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Heldenpolitik: Ritterkreuz, Ideology and the Complexities of Hero Culture under National Socialism

By Colin Gilmour

A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

December 2018

Department of History and Classical Studies McGill University Montreal, Quebec

©Colin Gilmour 2018

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Abstract

This dissertation explores the political history of ’s highest for military excellence during the Second World War: the ’s of the , or “Ritterkreuz.”

Expanding upon a limited foundation of existing scholarly research, its primary focus is to examine the role played by this famous as a vessel of “symbolic capital” for the National Socialist regime. Designed not only as a tool to help forge a new archetype for military heroism, it was also to represent the “revolution” that the Party claimed to have produced in German society and politics. Using this function as a framework, the component chapters of this study document different ways in which it informed or affected official usages of the Ritterkreuz and the activities of its recipients – called “Ritterkreuzträger” – during the war years. Through this investigation, the dissertation argues that while achieving an impact on wartime culture that continues to be felt in

Germany today, both medal and men proved as much a source of frustration and embarrassment to the regime as they did ideological success. As such, it challenges several existing assumptions regarding the role of orders and decorations created by National Socialism while highlighting an underrecognized layer of complexity in its “Heldenpolitik” (Hero Politics).

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Résumé

Cette thèse explore l'histoire politique de la plus haute distinction militaire accordée en Allemagne durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale : la croix de chevalier de la croix de fer, la « Ritterkreuz ». En s’appuyant sur une littérature scientifique limitée, l’objectif principal de cette thèse est d’examiner le rôle joué par cette célèbre médaille en tant que véhicule porteur de « capital symbolique » pour le régime national-socialiste. Conçues non seulement pour permettre au régime de façonner un nouvel archétype d’héroïsme militaire, ces médailles ont aussi été exploitées comme emblèmes de la « révolution » sociopolitique qu’il prétendait avoir accomplie en Allemagne. En utilisant cette fonction comme cadre analytique, les chapitres de cette étude documentent les différentes manières qu’elle contribue à influencer l’utilisation de la Ritterkreuz et les activités de ses récipiendaires – nommés « Ritterkreuzträger » – durant les années de guerre. Dans le cadre de cette recherche, nous argumentons que bien que les effets culturels de cette campagne militaire soient toujours ressentis en Allemagne aujourd’hui, les médailles et les récipiendaires se sont avérés être autant une source de frustration et d'embarras que de succès idéologique. En tant que telle, notre étude remet en question plusieurs des hypothèses concernant le rôle des ordres et des décorations créés par le régime national-socialiste tout en levant le voile sur la complexité sous-estimée de l’« Heldenpolitik » (la politique centrée sur les héros).

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ………………………………………………………………………………vi Guide to Abbreviations ………………………………………………………………………....viii

Introduction 1

Chapter I The Roots of Symbolic Capital: Revisiting the Origins 23 of the Ritterkreuz I.1 Symbolic Roots I.2 Forging a Mythology I.3 Barriers and Compromises I.4 Symbolic Amalgamation

Chapter II Hitler’s Halsorden: The Difficulties of Ritterkreuz-Distribution 74 II.1 Establishing Meaning II.2 The “Ordensfrage” II.3 Resentment and Division II.4 Fighting the Tide II.5 Symbolic Disintegration

Chapter III Privileges of Rank: Ritterkreuzträger and the 148 Question of Special Benefits III.1 “Special Care” for Heroes III.2 Problematic Promotions III.3 Creating a Settler Elite

Chapter IV Celebrity Soldiers: Ritterkreuzträger as the “Stars” 194 of the IV.1 “Kein Heldenkult” IV.2 Ritterkreuz-Mania IV.3 Déjà vu IV.4 Heroes of Necessity IV.5 Instruments of Delusion

Chapter V When Heroes Misbehave: Ritterkreuzträger and the 264 Problem of Political Reliability V.1 The “Risky” Side of Nazi Heldenpolitik

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V.2 Swept Under the Rug V.3 Crossing the Line V.4 Insult to Injury

Epilogue The Endurance of a Hero Cult: The Ritterkreuz after 304 National Socialism

Conclusions 320

Bibliography 331

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Acknowledgements

Those close to me are aware of the personal and professional challenges that accompanied the researching and writing of this work. They are in many ways woven into its pages. As such, I must offer my sincerest thanks to those who have helped in finally bringing about its completion.

First, of course, I thank Dr. Peter Hoffmann and Dr. Brian Lewis for the countless hours spent reading drafts, providing guidance and meeting with me when I needed it. I am also grateful to the other faculty members in the Department of History and Classics who encouraged me along the way, such as Judith Szapor, Lorenz Lüthi and Mike Fronda. Further afield, I am indebted to Ulrike

Zimmermann and Sonderforschungs-bereich 948 “Helden, Heroismen, Heroisierung,” at Karl-

Ludwigs Universität as well as the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of , for making possible much of the research which undergirds this work. On the same note, I would also be loath not to extend thanks (and apologies) to the archivists and librarians in Montreal,

Berlin, Koblenz and Freiburg who fielded my many, and often quite large, requests for books, microfilm and other materials over the past several years.

I want to specially thank the members of my writing and office-mates of Ferrier 333 including Max Hamon, Sonya Roy, Veronika Helfert, Catherine Ulmer, Raminder Saini, Andrew

Dial and especially Colin Grittner and Carolynn McNally. I am grateful for your advice, criticism and counsel and can only apologize once more for the volume of words you have all had to read about , and war hero culture. DTF indeed! Likewise, a special thanks to my uncle, Ian Gilmour, for his willingness to spend time helping me sculpt and clarify my thoughts and writing. I am also grateful to my parents, Craig and Cindy, my parents-in-law Ray and Judy, my brothers and sisters Scott and Sarry, Alanna and Benoit and Alyssa, as well as my pastors

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Dwight Bernier and Graham Singh for offering support and the ability to recharge amidst difficult seasons. Last but certainly not least, I must thank my wonderful wife, Ashley, for her patience, perseverance and encouragement through this project, and for bearing its challenges and frustrations with me. I could never have done this without you.

1 Peter 5:10.

Colin Gilmour, Montreal Montreal, QC. 2018.

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Guide to Abbreviations

Medals, Orders and Decorations of the Iron Cross (ascending by precedence) - EK-W – Eisernes Kreuz für Nichtkombattanten (Iron Cross for Non-Combatants) - EK2 – Eisernes Kreuz 2. Klasse (Iron Cross Second Class) - EK1 – Eisernes Kreuz 1. Klasse (Iron Cross First Class) - RK – Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes (Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross) - RK-E – Eichenlaub zum Ritterkreuz ... etc. (Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves) - RK-ES – Eichenlaub mit Schwerter ... etc. (Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and Swords) - RK-ESB – Eichenlaub mit Schwerter und Brillanten … etc. (Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds) - RK-ESBG – Eichenlaub mit Schwerter und Brillanten … etc. in (Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords and Diamonds in Gold) - GK – Grosskreuz ( of the Iron Cross) Order of the War - KVM – Kriegsverdienstmedaille () - KVK2 (-S) – Kriegsverdienstkreuz 2. Klasse ( Second Class (with swords)) - KVK1 (-S) – Kriegsverdienstkreuz 1. Klasse (War Merit Cross First Class (with swords)) - RKVK (-S) – Ritterkreuz des Kriegsverdienstkreuzes (Knight’s Cross of the War Merit Cross (with swords))

Other Military or Veterans’ - EW – Ehrenkreuz des Weltkrieges 1914-1918 (Honour Cross of the World War 1914- 1918) - SK – Spanienkreuz () - EB – Ehrenblatt (Honour Roll) - EBS – Ehrenblattspange (Honour Roll Clasp) - VA – Verwundetenabzeichen (Wound ) - NKS – Nahkampfspange (Close Combat Clasp) - DK – Deutsches Kreuz ()

Political Awards: - GPA – Goldene Parteiabzeichen (Golden Party Badge) - BO – Blutorden (Blood Order) - DO – Deutscher Orden (German Order)

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Relevant Institutions, Offices or Departments Military Offices/Designations - Adj.W.b.F. – Adjutant der Wehrmacht beim Führer (Wehrmacht Adjutant of the Führer) - HPA; LPA; MPA – Heerespersonalamt (Army Personnel Department), Luftwaffepersonalamt (Air Force Personnel Department), Marinepersonalamt (Navy Personnel Department) - OKW – Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht) - OKH/OKL/OKM – (Army), (Air Force) und Marine (Navy) - PK – Propagandakompanie ( ) - WFVA- Wehrmacht Fűrsorge- und Versorgungsamt (Wehrmacht Welfare and Maintenance Department) - WPr – Wehrmacht Propagandaabteilung (Wehrmacht Propaganda Department)

Offices/Departments of State and Party - DNB – Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro (German Press Office) - NSKOV – Nationalsozialistische Kriegsopferversorgung (National Socialist War Victims Association) - PKz – Parteikanzlei (Party Chancellery) - PräsKz – Präsidialkanzlei (Presidential Chancellery) - REM – Reichsministerium für Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung (Reich Ministry of Science, Education and Culture) - RKFDV – Reichskommissariat für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums (Reich Commissariat for the Strengthening of German Nationhood) - RKz – Reichkanzlei () - RMF – Reichministerium der Finanzen (Reich Finance Ministry) - RMI – Reichsministerium des Innern (Reich Interior Ministry) - RMVP – Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda (Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda) - RRVP – Reichsring für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda (Reich Ring for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda) - SD – (Security Service of the SS).

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Introduction

In January 1941, a German military court heard the case of a young named Adam

Drayss, who had recently committed one of the more remarkable crimes of the Second World War.

Over the course of several months, he had forged a series of awards to commit a spree of fraud across several cities, ending in his hometown of Frankenthal in the -Palatinate. It all started in the early summer of 1940, when Drayss had attempted to improve his level of care and comfort in a military hospital following a motorcycle crash. To that end, he had forged evidence of several promotions and an escalating variety of medals, ultimately graduating to the falsification of the rare and prestigious Knight’s Cross, a decoration that marked him as a superior soldier within the Wehrmacht (Armed Forces). Wearing this medal at his throat, over the following months Drayss thus enjoyed the acclaim and “red-carpet treatment” of a local hero: men bought him coffee and beer, cafés asked him to sign their guestbooks and dignitaries bestowed gifts, money and public honours on him as a hero of the . As with most fraudsters, however, the would-be hero was not satisfied and soon strove for even greater gain.

In September 1940, he proceeded to his hometown of Frankenthal to ply his fraud there on the pretense of a well-deserved leave to visit his father. Upon arrival, the local Bürgermeister greeted him as a returning hero and ushered him to the town hall, where he subsequently named

Drayss an Ehrenbürger (Honourary Citizen) of the city and announced that a square would be renamed in his honour. The beaming mayor then organized a grand reception at a local hotel where

Drayss signed autographs, gave a speech to assembled dignitaries and had his photograph taken with the regional Nazi governor (), Joseph Bürkel.1 The following day, though, the fraud

1 “Ein Frankenthaler Ritterkreuzträger. Adam Drayss vom Führer ausgezeichnet – Platzbenennung nach dem Helden und Verleihungen des Ehrenbürgerrechts,” Frankenthaler Zeitung. September 16, 1940. 1 came tumbling down after several local Army officers made inquiries about the curiously sudden appearance of such a hero in their midst. Surely of such a man would have preceded him in the press, newsreels or the Wehrmacht’s daily bulletin (). Arrested soon after,

Drayss was court-martialed for his crimes. In his wake, though, he had also left the reputation of the local authorities in shambles. As the military court noted in its judgement, the ease with which he had manipulated them through the symbolic value of the country’s medals and respect for war heroes spoke to wider political issues being at stake, issues that demanded his crimes receive an even harsher punishment.2

After receiving a substantial prison term, however, Adam Drayss vanished into obscurity.

Though recently published by German author Rüdiger Kramer as a semi-fictionalized novella entitled Der von Frankenthal (The from Frankenthal), his spree of fraud in

1940 remains little-known outside of his hometown.3 This is unfortunate, for besides being a fascinating story, it provides an illuminative, if unusual, window onto the focus of the present study: the role and significance of the Knight’s Cross in Germany during the Second World War.

Established by Hitler himself in September of 1939 as a new grade of the famous Order of the Iron

Cross (Eisernen Kreuzes, EK), the “Ritterkreuz” (RK) was the Third Reich’s highest and most famous military award. As demonstrated above, it evoked considerable respect in wartime society,

2 For the records of Drayss’s trial the following January of 1941, see BAMA RW 4/300 f.1. Gericht der Division No.173. Strafsache gegen den Gefreiten Adam Drayss, 5.2.1941. 3 Rüdiger Kramer, Der Hauptmann von Frankenthal. Erzählung über eine Köpenickiade in einer pfälzischen Stadt während des Zweiten Weltkriegs (Dienheim: Iatros Verlag, 2007). While drawing on the same records of Drayss’s court martial, Kramer’s story inserts thoughts, dialogue and details for dramatic effect. He also portrays Drayss as a hapless bungler who stumbles down a slippery slope of unfortunate choices until he has passed the point of no return. Witnesses at the trial, however, gave a much darker picture: that of a man whom one medical witness described as a “psychopathic liar and swindler” (BAMA RW 4/300). 2 even to the point of gullibility, while its recipients, called “Ritterkreuzträger” (Bearers of the

Knight’s Cross4), enjoyed considerable popularity and moral authority.

More important, like the highest military awards of other countries, the RK has continued to evoke a particular fascination after the war and remains today one of the most familiar and discussed decorations of the period. Awarded 7,314 times according to the latest index5, passing references to it are ubiquitous within the vast literature surrounding Germany during the Second

World War, and especially studies on the Wehrmacht, Waffen-SS and their leading personalities

(since almost all were recipients, unlike with other medals).6 Likewise, its connection to military excellence has led some historians, for example, to use its distribution as a metric for judging different groups’ combat effectiveness.7 Most notable, though, is the fact that there is today a sizeable popular literature produced by a committed cohort of hobby historians and enthusiast researchers about RK awardings and recipients’ exploits. The market for this material has also expanded exponentially in recent years with the onset of the Internet age; a simple search online will reveal many websites, forums and even social media pages dedicated to the subject.8

4 The remainder of this work will use the German form. This is not only for the sake of brevity but also because of the inadequacy of translations to fully capture the meaning of the term “Träger” (also translated as ‘holder’), which connotes not only having won to wear the medal, but also a connection to its symbolism and history. 5 Veit Scherzer’s 850-page index is the most recent of several works of this kind, being preceded those of Gerhard von Seemen and Walther-Peel Fellgiebel in 1955 and 1986 respectively. Veit Scherzer, Die Ritterkreuzträger: Die Inhaber des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes 1939-1945 (Jena: Scherzers Militär-Verlag Ranis, 2005); Gerhard von Seemen, Die Ritterkreuzträger 1939-1945 (Bad Nauheim: Verlag Hans-Hennig Podzun, 1955); Walther-Peer Fellgiebel, Die Träger des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes 1939-1945. Die Inhaber der höchsten Auszeichnung des Zweiten Weltkrieges aller Wehrmachtteile (Friedberg/H: Podzun-Pallas 1986). 6 Some biographies, for example, make the connection more explicit than others: e.g. David Fraser, Knight’s Cross. A Life of Field (New York: Harper Collins, 1993). 7 E.g. Roman Töppel, “Das Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes und der Kampfwert militärischer Verbände,” in Zeitschrift für Heereskunde. 76. No.446 (2012): 180-190. 8 Examples of what is a much wider literature include: Gordon Williamson, of the Iron Cross: A History 1939- 1945 (: Blandford Press, 1987), Knight's Cross and Oak Leaves Recipients 1939–40 (Oxford: Osprey, 2004) and Knight's Cross with Diamonds Recipients 1941–45 (Oxford: Osprey, 2006); : Knight's Cross Holders of the U-Boat Service (Atglen: Schiffer Publishing, 1995) and Knights of the Wehrmacht: Knight's Cross Holders of the Fallschirmjäger (Atglen: Schiffer Publishing, 1996). 3

Yet, despite this high degree of recognizability, the foundational problem addressed by this study is that scholarly research into the role and significance of the RK in wartime Germany – i.e. that illustrated by the story of Adam Drayss – is surprisingly underdeveloped. To date, in fact, there has yet to be a dedicated investigation of substance into this topic, much less one that incorporates its findings into the wider historiography of the Third Reich and its ideologically driven hero culture. The passing references to this medal mentioned above are often all one will find, even in vast, multivolume works on Germany and the Second World War.9 As will be explained below, what research has been undertaken offers an incomplete, and in places uneven, picture that not only represents a noteworthy gap in scholarly discourse, but one that continues to have serious ramifications for Germany’s continuing struggle with the legacy of National

Socialism.

Historiographical Review

Much of the existing information about the RK can be found in phaleristic10 literature documenting the history of the order to which it belonged. Sizeable studies of the EK’s long official existence from 1813 to 1945 by historians such as Frank Wernitz, Guntram Schulze-

Wegener and Steven Previtera, contain sections devoted to the 1939 issue and to the RK specifically.11 Such works, which often combine historical narrative with data useful for collectors,

9 For example, see the seminal series of this name edited by Jörg Echternkamp for the Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (MGFA). Most of its ten volumes contain several passing mentions of of the RK (and many others), but one will look in vain for discussion of substance on its significance outside of a few anecdotes and scattered statistics about award winners, even in sections detailing wartime hero culture. Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg. Vols 1-10. ( and : Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1979-2008). 10 Phaleristics relates to the study or categorization of orders and decorations, usually at the level of national or imperial systems of awards. See further Eckart Henning and Dietrich Herfurth, eds. Orden und Ehrenzeichen. Handbuch der Phaleristik (: Böhlau Verlag, 2010). 11 Frank Wernitz, The Iron Cross 1813 – 1870 – 1914. The History and Significance of a Medal, trans. Anne Kozeluh (Vienna: Verlag Militaria, 2013); Guntram Schulze-Wegener, Das Eiserne Kreuz in der deutschen Geschichte (Graz: 4 have meticulously reconstructed the policies and regulations that governed the awarding of this medal and its recommendation process, as well as the minute details of its physicality and manufacture (even down to changes in its chemical composition12). At the same time, they outline how Hitler added several supplementary grades to the RK during the war and how each gradually inflated in number. Finally, they include a short description of recipients’ and their experience as war heroes of the Reich, customarily citing examples of brave and daring soldiers who won the

RK, and stating that they were held in great esteem, enjoyed special privileges and became the darlings of the propaganda machine.

What these works present in these sections, in other words, is a synthesized historical profile of the RK. However, due to their role as sub-sections within broader studies, such profiles largely fall short of the mark in terms of scope and analytical vigour, highlighting in the process the uneven and often fragmentary nature of current historiography. On one hand, the detail they provide on award regulations, recommendation procedures and distribution-statistics, for example, is reflective of the methodological traditions of phaleristic history as an auxiliary discipline. Such information largely stands upon concerted research into original sources. Yet, beyond this area of focus, an uncomfortable amount of the aforementioned profile rests upon evidentiary foundations that are less stable, relying to an uncomfortable degree upon inference and extrapolation, rather than dedicated, systematic research.

Ares Verlag, 2012); Steven Previtera, The Iron Time. The History of the Iron Cross (Richmond, VA: Winidore, 1999); Harald Geissler, Das Eiserne Kreuz, 1813 bis heute (Norderstedt: Militärverlag Klaus D. Patzwall, 1995). 12 For arguably the most minute of such analyses which discusses the RK’s millimetric thickness and the chemical grade of its silver rim, see Dietrich Maerz, Das Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes und Höheren Stufen (Hong Kong: Kings Time Printing Press, 2007). Likewise, one of the most comprehensive studies of the EK order and the evolution of its regulations and structure (upon which recent EK scholars and histories base much their descriptions) is a 1968 doctoral dissertation by Otto Werner Hütte, “Die Geschichte des Eisernen Kreuzes und seine Bedeutung für das Preussische und Deutsche Auszeichnungswesen von 1813 bis zur Gegenwart,” (Ph.D. diss., Universität , 1968), n.b. 112-113, 125. 5

The standard description of the media-role of Ritterkreuzträger, for instance, rests largely upon a synthesis of isolated fragments of research from different fields instead of concerted examination of available sources pertaining to wartime propaganda policy. Most of these fragments that deal with Ritterkreuzträger directly, moreover, have only documented a few specific aspects of this role in any detail, chiefly their usage by the Wehrmacht’s speaker system during the war and their attendance of youth events.13 While providing hints, in other words, such references have lacked perspective on the wider evolution of Ritterkreuzträger’s involvement in propaganda and its impact on popular culture. The closest thing to such a perspective today are the many biographies of prominent members of this group such as Erwin Rommel or works like

Jochen Lehnhardt’s recent study of the Waffen-SS in wartime propaganda, though in both cases a limited scope precludes the possibility of meaningful conclusions about the experience of

Ritterkreuzträger as a whole.14

13 For two of the most comprehensive references to Ritterkreuzträger’s usage as speakers, see Daniel Uziel, The Propaganda Warriors: The Wehrmacht and the Consolidation of the German Home Front (New York: Peter Lang, 2008), 220, 231-233, 272-275 and Marlis Steinert, Hitler’s War and the Germans (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1977), 196-197. Regarding their involvement with German youth, see Michael Buddrus, Totale Erziehung für den totalen Krieg. Hitlerjugend und nationalsozialistische Jugendpolitik. Teil 1 (Munich: K.G. Sauer, 2003), n.b. 175, 218; Guido Knopp, Hitler’s Children (Stroud: Sutton, 2002), 165-167, 174. See also Roger Moorhouse, at War (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 65. 14 Rommel is by far the most well-documented Wehrmacht personality of the war. Among the most comprehensive of his many biographies which feature discussion of his propaganda work are: Fraser, Knight’s Cross, (n.b. 213, 308- 311); Ralph Georg Reuth, Rommel. The End of a Legend, trans. Debra S. Marmor and Herbert D. Danner (London: Haus Publishing Place, 2005) (n.b. chap.3) and Thomas Kubetzky, “The Mask of Command.” Bernard L. Montgomery, George S. Patton und Erwin Rommel in der Kriegsberichterstattung des Zweiten Weltkriegs, 1941- 1944/45 (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2010) (n.b. 282-298). After Rommel (and for reasons that will be made clearer shortly) the most numerous biographies that shed shafts of light on the connection between the RK and propaganda are those about prominent submarine commanders and fighter pilots, notably a series by German historian Kurt Braatz: . Die Biographie (Moosburg: NeunundzwanzigSechs Verlag, 2008) and Walter Krupinski – Jagdflieger, Geheimagent, General (Moosburg: NeunundzwanzigSechs Verlag, 2010) as well as several noteworthy works by American authors Colin D. Heaton and Anne-Marie Lewis, including: The German Aces Speak: World War II Through the Eyes of Four of the Luftwaffe’s Most Important Commanders (Wilmington: Zenith Press, 2011), The German Aces Speak II: World War II Through the Eyes of Four of the Luftwaffe’s Most Important Commanders (Wilmington: Zenith Press, 2014), and The Star of Africa. The Story of Hans Marseille, the Rogue Luftwaffe Ace Who Dominated the WWII Skies (Wilmington: Zenith Press, 2014). Jochen Lehnhardt’s useful study is entitled: Die Waffen-SS: Geburt einer Legende. Himmlers Krieger in der NS-Propaganda (: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2017). 6

Just as problematic, meanwhile, is the generally accepted claim that such men received special privileges as part of their official status as war heroes. Guntram Schulze-Wegener, who has written one of the most comprehensive of recent EK histories, expresses this claim succinctly by saying that Ritterkreuzträger “availed themselves of financial and material benefits.”15

However, like characterizations of their propaganda role, these general statements rely primarily on a scattered body of evidence comprising a single policy document included without context or comment in Gerhard von Seemen’s 1955 Ritterkreuzträger index, a few passing (and sometimes contradictory) recollections in egodocuments and several references to individual monetary payments in social histories of the Wehrmacht.16 There has been no serious attempt to determine if such a system of benefits ever really existed, let alone of what it consisted, to what degree it was formal or informal, or what bearing its material elevation of RK-recipients had on their role in wartime society.

Such examples, in short, illustrate that there is far too much that remains taken for granted about the Third Reich’s most famous award and celebrated soldiers. The current state of knowledge about their wartime role and significance finds perhaps its most effective comparison to an incomplete puzzle; different contributors have completed isolated sections (sometimes unintentionally) but there are many gaps which prevent an adequate understanding of the whole.

Filling in some of these factual gaps and creating a more complete picture of the

RK/Ritterkreuzträger thus represents a foundational contribution of the present study. In addition, however, it must also address arguably the most underdeveloped (and inarguably the most

15 Schulze-Wegener, Das Eiserne Kreuz, 148-149. See further Hűtte, “Eisernen Kreuzes,” 115-117; Rass, Menschenmaterial, 260. 16 See Anlage III, in Seemen, Die Ritterkreuzträger, 313; Christoph Rass, “Das Sozialprofil von Kampfverbänden des deutschen Heeres, 1939 bis 1945,” in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg.Vol.9.1 Die Deutsche Kriegsgesellschaft 1939 bis 1945. Erster Halbband: Politisierung, Vernichtung, Überleben, ed. Jörg Echternkamp (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2004), 717. 7 important) area of current research, namely exploration into their relationship to the National

Socialist regime. Understanding the precise nature of this relationship is not only of historiographical importance but of considerable contemporary relevance, for since 1945 it has become enfolded into the ongoing debate surrounding the proper place of the Wehrmacht in popular memory.

In large measure, this stems from the popular literature mentioned earlier that is dedicated to celebrating Ritterkreuzträger as superior soldiers. In their effort to highlight battlefield exploits, works in this genre have routinely de-emphasized, or outright omitted, connections between the

RK/Ritterkreuzträger and the Hitler regime; what’s more, such efforts have often been intentional.

Several of the most prolific contributors to the genre of popular Ritterkreuzträger biographies, such as Franz Kurowski, have been accused of fostering a nostalgic glorification of these men in support of the “clean Wehrmacht” myth, in which their wartime role is portrayed as apolitical and without any necessary link to the Party or its ideology.17 This long-standing process of historical whitewashing, unfortunately supported by a number of EK historians18, has helped to make the

RK into one of the myth’s enduring strongholds; the ultimate award for men who simply “fought a bad war well.”

17 Kurowski, who died in 2011, wrote numerous glowing biographies of Ritterkreuzträger and other aspects of Wehrmacht history under a variety of pseudonyms such as Karl Alman, Kurt Kollatz and Johanna Schulz. Canadian naval historian Michael L. Hadley has called his books “pulp-trade yarn.” See Hadley, Count not the Dead: The Popular Image of the German Submarine (McGill-Queen’s University Press: Montreal & Kingston, 1995), 129-130, 137, 169-170. His connection to the “clean Wehrmacht” myth and contributions to historical revisionism, moreover, have been the subject of several articles as well as a recent workshop at Ruprecht-Karls-Universität in Heidelberg. 18 Authors of popular RK or EK books like British author Gordon Williamson have made use of introductions to decry its historical denigration and connection to National Socialism, often by including forewords from former Ritterkreuzträger who do the same. E.g. Heinrich Springer, foreword to Williamson, The Iron Cross: A History 1813- 1957 (London: Blandford Press, 1985); Hans Sturm, foreword to Williamson, Knights of the Iron Cross. See also Jost W. Schneider, Verleihung genehmigt. Their Honor Was Loyalty: an illustrated and documentary history of the Knight’s Cross Holders of the Waffen-SS and Police, 1940-1945 (San Jose, CA: R. James Bender, 1977). 8

At the same time, recent years have seen the growth of a counter-reaction in the opposite direction, in which the RK is framed as the symbol of the “Nazi hero,” a medal connected as much to political fanaticism or nepotism as battlefield excellence.19 Shades of this perspective can be seen sometimes in criticism of connections between the Wehrmacht and the current German military, the , but is illustrated perhaps best by Hollywood in several of its recent about the Second World War. In many older depictions, the RK carried few political connotations and was often used to reinforce the moral complexity of Wehrmacht characters; in a growing number of new films, however, it has been used to demarcate arch-antagonists or the most fanatical

German soldiers.20 Though neither perspective represents what could be considered the mainstream position of reputable historians, the continued existence of both serves to illustrate the need to develop a nuanced understanding of the nature and significance of the RK’s connection to the regime that created it, symbolic or otherwise.

Fortunately, there now exists a foundational framework within which to do so, coming specifically in the wake of Ralph Winkle’s ground-breaking 2007 study Der Dank des

Vaterlandes.21 Winkle’s work represents a wider transformation in the discipline of phaleristics towards a methodology rooted in sociology and based on the theories of scholars such as Georg

Simmel and Pierre Bourdieu on the role of concepts like prestige, honour and distinction in shaping and affirming hierarchies of political or moral authority.22 Using this methodology, and Bourdieu’s

19 An example of this tone can be seen in Dieter Pohl, “Eisernes Kreuz. Orden für Massenmord,” Die Zeit, June 8, 2008. 20 Examples of the former trend include Robert Neame’s The File (1974), John Sturgess’s The Eagle has Landed (1976) and Jean-Jacques Annaud’s Enemy at the Gates (2001). Examples of the latter include Stefan Ruzowitzky’s The Counterfeiters (2007), Spike Lee’s Red Tails (2012) and George Clooney’s The Monuments Men (2014). 21 Ralph Winkle, Der Dank des Vaterlandes: Eine Symbolgeschichte des Eisernen Kreuzes 1914 bis 1936 (: Perfect Paperback, 2007). 22 Authority representing the Weberian understanding of the term as the approval or legitimization of power. For what is still arguably the best discussion of how such theory can be used to enrich the study of orders and decorations and reveal aspects of the “prestige exchange” between recipient and awarding body, see Ludgera Vogt, “Zeichen der 9 related concept of “symbolic capital,” Winkle consctructs what he describes as a

“Symbolgeschichte” (symbolic history) of the imperial EK order, in which he traces its usage in communicating shifts in moral values and the creation of political authority during the First World

War and the that followed.23 While its chronological scope (ending in 1936) precluded any substantive analysis of the Second World War, several EK historians have built upon the book’s findings to make inroads into a more refined understanding of the way in which the National Socialists harnessed orders and decorations as vessels of “symbolic capital” for political gain and to normalize its political mythology, an effort which has included the RK.

Said understanding appears concisely stated in a recent volume of essays on the EK order edited by Winfried and published by the Bundeswehr’s Center for Military History and Social Sciences (ZMSBw). In one chapter, Harald Potempa writes that this medal, like others, should be viewed within the context of the regime’s broader program of “Ordenspolitik” (Order

Politics). In the process, one can see that it was not just a symbol of military heroism but a vessel of the regime’s ideologically driven mythology of German history. In turn, Ritterkreuzträger represented an extension of this function, as embodiments of ’s utopic vision of an ethnically homogenous and socially egalitarian “Volksgemeinschaft” (National Community).24

Anerkennung” als Medien sozialer Differenzierung und gesellschaftlicher Integration,” in Soziale Welt, 48. H.2 (1997): 187-205. See also Heinz Kirchner and Birgit Laitenberger, Deutsche Orden und Ehrenzeichen. Kommentar zum Gesetz über Titel, Orden und Ehrenzeichen und eine Darstellung deutscher Orden und Ehrenzeichen von der Kaiserzeit bis zur Gegenwart mit Abbildungen (Köln: Karl Heymanns Verlag KG, 1997), n.b. 15-17, 38. 23 Winkle explains the theoretical methodology of his study in Chapter 1 of his study, which in turn was built upon foundations established in his contribution: “Für eine Symbolgeschichte soldatischer Orden und Ehrenzeichen,” in Nikolaus Buschmann, ed. Die Erfahrung des Krieges. Erfahrungs-geschichtliche Perspektiven von der Französischen Revolution bis zum Zweiten Weltkrieg (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2001), 195-214. 24 Harald Potempa, “Eisernes Kreuz, Ritterkreuz, . Altes versus Neues. 1939/45,” in Das Eiserne Kreuz. Die Geschichte eines Symbols im Wandel der Zeit, ed. Winfried Heinemann (: ZMSBw, 2014), 43-54. Though not specifically dedicated to the RK, a broader attempt to expand upon Winkle’s foundational work with regards to the Second World War can be found in researcher and RK-indexer Veit Scherzer’s monograph, Das Auszeichnungssystem der Wehrmacht (Bayreuth: Scherzer, 2015). 10

This characterization represents an important step forward, a means to weave together the fragmented pieces of RK-historiography and thereby create a more cohesive picture of its historical role and contemporary significance. Yet, for all its potential, there has been little progress made towards this goal. Though newer EK histories have begun to describe Ritterkreuzträger as the

“Heroes of the Volksgemeinschaft,” for example, it remains an assumption how much this symbolic role truly factored into their wartime experience, or whether they were effective in fulfilling it. In fact, there is evidence to suggest the contrary. Recent studies of the experience of

Wehrmacht soldiers in front line units by historians such as Sönke Neitzel, Harald Welzer and

Christoph Rass, for example, have concluded that ordinary “Landsers” (common soldiers) viewed the RK not as a reflection of the Volksgemeinschaft but as an award reserved for military elites.25

This seeming contradiction has remained unaddressed, not least because of an underlying assumption (prevalent not only among these scholars but among phaleristic historians as well) that

Nazi ideology, though a part of military medals’ declared symbolism, played little part in their actual administrative management or cultural impact, which are framed instead in terms of incentivization and group cohesion.26

25 Sönke Neitzel and Harald Welzer, Soldaten. On Fighting, Killing, and Dying. The Secret World War II Tapes of German POWs, trans. Jefferson Chase (Toronto: Simon & Schuster, 2012), n.b. 40-44, 277-284; Christoph Rass, Menschenmaterial: Deutsche Soldaten an der Ostfront. Innenansichten einer Infanteriedivision 1939-1945 (Munich: Schöningh, 2003), n.b. 253-261; Christian Hartmann, Wehrmacht im Ostkrieg, Front und militärisches Hinterland 1941/42 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2009), 196, 198-199. See further Bertrand Michael Buchmann, Österreicher in der Deutschen Wehrmacht: Soldatenalltag im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), n.b. 27-29; Felix Römer, Kameraden Die Wehrmacht von Innen. Kindle Edition. (Munich: Piper Verlag, 2012), chap.4, Kindle. 26 On one hand, the administrative half of this assumption stems from the misleading fact that military phaleristics technically lay under the authority of the Wehrmacht and not the Party (that said, given trends towards revisionist history within EK literature mentioned earlier, it is tempting to suspect that there are also less jurisdictional reasons as well (see Previtera, Iron Time, 228, 286; Schulze-Wegener, Das Eiserne Kreuz, 148-153; Hütte, “Eisernen Kreuzes,” 112-113, 125)). On the other hand, this assumption’s cultural half, that medals’ symbolism mattered little to ordinary soldiers (stated clearest by Rass, Neitzel and Welzer (see previous note)), reflects a wider argument made by some historians that “on the whole, soldiers placed far more importance on […] concepts such as comradeship, duty and older forms of German nationalism” than on Nazi ideology. Johannes Hürter, “The Military Elite and Volksgemeinschaft,” in Visions of Community in Nazi Germany: Social Engineering and Private Lives, eds. Martina Steber and Bernhard Gotto (: 2014), 269. See further Thomas Kühne, The Rise and Fall of Comradeship. Hitler’s Soldiers, Male Bonding and Mass Violence in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 11

To ground its foundational purpose of redressing the underdeveloped state of knowledge about the RK, therefore, the present study will pick up where Winkle and Potempa have left off.

It holds this medal’s function as a vessel of “symbolic capital” as a central analytical framework within which to document not only its own phaleristic role but also that of its recipients as a means to create a politically useful cult of heroes and heroism for the Nazi regime during the Second

World War. In doing so, this study strives to provide a more nuanced and valuable picture of one of the most controversial aspects of Germany’s wartime history, as well as new conclusions about the regime’s wider efforts at harnessing the symbolic power of orders and decorations to manipulate hero culture.

Sources and Structure

To reconstruct the political “instrumentalization” of the RK/Ritterkreuzträger, the research process for this study necessarily involved casting a wide net. More specifically, it involved a long-overdue investigation into the official documentation surrounding both medal and men, not only to establish a more solid evidentiary foundation than has been used hitherto but also a perspective on the administrative mechanics that underlay the aforementioned process. As a result, the author spent several months conducting systematic research into the holdings of the U.S.

National Archives, as well as the German Federal Archive (Bundesarchiv)’s branches at Koblenz,

Berlin-Lichterfelde and Freiburg, which yielded not only a sizeable volume but also a surprising diversity of underused source material from which to challenge existing assumptions and establish new arguments.

University Press, 2017); Rolf-Dieter Müller, Hitler’s Wehrmacht, 1935-1945, trans. Jance W. Ancker. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2016), n.b. chap.4. 12

Of greatest value were the abundance of files, reports, circulars, and memoranda from the various organs of the military, state and pertaining to the RK and its recipients. These included records from the commands of the different Wehrmacht branches (Oberkommando des

Heeres (OKH); Luftwaffe (OKL); and Marine (OKM)), their personnel departments (chiefly the

Heerespersonalamt, HPA), as well as the Wehrmacht Welfare and Maintenance Department

(Wehrmacht Fűrsorge- und Versorgungsamt, WFVA). Alongside these came more from the

Wehrmacht’s “Propagandaabteilung” (the WPr) and the civilian Propaganda Ministry

(Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda, RMVP), including the extensive

“Sammlung Oberheitmann” of daily instructions to the German press.27 In addition, though, there also emerged an abundance of important documentation from less-expected areas, such as the

“Meldungen aus dem Reich” compiled by the security division of the SS (the Sicherheitsdienst,

SD), as well as the files of the Reich and Party Chancelleries, the Ministries of the Interior,

Finance, the Office for Race and Settlement and even the Reich Postal Service.

In addition to this research, which forms the evidentiary core of this study, the author also conducted a thorough investigation into the discussion of the RK/Ritterkreuzträger within published collections of records and post-war egodocuments. This process yielded a further trove of useful evidence, the most notable sources being Hitler’s “Table Talk” (Tischgespräche), with

27 The Sammlung Oberheitmann comprises an almost complete series of these instructions between 1939 and 1945. They were the product of a complex process that began each day with a secret press conference of state organizations presided over by Propaganda Minister (records of which have been published by Willy A. Boelcke, upon which this work also draws), which was then followed by a conference for representatives of the (Berlin) press under the auspices of Reich Press Chief, . The instructions from the Minister, as well as a summarized and edited record of this second conference for journalists, would then be sent to the propaganda offices in the various districts of the Reich (the Reichpropagandaämter, RPä). It was these disseminated instructions (the “Vertrauliche Information” (V.I.) and “Sonderinformation” (S.I.) – often confused with the “Tagesparolen,” a term later used to describe a part of the V.I.) that Theo Oberheitmann, chief editor of the Weilburger Tageblatt, received through the RPä in -Nassau and preserved for posterity. They can be found today in the Bundesarchiv at Berlin-Lichterfelde (BAB ZSg.109). For a detailed description of the collection, its preservation and its contents, see Doris Kohlmann- Viand, NS-Pressepolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Munich: K.G. Saur, 1991), n.b. 89, 93. 13 volumes edited by Hugh Trevor-Roper and Dr. Henry Picker respectively, the diaries of the

Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels and the post-war writings of the two most influential officers of the WPr, Hasso von Wedel and Kurt Hesse. There were also the several memoirs and diaries of these figures’ aides and adjutants, most notably those of , Wilfred von

Oven and . Furthermore, this study also makes use of carefully selected testimony from Ritterkreuzträger themselves whose recollections offered valuable insight into their status, activities and responsibilities as war hero figures.

Finally, to compliment its principal focus on policy and practice, the author also consulted an assortment of media sources from various genres to develop a more accurate understanding of the RK’s depiction in wartime propaganda and the role of Ritterkreuzträgers’ in the public sphere.

Included were visual materials used for series of propaganda-postcards, as well as the editions of the weekly newsreels (the Deutsche Wochenschau28). More important, though, were the wealth of articles and featurettes about the RK/Ritterkreuzträger found in archival collections of newspaper clippings and several select publications, including the military’s illustrated magazines Die

Wehrmacht and Der Adler, the civilian Berliner Illustrirte Zeitung and the Party’s chief mouthpiece, the Völkischer Beobachter.

This diverse assemblage of evidence serves as the basis for five chapters, which analyze different aspects of the regime’s instrumentalization of the RK and its recipients as vessels of symbolic capital. Chapter I begins this discussion with an extended introduction into the content of this capital, as it were. It reopens the question of the RK’s origins and context within the broader development of National Socialist “Ordenspolitik,” thereby bringing into clearer focus the

28 This title was not used exclusively in German newsreels until June 1940, but all four newsreels had been consolidated in under Universum AG. Thus, those newsreels cited between , 1939 and June 1, 1940 will be described by this later title, abbreviated hereafter as DW. 14 importance of its intended symbolic function. While thus drawing considerably on the previous work of Ralph Winkle and others such as Samuel Clark, it also expands upon and revises their findings by both framing the RK within a wider political development of phaleristically defined hero culture and highlighting several previously undervalued factors which informed its creation in 1939 and determined its later usage.

Having established this foundation, Chapter II applies the RK’s intended function to an investigation of its distribution over the following years of the Second World War. More specifically, it addresses the aforementioned problem represented by the post-war testimony of veterans and prisoners of war that suggests an entirely different function for this award in practice.

In the process of solving this unanswered question, moreover, it offers a new perspective on the significance of award-distribution among German soldiers more broadly and, thereby, their perception of the regime and its moral authority. Furthermore, in presenting its evidence it also challenges the longstanding assumption about the role of ideology in the direction and administration of the Wehrmacht’s phaleristic policy.

Shifting focus onto the recipients of this process, Chapters III and IV apply an abundance of previously underutilized archival sources to solve similar historiographical problems, namely the lack of investigation into Ritterkreuzträger’s alleged receipt of special benefits and their oft- cited role in war propaganda and connection to the Wehrmacht’s “Starkult” (Star Cult), a term applied by several historians to describe the celebrity-like treatment of military heroes during the war.29 As outlined earlier, each of these questions represent a noteworthy gap in current scholarly research on these men and their role as “Heroes of the Volksgemeinschaft.” In presenting the first

29 E.g. Matthias Rogg, “Die Luftwaffe im NS-Propagandafilm,” in Krieg und Militär im Film des 20. Jahrhunderts, eds. Bernhard Chiari, Matthias Rogg und Wolfgang Schmidt (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2003), 343-348 (n.b. 345). 15 meaningful effort to document them in detail, therefore, these two chapters constitute an especially important addition to relevant historiography in and of themselves. Even so, as part of the larger study they also serve not only to demonstrate two particularly impactful aspects of RK- instrumentalization but some of its difficulties as well.

Chapter V presents undoubtedly some the most intriguing and original evidence about both medal and men to emerge from the archives. While continuing the discussion of

Ritterkreuzträger’s public role begun in Chapters III and IV, it documents the impact of their behaviour, or more accurately their misbehaviour, upon their value as symbolic vessels for the regime. This discussion draws upon similar questions raised by Ralph Winkle relating to the history of the EK during the First World War, as well as the sociological theory of Ludgera Vogt regarding the “prestige exchange” between the recipient of medals and their patron/distributor.30

In doing so, moreover, it also presents a new and challenging perspective on the nature of the relationship between the regime and its war heroes.

Before offering its conclusions and suggestions for further research, this work includes a brief Epilogue that describes the fate of the RK and its recipients after the collapse of the regime in 1945. Relying on a small collection of archival records and primary sources, it explains the preservation of the RK’s social and cultural importance in the post-war period, as well as its later role within the ongoing struggle to find a “usable” tradition for Bundeswehr. In other words, it illustrates the lingering side-effects of the events and processes discussed in preceding chapters and links their findings about wartime instrumentalization with the place of the RK in Germany today.

30 Winkle, Dank des Vaterlandes, 153-156; Vogt, “Zeichen der Anerkennung,” 188-192, 198. See also Kirchner and Laitenberger, Deutsche Orden und Ehrenzeichen, 15-17. 16

Further Contributions

Collectively, these chapters thus constitute the first attempt to undertake a comprehensive investigation into the RK that can, at last, not only fill the numerous gaps in its current historiography but also add a measure of clarity to the continuing controversy over its place in historical memory. However, in addition to this primary contribution to scholarship, this dissertation also strives to demonstrate how the history of this medal and its recipients represents an underrecognized historiographical nexus of sorts, and how a deeper understanding of their instrumentalization by the National Socialist regime can lead to further contributions in related streams of research.

First, the history of the RK and its recipients represents a fresh window onto the evolution and implementation of Nazi ideology during the war, as well as its effectiveness. It provides a useful case study, for example, to the long-standing debate regarding the Party’s true commitment to the concept of the Volksgemeinschaft: i.e. whether this utopian vision was ever truly a basis for social reform or simply a construct of propaganda that hid the hollowness of the regime’s “social revolution.”31 At the same time, specific facets of the RK’s process of instrumentalization also yield new insight into the role and impact of this ideological concept at lower levels of wartime society, not only among ordinary soldiers of the Wehrmacht as mentioned previously but also

31 The debate over this question dates to the work of social historians David Schoenbaum and Tim Mason in the 1960s and early 1970s. See Schoenbaum, Hitler’s Social Revolution: Class and Status in Nazi Germany 1933–1939 (New York: Anchor Books, 1967); Mason, Arbeiterklasse und Volksgemeinschaft: Dokumente und Materialien zur deutschen Arbeiterpolitik 1936–1939 (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975). For a recent, concise synopsis of this debate, see , “Volksgemeinschaft: Potential and Limitations of the Concept,” in Visions of Community in Nazi Germany: Social Engineering and Private Lives, eds. Martina Steber and Bernhard Gotto (Oxford University Press: 2014). For several different perspectives on the debate since its eruption, see David Welch, “Nazi Propaganda and the Volksgemeinschaft: Constructing a People’s Community,” Journal of Contemporary History, 39, No.2 (2004): 213-238; William Jannen Jr., “National Socialists and Social Mobility,” Journal of Social History. Vol. 9, No. 3 (Spring, 1976): 339-366; Schilling, Kriegshelden, 346-347. 17 among the wider German populace. Second, this work also offers new contributions to the historiography surrounding the administration of the Nazi state by shedding light on several revealing and previously neglected points of interplay between organs of the military, government and Party, such as in the formulation of propaganda policy, the administration of social welfare programs and the punishment of political crimes.

Most important, though, is the contribution this work offers of a new and much needed framework for the more focused historiography of the Third Reich’s politicized hero culture, its

“Heldenkult.” Much like the “Winkle-school” in phaleristics, since the 1980s leading scholars in this field such as Jay W. Baird, Sabine Behrenbeck and René Schilling have drawn upon concepts of political mythology and cultural capital to analyze the National Socialists’ usage of heroic archetypes to normalize ideological principles of class, race and gender - a multifaceted process this work will classify under the umbrella-term “Heldenpolitik” (Hero Politics).32 Yet, Heldenkult- scholarship has largely undervalued orders and decorations as a category of analysis, with the result that the RK and its recipients have been all but omitted from a field in which they should represent a central focus.33 Baird, for example, notes in his seminal study only that “the intrepid

32 The three seminal works in the field are Baird’s To Die for the Germany: heroes in the Nazi pantheon (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), Behrenbeck’s Der Kult um die toten Helden. Nationalsozialistische Mythen, Riten, und Symbole 1923 bis 1945 (Neuberg: SH-Verlag, 1996) and Schilling’s Kriegshelden: Deutungsmuster heroischer Männlichkeit in Deutschland 1813-1945 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2002). Each work grew out of research published in articles and chapters during the 1980s and 1990s. See Baird, “Goebbels, , and the Myth of Resurrection and Return,” Journal of Contemporary History 17. No.4 (Oct. 1982): 633-650; Behrenbeck, “Heldenkult und Opfermythos. Mechanismen der Kriegsbegeisterung, 1918-1945,” in Marcel van der Linden und Gottfried Mergner, eds. Kriegsbegeisterung und mentale Kriegsvorbereitung. Interdisziplinäre Studien (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991), 143-159; Schilling, “Die ‘Helden der Wehrmacht’ - Konstruktion und Rezeption,” in Rolf-Dieter Müller and Hans-Erich Volkmann, eds. Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1999), 550- 572. For a detailed explanation of this literature and its theoretical foundations, see Kubetzky, Mask of Command, chap. I.3, II, and Andreas Dörner, Politischer Mythos und symbolische Politik (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1995). 33 Similarly, elements of phaleristic history and analysis such as the origins, design or distribution of medals have been neglected as potential components of Heldenpolitik. The only meaningful, if brief, attempt at such an incorporation has been by German historian Aiko Wulff. However, this has not led to incorporation in any broader capacity in Heldenkult scholarship. See Wulff, ‘Mit dieser Fahne in der Hand’. Materielle Kultur und Heldenverehrung 1871- 1945,” in Historical Social Research. 34 (2009, 4): n.b. 347-348. 18 holders of the Ritterkreuz [sic] were lionized by the propaganda ministry,” while Schilling’s work includes but a few brief sentences on how they sometimes gave speeches to German youth.34

This study and its discussion of the RK, however, not only further highlights this omission but also illustrates how reversing it will rectify a myopia that has arisen because of a reliance upon several narrow analytical frameworks which together have created an unrepresentative picture of hero culture during the Second World War. The most prominent of these frameworks is an overemphasis on death as the defining characteristic of heroization.35 Owing chiefly to the theorization of Filadelfo Linares, it is rooted in the understanding that the creation of heroic archetypes is, at its heart, a post-mortem phenomenon, beginning only when the mythology of heroes’ lives and deeds evolves into a real cultural memory that can be politically exploited.36

Scholars have therefore emphasized the theme of the “Heldentod” (heroic death) as the interpretive mechanism for future heroic archetypes and concluded that the Heldenkult was “tied more to death than to life, more to destruction than to victory.”37 Indeed, this trend is reflected in the very titles of foundational studies such as Jay W. Baird’s To Die for Germany and Sabine Behrenbeck’s Der

Kult um die toten Helden.

The twin dictums that “there are no living heroes” and that “myths are not created but handed down” have thus correspondingly translated into a chronological emphasis on the years to the Third Reich, the so-called “Kampfzeit” (Time of Struggle, i.e. 1918-1933), and the quasi-religious instrumentalization of the early “martyrs” of the Nazi movement. The continuation of this period’s heroic themes forms the core of Behrenbeck’s tome, as well as a more recent work

34 Baird, Nazi pantheon, xvi; Schilling, “Helden der Wehrmacht,” 570. 35 This overemphasis has been noted previously by historians including Thomas Kubetzky (see Mask of Command, 22, 42-45). 36 Filadelfo Linares, Der Held. Versuch einer Wesensbestimmung (Bonn: Bouvier, 1967), 24, nt.13. 37 Baird, Nazi pantheon, xi. 19 by Sarah Thieme.38 This concentration is less pronounced in René Schilling’s 2001 monograph

Kriegshelden, in which he demonstrates the continuity of several of the Nazi Heldenkult’s social and gendered themes from earlier periods of Prusso-German history. Even so, while useful,

Schilling’s identification of the recycling of past heroes as a defining characteristic of the

Heldenkult has created a similar de-emphasis on analysis of the hero figures of 1939-1945. Such men were, after all, but reincarnations of earlier heroic archetypes; old wine in new wineskins.39

Recognition of earlier archetypes is essential, in other words, but cannot override the importance or uniqueness of wartime hero figures in their own right.

Additionally, this literature has been further limited in its adherence to a trend in the study of modern Germany’s hero culture that stretches beyond its own analytical parameters, namely an overemphasis on certain groups within the Wehrmacht, specifically fighter pilots and U-boat

(submarine) commanders. This fixation stems from the popularization of the so-called

“technological hero” archetype, whose emergence between the late nineteenth cenruty and the First

World War as the embodiment of a romantic, removed modernity has been characterized by historians such as Omer Bartov, Aiko Wulff and Bernd Hüppauf to have been one of the defining processes in the evolution of modern hero culture.40 For the past several decades, therefore, this archetype has become the dominant, and often exclusive, framework for the selection of case

38 Behrenbeck, Kult um die toten Helden; Sarah Thieme, Nationalsozialistischer Märtyrerkult. Sakralisierte Politik und Christentum im westfälischen Ruhrgebiet (1929-1939) (/Main: Campus Verlag, 2017). There have also been several excellent studies of these “internal heroes” of the Party in the last several years, most notably Daniel Siemens’s The Making of a Nazi Hero: The Murder and Myth of Horst Wessel (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 39 Schilling, Kriegshelden. Despite its title, this same approach applies to Schilling’s aforementioned chapter, “Helden der Wehrmacht.” See also Baird, To Die for Germany, 203, 227. 40 Omer Bartov, “Man and the Mass: Reality and the Heroic Image in War,” in History and Memory, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Fall - Winter, 1989): 99-122; Wulff, “Materielle Kultur und Heldenverehrung,” n.b. 343-344, 347-348; Bernd Hüppauf, “Fliegerhelden des Ersten Weltkriegs. Fotografie, Film und Kunst im Dienst der Heldenbildung,” in Zeitschrift für Germanistik 18. No.3 (2008): 575-595. 20 studies of hero culture, not only of the First but also of the Second World War.41 Finally, historians of the Third Reich have compounded this fixation still further by all too often focusing on those among this group who were also convinced Nazis, or even assuming that elevation to war hero status could owe simply to a man’s physical correlation to the Party’s racial ideals.42

As mentioned earlier, the cumulative effect of these concentric frameworks is that they have created an analytical myopia that narrows research onto a very small group of hero figures, a historiographical Venn-Diagram where the fanatical technological hero who fell “for Führer and

Fatherland” occupies the center as the Wehrmacht-war hero par excellence. Nearly every discussion of the wartime Heldenkult, for instance, draws upon the example of Günther Prien, a submariner who, being thus illustrative of romantic modernity, is remembered as a fanatical of the regime who died at sea in 1941.43 More important, this myopia has also thereby excluded groups, events and experiences that do not fit its moulds from discussion of the wartime

Heldenkult, as well as the “Heldenpolitik” that sustained it.

