ramadan, going to the mosque, praying ® ve timesa day,and voicing innumerable expressions (eg ` Allah,Allah ’),havebeen anintegralpart of Sunnireligiosity in modern, secular Turkey. Yet these rituals havenow become matters of political gesture. Themost divisive issue atthe level of symbolic and violent polarisation is women’s garments.Some Islamicist women wear a blackover-garment which exposesonly the eyes tothe public gaze. Others, who are identi®ed as themain culpritin the `turban’ affair, cover their head tightly and wear long overcoats. Itisimportantto highlight the difference in outlookbetween the black over-gar- mentand the turban in the context of thehistorical cleavage between urban and peripheralpolitics. Although both groups of womenare visiblein urbancentres, theformer is morea characteristicof thetradition of Islam inruralareas, towns andpoor districts in theoutskirts of majormetropolitan centres. Women in black garmentsdo not have any representation of their own in the public sphere. Thesecond group, identi® ed with the `turban’ is aproductof urbanpolitics. Thisgroup consists of housewives, wives of political leaders on the Islamicist side,as wellas universitystudents and professional women. The latter two play asigni®cant role in the politicisation of image. Their increased visibility in urban,public settings is perceivedas athreatto themodern make-up of Turkish society,designed by Ataturk’ s culturalreforms andreproduced by Kemalist ideology.When appearance is consideredalone, the turban affair contributes to aparanoiaabout the in® ltration of Islamicists into the public space, including universities,hospitals, professional organisations and the bureaucracy. In this context,the knee-jerk reaction to women wearing the turban is amanifestation ofoneof themain bipolar, oppositional dynamics of themodern nation-building process.This dynamic can be referredto as thedistillation of religiousin¯ uence inTurkish national culture. The turban affair, however, is notcon® ned to the politicsof image and perception. Themost recent case ofviolence concerning the turban affair was thedeath ofAliGunday, the President of theLawyer’ s Associationin Gumushane, a small cityin the Black Sea region.In his capacity as thePresident, Ali Gunday dismissedfemale lawyers wearing the turban from the Lawyer’ s Association.He was killedby a religiousindividual (a worker)who did not approve of his decision.The assassin livesin Nigde, Central Anatolia, which, by Turkish standardsis far fromGumushane. Therefore, the plot to kill Gunday remains suspicious.(How did a workerworking on a minimumwage obtain a gun?How 513 BANU HELVACIOGLU didhe decide to travel all the way to kill Gunday? etc). While Islamicist journalist,Abdullah Dilipak and an Islamic community leader Fettullah Gulen expressedtheir regret over this issue, the Vice-President of the Association to PromoteAtaturkist Thinking saw thisincident as partof `an organized plot by forces promoting Shariah’.Oneson of the assassin approvedof his father’ s deed,and the other son found the incident saddening. 25 Inboth mainstream party platforms and in everyday politics, the questions of theindivisible integrity of thestate and of preserving Ataturk’ s culturalreforms are oftenpresented as achoicebetween the Turkish national identity and the Islamicidentity. The polarisation between secular and Islamicist positions leads totheinsoluble problem of historicalsearches tode®ne thetemporal and spatial boundariesof a predominantlymodern, nationalist Turkish heritage and a predominantlyreligious, cultural Islamic heritage. In the secularist discourse, the ®xedpoints of references are thenational independence and cultural, political andjuridical reforms thatwere introduced from 1923 to the 1930s. When these references are viewedas amarkedbreak from the Ottoman heritage, the conceptionof modern national Turkish identity becomes identical with the foundationof the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923. Islamicists, on the otherhand, challenge the predominant conception of the Turkish Republic, and ofthe construction of a nationalTurkish identity, by counterposing different historical/geographicalreference points which include idiosyncratic interpreta- tionsof thereligious history of theOttoman Empire, teachings of theQuran, and ofthe history of Islam sinceProphet Muhammed’ s time(570± 632 AD). If weput all the historical and geographical references thatare incurrent use intothe debates on secularism versus Shariah,nationalismversus Islam,main- tainingAtaturk’ s heritageversus returningto `our true Islamic identity,’ then whatis atstake is ahistorywhich dates back (at least) to thesixth century after Christ’s death,within the geographical parameters of some twothirds of the world(excluding the Americas and the Paci® c Rim,where Islam and`Turks’ travelledmuch later). Faced with such a richtableau ® lledwith details of many civilisations,religions, languages and empires, one might choose to give in tothe richnessthat feeds intothe Turkish, Islamic heritage. The® rst stepin giving in to the rich historical, cultural in¯ uences on these polariseddebates is tostart loosening the bonds of polarisation. In fact, the politicalcon® guration of these two seemingly diametrically opposed historical lineagesbelies a simpledichotomy between Turkish nationalism and Islamic identity.Both sides are internallyfragmented and secular nationalist and Sunni± Islamicistpositions converge on anumberof issues (see theparty platforms and religiousconnections in the Appendix). Whatis ofimportance in these internally fragmented, convergent positions is thatboth the secularist, state-centred, nationalist position and Islamicist groups havean ambivalent relationship with Europe. To scratch the surface ofthis ambivalentrelationship, it is importantto ® rst notethat what appears as a dichotomy,in fact has threevariables. In so far as culturalconstructs are concerned,these variables are Turk(ish),Europe(an), and Islam(icist). Within the con®nes ofa simpledichotomy the key dynamic that regulates the polarisation is suchthat as thesecular, Kemalist± nationalist position approximates itself to 514 TURKS ATTHE PERIPHERY OF EUROPE