41 René Schilling uses a U-boat as his example of the Second World War’s continuation of earlier archetypes (e.g. Kriegshelden, 29). Similarly, Sabine Behrenbeck notes briefly in her work only that “The complicated logistics of the campaigns and new weapons technologies introduced the type of highly specialized technician (the living heroes of the war were above all fighter pilots and U-boat commanders) […].” See Behrenbeck, Kult um die toten Helden, 466). 42 A biographer of the fighter ace , for example, remarked how odd it was that this man was not made into a more prominent hero since in appearance he was “the type of Nordic soldier who fitted well into their ideological concept.” Peter Hinchcliffe, ed. The Lent Papers. Helmut Lent (Bristol: Cerberus Publishing Ltd, 2003), 154. Likewise, see discussion of Air Force Aces as being the “the epitome of Aryan manhood” in Mike Spick, Aces of the Reich. The Making of a Luftwaffe Fighter-Pilot (London: Greenhill Books, 2006), 208. Finally, in a recent study of wartime propaganda, Daniel Uziel remarks that just because of one soldier’s political sympathies to Nazism, it was “no wonder” that he became a celebrated hero. See Uziel, Propaganda Warriors, 295. Furthermore, this trend is not limited only to individual examples. In their discussions of the wartime Heldenkult, for example, both Sabine Behrenbeck and Jay W. Baird focus disproportionately on the Waffen-SS as the torchbearers of the Party’s hero culture owing to their political fanaticism and alleged racial selection. See Baird, Nazi Pantheon, Chapter 9; Behrenbeck, Kult um die toten Helden, 502-507. The construction of this “myth” of the Waffen-SS as the elite soldiers of National Socialism has recently been addressed in admirable comprehensiveness by Jochen Lehnhardt, who also provides a historiographical synopsis of its presence in post-war literature. See Lehnhardt, Geburt eine Legende, n.b. 13-14. 43 E.g. Schilling, “Helden der Wehrmacht,” 552-557. It should be noted, though, that Prien’s fanaticism has been called into question by several naval historians. Jordan Vause, Wolf: U-Boat Commanders in World War II (Annapolis: 1997), 44, 96. 21

Through its systematic investigation of the RK/Ritterkreuzträger and their instrumentalization, however, the following study will demonstrate how incorporating phaleristics into this field transcends these frameworks and adds considerable nuance to our understanding of wartime hero culture and its lasting impact. Its phaleristic lens allows for a broader view that will not only show how the Heldenkult encompassed a broader variety of individuals and groups than technological heroes like Günther Prien, but also how recognizing their shared identity as holders of the RK yields a clearer perspective on their unique roles and importance within it. Furthermore, it demonstrates how, like the “Captain from Frankenthal” Adam Drayss, not all war heroes were beacons of National Socialist virtue; indeed, quite the opposite as the regime found out to its cost.

Finally, at a structural level, it will demonstrate not only the underrecognized complexity of wartime Heldenpolitik, but also its frequent dysfunctionality and ineffectiveness in generating and extracting symbolic capital.

22

Chapter I

The Roots of Symbolic Capital: Revisiting the Origins of the Ritterkreuz

The immediate origins of the Knight’s Cross (RK) date to the first hours of the Second

World War. Shortly before 10 a.m. on September 1, 1939, as units of the Wehrmacht advanced into , arrived at Berlin’s Kroll Opera House to address an assemblage of Reichstag deputies and Nazi Party members. In his speech, the dictator issued a belated declaration of war, citing Polish aggression against ethnic Germans and the Reich itself. Near the end, though, he added that having “called the German people to arms” he was reinstituting the country’s most famous war order, the Iron Cross (EK). While retaining its traditional form and structure, the subsequent publication of the announcement in the Reich legal bulletin, the

Reichsgesetzblatt, noted that Hitler had added a wholly new grade to the order, one that was to have a unique of deportment and be accompanied by special honours: the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross (Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes, RK).1

The following chapter examines the processes and factors that underlay this decision to establish a framework with which to investigate its subsequent usage during the Second World

War. For many years, explanations for Hitler’s phaleristic-actions on September 1 were largely a matter of conjecture. Owing to an absence of any direct evidence documenting his thinking on the matter either that day or during the weeks previous, historians have often theorized that his revival of the EK was simply a reflection of the Third Reich’s need for a bravery-award on the eve of its

1 “Verordnung über die Erneuerung des Eisernen Kreuzes. Vom 1. September 1939,” Reichsgesetzblatt (hereafter RGBl) I. 1939. No.159, 1573. 23 first major war. At the same time, others have called it an homage to Germany’s Prussian military tradition, a theory supported by similar actions by the regime since taking power in 1933 as well as Hitler’s own personal fascination with Prussian King Friedrich II. (i.e. Frederick the Great). The dictator, who also had a personal attachment to the award as a holder himself, had simply gotten

“carried away” with a fantasy to emulate his idol’s role as “Kriegsherr” (Warlord) by creating the new grade in the RK.2

However, as noted in the introduction to this work, there exists a growing body of scholarship that highlights a deeper, ideologically based explanation for Hitler’s actions.

Historians including Harald Potempa have argued, in brief, that the revival of the EK represented an attempt to extract political capital from its ideological connection to the First World War, while its new grade was to communicate the uniqueness of the Third Reich from the old regime.3 The following pages will expand upon this characterization, first by highlighting the profound depth of the RK’s roots within the longue durée of Prusso-German history and the evolution of the country’s phaleristic and heroic cultures. Second and more important, though, it strives to add further nuance to this medal’s aforementioned symbolic function, situating its creation within a more comprehensive view of Nazi “Ordenspolitik” and demonstrating how this event was not only of considerable importance to the regime and its dictator, but also a long time in coming. Finally, in doing so, it draws attention to events, policies and practices that have gone largely unnoticed in

2 Max Domarus, Hitler. Speeches and Proclamations 1932-1945. The Chronicle of a Dictatorship. Volume 3 (Wauconda, Il.: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 1997), 1760-1762, nt.951-959. See further Scott Garrett, “Iron Cross and : An Historical Interpretation of Military Symbolism in the Third Reich” (PhD. diss., University of Southern Illinois, 1990), 19-21; Manfred Messerschmidt, Die Wehrmacht im NS-Staat; Zeit der Indoktrination (: R.v. Decker, 1969), 87-93. For further discussion of Hitler’s fascination with Friedrich II., see Konrad Barthel, Friedrich der Grosse in Hitlers Geschichtsbild (: Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH, 1977), n.b. 1-11. 3 Potempa, “Eisernes Kreuz, Ritterkreuz,” 43-54. See further Schulze-Wegener, Das Eiserne Kreuz, 148; Previtera, Iron Time, 227. 24 previous studies and establishes a crucial contextual foundation for discussion of the RK’s nstrumentalization in the chapters to come.

I.1 Symbolic Roots

As mentioned above, in characterizing the Hitler’s creation of the RK in 1939, previous historians have often begun with the First World War as a principal chronological starting-point, forming as it does the basis for much of the Nazis’ ideology and political programme. To be sure, the events of 1914-1918 are indeed of critical importance. But to better understand not only the nuance but also the historical weight of the Nazi RK and its potential as a vessel of symbolic capital, it is essential to first recognize the backdrop of socio-cultural change that stretched back well over a century before this conflict. A more appropriate starting point, therefore, is the political and social upheavals of the eighteenth century, which saw the beginning of a gradual revolution in the creation and distribution of state honours in western Europe, one which also greatly influenced the conceptionalization of military heroism.

This process has recently been studied by Canadian sociologist Samuel Clark, and the three thematic trends into which he divides its history provide a useful framework for understanding the distant origins of the RK.4 The first such trend is the degree to which orders and decorations created during this period helped to symbolize the process of modernization while actually facilitating the

4 Samuel Clark, Distributing Status: The Evolution of State Honours in Western Europe (Montreal: McGill Queen’s University Press, 2016). For further discussion of the “phaleristic revolution,” and specifically its manifestation in the German lands (which receive only limited spotlight in Clark’s more wide-ranging study), see Dietrich Herfurth, “Die Geschichte der Orden und Ehrenzeichen,” in Orden und Ehrenzeichen. Handbuch der Phaleristik, eds. Eckart Henning and Dietrich Herfurth (Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2010), 100-109, 112-120. 25 continued dominance of traditional elites.5 In the Kingdom of , this duality found expression through two awards which would ultimately become the symbolic forebears of the RK, the first being the order Pour le Mérite (PLM), founded by Friedrich II. in 1740. This award represented an early stage in the phaleristic revolution in which the traditional function of state awards, that of denoting membership in knightly or religious orders, gave way to new secular orders that recognized individual merit (normally on the battlefield) on behalf of the state or monarch.

However, coming at this early stage the PLM was very much an award of the social elite, symbolized chiefly by its distinctive manner of display as a so-called “Halsorden” (Neck Order), namely around the throat on a decorative . In keeping with other new orders of this type,

Friedrich II. and subsequent Prussian monarchs kept its distribution confined largely to aristocrats serving in the Army and, in this way, reinforced the prestige-hierarchy upon which the latter functioned. The “Wertesystem” (Value System) distributed recognition according to the perception of combatants’ value to the Army’s success, and its stratification followed social norms with elites claiming more prestigious and symbolic recognition while the rank and file claimed tangible plunder and booty. Even within this elitist framework, though, at this point the PLM remained primarily reserved only for the most senior of Prussian officers.6

By the end of the century, however, the concerted movement toward social egalitarianism fostered by the French Revolution resulted in more profound changes to practices of recognition.

The mass warfare in the Napoleonic period saw the creation of unique new awards such as the

5 Clark, Distributing Status, Part 1. Clark’s argument regarding modernization theory, in other words, echoes the now well-known arguments made by historian Arno Meyer, though he applies them in the more restricted context of phaleristic recognition. See Meyer, The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War (New York: , 1981) 6 See Winkle, “Symbolgeschichte,” 198-199; Wernitz, Iron Cross, 60-63. 26

French Legion d’Honneur (est.1802) that recognized bravery and merit regardless of social status.

In Prussia, King Friedrich-Wilhelm III. embraced the spirit of this phaleristic trend by creating the order of the Iron Cross in 1813. By design, this medal symbolized the King’s recognition of bravery and exemplary merit on the battlefield in the ongoing struggle against by any

Prussian man (and soon women as well) regardless of rank or class. In this, early recipients were to serve as integrative symbols of a nascent Prussian nationalism and a new “Volkskrieg” (War of

Nations). Its simple black-and-silver iron form also reinforced the call for austerity, resolve and sacrifice demanded of all Prussians to persevere and find eventual victory.7

Yet, in practice the EK of 1813 failed to live up to its revolutionary function, for it was quickly folded into the existing value system and hierarchy of prestige. While not as exclusive as the PLM, the result was that EK-awardings became concentrated in the higher ranks of the Prussian officer corps. The imbalance became more pronounced in each of the order’s three grades, starting with the EK Second Class (EK2), First Class (EK1) and finally the Grand Cross (GK), the latter being awarded only rarely to the highest of elites in command of victorious armies. Indeed, the incorporation of the EK into the existing “Ordensmonopol” (Orders Monopoly) of the social elites is symbolized best by the fact that it soon became informally fused with the PLM; the latter was increasingly standardized as the award for officers between EK1 and the GK.8

Even with this disparity between ideal and practice, though, the rare access to the realm of orders and honours was significant, for it also represented another aspect of Samuel Clark’s findings, namely the ability of the Prussian state to “manage” and “mobilize” its citizenry.9

7 For a recent study of the EK’s creation and its socio-cultural context, see Veit Veltzke, “Die Stiftung des Eisernen Kreuzes 1813. Ein ‘neuer preussisch-deutscher Orden’ für den Volkskrieg,” in Das Eiserne Kreuz. Die Geschichte eines Symbols im Wandel der Zeit, ed. Winfried Heinemann (Potsdam: ZMSBw, 2014), 9-20. 8 E.g. Wernitz, Iron Cross, 57-88, 144, 265-267. 9 Clark, Distributing Status, Part 2. 27

Historians including Karen Hagemann, for instance, have demonstrated how the EK succeeded in giving credence to new conceptions of social mobility for ordinary Prussians, something that quickly led to the creation of special privileges for surviving EK holders by the as well as the growth of a cult of egalitarian military heroism in contemporary media.10 This process only increased with the reinstitution of the award by Friedrich-Wilhelm II. during the Franco-Prussian

War of 1870-1871, which also added tens of thousands of names to the EK’s rolls even though the distribution was still skewed towards social elites. Yet, even as awards like the EK thus gained in symbolic and thereby political importance, increasing changes to the structure of German society during the latter decades of the nineteenth century helped give birth to the third of Clark’s trends: the growth of status competition as an element of phaleristic culture.11

One of the side-effects of German unification in 1871 was in making the Empire’s phaleristic system the largest in the world, now encompassing a diverse range of orders and decorations from its various states and royal houses. At the same time, the process of industrialization meant an ever-increasing connection of these awards to the accompanying social stratification. Thus, as historian Alistair Thompson has described, while the elites of the aristocracy and royal court continued to reward themselves with the higher orders (both civilian and military), the rise of a middle-class saw the many lesser orders and decorations (which furthermore continued to grow in number) act as a medium for the emergence of a bourgeois culture that emphasized symbolic honour and social prestige. “Order hunting”12 and corrupt practices of award distribution became increasingly common within middle-class professions,

10 Karen Hagemann, “Of ‘Manly Valor’ and ‘German Honor’: Nation, War, and Masculinity in the Age of the Prussian Uprising against Napoleon,” in Central European History Vol.30, No.2 (1997): 218; Winkle, Dank des Vaterlandes, 15, 30-31, 50-61, 83-85; Wernitz, Iron Cross, 213, 318-323. 11 Clark, Distributing Status, Part 3. 12 Ordenssehnsucht or Ordenssegen. 28 most notably in the civil service. Under the reign of the young, militaristic Kaiser Wilhelm II.

(1890-1918), moreover, this cultural fixation became even more pronounced; by 1914 over

100,000 Germans came to hold an order of one form or another.13

By the outbreak of the First World War, in other words, the role of such objects as portable symbols of accelerating social and political change (both real and imagined) had reached a heightened level of significance in Germany. The following four years, however, would only see this level increased still further, a process once again epitomized by the distribution and perception of the EK and PLM, now the Empire’s most famous awards. On the eve of war, Kaiser Wilhelm

II. found himself in need of an integrative mechanism to rally the citizens of his heterogeneous empire around the battle standard and put aside their political differences in a civil truce, his so- called “Burgfrieden.” In this context, he and his cabinet endeavoured to use the EK of his native

Prussia for this purpose given both its recognizability and, more importantly, its relevant symbolic tradition of nationalist egalitarianism. Indeed, after reinstituting the order at the outset of hostilities, they took strides to increase its capacity for integration by widening its eligibility requirements to include more activities within the combat zone and ordering a liberal approach to distribution among units from the various German states and kingdoms.14

The Kaiser had thus made the EK into the central symbol of the Empire’s war effort, underscoring this fact by lending it as much personal gravitas as he could, often by attending award ceremonies in person. This Ordenspolitik, moreover, proved successful in the war’s early stages, especially among enlisted men and junior officers who, though still statistically less likely to win the EK (or any other decoration), generally approved of its increasing prevalence.15 This was not

13 Alistair Thompson, “Honours uneven: decorations, the state and bourgeois society in Imperial Germany,” Past and Present. no.144 (1994): 172-173, 199. 14 Wernitz, Iron Cross, 357; Hütte, “Eisernen Kreuzes,” 73-79. 15 Evidence for this sentiment provided in Winkle, Dank des Vaterlandes, 76-79, 85-90, 97-101. 29 only because of the prestige it garnered among other soldiers but especially the treatment they received at home. The renewed symbolic association of the EK with German victory early in the war, combined with the government’s resurrection of its white-banded, non-combatant version to recognize the increased mobilization of the Home Front (the EK-W), ensured that civilians embraced the award with gusto as well. As a result, the emblem of the EK soon adorned everything from match-boxes to picture-frames, while its recipients quickly experienced the benefits of shortened queues, free steins of beer or simply the admiring gazes of passers-by.16

For the PLM, the opening years of the war had an even greater transformative effect, chipping away at its identity as an award of the military elite and ancien régime. This owed primarily to the development of two new forms of technologically based warfare, specifically aviation and the development of the submarine (U-boat). As the war on land turned increasingly bloody and protracted, combatants in these new spheres began to change the popular conception of military heroism and, thereby, challenged the traditional recognition-hierarchy. In 1914-1915, the U-boat commanders Otto Weddigen and Otto Hersing accomplished the unprecedented feat of sinking enemy capital ships underwater by torpedo. The following year, aviators like Oswald

Boelcke and became the country’s first “fighter aces” by shooting down multiple enemy aircraft.17 Such was the novelty and impressiveness of these accomplishments that beginning with Weddigen in 1914, the Kaiser deemed it appropriate to award these men the coveted PLM, a decision that changed the award forever.18

16 Ibid., 80-81, 136-143; Ina Syzmnau, “Zeugnisse der Alltagskultur in Frieden und Krieg? Symbolische Repräsentationen des Eisernen Kreuzes zur Zeit des Deutschen Kaiserreichs 1871 bis 1918,” in Das Eiserne Kreuz. Die Geschichte eines Symbols im Wandel der Zeit, ed. Winfried Heinemann (Potsdam: ZMSBw, 2014), 31-42. 17 See Hadley, Count not the Dead, 20-21; Peter Fritzsche, A Nation of Fliers: German aviation and the popular imagination (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 63-65, 67-75. 18 This decision was not an uncharacteristic one for Wilhelm II. As Alistair Thompson describes in his study of pre- 1914 phaleristic culture, the impetuous Emperor possessed a love of awards and uniforms and had already proven 30

In the past there had been a small minority of junior officers whose acts of extreme bravery had earned them this honour, but these exceptional awardings had never challenged the PLM’s elitist identity. One reason for this, and which had helped to limit access to the PLM for junior officers from the growing middle-classes, was the existence of other, less prestigious, Halsorden that could serve as buffer decorations such as the Royal House Order of the Hohenzollerns (known colloquially as the “’s Pour le Mérite”). There had even been one accessible to non- commissioned officers (NCOs) who demonstrated extreme merit or bravery such as the Golden

Military Merit Cross (the “NCO’s Pour le Mérite”).19 These medals continued to be used in this way (on land especially), but they proved inadequate for the new “technological heroes,” not only because of the novelty of their achievements but also because of their attraction among ordinary

Germans through the nascent disseminative power of mass-media that romanticized the uniqueness of their new forms of combat.

This latter process was key in creating a mythology around these men as being engaged (it was thought) singular, removed duels which reawakened the of medieval knights. They were, according to Peter Fritzsche, “the perfect middle-class heroes”: men who mastered technology and represented social mobility through courage and skill.20 For the government and military leaders, this level of popular acclaim represented a powerful tool of war propaganda and morale, one that had to be promoted, and rewarded, as much as possible. Each new sinking by Otto

Weddigen or aerial “kill” by and Max Immelmann (especially when framed as a competition between them), meant more newspaper headlines, new poems of praise and new

more willing than his predecessors to distribute high honours – even if not on this level of symbolic magnitude. Thompson, “Honours uneven,” 174-176. 19 Winkle, Dank des Vaterlandes, 166-178. See further Hütte, “Eisernen Kreuzes,” 76. 20 Fritzsche, Nation of Fliers, 63-75, 96-100. As Fritzsche points out, however, much of the romantic mythology around these men was erroneous in the extreme. The air war was anything but chivalric at times and aviators all too often died truly horrendous deaths. 31 photographs for mass distribution.21 More important, these men were given nearly every medal possible, not only imperial but also from their own home kingdoms, before receiving the coveted

PLM – which subsequently became known as the “Blue Max” in Immelmann’s honour.22

What made these famous awardings truly impactful, however, was that they represented precedents that soon turned into trends. While generals and senior commanding officers still encompassed most PLM recipients, as well as of its higher grade, the PLM with Oak Leaves

(Eichenlaub, PLM-E), this Halsorden became standardized as a reward for exceptional

“technological heroes.” Beside Boelcke and Immelmann, by the end of 1916 eleven other pilots received the Blue Max, along with a further four submariners. According to research conducted by Ralph Winkle, to those among the medal’s customary recipients this rise of the new parvenu

“Halsordenträger” (bearer of a Halsorden) figure represented a direct threat to the established value system, a middle-class invasion that “profaned” the social order. Nevertheless, such was the popularity and utility of the new heroes that dissenting voices simply had to rationalize it as best they could.23

In short, the first two years of war had created the impression that the country’s most prestigious awards were rapidly moving closer to the long-heralded ideals of egalitarianism.

However, even as they did so, they were also beginning to cause problems for the government and military authorities. As early as 1915, the more liberal policies governing award distribution combined with the steady intensification of the conflict ensured that the number of medals of all kinds rapidly outstripped those of earlier periods. Field commanders had developed an increasing

21 Examples of the hero-worship that quickly focused on men like Weddigen include Hermann Kirchhoff, Unsere Seehelden: Otto Weddigen und seine Waffe (Berlin: Marinedank-Verlag, 1915); Heinrich Richter, Otto Weddigen. Ein Lebensbild (: Velhagen & Klasing Verlag, 1915). 22 Ibid. See further Bartov, “Man and the Mass,” 99-122 and René Schilling, Kriegshelden, 29, 283-284. 23 Winkle, Dank des Vaterlandes, 90-95, 101-103. 32 reliance upon the distribution of orders and decorations to offset its horrors – none being more effective than the black and silver ribbon of the EK. With each new bloodletting, this famous medal became associated as much with heroic sacrifice as it did German victory.24 The rising inflation also soon wore on those struggling in the trenches, with so-called “Frontkämpfer” (Front Fighters) becoming increasingly incensed by the sight of awards intended to recognize hardship and sacrifice being given to others who did not share their world.

Much of this issue was attributed to a perceived epidemic of order hunting within the military, representing an extension of pre-war trends in Wilhelmine society. Egodocuments analyzed by Ralph Winkle, Benjamin Ziemann and other scholars reveal that many soldiers strove to possess decorations, and especially the EK, which had become a minimum form of evidence for military achievement; to be a hero one now had to have the medals to prove it. This was not simply ambition for prestige or material benefits but also often due to a sense of expectation or fear of being branded a coward if one returned with the “nackte Knopfloch” (naked buttonhole, i.e. without the EK2), or without the EK1 if they were officers – for whom this higher grade was needed to demonstrate their status within the extant prestige hierarchy. This culture not only resulted in a climate of competition but created an even greater hostility among fighting troops towards rear area personnel, known derisively as “Etappenschweine” (Rear Area Pigs), who were receiving the EK without ever having been shot at, smelled gas or heard an shell.25

Frontkämpfer reserved special ire, though, for the distribution of the EK and EK-W for loosely defined, “war related” activities on the Home Front. Since 1914, the government’s need to

24 Ibid., 123-124, 126; It did not help, moreover, that the Kaiser has also internationalized the EK by extending limited numbers to members of allied militaries from Austro-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. See Hütte, “Eisernen Kreuzes,” 74-80. 25 Winkle, Dank des Vaterlandes, 83-87, 104-117, 148-156, 176-177; Ziemann, Contested Commemoration, 81, 209. See also Thomas Weber, Hitler’s First War. Adolf Hitler, the Men of the List Regiment and the First World War. (Oxford University Press: 2011), 103-105; Wernitz, Iron Cross, 358-364. 33 recognize the ever-increasing demands placed upon this theatre to meet the needs of prolonged industrial warfare, had resulted in an increasing amount of such awardings, a fact Frontkämpfer resented bitterly. It was bad enough that their supposedly exclusive decorations could be worn by

“Etappenschweine” several kilometers behind the front lines, but it was far worse that factory workers and administrators, both male and female, now did so as well. The EK-W thus became known in soldiers’ slang as a “Schieberorden” or “Schieberkreuz” (the Profiteer’s Order/Cross), and complaints began to amass regarding Frontkämpfer’s discontent that they were becoming undervalued.26 Their own order hunting notwithstanding, award distribution became a focal point for many front-line soldiers who had lost faith in the willingness of higher authorities to recognize, much less reward, the unique suffering and sacrifice they experienced in the trenches.27

At the same time, problems were also beginning to foment at the more rarified level of the

Halsorden. On one hand, as the need for incentivization and symbolic rewards grew with each passing month, the number of the PLM’s distributed by the Army began to rise sharply, from 55 in 1916 to 124 in 1917 and then to 296 in 1918. More important, the ever-greater need for the propaganda capital of young, dynamic technological heroes like Boelcke or Weddigen resulted in even sharper increases of awards to this exceptional group. In 1916, the total of PLM submariners had stood at 4; the following year it had risen by 10 and then 13 in 1918. Likewise, pilot numbers had begun at 13, then climbed by 24 and then 48 (with an additional 5 navy airmen). The increasing prevalence of the award among these groups, moreover, created a similar, if more rarified, culture of competition and order hunting among successful pilots or U-boat commanders as that which

26 Winkle, Dank des Vaterlandes, 161-166. 27 Ibid.; Hütte, “Eisernen Kreuzes,” 73-74, 79-81. 34 existed around the EK. Competition between the former, for example, necessitated the number of required “kills” to receive the Blue Max having to be repeatedly increased.28

As a corollary of these latter increases, though, the more the authorities relied on young

Blue Max-heroes for propaganda the more problems they simultaneously created for popular morale when these men inevitably succumbed to the tragic realities of war. By the end of 1916, the country had already experienced repeated shocks from the deaths of Weddigen and then

Boelcke and Immelmann. In turn, there followed a need to replace them with new heroes to fill their shoes, the most famous example being the famous who, though not possessing the same middle-class appeal, succeeded Boelcke as the country’s leading hero figure.

He achieved an even greater level of fame with the help of an ever more organized and sophisticated propaganda apparatus. However, after downing eighty enemy planes he too perished in early 1918, causing great damage to public morale.29

The imperial authorities did try to arrest the inflation of the EK and PLM, and thereby mitigate the problems it caused. As the war progressed the supreme command had issued new guidelines to limit the number of EKs for noncombat activities, especially on the Home Front. At the same time, it placed ever more emphasis upon buffer decorations that could decrease inflation by providing outlets for recognition, including not only the use of medals like the Golden Military

Merit Cross but the creation of new ones like the Merit Cross for War Aid (Verdienstkreuz für

Kriegshilfe) that could recognize the contributions of civilians. There were also medals like the

Military Merit Cross (Militär-Verdienstkreuz) for noncombat merit in the military to decrease awardings of the EK to rear-area personnel. Finally, to appease angry Frontkämpfer the Kaiser

28 Indeed, the original standard that had been required for airmen in 1916 would have barely made a name for an ace pilot in 1918. Manfred von Richthofen famously downed eighty before being downed himself on April 21 of that year. 29 See Fritzsche, Nation of Fliers, 79-80; Hadley, Count not the Dead, 25. 35 created a new “” (Verwundetenabzeichen, VA) in 1918 which theoretically only they could receive.30

For all their efforts, though, the Kaiser and his military chiefs proved unable to stem the tide of inflation and devaluation from affecting the entire phaleristic system. Like most other

Halsorden, by 1918 the PLM had been awarded an unprecedented 687 times in four years, of which

531 had come in the final two years.31 The EK, meanwhile, had emerged from the war far worse.

The once exclusive and formidable symbol of heroism and integration had been awarded several million times (200,000 EK1s and upwards of 5,000,000 EK2s32), meaning that roughly one in three

German soldiers was now a recipient of the order (compared to one in twenty in 1870 or 1813).

Additionally, there were millions more of the myriad other decorations from the various kingdoms, both pre-existing or among the sixty new buffer awards created during the war. In the bloodshot eyes of many returning combat troops, therefore, these medals were not symbols of honour but of the mismanagement which had emptied the value from ‘true’ medals; they were “Fettflecken”

(grease spots) to be wiped off.33

In short, the First World War represented a significant point of both rupture and climax for

Germany’s phaleristic culture, marking the end to a century of development. Not only had many of its awards and medals lost their symbolic and material value, but most had lost their very raison d’être with the collapse of the Hohenzollern monarchy in November 1918. Nevertheless, as the

30 Winkle, Dank des Vaterlandes, 188-196. 31 Ibid. Lesser Halsorden, moreover, like the Knight’s Cross with Swords of the Prussian Hausorden of the Hohenzollerns or the Knight’s Cross of the Saxon Military St. Heinrich’s Order had even higher numbers. The war had produced over 8,200 new recipients of the former, for example, as well as 2,700 of the latter. Herfurth, “Orden und Ehrenzeichen,” 121 32 Unfortunately, the records of EK distribution during the war have been lost, and so precise totals are impossible to know and disputed. However, in his detailed doctoral study of the EK’s administrative history Otto Werner Hütte gives the figures of 218,000 EK1s and 5,190,000 EK2s. Hütte, “Eisernen Kreuzes,” 74-81. 33 The VA, it should be mentioned, was an exception. As told by Ralph Winkle and Frank Wernitz, this decoration actually proved entirely too effective, for as a medal which only Frontkämpfer could earn it met their need for unique recognition even better than the inflated EK. See Winkle, Dank des Vaterlandes, 188-196; Wernitz, Iron Cross, 366. 36 country descended into political instability it soon became apparent that the war’s impact on phaleristic tradition had also represented an important sign-post to its wider effects on German social and cultural life. As demonstrated by the wartime development and distribution of the EK and PLM, it appeared that the twin processes of modernization and egalitarianism had finally gained the upper hand over the persistence of the old order in the distribution of recognition.

Even though the distribution of the EK1 was still weighted disproportionately towards the officer class, there were many tens of thousands of NCOs and enlisted men from the lower and middle-classes who had earned this rare medal, to say nothing of the millions who wore the EK2.

Its longstanding egalitarian pretensions were now seemingly closer to reality than ever before. At the same time, though the awardings of the prestigious PLM were even more bent towards the traditional elites, with most recipients still being generals, and field , the emergence of the Blue Max Heldenkult of young, largely middle-class, cult of heroes built through the mass-media represented a great symbolic change. By 1918, such men accounted for 57 percent of Navy PLM holders and 97 percent of those in the new Air Service.34 Even in the Army, where junior officers ( and captains) accounted for only 15 percent, by 1918 this minority had been on the rise with the appearance of men like Lieutenant Ernst Jünger, soon a prominent author, who had risen from the ranks and thus demonstrated the rupture of class-barriers. With such examples, the prestige of a Halsorden was now seemingly within the grasp of the ‘everyman.’

Yet the importance of this paradigm-shift in the cultural perception of state recognition and military heroism was quickly matched by the events of the turbulent years that followed. Amidst the political instability and factionalism that was to define the ill-fated Republic, the

34 These awardings also accounted for men who, though not fighter pilots or U-boat commanders, still fit within their technological-archetype, such as torpedo-boat commanders from the Navy and zeppelin or bomber pilots from the Air Service. 37 orders and decorations of the Wilhelmine period (and specifically those of 1914-1918) were to become weapons in a new war, a “symbolic civil war” (Andreas Dörner) over the memory of

Germany’s past and the direction of its future. More important, it was within this context that the

EK and PLM, the chief symbols of the aforementioned shift, were repurposed for service to the nascent National Socialist movement and its efforts to emerge as a political force, first in and then Berlin. In turn, this symbolic appropriation during the period of the “Kampfzeit” established the foundational “Ordenspolitik” that would later inform the fusion of these medals into the RK in 1939.

I.2 Forging a Mythology

For some decorated veterans, this civil war began as soon as they returned home from the front during the winter of 1918-1919. Instead of a welcome, they found themselves the target of resentment and even violence by socialist or revolutionary elements who had inherited a resentment towards orders and decorations from the political left of the Wilhelmine period.35

Compounded by the order hunting and inflation of the past four years, many saw war medals as ready symbols of monarchical oppression, corruption and the status-obsession of the bourgeoisie.36

Their influence, however, gave way before long to a more refined form of anti-phaleristic sentiment from Germany’s new leadership. Out of fear that the revival of pre-war phaleristic

35 See Thompson, “Honours Uneven,” 174-175, 180-182, 195-196. 36 The , PLM holder and future Wehrmacht general , for example, reported in his memoirs of having been accosted in Munich by a man who grabbed his medal and loudly proclaimed it “scrap metal.” Ernst Udet, Mein Fliegerleben: Die Autobiographie. Vollständige Ausgabe (Germany: E-artnow, 2014), 113, iBooks. Reflecting on the revolution some years later, Prince Bernhard von Bülow similarly noted witnessing officers “with the Iron Cross or the order Pour le Mérite” having their uniforms stripped in the streets. Bernhard Fürst von Bülow, Denkwürdigkeiten (Berlin: Ullstein, 1931), 305-312. This process has been recently analyzed as a form of “symbolic castration” by Ralph Winkle (Dank des Vaterlandes, 209-222) and Benjamin Ziemann (Contested Commemoration, 43). 38 culture would represent a gateway to a renewed militarism and authoritarianism, Article 109 of the

Weimar constitution stipulated that the new state could not issue any orders and decorations and would allow only limited exhibition of those from before 1918.37

This “Ordensverbot” (Orders Ban) did not sit well in certain quarters. To those on the conservative right, among whom some longed to return to pre-war norms following the country’s first shaky steps into republican democracy, it represented a rejection of a legitimate symbolic tradition, as well as an unnecessary, post-facto denigration of the now defunct royal houses. More important, for many veterans it constituted an act of “Ehrvergessenheit” (dishonourableness), a twist of the knife they felt had been stabbed in their backs. Many had already taken up the call for a commemorative medal to be struck to honour those who had served, and so the new government’s effective denial of this possibility constituted a symbolic attack on the legitimacy of the war itself and, thus, the sacrifices of the country’s fighting men. As a result, the early post-war years saw a reinfusion of value and politicized importance into many war medals only recently dismissed as “Fettflecken.” Awards like the EK2 and especially the EK1 or VA lent their owners moral capital as representatives of a new social hierarchy based not upon birth but “front experience.”38

While sympathetic newspapers published articles calling on the government to reverse

Article 109, many of the veterans’ associations and paramilitary organizations springing up across the country began to wear their war decorations as a form of protest and even began to create their own. The Kyffhäuserbund, for instance, created its own commemorative medal, while the paramilitary units that made up the “” collectively created over forty decorations

37 RGBl I 1919. No.152, 1404. 38 Winkle, Dank des Vaterlandes, 243-247, 264-276. 39 honouring service in civil strife against socialists, communist and Polish forces. There were so many of these unofficial awards, in fact, that some veterans had entire chests full of them.39 The most noteworthy rejection of the government’s alleged anti-phaleristic position, though, came in

1922, when the Prussian Defence Ministry announced that, owing to popular demand, it would temporarily allow veterans who had earned the EK during the war but never received it to submit their claims. Much to its surprise and chagrin, applications dwarfed expectations, reaching over

250,000.40

As historians such as Benjamin Ziemann have documented, this phaleristic activism took place across the political spectrum, with the wearing of war medals quickly becoming an important public display of moral legitimacy for activists of different stripes. More important, orders and decorations like the EK, the principal symbol of military heroism and the war dead, also became a means to aid in the growing struggle to establish a ‘correct’ version of Germany’s recent history, at the center of which being the now well-documented concept of the “Frontgemeinschaft” (Front

Community).41 The carnage in the trenches, according to this concept, had not been a curse on the country but a blessing, one that had forged a new egalitarian comradeship among Frontkämpfer that was to serve as the basis for a new society – a Volksgemeinschaft (People’s Community).42

39 Ibid., 247-257, 276-280; Robin Lumsden, Medals and Decorations of Hitler’s Germany (: Airlife, 2001), 13-16. 40 Geissler, Das Eiserne Kreuz, 116-117. 41 In this context, for example, Ziemann has shown how the issue of imperial orders and decorations in particular became a source of considerable division within the political left, one that he argues ultimately weakened their ability to match the concerted and confident activism of the right. Ziemann, Contested Commemoration, 73-75, 94, 271; Winkle, Dank des Vaterlandes, 297-301. For further discussion of the “Symbolpolitik” (symbol-politics) of the , including the role of the EK within it, see Dörner, Politischer Mythos, 185; George L. Mosse Fallen Soldiers. Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 84; Reinhart Koselleck and Michael Jeissmann, eds., Der politische Totenkult: Kriegerdenkmäler in der Moderne (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1994), n.b.23-50. 42 For a recent work that offers an expanded discussion of the evolution of the Volksgemeinschaft concept, as well as its aforementioned malleability across the political spectrum during the Weimar Republic, see Frank Bajohr and Michael Wildt, eds. Volksgemeinschaft. Neue Forschungen zur Gesellschaft des Nationalsozialismus (Frankfurt/M: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2012). 40

The version of this malleable myth presented by the so-called “New Right,” which combined its social elements with a virulent nationalism and anti-Marxism, appealed to many veterans and non-veterans dissatisfied with the new social or political order. It drew inspiration from the writings of soldier-authors like Ernst Jünger to proclaim the emergence of a new manhood represented by the idealized Frontkämpfer: men from all social backgrounds who had proven themselves in combat and owed their status to bravery and determination rather than birth.

Conversely, its anti-heroes were the “Etappenschweine” behind the lines who had reaped undue reward from the war, and thereafter stabbed the nation in the back on the cusp of its victory by signing the despised “Versailles Diktat.”43

Few advocated this version of “Frontkämpferideologie” (Frontkämpfer-ideology) or the alleged Ehrvergessenheit of the Weimar Republic louder, though, than the National Socialist

German Workers’ Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP). Like other contemporary organizations, this small, Munich-based party stressed that it had been born, both physically and metaphorically, in the mire and blood of the trenches. It promised to create a new, ethnically pure German society rooted in the principle of front experience in which Frontkämpfer would hold a special place of honour. As such, as with other groups orders and decorations quickly became an important (and often overlooked) component of early Nazi activism, a means to demonstrate its legitimacy as the Party with the most righteous claim to institute the

Volksgemeinschaft.

43 E.g. Ernst Jünger, Der Kampf als innere Erlebnis (Berlin: Verlag Mittler, 1922), 72-76. For a more comprehensive description of this “new man” and its role as a composite of traditional heroic-archetypes with new, more modern ones, see Bernd Hüppauf, “Langemarck, Verdun and the Myth of a New Man in Germany after the First World War," War and Society 6 (Sept, 1988): 84-96; Hannes Lewalter, “‘Der Kampf ist hart. Wir sind härter!’ Die Darstellung deutscher Soldaten im Spiegel der Bildpropaganda beider Weltkriege und die Konstruktion des ‘Neuen Helden.’” (Ph.D diss., Universität Tübingen, 2010). 41

Early Party rhetoric and writings pointed to the frequency of decorated veterans among its leadership, especially EK1 holders like Adolf Hühnlein, , Viktor Lütze and Julius

Streicher.44 At the same time, it placed considerable emphasis on highlighting PLM holders in its ranks, such as the former fighter pilot Hermann Göring. According to leader Ernst

Hanfstaengl and subsequent biographers, Göring’s visibility and prestige as such was one of the

Party’s most important early assets, not only in bolstering its claims but in providing contacts with the more elite circles of the conservative right.45 Indeed, testifying two decades later at the

Nuremberg trials, Göring himself stated that “the NSDAP had always tried to find PLM holders, especially those popular heroes among aviators and submariners, to become figurehead leaders in the Party’s organizations.46 Such efforts succeeded to a degree as well, for during the 1920s it attracted several distinguished Halsorden-war heroes including , Ferdinand

Schörner, Rudolf Berthold and Josef Veltjens, all of whom, along with Göring, it displayed for propaganda purposes whenever possible.47

The political capital afforded by its connection to war medals also helped the Party to establish a heroic archetype of its paramilitary activists as the successors of the soldiers of 1914-

44 See “Was hat jetzt zu geschehen, und was wollen wir Nationalsozialisten” (München, 27.1.1923), in Hitler: sämtliche Aufzeichnungen 1905-1924 (hereafter sämtliche Aufzeichnungen), eds. Eberhard Jäckel and Alex Kühn (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1980), 807, No.467; Winkle, Dank des Vaterlandes, 295-297; Schilling, Kriegshelden, 319-320. 45 Ernst Hanfstaengl, Hitler. The Memoir of the Nazi Insider Who Turned Against the Führer, trans. John Toland (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2011), chap.3 (loc.1056, 1133 of 4830), Kindle; Alfred Kube, Pour le Mérite und Hakenkreuz. Hermann Göring im Dritten Reich (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1986), 8. 46 Testimony of Hermann Göring. March 13, 1946, in Trial of Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal. , 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946. (hereafter ) Volume IX (Nuremberg, 1947), 238-239. 47 Future Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels would write in his diary of the Party’s attempt to seduce Ernst Jünger to the cause. When he met the hero in person, however, Goebbels remarked that he was “disappointed.” As will be of relevance to Chapter III, Goebbels wrote of a “lack of civil courage,” suggesting that even at this early stage, he did not believe in the centrality of military experience in political activism. This was hardly surprising, given that he himself had none. Elke Fröhlich, ed. Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels: Sämtliche Fragmente (hereafter GTb), Im Auftrag des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte und mit Unterstützung des Staatlichen archivdienstes Russlands (München: K.G. Saur, 1987-2008), 1/II, 185 (17.2.1927); emphasis added. See further GTb 1/III, 361. (31.10.1929). 42

1918. The brownshirts of the SA (), who mixed a veneer of military discipline with street violence and fused Frontkämpfer-ideology with Nazism’s vicious brand of anti-Semitism and anti-Bolshevism, were now a species of heroic political Frontkämpfer, along with any others who could be bent into this mould.48 , a young veteran and EK1 holder exemplified this latter process by becoming an archetypal hero of the Party after his execution for combatting French occupation of the in 1923. In the hands of Nazi propagandists, Schlageter was hailed as an example of its new archetype, a kind of Freikorpskämpfer who laid down his life in the struggle against Versailles and foreign domination.49 In the same way, SA-Kämpfer fought the “internal enemies” of the Volk (the ethnic German nation), and in defeating these new

“Etappenschweine” he could finally allow for a classless and ethnically homogenous nation-state united by the spirit of perpetual struggle.50

The NSDAP’s most important phaleristic connection to Frontkämpfer-ideology, though, was Adolf Hitler himself. The future dictator’s many biographers and most scholars of the Third

Reich have long recognized that a significant portion of his charismatic authority emanated from the perception of his wartime experience, and particularly his receipt of the EK1. Hitler joined

Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment Sixteen (RIR 16) in , and within months he had been promoted to corporal and made a dispatch runner, tasked with delivering messages to and from regimental headquarters. In this role he had earned the EK2 by November 1914, of which he

48 See “Aufruf des Vaterländischen Kampfbundes (2.9.1923),” in Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen, 991, No.564; ibid., 323, No.199: “Nationalkokarde und Pleitegeier,” Aufsatz, München (20.2.1921) and 383, No.233, “Gelogen wie gedruckt,” Aufsatz, München (8.5.1921). 49 Schlageter was a proud nationalist to be sure, but certainly not the archetype which Nazi propagandists subsequently made him out to be. A recent comparative biography that includes a detailed analysis of the NSDAP’s heroization of Schlageter is Stefan Zwicker’s Nationale Märtyrer: Albert Leo Schlageter and Julius Fučik. Heldenkult, Propaganda und Erinnerungskultur (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2006), n.b. chap.II.5. 50 “Durch Kampfgemeinschaft zur Volksgemeinschaft,“ Hitler in Nuremberg, 14.9.1923, in Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen, 383 No.564, 991; Sven Reichardt, “Die SA im “Nachkriegs-Krieg,” in Nationalsozialismus und Erster Weltkrieg, ed. Gerd Krumeich (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2010), 243-245, 254-256. 43 said in a letter of self-congratulation to a friend that after “risking my life every day, looking death straight in the eye […] It was the happiest day of my life.”51 Over the following three years Hitler earned several more decorations until, in August of 1918, he received the EK1 for gallantry in action, a distinction still rare for enlisted men that meant considerably more prestige than his increasingly ubiquitous EK2.52 Shortly thereafter, the decorated corporal was wounded and finished the war in a military hospital.

These unchallenged facets of Hitler’s war record have compelled many to the grudging admission that, as Nazi propagandists claimed, he was indeed a brave and proven soldier who deserved his EK1. However, a recent wave of research into Hitler’s war record and its subsequent politicization allows for a more nuanced picture of his relationship to the EK order as an essential symbol of moral legitimacy. Far from constantly dodging bullets, Thomas Weber has documented how Hitler spent significant periods of his service in the relative safety of headquarters and casts some doubt on the circumstances of his medals using the regiment’s surviving records.53 While

Nazi lore claimed that he had won the EK1 for capturing fifteen French soldiers single-handed, it

51 Hitler again boasted of his EK2 in a letter some two months later (5.2.1915), describing in transparent self-promotion the danger he routinely faced and thereby how much he deserved the distinction. See Werner Maser, Hitler. Hitler’s Letters and Notes, trans. Arnold Pomerans (London: Heinemann, 1973), 50-56, 68-86. 52 These included the Military Merit Medal (Third Class, 17.9.1917), a regimental diploma for bravery in action (9.5.1918), as well as the wound badge (in black, i.e. third class, 18.5.1918). Hitler attested to these decorations himself on a form he filled out in Munich after the war. See 4.3.1919, “Über die Militärzeit,” in sämtliche Aufzeichnungen, 85f. 53 Weber, Hitler’s First War, 94-95. Weber’s research built on top of previous research works that proposed to revisit the history of Hitler’s First World War experience in RIR 16 to better understand him and his subsequent life, such as John F. Williams’s Corporal Hitler and the Great War 1914-1918. The List Regiment (New York: Frank Cass, 2005). However, while the source material and structure of their works are thus quite similar, these scholars reach very different conclusions about Hitler’s personal value as a soldier and the role of the EK in his subsequent political mythology. Williams takes an affirming stance, stating that: “There can be no doubt that he was a brave and fanatical soldier,” and that he won both EK grades “deservedly” (ibid., 2, 8, 13). However, in comparison Williams’ work does not take into account the same level of testimony from Hitler’s former comrades regarding his EK nor the wider phaleristic culture, and problems, surrounding EK distribution during the war (e.g. Weber, Hitler’s First War, 103- 105). Instead, Williams’ conclusions are based more on the assumption that a recipient of the EK1 had to be legitimately exceptional by simple virtue of the award’s prestige and rarity among men of lower rank. Though he focuses less on the issue, Finnish historian Vappu Tallgren has also produced a detailed study of Hitler’s heroic mythology and EK history. See Tallgren, “Hitler und die Helden: Heroismus und Weltanschauung,” (Ph.D diss., Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1981). 44 is more likely that this distinction was for delivering a message under heavy fire (together with another man), and then only because the officers at headquarters were more familiar with his name.54 For this reason, dispatch runners were known to have received disproportionate numbers of EKs, a trend resented by their comrades in the trenches and that placed them into a grey area between Frontkämpfer and Etappenschweine.55

Despite his prized medal, in other words, Hitler’s war record was not one of which to necessarily boast, and there is still conflicting evidence as to whether he wore the former after returning to revolutionary-Munich in November of 1918.56 Either way, it did not stop him from trading on his status when applying for membership in the nascent “German Worker’s Party” on

October 19, 1919, describing himself as a Frontkämpfer “recently decorated with the EK1 [sic].”57

Once a member, Hitler of course soon helped to transform this small beer-hall club into a growing movement and quickly became its leader. As a result, his war record and phaleristic credentials took on greater significance as the core symbol of the Party’s claims to be the natural home of the

Frontkämpfer. Consequently, one Munich newspaper article in 1923 wrote that Hitler now wore his EK1 “at every opportunity,” and that he “has been benefitting particularly from his […] activity

54 According to research conducted by Weber, it also took some effort on the part of Hitler’s superior to have his recommendation approved. Weber, Hitler’s First War, 94-95; Tallgren, “Hitler und die Helden,” 222-223. story, meanwhile, was repeated by the future dictator himself in a 1932 interview. See “Hitler Predicts Run- Off Victory,” New York Post, March 12, 1932 in Reden, Schriften, Anordnungen IV/2, 222. No.46. 55 In an official regimental history published in 1932, one soldier from RIR 16 wrote that men like himself “who stood in the first line of fire year long,” were and remained bitter that when decorations were distributed “[…] there were hardly any left.” Fridolin Sollender, “Erster Winter”, in Vier Jahre Westfront: Geschichte des Regiments List RIR 16 (Munich: M.Schick, 1932), 86. 56 Later in life, he claimed to have worn his medals only to distinguish himself from rear-echelon generals (“Etappengenerale”), while on another occasion said he had put on his EK1 when he saw “how the reds were behaving” as an act of defiance. Both claims could well be typical Hitlerian bluster, but each does ring true with contemporary trends mentioned earlier in this chapter. That said, another plausible explanation is that he had simply been reluctant to show off his medal around veterans who knew, and resented, how he had received it. See Erklärung, “Novemberverbrecher,” 27.3.1923, Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen, 851-3, No.500; Hugh Trevor-Roper, ed. Hitler’s Table Talk 1941-1944. His Private Conversations, trans. Norman Cameron and R.H. Stevens (New York: Enigma Books, 2008), 93 (10.11-11.11.1941). 57 “Hitler an die DAP” München. 19.10.1919, in Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen, 91, No.64. 45 in the trenches and likes to surround himself with the glory of the front fighters who were on the front-most lines for the whole war in the ‘filth of blood and muck’.”58

By the early 1930s, propagandists under the direction of one of the NSDAP’s rising stars,

Joseph Goebbels, had distilled the theme of Hitler as decorated war hero into a cohesive political myth, exemplified in a series of new biographies such as Adolf Hitler im Felde 1914-1918 (1931) by Hans Mend. Mend, a former comrade and now political supporter, praised Hitler’s soldierly acumen as a committed fighter who proved himself to be “superhumanly brave, calm and cold- blooded.”59 However, as Hitler and the NSDAP vied for national power in the presidential elections of 1932, this myth took on even more importance. To campaign against the communist leader Ernst Thälmann, propagandists juxtaposed Hitler as the honest, decorated soldier taking on the subversives who had perpetrated the humiliation of 1918. At the same time, because he was running against the former and holder of the GK as well, Party propagandists lauded the parallel image of Hitler as the relatable and humble Frontkämpfer, the hero of the everyman.60

With such high stakes, the Führer’s myth came under increasing scrutiny and criticism, and much of it from his former comrades in RIR 16 who alleged that Hitler had been, at best, only a

58 Erklärung, “Novemberverbrecher,” 27.3.1923, Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen, 851-3, No.500. For the most part, propagandists downplayed his role as a dispatch runner and its commensurate time spent out of danger. Though speaking at length about his war experiences, Hitler made little reference to this aspect in Mein Kampf. See Tallgren, “Hitler und die Helden,” 216-217; Schilling, Kriegshelden, 351-353. 59 Hans Mend, Adolf Hitler im Felde 1914-1918 (Munich: Huber Diessen, 1931). As John F. Williams outlines, however, Hitler disapproved of Mend’s work for while it praised him in sycophantic terms as a military hero, it was also quite honest in its characterization of Hitler the man: a loner and un-personable sort. Moreover, by including honest details about the extent of Hitler’s work as a dispatch runner, Mend’s biography soon became a tool for his political enemies to discredit the very myth he was trying to create. As a result, when Hitler came to power, he banned the book and even sent Mend to a concentration camp for a time. See Williams, Corporal Hitler, 134. For discussion of the wider series of biographies focusing on Hitler’s war service during this period, see Tallgren, “Hitler und die Helden,” 223. 60 Discussion of the elections and their accompanying propaganda can be found in Weber, Hitler’s First War, 105- 107; Williams, Corporal Hitler, 201-203; and Tallgren, “Hitler und die Helden,” 226. 46 part-time Frontkämpfer. One article alleged that his real record was “by no means that of a shining hero,” while one of his fellow dispatch runners even wrote to him personally to remind him of the more comfortable aspects of their shared role, admonishing: “Adolf, we can’t deny that we were regimental staff members.”61 A good portion of criticism, moreover, was directed towards Hitler’s

EK1. Lack of proper documentation and exactitude about the circumstances of its receipt lent credence to suspicions that the award smacked of the kind of order hunting that the Nazis themselves denounced; the product of a “rotten swindle” by the Nazi leader. Indeed, the previously mentioned article stated that “the comrades in the front-line would have shaken their heads when this one received the EK1.”62

Hitler lost the campaign, of course, but it had represented an important early lesson in identifying a potential Achilles’ Heel. Specifically, it had underscored the decisive role of the EK and other war decorations like the PLM in reinforcing the Party’s claims to legitimacy as champions of the Frontgemeinschaft and trustworthy builders of a new Germany. These awards’ connection to the mythologized “awakening” of the Volk from previous social and cultural divisions represented a critical source of moral capital, one which the Party, and Hitler personally, had a vested interest not only in preserving but in establishing as the foundation for a new symbolic tradition once they achieved their goal of ruling Germany. However, when President Hindenburg appointed Hitler on January 30, 1933, the Party faced several barriers and challenges that made this difficult. To consolidate its power, it was compelled into a new, compromise-based

Ordenspolitik that would provide more such lessons.