`Europe’as thecentre, the Islamicist side distances itself from the centre by posingits agenda as anti-Europeanand anti-Western. Thesecond point to note is thatthe de® ning feature of the cultural, political andhistorical construct of `Europe’ , is itspresent absence. As soonas itis put atthe centre of the debate, it ¯ ees andleaves the area tocircular debates. For example:`shall we join the European Union? Yes, we should; we are already Europeanany way. No. No, to the European Union. We are notEuropean. We are Muslim.’Another example from daily debates is thequestion of where we standin relationto Bosnia. `Shall we sendtroops to Bosnia?Yes, de® nitely. No, notover my dead body.’ Yes weare, no we are not.The outcome of all this is `Shoot!’Shoot the in® del, Serbian fascists, thelawyer, the journalist, the Jewish universityprofessor, the communists. This scenario reminds me ofthe 1930s Europe,where an author by the name of Dennis Wheatley imagines an Islamic plotto overthrowAtaturk, at atimewhen Hitler is inhissecond year of power. Inso far as theinternal politics is concerned,the polarised debates in Turkey requiresa doublegesture. Yes, we are inpart European, but not in terms ofthe wayin which state-centred, Kemalist ideologues de® ne us as `modern,secular Turks’. Weare Europeanin following the Hegelian Logic where political standpointsare presentedin dichatomous choices, social differences are experi- encedin oppositional terms andthe main tendency for resolution-synthesis resultsin an undifferentiatedoutlook on secularismand Islamicism. Yes, we are inotherways Muslim too, but not in the way in whichpoliticised Islamic groups claim.The predominant Sunni traditions and rituals continue to thread through thesocial fabric of everyday life as wellas statepolicies and secular party platforms.In addressing the polarisation in an af® rmativegesture, the double gesturealso requires problematising ambivalent areas. Themain ambivalence in thesecularist position is that,while it wishes to maintain the heritage of Ataturk’s projectof elevating Turkish civilisation to the level of European/West- erncivilisation, it carries allthe enigmatic features of the project of national independence.On the Islamicist side, the main ambivalence is that,in spite of itsanti-European, anti-statist, anti-modern position, it reproducesstatist, modern dynamicsin Turkey in innumerable facets oflife. Whereboth positions converge in reverse orderis intheir ambivalent stands onthe war in Bosnia. The Welfare Party and other Islamicist groups put aside theiranti-statist position and call for Turkish troops to besentto ®ghtthe Serbs. Coupledwith the heroic patriotism of defendinga Muslimland, Islamicists have capturedthe political space fora peacemovement by mobilisingtheir supporters, inmassive protests.In a recentprotest meeting held in Konya, there were womenwearing the black over-garment with a greenbandanna bearing the inscription`Salvation is inIslam’ .Otherinscriptions were in Arabic. Secularistsin the ranks of the state are dividedon this issue. One sideÐ the staunchphallic nationalistsÐ are infavour of taking military action. The other side,which I associatewith the yes-men of Jacques Chirac,does not wish to dissuade`Europe’ by getting involved in a warin its territory. This position seeks aplatformof peace in the realm of `European culture’ . Followingthe bombingof Srebrniya, and amid the outcries of European intellectuals against theirgovernments in the summer of1995, the minister of culture, Ismail Cem, 515 BANU HELVACIOGLU announceda decisionto organise an international concert in Istanbul to `protest againstthe genocide’ . Hearguedthat `Turkey is nolonger a peripheralcountry inthe outskirts of Europe. It is acountryin the position of a centrein a larger setting’. Theminister did not specify the parameters of thislarger setting, but he didmention that the planned concert would emulate Bob Geldof’ s LiveAid concertfor Africa. 26 Logic?Which Logic? Whose Logic? Turkeyhas comea longway since the days of TheEunuch of Stambul . To put themissing `I’ , inIstanbul, it might be helpful to revisit Istanbul in the spring of 1920.

The`present’ in history Inboth secular/ nationalistand religious/ Islamicistpositions, the cultural con- structof `Europe’is atthe centre position. Yet the centre, together with what it represents,is amobileconstruct. It is madeto appear and disappear according tothe speci® city of the issue thatis atstake. The main dynamics of the ambivalentrelationship with Europe can be traced to the political conjuncture immediatelybefore and after the foundation of the Turkish Republic. The key enigmaticfeature of the national independence project is thatit had three motivations:to ® ghtagainst the imperial powers of Europe, to mark a clear breakfrom the Ottoman empire, and to distil the pervasive in¯ uence of Islamic religiosity.What remains as aheritagefrom the years ofthe National Indepen- denceis theindecisive relationship with Europe. On theone hand, Europe is the enemy,the foreign invader, and the collaborator with the Ottoman Sultan. On the otherhand, Europe is afabricatedmodel whose constitutions, fashion, architec- turaldesign, political regimes and dominant modes of perceptions,thinking and logicare emulated. Withthis duality and double gesture in mind,we canturn to `historical facts’ . In1920 the Sevr agreement was signedbetween the Ottoman empire and the Europeanimperial powers. Istanbul was underthe British occupation. On 11 April1920, the Sheyh-ulIslam (thehighest religious authority under the Sultan’ s Caliphate),Durrizidade Abdullah issued a fatwa denouncingthe nationalistsÐ MustafaKemal and his groupÐ as agangof rebels. The nationalists formed a provisionalgovernment in Ankaraon 23April1920. `A counter-fetwaissued by the muftu [localreligious authority] of Ankara and endorsed by 152other muftus throughoutAnatolia called on the Muslim population ª todo all to liberate the Caliphfrom captivityº ’. 27 InMay1920 a militarycourt condemned Ataturk and hischief associates todeath in absentia. The Sultan con® rmed the death sentence. Thishistorical information is takenfrom two sources. Deniz Kandiyoti’ s interpretationof this conjuncture is thatMustafa Kemal condemned both the of®cial Islam ofthecentre ( Sheyh-ulIslam )as wellas thediverse religious sects (tarikats),whichwere considered to be centres of obscurantism, laziness, passivityand superstition: `in short a worldview incompatible with his Enlight- enmentvision of progress, rationalism and positivism’ . Inaccordance with this prevalentview of Ataturk’ s projectof secularisation, Kandiyoti argues that `religiousreaction ( irtica)was tobe identi® ed as oneof the main enemies of 516 TURKS ATTHE PERIPHERY OF EUROPE