61 NARA T-581-I. Ferdinand Widman to Hitler, 9.3.1932, cited in Weber, Hitler’s First War, 106-7; “Adolf, wo warst Du?” Schwäbische Tagwacht, April 7, 1932; “Frontsoldat Hitler – Klitterungen und Legedenbilderungen,” Münchner Post, March 2, 1932;“Adolf im Kriege – orientalische Phantasien bei Goebbels,” Vorwärts, March 8, 1932. 62 E.g. “Das Märchen vom Kriege. Wie Hitler das Eiserne Kreuz erhielt,” Neue Leipziger Zeitung, March 5, 1932 and “Frontsoldat und Staatsbürger,” Der Tag, February 5, 1932. See further Tallgren, “Hitler und die Helden,” 220-226; Williams, Corporal Hitler, 203. 47

I.3 Barriers and Compromises

As with most political movements freshly ushered into power, one of the first challenges that faced the new Nazi-led government was in fulfilling, or at least to be seen to fulfill, the commitments made to secure the support of its followers. For Hitler and the NSDAP, one of their chief commitments had been the perennial promises not only to restore the honour of Germany’s veterans (allegedly lost to years of Ehrvergessenheit) and reorder society into one in which front experience would represent a new metric for social prestige, a new ideologically driven value system. Keeping these promises, in other words, represented an early test of credibility of a Hitler- led regime among one of its most essential and symbolic demographics of . What’s more, the latter quickly made it clear that they expected the regime to keep its word.

To demonstrate the Party’s ideological fidelity, Hanns Oberlindober, head of the National

Socialist War Victims’ Support Association (Nationalsozialistische Kriegsopferversorgung,

NSKOV), had proposed to introduce special social benefits for veterans, ranging from discounted prices for transport and cultural events, access to work programs for those affected by the Great

Depression as well as a special pension. Reports from the Reich Chancellery (Reichskanzlei, RKz), however, spoke to a negative reaction from veterans, who felt that while these benefits were a nice gesture, what they most desired was a more symbolic elevation through the re-legitimization of old war medals, the revival of a vibrant phaleristic culture, and the creation of a commemorative decoration long asked for, but never received, from the previous regime. Such action would distinguish veterans, and specifically former Frontkämpfer, from those who had not shared their

48 experience or suffering, acknowledging them as the “first citizens of the nation.”63 However, they were not impressed by what they had seen so far.

Certainly, the Nazis in the new government had made it clear from the first that addressing the issue of phaleristics was to be a priority in the new Germany. In one of the first meetings of

Hitler’s cabinet in April 1933, for example, Hermann Göring (now a minister without portfolio) reminded attendees that the hated Weimar regime “had perished at least partially because of its lack of decorations of honour [and] orders.”64 Nevertheless, the first legislation in this sphere

(enacted later that day) had fallen far short of expectations. Among veterans it appeared half- hearted by merely confirming the continuation of several civilian awards.65 Thus, as the year progressed the RKz reported that this failure to re-establish a phaleristic system deemed to

“properly” commemorate the national war experience had begun to sow doubt in the minds of thousands of former soldiers about the reliability of a Nazi regime. The new boss seemed just like the old, the same Ehrvergessenheit but in a brown uniform.

Helping to fuel this pressure from veterans to re-legitimize the phaleristic culture of pre-

1918 Germany was the Party’s marriage of necessity with elements of the conservative political establishment. As historians have long recognized, were it not for this alliance it is unlikely that the Party could ever have attained power. Yet, part of the cost was that the latter now found themselves having to countenance their influence, and interference, in its attempt to create a new

63 James Diehl, Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans after the Second World War (Chapel Hill, 1993), 37-39. As Jason Crouthamel points out, veterans’ rejection of the early Oberlindober proposals was no doubt aided by the fact that the scheme had quickly become bogged down by the confused jurisdictional network of Nazi administration. Crouthamel, The Great War and German Memory: Society, Politics and Psychological Trauma, 1914-1945 (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 2009), 160-161. 64 “Ministerbesprechung, 7.4.1933,” in Akten der Reichskanzlei. Regierung Hitler 1933-1938 (hereafter Regierung Hitler) Vol.I.1, ed. Karl-Heinz Minuth (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1983), 311. No.93. See further BAB R 43-II/296a f.1, 27. Hans Pfundtner (RMI) an Heinrich Lammers (RKz). Betr. Gesetz über Titeln, Orden und Ehrenzeichen, 6.4.1933. 65 “Gesetz über Titel, Orden und Ehrenzeichen. Vom 7. April 1933,” RGBl I. 1933. No.5, 180. 49 symbolic culture.66 Conservative veterans’ organizations like the “” (the Steel Helmets), for example, were among the loudest in calling for new commemorative decorations for former

Frontkämpfer. More important, by the end of the year its members had taken matters into their own hands and created their own, thus representing a circumvention of government authority which the latter, under the circumstances, was obliged to allow.67 Even that authority, moreover, had clear limits. By law, the Party only had the power to create internal awards (to be discussed shortly); all official state awards and decorations fell under the authority of the conservative and monarchist President Hindenburg and were awarded in his name.68

The National Socialists were thus in a bind, severely limited in their ability to carry out their own phaleristic ambitions and facing the reality of having to make some undesirable compromises. Reversing the “Ordensverbot” and restoring the imperial phaleristic system certainly represented a source of political capital but doing so meant affirming the symbolic traditions of a Germany before National Socialism, i.e. one rife with regionalism, class-structure and monarchy. There were even pitfalls in creating the commemorative medal for veterans of

1914-1918. On one hand, pressure from Hindenburg and the broader veterans’ community meant that such a medal would have to recognize all veterans, including those the Party did not care to honour such as “Etappenschweine” and even . At the same time, Hitler and several of his senior lieutenants including Heinrich Lammers (head of the RKz) had been receiving letters from

66 The most famous example being the “Day of Potsdam” on March 21, 1933, when Hitler bowed to President Hindenburg on the steps of the Garrison Church in that city, the traditional resting place of Prussia’s kings. The event was a resounding success for the new Nazi government, establishing credibility in the eyes of conservatives still wary of its more revolutionary and brutish tendencies. 67 See BAB R 72/468. Stahlhelm, “Abzeichen Alte Garde,” n.d.; Anke Hoffstadt, “Frontgemeinschaft? Der „Stahlhelm. Bund der Frontsoldaten“ und der Nationalsozialismus,” in Nationalsozialismus und Erster Weltkrieg Gerd Krumeich, ed. in Verbindung mit Anke Hoffstadt und Arndt Weinrich. (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2010), 197, 203; C.M. Dodkins and David Littlejohn, Orders, decorations, medals and of the Third Reich (including the Free City of Danzig) (Mountain View, CA: R. James Bender, 1970), 214. 68 RGBl I. 1934. No.81, 619. 50 former Frontkämpfer urging caution about compromising the hierarchy of front experience. They also warned of a persistent resentment at the prospect of post-facto recognition being extended to the rear-echelon pseudo-soldiers who had unjustly won the EK during the war.69

Hemmed in between ideological fidelity and political necessity, the government debated the issue during the winter of 1933-1934 before ultimately yielding in the spring.70 In May 1934,

Interior Minister formally announced an amendment to its earlier law that restored the awarding rights for a large number of imperial orders and decorations, and encouraged veterans to wear their medals with pride.71 Within weeks, though, Hitler himself received a taste of the negative side-effects of this concession when he attempted to ban two knightly orders at a cabinet meeting in late May. The two orders, based entirely on social status (i.e. aristocratic birth) rather than on personal merit, were ideologically unacceptable and, as Frick was to describe, had no

“raison d’être [sic] in the National Socialist state.”72 According to the meeting’s minutes, however,

Hitler’s demand quickly met with a reminder from , soon to be named head of his

Presidential Chancellery (Präsidialkanzlei, PräsKz), that such power belonged to Hindenburg.

Moreover, he said, the current President was unlikely to acquiesce given that he himself was a recipient of several such awards and served as the honourary president of another. Furthermore, shortly thereafter Hindenburg himself, along with fellow Prussian Field Marshal August von

69 BAB R 43-II/296a f.1, 30. Fleck an Lammers, 29.1.1934; ibid., f.3, 175-176. Brief von Hanns Poser an Adolf Hitler, 2.5.1933. 70 For the debate that took place during the winter regarding the correct course regarding orders and decorations, see BAB R 43-II/296a f.1, 1-16; ibid., 30-50, 65-68; “Kabinettssitzung vom 15.5.1934,” in Minuth, Akten der Reichskanzlei I.2, 1266. No.346; Diehl, Thanks of the Fatherland, 37-39. 71 “Ergänzungsgesetz über Titel, Orden und Ehrenzeichen. Vom 15. Mai 1934,” RGBl I. 1934. No.52, 379. See further NARA T 70/17. IB/1212 FT. Reichsministerium des Innern (RMI) I 1726a/23.3 Pfundtner an Lammers, 26.4.1934. 72 Comments referenced within BAB R 43-II/296a f.3, 125. Frick (RMI) an Auswärtiges Amt (AA), Protokoll 3029 IX 381, 6.4.1935 (emphasis in original); ibid., f.3, 122. Meissner an Frick. RP.1542/35. 21.3.1935; Kabinettssitzung vom 15.5.1934, in Minuth, Akten der Reichskanzlei I.2, 1266. No.346. 51

Mackensen, petitioned Hitler to restore the rights of the exiled Kaiser to award his royal house order again.73

Two months later the government enacted the second part of its solution, but again achieved mixed results. On July 1, 1934, it unveiled the long-awaited commemorative

“Ehrenkreuz des Weltkrieges 1914-1918” (Honour Cross of the World War 1914-1918, EW), which, by clever design, managed to be both accessible and reflective of the hierarchy of front experience. Bearing the familiar shape of the EK and featuring a wreath of oak leaves to symbolize victory, it had several grades of precedence including a more prestigious version for Frontkämpfer (with crossed swords) and a lesser one for rear-echelon personnel

(without swords). Moreover, to maximize its political effect it also had a non-combatant version for surviving relatives (in black, without swords).74 Finally, as an additional display of the regime’s trustworthiness, Hanns Oberlindober of the NSKOV introduced a streamlined version of his earlier proposals in the form of a special pension for wounded veterans (Frontkämpfer only).75

The regime’s attempt to fulfill its commitments proved an enormous popular success.

Applications for the EW submitted by gratified veterans and eligible non-combatants ultimately exceeded seven million before the end of the decade.76 Oberlindober declared it a historic

73 “Vermerk des Ministerialrats Wienstein zur Frage der Anerkennung des Hohenzollern Hausordens, 8. Juni 1934,” in Akten der Reichskanzlei I.2, 1313. No.361. 74 “Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten über die Stiftung eines Ehrenkreuzes. Vom 1. Juli 1934,” RGBl I. 1934. No.81, 619. It is noteworthy that the medal was available to Germans only, thus symbolizing the ethnic homogeneity of the Volksgemeinschaft. The records of the RKz, for example, contain reference to a request made in 1937 from Bulgarian General Peter Gantcew, who requested permission to receive the EW in honour of their two countries’ former alliance. Hitler refused, answering that the award was “only for Reichsdeutsche,” and no exceptions were possible. See “Vorträge Lammers bei Hitler,” in Regierung Hitler II.4, 725. No.104. 75 Crouthamel, German Memory, 160-161. 76 This total included: 6,202,883 EW’s to combatants; 1,120,449 to non-combatant soldiers; 345,132 to war-widows and 373,950 to parents and other family members (figures taken from Lumsden, Medals and Decorations, 16-17). For further discussion of the creation of the EW and its significance to the process by which the regime consolidated its credibility and authority, see Winkle, Dank des Vaterlandes, 309-314; Arndt Weinrich, “Zwischen Kontinuität und Kritik: Die Hitler-Jugend und die Generation der “Frontkämpfer,” in Nationalsozialismus und Erster Weltkrieg, ed. Gerd Krumeich. (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2010), n.b. 280-282. 52 vindication for the regime and its “fight for the honour of the German soldier,” a slogan developed more broadly by the newly formed Propaganda Ministry (Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda, RMVP) under Joseph Goebbels.77 Once again, however, the decorative band of the EW bore witness to the continued subordination of the Party to its conservative allies and to the personal authority of the aging president. Despite being developed by the Party, it bore two large flanking stripes of white and black, the colours of Prussia, with only a small red stripe down the middle to represent National Socialism. Furthermore, the medal soon became known as the

“Hindenburg Cross,” and, true to his word, the President made it available to Jewish veterans.78

In short, the phaleristic history of 1933-1934 represented a pyrrhic victory for the new Nazi regime, securing important political capital at the cost of some ideological concessions. More important, it had thus gained a measure of political breathing room to begin to normalize its version of the First World War and interwar period as the foundational mythology of the new state, a process that included new roles for the EK and PLM. First, Goebbels and the RMVP reinforced

Hitler’s own war record and the legitimacy of his EK. Service as a dispatch runner, they now said through different media, had in fact been more dangerous than the experience of most

Frontkämpfer, and the EK1 had hardly been reward enough!79 More broadly, though, they endeavoured to reinforce the symbolic importance of this medal as the war order of the Volk, effectively expanding upon the integrative and nationalistic framework employed by Wilhelm II..

77 “Ein Kreuz für alle!” Berliner Lokal Anzeiger, June 3, 1934; “Der Führer legt das Frontkämpferkreuz an,” VB, November 7, 1934. 78 “Das erste Frontkämpferkreuz – Es befindet sich unter den Orden Hindenburgs,” Frankfurter Zeitung, February 20, 1935; Winkle, Dank des Vaterlandes, 322-328. 79 The 1930s saw the publication of more Hitler-biographies, new editions of Mein Kampf and countless essays and even children’s literature reinforcing this narrative. Likewise, Hitler and Goebbels did much to create a particular mythology around RIR 16 as “the birthplace of a more egalitarian, National Socialist Germany,” including staging reunions and naming military units after it. At the same time, though, the authorities also set about gathering any evidence relating to Hitler’s military career, and even imprisoning the superior who had recommended him for the EK1, and who also happened to be Jewish. See Weber, Hitler’s First War, 92-96, 289-295, postscript: “Hugo Gutmann’s Story.” 53

A surge in EK-themed literature and art followed, combined with a repurposed commemorative culture emphasizing a cult of sacrificial death (a “Totenkult”) for the fallen of 1914-1918 in which the EK served as the primary integrative symbol. Through such means the regime began to appropriate the EK for its own use, slowly divorcing it from its monarchic and Prussian connotations and consecrating it for service as a symbol of the “new” Germany.80

In much the same way, the PLM served effectively as a conduit for propagandists to revive and transform the popular wartime Heldenkult. Histories of the “Blue Max” and tales of its winners from 1914-1918 became the focus of a growing array of popular literature by authors sympathetic to the regime, along with postcards and even a feature film by famed director in 1938 about fighter pilots, aptly titled Pour le Mérite.81 This propaganda, though, did not present an accurate picture of the real distribution of the PLM but rather the image created during the First

World War. The PLM winners of Nazi propaganda were most often not the generals and colonels of reality but rather the younger and often middle-class junior officers of the storm-troops, U-boat commanders and ace pilots who supposedly exemplified an egalitarian ideal of Frontkämpfer- heroism. Like Albert Leo Schlageter a decade before, their memory became even further moulded post-mortem in the hands of Goebbels and the RMVP into warriors of National Socialism: fanatical nationalists and, if necessary, willing martyrs.82

80 For discussion this process, especially the role of the EK in the new commemorative culture, see Behrenbeck, Kult um die toten Helden, 511-514; Winkle, Dank des Vaterlandes, 314-315. 81 E.g. Franz Immelmann, Immelmann. ‘The Eagle of ’, trans. Claud W. Sykes (London: John Hamilton, 1938); Johannes Werner, Knight of Germany. Oswald Boelcke German Ace, trans. Claud W. Sykes (London: John Hamilton Limited, 1933); Rolf Italiaander, Manfred Freiherr von Richthofen: Der beste Jagdflieger des Grossen Krieges (Berlin: Weichert, 1938); Karl Ritter, Pour le Mérite (UFA GmbH, 1938). For examples of literature about the PLM itself, see “Der Orden Pour le Mérite,” Anzeiger für den Berliner Norden, January 24, 1934; Franz Schauwecker, “Symbol des Preussentums. Der Orden “Pour le Mérite,” Der Stahlhelm 3 Beilage “Helden und Zeiten” (1934), 14- 15; Walter Zuerl, Pour le Mérite -Flieger. Heldentaten und Erlebnisse unserer Kriegsflieger (Munich: Curt Pechstein Verlag, 1938); P. Leonhardt, “Für Tapferkeit vor dem Feind,” VB, May 9, 1939. For a number of clippings dealing with Oswald Boelcke, see BAB R 8034-III/41. 82 E.g. Immelmann, Eagle of Lille, 223; “Ein Deutscher Fliegerheld. Büchner zum 14.Todestag am 18.März,” VB, March 18-19, 1934; Otto Riebicke, “Der unsterbliche Flieger.’ Kampfflieger Rudolf Bertholds Heldenpassion,” 54

Yet, the usage of the PLM in this way also illustrated the ideological limits of the First

World War Heldenkult, as well as the duplicitous line the regime now walked regarding imperial phaleristic culture. While the transformed perspective of this award from 1914-1918 allowed it to be used as a symbol of Frontkämpfer-ideology, its profound historical roots and vestigial cultural connection to Prussianism and social elitism were simply too deep to overlook. The PLM was a valuable and propagandistically malleable symbol, but it lacked the more direct connection to the egalitarian, pan-German Volksgemeinschaft of the EK. This difficulty can be seen not only in the regime’s propaganda about arguably the most famous PLM winner of the war, the aristocrat-air ace Manfred von Richthofen, but also through its interaction with the PLM veterans’ association

(the Ritterschaft des Ordens Pour le Mérite, ROPLM).83

Given the renewed prominence of their namesake medal, this organization naturally presumed a close and mutually beneficial relationship with the Nazi regime.84 Indeed, Hitler himself had personally facilitated their publication of a book on PLM winners from 1914-1918,

Der Angriff, March 14, 1935. It should be noted too that Hitler, for one, knew full well that the vision of the PLM caste by his propagandists did not match reality. Later in life, he would remark to dinner guests one evening that from his own Army experience, one knew that “only an officer could win the Pour le Mérite. And at that, it was quite exceptional for an officer of middle-class origin to receive it” (see Trevor Roper, Table Talk, 37. No.27 (27- 28.9.1941)). On a historiographical note, this concerted revival of the First World War Heldenkult by the Party during the 1930s has been documented in the past by several different scholars (e.g. Schilling, “Helden der Wehrmacht,” 551, 560-561, 566-568; Behrenbeck, Kult um die toten Helden, 452-458; Fritzsche, Nation of Fliers, 98, 203, 217; Schüler- Springorum, Flying and Killing, 215-219). However, in keeping with trends outlined in the introduction to this work, such descriptions have tended to focus exclusively on propaganda about technological heroes and the way in which their connection to modern warfare was used by the regime to promote Hitler’s program of rearmament and the mental preparation of the German people for another war, a process described by Jutta Sywottek as “innere Mobilisierung” (inner mobilization) (see Jutta Sywottek, Mobilmachung für den totalen Krieg. Die propagandistische Vorbereitung der deutschen Bevölkerung auf den Zweiten Weltkrieg. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1976), n.b. 85- 90, 170. However, while submariners and fliers undeniably received disproportionate representation in the new Nazi Heldenkult and were indeed utilized for this purpose (especially towards the end of the decade), this framework minimizes the attention given to non-technological hero figures like Ernst Jünger or the Nazis’ own PLM holders from the Army. More important, it minimizes the attention given to the PLM itself as mentioned above, and thus their connection to the regime’s social ideals and wider process of Ordenspolitik. 83 For the regime’s difficulty in forging a ‘proper’ hero out of Richthofen during the 1930s (though not in relation to his medal), see Schilling, Kriegshelden, 344. 84 An issue of the ROPLM bulletin from late 1933, for example, wrote that the new state differed from [Weimar] “in that it values the deeds and accomplishments of great conflicts.” BAMA RW 4/355 f.1, 9. Nachrichtenblatt für die Ritter des Ordens Pour le Mérite, September 15, 1933. 55 with Hermann Göring (a member) providing a foreword.85 However, when the association later proposed to award the Führer this Halsorden, they received a polite but firm rebuff from Heinrich

Lammers, who responded that such an event would cause “misunderstandings among some circles of the Volk.” The PLM, he explained, simply belonged “to a previous period of development and therefore cannot be a suitable award for the creator of Greater Germany and of the Third Reich.”86

The symbolic limitations of the PLM, therefore, only underscored the Party’s need for a phaleristic system that explicitly reflected its own history and socio-political ideals – one without the same historical baggage. In fact, Hitler had already laid the foundations for such an updated system in the one sphere of Ordenspolitik in which he had unfettered authority. Since taking power in January 1933, he had created a series of new medals and decorations within the NSDAP that reflected the development of a new political component to Frontkämpfer-ideology to suit the changing face of the Party. Despite their figurehead role, since the late 1920s veterans had become a minority within the Nazi movement, and since the “Machtergreifung” (Seizure of Power) the ratio had shrunk even further after a surge of new applicants for Party membership.87 This demographic shift prompted the degree of participation in the Kampfzeit to become a new addendum to the concept of front experience and a new metric of internal Party-prestige. Those who had joined before 1930 became known as “Alte Kämpfer” (Old Fighters); those between 1930

85 See BAMA RW 4/355 f.2, 59. Mackensen an H. Möller-Witten; ibid., f.3, 112. Meissner u. Mackensen, 18.4.1936. The book project was eventually written in two volumes under the title Geschichte der Ritter des Ordens “Pour le Mérite” im Weltkrieg (Berlin: Verlag Bernard u. Graefe, 1935). 86 For context, this proposal came just after Hitler’s successful achievement of “” with in March 1938. “Anfrage des a.D. Friedrich Karl v.Witzleben, Geschäftsführer der Ritterschaft des Ordens Pour le Mérite, ob Hitler geneigt sei, zum Dank für Herstellung Grossdeutschland den Orden anzunehmen, 22.4.1938,” in Akten der Reichskanzlei. Regierung Hitler 1933-1945. Vol. 5, ed. Friedrich Hartmannsgruber (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 2008), 999-1000. No.200. 87 See Reichardt, “Die SA im “Nachkriegs-Krieg,” 248-251 56 and 1933 by the derisive term “Septemberlings”; and the perceived opportunists who joined after the political victory had been won as “Märzveilchen” (March Violets).88

Like Germany’s veterans, those in the first two categories sought recognition for their own superior experience, and so in 1933 and 1934 the Party elite created a series of so-called Civil War

Badges denoting participation in specific events, rallies or riots.89 In addition, Hitler authorized two awards that paralleled the military’s EW and EK. The first was the Golden Party Badge

(Goldene Parteiabzeichen, GPA), a general commemorative medal for Alte Kämpfer with Party numbers below 100,000.90 The second, and more significant, was the “Blood Order” (Blutorden,

BO), which elevated the elite among the Alte Kämpfer, namely the several thousand participants in the attempted 1923 Munich Putsch.91 Though initially commemorative as well, Hitler later widened the BO’s parameters to include those whose loyalty to the Party had landed them in prison, in hospital or in their grave. Taken in a broader view, this medal therefore represented a political version of the EK, honouring, and delineating, the political Frontkämpfer who had carried the struggle begun in the trenches into the streets.92 As a symbolic representation of this parallel, the ribbon of the BO was inverted from that of the EW, with the black-and-white stripes of the EK

88 For a more thorough discussion of the internecine rivalry between old and new Party members that defined internal Party culture in the years following the Machtergreifung, see Dietrich Orlow, The Nazi Party 1919-1945. A Complete History (New York: Enigma Books, 2010), 209-226. 89 These included the Coburg Badge (Coburgerabzeichen), Nuremberg Party Badge (Nürnberger Parteiabzeichen), and the Brunswick Rally Badge of 1931 (Abzeichens des SA-Treffen 1931). 90 As Robin Lumsden explains, “the early Party practice of allocating random numbers to new recruits so as to make the Party appear larger than it actually was, combined with the restrictions of active and unbroken membership, limited the recipients to around 22,000, all of whom had joined the NSDAP before September 1930.” Lumsden, Medals and Decorations, 92-93, 101. 91 These medals also provided a taste of the way in which such hierarchical recognition would function in the toxic culture of nepotism and self-aggrandizement within the Party. Leaders used them to enhance their power, whether from their own elevation or those of their subordinates. Several Party Gauleiter (regional governors), for example, created their own versions of Alte Kämpfer awards for those in their territories (thereby ironically reintroducing geographical fragmentism into German phaleristics). These medals also hinted at disunity within the Party regarding the more significant form of front experience. Joseph Goebbels, for example, wrote in his diary in 1936 that the GPA, which he held as Party leader of the Kampfzeit, should be “the highest German Order.” See GTb 3/III, 222 (22.10.1936); Orlow, Nazi Party, 246-249; Lumsden, Medals and Decorations, 92-97, 100. 92 “Die Verleihung des Ehrenzeichens vom 9 November 1923,” Uniformen Markt 4 (1935), 11; “Das Zeichen der Treue,” Dresdner Nachrichten, June 20, 1936. 57 now very thin and pushed to the margins in favour of a broad, central stripe in the blood-red of the

Party.93

Besides satisfying the expectations of the Nazi old guard, the BO aided in the construction of a new cult of commemorative heroism alongside that emblematized by the EK. Sabine

Behrenbeck has documented how, under the skillful direction of Goebbels, this cult came to include similar “Totenkult” components of ritual rites and themes of heroic self-sacrifice. The

“martyrs” of 1923 assumed the role of the fallen of Verdun or the Somme, and upon them Hitler posthumously bestowed the BO.94 This decoration also served to highlight the Party’s singular heroes of the Kampfzeit as standing alongside the military Heldenkult of Boelcke, Richthofen and

Weddigen, with the BO substituting for the PLM. Hitler presented the former posthumously to

Albert Leo Schlageter, as well as Horst Wessel, a young Berlin SA leader murdered by communists and later fashioned by Goebbels into the personification of the virtuous and self-sacrificing political soldier. After his predecessors had battled the Volk’s enemies abroad, and Schlageter their occupation of the Ruhr, Wessel had fallen in the victory over the internal enemies: i.e. the

Bolsheviks, Jews and other “asocials.”95

Still, for all the symbolic benefit of these political decorations there was still a notable divide between them and the rest of the country’s existing phaleristic and symbolic traditions, even

93 In practice, Alte Kämpfer were to wear the BO as a ribbon on the left breast pocket, directly opposite the EK1. What’s more, speculation by phaleristic historians as well as a vague reference within Goebbels diary suggest that Hitler’s deputy, , had made plans for an even higher award. This was to be above the BO, thus representing a Party equivalent to the highest of Halsorden such as the EK’s Grand Cross to reward the highest measures of political front experience. However, the award evidently came to nothing, at least at this point. As we shall see in the following chapter, it is likely (though not proven) that Hitler resurrected the idea in late 1941. See Lumsden, Medals and Decorations, 104; GTb 3/I, 191 (28.2.1935) and I.6, (9.8.1938). 94 It was from this cult, moreover, that the BO received its name, taken from the (Blood Flag) paraded each November 9 (the date of the Putsch) and still bore traces, it was said, of the martyrs’ blood. Regarding the cult around the martyrs of the Kampfzeit, see further Behrenbeck, Die Kult um die toten Helden, n.b. 2.2, 3.2-3. 95 Ibid., 2.2d.; Schilling, Kriegshelden, 319-320. Baird, “Myth of Resurrection and Return,” 633-650; Siemens, Horst Wessel n.b. Part 2. 58 if the former drew from them for inspiration. What Hitler and the National Socialist regime truly needed, and what they proceeded to work for, was to fuse the symbolic traditions of the BO and its Alte Kämpfer archetype with that of the elite military Frontkämpfer with the EK and PLM.

Thereby, the regime could maintain its connection to the mythology of the First World War and its seeming respect for the traditions and hero culture of Prusso-German history. At the same time, it could signify and celebrate the new, egalitarian Volksgemeinschaft brought about through the leadership of the Party and its struggle for “social revolution”; the old Germany passing its torch to the new.

I.4 Symbolic Amalgamation

This process of symbolic amalgamation began in earnest only nineteen days after the creation of the EW in July 1934, when the frail president Hindenburg, having personified the

Party’s early difficulties with national Ordenspolitik, died of natural causes on August 2. Almost immediately, Hitler consolidated his personal power by merging this office with his own, with one of his first acts being to amend existing law so that henceforth all state orders and decorations would be awarded “in the name of the Führer and Reich Chancellor.”96 This legal step was but the first of several towards securing the Party’s total control over this potent source of political capital. Within two years, he reversed the compromise solutions of 1933-1934 by ending all awarding rights from state governments and any former sovereigns, thereby creating the first truly national phaleristic system in German history; all of it under the control of the PräsKz or Party

Headquarters. In their place, began to appear an ever-increasing array of medals, awards and

96 “Zweite Verordnung zur Durchführung der Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten über die Stiftung eines Ehrenkreuzes. Vom 18. August 1934,” RGBl I. 1934. No.98, 791; “‘Im Namen des Führers und Reichskanzlers.’ Die Verleihung des Kriegs-Ehrenkreuzes,” Berliner Tageblatt, August 22, 1934. 59 decorations for civilians and political organizations that celebrated participation in the

Volksgemeinschaft project.97

However, this effort to create a new symbolic culture proved especially difficult in one key area: the military. As the “militarized Volksgemeinschaft,” demonstrating social as well as cultural “modernization” in this sphere was more important ideologically than any other given its history as one of the most conservative and tradition-bound of all state institutions. Yet, the need for political stability and support for a new program of rearmament meant that Hitler and the Party were compelled to take a conciliatory attitude towards the Army. Not only was much of its senior command and structure left intact, or “unrevolutionized,” but Hitler had brutally liquidated much of the SA’s senior leadership during the “” in 1934 – eliminating a perceived rival. In return, Army leaders such as War Minister Walther von Blomberg, who already shared some ideological sympathy with the regime’s aims for “national regeneration,” had initially become more amenable, if not enthusiastic, towards infusions of Nazi iconography into the military’s affairs. After only limited debate, for instance, the new Wehrmacht had adopted a new war flag featuring the EK and swastika in symbolic unity in 1935.98

97 See “Verordnung zur Ausführung des Gesetzes über Titel, Orden und Ehrenzeichen. Vom 14 Nov. 1935,” RGBl I. 1935. No.127, 1341; “Gesetz über Titel, Orden und Ehrenzeichen, Vom. 1. Juli 1937,” RGBl I. 1937. No.77, 725; Hütte, "Eisernen Kreuzes," 96-98. Awards the regime cancelled after Hindenburg’s death included the commemoration medal of the Stahlhelm organization mentioned earlier along with the aforementioned hereditary orders that Hitler had been unable to cancel because of Hindenburg’s authority. For further discussion of the role of these various new medals as tools of “” (Integration), see Winkle, Dank des Vaterlandes, 314-317. 98 “Verordnung über die , die Gösch der Kriegsschiffe, die Handelsflagge mit dem Eisernen Kreuz und die Flagge des Reichskriegsministers und Oberbefehlshabers der Wehrmacht. Vom 5. Oktober 1935,” RGBl I. 1939. No.122, 1285. According to Hitler’s Army Adjutant, , the dictator even had to restrain Blomberg from embracing symbolic harmony with the Party too eagerly in the pre-war years. See Gerhard Engel and Hildegard von Kotze, At the Heart of the Reich. The Secret Diary of Hitler’s Army Adjutant, trans. Geoffrey Brooks (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2016), 39 (20.4.1938). While this eagerness can (and has) been attributed to political sympathy for the regime among some senior military figures, Johannes Hürter has convincingly argued that members of this community developed their own personalized versions of the Volksgemeinschaft ideal that allowed them to embrace aspects of the Party’s socio-political goals while remaining committed to their own, more traditional conservativism at the same time. Even so, as Hürter points out and as we shall see shortly, the fragility of this psychological arrangement would soon become apparent to some of them, and then to many more during the Second World War. 60

This cooperation, however, ended abruptly when the Party attempted to insert political awards into the military’s phaleristic system. For Blomberg and other leaders, this violated what had long been a sacred ethos of the Army’s institutional relationship to the state; remaining (at least ostensibly) apolitical. Serving officers could not wear political decorations nor belong to their associations.99 Furthermore, it was one thing to symbolically embrace the sovereignty of the

National Socialists, but quite another to allow medals like the BO that signified acts taken against the legally elected republican government and . Furthermore, such an allowance would potentially cause disunity within the officer corps by giving rise to doubts about individual loyalties.100 After initially recoiling from this resistance, the Party succeeded in pressuring

Blomberg to lift the ban he had imposed as a result. Even so, the episode had illuminated a fine line in the sand for its future Ordenspolitik in the military sphere: a merger of symbols was seemingly alright, so long as decorations remained strictly military rather than political.

Hitler, for one, took these lessons to heart, for as the decade neared its end, he took advantage of new opportunities to implement changes that reflected them. In 1938, after friction over his increasingly bellicose foreign policy, he engineered the downfall of both Blomberg and the Army Commander in Chief . Hitler replaced Fritsch with a new and more biddable commander, Walther von Brauchitsch, and replaced the War Ministry altogether in favour of a new Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW), under .101 Though by no means ending the friction between the Party and elements within the Wehrmacht leadership, with these changes in place the dictator pursued his territorial

Hürter, “The Military Elite and Volksgemeinschaft,” 258-265; see also Messerschmidt, Zeit der Indoktrination, 92- 93. 99 See “Vorträge Lammers’ bei Hitler, 20.6.1935,” in Regierung Hitler II, 1095. No.411. 100 Messerschmidt, Zeit der Indoktrination, 87-93. 101 Peter Hoffmann, History of the German Resistance, 1933-1945, Third Edition. Trans. Richard Barry (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996), 37-40. See also Engel and Kotze, Army Adjutant, 26-30 (introduction), 36-37 (entry for 19.3.1938) and 71 (15.8.1939) 61 expansion. In the process, moreover, he authorized the creation of a new series of awards that reflected his new autonomy over military phaleristics, featuring Nazi iconography and celebrating the achievements of the new state.102 These “Flower War medals” were heading in the right direction, in other words, but they were only a first step. The events they commemorated were wars only in imagination, and thus hardly represented a significant victory in the transformation of military phaleristics. Both Hitler and the Party had to wait for a better opportunity.

That opportunity was just over the horizon in 1939 and took place during a largely forgotten incident in the history of the Third Reich. The occasion in question was the return to Germany of the Legion Condor, the covert military force that had fought in the alongside the forces of and other fascist ‘volunteers’ sent by Italian dictator Benito

Mussolini. As this war neared its end late in the winter of 1938-1939, Hitler announced to the new

OKW that he would “unmask” this heretofore secret force to the German people and use the opportunity to demonstrate their military strength and ideological superiority. He thus gave orders for a victory spectacle, codenamed “Operation Swallow,” and soon military and civilian propagandists began preparations for a series of homecoming events. The RMVP dispatched filmmakers and writers to to collect materials on the Legion’s activities and the OKW arranged for the legionnaires to submit testimonials that could be used for articles and books.103

102 On May 1, 1938, he created a commemorative medal for participation in the Anschluss Medal, and later in the year another for the annexation of the (the Sudetenland Medal). Finally, in March of 1939 he added a “bar” to the latter for occupying the rest of and another for the occupation of Memel. See Lumsden, Medals and Decorations, 36-38. 103 Minutes by Schwendemann to Culture Section. 5-6.1.1939, AA.1573/381000 – 01, cited in Robert H. Whealey, Hitler and Spain: The Nazi Role in the Spanish Civil War 1936-1939 (University of Kentucky, 1989), 216, nt. 254. For documentation of the preparations for Operation Swallow, see NARA T-77/975 OKW550. WPr.IIc “Reportage- film über LC nach Enttarnung,“ 3.4.1939; BAMA RH 37/1002 OKH (No.6164 G/Kdo) Betr. Rückkehr der Legion Condor, 30.3.1939; ibid., OKW 353/39. AWA/Allg.I (14/39) G.Kdo. Betr. Empfang der Legion Condor, 24.4.1939. Interestingly, there are only a few historical works which deal with Operation Swallow or the homecoming celebrations more broadly. To date, Stephanie Schüler-Springorum’s work Krieg und Fliegen Die Legion Condor im Spanish Bürgerkrieg (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2010) is by far the best, being one of the few studies of the Legion Condor from a cultural perspective rather than simply as the testing ground for the Wehrmacht (see chap 9.). 62

At the same time, Hitler announced that he would create a special new decoration for the returning “Spanienkämpfer” (Spain Fighters). According to phaleristic historian Robin Lumsden, the dictator had initially wanted to reinstate the EK for the occasion, but decided not to because the Spanish war, however important, had not been a formal one (a traditional requirement for such an act); the Legion Condor had not even fought in German uniform.104 Instead, the dictator created a new order that, like the Flower War medals, reflected the lessons learned over the past decade.

In its appearance, for example, he ordered that the “Spanienkreuz” (Spain Cross, SK) be

“recognizable as a war order,” that is using traditional military iconography and styling, but that it bear a prominent swastika emblem.105 In its phaleristic structure, meanwhile, it was to be an order like the traditional EK with ascending grades for military achievement but clearly styled on the

EW of 1934. There were three grades (Bronze, Silver and Gold), for which the first two had combatant and non-combatant forms (with swords versus without) and the third being reserved for those who had shown great bravery or merit in significant combat. Furthermore, Hitler created an extra, diamond-encrusted version of this final grade (the Spanienkreuz mit Brillanten, SK-B) for the most elite Spanienkämpfer – the heroes of the Legion.106

The grand “unveiling” began on May 31, 1939, when the ships bearing the Legion home arrived in Hamburg to crowds of cheering civilians, journalists and cameramen from the newsreels.

104 BAMA RW 8/17. Bülow an Schmundt (Br.B. No.5a/39 G. Kdo), 5.2.1939; Lumsden, Medals and Decorations, 31-34. 105 The result was a decoration with not just one swastika but five; it also bore a striking resemblance to the PLM in its shape. See BAMA RW 8/17. Bülow an Schmundt, 5.2.1939. Alongside this new medal, Hitler also reinstituted the wound badge from 1918, but similarly ordering that it appear identical except for a prominent swastika to symbolize its new role. See BAMA RW 8/17 Sonderstab W. (Br.B.Nr. 285/39) an RML-OKL. Betr. Rückkehr der Freiwilligen aus Spanien, 14.4.1939; ibid. Bülow an Sonderstab W (Ia/1 No.7388/39) Gkdos, 3.4.1939; “Verordnung des Führers und Reichskanzlers über die Stiftung eines Verwundeten-Abzeichens für deutsche Freiwillige im spanischen Freiheitskampf. Vom 22. Mai 1939,” RGBl I. 1939. No.139, 1364. 106 “Verordnung des Führers und Reichskanzlers über die Stiftung des Spanien-Kreuzes. Vom 14. April 1939,” RGBl I. 1939. No.139, 1359. Like the EW, moreover, Hitler created a miniature version for bereaved relatives of fallen Legion members, awarded in to widow; oldest son; oldest daughter; father; mother; brother; sister. “Verordnung des Führers und Reichskanzlers über die Stiftung des Ehrenkreuzes für Hinterbliebene deutscher Spanienkämpfer. Vom 14. April 1939,” RGBl I. 1939. No.139, 1362. 63

After proceeding to their base at Döberitz, where they received the SK from the heads of the

Wehrmacht branches, the Spanienkämpfer made a triumphal entry into Berlin on June 6, marching in the uniforms of the Spanish nationalists (Hitler’s idea107) down the triumphal procession route amid more cheering crowds. The procession ended in the city’s historic Lustgarten where the whole Legion paraded for the Führer, Party leaders, foreign dignitaries as well as the international press. Amidst the fanfare and celebrations, propagandists made it clear what role both the

Spanienkämpfer and their shining medals were supposed to play: they were the symbols of the militarized Volksgemeinschaft and the fulfillment of its foundational mythology of the First World

War.

Contemporary articles and the books that followed hailed the legionnaires (mostly from the Air Force) not only as the reincarnations of the heroes of 1914-1918, as reborn Boelckes and

Richthofens108, but as the fulfillment of the sacrifices of their entire Frontkämpfer-generation. In the Party’s primary mouthpiece, the Völkischer Beobachter, propagandist Karl Georg von

Stackelberg wrote of his meeting a grizzled old veteran of 1914-1918 in Hamburg who “stretched out the arms of the resurrected, strong and faithful Germany to the Spain fighters.” “Coming home in 1918,” the man allegedly said, veteran Frontkämpfer like himself were “beaten and mocked for our dedication and our willingness to sacrifice. Now our sons are coming home [… and] given the reception and honour which I and millions of my comrades hoped for in vain.”109 A participant in the Berlin parade on June 6, meanwhile, (and who later worked for Goebbels’s RMVP) wrote that

107 Hitler also insisted that in addition to uniforms, all members of the Legion should appear with the weaponry used during the campaign, including tanks, though in the end this was considered too difficult. See BAMA RH 37/1002. 30.3.1939. 108 See Hermann von Kohl, Deutsche Flieger über Spanien (Reutlingen: Englin & Laiblin, 1939), 28-29, 73, 92. 109 K.G. von Stackelberg, “Die Legion kehrt Heim,” VB, May 31, 1939. Similar references to the Spanienkämpfer as the fulfillment of the Frontkämpfer of 1918 can be found in “Vormast die rot-goldene Flagge mit dem Eisernen Kreuz” VB, May 31, 1939; “In dem Geist von Langemarck,” Der Adler 9, June 13, 1939; “Die Legion Condor vor dem Führer,” Frankfurter Zeitung, June 7, 1939; Kohl, Flieger über Spanien, 111. 64

“the sad ending of 1918” had now been reversed. The Germans, “treated for so long as pariahs, wanted something of which to be proud again. They could be now. And we were their object.”110

At the same time, in fighting the “Judeo-Bolshevik” Republican forces in Spain the legionnaires were also symbolic inheritors of the Alte Kämpfer. According to numerous articles and books they embodied “a spiritual and mental certainty which our role models of 1914-1918 lacked” and that had allowed them to defeat the enemies of the Volk in the first full scale war between communism and fascism.111 Consequently, the OKW and RMVP asked legionnaires to posit their experience of the war within the framework of a from Bolshevik barbarity, and commissioned the famous director Gerhard Ritter to do the same in a feature film entitled Im

Kampf gegen den Weltfeind. Deutsche Freiwillige in Spanien (In Combat Against the World

Enemy. German Volunteers in Spain).112 Additionally, the Spanienkämpfer and their unique medal incorporated elements of the commemorative culture the regime had developed for previous fallen

Kämpfer. Fallen Legion Condor men represented both those of Verdun as well as those of the 1923

Munich Putsch. This shown through at the parade in the Lustgarten, where each of their names was borne aloft on a white standard by a member of the (Hitlerjugend, HJ); another new generation honouring the martyrs of its predecessor.113

110 Wilfred von Oven, Hitler und der Spanische Bürgerkrieg. Mission und Schicksal der Legion Condor (Tübingen: Grabert-Verlag, 1978), 516. 111 “Vor 25 Jahren,” Der Adler 12. July 25. 1939; Kohl, Flieger über Spanien, 61, 65. 112 NARA T-77/935 OKW491. Wedel (WPr) an Bothe (Panzertruppenschule) Betr. Putlos, 2.3.1939. For later examples, see NARA T-77/935 OKW491 Erinnerungen und Erlebnisse an Spaniens nationale Erhebung 1936/37. Vom Hauptmann Kornatzki, n.d. and “Deutsche Freiwillige kämpfen für Spanien,” and “Sie kämpfen für eine Idee”, in Der Adler 8. June 1, 1939. Articles in the June 13 edition furthered this theme, documenting the cruelty and mercilessness of the “reds.” See Stabsfeldwebel L. Siegmund “Abgeschossen,” Der Adler 9, June 13, 1939; “Wir kämpfen für Spanien.” Die Wehrmacht 12, June 7, 1939; Max Graf Hoyos. Pedros Y Pablos. Fliegen Erleben Kämpfen in Spanien (Munich: Verlag F. Bruckmann, 1939), 11, 22. 113 BAMA RW 8/17 (14.4.1939); Kohl, Flieger über Spanien, 111. See also “Vom Spanienkreuz als neues Symbol,” Uniformen Markt 17 (1939), 269; “Stiftung eines Spanienordens durch den Führer,” VB, June 1, 1939. 65

Finally, and most important, the festivities and propaganda took special care to highlight those who had won the highest award, the SK-B. Though worn on the uniform tunic like the lower grades, this medal functioned as an updated, Nazi, PLM - that is, in its idealized, unrealistic form to showcase a small new cadre of elite Wehrmacht heroes who could represent the Frontkämpfer- ideals of egalitarianism, bravery and inspirational leadership. Thus, in contrast to the tradition of the old imperial Halsorden, the distribution of the SK-B, while still rare, was decidedly more diverse. Out of a total of twenty-eight awards, only seven were to senior officers (two , two colonels and three generals), while the rest were to junior combat officers (fourteen lieutenants and seven captains), an inversion of the pattern in 1914-1918. Moreover, given that most of the latter were fighter pilots, the SK-B furthered the image of the Frontkämpfer-hero as the daring air ace who had helped to revolutionize hero-culture twenty years before and now continued to do so in the Third Reich.

Likewise, the special celebrity that had become part of the PLM’s First World War cultural legacy found a renewed form in the treatment of these new heroes. Hitler personally invested all twenty-eight of them at a special ceremony and luncheon at the New Reich Chancellery along with assembled dignitaries of the state and military.114 Thereafter, these men took center stage in the media coverage about the Legion Condor, becoming its public faces and voice. The author Albert

Kropp, for example, gathered their war stories for a two-volume collection entitled So kämpfen deutsche Soldaten. SK-B holders also featured prominently in Wulf Bley’s popular work Das Buch der Spanienflieger, as well as Werner Beumelberg’s Kampf um Spanien.115 Likewise, they were

114 BAMA RW 8/17, 186. Program for reception and seating chart (1939); “Spanienkreuz in Gold mit Brillanten. Hohe Auszeichnungen der Generale Sperrle, Volkmann und Richthofen,” Der Westen-Berliner Tageszeitung, June 8, 1939. 115 Albert Kropp, So kämpfen deutsche Soldaten. Von Rittern des Goldenen und Brillantenen Spanienkreuzes. 1 u 2 Aufl. (Berlin: Wilhelm Limpert Verlag, 1939); Wulf Bley, ed. Das Buch der Spanienflieger. Die Feuertaufe der neuen deutschen Luftwaffe (Leipzig: Hafe & Koehler Verlag, 1939); Werner Beumelburg’s Kampf um Spanien. Die Geschichte der Legion Condor (Oldenburg: Stalling, 1939). 66 among the few to have their testimonials turned into autobiographical books by the propaganda authorities, such as those by the pilots Max Graf Hoyos and .116

The elite Spanienkämpfer, in short, were the first war heroes of the Third Reich, and as such their importance cannot be overestimated. Not only did their medal represent the symbolic amalgamation of old and new that the Party had long sought, but their popularization had given rise to a new, Nazi version of the cult of the “technological hero.” However, even as they reached the peak of their cultural impact during the early summer of 1939, their symbolic utility was already beginning to wane. Even before the Legion’s ships had docked in Hamburg, the regime was already shifting its attention away from the recent victory in Spain and the enemy they had fought there. This volte face owed to the opening of secret negotiations between Germany and the

Soviet Union to secure a free hand for Hitler’s next round of aggression: the conquest of Poland.

As a result, the RMVP shelved some of its propaganda films then under production about Spain and issued instructions for the press to avoid customary attacks on communism; to use the word

“Russian” rather than “Soviet” and downplay any previous mutual animosity.117 Instead, it recalibrated the media and its polemical ire against those who stood as of Poland, the old enemies of 1914-1918, Britain and France.

This shift found camouflage in the twenty-fifth anniversary of the beginning of the Great

War, for which propagandists received further instructions to draw “instructive parallels to the current time” and to reinforce the “purpose which [the people] follow today once more.”118

However, while Germany had then been “politically immature,” under National Socialism it had

116 Hoyos, Kämpfen in Spanien; Hannes Trautloft, Als Jagdflieger in Spanien. Aus dem Tagebuch eines deutschen Legionärs (Berlin: Albert Rauck & Co., 1939). 117 “Das Hauptthema: Erneuerung der deutsch-russischen Freundschaft,” Zeitschriften-Dienst, August 26, 1939; BAB ZSg.109-1, 68. S.I. 170/39, 20.7.1939. 118 BAB ZSg.109-1, 68. 67 since “learned from the experience of 1914-1918 and […] the post-war period. It is today politically aware like no other people on earth, [and] it is equipped with the best weapons and secure in its own economic strength.”119 Within this propaganda, the now inexpedient

Spanienkämpfer figure passed their symbolic torch, as it were, back to their ideological forbears of 1914-1918. In July and August, newspaper articles and featurettes in the Wehrmacht’s popular illustrated magazines Der Adler and Die Wehrmacht reminded readers of the bravery, sacrifice and camaraderie of the original Frontgemeinschaft and its symbol of the EK whilst re-hashing the daring exploits of Blue Max winners.120 The true nature of such material became clear to all on

August 28, when the negotiations with the became public in the form of the Molotov-

Ribbentrop Pact.

Only days later, Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht to launch “Case White,” the invasion of

Poland, and quickly found himself in a situation with strong parallels to that of Wilhelm II. in

1914. Indeed, given that most Germans did not relish the prospect of another war (much less one with Poland’s protectors, Britain and France), he was in even greater need of an integrative symbol with which to legitimize this new war and rally the nation. Thus, instituting a new issue of the EK was once again the logical choice, and there is evidence to suggest that Hitler had been preparing to do so for several weeks.121 With its symbolic pedigree reaffirmed during the previous months, its reappearance, Hitler said, would make Germans “mindful of the struggles which have existed

119 Ibid. 120 BAB ZSg.102/18/398 (4), 851, 26.8.1939. In July, the Presidential Chancellery released a book on the Third Reich’s phaleristic culture in which the EK featured prominently, and which the press was ordered to recommend to the public. See BAB ZSg.109-1, 19. V.I. 149/39. 6.7.1939. For examples of relevant propaganda see Otto Pause, “Ernst Udet. Kämpfer und Kamerad”; Franz Schauwecker, “Der grosse Lehrmeister”; Rolf Bathe “Der Adler von Lille”; and Walter Bloem, “Sieger, die uns Vorbild sind,” in Der Adler 12, July 25, 1939. See also Die Wehrmacht 14, July 5, 1939; ibid., 16, August 20, 1939; ibid., 17, August 27, 1939. 121 By mid-August, in fact, the PräsKz had begun to arrange for the manufacture of EK bands by various firms. See BAB R 601/1471 f.1, 5. Doehle an die Firma Carl Knoblauch, Seidenbandfabrik, 2.9.1939; Maerz, Ritterkreuz, 23. 68 for the sons of Germany in the previous great wars for the protection of the homeland.”122 In this it would also convey that, just as in times past, the Volk would have to band together and endure suffering to achieve the final victory (“Endsieg”). Most important, it would also reinforce confidence that this unwanted fight was one that the nation could win.123

From a broader perspective, though, the underlying significance of reinstituting the EK for the war that had just begun was in completing the process of symbolic appropriation that had begun two decades earlier, proving the regime’s moral legitimacy and the veracity of its mythology of the First World War. Building on well-honed rhetoric, the press reminded ordinary Germans over the following days and weeks that the reinstituted EK was a clarion call to prove themselves worthy to inherit the Volksgemeinschaft bequeathed them by earlier generations of “Kämpfer,” both military and political. The Frontgemeinschaft of the trenches, where this dream had been realized for the first time, was now at hand once again in a new Volkskrieg; unlike in 1918, though, the nation would emerge victorious if it stayed united under the banner of National Socialism.124

In serving these different short- and long-term symbolic functions, the EK of 1939 represented a delicate balance between both old and new. As Hitler proudly declared, it was to be largely unchanged in its form and traditional grades, thus displaying continuity with established tradition. However, there was no mistake that the medal was different; it was a new award for a new Germany, as evidenced by several subtle changes that reflected, like previous phaleristic creations, the lessons learned over the past decade. Replacing the traditional, embossed crown and

122 RGBl I. 1939. No.159, 1573. 123 On October 24, 1939, the American journalist William Shirer wrote in his diary whilst staying in Berlin: “I suppose every government that has ever gone to war has tried to convince its people of three things: 1. That right is on its side; 2. That it is fighting purely in defence of the nation; 3. That it is sure to win. The Nazis are certainly trying to pound these three points into the skins of the people.” William L. Shirer, Berlin Diaries. The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent 1934-1941 (Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1988), 239, 199-202. 124 BAB ZSg.109-3, 198. V.I. 198/39, 2.9.1939, 1; “Eisernen Kreuzes,” Frankfurter Zeitung, September 4, 1939; R.Lehnardt, “Für Tapferkeit vom Feind. Geschichte des Eisernen Kreuzes,” VB, September 5, 1939. 69 initial of the Prussian monarch, there was now a swastika in the center of the EK, echoing the design of the SK only months before. Likewise, the decorative band copied the tactic employed for the Party’s own BO, with the traditional black-and-white stripes of the old EK and of Prusso- imperial nationalism now dominated by a large central red stripe for National Socialism. Finally,

Hitler dealt with the issue of the continued existence of imperial EKs from 1914-1918, that veterans, by law, were entitled to wear. To circumvent this problem, he introduced a series of clasps (Spange) bearing the eagle and swastika which veterans serving in the present conflict could receive if they earned the same grade again. Thus, he ensured that even pre-Nazi awards would bear the stamp of the new state and symbolize its alleged harmony with Prussian tradition.125

The most important demonstration of the 1939 EK order’s simultaneous symbolism of both old and new, however, took place in its upper grades. On one hand, the dictator elected to maintain its highest distinction, the GK, even though it exemplified the elitism that had always defined the order; indeed, more so than other medals of the imperial period. While the original articles of reinstitution in the Reichsgesetzblatt stipulated that the new version was to be gold-rimmed, and thus aesthetically unique, phaleristic historians such as Robin Lumsden claim that Hitler had plans to resurrect the decorative “star” for this award that been awarded by Prussian monarchs only to the highest military elites.126 For this reason, and lacking any further evidence, it is possible that the GK of 1939 represented a concession to his fantasy to emulate his Prussian idol, Friedrich II.; it would be his own personal award, the Halsorden of the “Feldherr” awarded only to his favourites.