Kemalistideology’ . Onthe question of Ataturk’ s relationshipwith the Sultan, Kandiyoticlaims that Ataturk considered `Ottoman statesmen¼ as the ªgendarmesof foreign capitalº and their brand of Westernism as ashameful capitulation¼[he] sought to break away from the fetters of an Ottoman past he consideredas decadentand to forge a radicallynew sense ofnationhood.’ 28 DankwartRustow, on the other hand, emphasises twopoints in hisaccount of thesame conjuncture.First, he notesthe religious and communal loyalties of the provisionalgovernment in Ankara.Describing the crucial days of the opening of theNational Assembly in April 1920, Rustow claims that, `excommunicated by thehighest religious dignitary, [nationalists] began their proceedings with a solemnprayer at Haci Bayram mosque in Ankara.Once in session theyaf® rmed theirunswerving loyalty to the ª holyand inviolable personº of the very Sultan whosetroops were moving against them’ . 29 Inaccordance with his depiction of nationalistsas beingboth loyal to the Sultan and observing the religious ritual ofIslam, the second point that Rustow emphasises is that`Kemal’ s movement originatednot as arevoltagainst established authority but rather in popular self-defenceagainst a foreigninvasion which threatened national extinction’ . 30 Onthequestion of secularism versus religion,Rustow notes that `in these crucial years ofthe War of Independence the [religious] hierarchy’ s subservienceto a rulerwho was avirtualprisoner of the enemy did permanent damage to the statusof organised religion’ . 31 Hisconclusion is thatMustafa Kemal and his associates were`determined secularists and they found themselves at the head of anationalistmovement that started out being intensely religious’ . 32 Thepolitical developments that followed the foundation of the Turkish Republiccon® rm bothKandiyoti’ s andRustow’ sinterpretations.In this day and age,when rewriting history is thespace ofbloodshed, the purpose of revisiting Istanbulin 1920 is notto provide a differentinterpretation. Instead, recalling a conjunctureof British military invasion, along with the French and Italian occupationof Anatolia under the Sevr agreement is tonote two things. One, Turkishnationalism and Islamic religiosity are inseparablefrom one another. Two,nationalist religiosity and religious nationalism operate on the¯ uidline of acolonial/colonisedlogic. Thenational anthem is atestimonyof the entangled roots of Turkish, nationalist,Muslim identity. In the words of the religious poet who wrote the verse,`though the West gird itself with a wallof steel, my bosom ® lledwith my faithis myfortress. Fear not!How can this faith be smothered by that monster calledª Civilizationº! whichhas butone tooth left in its jaw?’ It speaks for heroicnationalism enriched by religious belief and contempt for Western civilisation.The questions which remain unanswered are as follows:if Ataturk was a`coercive’, `elitist’, secularistleader in the European Enlightenment tradition,why did he approve of the National Assembly’ s decisionto use these verses as thenational anthem? In the coercive years ofthe late 1920s and throughoutthe 1930s, when Ataturk and his associates are claimedto have pursueda Western,secular, rationalist and Turkish nationalist project from above,why did they leave the national anthem untouched? Why do Kemalist nationaliststoday promote unity by the symbolic power of the anthem? Thebinary logic does not address thesequestions. The predominant argument 517 BANU HELVACIOGLU thatAtaturk used religious mobilisation as apoliticalinstrument for `his project’ is toosimplistic. This explanation exaggerates Ataturk’ s despoticpower and underestimatesthe power of persuasion in all its complexity. For one thing, it assumes thatall devout Muslims who took part in the national independence movementwere brainwashed. Since, even in the spring of 1920, the truth could nothave been known with any degree of certainty, it is importantto problema- tisethe practical implications of the binary logic rather than offering an interpretationof history based on intentions and motivations. Implicitin the binary thinking of the opposition between secular and Islami- cistpositions is thesilencing of the missing link in the polarisationÐ the West, orEurope. That is whyit is importantto remember that the National Indepen- denceproject did not have two but three objectives. Today the polarisation betweennationalists and Islamicists has threevariables. The third variable is Europe,which is boththe enemy and the object of desire.(Notice it is thissame logicwhich manifests itself in objectsof desireand in objects of hatredsuch as `women’in patriarchal discourse, `east’ inorientalist discourse, `West’ in occidentalistdiscourse). Toaddress theduality of theway in which Europe today plays an active role inthe entangled nationalist Muslim identity in Turkey, the second point that needsto beproblematisedis thatpart of thenational/ religiousidentity in Turkey containsa fragile,¯ uidcolonial/ colonisedmentality. In this regard, Mustafa Kemal’s projectof NationalIndependence carries aduality.On theone hand, as has beenreiterated, it copies the colonial± orientalist± Enlightenment culture in its contemptfor the mysticism, laziness and obscurantism of Islamictraditions. On theother hand, recalling the historical conjuncture of foreign occupation, the NationalIndependence expresses apositionfrom the purview of the colonised, iethosecolonised by imperialmilitary occupation, by Westerncapital as wellas bytheSultan’ s and Sheh-ul-Islam’s cooperationwith the `gendarmes of Western capitulation’in economic as wellas inmilitary terms. This¯ uiddiscourse of thecolonial/ coloniseddimension of religiousnational- ism reappearsin themid-1990s in thecontexts of Turkey’ s pendingmembership tothe European Union and the war in Bosnia. The killing of Bosnian Muslims triggeredthe identity of the colonised in Turkey, in part because Muslims are marginalisedand discriminated against elsewhere in Europe in the contexts of bothmainstream politics and of the politics of neo-Naziatrocities. The character- isticfeature of Muslimidentity as amarginalisedgroup in Europe is thefragile self-perceptionof allcolonised entities whose conceptions of historical marginal- isationare enforcedby political and cultural realities of the present. In Turkey thefragility comes tothe surface as anexpression of contemptfor the `civilised’ Westwhere neo-Nazis burn Turkish immigrants alive, where the UN imposesan arms embargoin Bosnia, or where Turkish passports are viewedwith suspicion atcustoms posts in metropolitan airports in Europe. On the eve of the signing ofthe Customs Union agreement, the interventions by the European Parliament onthe state of democracy in Turkey further reinforced the fragility of the colonisedself. In this respect, it is alltoo logical to ® ndareas ofagreement betweenstaunch Kemalists and staunch Islamicists: `Europehas nobusiness in tellingus whatto do,and what not to do’.Inthis tacit agreement nationalists and 518 TURKS ATTHE PERIPHERY OF EUROPE

Islamiciststreat Europe as ifit is apoliceforce, regulating supervising, controllinginternal affairs inTurkey.