125 According to Robin Lumsden, soon after the new clasps were introduced in 1939 they quickly began to be distributed almost automatically to veterans of 1914-1918, whether or not they had earned the same award again. Lumsden, Medals and Decorations, 25. Furthermore, Hitler also added to this trend by reinstituting the old wound badge of 1918 (VA), but now with a prominent Swastika. “Verordnung über die Stiftung eines Verwundetenabzeichens. Vom 1. September 1939,” RGBl I. 1939. No.160, 1577. 126 RGBl I. 1939. No.159, 1573. This “Blücherstern” (or the Grand Cross with Golden Rays), so named for the famous field marshal of the , was only awarded twice in its history, the first to its namesake and the second to Paul von Hindenburg during the spring offensives of 1918. The 1939 version reputed to have been created for Hermann Göring, however, was never awarded. See further Lumsden, Medals and Decorations, 24. 70

More important, though, such an intention - i.e. to concede ideological consistency to personal fantasy - would help to explain his unprecedented and uncharacteristic step in creating an entirely new Halsorden grade to be positioned between the GK and the EK1.

The Knight’s Cross (RK) was to take the place of the ideologically inexpedient PLM, a fact verified explicitly by later deportment regulations which stated not only that the former was to be worn “exactly like the Pour le Mérite,” but that it was to be worn over the latter in case a soldier happened to come to possess both.127 More important, by instituting the RK as a new grade of the EK instead of a wholly separate order (like the PLM had been) it would be open to all members of the Wehrmacht regardless of rank or origin. To be accurate, therefore, it was not a replacement for the PLM per se, but rather of its mythical version that both imperial and Party propagandists had created but that had never truly existed. By finally bringing the prestige of a

Halsorden, long the objectification of the elitist “Wertesystem,” to the everyman, this “real” PLM would serve as a singular symbol of social egalitarianism within the Wehrmacht as the militarized

Volksgemeinschaft.

With such symbolic importance attached to the EK order and its new grade, the most important consideration now facing the Nazi dictator was the manner of its distribution during the coming conflict. As an important symbol of the new Germany, the order could not suffer the same fate of inflation and devaluation as had befallen its earlier version in 1914-1918. It was therefore vital that only the right men receive it, those who had not only proven themselves through bravery and leadership, but who were also diverse enough in rank (and preferably background) to demonstrate the Party’s “social revolution.” To this end, Hitler established safeguards to prevent

127 See “Tragen des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes, 20.11.1939,” Luftwaffenverordnungsblatt (hereafter LVBl). 1939. No.50, 338; ibid., 1940. No.31, 868: “Trageweise des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes, 15.7.1940.” 71 entry to the wrong men, the “Etappenschweine” who served behind the lines far away from danger.

For the 1939 EK, for example, he returned to the stricter, pre-1914 regulations for all grades to keep inflation manageable, and elected not to revive its despised noncombat version, the EK-W.

Most important, all recommendations for the Reich’s new Halsorden would require his personal approval.128

Furthermore, Hitler insisted upon a special level of finery and ceremony to accompany the awrding of this award, much as he had done with the SK-B earlier that year (and thus further demonstrating its previously unacknowledged role as the former’s symbolic template). For this, the dictator resurrected and repurposed elements of both Germany’s historical Halsorden culture as well as that recently developed by the Party during the 1930s. Recipients of the RK, for example, would receive mandatory salutes from all sentries no matter their rank. Likewise, as a personal touch, their medal would come with a special, leather-bound presentation certificate

(Verleihungsurkunde) etched in gold leaf and signed by the Führer himself, just like the one developed for the Party’s BO.129 By this means, they would not only be marked out as superior to other “Ordenträger,” but also to serve as the embodiments of an ideologically-updated Heldenkult, the torchbearers of the heroic tradition begun by the idealized Frontkämpfer of 1914-1918, and then carried on by Freikorpskämpfer like Schlageter, Alte Kämpfer like Wessel and, more recently, the Spanienkämpfer.

In sum, then, through his actions on September 1, 1939, Hitler had seemingly created a potential wealth of symbolic capital for himself and his regime, one with a profound resounance

128 RGBl I. 1939. No.159, 1573. 129 Ibid.; Lumsden, Medals and Decorations, 149. 72 in modern Germany’s cultural memory. In reinstituting the EK order, he had completed its transformation into an acceptable ideological symbol, and in creating the RK he had changed its fundamental structure, and thereby its political function and significance, forever. This new

Halsorden was to be the crown jewel in the Third Reich’s phaleristic system and its recipients the core of its wartime hero culture. Most important, together they would be proof that the Third Reich was what it claimed to be. This was the plan, at least, but as will be demonstrated in chapters to come, achieving this desired end was to prove more difficult than the regime, or its dictator, likely ever anticipated.

73

Chapter II

Hitler’s Halsorden: The Difficulties of Ritterkreuz-Distribution

Five years after Adolf Hitler’s reinstitution of the EK order in 1939, his ideologically streamlined system of awards, of which the new RK was to serve as chief symbol, was gone. Not only had distribution of this medal (and the order as a whole) reached uncontrollable levels of inflation, but it was now accompanied by dozens of other decorations, badges and miscellaneous awards, including many for noncombat personnel. Even worse, it had seemingly come unhinged and totally inverted from its intended meaning. Rather than an egalitarian symbol of Frontkämpfer- ideology, it had come to represent much the same hierarchy of recognition as had the imperial orders it replaced, i.e. an award for elites that was rarely worn by junior (combat) officers, and almost never by enlisted men. Hitler, according to one veteran after the war, had been “stingy” with the RK, which was “first and foremost a decorative-order for vain generals.”1 Understanding how this medal (and indeed the phaleristic system as a whole) went so wrong as a vessel of symbolic capital given its ideological importance represents the central focus of the following chapter.

Drawing principally upon records from the Army’s “Ordensabteilung” (Orders

Department), as well as select accounts from individuals with perspective on wartime phaleristic policy, it will reconstruct the politics surrounding the distribution of the RK between 1939 and

1945. In the process, it will first underline the degree to which existing scholarship has omitted or minimized the influence of Party ideology in this sphere of Wehrmacht administration. Indeed, by

1 BAMA MSG 2/15184 Dr. Jur. Eberhard Boerger, “Warum ich kein Ritterkreuz-Träger [sic] wurde,” 4. 1.12.1999. 74 demonstrating the efforts made to ensure the ‘correct’ distribution, it will show how this undervalued factor was actually its central driving force. Furthermore, through this discussion it will also offer a new perspective to the scholarly debate surrounding the role of ideology among ordinary soldiers, building specifically on Stephen G. Fritz’s arguments regarding the degree of importance they placed upon “positive ideals.”2 “Landsers,” it will argue, were not resigned to the de facto continuation of the traditional prestige hierarchy, as has been suggested or assumed in the past. Rather, the distribution of the RK highlights how many cared greatly about the social ideals this and other medals were supposed to represent; what’s more, they were not afraid to say so.

II.1 Establishing Meaning

To begin, despite his foreplaning and safeguards, Hitler’s new EK-Halsorden did not begin its symbolic service well. Thanks to its residual cultural value and a fresh wave of propaganda, most Germans received the return of the order with enthusiasm. Contemporary “mood reports” from the SS Security Service (SD) speak to recipients of the 1939 EK2 and EK1 experiencing a level of prestige comparable to that documented in 1870 or 1914, and note that such men were

2 Stephen G. Fritz, “‘We are trying to change the face of the world.’ Ideology and Motivation in the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front: The View from Below," The Journal of Military History, 60, (Oct. 1996): 683-710 (n.b. 700-702). In contrast to Fritz’s emphasis on “positive ideals,” Omer Bartov emphasizes the role of “negative” forces, particularly the shared demonization of the enemy and brutality of warfare as a principal factor in unit cohesion: Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-1945: German troops and the barbarisation of warfare (New York: Palgrave, 2001). For a further perspective, see also Sven Oliver Müller. Deutsche Soldaten und ihre Feinde. Nationalsozialismus an Front und Heimatfront im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Frankfurt a.M.: S. Fischer, 2007). This argument over positive and negative principles, though, represents but one segment of a larger debate that includes scholars such as Johannes Hürter and Thomas Kühne (see introduction nt. 26) who conversely emphasize other, non-ideological factors. Hürter, for example, has not only argued along such lines but also for soldiers’ rejection, or at least lack of attention, to “positive ideals” like egalitarianism (i.e. those symbolized by the RK). Such were unnecessary, he says, since the war “forced solidarity and levelling [… that] ensured the creation of a sense of community […] that went beyond class.” Hürter, “The Military Elite and Volksgemeinschaft,” 269. Within the context of phaleristic culture at least, the following chapter will challenge this argument. 75 often asked to speak of their deeds at specially organized events.3 Yet while these established grades of the order could thus serve the regime’s symbolic needs, the identity of the first recipients of the RK hindered its ability to lay the foundations for a new egalitarian Heldenkult. The first thirteen, whom the dictator decorated personally after the Polish campaign on September 30, were all generals or field marshals, members of the established officer class and mostly from aristocratic backgrounds. In other words, they represented the exact opposite of the idealized Frontkämpfer long heralded by the Party.

Because of a paucity of sources, we may never definitively know Hitler’s motives for this action. It is possible that it could simply have reflected the dictator’s allowance of his Frederician fantasies to override his political judgement or that he truly believed that these men deserved such an honour, however heretical in appearance.4 More likely, however, is the argument posited by

Christian Hartmann in his biography of (Chief of the General Staff and one of the early recipients): the act was part of the continuing politics of negotiations between Hitler and the

Wehrmacht’s conservative leadership.5 As noted in the previous chapter, Hitler had sacrificed a full reform of the latter in exchange for political stability during the 1930s. Yet, while he hoped the war would gradually break the hold of the old officer class, the dictator confided to his Army

3 Early EK2 recipient and future Ritterkreuzträger Wolfgang Falck recalled that in 1939: “I was ogled and admired as a hero, because so far no one had seen a [1939] Iron Cross up close. The barber, whom I visited […] treated me like the Emperor personally. All this made me quite embarrassed - but I will not deny that it also flattered.” Wolfgang Falck and Kurt Braatz, Falkenjahre. Erinnerungen 1910-2003 (Moosburg: NeunundzwanzigSechs Verlag, 2003), 111; Heinz Boberach, ed. Meldungen aus dem Reich. Die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS 1938- 1945 (hereafter MadR) (Herrsching: Pawlak Verlag, 1984), 3, 750. No.52 (12.2.1940). See also BAB ZSg.109-5, 29. V.I. 257/39 10.11.1939; “Das Eiserne Kreuz,” Die Wehrmacht, 19. September 13, 1939. 4 There is testimony from Wilhelm Keitel, for example, that Hitler is alleged to have said of General Kurt von Briesen (Commander of the 30th Infantry Division and one of the first thirty recipients of the RK): “I want him to be the first divisional commander to get the Knight’s Cross. He has saved [General] Blaskowitz’s army by his gallantry and drive.” Walter Gorlitz, ed. The Memoirs of Field Marshal Keitel, trans. (New York: Stein and Day, 1966), 95. 5 See Christian Hartmann, Halder. Generalstabschef Hitlers 1938-1942 (München: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1991), 166- 167. 76 adjutant Gerhard Engel that, for now, Germany had “anything but a revolutionary army.” Thus, according to Engel, a symbolic honouring of his commanders would be political in nature; to bring

“the individual[s] concerned under an obligation” to himself and the regime, Hitler would have to accept small compromises to the ideological purity of his new award.6

Even so, the dictator could quickly see the first of the problems this would create when it became clear that the German public was beginning to develop entirely the wrong impression of his new RK. Given the identity of the first recipients and (ironically) the extra layer of finery that accompanied it, it is perhaps not surprising that in October the Propaganda Ministry (RMVP) reported that newspapers were increasingly resorting to an imperial lexicon to describe the recipients of this medal, using the literal and more aristocratic sounding “Knights of the Iron

Cross” (Ritter des Eisernen Kreuzes). This was ideologically unacceptable, and so the Ministry had to quickly issue new instructions that in future the press was exclusively to use the egalitarian term of “Bearers of the Knight’s Cross” (Ritterkreuzträger).7

At the same time, there were problems arising from the way in which Hitler had designed the 1939 EK order, and from the regulations which had allowed for the paradoxical awarding of the RK to its first thirteen recipients. In accordance with tradition (that is, pre-1914 tradition), the

6 Gerhard Engel and Hildegard von Kotze, At the Heart of the Reich. The Secret Diary of Hitler’s Army Adjutant, trans. Geoffrey Brooks (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2016), 71 (15.8.1939). Furthermore, in a recent study Christoph Raichle presents the case that even while he decorated Franz Halder in 1939, Hitler was also deliberately attempting to marginalize him in his role as Chief of the General Staff – one of the institutional pillars of Prusso- German military tradition. As part of this snub, Raichle argues that Hitler and Party propagandists endeavoured to give more visibility and prestige to combat-general recipients like (i.e. entirely in line with the symbolic function of the RK). For Hitler to make such a denigration (an argument supported by events discussed later in this chapter) and yet still recognize the ‘map table’ contributions of Halder and the General Staff, only further underlines the likelihood of a political motive, i.e. as an act of necessity rather than preference. See Christoph Raichle, Hitler als Symbolpolitiker (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 2014), 343-344. 7 BAB ZSg.109-4, 197. V.I. 245/39. 27.10.1939. The term “Inhaber” which the RMVP cited as preferable to “Ritter” was an older one denoting grades of specific orders more commonly associated with lower ranks and humble social backgrounds. 77 new Nazi version of the order largely retained its customary provisions for determining those categories of actions eligible for recognition. Not only could it be awarded for “special bravery before the enemy,” but also for the somewhat ambiguous category of “outstanding merit in command.”8 This latter provision had long been the means by which both the EK and the PLM had folded into the “Wertesystem” and skewed towards officers, especially those of higher command rank, who could credit battlefield success of their units as a collective manifestation of their own heroism and merit.

The preservation of this seemingly antithetical provision extended beyond a hesitation to change the award too much and thus lose some of its symbolic capital. Rather, as Hitler later declared, if used properly this “command merit” clause could actually facilitate its symbolic utility.

Though bravery had always been the cornerstone virtue within Frontkämpfer-ideology, by maintaining this clause the regime ensured that the EK order would be able to be worn by all ranks; that commanding officers could become eligible in equal measure to their troops, even if they had not personally rushed a machine gun nest or dodged a grenade. Hitler’s ideal “Blücher-style” of commanding officer could stand alongside the ordinary Frontkämpfer as members of the same heroic brotherhood and thus project the utopian harmony of the militarized Volksgemeinschaft.9

At the same time, though, the dictator allowed that even without direct combat activity, exceptional strategic or tactical command could have decisive battlefield impact and could thereby be comparable to acts of bravery.10 However, within weeks it became clear that the “command merit” clause also left the 1939 EK open to the same kinds of abuses as had beset that of 1914. Though

8 “hervorragende Verdienste in der Truppenführung,” in RGBl I. 1939. No.159, 1573. §2. 9 It is in this context that we should understand his alleged praise of General Kurt von Briesen during the Polish campaign (see nt.4). 10 Hitler’s thoughts on the value of decisive command versus bravery are recorded in BAMA RM 7/94, 13. FHQ. Betr. Verleihung des EK, 31.7.1940. 78 young Frontkämpfer were winning these grades alongside their superiors, there were complaints from front line troops that rear-echelon men were already taking advantage of provisional ambiguities.11

After this hint at a reawakening of the problems of 1914-1918, in mid-October Hitler created a new medal, the “War Merit Cross” (Kriegsverdienstkreuz, KVK), to serve as a form of phaleristic safety-valve for the EK during the war. In a now familiar pattern, the KVK had both combatant and non-combatant grades (with swords and without, KVK-S; KVK) to reward miscellaneous merit, especially command-merit, both within and outside of the combat area. It could thereby leave ideologically superior decorations like the EK for acts of bravery and leadership that decisively affected the course of engagements.12 At the same time, new instructions also appeared for the latter designed to fortify this role, and thereby the hierarchical primacy of front experience. The OKH decreed that officers were to be judged more strictly in their applications than enlisted men and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), since the former were less likely to be in direct combat situations.13 Of the RK it also stated that in order “to increase the effect of this high decoration,” recommendations were only to be submitted for “outstanding bravery which brings a special victory or advantage to the whole,” or, alternately, for “battle-

11 BAMA RW 59/8, 225. Abschrift OKH, 25.10.1939; HPA/2 Gr.III (5101/39), 9.10.1939 in Hütte, “Eisernen Kreuzes,” 104-105. 12 To highlight the inferiority of command merit as a category of recognition, servicemen could not even possess the KVK and EK simultaneously. One was a Frontkämpfer or one was not. See BAB NS 6/339 f.5, 144. Rundschreiben (216/39). Betr. Verordnung des Führers vom 18. Oktober 1939. Stiftung des Kriegsverdienstkreuz, 7.11.1939; Hütte, “Eisernen Kreuzes,” 119-120. That said, even though designed as a safety valve, the KVK was not to be awarded too liberally. A letter between State Secretary Otto Meissner and (Reich Leader) in 1940 attests that Hitler’s plan had been to distribute this award only sparingly during the war, to reward only exemplary acts of service. After the war, it could be awarded more freely as a commemorative decoration. See BAB R 43-II/421, 81. Meissner an Bormann, II.P.I. H1, 18.10.1940; Kurt-Gerhard Klietmann, Auszeichnungen des Deutschen Reiches 1936-1945 (Stuttgart: Motorbuch, 1971), 38. 13 BAMA RW 59/8, 225. Abschrift Ob.d.H. Betr. Verleihung des EK (5410/39 PA 2 Gr III), 25.10.1939; Hütte, “Eisernen Kreuzes,” 103-104. In limiting the number of EKs in circulation, Hitler even went as far as to decree that there would be no posthumous awardings of this decoration to relatives of fallen Frontkämpfer. See “Keine Verleihung des Eisernen Kreuzes für Gefallene an Hinterbliebene (RDl. LP5.IV (No.66727/39), 16.10.1939,” LVBl 1939. No.31, A285. No.45. TA.303. 79 deciding feats of leadership” brought about by personal decision and personal action. It was not to become, whether in fact or reputation, the award of senior officers for successful battles or campaigns.14

Considering these early problems, what Hitler and the regime needed most was the appearance of a recipient who could establish the medal’s proper symbolic function, a first “true”

Ritterkreuzträger of more junior rank whose eligibility derived from undeniable bravery or combat leadership. There were, as it happened, two junior Army officers then recommended for the RK for actions in Poland, Lieutenants Dietrich Steinhardt and Josef Stolz. Their names, however, have been largely forgotten because a figure soon appeared who served the regime’s symbolic needs perfectly.15 This man was Günther Prien, the commander of U-47, who, on the night of October

14-15, stole into the British naval anchorage at Scapa Flow and sank the battleship HMS Royal

Oak. The feat was an important blow for the heavily outnumbered . More important, though, he was not only young and energetic (just thirty-one years old at the time) but possessed a life-story perfectly suited to symbolizing the social mobility of the Volksgemeinschaft. As a bonus, he had even been a Party member.16

Raised in a family of modest means, he had joined the merchant marine at a very young age, progressed through its ranks and then joined the Navy where he eventually achieved command in the elite U-boat arm. What’s more, his recent actions at Scapa Flow reflected both bravery and daring command, whilst also allowing propagandists to draw an even clearer symbolic connection

14 Emphasis in original; BAMA RW 59/8, 225. 15 Steinhardt and Stolz had both taken part in the capture of Fort Wawrzyszew. Both received the RK from Hitler at a ceremony on October 27, along with more generals and senior officers. 16 As mentioned in the introduction, this fact (in actuality a temporary membership between his time in the Merchant Marine and the Navy, in which officers could not possess them), has often been seen as the reason why Prien was selected to be a public hero. E.g. Uziel, Propaganda Warriors, 295; Terence Robinson, The Golden Horseshoe (London: Evans Brothers Limited, 1955), 114. 80 between Ritterkreuzträger and the foundational mythology of the First World War and its PLM- centered Heldenkult. It had been at Scapa Flow that German commanders had scuttled the High

Seas Fleet in 1919 and, as such, his raid could be marketed as the revenge of the Third Reich for this ignominious defeat.17 The RMVP also encouraged correlations between Prien’s actions and those of earlier submarine heroes who had held the PLM, issuing instructions that the former were to be “emphasized and compared with those of the glorious U-boat commander [Otto]

Weddigen.”18

Unfortunately, though, the “Bull of Scapa Flow” was ineligible for the new Halsorden since he had not yet received the EK1. Nevertheless, given his symbolic potential Hitler made an exception. Returning to a hero’s welcome on October 17, 1939, Prien immediately received the prerequisite medal19 from his military superiors, and then the RK from Hitler himself (illegally since each grade of the EK order had to be for a separate act). At the same time, Propaganda

Minister Goebbels orchestrated comprehensive media coverage about this first Frontkämpfer-

Ritterkreuzträger that drew attention to Prien’s background, virtue and respect among superiors and subordinates.20 The Minister even arranged for work to begin by a ghost writer on an autobiography that would tell of his parvenu-path to the RK.21 However, despite the symbolic victory represented by Prien’s elevation to Halsordenträger, as well as an important experience for propagandists in creating living war heroes through the mass-media (an idea developed in Chapter

17 See Domarus, Speeches and Proclamations Volume 3, 1859. 18 BAB ZSg.109-4, 67. V.I. 236/39 17.10.1939, 2. Though without reference to phaleristics, much of this nostalgic connection has been noted by previous scholars, most notably René Schilling, as being a central component of Prien’s heroic persona. See Schilling, Kriegshelden, 326; Schilling, “Helden der Wehrmacht,” 552-554. 19 In fact, the whole crew received the relevant grades of the EK (EK1 or EK2) for their joint exploit. 20 Goebbels spent time with Prien immediately after his investiture at the Chancellery and wrote in his diary that the young hero had made a strong impression on him. GTb I.7, 160 (19.10.1939). 21 Hadley, Count Not the Dead, 82; “Vom Schiffsjungen zum Marineoffizier,” Die Neue Leib, October 19, 1939. 81

IV), the process also revealed another barrier to the establishment of this decoration as a symbol of Frontkämpfer-ideology.

As in 1914-1916 when the PLM had begun to be awarded to young middle-class heroes, the elevation of Prien provoked resentment among certain military elites, i.e. the traditional community of Halsorden-holders. Specifically, it came from Prien’s own superior, the chief of the

German Navy (and one of the thirteen original Ritterkreuzträger), . Raeder was a career officer of the old school, steeped in the rank-based value system of the imperial military and, though he proclaimed loyalty to the new state, under his tenure the Navy lagged behind the other services in ideological fervour.22 More important, though, this background also influenced his views on Hitler’s choice to award Prien what was now Germany’s only military

Halsorden. Different sources reveal that despite representing a boon to the Navy’s prestige, the

Admiral quickly developed a dislike for Prien after his receipt of the RK. Joseph Goebbels would write in his diary of his favourite hero’s “mistreatment” at the hands of the Naval High Command

(Oberkommando der Marine, OKM), while Prien’s own mother, Margarete, declared after the war that “the day that my son returned from Scapa Flow […] Raeder was against him.”23 He frequently belittled her son, she said, and had stated that he was “unworthy of the Knight’s Cross or high honours,” i.e. those more properly reserved for “his old comrades from the World War.”24

22 Indeed, one of Goebbels’s main annoyances at Wehrmacht propaganda was that under Raeder, the Navy had become a hotbed of “anachronistic conservativism.” According to his diary, the running joke went: “We have a National Socialist Air Force, a , and an imperial Navy” (GTb II.1, 431 (16.9.1941)). Moreover, historian Sönke Neitzel has demonstrated that he was not wrong. See Neitzel, “Der Bedeutungswandel der im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Das militärische und politische Gewicht im Vergleich,” in Die Wehrmacht. Mythos und Realität, eds. Rolf- Dieter Müller and Hans-Erich Volkmann (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1999), 245. 23 See BAB DY 55/V 278/6/1425, 3. Margarete Bohstedt (née Prien) an Herr Raddatz, Leipzig. 5.11.1945. See also GTb I.8, 406 (5.11.1940). 24 BAB DY 55/V 278/6/1425, 3. 82

Raeder’s personal objections to Prien, though, seem to have also betrayed a deeper rejection, or at least misunderstanding, of the depth of the regime’s commitment to the social elements of Frontkämpfer-ideology. The Admiral’s view of his own status as one of the original

Ritterkreuzträger was that of a participant in the age-old prestige exchange between the “Feldherr”

(Warlord) and his senior commanders; his RK was more GK than EK1, a representation of traditional Halsorden culture rather than its new egalitarian form. As such, it was not correct for

Hitler (the politician and former corporal) to confuse the two by elevating the “little man from the merchant marine,” as he reportedly referred to Prien, into the ranks of Ritterkreuzträger.25 Such an act had been bad enough, but after watching several more of his own men (as well as several Army officers) similarly honoured the admiral realized that Prien had been no flash in the pan. Rather, he represented a template for more parvenu-heroes with whom he would share this distinction.

In January 1940, he took the matter up with Hitler at a private meeting and suggested curtailing this new trend. Specifically, he suggested creating another new grade for the EK order to stand between the EK1 and RK. The new award, he continued, could be modelled on earlier

(less prestigious) buffer-awards like the Halsorden grade of the Royal House Order of the

Hohenzollerns, which had had a knight’s grade for officers and a bearer’s grade for NCOs.26 In his

25 Ibid., 6. Bohstedt an Raddatz, 14.11.1945. Raeder’s hostility to Prien’s symbolic elevation, though, does not discount an overall sympathy for the regime’s ideological program. As mentioned in the previous chapter (nt.98), many among the Wehrmacht’s senior leadership were able to simultaneously embrace aspects of Party ideology and rule while rejecting others. This duality with regards to orders and decorations is visible in the former grand admiral’s post-war memoirs. Raeder’s discussion of his imperial awards reinforces the impression not only of his deep pride in them, but also their positive association in his memory with that regime’s phaleristic traditions and particularly with the authority of the Kaiser, with whom he had enjoyed a close relationship and who had bestowed some of his highest decorations in person. Yet, as evidenced by a photograph included in a recent edition featuring Raeder sporting a miniature RK lapel-pin after release from Allied captivity in the 1950s, he possessed a parallel pride in this award whose symbolic meaning was (ostensibly) wholly counter to the above. Thus, it is not unsurprising that Raeder would embrace his receipt of the RK in September 1939 in a manner echoing that of his imperial awards (i.e. the “Feldherr” rewarding senior officers), while shortly thereafter take issue with its ‘abuse.’ See Erich Raeder, Grand Admiral, trans. Henry W. Drexel (USA: Da Capo Press, 2001). 26 Since this order had both Hals- and non-Halsorden versions, it is not clear if Raeder meant a compromise in the creation of a lesser Halsorden or simply a medal to be worn on the tunic like the EK1 or EK2, traditionally the more deportment for a common soldier or junior officer. 83 own sphere, moreover, Raeder suggested that this new medal could be used to reward U-boat commanders who had sunk over 100,000 tons of enemy shipping.27 In a sense, he was suggesting much the same as the Party had done with the PLM – only in reverse. By re-dividing Halsorden culture he could redeem it and demarcate the RK as the award of senior commanders, a stepping stone to the GK rather than an EK-styled Halsorden for the lowly lieutenant or private.

Though left out of most previous studies of the war’s phaleristic or heroic cultures, this proposal represented an early crossroads for Hitler’s experiment in Halsorden culture, which to date had proven, at best, only a qualified success (largely thanks to Prien). The RK was certainly exclusive (by March 1940 there were twenty-eight awarded RKs, compared to 4,000 EK1s and over 100,000 EK2s), just in the wrong way.28 Thanks to the elitist tone struck by his early awardings (compounded by further awardings to high ranking officers in October), this medal seemed to be going backwards from the symbol which the PLM had become in the hands of Party propagandists: an award for map-table warfare rather than the trenches. Moreover, the effective stalemate on land which had followed the campaign in Poland, the “Phony War,” meant that there were too few opportunities for young Frontkämpfer to earn the award and so develop its symbolic potential.

Nevertheless, Raeder’s suggestions seem to have given Hitler an idea. Within six weeks

General (the chief of the OKW’s operations staff) noted in his diary that the dictator had resolved to create new grades for the EK order. As Jodl described, he first planned for an

“interim” award between the EK1 and RK as Raeder had suggested. However, rather than a buffer award to protect traditional Halsorden culture, Hitler toyed with the idea of creating a gold-rimmed

27 Jak P. Mallmann Showell, Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945 (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2005), 79. 28 BAB R 601/1331 f.1, 37; ibid., f.2, 63-73. PräsKz Statistics, January – March 1940. 84 version of the EK1, which fit far better with Frontkämpfer-ideology and could conceivably have helped to bridge the growing gap in recognition below the RK. Nevertheless, according to Jodl he ultimately rejected the idea because it would deviate too far from the EK’s familiar aesthetic.

Instead, Hitler favoured the idea of creating a new grade above the RK in the form of an (Eichenlaub), which likely drew inspiration from a similar supplemental grade for the PLM created in 1813 and traditionally reserved exclusively for the most senior officers. By resurrecting and repurposing this elitist symbol for the new RK, he could strike a compromise with men like

Raeder, preserving their self-determined level of dignity, whilst simultaneously reinforcing the meaning of the original RK as a Frontkämpfer-decoration and symbol of Nazi-led social progress.29

Before he could put this idea into effect, though, Hitler saw his concern for the RK temporarily swept away by events which promised to correct its symbolic waywardness. On April

9, the Wehrmacht launched a new series of lightning campaigns, beginning with the conquest of

Denmark and . In the process, military authorities were soon processing thousands of new recommendations for decorations, including a surge of younger Frontkämpfer-figures for the RK.30

Word of a possible egalitarian turn in this medal’s distribution created a stir within the popular

29 Jodl’s notation is unclear regarding whether Hitler himself devised the idea of resurrecting the Oak Leaves, stating only that the dictator was “sympathetic” to it. See Doc. 1809-PS “Tagebuch General Jodl (WFA), umfasst Zeit vom 1.2.-2.6.40,” Nuremberg Trials, XXVIII, 412. More important, in the past this important notation has been mistranslated. Rudolf Absolon cites Jodl stating that Hitler was considering the idea of “Oak Leaves to the Iron Cross.” This subtle but important mistranslation alters the meaning of the idea, which thereby includes, for example, the possibility of an EK1 with Oak Leaves instead of the RK, which Jodl states clearly in the document cited by Absolon as the intended decoration. Furthermore, as we shall see, this mistranslation also has effects on Absolon’s subsequent discussion of phaleristic policy. See Absolon, Die Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich. Vol.V. (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1988), 271. 30 Such was the surge of decorations after the malaise of the Phony War, in fact, that the Commander in Chief of the army, General Walther von Brauchitsch, formalized a new honour: being named in the OKW’s regular bulletin (Wehrmachtbericht), which served (whether intentionally or not) to fill part of the role of Hitler’s abortive golden EK1. See “Namensnennung im Wehrmachtberichte, 27.4.1940,” in Heeresverordnungsblatt (hereafter, HVBl) (1940) C s.77 No.520. See further BAB R 601/1331 f.1, 37; ibid., f.2, 4. PräsKz. Statistics for April 1940; BAMA RW 59/360, 33. Tätigkeitsbericht der Ordensgruppe, HPA für die Zeit vom 1.9.1939-31.10.1941. 85 media, which began to take note of new RK awardings with growing frequency. In response, though, the regime acted as if this distribution-pattern had been the reality all along. On May 9, the daily press instructions contained a reproach at the evident shock among journalists at recent trends. After all, it said, “in the new German Wehrmacht, decorations and orders are gained by every brave soldier as a uniform honour.”31 Nevertheless, in private the Minister ordered increased publicity for RK presentation ceremonies to promote this Frontkämpfer connection, as well as, where possible, the Party’s Nordic racial ideals.32

Scandinavia, though, had just been the beginning. On May 10 the Wehrmacht launched its long-awaited offensive in the West, and within days recommendations for orders and decorations multiplied exponentially.33 Those decorated still represented only a fraction of the Wehrmacht, but the surge nevertheless meant that hundreds more men of younger age and humbler background became eligible for the RK each day. As a result, by July 1940 the number of Ritterkreuzträger stood at over 250, almost ten-fold more than the paltry three dozen several months earlier.

Additionally, though use of the “command merit” clause and traditional hierarchies within the

Wehrmacht ensured that recommendations still favoured officers, the ratio between higher and lower ranks narrowed considerably. In the Army, for example, there were now fifty-two general officers with the RK, ninety majors and colonels, sixty-one junior officers (lieutenant to captain) and even twenty-three NCOs.34

31 BAB ZSg.109-11, 27. V.I. No.107/40. 9.5.1940. 32 Willi A. Boelcke, Kriegspropaganda 1939-1941. Geheime Ministerkonferenzen im Reichspropaganda-ministerium (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966), 382 (8.6.1940). 33 By the end of the campaign, the authorities had distributed another 32,000 EK1s and 391,000 EK2s. See BAB R 601/1332 f.1, 30, 87. PräsKz. Statistics for May-June 1940. 34 BAMA RW 59/360, 33. 86

Propagandists did their bit to project this shift towards a more balanced distribution in the country’s newspapers and newsreels, while senior leaders like Hermann Göring and Hitler himself emulated the tactics of Wilhelm II by frequently presenting the award in person, magnifying its visibility and gravitas. One of the campaign’s most enduring photographs (circulated on the orders of the RMVP), was of Hitler decorating junior combat officers for capturing the Belgian Fort Eben

Emael; the former Frontkämpfer standing amidst the bemedaled young officers still fresh from battle.35 The reward of such images was a detectable shift in the public perception of the RK in the correct direction. SD reports from May-June spoke of ordinary Germans being quite vocal about seeing younger men of more humble backgrounds winning the RK, thus breaking old social boundaries. In particular, they noted how pleasure at this elevation of men “without birth or background” was especially prevalent among veterans of 1914-1918.36 The “” campaigns of 1940, in short, had finally produced the desired dividends of Hitler’s phaleristic investment the previous September.

Yet even before the campaigns had ended, the dictator had hedged his bets regarding the

RK’s symbolic potential. Though its distribution was already more diverse than the PLM had ever been during its long history, the high number of rear-echelon or headquarters-Ritterkreuzträger who had won their medal by virtue of “command merit” was still too high. Thus, Hitler decided to implement his earlier idea about a new grade above the RK. However, there was now far less need

35 BAB ZSg.109-11, 50-51. V.I. 109/40, 13.5.1940; “Ritterkreuze für Fallschirmjäger!” VB, May 14, 1940; “Eben Emael. Mit dem Ritterkreuz ausgezeichnet,” Der Adler 11, May 28, 1940. See further Nicolaus von Below, At Hitler’s Side. The Memoirs of Hitler’s Luftwaffe Adjutant 1937-1945 trans. Geoffrey Brooks (Barnsley: Frontline Books, 2010), 59. 36 MadR, 4, 1177. No.91 (27.5.1940). Such remarks, moreover, also demonstrate how the RK helped to contribute to a much wider feeling of egalitarianization that swept the country in 1940. As Jörg Echternkamp notes, the early victories of the Wehrmacht led many Germans to believe that the war was “levelling” society. See Jörg Echternkamp, “Im Kampf an der inneren und äusseren Front. Grundzüge der deutschen Gesellschaft im Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg.Vol.9.1 Die Deutsche Kriegsgesellschaft 1939 bis 1945. Erster Halbband: Politisierung, Vernichtung, Überleben, ed. Jörg Echternkamp (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2004), 6-36. 87 for an of elites like Erich Raeder by resurrecting an element of imperial tradition.

Rather, such an award could now deepen the well of ideological capital that the RK had opened by creating a new tier of recognition for those who most ably demonstrated the ideals the Reich’s

Halsorden had been meant to symbolize, namely combining bravery and decisive leadership.

Consequently, on June 3, 1940 Hitler had announced the creation of the “Oak Leaves to the

Knight’s Cross” (Eichenlaub zum Ritterkreuz, RK-E) as his own special supplemental grade, for which he would accept no recommendations. Instead, he would distribute it at his own discretion.37

Unlike in September 1939, Hitler carefully selected an ideologically suitable first

“Eichenlaubträger.” Rather than a fresh young Ritterkreuzträger like Prien or a senior general who had led the campaign in France, he chose , a middle-aged general of mountain troops who had recently won a name for himself in Norway. For over a month, Dietl’s small mixed force of sailors, airmen and infantrymen had withstood an Allied siege at the port of , for which he had received the RK from Hitler on June 6 and became an overnight sensation across

Germany.38 His feat, moreover, was not only a perfect singular demonstration of German military might and perseverance, but also a comparative for propagandists to previous Heldenkult mythology, this time of the Spanienkämpfer. Articles and featurettes compared his defence of

Narvik with the famous siege of Alcazar in 1936, where Spanish Nationalists had withstood repeated republican assaults. Furthermore, while he himself was an Army officer, the

37 “Verordnung über die Änderung der Verordnung über die Erneuerung des Eisernen Kreuzes. Vom 3. Juni 1940,” RGBl I. 1940. No.102, 849. 38 The V.I. from Berlin to the Reich press on June 10 stated: “The honouring of this unique soldierly accomplishment of numerically weak German forces, located 2,000 km from home and […] faced superior odds for two months, must become a heroic-song of the German soldier, [and] one which holds a special place in the history of warfare.” BAB ZSg.109-12. 33. V.I. No.133/40. 10.6.1940. See also BAB ZSg.109-11, 114. V.I. 120/40, 25.5.1940; ibid., 122. V.I. 121/40, 27.5.1940. 88

“Narvikkämpfer” Dietl commanded had had contingents from all three services, making him a symbol for the Wehrmacht as a whole.39

Dietl’s true significance as a candidate for the first RK-E, though, lay in his ability to bridge the bravery and command merit components of the Reich’s Halsorden culture that were creating a duality in its symbolic capital. Though a senior officer, the wiry Bavarian was no headquarters- general. As propagandists proclaimed in numerous books, articles and featurettes, the “Defender of Narvik” led from the front-most lines, sharing the dangers with his men, dressing their wounds and even picking up a rifle to fight alongside them, thus combining skillful command with personal bravery and resolve.40 What’s more, as a bonus, he was also a loyal National Socialist, an Alte

Kämpfer who had been one of the earliest members of what would become the NSDAP during the so-called Kampfzeit.41 In short, then, just as Günther Prien had seemed a godsend the previous year, this “Blücher-type” of fighting general represented the perfect Eichenlaubträger to be symbolic template for RK-E. Dietl’s elevation came on July 19, 1940 during a publicized ceremony celebrating the country’s historic conquests and for which Hitler had ordered every

39 By extension, the “Hero of Narvik” was framed as a German successor to the Spanish “Hero of Alcazar,” General José Moscardo. The latter, further solidifying the link, even presented the former with a sword of honour at the suggestion of the Spanish newspaper Arriba in late July. See “Ehrendegen für General Dietl. Der Held des Allcazar [sic] dem Helden von Narvik,” Preussische Zeitung (Königsberg), July 25, 1940; “Narvik, Alcazar des Nordens,” Westfälische Landeszeitung (), June 13, 1940; K. Parbel, “Der Verteidiger von Narvik. Dietl,” Berliner Börsen Zeitung, June 8, 1940; “Matrosen, Gebirgsjäger...,” VB, June 8, 1940. 40 One article, for example, quoted a subordinate who spoke of him personally distributing food and cigarettes to his soldiers, as well as aiding medics in dragging wounded men to safety. “The high decoration [i.e. RK-E] which the Führer awarded our General,” he said, “makes us rejoice from the bottom of our hearts.” “Die Soldaten des Generals Dietl,” Tagespost (Graz), July 23, 1940. See also Gerd Böttger, Narvik im Bild. Deutschlands Kampf unter der Mitternachtssonne (Berlin: Stalling Verlag, 1941), 110-113. 41 Unfortunately, similar to descriptions of Günther Prien, there has been something of a fixation on this latter fact in relevant historical works. While it is certainly true, as Winfried Heinemann has written, that Dietl’s political history was to be used to effect by party propagandists during the war (part of a process discussed here in Ch.IV), some biographers have assumed (incorrectly) that it was simply because of his activism that Dietl was ‘selected’ to become one of the Reich’s leading heroes and the first recipient of the RK-E, the latter thus representing an act of political nepotism. Compare, for example, Winfried Heinemann, “Eduard Dietl – Lieblingsgeneral des “Führers”, in Militärelite des Dritten Reiches. 27 biographische Skizzen, eds. and Enrico Szring (Berlin: Ullstein, 1995), 105-106, 108 and Roland Kaltenegger, Eduard Dietl. Teil 2 Der Held von Narvik 1933-1944 und seine Zeit (Würzburg: Flecher Verlag, 2012), 102-103. 89 general with the RK to be present. After making his first (and only) presentation of the rare GK to

Hermann Göring, the dictator named him the country’s first Eichenlaubträger and thereby the chief symbol of the “new” Wehrmacht.42

II.2 The “Ordensfrage”

The summer of 1940 thus represented something of a high point for the RK as a symbol of a changed social order and recognition hierarchy. Furthermore, while Hitler, Goebbels and the rest of the Party could take pride in finally achieving something of this medal’s intended symbolic function, later chapters will demonstrate how it was also quickly becoming the conduit for a new cult of popular heroes that rivaled and soon surpassed that of 1914-1918. Nevertheless, no sooner had Hitler awarded his first RK-E than he began to fear that his 1939 EK was beginning to fall victim to the same pressures that had inflated and devalued that of 1914. After the fall of France in June there had been a tremendous boom in the number of award-recommendations flooding into

Wehrmacht personnel offices. Indeed, taken together with those processed for earlier campaigns in the spring, the number became so vast that the Army created a special working-group, the

Ordensgruppe (Orders Group), to deal with the administrative workload.43 Of course, many of these awards had been for Frontkämpfer who had genuinely earned them through service in the front lines. However, according to the testimony of veterans published by historian Bertrand

42 Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, ed. Generaloberst Halder, Kriegstagebuch Band II. Von der geplanten Landung in England bis zum Beginn des Ostfeldzuges (1.7.1940 – 21.6.1941) (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1963), 11 (5.7.1940). See further Engel and Kotze, Army Adjutant, 96 (22.7.1940). 43 The Ordensgruppe, established on August 15, consisted of three sub-groups: one for the growing administrative culture surrounding the RK; one for the EK and other military lesser decorations; and one for political and foreign decorations. Before this, matters of orders and decorations had been dealt with by one officer and two clerical assistants. BAMA RW 59/360, 1. OKH/P5. Betr. Ordensgruppe, 31.10.1940. 90

Michael Buchmann, amid the general atmosphere of victory, there was also “an abundance of order hunting.”44

This inherited practice had changed little from 1914-1918. However, with the current war seemingly in its closing days, combat medals represented not only a source of prestige and status but also a visible marker of those who had taken part in the historic triumph of the new Reich.45

Consequently, as the aforementioned veteran continued, it was not just soldiers but also rear echelon men and “political bigshots [Bonzen] of all kinds” who wanted a medal to show off back home.46 Moreover, thanks in part to the regime’s own efforts, this culture of order hunting once again revolved chiefly around the EK, which dominated soldiers’ expectations and fears of social ostracism. For ordinary rankers, the EK2 represented the marker of a “true” and competent

Frontkämpfer, while the EK1 did the same among officers who set for themselves a higher standard as evidence of command ability.47 The desire to gain these awards led some to perform superhuman acts of bravery. For others, however, it created a willingness to bend rules and regulations.

According to one Ordensgruppe report, some officers had taken to recommending themselves for the EK or exerting pressure on superiors to do so. Another, meanwhile, alluded to soldiers emulating Adam Drayss by forging medals they had not earned.48

44 Typescript of Rudolf Biedermann, p.354-356 cited in Buchmann, Soldatenalltag, 27-29. 45 E.g. “Die Ehrenzeichen deutscher Tapferkeit,” Uniformen-Mark 19, (1940); Otto Hoffmann, “Orden und Ehrenzeichen. Eine neue Entwicklung beginnt,” Schwert und Spaten, 14 (1940): 89-90. See also: “Ewig. Symbol deutschen Heldentums,” Magdeburgische Zeitung, August 11, 1940; Otto Hoffmann, “Über die Entstehung des E.K. 1939,” Schwert und Spaten (Okt. 1940). 46 Biedermann, p.354 in Buchmann, Soldatenalltag, 27-29. 47 The prevalence and power of these sentiments among both soldiers and officers is well attested by contemporary historians. For example, see Buchmann, Soldatenalltag, 27-29; Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, 278, 280-283; Rass, Menschenmaterial, 254-255; Hans Ertl, Hans Ertl als Kriegsberichter 1939-1945. (Innsbruck: Steiger, 1985), 51-52; Römer, Kameraden, chap.4 (n.b. loc. 2110 and 2200 of 11262), Kindle. 48 BAMA RW 59/359, 16. OKH/Ia (110/40) Brauchitsch an alle Armeen und Armeegruppen, 2.10.1940; BAMA RW 59/364, 209. HPA (543/40), 2.12.1940; “Missbrauch beim Tragen von Orden,” Schwert und Spaten, 5 (1940), 70. 91

Such behaviour was bad enough for the Wehrmacht’s phaleristic administrators, but for

Hitler and the Party it represented a serious political issue. Not only did it represent the seeds of inflation and thereby devaluation, but it also demonstrated that despite the regime’s propaganda, the old value system still shaped the distribution of awards within the new Wehrmacht. As early as July, the dictator complained that there were “many utterances from the front,” that

Frontkämpfer who had won an EK legitimately judged their medals devalued by the lengths to which some rear-area personnel, and specifically staff officers, were willing to stretch the

“command merit” qualification. This, he said, was completely contrary to his intentions for the EK and it was for this very reason that he had subsequently created the KVK.49 As a result, on July

31, he issued a formal ban on any awardings of the EK grades (especially the RK) within the high commands of the Wehrmacht, and on August 3 he similarly declared his wish for a lessening of

EK-recommendations for the “command merit” clause more generally.50 Furthermore, he expanded the potential utility of the KVK as a safety valve by first ordering increased distribution of its lower grades and by creating a new Halsorden grade in the Knight’s Cross of the War Merit

Cross (the Ritterkreuz des Kriegsverdienstkreuzes, RKVK).51

Hitler’s attempt to put the distribution of the EK back on course and thereby preserve its ideological value, however, only created more problems. On one hand, the new emphasis on the

KVK and limitation on EK awardings led quickly led to an inflation of this lesser award as well, thus weakening its own value and compelling administrators to limit its distribution. What’s more,

49 Notice from 31.7.1940, referenced in BAB RM 7/94, 13. OKW/WZIII (29c16 6406/41). Betr. an OKH/OKM/ODL Betr. Eisernen Kreuzes, 16.3.1941. 50 Referenced in “Erlass des Führers u. OB.Wehrmacht, 16.3.1941,” in Doehle, Sammeldruck, 18-19. See also Hütte, “Eisernen Kreuzes,” 106-107. 51 On the same day, he also created a civilian grade, the War Merit Medal (Kriegsverdienstmedaille, KVM), which would serve the same preventative function as the Merit Cross for War Aid two and a half decades before. “Verordnung über die Änderung der Verordnung über die Stiftung des Kriegsverdienstkreuzes. Vom 19. August 1940,” RGBl I. 1940. No.154, 1178. 92 it also became apparent that commanders had blurred its ideological utility by awarding its combat grade (the KVK-S) to rear-echelon men.52 Far more serious, though, Hitler’s aggressive counter- measures created a climate of resentment among the elite of the rear-echelon, specifically staff- officers, who, in the old prestige culture, were accustomed to their work being deemed superior to that of most combat troops. Their cause was taken up by the enraged General Franz Halder. Like

Erich Raeder, for Halder the recognition-traditions inherited from the Imperial Army were sacrosanct, and this included the recognition for such behind-the-scenes work. In an entry in his war diary in December 1940 entitled “Recognition for general staff officers smear campaign [sic],” he ranted at uncharacteristic length that any commander and his staff were a single unit and thus deserving of equal recognition. He also vehemently rejected the implied suggestion that order hunting was more prevalent among such men.53

In the face of such objections from the Army, in early 1941 Hitler extended an olive branch by partially lifting the ban on EK awardings within the various high commands of the Wehrmacht.

They were now allowed but required his own personal approval. At the same time, he formally codified what he had stated as a “desire” the year before regarding the future of the “command merit” clause. The EK could be awarded to members of “higher command authorities” (i.e.

52 This information emerged from Ordensgruppe reports during a meeting convened by the chief of the Army Personnel Department (Heerespersonalamt, HPA) General Bodewin Keitel on the increasingly confused state of the Army’s phaleristic system. See BAMA RW 59/364, 209. Reinforcing these problems, moreover, the RMVP had reported in October that owing to the policy developments over the summer, press coverage about the KVK had become uncomfortably close in tone and substance to the ideologically superior EK. As a result, it had to order that the visibility of the former be lowered in the press as much as possible. See BAB ZSg.109-16, 137. V.I. 284/40, 29.11.1940; NARA T-77/985 OKW757. WPr an Stellv.G.Kdo.IV Betr. Bekanntmachung von Auszeichnungen, 28.2.1941. 53 In his time, he wrote, the ethos of the general staff and “the great men of our profession,” had been the opposite: to “suffer much, [but] stand out little.” Jacobsen, Halder KTB, 229 (13.12.1940). For earlier entries demonstrating Halder’s frustration over the ban and his discussion of the matter with others in his circle of officers (see ibid., 113 (25.9.1940) and 174 (9.11.1940)). Halder’s anger over the Ordensfrage was no doubt also stoked by the fact that the dictator had also recently tried to limit promotions for officers of the general staff. See MacGregor Knox, “1 October 1942: Adolf Hitler, Wehrmacht Officer Policy, and the Social Revolution,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 43, No.3 (Sept. 2000): 817. 93 regimental command staffs or higher), but only the commander, the chief of staff and their primary aides and similarly had to be authorized by a higher authority first.54 This olive branch, though, did not mollify those represented by Halder, who subsequently submitted his feelings in writing on the “Ordensfrage.” His statement, preserved in the files of the Ordensgruppe and written in more guarded tones than his earlier diary entry, declared directly that the denial of any grade of the EK order to any rear-echelon personnel ran contrary to the spirit of Germany’s military heritage. Only a third of his own men, for example, were eligible for the basic EK2, let alone the

RK which he himself wore. This could not continue, he said; there should be no restrictions on EK distribution.55

Yet the dictator would not budge. With the start date for (the invasion of the Soviet Union) fast approaching in June 1941, and with it the prospect of another surge in medal recommendations, Hitler made a definitive pronouncement on the “Ordensfrage.” At a conference at his residence on the Obersalzburg on May 16, he outlined the future of the 1939 EK and its Halsorden grade. First, regarding access to the order for rear-echelon personnel he restated his case even more forcefully. Staff-work and other forms of “intellectual preparations” were not worthy of the EK order, and nor did simply being close to the enemy count as combat leadership.