Welcomingat the spring Springis aseason ofplenty. A springis alsoa source.In Turkey, the source of thepolarisations between secular and Islamicist politics is aviciouscircle of Hegelianlogic where difference is conceivedas oppositionand solution as a synthesisof opposites. The polar opposites are conceivedand experienced at the levelsof exalted conditions and Beings: God/ Allah, Nation/Millet,andWestern Europeancivilisation. In Turkey, the Hegelian logic presents itself in three choices:a predominantlynationalist, modern secular position; a predominantly Sunni,anti-European, anti-Ataturk position; and a thirdposition synthesising bothtrends, in the form of a Turkish,Islamic formation. All three positions reproducea viciouscycle of an authoritarian heritage of political change from above,and culturally, politically designed amnesia. If Hegelianlogic and the reproduction of this logic in authoritarian patterns, stylesand intonations are thesources ofthe problem, then is therea wayout of thiscircular cycle? No, there is not.There is noway out, but there is awayin. Ratherthan repudiating the heritage, opposing binary thinking, claiming to go beyondit, I proposeto establish a differentrelation with the heritage. The differencelies in the recognition that oppositional stands and a negationof one poleat the expense of theother only reproduce the heritage of destruction.In the currentregional conjuncture what is neededis alaboriousanalysis of the entangledroots of religious nationalisms. To that end, the politics of difference inTurkey needs partnership both inside and outside. Where? How? Easyand simple, just hail: Europe! where have you been all these years? We havebeen looking for you all over the place. Would you like to join us in examininghow the Hegelian logic appears in your home? Looking forward to ameetingat the spring in spring.

Notes Iwouldlike to thank Professor Metin Heper, Sami veYekhan Helvacioglu and Jan Nederveen-Pieterse for theircritical comments andvaluable insight into history, religion and tradition. 1 FromJacques Chirac’ sspeech inthe European Parliament concerningTurkey’ s acceptance ofthe Customs Union.Quoted as headlinenews inthe daily Yeni Yuzyil,17July 1995. 2 Mehmet AkifErsoy was adevoutMuslim. In March 1921 the National Assembly, under Mustafa Kemal’ s leadership,decided to use Mehmel AkifErsoy’ s poem`To Our Heroic Army’ as thenational anthem. In translatingthe verses fromTurkish, I bene®ted from Dankwart Rustow’ s translationin `Politics and Islam inTurkey 1920± 1955’ , inRichard Frye (ed), Politicsand Islam in Turkey ,S’gravenage:Mouton, 1957, p 74.Rustow’ s translation,however, misses manydifferent meanings of theArabic word,`Hak’ ,whichErsoy uses todenote justice, right, righteousness and God all at once.Another subtle reference byErsoy is the Arabic word,` millet’,whichmeans nation,people, as well as areligiouscommunity. 3 SerifA Mardin,`Ideology and religion in the Turkish revolution’ , InternationalJournal of Middle East Studies,2, 1971, p 238. 4 HowardReed, `Revival ofIslam in Secular Turkey’ ,TheMiddle East Journal ,Summer 1954,p 267. 5 Rustow,`Politics and Islam inTurkey’ , p70. 6 GHJansen,`Turkey: the Need forRoots’ , MiddleEast Forum ,37(9),1961, p 15. 519 BANU HELVACIOGLU