Such actions found their recognition in the KVK-S, and now the RKVK-S. Furthermore, Hitler voiced his opposition to “mass awardings” of the EK as forms of symbolic recognition, such as to whole units, ships, plane crews etc. In keeping with its ideological mandate, this honour was for individual action only.56 With this announcement, in short, Hitler had definitively taken his stand

54 “Erlass des Führers und OB.d.W vom 16 März 1941,” and “Richtlinien des OKW/WZ.III (29c16 // 6406/41), 16.3.1941,” in Doehle, Sammeldruck, 18-20. 55 BAMA RW 59/365, 7. Abschrift, Halder an Gen.Stab.H. (312/41). G.Kdo-Gz.1. Betr. Verleihung des EK an Offiziere im Generalstabstellen, 14.5.1941. 56 It is unclear whether Hitler was referring to any specific instance in the current conflict, but he also conceded a few exceptions to this rule, such as to special cases involving infantry assault (Stosstruppen) or U-boat and aircraft 94 against Halder, the Prusso-Imperial “Wertesystem” and the traditionalist elements within the officer corps, and it was perhaps with this in mind that he noted to his adjutant Gerhard Engel two weeks later how “an overall world-political view was unknown to such officers, for that was something greater than Fatherland or ‘with God for Kaiser and Reich.’”57

Even more important, though, Hitler also announced in May that he would once more create new grades for the EK and thus further levels of symbolic recognition. This would begin, he said, with an “interim order” between the EK1 and RK, i.e. that which he had considered privately the previous year but never created. In the shadow of Barbarossa, such an award could now serve to create more space beneath the RK to protect it from inflation. Even so, Hitler left its details vague and said he would introduce it “at the appropriate time.”58 In the meantime, the OKH issued a new set of guidelines in early June that reinforced Hitler’s protectiveness, encouraging commanders not to think of the RK as simply an expected next step for any EK1 holder, and reminded them that there were other forms of recognition that could serve the same purpose, such as being named in the daily dispatches or an elevation in seniority (depending on the act involved).59

On top of this, Hitler also announced his intention to make changes above the RK. Since creating the RK-E, he had awarded it to a series of young Frontkämpfer (a dozen in all and primarily from the Air Force and Navy) whom propagandists had transformed into the most popular heroes of the Wehrmacht (see Chapter IV). For the coming campaign in Russia, however,

crews, the nature of whose collective work meant that all shared in the same level of danger. Thus, equal shared recognition was in fact appropriate. BAMA RW 59/8, 231. Geh. Abschrift Schmundt (33a/41) an Chefs Wehrmachtpersonalämter, 29.5.1941. 57 Engel and Kotze, Army Adjutant, 114 (31.5.1941). 58 BAMA RW 59/8, 231. 59 “Richtlinien des OKH für die Verleihung des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes. Stand 3. Juni 1941,“ cited in Geissler, Das Eiserne Kreuz, 165-167. 95 the dictator promised to modify this grade, allowing recommendations to be submitted for worthy

Ritterkreuzträger eligible for a second award instead of vetting the recipients himself. Even so, he stressed that unlike the initial RK, recommendations were to be made only for repeated acts of bravery. Even supreme achievements by commanding officers that did not involve a demonstration of this virtue would be considered insufficient.60 At the same time, the RMVP notified the press that this medal was the marker of “extraordinary personal heroism,” and as such any news of it had to be published on the front page as a matter of policy.61

Hitler’s sudden willingness to make these changes became clear when he subsequently announced that he was now planning another two supplemental grades above the RK-E. The first was to be a set of golden oak leaves, and the second a version inlaid with diamonds reminiscent of the SK-B and PLM-E, presumably to be awarded only to the most singular of hero figures.62 Once again, the dictator did not provide any detail of his plans for these decorations. Yet, in view of the circumstances these new supplemental grades were likely meant to do much the same as he had initially intended for the RK-E in the winter of 1940: to provide greater flexibility in the distribution of his Halsorden and thereby improve their symbolic utility. Specifically, it is possible that they were meant to satiate the expectation of generals and field marshals for recognition during the coming campaign so that he could be “sparing” with the Frontkämpfer-version, an intention he later confided to his chief Wehrmacht adjutant Rudolf Schmundt.63

60 BAMA RW 59/8, 231. 61 BAB ZSg.109-22, 41. V.I. 147/41, 1.Erg., 13.6.1941. These instructions were repeated more forcefully later in the year when it was discovered that RK-E announcements had been found on the second or even third page in some newspapers. “Personal appreciation of these men by the Führer,” the reminder read, “belong[s] on the first page!” (ibid. 109-25, 72-73. V.I. 276/41, n.d., ca. October 1941). 62 BAMA RW 59/8, 231. 63 BAMA RW 59/364, 191-192. Anruf Schmundt Betr. Brief chef PA an Schmundt in Ordensangelegenheiten, 3.9.1941; Absolon, Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich, IV, 271. 96

On the eve of Operation Barbarossa, however, most of what Hitler promised did not materialize – at least not in the way he had said. For one, he did not create his golden RK-E, though whether he found the idea unworkable as he had the golden EK1 the previous year or simply because he changed his mind remains a mystery. Instead of separate oak leaves for elites (merit) and Frontkämpfer (bravery), the day before Barbarossa he created an entirely new grade, the Oak

Leaves with Swords (Eichenlaub mit Schwerter, RK-ES). Three weeks later, however, he did belatedly revert to his idea for the diamonds as the new highest award for Wehrmacht personnel

(Eichenlaub mit Schwerter und Brillanten, RK-ESB). Furthermore, despite potential ideas for an

Oak Leaves for the EK1, his “interim order” did not appear in time for the campaign; according to

Ordensgruppe records he had rejected the initial designs and ordered new ones.64 In its place, the

Army (and soon the Air Force) created what in context was an eleventh-hour substitute in the form of the “Honour Roll” (Ehrenblatt, EB): a list of men whose recommendations for the RK had been deemed insufficient and therefore received a paper-certificate and an elevation in seniority instead.65

In short, having thus solved his problems with disgruntled “Etappenschweine” and creating new strata of recognition, the Wehrmacht’s phaleristic system could regain the trajectory of the previous summer and the EK order its proper symbolic meaning. When the Wehrmacht crossed the common border with the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, moreover, things appeared to start

64 BAMA RW 59/364, 195. Schmundt u. Engel. Besprechung, 10.7.1941. 65 Ibid.; OKH H.West.Abt No.2310/41, 15.7.1941, in Doehle, Sammeldruck, 73; Hütte, “Eisernen Kreuzes,” 123-124. Discussion of an “Eichenlaub” can be found in a document cited by Rudolf Absolon in his previously referenced work Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich, which records that the OKW and different Wehrmacht suggested guidelines for such an award (Absolon, Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich, V.271). In keeping with his mistranslation of another document (see nt.29), however, Absolon sees this document as proof that this was simply Hitler’s re-visitation of his original idea from March 1940 (i.e. that which he claims the dictator considered in lieu of a gold-rimmed EK1, and which had only “retreated into the background”). Once again, however, Absolon’s interpretation is false. As demonstrated previously, Hitler had not planned for oak leaves for the EK1 in 1940, but for the RK. This evident idea for an EK1-E (which never appeared) as the desired “interim order” in 1941, therefore, was a new one. Furthermore, it is fully in keeping with Hitler’s contemporary fixation with the idea of creating new sets of Oak Leaves for the RK, as mentioned above. 97 off very well. The surprise attack had given way to tremendous victories which, in turn, had resulted in a new surge in RK awardings that further strengthened the ideological gains made the previous year. True, many of these awardings were to generals and field marshals, but their success in grandiose battles of encirclement that destroyed entire Soviet armies demonstrated what the

“command merit” clause was supposed to be in its requirement of a “battle-deciding act.” More important, the summer campaign had produced a rapidly growing number of new Ritterkreuzträger from the ranks of junior officers, NCOs and now even enlisted men who more closely fit the

Frontkämpfer ideal and lent parallel weight to the RK’s egalitarian credentials.66

II.3 Resentment and Division

Within weeks of the campaign’s dramatic opening, however, Hitler soon found himself facing new and more worrying threats to the symbolic value of his prized Halsorden. The first such threat was to its ability to project the ethno-nationalism of the Volksgemeinschaft. In a spirit reminiscent of the Spanish Civil War (a parallel expressed in numerous newspaper articles),

Germany had embarked on its newest campaign as the senior partner in an alleged pan-European crusade against the barbaric forces of Slavic bolshevism.67 Among other things, this meant that

Hitler faced the uncomfortable task of revisiting the question of awarding German war decorations to foreigners, an issue that had come up the previous year when joined the war. Hitler had certainly not wanted to award his decorations to Italians, fearing that this would dilute their

66 In the Army, which traditionally had a worse record in this regard, junior officers had begun to rival the number of senior officers among Ritterkreuzträger. See BAMA RW 59/360, 33. 67 “Anregungen und Richtlinien für die Zeitschriftenarbeit gegen die Sowjet-Union,” Zeitschriften-Dienst, No.113 (June 27, 1941), 3-4; “Alkazar – 5 Jahre Später” Frankfurter Kurier, September 7, 1941. See Rolf-Dieter Müller, The Unknown Eastern Front. The Wehrmacht and Hitler’s Foreign Soldiers, trans. David Burnett (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2012), xxiv. 98

“Germanness” as symbols of an (ostensibly) racially and culturally homogenous society. However,

Mussolini’s government had announced their desire to award Italian decorations to Germans out of “soldierly comradeship” (Waffenbrüderschaft), and as a result he had been unable to refuse without causing a diplomatic offence.68

Decorating Italians had been one thing, but now his allies included Romanians, Finns,

Hungarians as well as volunteers from across Europe.69 These countries soon also stated their desire to honour German troops, and as a result, Hitler and the OKW were thus forced to re- examine the limits of their reciprocity.70 Not only were there racial and cultural differences to consider regarding the effects on the EK, but also on its military credentials given, as Rudolf

Schmundt complained to the Ordensgruppe, the poor quality of the “mentality, morale and fighting

[power],” of some allied troops.71 To mitigate the potential damage, the OKW established a prioritization system for more racially or culturally similar nations or, if necessary, those whose strategic contribution was deemed of greatest value. Above all, though, Schmundt emphasized that allied troops would be allowed the EK only if they perform special acts of bravery shoulder to shoulder with German troops.”72 Still, there could be more hope for the RK, for while foreigners could thus technically qualify the approval process lay under Hitler’s direct control.

68 Foreigners, though, would still have to meet stringent requirements for eligibility, they would have to be serving under German command. “Verleihung von deutschen Kriegsauszeichnungen an Wehrmachtsangehörige verbündeter und befreundeter Länder, 30.10.1940,” in Moll, Fűhrer Erlasse, 150, No.63; Absolon, Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich, IV. 270. 69 Hungary had already joined the conflict shortly before Barbarossa, taking part in the conquest of the Balkans in April-May 1941. However, not all of these countries formally joined the expedition. Slovakia, for example, did not join but did send an expeditionary force under German command. Spain, likewise, remained neutral but allowed volunteers to join what became the “Blue Division” which fought on the Eastern Front. 70 The German Eleventh Army Group had received 20,000 Romanian orders in thirty-two classes. BAMA RW 59/364, 193-194. Besprechung bei der Adj.W.b.F, 2. 1.9.1941. 71 BAMA RW 59/364, 197-198. Vortragsnotiz EK an Angehörige ausländischer Wehrmachtteile, n.d., ca. Sept.1941. 72 Ibid. 99

Even so, within weeks of Barbarossa the possibility of a foreign Ritterkreuzträger also became very real. A notation in an SD mood report in mid-July stated that in Slovakia, there was a growing expectation in public circles that a Slovak would soon earn this highly symbolic and prestigious decoration.73 Faced with such expectations (which would surely grow among other allies as well), Hitler seemed to have little choice. However, instead of opening the RK to any foreigner, the dictator resurrected a component of imperial Ordenspolitik that could now limit foreign distribution to the essentials, namely by making a small number of symbolic awardings to heads of state and senior military leaders. At the same time, this could strengthen personal ties to each since, as he would comment in May of 1942, “vain men […] could be led to a more or less pro-German attitude by decorating them with an impressive German order.”74 Thus, on August 8,

1941 he awarded the RK to Rumanian dictator Ion Gheorghe Antonescu, soon followed by Finnish

Field Marshal Carl Gustav Mannerheim, Hungarian dictator Admiral Nikolaus Horthy von

Nagybana and one of his senior commanders, Field-Marshal-Lieutenant Béla Miklos.75

Such acts were, of course, counter to the entire purpose of the RK, but Hitler consoled himself with the knowledge that, as his Air Force adjutant Nicolaus von Below noted, they had

73 Einzelmeldung – Lage in Slowakei. MadR, 7, 2543. No.203 (17.7.1941). 74 Picker, Tischgespräche, 302-303. No.118 (15.5.1942). Hitler had actually found himself in a similar predicament before the war in 1939 during his creation of the SK for the Legion Condor. However, unlike in 1940-1941 Hitler had elected not to extend this award to Spanish or Italian combatants in the Spanish Civil War, instead creating a military grade for the country’s civilian award for foreigners, the Meritorious Order of the German Eagle (“Verdienstorden vom Deutschen Adler,” VDA). Hitler could have done the same now, but it is probable that since the Kaiser’s government had extended the EK to the country’s allies in 1914-1918 it could be taken as an insult to withhold it. “Verordnung des Führers und Reichskanzlers über die Anderung der Satzung des Verdienstordens vom Deutschen Adler. Vom 20. April 1939,” RGBl I. 1939. No.82, 853; Doehle, Sammeldruck, 238-244. By the same token, Hitler’s plan for symbolically issuing a small number of RKs to foreign dignitaries was likely influenced by a report compiled by the Ordensgruppe that summer (to be discussed shortly), in which it noted how the PLM had been used in this way under the Kaiser as well. See BAMA RW 59/364, 184. OKH/P5 Abschrift 2b (12397/41) Heeresarchiv, Potsdam. Betr. Zahlen über PlM (Weltkrieg), 23.8.1941. 75 To add to their diplomatic worth, he ordered that each of these RKs be accompanied by a special gold-leafed Urkunde (presentation certificate) in similarly ornate portfolios, to be made, he said, “in the most beautiful form.” E.g. BAB R 601/224, Doehle (PräsKz) an Frau G. Troost, 3.9.1941. 100 been “a purely political gesture.”76 Nevertheless, they did need to be justified. Under orders the press made repeated efforts to emphasize that each had been genuinely in line with the RK’s regulations and the spirit of Frontkämpfer-ideology, such as Antonescu’s leadership of Rumanian forces in the capture of Bessarabia and Mannerheim’s generalship in the far north.77 These could not have been difficult to believe, moreover, since such justification was no worse than that which some German generals had already needed for the RK.

Yet, even though the SD soon reported a positive reception for such awardings among the

German populace, Hitler’s solution only worked for so long.78 With the onset of winter, the support of allied troops to maintain the momentum of advance and end the campaign became increasingly urgent. As a result, the dictator began to remove the safeguards placed upon the EK order, and by the beginning of 1942, moreover, he soon found himself awarding the RK to more foreigners, now including generals commanding armies or divisions supporting German forces (three in January; two in February and one in March).79 Once again, the RMVP did its best to put a positive spin on

76 Below, At Hitler’s Side, 111. Hitler did seem to harbour some genuine admiration for Antonescu and perhaps even gratitude at the latter’s leadership of Rumanian forces that summer, which likely made the unfortunate task of awarding him the RK easier. See Trevor-Roper, Table Talk, 40. No.30 (27-28.9.1941 and 9.10.1941); Müller, Hitler’s Foreign Soldiers, 46. Even so, Hitler’s willingness to decorate foreign personages also seems to have clear limits at this point. In mid-September, 1941, the Italian ambassador to Berlin, Dino Alfieri, privately entreated , the German Foreign Minister, to award the RK to Mussolini, citing the precedents set for Antonescu and Mannerheim. We do not know what became of this request, but if it did make it to the ears of the German dictator it would seem, evidently, that justifying this particular awarding in military terms was deemd to be a bridge too far. ADAP, D, Bd XIII, I, Dok.308 (12.9.1941), cited in Jürgen Förster, “Die Entscheidung der Dreierpakstaaten,” Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg.Vol.4 “ auf die Sowjetunion,“ ed. Horst Boog and Jürgen Förster, et al. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1983), 899. 77 BAB ZSg.109-24, 18. V.I. 202/41; BAMA RW 4/339 f.4, 208. WPr Lagebericht (6800/41 - 527/41), 8.9.1941. “Ritterkreuz fűr Feldmarschall Mannerheim,” VB, September 1, 1941; DW, 585 (20.11.1941). 78 MadR, 8, 2631. No.210 (11.8.1941); ibid., 8, 2761. No.220 (15.9.1941). 79 These included recipients no longer needing to be under German command. See BAMA RW 59/364, 193 (OKW 3601/41 from 18.9.1941 decree), 1.9.1941; BAMA RW 59/360, 33; “Verleihung des Eisernen Kreuzes an schwerverwundete ausländische Freiwillige und Angehörige verbündeter oder befreundeter Mächte (V.I. 56/599), 15.11.1941, Verfügungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben, III, 728. 101 the awardings, notifying the press that “foreign officers winning the Knight’s Cross […] deserve appropriate attention.”80

As much as the internationalization of the RK represented a symbolic setback for Hitler, his concerns were rapidly being overshadowed by growing problems within his own military that arose partly because of his increasing distance from the day-to-day of RK-administration. For some time, individual recommendations had become far too numerous for the dictator to vet personally. While he still managed the recently expanded higher grades himself, he had effectively become a rubber stamp for the original, relying on the various personnel departments to provide him with considered lists of worthy applicants to which he could affix his signature.81 As early as

July 1941, though, the dictator had become worried about the volume of names that were now totaling over one-hundred per month and climbing. Not only did this inflation obviously affect the exclusivity of the RK, but to Hitler it represented a threat to the perceived value of the EK’s lower grades as well. Consequently, to prevent them from becoming “Fettflecken” once again, he ordered the OKW to compile examples of heroic acts by men of all ranks that had earned them the EK2 or

EK1. Their testimonials, in turn, were to be used to produce a book project that could prove that neither medal was merely “a war memento decoration” (Kriegserinnerungs-dekoration).

Ritterkreuzträger, he said, were not to submit entries.82

80 By contrast, by official instruction German authorities censored any notification of foreign awards being given to their own troops except if dealing with a famous personality. See BAB ZSg.109-29, 77. V.I. 18/42, 21.1.1942; ibid., 109-32, 15. IwM Geh. 89/42, 7.4.1942. See further: “Rumänischer General mit dem Ritterkreuz ausgezeichnet,” VB, January 18, 1942; ibid., March 14, 1942: “Das Ritterkreuz für Muñoz Grande”; MadR, 10, 3575. No.273 (28.3- 3.4.1942). 81 Schulze-Wegener, Das Eiserne Kreuz, 146-147. 82 BAMA RH 53-18/86. Chef.H.u.B.d.E. Stab.Ic. (4689/41). Betr. Buchplanung, 3.7.1941. The book Hitler ordered, entitled “How we won our Iron ” (Wie wir unser Eisernen Kreuze erwarben), was in fact simply a new version of several identically titled books from the EK’s former periods of institution. E.g. see Friedrich Freiherr von Dincklage-Campe’s books: Wie wir unser Eisern Kreuz erwarben [sic]. Nach persönlichen Berichten bearbeitet [sic] (Berlin-Leipzig: Deutsches Verlagshaus Bong & Co., 1900) and Wie wir unser Eisern Kreuz erwarben. Nach persönlichen Berichten von Inhabern des Eisernen Kreuzes (Berlin-Leipzig: Deutsches Verlagshaus Bong & Co., 102

Hitler’s fears about his EK repeating the fate of the Kaiser’s at this juncture, though, were misplaced. Over the summer the Army’s Ordensgruppe conducted a statistical analysis of award distribution since 1939 and compared it with imperial records from the Army’s archive in Potsdam.

Their findings, subsequently submitted in a report to Hitler via Rudolf Schmundt, demonstrated that the current state of inflation was not in danger of repeating earlier failures. During the former conflict, 40 percent of all soldiers had received decorations, compared to only 20 percent of the

Wehrmacht. As for the EK, the ratio between the more prestigious EK1 and EK2 currently stood at 1:84, which was significantly better than the previous 1:60. The RK, it acknowledged, did seem like it was inflating too quickly. In two years Ritterkreuzträger had already surpassed the number of PLM holders from the four years of the First World War by over 15 percent. Yet as the

Ordensgruppe hastened to point out, since the “Blue Max” had been available only to officers and thus having a ratio of one PLM to every seventy-seven eligible recipients; the more egalitarian

RK, by contrast, currently had the far wider frequency of 1:8350.83

Even if inflation was not the problem, though, there were still dark clouds forming, particularly within the Army. For one thing, through his conduit Schmundt Hitler could now see that the antipathy between his policies and rear-echelon personnel (especially staff officers) was still very much alive and more intense than ever. For such men, having to settle for the inferior

KVK while increasing numbers of combat troops reaped the prestige of the EK or RK was an insult, one likely made worse by the fact that even foreigners could now do what they could not.84

Following the example of Franz Halder, increasing complaints about the injustice of this arrangement soon rose to the extent that in a correspondence to the Ordensgruppe in September

1916). Within weeks, moreover, hundreds of handwritten or typed testimonials had been collected from EK2 or EK1 holders, many of which can be found in BAMA RH 53-18/86. 83 BAMA RW 59/364, 184. 84 E.g. Jacobsen, Halder KTB III, 440 (4.6.1941). 103

Schmundt confessed that the relationship between the Führer’s headquarters (Führerhauptquartier,

FHQ) and Army staff officers was only “limping” along. The Führer, he said, remained hopeful that he could perhaps find some unique way to compensate them for the perceived slight after the end of the campaign, but in the meantime, he refused to weaken his stance or resolve.85 More important, there were bigger problems.

Despite Hitler’s efforts to forge the RK into a symbol of Frontkämpfer-ideology, the

Army’s front-line troops were also growing incensed by the patterns within RK distribution.

According to a series of reports and letters collected by the Ordensgruppe, for increasing numbers of combat officers and men these patterns were painting a very distressing picture regarding the distribution not only of this prestigious medal, but thereby also the prestige of their service as a whole compared to the other Wehrmacht branches. Counting the number of Halsorden for each service had become a kind of litmus test to determine the degree to which the state recognized their unique forms of courage and sacrifice, and many Army Frontkämpfer did not like what they saw. To be sure, their service received more RKs than any other, and the infantry most of all. Yet what truly mattered was proportionality.

The smaller services, particularly the Air Force, seemed to receive RKs at a rate disproportionate to their size and, infantrymen believed, to the quality of their contribution to the war effort. What’s more, this trend became more obvious the higher one ventured up the new higher grades of the RK. While in July Hitler had ordered for the number of Eichenlaubträger from the Army to be increased, as of September 1 there were only seven among the Wehrmacht’s thirty- four, and furthermore all seven wore a general or field marshal’s epaulettes.86 The much smaller

85 BAMA RW 59/364, 193; ibid., 167. OKH/P5. Fernmündliches Gespräch mit Schmundt, 14.9.1941; ibid., 191-192. OKH. B.Keitel an Schmundt. Betr. Ordensangelegenheiten, 3.9.1941. 86 BAMA RW 59/364, 195. 104

Navy, by contrast, possessed an equal percentage of the total while the similarly sized Air Force had twenty Eichenlaubträger (nearly 60 percent). Even more unjust, the latter service also included all of the recipients of the newest grades of the RK Hitler had recently created: five

“Schwerterträger” and one “Brillantenträger.”87

These complaints were quite justified in different ways. As in the First World War, both smaller services possessed sub-groups whose military roles allowed them to quantify and systematize their heroism, and each had developed scoring systems to facilitate the swift receipt of high decorations. In the Navy, this was once again U-boat commanders. Since 1940, these junior officers88 had had the upper hand in the and a growing number of “aces” from their ranks amassed considerable totals of shipping tonnage sunk. The OKM had thus developed a system for the grades of the EK: after 50,000 tons a U-boat commander received the

EK1, and after 100,000 the coveted RK.89 Similarly, the air battles over France and then Britain in

1940 had produced a number of fighter pilots whose aerial victories counted towards a similar system: five enemy planes downed meant the EK1 and twenty the RK.90 Such was the frequency of RK awardings within these groups, that they had adopted a more casual and competitive attitude towards it. By 1941, it had become common for ace submariners and pilots race each other to the

“tin necktie,’ a cavalier form of order hunting known as “Halsschmerzen” (a “sore throat” whose only remedy was the swift application of a Halsorden).91

87 BAB R 601/1332 f.1, 120-144. PräsKz Statistics, July-September 1941. 88 U-boats were most often commanded by Lt. Commanders (Kapitänleutnant, the equivalent of Army captains). 89 Ironically, the amount chosen for this threshold had been proposed by Erich Raeder in January of 1940 when he had tried to prevent such men from joining him among the ranks of Ritterkreuzträger. For a more detailed discussion of these systems and their evolution during the war, see Vause Wolf, 68-71; Schulze-Wegener, Das Eiserne Kreuz, 153. 90 These latter totals, moreover, had already had to be raised after pilots rapidly gained the requisite numbers against the woefully outclassed Soviet Air Force. 91 Sometimes “Halsweh,” or “Halskrankheit.” Mention of this unique practice, moreover, has since become a fixture in literature about these groups and their role within the culture of the Wehrmacht. See, for example, Spick, Aces of 105

The ability of these groups to quantify their success was also the reason why most

Eichenlaub-, Schwerter- and Brillantenträger also came from their ranks. On one hand, since it had ostensibly been created to be the reward of men who deserved a second RK because of continued exemplary service, the RK-E was the obvious reward for those pilots or submariners who soon began to double the kill or tonnage totals required for the former. Furthermore (as discussed further in later chapters), their unique benefit of being able to showcase the technical superiority of the

Wehrmacht made their elevation highly beneficial for the purposes of war propaganda. Most important, though, both groups were also ideal candidates to fulfill the ideological function of the

Eichenlaubträger: they were junior combat officers who combined decisiveness in command with personal bravery to achieve demonstrably high contributions to victory. It was therefore understandable that when Hitler had recently selected recipients for the new RK-ES and RK-ESB, he chose the country’s best known and respected fighter pilots, and Werner

Mölders, choices that were then justified by approval from the public.92

Within the Army, though, this disproportionality amounted to undue favouritism for the smaller services and a neglect of their own unique contribution. Rudolf Schmundt and General

Bodewin Keitel (head of the Army Personnel Department, Heerespersonalamt, HPA) received complaints, including from senior Army commanders on behalf of their men, that the merit of the ordinary Landser was “in no way appreciated.”93 Junior infantry officers or NCOs with the EK1 who led their men successfully and effectively, one letter read, were so seldom “blessed by the

the Reich, 120-124; , 200 Luftsiege in 13 Monaten. Nacherzählt von Berthold K. Jochim (Rastatt: Erich Pabel Verlag, 1970), 10, 87; Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, 283; Robertson, Golden Horseshoe, 114. 92 E.g. MadR, 7, 2548. No.204 (21.7.1941). 93 This quote came from a letter submitted to Keitel by the commander of the forty-fourth Army Corps, General Friedrich Koch, who claimed to speak for a number of other senior officers. The letter was evidently deemed concise and clear enough that it was attached as a summary of grievances to later reports. See BAMA RW 59/365, 12. Koch (XXXXIV Armeekorps) an B. Keitel, 20.8.1941. 106

‘gods of war’,” to have the opportunity for an independent, battle-changing decision, whereas fighter pilots could “zoom up” to twenty kills against “technically inferior opponents” and so earn the RK.94 Furthermore, current distribution trends ignored the “spiritual and physical perspectives” of the unique sacrifice of Frontkämpfer who had a “tougher war” both in terms of everyday hardship and responsibility. Infantry officers were responsible not just for themselves or a small aircrew but dozens and hundreds of men along with their equipment, provisions and all the logistical flotsam of war. “Twenty-five days on the Eastern Front,” they said, were “just as brave” as twenty-five kills in the air.95 As one complainant concluded his letter, the feelings of inequality that had arisen as a result were creating bad blood between the services, and the longer the campaign in the east continued the more fatigue would set in among front-line troops. Thus, there was a need to be more liberal with the RK and other decorations within the Army, not more conservative.96

Finally, according to the Ordensgruppe, what exacerbated these feelings was the continued lack of a respectable “interim order” between the RK and the EK1 to provide at least some higher recognition. Hitler had still not delivered on his promise for such an award, and most Frontkämpfer rejected the EB created in its place. This sentiment has been recorded by scholars including

Christoph Rass, who has noted how, to ordinary soldiers, the paper EB certificate could be tucked into a drawer and forgotten, making it an inferior form of recognition to medals that would be on constant, open display.97 In another letter sent to the Ordensgruppe, for example, a disgruntled

94 Ibid. 95 Reports and discussion within the HPA’s Ordensgruppe and in communication with Schmundt at FHQ on this growing discontent can be found in BAMA RW 59/364, 193; ibid., 168. Chef HPA. Kurze Zusammenstellung über Ordensfragen zu Beginn des 3. Kriegsjahres, 11.9.1941; ibid., 166. HPA. Vortragsnotiz. Antwort Schmundt auf Brief Amtschef, 20.9.1941. 96 BAMA RW 59/365, 12. 97 Rass, Menschenmaterial, 252. See also Römer, Kameraden, chap.4 (n.b. loc. 2110 of 11262), Kindle. 107 lieutenant from the 134th infantry division derided the certificate as evidence of the high command’s “incorrect handling of the Army in the ‘Ordensfrage’ [sic] vis-á-vis the other

Wehrmacht branches.”98 He added that his viewed this “honour” as a poor attempt at a consolation for infantry Frontkämpfer who, despite consistent bravery and sacrifice, were being excluded from consideration for the RK. Moreover, he warned that if this problem were not remedied forthwith, it would result in an “indirect decomposition of fighting strength.”99

In early September, the Ordensgruppe submitted a formal report regarding the growth of these phaleristic trends within the Army, and specifically about the problems with the EK order. It included letters of complaint like those mentioned above as well as recommendations for possible solutions. First, the report mentioned that Frontkämpfer were indeed right about the disproportionality in RK awardings to more technologically involved groups and that consequently the High Command (i.e. Hitler) should consider revising the regulations surrounding the EK order.

Specifically, they advised changing or removing the problematic “battle-deciding act” proviso in favour of a more flexible view of “leadership merit” that could allow more access for men of lower rank who could not quantify their success.100 Likewise, the authors urged the creation of the promised interim order forthwith.101 Above all, though, the Ordensgruppe report diagnosed the current discord surrounding the EK order as a symptom of a far more fundamental problem with the design of this award, and, indirectly, with the regime’s Ordenspolitik more broadly.

98 BAMA RW 59/363, 321. OKH P.5 Auszugsweise Abschrift. 134 Inf.Div. 1 Stab, 18.2.1942. 99 Ibid. 100 For example, they recommended including new categories such as exemplary conduct in defence for men who had repeatedly shown themselves to be “shining examples” in such circumstances. See BAMA RW 49/364, 168. Chef HPA. H.Qu.H. 101 Ibid.; BAMA RW 59/364, 193-194. 108

It said that “we have spoiled our soldiers with different medals since the bloodless entry into Austria [in 1938],” and the result had been a commensurate culture of expectation, rivalry and covetousness. What’s more, the authors suggested that within the Army the streamlined design of the phaleristic system itself had served to channel this culture. Commanders desirous of recognizing their subordinates with medals and decorations possessed only a limited number of ways in which to do so. Using their research from Potsdam, the Army’s phaleristic experts explained that under the monarchy, there had been any number of medals that soldiers of any rank could earn from the various states and royal houses.102 A successful general could receive the Blue

Max, the lieutenant the Hohenzollern House Order and the NCO or enlisted man the Golden

Military Merit Medal – with each honoured within an established and accepted framework of expectation. Now, however, because of Hitler’s own resolute emphasis on the EK order as the pre- eminent symbol of uniqueness from that society, they all competed for the same award, creating bottlenecks beneath each successive grade. What’s more, Hitler’s creation of the KVK had not gone far enough and lacked the suitable “range” to protect the EK from inflation and devaluation.103

Extant sources do not record the dictator’s reaction to the Ordensgruppe’s damning commentary. However, there is some clue found within the running correspondence between the latter and Rudolf Schmundt. When pressed about the reception of the report, Schmundt replied that he was reluctant to give any answers in writing and stated cryptically that although he was personally in agreement with it, there would be “difficulties” in implementing any “rash solutions.”104 Such allusions aside, though, it is clear that for Hitler the internecine strife and

102 BAMA RW 59/364, 168. 103 At the time, and despite its short craze in late 1940, only 5.1 percent of the Army possessed the KVK2. As we shall see, though, this would soon change. Ibid. 104 BANA RW 59/364, 191. 109 perception of order hunting within the Wehrmacht (whether accurate or not) could have disastrous consequences to the utility of the EK order, and the RK specifically, if allowed to continue unchallenged or unchecked; it required immediate and decisive countermeasures. As Schmundt added in one conversation, though, the dictator hoped that it was not coming too late.

Instead of altering the EK order, however, his solution was to expand the system of ‘safety valves’ that could hopefully ease the bottleneck of expectation and enthusiasm. First, to improve its “range,” Hitler did as the Ordensgruppe recommended regarding the KVK, not only increasing its distribution within the Army compared to the other services but also promising to create several additional grades above the RKVK to parallel those for the RK.105 Even more significant, by mid-

September he finally approved the long-awaited interim order. Instead of Oak Leaves to the EK1, though, it would take the form of an ornate decorative star called the “German Cross” (Deutsches

Kreuz, DK). While not technically a part of the EK order, therefore, this de-facto grade could still fill the perceived recognition gap between the EK1 and RK while at the same time providing a further means to minimize the impact of the still-powerful prestige hierarchy. Reflecting his aborted plans for the RK-E from earlier that summer, the DK would have both a silver and golden version (DK-S and DK-G), rewarding either repeated demonstrations of leadership-merit or bravery which did not qualify for the RK. Awardings were also to follow a “strict scale,” Hitler said, and the DK-S in particular was to be restricted to commanders and their primary aides only, without consideration to rank, office or length of service.106

105 BAMA RW 59/364, 167. Alongside this increase, there were also changes to the deportment rules and regulations regarding the possession of the KVK. Since mid-August Hitler had agreed to ease some of the restrictions on possessing both the EK and KVK. See BAMA RW 3/15. OKW WZIII an HPA, MPA, LPA, und PräsKz. Betr. Weitertragen des Kriegsverdienstkreuzes bei späteres Verleihung des Eisernen Kreuzes, 18.8.1941. 106 BAMA RW 59/364, 166, 167; “Verordnung über die Stiftung des Deutschen Kreuzes. Vom 28. September 1941,” RGBl I. 1941. No.111, 593. See further Hütte, “Eisernen Kreuzes,” 122-123. Furthermore, although Hitler did not 110

Unfortunately for the dictator, though, these measures failed to stem the flow of complaints from the Army, nor indeed the problems that had caused them. Word soon reached the FHQ, for instance, that field commanders were already ignoring the guidelines for the new DK. At the same time, though the first thirty-eight of these awards had all gone to Army men, the Ordensgruppe noted how it was already developing a reputation within this branch as but another poor consolation prize for the RK; a wearable version of the EB that marked recipients as belonging “in the second row.”107 As a result, by the end of October 1941 the countermeasures against the denigration of the EK and RK became more and more drastic, including limiting the phaleristic propaganda that helped to fuel the Wehrmacht’s problems with order hunting and

Halsschmerzen.108

Even so, by November the dictator reached a low point. Communication at this time between Rudolf Schmundt and Hitler’s Army Adjutant, Gerhard Engel, speaks to his even having contemplated whether it would not be better to simply discontinue the awarding of war decorations as a whole, especially the RK and RK-E, at least until after the campaign in the east concluded.109

Such plans, though, never came to fruition; they would, after all, have demonstrated his own misjudgment and mismanagement. Instead, Hitler retreated into bitter resignation and daydreams,

abolish the despised EB, he did introduce a new version bearing his own signature instead of the Army’s Chief, Werner von Brauchitsch. See Lumsden, Medals and Decorations, 80. 107 Given its role in rewarding bravery and combat leadership like the EK (DK-G) and noncombat merit like the KVK- S (DK-S), contemporary sources reveal that there was some confusion both within the Wehrmacht and among the public about the proper place of this new order within the phaleristic system and its intended value. See BAMA RW 59/364, 145. Vortragsnotiz. Betr. Verleihung des Deutsches Kreuz in Gold an Truppenführer für vielfache, aussergewöhnliche Verdienste um die Truppenführung, 29.11.1941; BAB ZSg.109-31, 51. V.I. 66/42, III. 13.3.1942. 108 In October, for instance, he issued a ban on notifications about war decorations in the press and then did the same for any public congratulations for awardings of his beloved RK in November. BAB NS 18/488, 751. Notiz für Tiessler. Betr. Verbot der Veröffentlichungen von Kriegsauszeichnungen (II g Bd 2300/9/70). 22.10.1941; ibid., 750 (4). Tiessler an Goebbels. Betr. Keine Veröffentlichung von Glückwünschen bei Verleihung des Ritterkreuzes in der Presse, 5.11.1941; BAB NS 6/335. NSDAP Rundschreiben Bormann (138/41). Betr. Keine Veröffentlichung von Glückwünschen bei Verleihung des Ritterkreuzes in der Presse, 1.11.1941. 109 BAMA RW 59/364, 150, 162. Schmundt an Engel (FHQ), 3.11.1941. 111 treating one group of dinner guests in mid-November to a diatribe on his frustrations with the direction of Wehrmacht phaleristics. He ranted about how his vision for an integrative, exclusive and egalitarian EK order had been betrayed by greed, pettiness and anachronistic military hierarchies that he had been unable to break. Indeed, there were only a handful of awards, he said, that still had “any real value” because of their immunity to such problems, the best example being the “Mother’s Cross” (Mutterkreuz) for childbearing.110

Hitler dreamed aloud of the chance to start over, to create a new decoration that would be similarly impervious and become the chief decoration of the Nazi state. The “Order of the Party,” as he called it, would replace the Blood Order (BO) as the NSDAP’s highest honour; a kind of political RK.111 It would be based, he said, on “the orders of chivalry of the middle-ages,” complete with an electoral body directly under himself that would select new members.112 More important, reflective of his recent experience he specified that it would be issued in very small numbers and be unambiguous in its purpose and qualifications. It would be awarded only to those whose contributions to the Party and people were so great as to be unquestionably distinct and thus represent “incomparable claims to the nation’s gratitude.” As he would clarify over a subsequent dinner several months later, moreover, in his dream this award was to be available only to

Germans, thus not allowing foreigners or diplomatic niceties to dilute its racial symbolism.113

110 Trevor-Roper, Table Talk, 92-93. No.64 (10-11.11.1941). 111 There was no formal order or provision stating this transition, but as Robin Lumsden points out there were no awardings of the Blutorden past this point. Lumsden also argues that designs for a new higher series of Party awards had been proposed by Hitler’s former deputy Rudolf Hess in 1939 but were never taken further (that is until Hitler evidently felt the need in November 1941). Hess’s proposal had encompassed several grades, much like the EK. Lumsden, Medals and Decorations, 105-106. 112 Trevor-Roper, Table Talk, 92-93. No.64. 113 Picker, Tischgespräche, 302-303. No.118 (15.5.1942). 112

II.4 Fighting the Tide

The second half of 1941, in short, had been an important wake-up call for Hitler regarding the flaws within his phaleristics system and its potential ideological impact. Alongside inflation and internationalization, it had showed how the practical realities of modern warfare and the vestigial influence of imperial phaleristic culture made it very difficult to illustrate thata Nazi military cared more about egalitarianism and equity in recognition than had its predecessors.

Instead, the distribution of the RK was rapidly becoming a source of disunity, hostility against the authorities and evidence of their failure to supplant the traditional class-based value system.

Nevertheless, following his nadir in November, Hitler resolved to struggle on. With the failure of the Wehrmacht to capture Moscow (Operation Typhoon) and the onset of war with the United

States as of December 11, 1941, there would surely be even greater need for medals to act as reliable sources of symbolic capital in the years to come. Thus, during the first half of the following year, while the Wehrmacht martialed to regain the initiative, the dictator oversaw an effort to “fix” the phaleristic system, and thereby reinforce the purity and effectiveness of its most ideologically important symbols.

Beginning early in 1942, Rudolf Schmundt communicated the need for reform and reorganization among the Army’s phaleristic administration. In February he issued a memorandum to the Ordensgruppe reinforcing the “foundations for the distribution of orders,” in which he emphasized the need for the RK not to be seen as an award for senior officers. Likewise, he particularly condemned the order hunting that occurred among this group, and that they sometimes withheld their recommendations in order not to have a subordinate decorated before them. There had to be a level playing field when it came to both submitting and adjudicating

113 recommendations.114 In March, moreover, the Ordensgruppe itself received a new commanding officer in the form of Bernd von Doering, to “correspond with a general wish [that] the

Orders Group be led by a Knight’s Cross holder.”115 Finally, in May the OKH released a new

“guide” for all Army commands to Wehrmacht awards, outlining their proper use and conditions for their recommendations. Of the RK, it stressed for the umpteenth time that its primary significance was to be an award for bravery in combat, and thus once more highlighted possible alternative forms for recognizing eligible men.116

For his part, meanwhile, Hitler continued to heed the advice given by the Ordensgruppe the previous year by addressing the problematic narrowness of the Wehrmacht’s forms of phaleristic recognition. In the new year, he once more tried to extend the reach of the safety valves within the system that could not only communicate to Frontkämpfer the authorities’ earnest desire to recognize their unique experience, but also further preserve the EK from inflation and devaluation. He began by widening the eligibility of existing service badges and lesser awards to encompass more activities and groups within the combat zone (ironically like the Kaiser’s actions in 1914 to maximize the impact of the EK). In addition, though, it involved creating a new series of awards such as a special badge for the single-handed destruction of enemy tanks (the Tank

Destruction Badge) as well as a commemorative medal for the recent winter campaign (the Eastern

Medal) which he allowed soldiers to design themselves and which became known mockingly as

114 114 BAMA RW 59/364, 144 . OKH/P5. Vortragsnotiz: Unterredungen mit Gen.Schmundt und Obstlt v.Gyldenfelt, am 2.1.1942; ibid., 140. Anruf Gen. Schmundt am 16.1.42 über Grundsätze für Ordensverleihungen in jetzigen Zeit, n.d.; Trevor-Roper, Table Talk, 92-93. No.64. The problem is also mentioned Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, 280-281. 115 BAMA RW 59/360, 1. 116 It is unclear, though, whether the OKH undertook to create the aforementioned guide on its own initiative or on orders from Hitler/Schmundt. See BAMA N 849. Nachlass Heinrichs. Keitel. OKH/PZ V/Gen.zbV/ H.Wes.Abt (6670/42), 14.5.1942. 114 the “Gefrierfleishorden” (Frozen Meat Order).117 To these awards, moreover, were soon added a whole series of combat badges, commemorative medals, cuff titles and arm shields symbolizing participation in noteworthy battles or campaigns.118

By the summer of 1942, however, shortly before the Wehrmacht launched a fresh offensive on the Eastern Front codenamed “Operation Blue,” the Ordensgruppe and its newly appointed commander, Doering, submitted a follow-up report to that produced the previous fall. Reflecting the results of another comparative analysis of award distribution statistics, the report affirmed in hard facts the nature of the problem that had been building over the past year within the Army regarding the RK. The distribution of this medal, it said, remained worryingly skewed, chiefly because of the issue of success-quantification that produced disproportionality. Moreover, this problem was no longer just an issue between the services. Within the Army too, Ritterkreuzträger- numbers were now leaning towards tank, anti-tank or assault gun commanders who could similarly count their “kills” to demonstrate their success.119 At the same time, Doering provided evidence for the breakdown of awardings by rank to demonstrate the depth of the imbalance between officers and enlisted men throughout the Army (sometimes as high as 11:1 in particular branches, and especially true of the higher grades like the RK-E). Without sufficient authority, he wrote, enlisted men and NCOs were still struggling against the proviso of a “battle deciding act” and finding it difficult to find “the opportunity for great success on behalf of the whole.”120

117 The award was officially called the Winter-Battle in the East Medal (Winterschlacht im Osten Medaille or Ostmedaille). See Doehle Sammeldruck, 129-130, 183; Kleitmann, Auszeichnung, 83-84, 118. 118 Lumsden, Medals and Decorations, 41-45. 119 BAMA RW 59/364, 76. Ordens.Ref.Va/3 – Tätigkeitsbericht, 1.11.1941-31.5.1942. Betr. Vergleichzahlen der hohen Tapferkeitsauszeichnungen, 26.6.1942. Though he does not provide a precise date, the famous Panzer-General Heinz Guderian noted this same problem of disparity in RK preference due to mechanization in his memoirs. He mentions having had a conversation with Hitler in 1942 in which they, along with Rudolf Schmundt and others, argued over the ability of certain groups to win this prestigious medal. See Guderian, Panzer Leader, trans. Constantine Fitzgibbon (New York: De Capo, 1996), 298. 120 BAMA RW 59/364, 76. 115

In short, this new report stood as official confirmation that the infantryman, i.e. those who fought and suffered together in the trenches like the idealized Frontkämpfer of 1914-1918 and whose cause the Party had long championed, had become (per capita) the group least recognized by the RK. Having belonged to this branch, moreover, it represented a direct affront to the dictator himself. As demonstrated in Chapter I, he had built his political career as a personification of the humble, decorated, Frontkämpfer, and it was an experience he had long lorded over career officers of the old school like Franz Halder.121 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that shortly after this report from the Ordensgruppe the RMVP warned the German press not to publish complete lists of

Halsorden recipients, specifically the RK-E; “statistical surveys” of all of the highest orders, it said, “are not desired.”122 More important, after the first few months of Operation Blue, when RK awardings rose steeply once again, Hitler again began to take a more active role in the management of the RK and its symbolic reputation.

In September 1942, for example, he pointedly reminded the German people of the RK’s chief symbolic role in one of his last public speeches at the Berlin Sportpalast for the Winter Relief

Fund (Kriegswinterhilfswerk, KWHW). When “you read that so and so has received the Knight’s

Cross,” he declared, it should call to mind the near inconceivable heroism of the German soldier.

In his own reviewing of the recommendation lists for this medal, he continued, one saw a cross- section of German society, a reflection of the meritocracy that had been forged in the trenches of

1914-1918 and was now protected by himself and the Party: “You see the common man next to the private first class, the non-commissioned officer, alongside the sergeant-major, with the lieutenant and with the general.” Such a pattern of distribution, he declared, was proof that the old

121 E.g. Engel and Kotze, Army Adjutant, 131 (4.9.1942); Guderian, Panzer Leader, 378. 122 BAB ZSg.109-35, 69. V.I. III IwM., Juli 1942. 116 social structures had gone, replaced by a society “established by blood,” in which “there is only one standard of value: the standard of the brave, valiant, loyal man, the determined fighter, the daring man who is fit to be a leader of his Volk.”123

Shortly thereafter on November 25, he personally ordered the creation of another, even more overtly symbolic safety-valve decoration to recognize the specific sacrifices of infantrymen like himself and that would, in context, to offset some of the hypocrisy of their perceived exclusion from the RK. The Close Combat Clasp (Nahkampfspange, NKS), worn uniquely above the left breast pocket, denoted the number of days spent in close-combat (Bronze: fifteen; Silver: thirty;

Gold: fifty). Hitler dictated that it could only be awarded to front-line troops under arms and also insisted that this provision be strictly enforced by commanders and personnel departments.124 It was, in other words, to be a kind of special infantry order alongside the EK and, as Rudolf

Schmundt (now appointed head of the HPA) noted in his war diary, the former dispatch-runner stated his desire that the new award was to become the ultimate decoration for infantrymen beneath the RK. As such he ordered that like the latter its highest-grade (i.e. the Gold, NKS-G) was to be dependant on his personal approval.125

123 In this section of the speech, Hitler also made special note to say that “for all the homeland is doing,” the sacrifice of Frontkämpfer – *even those of allied nations* - was still of superior quality of contribution and thus deserving of the RK. Domarus, Speeches and Proclamations. Volume 4, 2680-2682. 124 Rudolf Absolon, Wehrgesetz und Wehrdienst 1935-1945. Das Personalwesen in der Wehrmacht (Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt Verlag, 1960), 270. 125 See “Stiftung der Nahkampfspange,” in Tätigkeitsbericht des Chefs des Heerespersonalamtes General der Infanterie Rudolf Schmundt. Fortgeführt von Gen.d.Inf. . 1.10.1942 – 29.10.1944, eds. Dermot Bradley and Richard Schulze-Kossens (Ornasbrück: Biblio Verlag. 1984), 23-24 (25.11.1943). The PräsKz had in fact received a prototype of a diamond version of the DK less than a month before. It is possible that this decoration had been intended to fulfill the role now played by the NKS but had proven too expensive or ornate. Only a month before, the OKW had authorized a cloth version of the former since its large decorative face proved susceptible to damage in combat. See “Deutsches Kreuz in Gold. Zentr. Abt.III.b (7664/42), 5.9.1942,” in LVBl 1. 1942. No.8, 865. No.26.1598; Lumsden, Medals and Decorations, 40; Kleitmann, Auszeichnungen, 49-50. 117

Most important, though, the nation’s self-appointed chief infantryman had also begun to make concerted demands of his Wehrmacht leadership that he see more RK recommendations for the disadvantaged within the Army. In October, Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels wrote in his diary after a meeting with Hitler how he had fumed that there were “too few Knight’s Crosses for the Army,” and that he was working to see that “these injustices are eliminated.”126 By

December, these efforts had resulted in a secret and pointed memorandum from Schmundt (via

Doering and the Ordensgruppe) to all army group and army commands. Attaching a summary of comparative statistics from the Navy and Air Force, it stated that the Army’s total of RKs and other bravery awards did not match the great accomplishments of its fighting men.127

The Army’s fifty-four Eichenlaubträger (of whom 75 percent were generals and 100 percent officers) were only double those of the much smaller Navy and twenty-two less than the

Air Force (most of whom were junior officers). Worse, it had only one Schwerterträger (a general) compared to the Navy’s three and Air Force’s sixteen, the latter having all five Brillantenträger as well.128 As a result, Schmundt argued on Hitler’s behalf for an effective breakup of the elitism that had come to dominate the Army’s brotherhood of highly decorated personnel in favour of a more inclusive one. He demanded that commanders make an effort to submit more recommendations for the RK, RK-E and even the RK-ES among lower ranks.129

126 GTb II.6, 66 (4.10.1942). See also David M. Glantz, ed. Hitler and His Generals. Military Conferences 1942-1945 (New York: Enigma Books, 2003), 37 (12.12.1942). 127 BAMA RH 4/266, 3. Geh. Abschrift. Chef.HPA. Betr. Vorschläge zum Ritterkreuz und Berichte über Ritterkreuzträger, 10.12.1942. 128 Ibid., Anlage. Ritterkreuz Verleihungen. Stand 30.11.1942. 129 Ibid. Even so, Schmundt made sure to add that all recommendations were to be in strict alignment with official instructions and regulations. The deeds of the nominee were all that mattered, rather than “bombastic explanations and the exposition of a military resume.” BAMA RH 4/266, 3. See also BAMA RW 59/360, 130. OKH/P5 – Tätigkeitsbericht, No.19/42. Betr. Ritterkreuz – Befehl Veränderungen. 10.12.1942; ibid., 167. OKH/P5. Tätigkeitsbericht. Befehle Veränderungen, 8.3.1943. 118

In reality, however, such measures were simply coming too late to curb the devolution not only of the RK, but of the entire phaleristic system. Even before the onset of Operation Blue in

July these efforts had already begun to be undermined by the growing need to sacrifice such long- term ideological capital in award distribution for short-term military expediency. First and foremost was the fact that, as in 1914-1918, with the tide of the war turning steadily against the

Wehrmacht on all fronts command authorities were becoming increasingly dependant upon orders and decorations to raise morale and incentivize beleaguered troops. On one hand, Hitler’s new safety-valve awards did provide some recourse to commanders in distributing recognition, but even so there was no question that the EK order remained the most coveted medal of all, and thereby the most effective incentive. As a result, not only did RK awardings soon reach a new wartime high of over 150 per month by the fall of 1942, but this period also saw the problems identified in 1941 only become further entrenched and Hitler’s efforts to reverse them sapped of any effectiveness.

To begin, incentivization only worsened the culture of order hunting that the Ordensgruppe had identified as an underlying issue. Several recent studies of the internal culture of units on the

Eastern Front have documented how the increased distribution of the EK made covetousness and competition among front-line and rear-echelon troops a defining aspect of phaleristic culture.