7 SerifMardin, `Religion in Modern Turkey’ , InternationalSocial Science Journal ,29,1977, p 579. 8 Thesecular electioncampaigns for the parliamentary election in December 1995coincided with Turkey’ s acceptance ofthe European Customs Union which has beenviewed as the® rst steptowards membership ofthe European Union. In both instances thesecular bloctargetted the Welfare Partyas athreatto the Europeanidentity of the Turkish Republic. 9 BinnazToprak examines thesecularisation process underfour headings: symbolic, institutional, functional andlegal. Symbolic secularisation included changes in alphabet from Arabic toLatin script, and in language, egsubstituting new wordsderived from Turkish roots in place ofArabic andPersian derivatives. `The sacred qualityattached toArabic as thelanguage of Godhad made theuse oftheArabic scriptladen with religious symbolism’. Institutionalsecularisation put religion under the control of thestate. Functionalsecularisation broughtchanges in the judical process andin education. Legal secularisation brought changes in favour of women,such as compulsorycivil marriage ceremony,as opposedto religious ceremony, the adoption of the principleof monogamy, freedom ofinter-religious marriage forMuslim women, equal inheritance and parenthoodrights. See BinnazToprak, Islamand Political Development in Turkey ,Leiden,Netherlands: E JBrill,1981, pp 41, 42± 55. 10 Fora briefhistorical summary ofthe opposition between Republican,modern, secular, Europeanand Islamic, Ottomanheritage see MetinHeper, `Islam, polityand society in Turkey: a MiddleEastern perspective’, TheMiddle East Journal ,35(3),1981, pp 350± 351; and Mardin, `Religion in Modern Turkey’ , p 580. 11 Ayse Oncu,`Small Worldsand Grand Projects’ , inMetinHeper, Ayse Oncu& Heinz Kramer, (eds), Turkey andthe West: Changing Political and Cultural Identities ,London:IB Tauris,1993, pp 260± 261. 12 BinnazToprak, `Islamist Intellectuals:Revolt against Industry and Technology’ , inHeper et al. Turkey and the West, p 240. 13 Toprak, Islamand Political Development , p 42. 14 Ayse Kadioglu,`Women’ s Subordinationin Turkey: Is Islam reallythe Villain?’ , MiddleEast Journal , 48(4),1994, p 659. 15 Theground-breaking work in this regard is bySerifMardin, `Center± periphery Relations: a Key toTurkish politics?’, Daedalus,102,1973 pp. 291± 312. For an elaboration of this duality on the question of the politicisationof Islam see, alsoby thesame author,`The Just and the Unjust’ , Daedalus,Summer 1991pp. 113±129; and `Islam inmass society:harmony versus polarisation’ , inMetin Heper &Ahmet Evin(eds), Politicsin the Third Turkish Republic ,SanFrancisco: Westview Press, 1994.For an analysis of the organisationof state poweron theprinciple of bipolarisationsee MetinHeper, `Center andperiphery in the Ottomanempire’ , InternationalPolitical Science Review ,1(1),1980 pp. 81± 105. For ® eldwork on the polarisationbetween urbanand rural, between modernand traditional cleavages see RichardTapper & NancyTapper, `Religion, education and continuity in a provincialtown’ , inTapper & Tapper(eds), Islam inModern Turkey: Religion,Politics and Literature in a SecularState ,London:IB Taurus,1991. 16 As astartingpoint for this rich, diverse area ofregional differentiation, see NurYalman, `Islamic reform andthe mystic traditionin Eastern Turkey’, Archives ofEuropeanSociology ,10,1969 pp. 41± 60. Yalman examines `some Aleviand Bektashi (Kurdish- and Turkish-speaking) villages in the provinces of Malatya andElbistan’ and the relationship between Kemalist reforms, Kemalist intellectualsand the mystic Islamic traditions.Lale Yalcin-Heckmann,`Ethnic Islam andnationalism among the Kurds in Turkey’ , inTapper & Tapper, Islamin Modern Turkey .Yalcin-Heckmann examines therelationship between ethnicityand Islam inthe south eastern provinceof Hakkari.Also, for further research, see SerifMardin `The Naksibendi orderin Turkish history’ , inTapper & Tapper, Islamin Modern Turkey . 17 InTurkey, a radical, revolutionaryIslamic group,called IBCA-C recentlysend a life threateningletter to FethullahGulen, the leader ofa religious±political community. The reason for the life threateningletter is because Gulen`has beenco-opted into the mainstream media andthat he looksdown on ªignorantºradical, militantIslamic groupswho do not even know who Pablo Picasso is’ .Inresponse, IBDA-C made sure to includein its letter anerroneous reference toGauginwho is claimed tohavelost his ear. ` IBDA-C, Fethullah Gulen’i TehditEtti’ , Yeni Yuzyil,13July 1995. According to Binnaz Toprak’ s surveyof theeducational and professionalbackgrounds of some ofthe leading Islamic intellectualsand political leaders, theyhave all beenexposed to western, modernEuropean education. See Toprak,`Islamist intellectual’also by the same author see Islamand Political Development in Turkey ,pp107± 108. Serif Mardin notes the in¯ uence of American intellectualhistory and French literature onIsmet Ozel whois oneof the most articulate, analyticaland politically vocal Islamic intellectualsin Turkey. Mardin, `Islam inmass society’, p167. 18 Onthe question of paradoxical convergence between Islamic feminism anda critiqueof ethnocentricism withinthe Western feministmovements see Deniz Kandiyoti`Introduction’ and `End of Empire: Islam, Nationalismand Women in Turkey’ , inKandiyoti (ed), Women,Islam and the State ,London:Temple UniversityPress, 1991.On the question of the pervasive in¯ uences ofthe histories of colonialism and nationalismon women in Egypt and Turkey also see DKandiyoti,`Identity and its Discontents,: Women andthe Nation’ , inP Williams et al (eds), ColonialDiscourse andColonial Theory ,NY: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992. 520 TURKS ATTHE PERIPHERY OF EUROPE

19 Yasar Demirbulak,`Refahli Belediyelerin 14 Aylik Icraatlari’ , Yeni Yuzyil,3July1995. 20 JSzyliowicz,`Education and political development’ , inHeper &Evin, Politicsin the Third Turkish Republic p 158. 21 In1991 a particularclause ofthe Turkish Republic Law ofAssociations(no 163) has beenchanged so as tolift the ban on theorganisation of anti-secular groups.Bulent Tanor, `Laiklik,Rejim, ve 24. Madde’ , Yeni Yuzyil,23June 1995. 22 GalipRidvanoglu, `The state is thebiggest supporter of the Islamic organisations’, TurkishDaily News , 9 January1995, p A3. 23 RusenCakir’ s journalisticaccount of the Islamicist youthmovement, IBDA-C anddirectory of the editorial boardsof some Islamicist journalscon® rms thisrumour. Rusen Cakir, Ayet ve Slogan ,Istanbul:Metis Yayinlari,1990. 24 Reeva SSimon, TheMiddle East in Crime Fiction ,New York:Lilian Barber Press, 1989,p 49. 25 `TurbanciKatilin Oglu: Boyle bir Sey lazimdi!’ , Yeni Yuzyil,27July1995. The title of this article isanother example offuellingresentment amongsecularists. Itreads `Theson of themurderer: this was needed!’. The titlesilences itsown story, whereby one son and some close relatives ofthe assassin were saddenedand surprisedby the incident. 26 `Istanbul’da Dev BosnaKonseri’ , Yeni Yuzyil,2August1995, p 7. 27 DankwartRustow, p 76. 28 Deniz Kandiyotiª Endof Empire: Islam, Nationalismand Women in Turkeyº in Kandiyoti (ed.), Women, Islamand the State ,London:Temple UniversityPress, 1991,pp 39± 40. 29 Rustow,`Politics and Islam inTurkey’ , 1957,pp 75± 76. 30 Ibid, p 70. 31 Ibid, p 78. 32 Ibid,pp106± 107. 33 Thislist is compiledfor informative purposes and is byno means acomplete documentaryof politicised Islam. 34 Withinthe Sunni community there are fourschoolsÐ Hane® s,Sha® s, Malikis and Hanbalis. Most Sunnis inTurkey belong to theHane® school.One ofthemain distinguishingfeatures ofSunnis from both Alevis andBekthasis is that,while the Sunni traditions are basedon the Quran, the latter twoare notbased on a writtenscript. Alevi and Bektashi groups have af® nitywith the oral history, local traditions, beliefs and ritualsin Anatolia which pre-date the history of Islam. Languagedifferentiation is anotherfactor thatneeds tobe taken into account. Given the of® cial state policyand the educational system, themother tongue of Sunnis,as thepredominant Islamic tradition,is Turkish. 35 Alevismake upof about 30% of the Kurdish population, and some ofthe Kurdish Alevis speak Kurdish onlyor both Kurdish and Turkish depending on their level of schooling and gender. Women as aruledo notdo military service, whichis oneway forKurdish-speaking men inremote villagesto be introduced to Turkish.Rural women who do notparticipate in the public realm, includingformal education,do not learn Turkish. 36 TheNational Order Partywas `proscribedfollowing a rulingof the Turkish Constitutional Court, to the effect thatthe Party had improperly published materials whichviolated the fundamental provision of the Constitutionconcerning laicism’ .Mardin,`Religion in modern Turkey’ , p593.The National Salvation Party,like all politicalparties, was bannedby the military regime whichremained inpower between 1980±1983. 37 Fora complete partyprogramme see RusenCakir, Ayet ve Slogan ,Istanbul:Metis Yayinlari, 1990, pp 226±230. 38 Ibid,pp175± 176. 39 Fora surveyof these journalsand their impact onfemale universitystudents see FerideAcar, `Turkiye’de Islamci Hareket veKadin’ in Sirin Tekeli (ed), KadinBakis Acisindan 1981’ ler TurkiyesindeKadin , Istanbul:lletisim Yayinlari,1990. 40 There is muchconfusion about the theological and political con® guration of tarikats since theOttoman period.Two of the overlapping contexts in which tarikats are analysedare theSu® order, which is a mystical branchof Islam predominantlywithin the Sunni tradition, and the Dervish order, which is also mystical butsometimes Bektashisare includedin dervish orders. Bektashis’ relationship with the Sunni traditionis complicatedby local traditions and rituals. 41 BinnazToprak, `The state, politics,and religion in Turkey’ , inHeper &Evin, State,Democracy andthe Military, p 130. 42 Forsources onthis issue see, Mardin,`Religion in Modern Turkey’ , pp594, 599.