Indeed, some would even request to be sent to the east because of the higher chance of winning the award.130 At the same time, as in 1940 administrators had to contend with ever more cases in which officers and men proved willing to take dishonest routes to “the cross,” whether by

130 Rass, Menschenmaterial, 251-255, 256-257. This hunger for the EK among officers in particular was captured by Willi Heinrich in the character of Captain Stranksy in his 1957 novel Das geduldige Fleisch (The Willing Flesh). Himself a former Frontkämpfer, Heinrich made Stransky’s all-encompassing hunt for the Iron Cross such a theme in the novel, that when it was translated for U.S. publication in 1957 it was retitled , a name it kept in its 1977 film adaptation by . See further: Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, 282-284; Picker, Tischgespräche, 84-85. Hartmann, Ostkrieg, 196-198. 119 recommending themselves or forging medals to wear when on leave back home.131 With the creation of a growing number of special benefits and privileges for Ritterkreuzträger, meanwhile, along with a vastly increased amount of time spent away from the front lines doing propaganda work (discussed in subsequent chapters), “Halsschmerzen” was growing into an ever more contagious illness among holders of the EK1, especially officers.132

As in 1940 and 1941, the intensification of the war had resulted in another surge of junior officers, NCOs and enlisted men receiving the RK. However, order hunting among Army officers ensured that this progress only marginally helped with the RK’s symbolism of a break with the traditional recognition hierarchy. Generals and field marshals still represented a disproportionate percentage among RK and especially RK-E recipients, and during the middle-war years majors and colonels commanding regiments and were growing in proportionality as well thanks to the “command merit clause.”133 More important, since such awards were often justified through the implied recognition of their units as a whole (contrary to Hitler’s express wishes), they only added to the perception of elitism among ordinary Frontkämpfer, who could see that although celebrated as “one for all” recognition, the one in question was “always a chief and the superior.”134

Furthermore, while it was certainly a point of pride to have one’s unit so recognized (even symbolically), common soldiers also came to resent how their officers’ Halsschmerzen often

131 E.g. BAMA RW 59/365, 20. No.38 HPA. Bez. Sammeldruck Orden und Ehrenzeichen – Neudruck. Abschnitt I.s.12. Bt., 1.7.1943. 132 Schulze-Wegener, Das Eiserne Kreuz, 150. 133 Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, 280-281. 134 Buchmann, Soldatenalltag, 27-29. See also Römer, Kameraden, chap.4 (n.b. loc. 2255 of 11262), Kindle; Florian Berger and Christian Habisohn, Max Zastrow. Der mit dem Ritterkreuz (Vienna: Selbstverlag Florian Berger, 2003), 25. 120 resulted in their own lives being endangered on a so-called “Ritterkreuz-Auftrag” (Knight’s Cross

Mission).135

By February 1943, in fact, such order hunting prompted the newly-expanded

“Ordensabteilung” (Orders Department)136 to demand, like Rudolf Schmundt the year before, that field commanders refrain from thinking that higher decorations were theirs by right. It should be more difficult for them than more junior officers and enlisted men who more accurately fit the preferred qualifications.137 Further, in a widely circulated notification in March, the department decried the abuse of the perennially problematic proviso of the “battle-deciding act.” Skilled leadership was not enough to earn the country’s most prestigious (and symbolic) war order; nor would proximity to the enemy suffice either. Rank should by no means supersede achievement or bravery; likewise, these had to be one’s own, not that of one’s troops. In short, the authors stressed repeatedly that bravery was the key determinant in the intended distribution of the EK order, and so it was here, rather than for leadership, that personnel officers needed to provide more leeway in their subjective judgement of worthiness.138

Even among lower ranking officers, though, incentivization also helped to maintain the problematically high concentration of RK awardings among the technological elite. Within the

Army, for instance, the increasingly central role of tank, anti-tank and other mechanized units in the new offensives in the east meant that the disparities highlighted by the Ordensgruppe earlier in

135 The theme of commanders dispatching men on such missions is one of most common references to the cultural memory of the RK in postwar literature. See, for example, Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, 283; Buchmann, Soldatenalltag, 27; Müller, Hitler’s Wehrmacht, 104; Ertl, Kriegsberichter, 143-144. It was also an image seized upon by the controversial post-war author Günter Grass, who used the RK in his novel Katz und Maus (1961) as a symbol of the toxic culture of the Nazi Wehrmacht. See Frank F. Plagwitz, “Die Crux des Heldentums: Zur Deutung des Ritterkreuzes in Günter Grass’ Katz und Maus,” in Seminar: A Journal in Germanic Studies 32. No.1 (1996): 1-14. 136 The Ordensgruppe was made into a full “Abteilung” (Department) in January 1943 to reflect the increasing scope of its activities. 137 BAMA RW 59/361, 101. HPA.P5. Notiz, 15.2.1943. 138 Ibid., 49. Die Verleihung des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes 1939. Stand vom 1. März 1943. 121

1942 grew even more pronounced. Many of these new land-warfare Ritterkreuzträger also belonged to the increasingly prominent Waffen-SS, thus providing yet another layer of dispersal, and rivalry, among the land-based services.139 Moreover, with the once feared U-boat fleet now suffering grievous losses against Allied naval forces, the standards required for the RK and its higher grades began to drop below the thresholds established in 1940.140 By contrast, the intensification of aerial combat in the east meant that experienced Air Force aces’ kill-totals continued to rise so steeply that their thresholds needed to be repeatedly increased.141 Either way, though, it meant that their disproportionality among Ritterkreuzträger would continue.

Alongside and facilitating this phaleristic inflation was the fact that since the beginning of

1942, Hitler had found it increasingly necessary to make small concessions regarding access to the

EK order as a whole, with the result that its symbolic meaning became ever more degraded from its original Frontkämpfer-ideal. With the draining of German resources and manpower in the east, for example, it had become even more critical to maintain the fidelity and support of Germany’s allies (which now also included Japan). Despite strong reservations Hitler thus found himself acquiescing to pressure from his subordinates to further increase the internationalization of the RK

139 Ibid., 209. OKH/P5 Zahlenmässige Verteilung der Ritterkreuz auf Waffengattungen, 14.4.1943; BAMA RH 4/266, 3. 140 E.g. Bodo Herzog, “Provozierende Erkenntnisse zur deutschen U-Boot-Waffe,” In: Historische Mitteilungen der Ranke-Gesellschaft 11 (1998): 105; Timothy P. Mulligan, Neither Sharks Nor Wolves: The Men of Nazi Germany’s U-Boat Arm, 1939-1945 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 182-183. 141 Speaking for the Air Force’s daytime fighter pilots, 1942 had proven a particularly good year for its amount of RK’s, having earned 105 of the total RKs, 32 RK-E’s and 10 RK-ES’s. Simultaneously, though, the advent of bombing raids over the Reich itself meant that the OKL created a new points-based system of quantification to facilitate the decoration of pilots downing smaller numbers of heavily armed and defended Allied bombers. See Spick, Aces of the Reich, 124. In addition, the preponderance of high-scoring Air Force aces also had much to do with the fact that as demonstrated by historians Trevor J. Constable and Raymond F. Toliver, the majority of them had been in combat since the Spanish Civil War in 1936. Furthermore, unlike Allied services, the German Air Force had no system of rotation to rest its pilots. Instead, they simply kept fighting, and gaining kills, until they were wounded, killed or the war ended. See Trevor J. Constable and Raymond F. Toliver, Horrido: Fighter Aces of the Luftwaffe (New York: Macmillan Company, 1968), 14-16, 203. 122 and the rest of the order.142 That year he made sixteen awardings to foreign officers from Italy,

Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and even a fascist volunteer from Spain, and adding another twelve during 1943.143 In addition, not all foreign Ritterkreuzträger were outside of the Wehrmacht. There was also a rising number of more camouflaged awardings to foreigners serving in German uniform as part of the volunteer divisions mobilized by the Waffen-SS.144

These latter awardings thus represented a more limited form of symbolic damage, and likewise the German press could salvage some semblance of ideological capital from the investiture of junior officers like the Italian U-boat commander Enzo Grossi or fighting generals like Augustin Muñoz Grandes (commander of the Spanish “Blue Division”).145 Nevertheless, most of the diplomatic awardings to foreigners were to the more ideologically unpalatable headquarters generals and elites, a fact which annoyed the dictator no end. According to the Goebbels diaries, for instance, Hitler had been extremely reluctant to entertain the possibility of decorating Italian

General Italo Garboldi whose accomplishments did not reflect anything like a “battle-deciding act.” Nevertheless “in the end […] he gave way to diplomatic interests.146 To make matters worse,

142 According to post-war attestations by Nazi ideologue at the Nuremberg Trials, many within the military were comfortable with expanding the number of EKs to foreigners, and that it was really only “political considerations” that kept the numbers down (See Doc. 1520-PS, “Vermerk über eine Unterredung mit dem Führer im Führer-Hauptquartier am 8.5.42,” Nuremberg Trials, XXVII, 292). Despite relenting in different ways, for example, Hitler’s resignation to the realities of the war had its limits. Both Hitler and were intent not to allow those volunteers from captured soviet territory (Ostvölker) access to the EK. This was partly political, for as Himmler pointed out awarding such peoples the EK could arouse dangerous new currents of dignity and “national feelings” among those who were to become the subject peoples of the Greater Reich. At the same time, the Reichsführer-SS also feared that awarding the EK to people of lesser races would also represent too much of a degradation for the EK’s remaining ability to symbolize ethnic purity. As a result, in July 1942 he had secured Hitler’s blessing to create a separate, catch-all medal: the “Bravery and Merit Decoration for Members of the Eastern Peoples” (Tapferkeits- und Verdienstauszeichnung für Angehörige der Ostvölker (est. 14.7.1942)). See BAB NS 19/2368, 1. AR 29.2.1942. Aktenvermerk fűr SS-Obergruppenfűhrer, 4.6.1942; ibid., 2-4. RFSS. “Gedanken über die Schaffung einer Tapferkeitsauszeichnung für die in den deutschen Diensten stehenden Männer fremder Rasse und Nationalität, 2.6.1942; Picker, Tischgespräche, 316. No.126 (20.5.1942). 143 E.g. BAMA RH 4/266, 3; RW 59/361, 209. 144 E.g. DW, 654 (19.3.1943). 145 BAB ZSg.109-40, 37. V.I. No.320/42, 14.12.1942; BAMA RM 8/1554, 201. WPr.VII 3224. “Erster Ritterkreuzträger der Italienischen Marine,” 8.10.1942; DW, 629 (6.9.1943). 146 GTb, II.8, 44 (3.4.1943). See also Glantz, Hitler and his Generals, 897 nt.733. 123 the need to maintain their allies’ support now meant not only awarding the RK, but also its higher and even more symbolic grades as tokens of good will, such as a posthumous awarding of the RK-

ES to Japanese Admiral in May 1943.147

At the same time, similar compromises had to be made within the Wehrmacht itself. On one hand, the scope and increasing diversity of the fighting meant that Hitler had been compelled to extend EK eligibility to more and more noncombat groups for forms of bravery that took place behind the lines. This included the clearing of unexploded bombs and landmines in rear areas or even in bomb-damaged cities, for example, and one technician even received the RK for his efforts along with a place on the cover of the Berliner Illustrirte Zeitung in late 1942.148 Aside from such groups, an official collection of documents published by the PräsKz in 1943 demonstrated that EK eligibility had been similarly widened for groups including the severely wounded (their wounds being taken as evidence of bravery) or noncombat medical personnel, both male and female - groups who had been barred from the award earlier in the war.149

This extension of recognition to new groups, moreover, also meant that the order was increasingly being used to recognize types of military activity that crossed over the boundaries of honourable and even criminal conduct. The best example of this was the inclusion of Wehrmacht and SS security forces for fighting against irregular units in rear areas: activities that most often did not fit within the traditional understanding of “bravery in the face of the enemy” or even

“command merit.” By late 1942, the threat of resistance groups and Allied saboteurs in the west

147 BAB ZSg.109-42, 128. V.I. 130/43, 27.5.1943; GTb II.8, 375 (27.5.1943). Hitler would award the RK-E to seven foreign dignitaries and combat officers from , Spain, , and another to Japan in the form of Yamamoto’s successor, Admiral Mineichi Koga, in May 1944. 148 “Der mit den eisernen Nerven,” BIZ, October 21, 1942. 149 Richtlinien und Zusätze des Oberkommandos des Heeres,” in Doehle, Sammeldruck, 22-33. Hitler reserved the right to award the EK for himself. Twenty-seven women ultimately counted among its recipients by 1945; two of them even winning the more prestigious EK1. See further Lumsden, Medals and Decorations, 20-21. 124 and bands of partisans in the east required an increasing amount of personnel for sometimes brutal or repressive security work. As a result, Hitler acquiesced to the request to extend first the KVK-

S, and then finally the EK (and VA) to recognize service in this “Bandenkampf” (Struggle against

Bandits), which thereby extended this award not only in rear areas, but also into activities related to the regime’s genocidal programs and war crimes.150 In 1943, for example, EKs were awarded to the troops who brutally suppressed the ghetto uprising, with their commander even receiving the RK.151

Third, as the tide of the war began to shift incrementally against Germany the EK was also becoming a tool not only of incentivization but also of commemoration and compensation for the mounting casualties and symbolic defeats suffered by the Wehrmacht, just as it had for the imperial army in 1914-1918. This practice, for example, played an important role in diffusing the impact of the catastrophes at Stalingrad in February 1943 and then in in May. With each defeat, the OKH issued orders that any survivors lucky enough to have escaped capture or death were to be “generously rewarded by appropriate awards” as quickly as possible, up to and including the

RK. Likewise, as part of the compensation for the fallen “Stalingradkämpfer” and

“Afrikakämpfer,” it ordered that any medals for which they had been recommended were to be processed expeditiously and delivered to their next of kin – a practice that soon became standard for the martyred heroes or broken survivors of future battles.152 Thus, as in 1914-1918, alongside

150 OKW 29c16. 8264/42 WZ III, 18.7.1942 in Doehle, Sammeldruck, 21. See further BAB NS 19/79, 2. RFSS. FKdo. Chef.Stab IIa 1468/43 geh. Betr. Verleihung von Kriegsauszeichnungen, 5.7.1943. 151 BAMA RW 59/361, 209. By late 1943, the fighting against partisans in the east became so extensive that after urgings from Heinrich Himmler, Hitler authorized the creation of a special new badge for anti-partisan service (Bandenkampfabzeichen) now undertaken largely by the SS. See Lumsden, Medals and Decorations¸ 58. 152 BAMA RH 53-17/129. HPA/P5 Abdruck (1024/43). Betr. Auszeichnung von Angehörigen des ehemalige AOK6., 15.2.1943; BAMA RH 15/437, 27. HPA/P5 Abschrift. (Az29a12 1024/43). Betr. Auszeichnung für Kämpf um Welikije Luki, 26.3.1943; BAMA RW 59/360, 203. Ordensabteilung Tätigkeitsbericht, Juli 1943; BAMA RH 53- 17/129, 9. WKK XVII/IIa (13523 geh.). Betr. Auszeichnung von Angehörigen der ehemaligen Heeresgruppe Afrika, 9.10.1943. 125 its representation of victory the EK in particular was also coming to symbolize the darkening of

Germany’s military fortunes and the war’s toll on another generation.153

Last and most important, however, was the symbolic damage done by the expansion of the

EK (and other awards) into the civilian sphere. This occurred as a direct result of Hitler’s completely separate decision in early 1942 to increase the distribution of the KVK on the Home

Front. The move was intended to reward German workers for their willingness to make increasing contributions to the war effort. Unfortunately, it also came at the same time as bombing raids on

German cities reached a new level of intensity.154 Within months, civilians began to openly ask why, given the increasing number of employed in civil air defence, they were not entitled to military decorations as well. Joseph Goebbels, for his part, encouraged such questions to promote his own interests through a parallel Home Front-branch of Frontkämpfer-ideology. Just as Hitler acted as a patron figure for the Frontkämpfer in the trenches, so too would he be for the civilian equivalent, a kind of Heimatfrontkämpfer (Home Front Fighter).155 Consequently, over the second half of 1942 the Minister did all he could to see civilians of all ages, male and female, decorated with the KVK-S, VA and by the end of the year the first EK’s as well. He even declared that there was no reason why civilians should not be considered for the RK.156

153 This commemorative function has been highlighted by Sabine Behrenbeck in her monograph Der Kult um die toten Helden (p.511). 154 For Hitler’s expansion of the KVK in 1942 see Willi A Boelcke, ed., Deutschlands Rüstung im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Hitlers Konferenzen mit , 1942-1945 (Frankfurt/Main: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft Athenaion, 1969), 109-117 (6.5.1942). See also BAB ZSg.109-33, 49. V.I. 127/42, 19.5.1942. 155 For evidence of this thinking, see Wilfred von Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende. II (Buenos Aires: Dürer Verlag, 1950), 86-87 (10.8.1943); Willi A. Boelcke, Wollt ihr Den Totalen Krieg? Die Geheimen Goebbels-Konferenzen 1939-1943 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967), 270 (11.8.1942); GTb II.4, 263 (9.5.1942); ibid., 329 (21.5.1942). 156 Boelcke, Wollt ihr den totalen Krieg?, 270 (11.8.1942). See further: Akten der Partei-Kanzlei der NSDAP. Rekonstruktion eines verlorengegangenen Bestandes (hereafter Akten PKz) II.4, ed. Peter Longerich (Munich: K.G.Sauer, 1992), 372. 43135 (5.9.1942); “Tapfere Jungen mit dem E.K. und dem Kriegsverdienstkreuz mit Schwertern. Dr. Goebbels empfing 31 besonders tapfere Hitlerjungen aus den luftbedrohten Gauen,” VB, October 15, 1942. Goebbels even began to propose new military decorations for civilians that would reinforce the 126

Of course, this ran completely counter to Frontkämpfer-ideology and the principle of front experience; it had not been Hitler’s intention. Accordingly, documents from the PräsKz suggest that the dictator even briefly considered halting the awarding of orders and decorations to civilians altogether.157 Nevertheless, whether because of the incessant advocacy of Goebbels or perhaps because of the realization that after the fall of Stalingrad the sacrifices demanded of the Home

Front were only to increase, Hitler relented. Even so, he still insisting on new guidelines to regulate the flow of military medals to civilians, and especially women, who were being mobilized for war work at an increasing rate.158 As the bombing intensified, however, civilians involved in civil air defence began to receive such awards at a quickening pace which, though representing only a fraction of the amount awarded every day to the Wehrmacht, signified an important symbolic blow to the regime’s credibility as a defender of soldiers’ supposedly elevated place within the

Volksgemeinschaft.159

In addition, the parallel inflation of the KVK on the Home Front during 1942-1943 had also weakened what remained of its utility as an effective safety valve for the EK. As the SD later reported, it had become a popular medium of order hunting among civilians, and especially those

“Bonzen” (Big Shots) among local government and Party officials. Since the Home Front did not possess the dictator’s attention to the same degree as the Wehrmacht, these authorities were soon distributing the KVK by the tens of thousands in an uneven and increasingly elitist fashion,

Heimatfrontkämpfer archetype and continued to do so until the end of the war. See GTb II.6, 123 (14.10.1942); ibid., II.7, 506-507 (9.3.1943); ibid., II.11, 582 (30.3.1944). 157 BAMA RH 15/437, 26. RP.0 1970/43, St.M.PräsKz. Schnellbrief betr. Einschränkung des Verleihungs von Orden und Ehrenzeichen während des Krieges, 17.2.1943. 158 “EdF über den umfassenden Einsatz von Männern und Frauen für Aufgaben der Reichsverteidigung, 13.1.1943,” in Moll, Führer Erlasse, 311, No.222; GTb II.7, 506-507 (9.3.1943); “Besprechung mit Generaloberst Fromm,” in Bradley and Schulze-Kossens, Tätigkeitsbericht, 89 (17.8.1943). 159 BAMA RW 3/493, 4. Präs.Kz (RP.0.5641/44 - II/1570/ 6 VI.44) Betr. Voraussetzung für die Verleihung des Eisernen Kreuzes und des Kriegsverdienstkreuzes mit Schwertern aus Anlass von Luftangriffen. 22.5.1944. 127 creating division and resentment. Much like the EK-W of 1914-1918, therefore, by 1944 this order had all but lost its value among soldiers and civilians alike, earning the inherited nicknames of the

“sycophant order” or “restaurant order,” among others.160 Even more significant, though, the same thing had also happened to the RKVK (i.e. the buffer Halsorden created by Hitler in 1940).

The first awarding of this grade had finally taken place in May of 1942 at a publicized ceremony, and on Hitler’s orders by a recipient of the RK (of the EK), symbolizing the unity of fighting and home fronts.161 However, the SD quickly reported that the event had not gone without criticism, as some Germans complained that the gesture had presented a false comparison between the two medals, and that as a result “the actual Knight’s Cross, awarded for heroic action, has

[now] lost some of its worth.”162 Over the two years that followed, moreover, the country’s highest ranking Bonzen engaged in their own form of Halsschmerzen, vying for the prestige of a Halsorden in the RKVK or recommending their subordinates to gain the reflected institutional prestige. By the end of 1943, in fact, the practice had become so problematic that Martin Bormann, head of the

Party Chancellery (Parteikanzlei, PKz), issued a moratorium on Hitler’s behalf on its distribution to “prominent Party members.”163 Nevertheless, the damage had been done. The RKVK had lost

160 The SD submitted a lengthy report on the development of the KVK in July of 1944, reflecting a survey of reports, testimonials and statistics. See MadR. 17. 6658-6666 (Gelbe Serie) (24.7.1944) 161 Boelcke, Deutsche Rüstung, 109 (6.5.1942); Boelcke, Wollt ihr Den Totalen Krieg?, 238 (8.5.1942); “Ohne die Waffen des Rüstungsarbeiters hätte ich niemals das Ritterkreuz errungen” and “Die feierliche Ehrung der deutschen Heimatfront. Ein Rüstungsarbeiter erhielt das Ritterkreuz des Kriegsverdienstkreuzes,” VB, May 22, 1942. 162 MadR, 10, 3758. No.287 (28.5.1942); emphasis added. 163 BAB R 43-II/649b f.1, 30 NSDAP Bormann Rundschreiben (139/43). Betr. Auszeichnung führender Parteigenossen. 27.9.1943; GTb II.8, 215 (6.5.1943); ibid., II.9, 630 (30.9.1943). This decision most likely also reflected Hitler’s experience with the “Order of the Party” of which he had spoken in November 1941. After creating the award and making several awardings to several prominent men during 1942, Hitler confided to Joseph Goebbels in May of 1943 that given how Party elites had jostled to be considered for the honour and their own self- aggrandizement, he would keep it a posthumous award until after the war. GTb II.8, 248 (9.5.1943). See also Lumsden, Medals and Decorations, 104-105. 128 much of its symbolic value and, thereby, its utility as a valued alternative Halsorden that could help ease the pressure on the RK.

Combined with developments within the Wehrmacht, by the summer of 1943 Hitler faced a similar climate of inflation, devaluation and resentment as the Kaiser had two decades before, a situation he had striven to avoid since 1939. As documented by his faithful acolyte Rudolf

Schmundt in his war diary in June, a worrying number of “voices from the front” had made it plain that the climate there was one of resentment about the distribution of awards and the neglect it represented for the common Frontkämpfer.164 Their medals were being doled out to men on the lower strata of the front experience-hierarchy: rear-echelon men, foreigners, Party Bonzen and finally to civilians – even women and children. Taken with the growing logistical problems of phaleristic administration because of increasing demand, moreover, it seemed that the closer one got to the front the less likely one was to receive the proper recognition one deserved; the very antithesis of Frontkämpfer-ideology.165 In consequence, ignorant of much of the efforts of

Schmundt and Hitler out of public view, and in unintended echo of complaints made in 1918 and

1933-1934, the Army’s Landsers demanded that the authorities show some new proof of their supposedly honoured place within phaleristic culture as “true front soldiers.”166

164 Bradley and Schulze-Kossens, Tätigkeitsbericht, 72-73 (20-21.6.1943). See further MadR. 17. 6658-6666. Gelbe Serie) (24.7.1944). See also Römer, Kameraden, chap.4 (n.b. loc. 2200-2265 of 11262), Kindle; Hartmann, Ostkrieg, 198. 165 E.g. One report from the political leadership of Westfälen-Nord, for example, complained to the OKH these administrative difficulties had been causing considerable confusion among local merchants as well as public disquiet about disgruntled soldiers’ claims that the Army was not rewarding them properly. See BAMA RW 59/365, 41. WK.Kdo.VI (Münster). Betr. Ordensverleihungen an Frontsoldaten, 4.7.1942; ibid., 40. (12) OKH 118/42 an WK.Kdo VI. Beschaffung von Orden und Ehrenzeichen durch die Beliehenen, n.d.; BAMA RW 59/363, 194. HPA P5, Betr. Ordensvorrat, 10-14.12.1943; BAMA RW 59/360, 224. 166 The Schmundt diary reveals that some soldiers recommended the creation of a special “Frontkreuz” (Front Cross). Hitler apparently liked this idea but ended up dropping it later in 1943 owing to (as recorded by Schmundt) the intensification of the air war. Ibid., 113. 10.11.1943. See Bradley and Schulze-Kossens, Tätigkeitsbericht, 73 (23.6.1943) and 113 (10.11.1943); Lumsden, Medals and Decorations, 72. 129

As in 1941, this resentment and the authorities’ response focused around access to the RK, the most prominent symbol of the supposedly “new” Wehrmacht. For Hitler and Schmundt, their failure to recalibrate the perception of this award and its distribution became evident from some of the responses to a survey commissioned by the HPA about the possibility of a new replacement for the despised EB.167 One evocative letter included within the responses from a Sr.Lieutenant

Bermann stated that there was still a “recognized discontent among the wide body of the Army” towards the highly skewed pattern of RK distribution.168 NCOs and enlisted men, he said, were still neglected in favour of senior officers and there was incredulity among “field, forest and meadows infantry” about the continued clear imbalance in distribution among the different branches and services. If a grenadier, Bermann explained, kills fifteen Russian soldiers from his foxhole armed only with his rifle, it should be counted a greater act of bravery than that of the tanker who, from the safety of his armoured periscope, destroyed fifteen enemy tanks. Yet, in reality, “the tanker gets the Knight’s Cross and the grenadier nothing. That embitters!”

Consequently, he argued that the RK had to be altered at a fundamental level to finally make it as equitable and just as it was supposed to be.169

167 The survey, which enjoyed broad participation, also offered insight into the perceptions of Frontkämpfer regarding legitimate and illegitimate forms of recognition. The vast majority (95 percent), for example, favoured the creation of another new award despite the abundance already in circulation. Only 10 percent of these favoured the creation of “privileges or benefits” in lieu of a symbolic physical reward. Of the remainder, 30 percent said they liked the idea of a ceremonial weapon of some kind such as a dagger or pistol because of their “high ideal and traditional worth.” Interestingly, this option was also the preference of the Ordensabteilung, which said that although creating an embroidered badge was the easiest solution, a decorative weapon (as long as it was not too ornate) represented the best combination of promise and popularity given its potential for “abstract value.” For these conclusions and the survey results, see BAMA RW 59/360, 220. HPA/P5 Ordensabt.Vortragsnotiz. Abschrift Betr. Äusserliche Hervorhebung der im Ehrenblatt des deutschen Heeres genannten Soldaten, 28.8.1943; Bradley and Schulze-Kossens, Tätigkeitsbericht, 72 (20.6.1943). In addition to replacing the EB, moreover, Hitler also quickly instituted a series of new grades for medals and badges that were unique to Frontkämpfer as he had done in 1942, including a golden wound badge. See Klietmann, Auszeichnungen, 118. 168 BAMA RW 59/363, 210. HPA P5 Anlage. Teil-Abschrift aus Eingabe Oberlt. Friedrich Bermann, 14.9.1943. 169 Ibid. 130

This damning review evidently made a substantial impact upon Schmundt, unsurprising given his strenuous efforts to address these very problems. As head of the HPA, he personally reviewed and responded to each of Bermann’s points in a memorandum of September 17, 1943.

Regarding service favouritism, Schmundt admitted that there was certainly still room for improvement, but it was simply not possible to change the regulations of the Reich’s most prestigious Halsorden to “tailor” it for the infantry. The advantages of success-quantification for tankers and others was unfortunate but unavoidable. If there was fault, Schmundt added, in echo of comments made the previous year, then it lay with commanding officers who judged the heroic deeds of ordinary Frontkämpfer too harshly (or their own too lightly, for that matter).170

Moreover, using Ordensabteilung statistics, he demonstrated that the inter-service imbalance was in fact not as bad as Bermann claimed. The 1,444 Ritterkreuzträger among infantry officers and men to date were more than the total of all other Army sub-groups combined, not just including those among tankers (197) but also pioneer troops (88), artillery men (101), tank hunters

(64) and reconnaissance units (138). Even so, Schmundt admitted that RK-distribution according to rank was still a source of legitimate concern even though this too was not as bad as Bermann

(and the compatriots on whose behalf he claimed to speak) claimed either. There were more enlisted men, sergeants and NCOs among infantry Ritterkreuzträger (35; 50; 147) than there were lieutenant- or major generals (61; 86). The real problem was the number of majors and colonels

(127; 164) who should more appropriately have received the RKVK-S or even DK-S for repeated meritorious, but not decisive, leadership as opposed to the more junior combat officers, i.e. lieutenants like Bermann (77).

170 BAMA RW 59/363, 210. HPA/P5 Vortragsnotiz (Schmundt), 17.9.1943. 131

In other words, the median rank of Ritterkreuzträger was thus still too high, but not so high that it deserved the reputation of an award only for elites. Thanks in part to his own efforts and those of Hitler, within the Army at least the RK was in fact a relatively egalitarian award, all things considered. Unfortunately, though, as the Bermann letter demonstrated, this was not its reputation among many front-line troops, whose perception mattered the most. In their eyes, it had become associated with neglect and the preservation of the old traditions of Halsorden culture, in which only a handful of lowly Frontkämpfer were permitted to be “ennobled” alongside generals and colonels, that is unless they were part of a “technological elite” who flew planes, commanded submarines or drove tanks.

It is unclear whether Hitler saw the Bermann letter or Schmundt’s response, but its symbolic implications were clearly demonstrated in his subsequent behaviour, which resembled that of October-November 1941. Writing in his diary after a meeting in September, Joseph

Goebbels noted (without irony given his own role in the process) how: “The Führer considers it very difficult, if not out of the question, to allocate [military] orders and decorations fairly,” and that the RK in particular had proven “extraordinarily difficult.”171 Hitler was especially disheartened, he went on, about the continued unhappiness within his own former service, and stated that he was uncomfortable about the disproportionality of Air Force aces among

Ritterkreuzträger; in an ideal world the pattern would be reversed. The bravery of the infantryman was not always as evident in “exemplary accomplishments,” but it is “that he perseveres and proves

[his] masculine courage [Mannesmut], that is worth the Knight’s Cross.”172 Still, he saw no fault for this in himself, of course. The devaluation of his prized symbol of Frontkämpfer-ideology he

171 GTb II.9, 476 (10.9.1943). 172 Ibid. 132 attributed solely to the actions of subordinates: to their nepotism, greed and their extant imperial traditions (i.e. those he had allowed to continue during the 1930s).

II.5 Symbolic Disintegration

As in the winter of 1941-1942, the dictator’s melancholic mood lasted only so long; he had evidently not yet given up on the RK or its potential for symbolic capital. By November 1943, he once more presented fresh orders to Schmundt to renew the struggle for a stabilization, if not an equalization, of RK recommendations.173 In January, moreover, he issued a new directive demanding that “extreme reserve” be exercised in the awarding of all high decorations (including merit-based awards like the DK-S) to rear-echelon members of command staffs, which he added was for “psychological reasons.”174 Finally, reflecting on the results of the aforementioned survey from the previous summer, he finally introduced the replacement for the Army’s EB in the form of the “Honour Roll Clasp” (Ehrenblattspange, EBS), instituted on the anniversary of the

Machtergreifung (January 30). It featured an oak-wreathed swastika medallion affixed to the band of the EK2 and was to be awarded to holders of the EK1 exclusively on the basis of combat bravery. In other words, it was meant to serve as a yet another ‘safety valve’ for the RK to manage the expectations it created while also serving as the “proof” Frontkämpfer demanded of the authorities’ commitment to their symbolic elevation.175

173 Bradley and Schulze-Kossens, Tätigkeitsbericht, 113 (10.11.1943). 174 BAMA RW 59/310, 49. Adj.W.b.F. Abschrift an OKW/WZA/HPA/MPA/LPA/PA.WFSS. Betr. Auszeichnungen in den Oberkommando, 23.1.1944; NARA T-175, 32. F240. RFSS, RF/M Fkdo (48/13/44), 3.3.1944; BAB NS 19/2840 f.1, 1-2. RFSS FKdo (240/2 RF/M 49/13/44), 3.5.1944. 175 “Stiftung einer ‘Ehrenblattspange,’” DAZ, 3 (1944): 3. According to Robin Lumsden, moreover, it proved a success in this regard, quickly becoming a more highly regarded decoration among front line troops than its ‘buffer’ forerunner the DK. The decoration proved so popular, in fact, that the Navy would follow suit with its own version in May and the Air Force in July. See Lumsden, Medals and Decorations, 24-26. 133

Supporting these new administrative measures, moreover, the propaganda machine produced materials whose tone could reassure skeptical readers about the continued value of the

RK and remind them of its proper symbolic meaning. The issue of the Völkischer Beobachter on

January 22 extolled the value of this prestigious Halsorden as the objectification of the regime’s unique regard for the sacrifice of soldiers compared to previous governments. It was the symbolic objectification of the egalitarian meritocracy that was the new revolutionary Wehrmacht and its reflection of the wider Volksgemeinschaft. “A Knight’s Cross winner today,” it read, “belongs unquestionably to the of the nation, and his social regard is determined by his Knight’s

Cross, even though he used to be a small-bank clerk and now carries the corporal’s chevrons.”176

Likewise, articles announcing RK presentations to enlisted men proclaimed that such events should give all Germans pause to reflect upon the many parvenu heroes who had come before them, and that any soldier “knows [that] the German people value the accomplishment of the anonymous lone fighter as much as the skirmish-deciding deed of the officer and the battle- deciding decision of the general.”177

Other articles and essays, meanwhile, directly addressed the increasingly obvious problem of inflation, which was now reaching unprecedented levels. Following a new series of Allied offensives during the early months of 1944, RK-awardings had more than doubled from one hundred to two hundred per month, a trend mirrored for the RK-E (up by a third to twenty-seven

176 “Die neue Gesellschaftsordnung und der ,” VB, January 22, 1944, 6. See further: H. Okrass, “Orden und Ehrenzeichen,” Freiheitskampf (), February 23, 1944; “Symbole deutscher Heldenehrung in diesem Kriege”; “Der Soldat und seine Auszeichnungen,” Frankfurter Zeitung (Reichausgabe), 117/118 (1944): 4; Eckart von Naso, “Symbolkraft der Orden,” DUZ 11 (1944): 1; Der Lohn der Tat, die Auszeichnungen des Heeres. Oberkommando des Heeres, ed. (Hamburg: Kommissions-Verlag Friedrichsen, 1943). 177 BAMA N 460/18, “Das Ritterkreuz für Loibl,” 26.6.1944. See also BAMA RL 1/114 Luftwaffe Kriegsberichter Abt.6 – No.221/Boe/34. “Der Bauernsohn wird Soldat. Ritterkreuzträger Hauptmann Badorrek. Der Fernaufklärer ist auch hervorragender Kämpfer,” 25.2.1944; DW, 697 (12.1.1944); ibid., 711 (19.4.1944). 134 per month) as well as the RK-ES (ten per month).178 Indeed, such was the level of inflation that the Ordensabteilung complained that accurate record keeping, even for such high awards, was becoming difficult.179 RK distribution, one article from an Air Force propagandist noted, “is large and becoming [even] larger,” but even so, it assured readers, each and every awarding was well- deserved and in keeping with proper standards; the award had not lost “an inch of its worth.”180

While most Frontkämpfer were loath to seek personal recognition, another article said, there was no greater joy than to see one of his comrades so honoured and that there should be no questions about their legitimacy. The Wehrmacht was duly attentive in the way it parsed recognition: “That is why we stand by every Ritterkreuzträger,” and, its author added, why asking “how” or “why” was inappropriate.181

The inflation that such articles attempted to explain away, however, was nothing compared to that of the EK order’s lower grades as an ever-rising cost of incentivization and compensation.

Indeed, the OKH determined that it had reached “an intolerable extent” and that as a result its value had “sunk significantly.”182 Therefore, in May of 1944, the HPA conducted a thorough investigation of the structures and practices of phaleristic administration. The investigation determined that the root problem lay in the level of autonomy granted (by Hitler in 1941) to individual field commanders in adjudicating and distributing awards below the RK, and the fact that they could not compare their distribution to others and so gain an informed impression of reasonability.183 To stop this, the HPA announced what it called a central “planned economy” for

178 Maerz, Ritterkreuz, 39, 243, 269. 179 BAMA RW 59/363, 167. OKH. Chef P5. Erbietsgebiete a/e bei 2 Staffel an 2 Staffel, 17.2.1944. 180 BAMA N 460/18, “Das Ritterkreuz für Obergefreiter Loibl.” 181 BAMA RL 15/114. Luftwaffe Kriegsberichter Abt.6 -213/Sch/7. J.Schulze, “Ein junger Mensch, schnell und entschlossen, 29.2.1944. 182 BAMA RW 59/368, 111. 183 As a result, the report declared, while there were thankfully still fewer EK2s than had been awarded in 1914-1918, there were far more EK1s and the ratio between the two was far narrower than before. During the former conflict it 135 the distribution of the EK order that would, in addition to slowing general inflation, ensure a definitive decrease of awardings to rear-echelon personnel and increased concentration among

“proven fighters.”184

Early reports from frontline units were optimistic, but soon the necessity of countering the

Allied invasion of France in June and new Soviet offensives in the east swallowed up the impetus of the HPA’s efforts. Not only did recommendations once again rise sharply as a result, but amid the chaos of retreat they were increasingly lacking in observance of administrative standards or due process, to the extent that some arrived at the Ordensabteilung devoid of context or justification.185 The sheer number of recommendations continued to increase with each passing month as summer turned to fall, first passing 200 per month and then 250 (trends echoed in smaller quantity in the higher grades).186 By October, when awardings reached their wartime peak at over

320 in one month, the number of Ritterkreuzträger had doubled from that of 1943. With the sizes of the monthly lists passing his desk, moreover, Hitler finally abrogated even his now meagre role in the approvals process. According to the HPA war diary, he had become “so burdened by the whole war situation,” that he delegated the responsibility of approving RK-recommendation lists

had been 1:23; it stood now at 1:9. Since June of 1941, for example, the average division the Eastern Front had awarded 6,000 EK2s and 800 EK1s. Ibid. 184 The “planned economy” involved coordinating a system of quotas that would distribute EKs among units according to a scale of combat participation. Ibid.; HG von PKz VI No.15/128, V. Betr. Nachträgliche Verleihung von Kriegsauszeichnungen, 26.5.1944 in Verfügungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben, VI , 322. See further Rass, “Social Profile of the German Army’s Combat Units,” 686. 185 See BAMA RW 59/368, 95. 20 Gebirgs.Armee (Abt.IIa 540/44). Betr. Bericht über Einflussnahme auf die EK Verleihung, n.d., ca. July-Oct, 1944; BAMA RW 59/365, 374. HPA/P5. Abschrift Oblt. Thiede. Vorlage von Vorschlägen zur Verleihung des Ritterkreuzes und des Eichenlaubs zum Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes, 23.12.1944. 186 Maerz, Ritterkreuz, 39, 243, 269; BAB R 601/1332 f.2, 313, 324, 332. Such was the inability of manufacturers and administrators to keep up with this skyrocketing demand, that miniature or even cloth decorations were considered. However, Hitler rejected the proposal. Instead, he ordered that military decorations for rear-echelon personnel be limited or discontinued and even commissioned more awards for Frontkämpfer including new cuff-titles and arm- shields for defenders for defenders of key strategic cities as well as special badges for individual soldiers who caused disproportionate damage to the enemy. See BAMA RW 59/312, 33. HPA/P5. Vorschlag Gefr. Tiedemann, 15.10.1944; ibid., HPA/P5. Vortragsnotiz, Betr. Vorschlag über Materialersparnis bei Auszeichnungen, 30.11.1944; Littlejohn and Dodkins, Medals and Badges, 158, 136-137, 144-147. 136 to Wilhelm Keitel (chief of the OKW) and Heinrich Himmler for the Waffen-SS and security forces.187

Even more important than the pure inflation of the RK was that distribution was now becoming ever more definitively subordinated to the needs of propaganda rather than the strictly military standards for which Hitler had fought for so long. This was particularly evident in the highest Halsorden grades (over which the dictator did still exercise some control). Because of their exalted prestige and demonstrated value as focal points of popular culture (see Chapter IV), the awarding of the RK-ES and RK-ESB concentrated among men whose indisputable accomplishments could reinforce public confidence that the Wehrmacht could still reverse the tide of the conflict and achieve victory on a grand scale. This, in turn, meant an even more focused favouritism towards those whose disproportionality had caused so much resentment and division already, such as generals and field marshals who could hold key cities or achieve limited counter- offensives.188 At the same time, the quantifiable and thus easily marketable success of leading technological elites like fighter pilots and tank commanders (there were few decorated U-boat commanders able to produce results of any kind at this point189) ensured that their elevation to these exalted ranks could likewise strengthen the hope that could still be found in the superiority of German technology and production to ensure victory.190

At the same time, among the more numerous Halsorden (i.e. the RK and now also the RK-

E) these new priorities had resulted in a very different pattern. To be sure, it was still by no means

187 Bradley and Schulze-Kossens, Tätigkeitsbericht, 288 (17.10.1944). 188 “ Model,” VB, August 20, 1944; ibid., 21 September 1944: “Die Brillanten für General Ramcke”; DW, 732 (14.9.1944). 189 The one example was Albrecht Brandi, the Navy’s only new Brillantenträger in 1944. 190 “Der Dritte mit 250,” Die Wehrmacht 7. March 29, 1944; “Die Brillanten für Hauptmann Schnaufer,” VB, October 17, 1944; ibid., June 26, 1944: “Die ersten Schwerter an der Atlantikfront. SS-Obersturmführer Wittmann schoss 138 Feindpanzer ab.” 137 easy to win either award, but there could be no doubt that prerequisite acts were now less spectacular in scope or effect. Before giving over his prerogatives, for example, Hitler had ordered that soldiers who displayed extreme loyalty (as he defined it) by fighting their way back to German lines after being cut off rather than surrender (“Rückkämpfer,” or Return-Fighters) were to automatically receive the next highest decoration, up to and including the RK.191 Likewise, RK recommendations became increasingly directed towards acts of even limited effect but that showcased the ability to halt, or at least temporarily check, Allied advances. Junior Army officers,

NCOs or individual men like snipers who could hold off Allied attacks for a few hours could be deemed worthy. In the Air Force, more RKs went to members of anti-aircraft units or to dive- bomber crews who could destroy enemy tanks on the ground. At sea, meanwhile, Ritterkreuzträger now included more men from small torpedo boats operating from coastal bases and even a merchant marine captain for delivering much-needed supplies.192

However, there was a limit to the utility of the RK as a symbol of the kind of fanatical- heroism the regime was increasingly needing. Despite the patterns mentioned above, even as late as September 1944 Hitler had refused to change the RK’s foundational regulations to further politicize its awarding. Whether because of his own connection to the EK order or his own long- suffering efforts to create and maintain its intended-meaning, the dictator had angrily rejected a

191 BAMA RW 59/361, 2. Abschrift OKH/P5 an HG Mitte, Sudukraine, Nord, Nordukraine und West, 18.9.1944; ibid., 60. Abschrift OKH/P5 Betr. Rückkämpfer-Verfügung, 30.11.1944. Alternately, Hitler also took action to limit the rewarding of men who had failed to demonstrate these virtues, such as those who had been captured or interned, and even those who had gone missing. See BAMA RW 3/15. OKW/WZIII (8517/44). FHQ. Auszeichnung, 27.9.1944. 192 For further discussion of the greater importance of the “Einzelkämpfer” (lone fighter) in these final months, as well as the system of ‘points’ created for Army snipers (not unlike that for pilots and U-boat commanders) for the awarding of decorations including the RK, see John Zimmermann, “Die deutsche militärische Kriegführung im Westen, 1944/1945,” in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg.Vol.10. Der Zusammenbruch des Deutschen Reiches 1945. Erster Halbband: Die militärische Niederwerfung der Wehrmacht, ed. Rolf-Dieter Müller (Munich: Deutsche- Verlags-Anstalt, 2008), 323-324; Lumsden, Medals and Decorations, 60-61; Herzog, “Provozierende Erkenntnisse,” 105. For contemporary propaganda demonstrating this shift, moreover, see “Der Einmann-Torpedo,” BIZ, August 3, 1944; DW, 714 (10.5.1944); ibid., 739 (2.11.1944). 138 proposal to make it easier for propagandists to highlight fanatical Ritterkreuzträger by adding a

“political activity” section to the recommendation procedures. “The Führer,” one Ordensabteilung report attested, “refuses to accept political merit in recommendations for bravery awards.”193

Instead, the dictator had already begun to direct his attention towards medals and awards that could emphasize the kind of ideals needed in this grave hour: the alleged stubborn tenacity and absolute loyalty of the Alte Kämpfer.

The fall of 1944, for example, saw him attempt to revive his “Order of the Party” (now known as the “German Order,” or Deutsches Orden, DO) that he had indeed created two years earlier and awarded to a few senior Party men but then aborted. He now added new military grades for it with oak leaves and swords like the RK.194 Within the Wehrmacht, meanwhile, Hitler focused his efforts on the golden grade of the NKS (the NKS-G), which he awarded for the first time in

August. This medal had, of course, been his solution to trouble surrounding the RK in 1942, a more accessible and symbolic form of recognition to fill an important gap. It was much the same now, acting as the reward for only the most perseverant of combat troops, the “Nahkämpfer” (close

[quarters] fighter) who had endured fifty days of close combat and thus displayed the tenacity required of all Germans.195

Though it still technically lay beneath the RK in prestige and outside the EK order, Hitler’s treatment of its first recipients demonstrated that for now, at least, the specific kind of symbolic

193 BAMA RW 59/363, 79. HPA an OKW WZA. Bez. Schreiben des Stabschefs der SA, 22.9.1944 über Kriegsauszeichnungen, 22.10.1944. See further ibid., 74-78; Bradley and Schulze-Kossens, Tätigkeitsbericht, 292 (22.10.1944). 194 “Trauerfeier für Bürckel – Die höchste Stufe des Deutschen Ordens mit Schwertern verliehen,” Berlin Lokal Anzeiger, October 4, 1944; “Das Goldene Kreuz des Deutschen Ordens für Arthur Axmann,” VB, April 29, 1945. See also Littlejohn and Dodkins, Medals and Badges, 28; GTb II.15, 194. 23.1.1945. Likewise, he did much the same for the RKVK, reportedly ordering the creation of a golden version in late 1944. 195 “Der Führer ehrt Nahkämpfer,” Deutsche Uniform Zeitung 9 (1944), 3; “Die goldene Nahkampfspange aus der Hand des Führers,” VB, August 30, 1944. 139 capital it could hopefully produce rendered it just as high, if not higher, in importance. Earlier in the year he had reserved the right to award this grade in person, an honour he had long stopped bestowing on Ritterkreuzträger and now even to Eichenlaubträger as well. This he did in late

August, and then added that each NKS holder automatically received the EK1 (i.e. given a ‘fast- track’ to achieving the RK which around a sixth of them would eventually do). Finally, he even extended to them some of the same privileges that had belonged exclusively to Ritterkreuzträger

(see Chapter III) and even more besides, giving them the rare privilege of having guaranteed leave from the front that winter.196 By the end of the year, though, it became clear that the NKS-G could not achieve his desired results either. Field commanders had complained of the administrative impracticality of tracking the number of days each soldier spent in close combat amid the chaos of retreat. Furious, the dictator called this response an abnegation of the “high responsibility” to administer the “highest decoration of the Frontkämpfer in the front most lines,” and quickly gave up awarding this decoration in person as well.197

This failure of the NKS-G, moreover, was emblematic of the broader disintegration of the phaleristic system that occurred in the final months of 1944. Writing to the Propaganda Ministry in October, for example, State Secretary Otto Meissner (chief of the PräsKz) noted how, after beginning the war with so few war decorations, the Reich now had so many that few Germans could keep track of them all; “even fewer,” he added critically, “know their meaning.”198 Such

196 BAMA RW 59/360, 20. HPA/P5 Notiz., n.d. ca. March 1944; Bradley and Schulze-Kossens, Tätigkeitsbericht, 224 (27.8.1944); BAMA RW 6/316. OKW/WVers.Ia (8336/44 // 2362/44). Betr. Betreuung der Träger der Goldenen Nahkampfspange und ihrer Hinterbliebenen, 19.9.1944; BAMA RH 9/88. Abschrift. Abt IIa 31 No.37/45. Wehrmachtbevollmächtigte beim deutschen StM für Böhmen und Mahren und Bhbr im WK Böhmen und Mahren, 19.1.1945. 197 BAMA RW 59/361, 60. OKH/P5. Betr. Anrechnung von Nahkampftagen und Verleihung der Nahkampfspange, 30.11.1944. Despite such problems, though, by the end of the war 600 NKS-G’s had been awarded, along with almost 10,000 of the silver and over 35,000 bronze grades. 198 BAB R 55/624, 62. Dr. Schroeter (PräsKz.) an Schäffer (RMVP), 13.10.1944; ibid., 63. Anlage. RP.0.1181/44. Meissner Betr. Auszeichnung, n.d.. 140 concerns only underscored the fact that, for all its inflation and limitations, there was only one order that still commanded enough respect and whose basis in Prusso-German symbolic tradition could still help facilitate a final push to save the Reich from collapse.

Unsurprisingly, therefore, records from the Ordensabteilung reveal discussion in

December of 1944 about the possibility of creating yet more grades to the EK. One proposal was to produce a series of “bars" of black, silver and gold for the EK1, i.e. an idea presumably inspired by that considered by Hitler several years before.199 However, this was evidently not to his liking, for instead of such a widely distributable medal he chose to do what he had done so many times since 1939: create another Halsorden grade above the RK whose visibility could achieve a singular level of symbolism to compliment the Party’s new militarized DO as the pinnacle of the new politicized heroism. Hitler revealed his creation on December 29, 1944 in the form of the Golden

Oak Leaves to the Knight’s Cross with Swords and Diamonds (Ritterkreuz mit Eichenlaub,

Schwertern und Brillanten in Gold, RK-ESBG). According to the official proclamation, like the

DO it would be awarded only twelve times to honour “battle tested individual fighters before the

German Volk.”200 As he had done several times before, moreover, Hitler quickly selected a man suitably symbolic in his own right to be the first ‘Goldträger.’

On paper and in life, Hans-Ulrich Rudel was an obvious choice. He was a highly successful and decorated pilot who had destroyed many enemy planes, vehicles and tanks. Furthermore, he had demonstrated extreme perseverance as a “Rückkämpfer” after being shot down earlier in the

199 BAMA RW 59/362, 240. Volks-Artl.Kps. 410 an OKW.P7. Betr. Vorschlag für die Würdigung von Tapferkeitsauszeichnungen, 4.12.1944. 200 “Erlass über die Stiftung des Ritterkreuzes des Eisernen Kreuzes mit Goldenen Eichenlaub mit Schwertern und Brillanten. Vom 29. Dezember 1944,” RGBl I. 1945. No.3, 11; Below, At Hitler’s Side, 224-225; Höchste deutsche Tapferkeitsauszeichnung vom Führer gestiftet,” VB, January 3, 1945. 141 year, earning a place among the fewer than two dozen Brillantenträger.201 Even more important than his military credentials, though, he was a well-known supporter of the Party, a quality that was more important now than it had ever been before. Rudel, in short, was the perfect man to symbolize the importance of Hitler’s newest creation – much as Günther Prien had done for the

RK in 1939. Unfortunately for the dictator, however, even though he had taken steps to ensure

Rudel’s safety, only a few weeks later in early 1945 the hero crashed and lost his leg, removing him from combat duty and limiting his symbolic potential.202

Taken together with the failure of his last-ditch offensive in the forest in

December, known to history as the , this setback was a heavy blow for Hitler, and it was perhaps because of it that he quickly surrendered any remaining motivation to protect the original symbolic meaning of the RK. Over the rest of the winter, as Allied armies closed in, the dictator relegated RK distribution to an incentive for any and all who would throw themselves forward and so preserve the regime by a few more hours. In March, he extended its qualifications to include suffering extreme wounds as well as the vague category of demonstrating great

“commitment” (Einsatzbereitschaft).203 Most emblematic of his new resignation, though, was his decree that any personnel under arms who destroyed six enemy tanks with a hand-held weapon

(i.e. the “”) or any other improvised means would automatically receive the RK.204 As

201 E.g. Josef Ollig, “Major Rudel Flucht durch die Sowjetlinien. Durch den eiskalten Dnjester geschwommen,” VB, March 29, 1944; ibid., March 31, 1944: “Die Brillanten für Major Rudel. Seine aussergewöhnlichen Leistungen vom Führer durch Verleihung der höchsten deutschen Tapferkeitsauszeichnung gewürdigt.” 202 See GTb II.15, 166 (20.1.1944) and 194 (23.1.1944). 203 BAMA RW 59/308, 10. HPA/P5 Vortragsnotiz. Betr. Neufassung der Verleihungsvoraussetzungen für das Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes, 19.3.1945; ibid., 2. HPA/P5. Maisel an HG Kurland (2). Truppenangelegenheiten,” 19.3.1945. Earlier in the year, moreover, Hitler had issued further orders to all but ban the awarding of the EK order, or even the DK, on the grounds of leadership without accompanying acts of physical bravery. See BAMA RW 59/364, 295. OKW/WZIII (10015/45). Betr. Verleihung des EK und DK für Führungsverdienste, 10.3.1945; ibid., 260. Abschrift 1195/2004 10/3 1415; BAMA RW 59/360, 380. HPA/P5 Tätigkeitsberichte für März, 1945. Befehle und Veränderung, 2. 204 BAMA RH 7/2748. Abschrift. Fernschreiben FHQ an OB Südwest, 6.3.1945. 142 a result of such orders, RK distribution once again rose dramatically to 200 and then 300 per month, with similar trends for the higher grades.205

By this time, though, many of these hundreds of awards were little more than promises, for the concurrent collapse of the Wehrmacht’s administrative and logistical system meant that this demand far exceeded the capabilities of the Ordensabteilung and its counterparts in the other services. With growing frequency, personnel offices began to simply approve RK- recommendations even if they had no medals to give.206 One Army sniper recalled after the war that, in contrast to the celebratory parades and assembled dignitaries that had accompanied previous ceremonies, his investiture had consisted merely of a junior staff officer suspending an ersatz RK (a jerry-rigged EK2) from his throat at headquarters. The officer had expressed his general’s apologies for not being present and promised that he would receive the real award and its relevant documentation sometime in the future.207

Nevertheless, what is most significant about these latter-day RK awardings was the identity of the recipients, who now represented less of a Frontkämpfer-archetype legitimizing the regime’s authority than a collective personification of its final fight for survival, an Endkämpfer. The further disintegration of standards and the politicization of distribution meant that the patterns of both concentration and diversification from the previous year only became worse. What’s more, the

RK had lost even more of the ethnic exclusivity that formed the central core of the

Volksgemeinschaft concept. By 1945, the regime depended on more than a million foreign

205 See Maerz, Ritterkreuz, 39, 243, 269. 206 BAMA RW 59/364, 255. Chef HPA/P5 an Major Domaschk (P5.1), 18.4.1945; BAMA RW 59/362, 302. HPA/P5.2 an Chef P5, 16.10.1944; BAMA RL 1/587, 1945. 46. No.4, 78. Anträgen auf Verleihung des RK des EK und höherer Auszeichnungen, 22.1.1945. See also Maerz, Ritterkreuz, 38. 207 Josef Allerberger, Sniper on the Eastern Front. The Memoirs of Sepp Allerberger. Knight’s Cross, ed. Geoffrey Brooks (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2005), chap.11 (loc.2317, 2330 of 2695), Kindle. 143 volunteers for its defence, and as such there were now over forty men among the ranks of

Ritterkreuzträger from foreign militaries along with even more French, Dutch, Belgian, Walloon,

Danish, Estonian and Latvian recipients among the volunteers within the now vast corpus of the

Waffen-SS.208 The compromised state of Germanic superiority that these awardings represented was exemplified perhaps best by the reporting surrounding Estonian Ritterkreuzträger Harald

Nugiseks, whom propagandists celebrated as a “living symbol” of the “warrior spirit of […] the entire Estonian people.”209

Still, at least such men were soldiers. Arguably the most iconic demonstration of the new

Endkämpfer-archetype was the appearance of the first civilian Ritterkreuzträger. Since the fall, growing numbers of civilians, who ranged in both age and gender, received military decorations as they were called up to fight, often in hastily organized units of the (the paramilitary formation created by Joseph Goebbels in 1944). Given minimal training, these units had “no staffs, no rear echelon, no officer’s mess; instead only a single resolute community that is prepared to defend its home to the last breath.”210 Thereafter they were often placed under the command of an

Army Ritterkreuzträger as a special form of soldier-Gauleiter, to symbolize the dissolution of boundaries between the real and ersatz-soldier.211 Under their leadership, men, women and children soon received the EK2, EK1 and finally the RK in 1945, often for destroying enemy tanks

(in accordance with Hitler’s aforementioned wishes) and were soon featured in surviving

208 Rolf-Dieter Müller, Hitler’s Foreign Soldiers, 254, 125, 136. 209 BAB NS 31/449, 31. SS-Kriegsberichter Elmar Tönimäe, “Das Ritterkreuz für einen estnischen SS-Freiwilligen. Eine Auszeichnung auf die das ganze estnische Volk stolz ist,” n.d., ca. late 1944. See also “Auszeichnungen für Ostfreiwillige,” VB, December 13, 1944; BAB R 34/51. Ritterkreuz-Verleihungen DNB, 10/1227 No.45 “Der Führer verlieh drei Angehörigen der 19 Lettischen SS-Division das Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes,” 14.2.1945. 210 “Das ganze Volk tritt an,” Heidelberger Volksgemeinschaft, October 19, 1944, quoted in David Yelton, Hitler’s Volkssturm. The Nazi and the Fall of Germany, 1944-1945 (University Press of Kansas, 2002), 27-29. 211 Yelton, Hitler’s Volkssturm, 31, 58. 144 newspapers and magazines.212 Such awardings, perhaps more than any other, encapsulated the symbolic disintegration of the RK as a vessel of the Frontkämpfer-ideology of 1939.

Culminating in a bloody struggle over the Reich capital of Berlin, the regime continued to rely on the RK in the remaining weeks of fighting and numbers continued to climb until April 28.

On this day, in a gesture of final resignation, Hitler formally handed all control over RK-approval and distribution to the OKW, jurisdiction which then fell to his successor, Admiral Karl Dönitz after his suicide two days later. Amidst the desperate struggle to hold back Soviet forces for a few more days, the new leader of the Reich cared less than even Hitler now did about preserving any symbolic value to the RK, and thus gave Wehrmacht commands full authority to distribute it at their own discretion. In the days that followed, there were so many RKs (and higher grades) haphazardly awarded that to this day historians debate how many were “legitimate,” demonstrating thereby that the RK was, from its inception to final awarding, Hitler’s Halsorden; its fate was connected to his.213

In the end, then, achieving an ideologically acceptable distribution of the RK ultimately proved a goal that the dictator was never able to realize, though not for a lack of trying. After spending years fighting to preserve its symbolic exclusivity, the final four months of the war had accounted for one sixth of all RKs since 1939, along with a third of the next two grades, a fifth of the penultimate and the only awarding of its last and highest grade. By the time the guns fell silent

212 E.g. BAB R 34/51. 18/1238, DNB 21f. “Das Ritterkreuz für einen Hitlerjungen. Neun Sowjetpanzer durch Panzerfaust erledigt,” n.d., ca. early 1945; “Zivilisten mit dem Ritterkreuz,” BIZ, April 8, 1945; “Ritterkreuz für einen Hitlerjungen. Neun Sowjetpanzer durch Panzerfaust erledigt,” VB (Munich), February 17, 1945; ibid., March 3, 1945: “Das erste Ritterkreuz für Volkssturmann”; DW¸753 (5.3.1945); ibid., 755 (22.3.1945). 213 For details on this controversial process and what has become known as the “Dönitz Decree” on May 7, 1945, which ultimately resulted in legal action in Germany during the 1980s, see Scherzer, Ritterkreuzträger, 9-11. 145 following Germany’s surrender on May 8, 1945, this period of hyperinflation had driven the totals for distribution to 7,314 RK’s, 863 RK-E’s, 147 RK-ES’s, 27 RK-ESB’s and 1 RK-ESBG.214 More important, these final frenzied months had also had an impact on the balances and ratios of RK- distribution that would help to form its future role in memory.

Ironically, given the efforts taken over the previous five years, the inflation and low standards that had taken hold since the previous summer had adjusted RK-distribution to be far closer to an egalitarian level than ever before. Generals, admirals and field marshals now accounted for less than one in ten Ritterkreuzträger, a figure only slightly higher than private soldiers and two-thirds less than NCOs (one in five). Senior commanding officers (majors and colonels) with the RK, meanwhile, were only half those among junior combat officers, rendering the latter the most common recipients - as intended. What’s more, the final months had had a similar effect on the distribution between the services, with the Army ending with roughly six out of every ten

Ritterkreuzträger in its ranks (compared to two from the Air Force and one each from the Navy and Waffen-SS). Finally, though still disproportionate, the number of “technological elites” had also been lessened from previous periods in favour of higher proportions of men in roles which did not involve the quantification of success.215

Yet, even with such eleventh-hour amendments, the final ratios among its higher grades were still emblematic of the problems that had plagued RK-distribution since Hitler’s announcement at the Kroll Opera House. Senior officers accounted for six of every ten

Eichenlaubträger, and eight of every ten Schwerter- and Brillantenträger. Only thirty-eight NCO’s

214 Statistics from Scherzer, Ritterkreuzträger, 15. 215 By way of example, by 1945 aircrew represented a far smaller contingent of Air Force recipients because of the recent surge in desperate awardings to personnel fighting on the ground in defence of Germany’s streets and fields (such as paratroopers or anti-aircraft gunners). A similar pattern also occurred within the Navy regarding the ratio of U-boat commanders to other roles, including shore-battery commanders and members of marine detachments. 146 ever received a grade higher than the RK and not a single enlisted man. Among the services, the long-disputed proportionality of awardees lay in favour of the Air Force, having ended the war with a quarter of all Eichenlaubträger (over half of whom being pilots), one third of

Schwerterträger (two-thirds pilots), almost half of all Brillantenträger (three-quarters pilots) and the one and only Goldträger (also a pilot).216

This final breakdown of RK-distribution, in short, serves as highly visible evidence of the ideological failure that RK-distribution ultimately became for the regime. Having failed to eliminate the problems of order hunting, the lingering influence of the “Wertesystem” as well as the realities of modern, mechanized warfare from phaleristic culture, the regime and its dictator had ended with a Halsorden that belied its intended symbolic meaning. Thus, it is easier to see why, in the memory of some Frontkämpfer, now turned veterans, it was not a symbol of a “new”

Wehrmacht in which recognition and prestige were distributed equally (or even equitably), but rather of enduring inequalities and the moral bankruptcy of the regime’s promises.

216 In more detail, the breakdown of the RK-E had the Air Force with 27 percent, the Waffen-SS with 8, the Navy with 6 and the Army with the rest. For the RK-ES, the same breakdown amounted to 33, 15, 3, 47, and with the RK-ESB it was 44, 7, 7 and 40. For these and further breakdowns of RK distribution by Wehrmacht services and individual ranks, visit www.das-ritterkreuz.de, which bases its findings on the latest indexes and archival records. 147

Chapter III

Privileges of Rank: Ritterkreuzträger and the Question of Special Benefits

Although representing the primary function for extracting political capital from the RK, distribution was not the only means by which the National Socialist regime attempted to do so. Its recipients could act as living extensions of its intended meaning through their positions within the

Volksgemeinschaft as well. As seen in the story of the RK-imposter Adam Drayss, spontaneous popular enthusiasm for war heroes certainly played a part in this (and one discussed at length in the following chapter), but scattered references in egodocuments and biographies have long been used to suggest the existence of a more formal system of special benefits and privileges. Such claims, however, have largely remained uninvestigated. When mentioned in various studies it has remained stalled in generalities, charactierized as but another ill-defined incentive for Wehrmacht soldiers to fight harder or simply dismissed as a fantasy that was to be implemented only after the war and thus of little relevance.1

Yet, as the previous chapter has demonstrated, such purposes would have stood against both official policy (at least until 1945) as well as the RK’s symbolic function. The following chapter, therefore, undertakes to finally reconstruct this underrecognized facet of RK-history. It will contend that what is often referred to as a ‘system,’ was in fact a succession of loosely connected initiatives that emerged during the war, and which in turn spawned several series of smaller privileges and ‘perks’ for Ritterkreuzträger. More important, though, by focusing on three

1 See, for example, Schulze-Wegener, Das Eiserne Kreuz, 148-149; Rass, Menschenmaterial, 260; Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, 284. 148 of these initiatives it will argue that even if disconnected, they reveal a distinct evolution in the regime’s wider program to display Frontkämpfer-ideology and reorder German society according to its principle of front-experience (or at least be seen to do so). In the process, however, it also demonstrates how, on balance, this component of RK-instrumentalization proved at best only of mixed benefit; in the least extreme it became a source of occasional embarrassment, and in the greatest it acted as a signpost to their own flaws and inconsistencies.

III.1 “Special Care” for Heroes

To begin, it does not appear that the creation of this network of special benefits and privileges was part of Hitler’s original plans for the RK. The first formal benefits accorded to

Ritterkreuzträger were ceremonial in nature and inherited from their predecessors, the holders of the PLM. Just before the beginning of the war in the summer of 1939, Hitler had revived several of their customary privileges, such as mandatory salutes for all Halsordenträger from military sentries across the Reich. He had then extended them to the recipients of his new award.2 Aside from such honours, though, stipulations of special or preferential treatment for the holders of high military awards were vague and ill-defined. Such men, instructions said, were “to be promoted within the Wehrmacht in every way,” and provided “special welfare” (besondere Fürsorge) wherever possible.”3

2 See “Inhaber höchster Kriegsauszeichnungen, 10.7.1939 (ODL 64145/39),” in LVBl 1939. No.31, TC. 617; BAB R 43-II/1286 f.3, 142, RK.0.22726. 14.8.1939; ibid., 121. “Erlasse des Führers und Reichskanzlers über die Neuregelung des Ehrensoldes für Träger (Ritter und Inhaber) höchster Kriegsauszeichnungen und der Zulage für Schutztruppenbeschädigte,” 27.8.1939. 3 BAMA RH 15/437, 1. OKW. Abschrift Reinecke (29.6188/40). Betr. Förderung der Träger höchster Kriegsaus- zeichnungen, 8.11.1940. 149

It was over a full year later, in November of 1940, that the first signs of any further action appear in official records. This was the point at which it seems to have become clear to Hitler that the aforementioned vague provisions for “special welfare” amounted to little. While his immediate thoughts on the matter are unknown, Wehrmacht commands subsequently received new instructions that not only reaffirmed but expanded the scope of those previous. Holders of

Germany’s most prestigeous decorations, they said, were to receive higher seniority, preference or special consideration for assignments, transfers and promotions as well as benevolent consideration of health problems attributable to wounds suffered in the line of duty.4

These new instructions may have been a catalyst of sorts, for it was soon after that Hitler began to formulate what would become the first dedicated benefit program for Ritterkreuzträger.

However, it did not begin with them. Rather, extant sources suggest that the dictator first considered ways to materially reward EK holders as a collective. Given their context of the winter of 1940-1941, it is quite possible that these thoughts were connected to the budding “Ordensfrage” debate, in which he was trying concertedly to preserve the order’s ‘proper’ meaning. As discussed in Chapter I, material benefits had been associated with it for over a century and had played an important role in its early development as a symbol of egalitarianism.5 As such, restarting this tradition might well have appeared a beneficial reinforcement of its symbolic purity.

The dictator’s first instinct, it seems, had been to resurrect the “Ehrensold,” a lifelong, honourary pension for EK holders that dated to 1841 (an honour also shared by holders of the PLM and one of those resurrected in 1939).6 This famous benefit had been discontinued during the First

4 Ibid. See also Absolon, Wehrgesetz, 248. 5 For this aspect of the EK’s phaleristic heritage see Winkle, Dank des Vaterlandes, 97-99; Wernitz, Iron Cross, 65, 213, 323. 6 The Ehrensold was originally created by Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm IV. but only for a limited number of EK winners. Later, in 1863, the benefit was expanded to include all recipients. Since then, it had become arguably the 150

World War because of fears that the rapidly inflating number of EK holders (even of the higher

EK1), would make its maintenance financially unviable.7 After the war, moreover, the Weimar government had refused to honour it and as such it had become another component of that state’s alleged “Ehrvergessenheit.” Thus, by restoring the Ehrensold the regime could further demonstrate its differentiation from these earlier governments and its priority to care for Frontkämpfer.

However, even as early as the beginning of 1941 there were already too many holders of even the

1939 EK1 (around 75,0008), let alone the EK2, for Hitler not to see the merit in the arguments of his forebears.

Yet, he could still achieve the symbolic benefit of revived financial privileges if applied to a smaller group, such as Ritterkreuzträger, who were not only far fewer in number but also more visible in propaganda. Moreover, such a measure could only increase their utility as more focused symbols of Frontkämpfer-ideology. Even so, the dictator evidently believed that there were still too many of even these rarified heroes for the program to be cost-effective, for contemporary records reveal that he soon tabled the question of their receiving the Ehrensold until after the war.9

Instead, he seized upon a smaller, parallel component of the EK’s history of financial benefits that had been instituted alongside the Ehrensold, in which the state provided support for heroes who had fallen into financial need.

Such a program would not only demonstrate the regime’s devotion to Frontkämpfer in a more realistic way, but could also be built into the pre-existing administrative structures of financial support that had been created during the 1930s to further the original Oberlindober

most famous aspects of the award but was later cancelled during the First World War (see Hütte, “Eisernen Kreuzes,” 47-48). 7 Wernitz, Iron Cross, 350. 8 BAB R 601/1332 f.1, 16. Statistics PräsKz for April 1941. 9 See BAMA RW 59/294, 24. OKW WZ.III. Abschrift (29c16 711041), n.d., ca. late 1941. 151 system discussed in Chapter I. At the beginning of the war, in fact, the Wehrmacht possessed one of the most comprehensive and efficient welfare systems for its troops in the world, run primarily by the Wehrmacht Welfare and Maintenance Department (WFVA). Under its authority, the unit boasted, the German soldier had been freed “from all worries about the maintenance of his family.”10 Now, Hitler’s plan was to create a distinct new tier of “special care” (Sonderbetreuung) within this system for Ritterkreuzträger that would underline their special status.

The dictator put his plan into action in late April 1941, stating in documents later distributed throughout the Wehrmacht that the RK represented the gratitude of the Volk for the most devoted

Frontkämpfer, and as such they would receive “the material foundations for a lifestyle worthy of the decoration.”11 Under the direction of his faithful acolyte Rudolf Schmundt, and with the aid of the Wehrmacht personnel departments, the WFVA established a system to distribute state funds to Ritterkreuzträger who, “through no fault of their own,” had fallen on hard times (through illness, the collapse of a personal business, the loss of their civilian careers, etc.). With its support these heroes could get back on their feet and maintain a comfortable lifestyle, whether through a one- time infusion of cash or funding to change professions including any costs incurred by educational training. It would even ensure that their family did not lack for adequate household entertainment.12 Furthermore, while these initial documents emphasized support for living heroes, when Hitler formally announced the launching of this new program at a conference on the

10 Regarding the development of Wehrmacht welfare policy and organization, see Crouthamel, German Memory, 160- 161; Rass, Menschenmaterial, 238-239; Götz Aly, Hitler’s Beneficiaries. Plunder, Racial War and the Nazi Welfare State, trans. Jefferson Chase (New York: Metropolitan Books. 2007), 68-72. 11 Referenced in BAMA RW 59/294, 48. LPA Az.31 (63216/41) an ZA/Min.Büro. Betr. Betreuung der Ritterkreuzträger und ihrer Hinterbliebenen, 21.8.1941. 12 BAMA RW 59/294, 7. OKW (WZ-III) an Personalämter (HPA, LPA, MPA) und WFVA. Betr. Betreuung von Ritterkreuzträger (6731/41), 22.4.1941. 152

Obersalzburg on May 16, 1941, he had extended it to post-mortem support for their families as well.13

For Hitler, though, establishing such a system was not enough; it also needed not only to be timely in its attention to Ritterkreuzträger in need, but efficient. This was not simply the dictator being pedantic. Rather, he stressed these priorities as the key to achieving the program’s desired result: demonstrating the regime’s unique and beneficent respect for Ritterkreuzträger as the country’s chief Frontkämpfer. Conversely, to fail and thereby allow the process to sink into the mire of bureaucracy would be a demonstration of continuity with the disinterested and disrespectful inefficiency which the Party claimed had been the hallmark of previous governments.

Each case, therefore, needed to be handled “through immediate and adequate measures” to be a

“worthy” form of recognition.14 Commensurately, Wehrmacht personnel offices were obliged to track the whereabouts and personal details of each Ritterkreuzträger under their jurisdiction. At the same time, they were to create a system of central indices (Zentralkartei) of all these men and their personal details for quick and easy reference. If notified that a Ritterkreuzträger had fallen in combat, for example, they could thus conduct an immediate investigation, make a joint recommendation for financial aid with the WFVA, and then submit all relevant documentation

13 This was the same meeting, in fact, at which he had made his definitive ruling on the “Ordensfrage” then underway with Franz Halder and the officer corps, further suggesting a link between the two. Likewise, as we shall see in the following chapter, Hitler’s addition of post-mortem benefits was likely reflective of several significant deaths among the country’s leading heroes that had taken place shortly before. For the details of the program and the complex process of its administrative creation over the following weeks and months, see: BAMA RW 6/339. Abschrift – WZ.III (29c16/6852). Betr. Betreuung der Hinterbliebenen der Ritterkreuzträger, 16.5.1941; BAMA RW 59/294, 11. Luftwaffe Adj.d.W.b.F. BrB No.1465/41, 13.6.1941; ibid., 48; BAMA RH 15/288, 2-3. Richtlinien für Sonderbetreuung Ritterkreuzträger, 27.7.1941; ibid., 8. Anlage. Bekanntgeben. Zusätze des OKH (2300/41 PA.(Z) Gr.III/IIIb). Richtlinien für Sonderbetreuung der Ritterkreuzträger, 12.9.1941; “Betreuung der Ritterkreuzträger und ihrer Hinterbliebenen (WZ-III 71110/41). Vom 27 Juli 1941, 1.9.1941,” in LVBl 1. 1941, 36. No.1074. 649. 14 BAMA RW 6/339. OKW Abschrift. Betr. Betreuung der Hinterbliebenen gefallener oder vermisster Ritterkreuzträger (WVers (I) 2429/41), 27.6.1941; LVBl 1941, 36. No.1074. 649. 153 with dispatch to Schmundt at FHQ. He would then present a summary to Hitler to make a final judgement in each case.15

The result of these demands, however, was that the program quickly became something of an administrative behemoth. It was soon apparent to Schmundt and his subordinate administrators that fulfilling their task required a sizeable structure of policies, guidelines and channels of communication. For one thing, there was the sheer volume of information to be collected for the aforementioned indices regarding each of the then 500 Ritterkreuzträger, and even information about those who had been rejected for the RK as well. They were to include the man’s date of birth, religion, civilian occupation and a panoply of details about his family and personal circumstances: information on his close relatives and his spouse (current as well as maiden names, date of birth and current address), his children (names, dates of birth and education or training levels), his parents (names, professions, dates of birth and current addresses), as well as the household income and housing conditions of each. On top of this, Hitler even demanded that in the name of equity, the central indices were also to include this information about those

Ritterkreuzträger who had already fallen since 1939 to ensure the well-being of their families too.16

Unfortunately, there are precious few records relating to the program’s support of living

Ritterkreuzträger during the war. There are, however, voluminous records pertaining to its post- mortem component which further illustrate the level of work and detail it involved for administrators. One file provides the case of SS-Unterscharführer (Junior Section Leader, equivalent to Sergeant) Erich Rossner, who served in the “” Division and received the

RK posthumously in August after dying of wounds suffered in action. Thereafter, the investigation

15 BAMA RW 6/339. (WZ.III 29c16/6852); BAMA RW 59/294, 7 and 11. 16 Referenced in BAMA RH 15/288, 8. Abschrift. Btr. Betreuung der Ritterkreuzträger und ihrer Hinterbliebenen, 23.10.1944. See also BAMA RW 59/294, 8. Entwurf, LPA (Az g 11 No.25020/41 (2IE)), 17.5.1941. 154 of the SS branch of the WFVA17 determined that Rossner had two living parents, Georg (fifty- two) and Johanna (fourth-eight), who lived in the town of Gfress in a house worth 20,000

Reichsmarks (RM) with a mortgage of 16,000 RM at 5 percent interest and had a monthly income of 250 RM derived from a combination butcher’s shop and inn. He also had two siblings, a brother

Georg (twenty-seven) and a married sister, Elsa Lutz (nineteen), as well as a fiancée, Anni

Schinhammer, who similarly resided in Gfress but had been serving in as a female auxiliary since August 1940.18

Compiling such information on a large scale and then keeping it updated proved understandably difficult, and soon affected various levels of military and civilian administration.

Within weeks, those involved had been forced to seek the aid of municipal authorities, local Party offices and even police forces to help them and complained that it was unrealistic to expect the level of efficiency the Führer desired.19 They were proved right. The program soon became bogged down by delays that exceeded the dictators preferred time frame. Despite Ritterkreuzträger like

Rossner falling in battle in increasing numbers after Barbarossa, it took over a month for the SS-

HFVA to compile the aforementioned information, submit a formal recommendation to Schmundt, and then receive final approval from Hitler.20 Much the same happened to Sr.Lieutenant Gerhard

17 The SS-Hauptfürsorge- und Versorgungsamt (SS-HFVA). 18 BAB NS 19/3739, 5. Abschrift Chef des SS-HFVA im RMI (Az 46/A) An den Adj.W.b.F. Herrn Oberst Schmundt. Betr. Laufende Zuwendung für Angehörige von Ritterkreuzträgern, 29.9.1941. 19 BAMA RW 58/288, 8; V.I. 30/282. Betreuung der Hinterbliebenen gefallener oder vermisster Ritterkreuzträger, 10.7.1941 in Verfügungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben III, 452. 20 Ultimately, Anni Schinhammer received a one-time “bereavement aid” payment (the amount is not listed), while Rossner’s parents, whom the SS-HFVA deemed ineligible for this aid, did not. Nevertheless, they received an allowance of 100 RM per month owing to the fact, the office said, that Erich would have run their butcher shop after the war were it not for his heroic death (BAB NS 19/3739, 5). Interestingly, despite the relatively recent date of Erich’s death (30 July), this aid was to be retroactively fixed from September of 1939. As a side note, the SS-HFVA also sent a copy of the report to SS-Gruppenführer , the Chief of Staff of Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler, who in turn ordered that it be put in a special safe by Himmler’s secretary, Erika Lorenz. See BAB NS 19/3795, 2. Aktennotiz für Fraulein Lorenz; ibid., 4. SS-Führungshauptamt und Kommandoamt der Waffen-SS. Ritterkreuzträger SS-Uscha. Erich Rossner, 1.10.1941. 155

Etzold, who fell just days after Barbarossa and for whom the WFVA needed over a month to complete the process to secure the Führer’s Sonderbetreuung funds for his family.21 According to program records, by October of 1941 it had accomplished less than twenty retroactive payments and only a handful (the above included) of the growing number of men killed since June.

Despite these early problems, though, the support offered by the program would eventually become an relatively efficient administrative machine that distributed millions to the grieving families of fallen Ritterkreuzträger for the rest of the war.22 Many of these families wrote letters to the dictator or to Schmundt (who personally signed each letter of notification) expressing their gratitude and reaffirmed belief in the justness of the regime and Hitler’s leadership. The parents of

Major Alfred Randel, for instance, wrote to Schmundt in 1944 to say that although they had now suffered the loss of a second son to the war, the Führer’s kind gesture had ensured that their optimism for Germany’s future was still intact. “We have grown old and have seen much,” they wrote, “even in the difficult years [of the Kampfzeit…but] never have we known our destiny so securely as today in our beloved Führer. Tell him, please, that we trust and believe in him to the final victory.”23

By the same token, the program’s value also lay in the fact that it did genuinely prioritize financial need and the principles of egalitarianism in the money it bestowed. The parents, spouses or siblings of fallen Ritterkreuzträger received, on average, 100 to 500 RM from the dictator’s private fund in monthly stipends, and if the hero had children then their surviving parent received

21 See BAB R 2/17726 f.1 Sonderbetreuung Etzold (8263/41), 25.7.1941. 22 Different sections of the voluminous extant records of the program’s transactional history in the later year years can be found in: BAB R 2/17708; BAMA RW 8/11; NARA T-77/853 OKW 99-102. 23 BAMA RW 8/11a 63. J.Randel und Frau an Schmundt (FHQ), 21.5.1944. See further ibid., 19. Frau Hellriegel an Schmundt, n.d.; ibid., 41. Eva Mohr an Schmundt, 16.5.1944; BAMA RW 8/12a 15. Frau Seibicke an den Führer und Reichskanzler Adolf Hitler, 24.8.1944. 156

5,000 RM per child. Thus, some widows received 20,000 RM or more in lump sums in addition to their monthly payments.24 It seems that these funds, moreover, did not favour men of higher rank (as the distribution of the RK did). During 1941, the widow of SS-General Hans-Christian

Schulze, for example, was paid less monthly than the father of Air Force Sergeant Willi Schultz

(120 to 150 RM).25 By the same token, there seems to have been no favouritism by popularity. The surviving spouses or parents of a little-known Ritterkreuzträger could receive as much or more than those of the Reich’s most famous heroes, such as the mothers of the prominent

Eichenlaubträger Joachim Schepke (250 RM)26 or Margarite Prien, the mother of the “Bull of

Scapa Flow” (300 RM)27.28

More important than these positive results, though, was the fact that Hitler’s financial safety net for Ritterkreuzträger appears to have inspired the creation of a growing number of other material benefits. By the end of 1941, a host of honours, special rights and other perks began to appear for members of this group that reinforced the regime’s new efforts to appear to give

Frontkämpfer their promised place in society. Official benefits contained in Wehrmacht regulations that stipulated “care during lifetime” (Betreuung bei Lebzeiten), for example, included the privilege for Ritterkreuzträger of enlisted or NCO rank to travel for free in higher-class carriages on German trains (whether on active duty or private holidays), normally the preserve of officers.29 Hitler’s program, moreover, also seems to have sparked the desire among other Nazi leaders to emulate him by allowing Ritterkreuzträger special privileges in their own sphere of

24 E.g. BAB R 2/17726 f.2, No.10348/41, 11401/41, 11868/41. 25 Ibid., No.11960/41. 26 Ibid., No.11492/41. 27 Ibid., No.14256/41. 28 There are some cases, such as in late 1941, where Hitler did make specific provisions for the families of certain Ritterkreuzträger, but these were varied in both rank and service. They were very much an exception rather than a rule. See BAMA RW 59/294, 4. L.P. 5. “Betreuung von Hinterbliebenen von Ritterkreuzträger“, 11.12.1941. 29 BAMA RW 59/294, 24 §3e. 157 influence. In his capacity as Reich Hunt Master, for example, Hermann Göring was to arrange exemptions from wartime restrictions on hunting across Germany, while Propaganda Minister

Goebbels soon implemented a new policy that reserved boxes for Ritterkreuzträger in all theatres across the Reich.30

At the same time, in the wake of the special-care program there now emerged a series of special policies and ceremonial regulations surrounding the deaths of Ritterkreuzträger. Aside from the development of a strict process of notification and press-releases discussed further in

Chapter IV, the WFVA soon also had to help widows and parents to organize funerals and funerary processions (Trauerparade) suitable for the nation’s heroes, the cost of which was to be borne by the Wehrmacht. This included the design, acquisition and delivery of “suitably ornate headstones,” the cost of a casket or cremation, any printed matter, horticultural equipment and even appropriate mourning clothes for the family to wear.31 Likewise, local WFVA authorities were to arrange for commemorative wreaths, including (in the case of the Air Force) one on behalf of the relevant

Wehrmacht branch chief (costing between 100 and 120 RM) and a slightly bigger one from Hitler

(150-250 RM).32 Finally, the latter himself insisted that “Ritterkreuzträger receive a preferential

30 It is unclear exactly when this hunting privilege began but record of its official existence can be seen in a later document from 1944. See “V.I. 8/68. Zulassung zur Jägerprüfung, 24.3.1944,” in Verfügungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben, VI, 223. For details of Goebbels’s theatre-seat program see BAB R 55/20435, f1 22. Abt.T (Berlin), T 65-2/100 15/13. Ref. Dűrr an Goebbels Betr. Dienstplätze in den Theatre, 18.2.1942; ibid., 43. RMVP. Gutterer an Theatreabteilung. (Meldung No.30002 Akz t 6502/100 – 15/13), 21.4.1942. See also GTb II.3, 412 (4.3.1942). It is perhaps worth noting, moreover, that in December 1941 Goebbels railed furiously at the Reich Ministry of Finance for having the audacity to saddle the bereaved dependents of leading Frontkämpfer with the indignity of taxes. However, this was one perk that Ritterkreuzträger did not receive. See GTb II.2, 505 (14.12.1941). 31 BAMA RW 6/339 (Wvers 2429/41); ibid., OKW Abschrift (WVers. 4753/42), 17.7.1942; ibid., Notiz Chef. WFVA. Betr. Betreuung der Hinterbliebenen von Ritterkreuzträgern, 17.12.1942. 32 BAMA RW 59/294, 24 §4; BAMA RH 55-18/86, 1. “Handakte Ritterkreuzträger.” Betr. Anweisung an den Sachbearbeiter für die Bearbeitung der Ritterkreuzträgerfälle beim Tod und Vermisstsein,” n.d., ca. early 1943. 158

[and highly visible] grave site,” namely in cemeteries near city centers if inside the Reich and preferably in a central spot therein, in order that the grave “achieves the appropriate effect.”33

Within two years of Hitler’s first recorded deliberations on special provisions for

Ritterkreuzträger, in other words, there was a growing array of advantages that came bundled together with the receipt of the RK and which augmented their prestige in wartime society. In fact, the ability of administrators to keep track of them all, along with the many other ceremonial and honourific obligations it had to other esteemed personages, compelled the Army to create a special department in January 1943 called the “Group for Representation and Honours” (Gruppe

Repräsentationen und Ehrungen).34 However, the need for such an organization was indicative of a wider trend of issues that the rapid growth of the benefits system for Ritterkreuzträger was beginning to produce, and which only got worse as the war progressed.

For one, despite its appearance of beneficent and equitable recognition for the sacrifices of

Frontkämpfer, the special-care program itself was soon suffering from human and design errors that undermined this message. Even though it operated by the aforementioned benchmarks for distributing funds to grieving families, administrators with the WFVA and OKW found that the program did not take into account differences in living expenses between, for example, urban and rural families.35 Even worse, Hitler soon discovered to his frustration that certain WFVA case officers were simply not bothering to ascertain specific economic conditions for affected families, with the result that some were receiving money they did not need while other, more deserving

33 Two good examples of discussion about gravestones and plots can be found in BAMA RW 59/307, 47 HPA an RMin.L.ODL. Betr. Grabmal für den Ritterkreuzträger Hauptmann Kuntze, 30.1.1944 and BAMA RW 59/1378, 264. OKL Az.21 (g/45) Chef.Abt. IV.b an OKH. Betr. Errichtung der Grabstätte für Brillantenträger Oberst Helmut Lent und Ritterkreuzträger Oberfbwl. Walter Kubisch auf dem Garnisonfriedhof in Stadte, März, 1945. 34 BAMA RL 5/894, 18. HPA (No.240/43) Gruppe Repräsentation und Ehrungen (hereafter GRE). Geschäftsverteilungsplan, 25.1.1943. 35 BAMA RW 6/339, Abschrift OKW AWA/Wvers (2540/44). Betr. Sonderbetreuung der Angehörigen von Ritterkreuzträgern, hier bei selbständigen Landwirten, Altenteilern usw., 30.9.1944. 159 families were left in poor living conditions, defeating the whole purpose of the project.36 Some officers, meanwhile, had simply taken it upon themselves to create new benefits, such as provisions for the families of fallen Ritterkreuzträger to travel to local spas for periods of rest at the expense of the Wehrmacht.37 Consequently, despite their best intentions, the culture of special rights and honours served to stoke up feelings of inequality amongst some Germans who watched war heroes and their families receive an ever mounting number of seemingly unnecessary benefits while their own conditions grew steadily worse.

It was not until the summer of 1943, though, that this resentment led to action at high levels to address the “problem of preference.” The issue that sparked this action was the “developed habit” of favouritism towards Ritterkreuzträger, and specifically their families, at local government offices. According to complaints received by the PKz attested in a Reich-wide circular in June, when the latter entered such facilities they received immediate and efficient attention from the chief official to resolve their problems. By contrast, amid the growing administrative difficulties facing such offices, all others had to wait long periods and only received “businesslike” help, if they received it at all. Thus, the PKz stressed that while “originating from good intent,” the elevation of elite Frontkämpfer needed to be taken with greater circumspection because of, ironically, “its propaganda effect.” Given the difficulties of the present war situation, it would not do to show such exaggerated favouritism to the families of Ritterkreuzträger (who also had the

36 Ibid., Abschrift. Chef. WFVA. Betr. Betreuung der Hinterbliebenen von Ritterkreuzträgern, 17.12.1942; BAMA RH 53-17/129 Az. 29.1 OKH PA/GRE (16/43 geh). Betr. Betreuung der Ritterkreuzträger, 14.1.1943. 37 BAMA RW 6/339 (17.12.1942). 160 safety net of the special-care program beneath them) when there were scores of children and war widows in need of “first line care” by the Party and government.38

In addition to resentment, though, the political authorities and WFVA also found themselves in particularly delicate and sometimes awkward territory from an ideological standpoint when it came to the new regulations and mandated style for the commemoration of fallen heroes. While most families undoubtedly appreciated the provisions made for these occasions, reports from 1942 and 1943 illustrate how there were cases when they did not or had different desires regarding the burial and commemoration of their loved ones.39 Compromises could be made, but on occasion these disputes boiled over into public spectacle and embarrassing displays of disunity. One notable example comes from the life of Air Force ace and Brillantenträger

Helmut Lent. Killed near the war’s end, Lent’s status necessitated (according to regulations) a state funeral complete with procession, wreaths and suitably ideological rhetoric.40 This displeased the

Lent family, however, who publicly protested that the ace, a devout Christian, had wanted a religious burial without reference to Nazi ideology, and soon published an obituary that said as much in the popular Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. Such events prompted a response from the SD, which, according to Peter Hinchcliffe, subsequently had the same publication print a story reaffirming the regime’s praiseworthy commemoration and added, ominously, that Lent’s record was the only thing saving his family (and the relevant editor) from punishment.41

38 “V.I. No.32/402. Richtlinien über bevorzugte Abfertigung, Bedienung und Betreuung, 30.6.1943,” in Verfügungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben IV. 1524, 33 (see also BAB R 4901/14360 (1), 263. Goebbels an REM. Betr. Richtlinien für bevorzugte Betreuung, 30.6.1943). 39 BAMA RW 6/339. OKW/AWA/WVWIIa (4753-42). Bestimmungen für die Durchführung der Beerdigung und Herrichtung einer würdigen Grabstätte für Inhaber des Ritterkreuzes im Reichsgebiet, 17.7.1942; ibid., Abschrift. OKW/AWA/WVWIIa (1951/43). Betr. Aufstellung von Erinnerungsmalen zum Gedächtnis an Gefallene auf Friedhöfen im Heimatgebiet, 12.5.1943 40 Hinchcliffe, Lent Papers, 265-273. 41 Ibid., 273-281. 161

As we shall see in Chapter V, trouble stemming from the connections between

Ritterkreuzträger and the Christian churches was not limited to this event. Yet, such an incident paled in comparison to the possibility of a far more embarrassing ideological heresy made possible by the new regulations for commemorating fallen Ritterkreuzträger. In the summer of 1943,

Walther Tiessler, the head of a special liaison department between the PKz and Joseph Goebbels’s

Propaganda Ministry (the Reichsring für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda, or RRVP), received a request from political authorities in the Sudetenland regarding a particularly sensitive matter.

Specifically, they asked what they were supposed to do if an unnamed local Ritterkreuzträger were to perish since it had been discovered (the report does not say how) that he happened to be among those rare members of the Wehrmacht whose family were racial Mischlinge; that is, part Jewish.42

Thus, the Sudeten authorities now realized that they faced the possibility of demeaning themselves by providing public honours (and financial care) to these racial inferiors.

To do so would be in accordance with the strict directives that had flowed outwards from

FHQ over the past two years, but in obvious contravention of the Party’s anti-Semitic principles.

As a result, they sought the counsel of the PKz on the appropriate course of action should this eventuality occur. However, the latter was evidently just as confused and/or apprehensive about providing the requested counsel (and thus the responsibility for any ugly consequences). As a result, and in a fashion typical of Nazi administration, after two weeks of discussion Tiessler and

42 Akten PKz II.4, 553. 44707 (14.7.1943-2.8.1943). Mischlinge, meaning “Half Breed,” was a category created by the 1935 “Blood and Honour Laws” which regulated intermarriage within the Volk. Just before the war, Hitler had made special exemptions for some Mischlinge to serve within the Wehrmacht as well as to win decorations and even obtain a “Certificate of German Blood” (Deutschblütigkeitserklärung) through exemplary conduct. As Bryan Mark Riggs has documented in multiple works on the subject, such opportunities drove numerous Mischlinge to feats of bravery that earned them high honours, including the RK and even the RK-E. Arthur Becker-Neetz, for example, one quarter- Jewish Mischlinge, was received by Hitler personally to receive his Ritterkreuz as well as Hitler’s pardon in August of 1941 for having saved his company and taken a bullet to the head in the process. See Bryan Mark Riggs, Lives of Hitler’s Jewish Soldiers. Untold tales of Men of Jewish Descent Who Fought for the Third Reich (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2009) 7, 108, 172-176, 200, 205; “A 34/42. Behandlung von Jüdischen Mischlingen in der Wehrmacht, 23.6.1942,” in Verfügungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben II, 152-153. 162 the PKz passed this responsibility back to the Sudeten authorities. In their response they stated that

“the settlement of this question” was something that could surely be handled locally as long as the latter exercised “the appropriate tact,” if indeed if it ever happened at all. 43 Extant sources do not provide further explanation about this case, nor if the feared eventuality did actually take place.

Yet, its existence serves as further evidence of the potentially damaging issues that were being created by the growing assortment of privileges and honours for Ritterkreuzträger and that helped define their symbolic role in society.

Even so, by 1942 the benefits network as a whole was already in the process of undergoing an important shift. Those created before this date that had flowed outwards from the special-care program in 1941 were largely semiotic in nature and did not signal any major societal reforms.

Enlisted Ritterkreuzträger obtaining passage in first class train carriages may have been good propaganda but did not change the fact that such spaces were still largely defined along class lines.

Likewise, in practice even the financial aid distributed through the special-care program was geared primarily to ensure only that elite Frontkämpfer could maintain their lifestyles. Most of these early programs, in short, created the aura of material elevation but in reality simply avoided the negative symbolic capital of highly visible heroes, or their families, becoming destitute and thus belying the regime’s self-proclaimed revolution. Such benefits, in short, were window dressing, an ideological insurance policy.

That said, Hitler and the Nazi elite do appear to have genuinely intended to reorder German society according to the Party’s ideological principles and promises, but only after the war when the Wehrmacht had won a pan-European empire and the regime had the space, wealth and

43 Akten PKz II.4, 553. 4407. 163 resources with which to do it. During 1942, however, several factors encouraged Hitler to accelerate this timetable for social engineering. Consequently, while Ritterkreuzträger continued to enjoy the honours and everyday “perks” of the 1941-style, two new and large-scale benefit programs soon emerged that differed in both tone and substance, reflecting a more tangible, future- oriented form of symbolic elevation. At the same time, in their own ways these new initiatives would each reveal some of the potential consequences of the regime’s new policy direction and, like their forerunners, some of the inconsistencies of the Nazi state itself.

III.2 Problematic Promotions

The first of these new benefits was that of promotion and would have both a military and civilian component. Within the Wehrmacht, this process began because of Hitler’s desire to

“modernize” its personnel and promotion policies, yet, at the same time, was wholly counter to his express wishes. As discussed by historians including Reinhard Stumpf and MacGregor Knox, alterations to the Wehrmacht’s promotions structure had already been a point of contention between Hitler and the military elite for some time. The traditional emphasis on educational and intellectual requirements (Bildung) in promotion procedures remained a jealously guarded pillar of military personnel policy, something that, like the “Wertesystem” discussed in the previous chapter, was related to conciliatory political decisions taken by the dictator during the 1930s.44

Hitler was no great fan of this culture, but according to his Army Adjutant, Gerhard Engel, he took comfort in the hope that the war would infuse the officer corps with a younger generation who had

44 See Reinhard Stumpf, Die Wehrmacht-Elite: Rang- und Herkunftsstruktur der deutschen Generale und Admirale 1933-1945 (Boppard am Rhein: H. Boldt, 1982). See further Knox, “Wehrmacht Officer Policy,” 801-825; Messerschmidt, Zeit der Indoktrination, 87-93, 422-40; Hürter “Military Elite and Volksgemeinschaft,” 262-265; and Müller, Hitler’s Wehrmacht, 14-15. 164 grown up under National Socialism.45 Even so, during the first three years of the war he had still tried, unsuccessfully, to deemphasize the importance of “Bildung” in promotion regulations in favour of “Leistung,” advancement based on measurable combat effectiveness (i.e. the qualities theoretically symbolized by the “command merit” clause of the EK).46

Hitler’s willingness to tolerate this state of affairs, though, evidently ran out as the

Wehrmacht struggled for every step of Soviet territory on the Eastern Front. With each passing month, the dictator grew increasingly incensed at his military leadership and their seeming lack of commitment to Frontkämpfer-ideology. Once again, a main target was Franz Halder who, as discussed in Chapter II, acted as an ambassador for the traditional officer corps. Hitler berated him in September 1942 (before dismissing him): “What do you, Herr Halder, you who in the First

World War sat on the same revolving stool, want to tell me about the troops. You, who did not even once wear the black armband of the wounded?”47 With the help of his fellow former

Frontkämpfer and loyal servant Rudolf Schmundt (whom he elevated to chief of the HPA at this point), the dictator began to implement new reforms to promotion policy. In October he formally instituted a new system of “preferential promotion” (bevorzugte Beförderung) that would be based on a “Leistungsprinzip” (achievement principle) in which proven combat officers were to be identified for promotion without regard to age or length of service. In effect, the new policy would accelerate the creation of a true Volksoffizierskorps (People’s Officer Corps) in which, as

45 Engel and Kotze, Army Adjutant, 88, nt.241 (4.3.1940). 46 For a detailed discussion of these efforts, see Knox, “Wehrmacht Officer Policy,” 806, 816-817. 47 Engel and Kotze, Army Adjutant, 131 (4.9.1942), 136-137 (19.10.1942). Similar pronouncements are recorded by Heinz Guderian in his memoirs (Panzer Leader, 378). For Halder’s dismissal, see Hartmann, Halder, 329-342. 165 famously proclaimed in an OKW bulletin of October 20, “every soldier carries a field marshal’s in his knapsack.”48

However, even though this measure amounted to an institutional application of

Frontkämpfer-ideology, it was not meant to include Ritterkreuzträger. Hitler had already made clear that while the symbolic virtues that earned one the RK (or at least were supposed to – i.e. bravery) were certainly good to promote in a general sense, he knew from his own time as a soldier that they were not necessarily evidence of one’s capacities as a commander. In one of his “table talks” the previous year, he noted: “One can be a courageous soldier and have no gift for command.

One can reward courage by a Knight’s Cross without implying a subsequent promotion in rank.”49

The two often coincided, in other words, but they were fundamentally distinct. Consequently, while Hitler’s policy did include the stipulation that high bravery decorations would include improvement in rank seniority (Rangdienstalter), the “preferential promotions” were to be limited only to those few men who had proven themselves not only through “momentum and bravery,” but as capable of higher responsibility.50 This new policy and its underlying Leistungsprinzip, in short, demonstrated some of the practical limits of the dictator’s view of Frontkämpfer-ideology.

Yet, while these limits were clear to the dictator, they evidently were not to a good many of his field commanders. Given the other benefits already extended to Ritterkreuzträger, there was confusion about the specifics of their role within the new promotion paradigm. During the

48 See Knox, “Wehrmacht Officer Policy,” 801-802, 817-818, 820-823; Messerschmidt, Zeit der Indoktrination, 426. Rudolf Schmundt naturally praised the policy as a step towards a more egalitarian Wehrmacht while Joseph Goebbels noted in his diary how it would reawaken a spirit of political fanaticism not seen since the Kampfzeit. See Bradley and Schulze-Kossens, Tätigkeitsbericht, 4-8 (4-5.10.1942), 16 (4.11.1942); GTb II.6, 51-53 (2.10.1942); ibid., II.7, 514 (9.3.1943). 49 Trevor-Roper, Table Talk, 92-93. No.64. 50 BAMA RH 12-1/75, 132. Abschrift HPA 21/42. FHQ. Betr. Förderung von Führerpersönlichkeiten, vorzugsweise Beförderung, Verbesserung des Rangdienstalters, 4.11.1942; BAMA RH 4/266, 110 Chef.HPA Bez. AHM 43, z.98. IV.10. Betr. Verbesserung des Rangdienstalters bei hohen Tapferkeitsauszeichnungen, 17.4.1943. See further Messerschmidt, Zeit der Indoktrination, 422-425. 166 following year, documents from both Army and Air Force personnel offices reveal that both services had to issue repeated memoranda and guidelines to confused commanders who were not quite sure, in light of the new changes, when it was appropriate to award a proven officer the RK or RK-E etc., or to extend him “preferential promotion” since, to their mind, they seemed to be based on the same principles.51 Despite clarification being provided by said offices, though, there is evidence suggesting that, contrary to Hitler’s wishes, this conflation of Ritterkreuzträger-status and promotion become an increasingly standard practice.

After the war, for instance, the Ritterkreuzträger veterans’ association (the

Ordensgemeinschaft der Ritterkreuzträger, OdR) responded to continued queries (and evidently still confusion) about this issue. According to these men themselves, it was a general rule that if a promotion followed within a month of a man receiving the RK, the two were considered causally connected: a so-called “Bravery Promotion” (Tapferkeitsbeförderung).52 In any case, by 1944 the

OKH had embraced the concept, and specifically searched for regimental commanders with the

RK for promotion to command divisions, based on the belief that “the type of future divisional commander should be a younger, war-experienced and proven officer, who can carry the troops through his impetus and his will.” His “heart and character stand first,” it continued, “and intellect second.”53 Finally, even Hitler’s own scruples about conflating bravery with command potential

51 In response, for example, the HPA issued a notice in the fall of 1943 reaffirming the spirit of Hitler’s new program, namely that automatic promotions, however honouring to successful Frontkämpfer, were not ideologically correct. Indeed, it even issued a template for the rejection of a Ritterkreuzträger-promotion application. See BAMA RW 9/20, 63. OKH PA Ag 1 3860 (1a1) Schmundt. Betr. Beförderung zu Generalsdienstgraden, 14.5.1943; ibid., HPA Staff.1 an Ag.P1. Neue Regelung, 8.10.1943; BAMA RH 4/266, 109. Abschrift HPA. Betr. Betreuung von Ritterkreuzträger, 30.3.1943; “Bevorzugte Beförderung von Wehrmachtbeamten. Vom 27 Sept. 1943,” LVBl II. 1943. No.42. 1750, 959. 52 MSG 3/685. “Denkschrift der GdR zu der Frage der Tapferkeitsbeförderung,” in Das Ritterkreuz. Mitteilungsblatt der Ordensgemeinschaft der Ritterkreuzträger (hereafter Das Ritterkreuz) 3. 1958. No.8-9, 84. 53 Bradley and Schulze-Kossens, Tätigkeitsbericht, 212 (19.8.1944). See also Absolon, Wehrmacht im Dritten Reich, VI, 398. 167 seem to have disappeared by 1945, when he ordered automatic promotions for NCOs with the RK and other high awards to lead the desperate fighting.54

Unintentionally, therefore, the dictator’s program of preferential promotions became enfolded into the growing panoply of benefits and privileges that came along with the RK (for officers, at least), now adding the potential for career advancement. However, what was more significant for a growing number of recipients was that this mobility was also becoming a reality in civilian life. Unlike military promotions, Hitler had never condemned this form of automatic career advancement, and some sources do suggest that, because of his vague policies in 1939-1940 about the general elevation of high-award winners, at least some had experienced preferential treatment already.55 However, beginning in late 1942, and possibly as an homage to the dictator’s own efforts within the Wehrmacht, several senior leaders in the political administration began to organize a broader, and more formalized system of preferential promotions to Ritterkreuzträger in their own sphere.

The first such effort to appear in contemporary sources came from one leader who had already made good use of his position to create special privileges and positions for

Ritterkreuzträger: Heinrich Himmler. For some time, as testified by Rudolf Schmundt, the

Reichsführer-SS had been willing to circumvent proper channels to ensure that his own men received this Halsorden.56 What’s more, as evidenced by his own staff files, he had also been one of those leaders who rushed to create special privileges for SS-Ritterkreuzträger in 1941, ranging

54 BAB NS 6/353, 173. Abschrift FHQ an Chef HPA, 7.3.1945. Writing in his diary, Joseph Goebbels remarked that Hitler’s new initiative would be a positive influence towards the continued goal of reshaping the Wehrmacht to be more in line with the egalitarianism of the Volksgemeinschaft, in which it did not matter whether one “understood how to eat with a knife and fork.” GTb II.15, 481 (12.3.1945). 55 See Erlass II. SB 1763/40 - 6197 vom 10.5.1940 in BAMA RH 15/437, 1. 56 E.g. BAMA RW 59/364, 137. Vortragsnotiz. Anruf Schmundt, 2.3.1942; BAB NS 19/938, 7. Brack an Wolff, 23.3.1943. 168 from securing places for their children in elite schools to sending them personal Christmas hampers.57 In September of 1942, though, Himmler issued an order for his staff to gather the names and professional information on all Ritterkreuzträger under his jurisdiction and soon after began to organize appointments and promotions for them as well.58 In October, for example, he began arrangements for Hans Plesch, a recent RK-recipient, to be named police president of

Munich, writing to him of his pleasure that one of the “old Nazis [sic]” had proven himself “a

[Kämpfer] in every situation.”59

This general level of activity on behalf of his own men does appear to have been singularly proactive, but Himmler’s most recent efforts were part of a wider trend. Just days after his aforementioned orders to collect the names of SS-Ritterkreuzträger, similar instructions emanated from the office of Hans Pfundtner (State Secretary at the Interior Ministry) to all Reich, Gau and municipal authorities to collect the names and employment history of all Ritterkreuzträger employed by the civil service in civilian life.60 The same went for the Justice Ministry, in whose files appears a list of the names, internal departments, specific offices and military ranks of twenty- four employed Ritterkreuzträger.61 The synchronization of action by these different state organs suggests, at the very least, the foundations of a general movement towards the professional

57 BAB NS 19/3795, 6. Adj. der Reichsführer-SS Hauptsturmführer Grothman. “Vorschlag für die Verleihung des Ritterkreuz für SS-Obersturmführer Rentrop, 8.10.1941; ibid., 10. RFSS Personalstab, Tgb No.A 18/232/41, Betr. Ehem. SS-Mann Karl Nordmann, SS No.135-148 Fr. 18.10.1941; ibid., 8. RFSS Personalstab (Tgb A 35/173/41 BraSchb.). Betr. Ritterkreuzträger der Waffen-SS. 27.11.1941. 58 Himmler’s instructions, dated 5.9.1942 (IIa 2360/42-6210), are referenced in an Interior Ministry (RMI) report from 1944: BAB R 1501/130230. RMI zu III 1 A 88/44. An Ref. Dr. Joachim u. Ref Dr. Molsen. 13.7.1944. 59 On top of his appointment, Himmler awarded Plesch an honourary rank of Obersturmbahnführer (Lt. Colonel), which was soon followed by two more rapid promotions: first to SS-Oberführer (Sr. Colonel), and finally to SS- Brigadeführer ( General) in January 1944. See BAB NS 19/784, 5-22. SS-Oberführer Hans Plesch, d.R.- Gratulation zur Verleihung des Ritterkreuzes, Verwendung für SS bzw. Waffen-SS, Einsetzung als Polizeipräsident in München (1942-1944). 60 BAB R 1501/130230. Pfundtner an Reichsstatthalter, Landesregierungen, Reichsstathalter in Gauen und Preussen, Oberpräsident Preussen u. Oberbürgermeister Berlin. Betr. Verleihung höchster Kriegsauszeichnungen an Beamte, Angestellte und Arbeiter des öffentlichen Dienstes, 11.9.1942. 61 See BAB R 3001/24687. Liste der Ritterkreuzträgern in der Reichsjustizverwaltung, n.d., ca. late 1942 – early 1943). This list also included those decorated with the DK-G. 169 elevation of war heroes in civilian administration in the fall of 1942 (i.e. at the same time as Hitler’s

Wehrmacht reforms). By the winter, however, this movement had begun to evolve into a general policy.