521 BANU HELVACIOGLU

Appendix.A partialcon® guration of Islam inTurkey 33

IslamicTheological Divisions in Turkey 1 Sunnis34 2Alevis(speak Turkish and Kurdish), 35 3Bektashis(speak Turkish); 4Nuseyris(speak Arabic).

Withinthe Sunnitradition PoliticalParties (1) TheWelfare Party (Refah Partisi):founded in 1983,an offspring of TheNational Order Party,1970± 71 (MilliNizam Partisi)and the National Salvation Party, 1972± 1980 (Milli Selamet Partisi). 36 (2) TheRevivalist Party (DirilisPartisi): founded in 1990; no documentedprevious involvement in politics; amongsome ofits founding principles are seekingthe truth, science as themain method,tool and road to truth,the integration of intellectuals with the people, the unity and integrity of the state, andencouraging theuse ofglass rather thanplastic bottles. 37 (3) TheGrand Unity Party (BuyukBirlik Partisi): an offspring of the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi);party platform cuts across Turkic(ethnic/ racial) nationalismand Islam as theethnic, racial, religiousorigin of Turks.

Politicalmovements (1) Nurcular:®rst emerged as afringeIslamic grouppredating the foundation of the Turkish Republic aroundthe teachings of Bediuuzzam SaidNursi; are nowpoliticised around different leaders; primary publicationsassociated withNurcus are Yeni Asya and Yeni Nesil (dailynewspapers), Kopru,Bizim Aile, Can Kardes (magazines addressingfamily and cultural issues); are rumouredto have connections with mainstream politicalparties. (2) Fettullahcilar :anoffspring of Nurcus organised by FethullahGulen; publications: Zaman (daily), Sizinti (a magazine foundedin 1978); de® ned as moderate andcooptive by radical groups. (3) Suleymancilar :predatingthe foundation of theRepublic, emerged as anoffshoot of theNaksibendis, are noworganised around different leaders. (4) CemallettinKaplan Group :organisedin Germany, emulatingthe Iranian Shi’ ite modeof mobilisation aroundan Imam as areligious/politicalleader. Thefounder of the movement, Cemallettin Kaplan,ran as acandidatefrom the National Salvation Party in 1977. (5) Hizbullah:Sunnisupporters of the Shi’ ite Islamic Regime inIran, suspected to engage in physical violence. (6) IBDA-C-TheIslamic Front for Great EasternRaiding (Islami BuyukDogu Akincilar Cephesi): originated from within theAkincilar (1975)which was themilitant youth movement of theNational Salvation Party; IBDA-C has come toprominence in the late 1980s;assumes responsibilityfor some ofthe bomb attacks in urbancentres; itsparty platform legitimises thespiritual importance of killing which also brings unity among believers,38 publication: Ak-Dogus (WhiteBirth) which in July 1995 ran an article threateningFethullah Gulen,the leader ofFethullahcilar, for his cooptation with the mainstream media.

Journalson women’ sissues: Mektup39 (Letter) Kadinve Aile (Womenand Family) Bizim Aile (OurFamily); associated withNurcus

TarikatsÐIslamic brotherhoods or mystical orders 40 Naksibendis Rufais Kadiris 522 TURKS ATTHE PERIPHERY OF EUROPE

Distributionof Islamicist support for `mainstream’ political parties 41 TheWelfare Party is `rumouredto have connections with’ the followers of the late sheikMehmet Efendi,a particularsect withinthe Nakshibendi order. The party leader, Necmettin Erbakan’s af® liationwith Naksi- bendishas beenwell documented. 42 TheMotherland Party is `rumouredto have connections’ with some Suleymancigroups, an offshoot of Naksibendis. TheTrue Path Party andits predecessorsÐ TheJustice Party and The Democrat Party Ðare rumouredto have received supportfrom groups associated withNurcus.

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