On December 3, Pfundtner dispatched a memorandum to the Supreme Government

Authorities (oberste Reichsbehorden62) about the possibility of creating a set of uniform guidelines for a system of preferential promotions for Ritterkreuzträger employed in the civil service. He framed the proposed measure as nothing less than the just reward for those who had proved their metal in “the fight for the freedom of our people.” Even if they had not yet fulfilled the requisite tests or requirements, such a man “will be competent, by virtue of his high courage, his decisiveness, his presence of mind and his constant selfless sense of duty, for peak performance in a professional position in the coming time of peace.”63 Such an idea, Pfundtner acknowledged, had been proposed the year before for EK1 holders, but as with Hitler’s idea for the Ehrensold this too had been dropped for sheer impracticability. To dispel similar concerns, he assured readers that this new program for Ritterkreuzträger was as feasible as it was noble.64

After several weeks of discussion, on January 19, 1943 the Reich Ministers of the Interior

(Wilhelm Frick), of Finance (Lutz Graf Schwerin von Krosigk), and the head of the RKz (Heinrich

Lammers), issued a joint circular that mandated the automatic promotion of Ritterkreuzträger of any who had been employed within the civil service (presumably upon their return).65

Moreover, unlike in the Wehrmacht, rather than simply receiving special consideration for

62 All state authorities, including Reich Ministries, directly subordinated to Hitler and those with special designations. 63 BAB R 43-II/455 f.1, 40-41. RMI. II A 2830/42 – 6197. Betr. Förderung eines im Beamtenverhältnis stehenden Ritterkreuzträgers, 3.12.1943. 64 According to surviving records, Frick put an end to the EK1-scheme in a circular of April 28, 1941 (II SB 570/41 – 6197). See BAB R 43–II/455 f.1, 48. RMI an die Obersten Reichsbehörde, Betr. Förderung der im Beamtenverhältnis stehenden Ritterkreuzträger (II a 2830/42 6197), 19.1.1943. 65 BAB R 43-II/455 f.1, 48-49. 170 promotion but still being subject to proper evaluation, this new scheme entailed blanket exemptions for Ritterkreuzträger from nearly all pre-war laws regulating employment, appointment and promotion within the service. This included the passing of official examinations, probationary periods, minimum age and service requirements as well as limitations on salaries.66

It amounted, in other words, to an unqualified fast-track to social mobility for Ritterkreuzträger, and the blueprint for a substantial work of social engineering.

Pfundtner’s easy assurance about the straightforwardness of the program, however, was quickly swallowed up by the toxic culture that was endemic within the Nazi state. This was not the first time that a wave of “Kämpfer” had been given promotions en masse outside of normal processes as a reward for superior “front experience.” In the years after the Machtergreifung in

1933, the Party’s Alte Kämpfer had flooded into positions of power within the administration in an unprecedented wave of politically sanctioned nepotism.67 Often without any qualifications or relevant experience, their elevation caused serious rifts between the professional civil service and the Party, establishing what Hans Mommsen once famously called a "polycratic” system of corruption wherein elites competed with each other using their own administrative fiefdoms as bases of influence and authority.68 Unmerited promotions and professional nepotism, in other

66 The only exemptions that would not be given automatically were promotions to the senior levels of the civil service, which would require Hitler’s personal approval. Ibid.; 43. Pfundtner an Lammers. 9.12.1942; 44. RK.17045 C/E S. RK 13226. Lammers an Frick. 11.12.1942l. See also BAB R 4901/14360 (2), 62. MLBl (1943) s.102 Abdruck des Runderlass vom 24.1.1943 Z I B 144/43 IIa. 24.2.1943. 67 In 1937, for example, Hitler passed a decree mandating that 10 percent of posts within the civil service would be reserved for such men. See further Orlow, Nazi Party, 209, 226, 246-248; Aly, Hitler’s Beneficiaries, 25-30. 68 Hans Mommsen’s Beamtentum im Dritten Reich (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1966) remains the foundational study on this subject, in which he chronicles the Party’s gradual campaign to take over the civil service. For a more recent and succinct historiographical overview of the debate over which won the struggle, however, see Dietrich Orlow’s introduction to Part II of his Nazi Party, 215-224. 171 words, were the modus operandi of the Nazi state, and it is therefore easy to see how ministers and department chiefs quickly embraced the new system.69

The records of the Ministry of Labour (Reichsarbeitsministerium), for instance, provide the example of Captain Wilhelm Hemmer, who received the RK in 1943. In civilian life he had been a member of the civil service in Hamburg since 1920 and thus, in accordance with the new policy, found himself promoted from Secretary in the Provincial Insurance Office (Landessekretär) to Administrative Inspector (Verwaltungsinspektor), with a salary increase to the second highest level in the service.70 The records of the RMI, meanwhile, yield five further examples of war heroes who similarly received preferential promotions. Minister Frick elevated Dr. Curt von Burgsdorff, a senior official in the administration of the Protectorate of and Moravia, as full State

Secretary. He also promoted Wolf-Werner Graf von der Schulenburg, a Senior Governing

Councillor (Oberregierungsrat) in the Reich Sport Department, to the rank of Governmental

Director (Regierungsdirektor). In the mid-levels of the service, meanwhile, Kurt Drössiger, a

Departmental Assistant (Amtsgehilfe) from , received the rank of Government Assistant

(Regierungsassistent) and Friedrich Musculus, a clerk in the state administration of Bavaria, became a Government Councillor (Regierungsrat).71

According to the RMI summary from which these examples came, this list of promotions was but a fraction of those distributed and there were also further efforts underway to identify more eligible Ritterkreuzträger (something also happening in other ministries and departments,

69 Götz Aly demonstrates how Finance Minister Krosigk received tax free subsidies from Hitler and availed himself of 450,000 RM of public funds to purchase an apartment (Aly, Hitler’s Beneficiaries, 25-30). It is also worth noting that Krosigk also had a brother who happened to be a Ritterkreuzträger, which perhaps made him so amenable to their rapid social elevation. 70 BAB R 3901/11916. Notiz, Reich Arbeitsminister (Berlin). Betr. Förderung eines im Beamtenverhältnis stehenden Ritterkreuzträgers. Anlage 1: Betr. Ritterkreuzträger Hauptmann Hemmer, 21.8.1943. 71 BAB R 1501/130230. RMI III.1. 2815/2727. Vermerk Glaezer, 30.9.1943. 172 whose files demonstrate a constant process of updating their own lists).72 What’s more, promotions were not the only honours bestowed. One report to RMI State Secretary Wilhelm Stuckart detailed how eighteen Ritterkreuzträger were to be assembled for a series of special receptions with him.73

Given this fact, it is difficult to determine the total number who received special treatment in the civil service, and it is also possible (even likely) that private institutions, associations or companies employed similar official or unofficial policies to reward Ritterkreuzträger. Yet, even without such information, the program and its infusion of men into higher positions throughout the civil service unquestionably represented an important leap forward in wartime Heldenpolitik, as well as a noteworthy precedent for the accelerating transformation of German society to reflect Nazi ideals.74

Like its Alte Kämpfer predecessor, however, the new Ritterkreuzträger promotion scheme developed problems almost as soon as it had started. Within six months a pair of high-level cases had revealed the fundamental inconsistencies with the program (and with Nazi social engineering more broadly). The signs of this revelation appeared to one of its original signatories, Heinrich

Lammers, regarding the promotion of Major Paul Marbach, who had received the RK from Hitler on February 20, 1943. In celebration, the mayor of his city, Oppeln75, planned an immediate

72 Ibid.; BAB R 1501/130230. RMI 2816/44 – 2727. Notiz für Helms und Kreissl, 24.9.1943; ibid., 715/43 // 217 27.9.1943; ibid., Abt.III (III1A – 88/44 No.2) an Abt.I. Betr. Ritterkreuzträger. 73 In addition, the list included a further five Ritterkreuzträger who had been killed in action, of whom one had received a promotion beforehand. See BAB R 1501/130230 RMI Abt.III – 88/44 an Herrn StS Stuckart Betr. Förderung und Empfang der Ritterkreuzträger, 17.2.1944; ibid., RMI Abt.IV an III 2816/44 2727. 23.3.1944. See also BAB R 187/256. Sammlung Schumacher. Brief an StS Stuckart, 23.3.1944. 74 From a monetary perspective, for example, promotions such as those described above would certainly have represented the means to enter into a new economic stratum for Ritterkreuzträger. According to Richard Grunberger, salaries for civil servants, especially those of lower grades, were not particularly attractive despite the high regard and frequent educational requirements for the profession. Men in these lower positions earned little more than labourers. Rapid promotion to the middle or even senior service, therefore, would have meant a considerable change in lifestyle and an increase in social status. See Richard Grunberger, The 12-Year Reich. A Social History of Nazi Germany 1993- 1945 (New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1971), 127-129. 75 Now Opole, in southern Poland. 173 ceremony to present him with a gift and accord him an official entry into the city’s golden book.

However, since Marbach had been employed as a civil servant in the town since 1925, he was also to be promoted to senior town magistrate with a pay raise to the highest level within the service

(A2c2).76 Local authorities wished for the two events to coincide, and so Ministers Frick and

Krosigk jointly petitioned Lammers, whose permission they needed, to expedite the promotion procedures (given the rank involved, Lammers was the one who would have to take the matter to

Hitler for his approval).77

Yet the chief of the RKz was not pleased at the cavalier way his colleagues expected to bend the rules of the civil service, given that the requested promotion and pay raise went beyond even the already generous exemptions provided for Ritterkreuzträger. More important, it was also in conflict with a “Stop Decree” he had promulgated on February 17 on any further changes to the hiring, promotion or pay structures within the civil service as part of his ongoing efforts to combat the steady encroachment of the PKz and its chief, Martin Bormann, into his domain. The extra- legal promotion for Marbach advocated by his fellow ministers was thus a precedent that could,

Lammers objected, have “negative effects on the system.”78 The conflict escalated, however, when

Frick subsequently took the matter straight to Bormann, who together with Lammers and Wilhelm

Keitel of the OKW sat on a special “Three-Man Committee” (Dreierausschuss) that had been

76 The promotion was to be retroactive, taking effect as of 1.3.1943. See BAB R 43–II/455 f.2, 91. Dr.Suren (RMI) an Krosigk, 3.5.1943. For details on the gradation of salary levels and promotion regulations in the civil service, see Absolon Wehrgesetz, 252-254. 77 BAB R 43–II/455, f.2, 92-93. RMI. Betr. Ausweitung des Stellenplans der Stadt Oppeln wegen Beförderung eines Ritterkreuzträgers,” 3.5.1943. 78 BAB R 43-II/657, 111. Runderlass Lammers (RKz). RK.1809, 17.2.1943; BAB R 43–II/455 f.2, 90. Krosigk an Lammers, 5.5.1943; ibid., 91. 174 formed in January to help coordinate the war effort.79 Thus incensed, Lammers circulated a letter to those involved stating his firm resolve to oppose any exemptions sought for Marbach.

Beyond these political considerations, the frustrated Lammers also began to express more serious doubts about the dangers of their entire promotions program. Although he qualified his concerns by saying that Ritterkreuzträger, as elite Frontkämpfer, were indeed worthy of special recognition, he continued that “the most strenuous objections need to be made” against the principle being taken too far by conflating professional merit with excellence at the front. “It is unacceptable,” he argued, that all standards of assessment be increasingly abandoned in favour of obeisance to front experience, i.e. on the assumption that this actually provided the “adequate knowledge and skills” for more senior administrative positions. Instead, Lammers invoked the logic Hitler had used regarding promotions, pointing out that there were many Ritterkreuzträger who did not expect automatic promotions even within the military (though as we have seen this was not quite accurate). Extra allowances, therefore, would only exacerbate this “confused conflation.”80

These concerns were more justified than Lammers perhaps even realized. Within the records of Frick’s own RMI, others were beginning to voice concern about the slippery slope of abusing this ideological principle. In one letter submitted to his Ministry in June 1943, a municipal official in Württemberg reported that it was now official policy in his area to show “extraordinary preference” to all highly decorated Frontkämpfer once they returned home. Recently, he had been forced to promote three elementary school teachers to school board and chief-teacher positions

79 After the defeat at Stalingrad in early 1943, the Dreierauschuss represented Hitler’s attempt to revitalize and centralize the coordination of the country’s war effort, focusing especially on the mobilization of the Home Front and to provide more men for military service. 80 BAB R 43–II/455, 92-96. Notiz Lammers. Betr. Ausweitung des Stellenplans der Stadt Oppeln wegen Beförderung eines Ritterkreuzträgers, 6.5.1943. 175

(with commensurate pay raises) for winning even the less prestigious DK-G despite their lack of qualifications. Two had passed the requisite examinations with grades of only “adequate” and

“satisfactory” while the other had not even taken them. In addition, although they had been on active military service for several years, the longest any of them had been employed as a teacher was two years, with one having had only a few weeks’ experience.81 In response, an unnamed RMI official replied that there were indeed “foundational objections” to war decorations becoming “the sole and exclusive basis for a preferred promotion.” Any accomplishment a man may have had on the battlefield was no substitute for a lack of professional qualifications; the whole thing “would not be doing any good.”82

Whether or not he had read such reports, Heinrich Lammers soon saw his fears confirmed by the appearance of another, even more distressing case, this time regarding Eichenlaubträger

Heinrich Schüler in a request from the Reich Postal Minister, Karl . Ohnesorge wished to promote this hero to the rank of Postal Councillor (Postrat - in the highest tier of the civil service) in recognition of his accomplishments. However, despite the Minister’s claims that he had “proved himself in every respect,” Lammers noted from Schüler’s personnel file that the forty-year-old had only worked for the service since December 1936, and furthermore had held his present rank for only a few months.83 Moreover, as in the Marbach case, the requested promotion and pay raise went well beyond the allowed limits under the decree of January 19.

Consequently, instead of bringing the case to Hitler for approval (as mandated by the legislation),

81 BAB R 4901/14360 (1), 364. Reichsstatthalter Württemberg an RMI (D1 b 324). Betr. Beförderung von Beamten mit Kriegsauszeichnungen, 19.6.1943. 82 Ibid. RMI (1168/43, 6197) Betr. Bevorzugte Beförderung von Beamten mit Kriegsauszeichnungen, 24.7.1943. 83 The date of this last promotion, in fact, corresponds to the date of his receipt of the RK. Most likely, this demonstrates that Ohnesorge, or members of his ministry, had been practicing their own policy of preferential promotions even before the general circular of January 19, 1943. See BAB R 2/21232, 8. Personnel file for Heinrich Schüler, Anlage. Reich Post Minister IV.3t 8000-0 K 3 B an Lammers. Betr. Führerentscheidung, 20.4.1943. 176

Lammers took it to the Dreierausschuss during the summer of 1943 and presented his case for enforcing some practical limits on the application of front experience.84

As chief of the PKz, Martin Bormann was well aware of the broader issues discussed earlier that were affecting the culture of privileges and benefits for Ritterkreuzträger at this time. Despite his rivalry with Lammers, therefore, he proved amenable to the latter’s arguments regarding the evident pitfalls of Frontkämpfer-ideology. In a subsequent letter to Krosigk and Frick, Lammers wrote that the committee had determined that there “exist serious concerns of a fundamental, and especially a political nature, that the military merit of an official is rewarded for its own sake,” as well as being “the sole and exclusive basis for a promotion.” Speaking specifically of Schüler, the committee felt that despite his undoubted accomplishments, his small amount of relevant experience would provide only “the minimum of knowledge and skills which he would need for the adequate fulfilment of his duties as a postal-councillor.”85 Such a breach of reasonability,

Lammers concluded, would in turn create “the greatest imaginable difficulties,” not least for underqualified Frontkämpfer themselves. Thus, while not repealing the promotional terms from their January decree, they were to be respected absolutely from now on.

This letter, though, did not end the issue. Over the following months Krosigk and Frick86 resumed their lobbying for the extra-legal promotion of both Schüler and Marbach.87 Lammers

84 Whether or not Hitler would have approved of the request is an interesting question. Despite his hesitation about promoting Ritterkreuzträger within the Wehrmacht, there is no sign in any extant documentation that he had a problem with their receiving a ‘leg up’ in the civilian sphere – a supposition reinforced by the fact, as seen here, that he was legally involved in the promotions’ scheme as its ultimate arbiter. At the same time, though, the dictator does seem to have been critical about unmerited promotions within the civil service. The records of one of his “table talks” from November 1941, for example, record him making the extremely ironic statement: “The Party must take care not to imitate the state,” wherein people “have the automatic right to promotions” (Trevor Roper, Table Talk, 92-93, No.64). 85 Ibid., 98-100. Lammers an Ohnesorge, RK.5860 C. Betr. Ernennung des Postinspekters Heinrich Schüler zum Postrat, 10.7.1943. 86 Frick was no longer Interior Minister as of August 1943, when he was replaced by Heinrich Himmler. 87 BAB R 43-II/455 f.3 101-102. Ehrenberger (RMI) an Lammers. Betr. Beförderung eines Ritterkreuzträgers. 15.10.1943 177 refused to budge, however, and wrote to Krosigk in October that to acquiesce would “lead to countless appeals, irregularities, and finally the destruction of the entire administrative field in question.”88 Alongside him, Martin Bormann became just as resolute to stop the abuse of

Ritterkreuzträger promotions within his own sphere of influence, realizing not only its effects upon administration but also on the public reputation of the Party. Consequently, several months later he issued a formal circular to all Party authorities on “the promotion of political leaders and organization leaders who have won high military decorations.” Echoing Lammers, he stated that even within the Party, where both military and political front experience had traditionally played such an important role as a delineator of status, promotion was by no means to be guaranteed for members who had proven themselves in combat. This privilege was to be based on one’s political accomplishments, which could not be equated with battlefield bravery: the two “lie on very different levels.”89

Bormann’s directive thus represented an important turning point in the understanding of the shortcomings that came with using ideology as a metric for social engineering. At the same time, though, other leaders like Heinrich Himmler continued to press the demonstrably naïve theory that programs like the promotions scheme would be a core feature of a post-war Germany built upon the precepts of unqualified front experience. Even as late as October 1944, only months before the war’s end, Eichenlaubträger and ace tank commander recalled speaking

88 BAB R 43-II/455 f.3 103-111. Lammers an Ehrenberger. Betr. Beförderung eines Ritterkreuzträgers, 23.10.1943. Amazingly, the Marbach case would not be put to rest until May of 1944, when Lammers’s subordinate, Wilhelm Stuckart, was obliged to travel to Oppeln and explain to its Mayor and municipal authorities why Marbach could not be promoted. See ibid., 115. RMI Rundschreiben (RK.4471 C.). Betr. Beförderung eines Ritterkreuzträgers, 28.5.1944. 89 BAB NS 6/346, 122. Notiz Bormann 80/44 see RVBl, Ausgabe A., Ordnungszahlen 20/022. 13.4.1944. 178 with Himmler and being told that “the best people are at the front,” and that “when we win the war

[…] we will replace the incapable men [at home] with proven ones.”90

III.3 Creating a Settler Elite

Himmler’s vote of confidence, however, was far from his attitude towards the second major benefit for Ritterkreuzträger to emerge during the crucial year of 1942, namely that of special packages of land in the captured eastern territories. References to this benefit appear sporadically in the memoirs of several prominent Ritterkreuzträger such as the Air Force ace and prodigious author . In a published memoir relating his experiences near the end of the war, this Schwerterträger recalls joking with fellow ace Günter Lützow about “those knightly estates for Knight’s Cross winners that lie in the fertile plains at the foot of the Mountains.”

When asked if the regime had “really been serious about that,” Lützow had replied that they certainly appeared to have been, promising a “fief from the Reich for everyone with the Knight’s

Cross – a feudal benefice.”91 Despite such references, however, because of a paucity of official documentation regarding this alleged system (in stark contrast to the Sonderbetreuung and civilian promotion programs), there have been doubts among historians whether, as Steinhoff and his friends had thought, it had ever been more than a Hitlerian fantasy, or, alternately, simply another element of the regime’s post-war plans that was never actually implemented.

Those scholars who do credit its existence during the war have generally been amongst those studying the feudal aspects of National Socialism and its scheme for the settlement of a pan-

90 Otto Carius, Tigers in the Mud. The Combat Career of German Panzer Commander Otto Carius (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 1992), 194-198. 91 Johannes Steinhoff, The Final Hours. The Luftwaffe Plot Against Göring (Dulles, Virginia: Patomac Books, Inc., 2005), 51-52. 179

European empire. Rolf-Dieter Müller, for example, has written that Ritterkreuzträger received special land grants as part of these plans, but argues that it was only a short-lived initiative that grew out of Hitler and Himmler’s inability to “withstand the temptation” of distributing largesse to their “loyal and deserving followers.”92 This characterization is correct in its broad strokes. Yet a closer investigation of a wider range of extant sources reveals that its origins were more nuanced than a simple or spontaneous outpouring of generosity. Rather, like the promotion programs happening at the same time, what would indeed become a failed program for Ritterkreuzträger- settlement (Sesshaftmachung) was another, more far sighted aspect of the regime’s newfound desire to see its utopian plans become a reality during the war.

The first and most important problem that has clouded the view of this topic in the past is its conflation with Hitler’s more well-documented “Dotation” (Allowance) program, in which he bestowed largesse, both monetary and territorial, on senior figures from the Wehrmacht, Party and government. This program began in 1940 amidst the euphoria following the historic victory over

France and represented perhaps the most prominent example of Hitler’s fixation with Friedrich II..

He announced that summer that, like the latter, he would reward his senior commanders generously, specifically by distributing monthly, tax-free stipends.93 On July 22, though, the dictator-come-warlord declared that he would also resurrect the old practice of giving tracts of land and estates to these men. However, while he said that he would not be “tight-fisted” in this regard, in keeping with Frederician tradition he would withhold their distribution until the end of the war, which both speaker and audience thought at that point to be a foregone conclusion.94

92 Rolf-Dieter Müller, Hitlers Ostkrieg und die deutsche Siedlungspolitik. Die Zusammenarbeit von Wehrmacht, Wirtschaft und SS (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1991), 35-37. 93 E.g. KTB Halder, II, 97 (13.9.1940). 94 Engel and Kotze, Army Adjutant, 96 (22.7.1940). Two of the standard texts on the development of the Dotation program and its role as a form of political bribery for the loyalty of senior officers are Gerd R. Ueberschär and Winfried 180

Yet two years later, the dictator went back on his obeisance to tradition and began to award the promised land (along with substantial gifts of cash) not only to the Wehrmacht elite but also those of the Party and state.95 It is unclear whether this change of heart was an attempt to entreat his generals before he resorted to his promotions program or simply a symptom of another euphoria as he regarded the vistas of the long awaited “” (Living Space) in the east, as Rolf-

Dieter Müller claims. It could even be attributable to the fact that earlier that year the RMVP had produced a new film entitled Der Grosse König (The Great King), which depicted the dictator as the modern reincarnation of his idol. In any case, this expansion was important for most of its recipients were also holders of the RK. Thus, while not specifically a Ritterkreuzträger benefit per se, previous historians have associated this program with that referenced by Steinhoff. Indeed, even contemporaries did so. Writing after the war, one veteran recalled that, to his mind, the RK had been just another of the ways Hitler incentivized his senior acolytes, the others being “large amounts of money and knightly estates.”96

Despite this overlap, though, the specific Ritterkreuzträger-settlement initiative was a distinct entity, having its origins not in Hitler’s Frederician fantasies but in the regime’s pre- existing imperialist aspirations and their adaptation to changing circumstance. Dreams of a “Drang nach Osten” (Thrust towards the East) and a reincarnation of the medieval Teutonic knights were concepts that the National Socialists adapted from earlier movements in modern German history, infusing it with their own unique racialist flavour. During the 1930s, the vision of more land for

Vogel’s Dienen und Verdienen: Hitlers Geschenke an seine Eliten (Frankfurt/M: S. Fischer, 1999); and Norman J. Goda’s article “Black Marks: Hitler's Bribery of His Senior Officers during World War II,” Journal of Modern History. Vol.72, No.2 (June, 2000): 413-452, n.b. 413, 441. 95 The abundant records of these transactions can be found in BAB R 43/985a, 985b, 985c, 1092 and 109b. See also Goda, “Black Marks,” 436-437; Ueberschär and Vogel, Hitlers Geschenke, 152-157, 166-168, 168-174; Barthel, Hitlers Geschichtsbild, 10. 96 BAMA MSG 2/15184. 181 the German Volk began to take a more concrete form through the work of Heinrich Himmler and other senior Party ideologues, who drew up ever more detailed plans for eastern settlement. As early as 1934, the Reichsführer drafted his first settlement guidelines which envisioned millions of Aryan Germans populating an eastern empire and, ultimately, a new racial nobility of superior men (drawn principally from his own SS).97

Early in the Second World War, these dreams began to come true. In 1940, Himmler, in his new capacity as head of the Reich Commissariat for the Strengthening of German Nationhood

(Reichskommissar für die Festigung deutsche Volkstums, RKFDV), along with Hitler and the

OKW, jointly redrew the pre-war settlement plans for the conquered territory of Poland. The new plans called not only for SS settlers but also the veterans of the current war, who could settle the new (and then still peaceful) border with the Soviet Union, becoming a defensive shield of soldier- farmers (Wehrbauern).98 The following year, though, the early successes of Operation Barbarossa necessitated that these plans be redrawn in light of the vast new swaths of territory outstripping even those gained by Germany following the Treaty of Brest Litovsk in 1917.99 Himmler ordered the RKFDV’s chief planner, Konrad Meyer Hetling100 to redraft the plans to reflect what appeared to be the new expanded form of the future Reich.

Meyer-Hetling produced “Generalplan Ost” (General Plan East), which refocused plans towards the pacification and repopulation of a vast territory stretching to an “Eastern Wall,” a

Hadrian-like boundary consisting of settlement-strongpoints (Stützpunkte). After the war,

97 E.g. see BAB NS 47/39, 8. Reichsführer-SS (RFSS) Tagebuch (TB) z.K. Nr.Ch.547/35 Betr. Sesshaftmachung von SS-Angehörigen, 3.9.1935. 98 Erlass des OKW Betr. Ansiedlung von Wehrmachtsangehörigen in den neuen Reichsgebieten vom 18.10.1940, HVBl (T.C., 22) (1940) s 441, 18.10.1940, quoted in Müller, Hitlers Ostkrieg, 27-28, see also 13-19, 25-26. 99 According to Rolf-Dieter Müller, the new vista of opportunities in the east quickly became “a chimera in the minds of military staffs and national socialist leaders drunk with victory.” Müller, Hitlers Ostkrieg, 22. 100 Meyer-Hetling’s full title was Senior Settlement and Area Planner and Director of the Institute for Agriculture and Agrarian Policy in the University of Berlin. 182

Frontkämpfer Wehrbauern would assume the role of modern legionnaires from these outposts, ruling over the serf-classes of lesser races (Hilfsvölker) and, with their military background, fend off future incursions from yet-unconquered eastern hordes. The new territory would be divided into provinces (Marken), comprised of smaller fiefs of differing types for settlers: “lifetime land tenure” (Zeitlehen), “hereditary land tenure” (Erblehen) and “special status properties” (Eigentum besonderen Rechts).101

During the pivotal year of 1942, though, extant sources suggest that Hitler decided - just as with his Dotation program and thereby another reason for their conflation – that circumstances allowed him to accelerate these plans for making Frontkämpfer-colonialism a reality. Whether a form of incentivization or again because of optimism, the dictator decreed for the first stage in this process to begin. Limited numbers of deserving Frontkämpfer, particularly wounded soldiers, veterans of the Great War and any willing members of the Party’s own Alte Kämpfer, were to be allowed to submit applications for settlement in the east immediately rather than waiting until after the final victory.102 It was in this context, moreover, that the dictator also seems to have created his mysterious special privilege for Ritterkreuzträger. From the case files of Himmler’s personal staff and of the RKFDV, it appears that within the broader policy expansion of 1942, he formulated a special dispensation which would accord special tracts of land to be reserved for the

Wehrmacht’s heroes, effectively a mixture of Frontkämpfer-settlement and Dotation.

Yet compared to these two other processes the presence of this new special provision went all but unmentioned, failing to appear in Generalplan-Ost or any other official set of plans. The

101 Helmut Heiber, “Der Generalplan Ost,” in VjZ (1958) 3., 289-292; Müller, Hitlers Ostkrieg, 22. 102 NARA T-74. RFSS.Feld.Kdo, Allgemeine Ordnung 15/III über die bevorzugte Sesshaftmachung von Kriegsversehrten, Kriegsdienstbeschädigten des Weltkrieges, Kämpfern der nationalen Erhebung sowie deren Hinterbliebenen in den neuerworbenen Gebieten des Deutsches Reiches, 10.8.1942; Müller, Hitlers Ostkrieg, 33-34. 183 lack of a public policy was certainly atypical. As already demonstrated in this chapter, neither

Hitler nor his lieutenants were particularly hesitant about announcing special privileges for

Ritterkreuzträger, and as demonstrated by post-war testimony from the latter themselves like the fighter ace , the dictator discussed the program openly and without any request for secrecy.103 More important, celebrating the idea of the hero-turned-settler was certainly within the normal framework of Frontkämpfer-ideology and represented a bridge with the agrarian, “Blut und Boden” (Blood and Soil) aspect of the Nazi worldview. A 1942 biography of the

Eichenlaubträger Gerhard Hein published by the OKH, for instance, celebrated his receipt of an honourary farming estate in the Warthegau (part of occupied Poland) from its Gauleiter, Artur

Greiser. In this, moreover, the book framed Hein as the archetypal Frontkämpfer of the post-war age: “In his life, Captain Gerhard Hein was a fighter, and he remains so for the future under the victorious symbol of plow and swords.”104

However, Rolf-Dieter Müller posits an explanation which potentially accounts for this seemingly antithetical secrecy. He suggests that the policy (though again erroneously attributing it to spontaneous generosity) was deliberately kept secret and unofficial in order not to arouse popular envy.105 On the surface, this too seems atypical since, as mentioned above,

Ritterkreuzträger privileges were largely, and quite deliberately, on display for the public. Even so, there is evidence that provides possible reasons why Hitler would especially hesitate to do so in this case, i.e. highlight the distribution of special lands to an elite group, even one supposedly made up of Frontkämpfer. While unofficial, Hitler’s Dotation program was public knowledge. As early as 1941 Frontkämpfer and ordinary Germans had begun to voice their displeasure at the way

103 Heaton and Lewis, German Aces Speak II, 29. 104 Johannes von Kunowski, Ritterkreuzträger des Heeres: Eichenlaubträger Hauptmann Gerhard Hein (Berlin: Aufwärts-Verlag, 1942), 38-39. 105 Müller, Hitlers Ostkrieg, 35-37. 184 in which traditional elites seemed to be scouring conquered territory for huge plots of land to reserve for their post-war estates.106 The following year, moreover, there were further reports that such suspicions had given rise to a growing opinion that all the good land had already been snapped up, and that they would be left only with patches of undesirable territory.107

The Dotation program, in other words, had resulted in much the same negative impression that was becoming such a problem regarding the distribution of the RK: that despite Party rhetoric about egalitarianism and equity, the distribution of recognition and reward had changed only little from earlier times. Even as he expanded the program in 1942 and 1943, therefore, Hitler and the

Wehrmacht leadership were attentive to minimizing this impression, and tried to reassure

Frontkämpfer that their fears and anger were unfounded whilst simultaneously entreating military and political elites to be more discreet.108 Furthermore, since most military Dotationen-recipients were also Ritterkreuzträger it does make sense that when deciding to incorporate land grants as a blanket privilege for the latter as a whole the dictator would be hesitant to encourage the

106 BAMA RW 4/251b f.2, 107. Gen. II Flakkorps (BrB. No.313/221/41) an Generaloberst Weise. 16.5.1941. 107 While Hitler had not yet acquiesced to such acquisitions, there was certainly truth to this rumour. As attested by a report from a land administrator in in the same year discussed elsewhere by Müller, certain “personalities” were indeed scouring conquered territory for suitable estates. See Denkschrift des Landesplaners von Danzig - Westpreussen, Prof Liedecke über die raumpolitische Sicherung des Reiches gegen Osten (unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Nordostens), 23.11.1941, cited in Müller, Hitlers Ostkrieg, doc.12. See also Heiber, “Generalplan Ost,” 288-289. 108 In 1942, Hitler had decreed that to “protect the interests of Frontkämpfer,” agricultural land was not to be distributed except under special circumstances. Decree cited in NARA T-78/42 Reichsbauernführer 290/44-PA Gr z b V/E an OKH. Anlage: “Ankauf eines Gutes durch die Hinterbliebenen des gefallenen Ritterkreuzträgers von Peter, 17.4.1944. In 1943, the OKW tried to reassure soldiers that they would still be able to “realize their desires for settlement,” and indeed that there would still be land enough for their grandchildren. See “Sicherung der Ansiedlungswünsche siedlungswilliger Kriegsteilnehmer in den dem deutschen Volk wiedergewonnenen Siedlungsräume. Vom 25 Jan. 1943,” LVBl I. 1943 No.5 143. For his commensurate warning to Party elites, see BAB NS 6/341 f.4, 116. Abschrift. Schmundt. Betr. Landerwerb durch Ankauf oder Dotation im Laufe des Krieges, 15.6.1943. Interestingly, much like the distribution of the RK, Hitler had abrogated his direct management of the Dotation program, leaving it in the hands of Heinrich Lammers. Despite his pleas, therefore, field marshals and civilian elites (including Lammers) continued to claim large estates until the very end of the war. See, for example, NARA T-175/33; Goda, “Black Marks,” 441; Müller, Hitler’s Ostkrieg, 35. 185 association between the two by making it a formal component of settlement policy. Without further evidence, though, it is impossible to say for sure.

Whatever the explanation for its lack of codification, the existence of a small handful of previously unexplored case files relating to eastern settlement do reinforce the existence of a special privilege for Ritterkreuzträger and provide some clues into how it functioned (or was meant to). The first file comes from the records of the RKFDV and pertains to the acquisition of property for Ritterkreuzträger Ernst Siefert.109 In March 1942, Siefert wrote to Meyer-Hetling declaring his intention to invest in property in the east as a precursor to taking up residence there after the war.

He asked whether the settlement authorities could find him a suitable property of 600-800 acres.110

Over the following three months, the authorities made inquiries to the Land Department

(Bodenamt) of different districts to narrow down a list of potential properties. The RKFDV also insisted that there be a chance for “the Ritterkreuzträger” to visit the properties and make his choice, effectively allowing Siefert to “scout” for properties just as the OKW report had noted elite figures doing the year before (and thereby reinforcing the secrecy-thesis underlined by Müller).

By June 1942, Siefert had decided on a property near Rawitsch111, and soon after the RKFDV issued a formal request that this property be marked as reserved for Siefert on all official maps.

A second and very different case from 1942 appears in the personal staff files of Heinrich

Himmler. In the late spring, he received a personal application for settlement from Frau Astrid

Iwand, wife of fallen Ritterkreuzträger Fritz Iwand. In keeping with her late husband’s wishes (and

109 In the files, the name of the applicant is actually given as “Seiffert,” but after cross-referencing the lists of Ritterkreuzträger it seems likely that the man in question was Ernst Siefert. Documentation for his case can be found in BAB R 49/1303 “Landerwarb in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten durch verdiente Kriegsteilnehmern und Ritterkreuzträger (1940-1943).” 110 The allotment of commercial enterprises had also formed part of eastern settlement plans alongside agricultural plots. See Müller, Hitlers Ostkrieg, 13-14, 27-28. 111 Present day Rawicz, Poland. 186 in addition to the Sonderbetreuung payments she would have received), Frau Iwand asked the

Reichsführer through his chief of staff SS-Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff to secure for her and her sons a suitable property to settle in the east.112 Wolff was taken by surprise, however, when he saw the amount of land she deemed as “suitable”: no less than a 5,000-acre plot of good agricultural land worth several million RM. In response, Wolff replied apologetically on Himmler’s behalf that this simply was not possible. Indeed, he added by way of qualification, her proposal amounted to more than was once allotted to President Hindenburg (3,000 acres).113 Instead, the Reichsführer had decided to award “to your sons a good farmstead of a size of about 500 acres, which has a current market value of a quarter-million Reichsmarks.” The haughty Frau Iwand rejected the offer indignantly, replying that she “hears constantly” of hundreds of thousands of acres in the east being distributed for settlement and that it was quite incomprehensible how the Reichsführer would deny her and her sons a paltry 5,000, giving them instead only “a few hundred.”114

These two cases serve as further demonstration of the difficulty in gaining a clear picture of Ritterkreuzträger-settlement, for both involved direct communication with senior figures in the settlement administration (Himmler and Meyer-Hetling). Even so, the Iwand case serves as further evidence in support of the program’s secrecy, given that Frau Iwand held such unrealistic notions as to what her husband’s status entitled her. More important, though, both cases give some indication of the substance of the benefit extended to the Reich’s war heroes for a future on the frontier. The size of the land mentioned in both suggests that Ritterkreuzträger (and their families)

112 Documents relating to her settlement case can be found in BAB NS 19/1199 f.2-3, 58-94. 113 Part of Himmler’s shock at Frau Iwand’s request, Wolff said to her chidingly, was because he had already shown substantial grace to Astrid when, being unable to bring a sufficient dowry at the time of her marriage, he had generously provided one because of her husband to be’s service. See BAB NS 19/1199 f.3, 77. Wolff an Astrid Iwand. n.d., ca. April-May 1942. 114 Thanks to Frau Iwand’s stubborn persistence, her case file extends well into 1944 and even 1945 as she continued to lobby (unsuccessfully) for a more “suitable” property. See BAB NS 19/1199 f.3. 187 received territory in the range of 500-800 acres. In other words, they received slightly less land than their Dotation-superiors (often in the low thousands), but far more than the “respectable size” of between seventy-four and a few hundred acres of farmstead mentioned by Heinrich Himmler in a speech in 1944 as the standard for ordinary Frontkämpfer-settlers. As he claimed in the same speech, moreover, allotments for Ritterkreuzträger were to be hereditary, that is an Erblehen property, thus ensuring the “prosperity and wealth” of heroes’ progeny for generations to come.115

Additionally, it seems that the generally accepted impression that the program entailed the simple gifting of set packages of land, i.e. estates in the feudal style, requires further nuance. Both cases and their depictions of the administrative mechanics of the process suggest that it amounted more accurately to priority in the application process and preferential treatment in the selection of the slightly larger sized land they would receive at public expense to suit their special status. This provides clarity to the statements of Günter Lützow as well as the aforementioned Erich Hartmann, who later claimed that Hitler had told him and other decorated officers that “we would all be given estates of our choice in the occupied territories […] We would have houses built for us so that we could raise our families.”116 More than that, though, when viewed through the lens of

Frontkämpfer-ideology, these land grants were not just rewards, and nor were they for all

Ritterkreuzträger. Rather, their preferential treatment represented a means by which those war heroes desirous of a frontier life would become the leaders in the future community of Wehrbauern, the legates of the regime’s envisioned colonial legions.

However limited the proof of the intended or real details of this privilege, though, by the summer of 1943 this too had to be curtailed for reasons similar to those then plaguing the

115 “Rede Himmlers vor den Gauleitern,” 357-58. 116 Heaton and Lewis, German Aces Speak II, 29. 188 distribution of the RK. The first was simple inflation, or the perception thereof, among ordinary

Frontkämpfer. Little more than a year after Hitler’s decision to accelerate the settlement program, the number of applicants from all eligible groups had begun to overwhelm the relevant administrative systems thanks to their promotion by the OKW as another incentive to secure the final decisive breakthrough on the Eastern Front.117 Though representing only a fraction of the military, moreover, because of their entitlement to special administrative support and larger plots of land, the growing number of Ritterkreuzträger was thus also becoming a significant concern.

Indeed, Karl Wolff cited this very fact to Astrid Iwand as to why she could not have such a vast plot. There were well over a thousand Ritterkreuzträger (that is, potential Erblehen settlers), he said, a number which was already stretching the ability of the authorities to be flexible or generous in the distribution of promised land.118 A year later, this number had risen by 150 percent to 2,500 eligible men.

As the more direct supervisor of settlement affairs, Heinrich Himmler was similarly concerned about inflation. He was even more concerned, though, about the impact of the increasing diversification of both groups and their potential destabilization of the settler community that he and his SS administrators had been crafting for a decade. In July of 1943, he wrote to Wilhelm

Keitel to voice his reservations, and focused specifically on a recent OKW proposal regarding the preparation of 24,000 small farms, and even a few larger Erblehen plots (i.e. those properties assigned to Ritterkreuzträger), as incentives for Ukrainian troops fighting alongside the

Wehrmacht. As the disgruntled SS-chief continued, the en masse-settlement of inferior men would cause a significant dilution in the racial quality and ideological purity of the future colonial

117 Müller, Hitler’s Ostkrieg, 35-37. 118 BAB NS 19/1199 f.3, 77. Much the same comment was made, according to Johannes Steinhoff, by Günther Lützow in 1944 in the conversation which appears in the former’s memoirs about his activities in the war’s final months. See Steinhoff, Final Hours, 52-54. 189 population. What’s more, his administrators were having a tough enough time finding appropriate land for German Frontkämpfer, let alone to ascertain the proper origins, attitudes or general reliability of these new men.119 Consequently, that summer the OKW began to apply stricter criteria in both offering and forwarding soldiers’ settlement applications, with only those of the most deserving (and ideologically appropriate) applicants being taken forward.120

As the intended leaders of this community, moreover, the increasing diversity among

Ritterkreuzträger was an even more dangerous potential threat to Himmler’s plans for the hierarchy of the settler community. Furthermore, as we shall see in a later chapter, in addition to other problems springing up at this time regarding these men and their special privileges (i.e. the

Mischlinge case, complaints about favouritism in administration and civilian promotions), their collective political reliability was also becoming suspect as well. As a result, a few days after receiving a proposal from the OKW to increase the rate of settlement for these heroes, the

Reichsführer-SS put his foot down. On August 7, he notified all relevant agencies that the settlement of Ritterkreuzträger in the east was to be deferred until the war was over, when it could be accomplished properly. In his communiqué, he also added that he “just want[ed] to stress,” that the glory, prestige and moral authority attached to the receipt of this medal was “still no proof of political or ethnic reliability for the bearer and his family.”121

119 Himmler was so incensed that he demanded the names of those responsible for the suggestion so that they could be punished. No.253 Gkdo A: RF, E: GFM Keitel, Chef OKW. 21.7.1943 in Helmut Heiber, ed., Reichsführer! … Briefe an und von Himmler (Stuttgart Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1968), 223. See also BAB NS 19/967 Schreiben Himmlers an Stabshauptamt RKFDV, 11.3.1943; ibid., Schreiben des Reichsführer-SS Himmler, 27.10.1943, and BAMA RH 53-17/161 (OKW/BW Sied.No.144/43 geh., 5.7.1943, all quoted in Müller, Hitler’s Ostkrieg, 34-37. 120 BAB R 88/70, BW Sied. No.2823/43 Zusammenfassung der wesentlichsten Punkte aus der Siedlungsreferenten- Besprechung am 4.11.1943, quoted in Müller, Hitler’s Ostkrieg, 37. See also BAMA RW 2/298, 301 Abschrift der Chef der Heeresrüstung und Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres Stab/Ic No.3724/43. Betr. Landerwerb und Landdotation im Laufe des Krieges, 15.7.1943. 121 BAB NS 19/2609. Reichsführer-SS Tgb Nf.47/136/439. RF/Bn 32/2. Feldkommandostelle an Stabshaupamt RKFDV, 7.8.1943; Akten der Partei-Kanzlei der NSDAP. Rekonstruktion eines verlorengegangenen Bestandes. I.1, ed. Helmut Heiber (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1983), 871. 17132 (7.8.1943). 190

Despite its definitive tone, however, Himmler’s stop-order did not spell the end of the settlement privilege for Ritterkreuzträger during the war per se. As extant records reveal, he and his staff continued to receive applications for special settlement from the families of these heroes well into 1944 and 1945 (though all appear to have been rejected). 122 On one hand, this makes sense given the fact that the internal moratorium related to a practice that had never been a formal policy and that Ritterkreuzträger themselves were not universally sure existed (as suggested by the

Lützow-Steinhoff conversation mentioned earlier), let alone cancelled. More important, though, what further explains such confusion is the theory that the program in fact continued, just in a more limited form. While holders of the RK may have now been unable to reserve any of the rapidly shrinking territory that the regime continued to promise as the Wehrmacht retreated westward, the privilege remained open to holders of the higher grades: the RK-E, RK-ES etc., who amounted only to several hundred potential properties to arrange rather than several thousand.

Such an understanding of the fate of Ritterkreuzträger’s settlement privileges provides greater clarity to the oddity that most references in post-war memoirs not only fail to mention the

Himmler order, but also erroneously frame the privilege as having been meant for these senior heroes all along. Such was the characterization, for example, of Field Marshal Heinz Guderian who later described how Hitler desired “to make a national donation to all men who had been decorated with the Oak Leaves to the Knight’s Cross, and such donations were to consist primarily of land.”123 Similarly, this is how Erich Hartmann described what he had been told by the dictator in mid-1944: estates would be allocated “starting with men who received the Oak Leaves, then up

122 NARA T-78/42. Reichsbauernführer 17.4.1944; NARA T-175/61, 1358. Beschaffung eine Wohngrundstückes für Frau Büsing. Witwe des gefallenen Ritterkreuzträger Oberst Büssing, Oppeln, 1944-1945. 123 Guderian, Panzer Leader, 274. 191 to the Swords, and so on.”124 Such descriptions were not wrong, in other words; they simply applied to a later stage of a privilege that had gone awry and had, like the promotions program, been reformed once it became clear that the ideal did not match reality.125 In any case, the regime continued to entertain the promise of land long past the point at which there was no hope of it ever coming to fruition.

Combined with the necessary curtailing of the promotions scheme, this devolution of the settlement privilege was emblematic of the administrative headache that the broader network of benefits had become by 1944-1945. What had begun principally by Hitler’s desire to extend some financial support to Ritterkreuzträger was now an unwieldy enterprise with unclear parameters, involving numerous governmental, Party and military authorities. Not only had some privileges been repealed (a process discussed further in Chapter V), but they did not affect all

Ritterkreuzträger equally, or at all. Access to them depended upon personal wealth, social background, civilian employment and attitude towards a future life in the colonial hinterland. Most important, though, it had lost focus of its original direction in demonstrating the regime’s commitment to Frontkämpfer and had become decidedly counter-productive as a symbol of the social mobility and equality within the Volksgemeinschaft. It was, thus, akin to a snowball that,

124 Heaton and Lewis, German Aces Speak II, 29. Such references to the settlement benefit being available only to Eichenlaubträger and above is also that which appears in biographies such as Jordan Vause’s study of Wolfgang Lüth: U-boat ace. The Story of Wolfgang Lüth (Annapolis, Naval Institute Press, 1990), 137. See further Ueberschär and Vogel, Dienen und Verdienen, 175. 125 It should be noted that while some Ritterkreuzträger mention the settlement privilege, unlike recipients of the Dotationen there are none (to the knowledge of the author) who have admitted to taking advantage of it, perhaps understandably not wanting to advertise having been a privileged beneficiary of what has since been revealed to be the genocidal imperial project of the Nazi regime. Those that do reference it, in fact, often specifically make mention of their not having taken part. 192 having been set in motion, steadily gained in both size and speed to the point that it needed to be slowed down before it could cause serious damage.

193

Chapter IV

Celebrity Soldiers: Ritterkreuzträger as the “Stars” of the Wehrmacht

The special privileges and other ‘perks’ created to accompany the receipt of the RK may have set its recipients apart in wartime society, but their most important role in the public sphere was unquestionably their involvement in propaganda and the media. This fact has long been acknowledged (by inference if not directly) by post-war historians, who have pointed to examples of headlines in the press or instances of Ritterkreuzträger giving speeches or attending youth events. Yet, as mentioned in the introduction, there has been little effort to trace the wider role of

RK-holders as “media heroes,” much less to understand its scope or impact. Instead, discussion of the Wehrmacht’s “Starkult” has remained confined largely to individual hero figures like Erwin

Rommel or, in keeping with the scholarly fixation with “technological heroes,” submariners and fighter pilots. The fact that such men were also all Ritterkreuzträger is rarely acknowledged, let alone utilized as a framework for analysis.

The following chapter, by contrast, will show that the RK represented the central metric within the Starkult, and that Ritterkreuzträger were the primary focus of hero-themed propaganda during the war. Drawing on archival records and a comprehensive study of wartime media sources, it explains how their prominent role in this sphere of popular culture developed in stages, becoming ever wider in scope and more diversified in form as one of the most potent tools at the disposal of war propagandists. Reinforcing a pattern established in the previous chapters, however, it also demonstrates how building and harnessing this role was at times haphazard and problematic,

194 highlighting not only areas of dysfunctionality within the Reich’s propaganda apparatus but also discord between the military and their civilian counterparts, and even the population at large.1

IV.1 “Kein Heldenkult”

Prior to the outbreak of war in 1939, the regime’s propagandists had nurtured the largely post-mortem Heldenkult of young Blue Max winners from 1914-1918. Furthermore, only months before they had had their first taste of first-hand heroization through the returning members of the

Legion Condor, especially those who had received the rare SK-B – the forerunner to the RK.

Nevertheless, it took time before these same propagandists could give Ritterkreuzträger the public profile for which they were intended and for which they are remembered today. On one hand, because of the limited distribution of the RK during the war’s opening weeks to military elites, there were few ready recipients able to inherit the media persona of a PLM hero, i.e. to take up the mantle of Boelcke, Weddigen or Richthofen. On the other hand, in addition to this lack of raw material (so to speak), Hitler and the Party once again faced opposition to their plans from within the military itself, but this time, ironically, from the man who was supposed to oversee this creation of celebrity-soldiers.

Though presented as something of a monolith in some studies of the Nazi Heldenkult, propaganda about the Wehrmacht and its heroes was not, at least technically, the province of

1 Within the literature on wartime propaganda, the relationship between the civilian and military propaganda agencies (the RMVP and WPr) has been one of contention. On one hand, post-war writings from representatives of the WPr helped have long claimed a constant rivalry and antipathy between the two (see, for example, BAMA N 558/68-70. Hasso von Wedel, Die Wehrmachtpropaganda, 193-194; Martin H. Sommerfeldt, Das Oberkommando gibt bekannt. Ein Augenzeugenbericht des Auslandsprechers des OKW (Frankfurt/Main: Westdeutsche Verlag, 1952), 46-49). Yet, in recent years, historians such as Daniel Uziel have argued that the relationship was more nuanced than such descriptions alleged, if not harmonious at times (see Uziel, Propaganda Warriors). 195

Joseph Goebbels and his Propaganda Ministry (RMVP). Rather, this authority belonged to the

RMVP’s military counterpart, the Wehrmacht Propaganda Department (WPr) and its commander,

Lt. Colonel Hasso von Wedel. This agency had come into being only months before, in April 1939, as the result of negotiation with Goebbels to cede some of his prized authority over the Reich’s propaganda machine. As a result, the WPr had jurisdiction over all propaganda involving the

Wehrmacht and its personnel, which in practice primarily meant coordinating the deployment of its new propaganda companies (Propagandakompanien, PKs), as well as supervising the preparation and censorship of all materials prior to publication or broadcast. Goebbels and the

RMVP, meanwhile, had access to this process by staffing the PK units and ensuring their political reliability (meaning that many early war reporters were from the RMVP). More important, though, as the primary propaganda authority in the Reich they controlled much of the means of distribution, and therefore could put their own spin on the material Wedel and his men provided.2

The correct place of heroes in official propaganda quickly became an important source of friction between these two agencies. A professional Army officer who held the EK1, Wedel was certainly attuned to the egalitarian tenets of Frontkämpfer-ideology and its recognition of ordinary soldiers. During the Polish campaign he ordered that PK units avoid focusing attention on generals and senior officers (such as those winning the RK), and focus instead on the ordinary soldiers winning the EK2 and EK1. He even added that stories about the latter were to receive automatic approval from the censor.3 Yet, at the same time, the WPr chief was doubtful about the wisdom of

2 For discussion of the WPr’s formulation and structure, see Uziel, Propaganda Warriors, 11, 88-89; Martin Moll, “Die Abteilung Wehrmachtpropaganda im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht: Militärische Bürokratie oder Medienkonzern?” in Beiträge zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus. Bd.17. Bürokratien. Initiative und Effizienz, eds. Wolf Gruner and Armin Nolzen (Berlin: Assoziation A, 2001), 111-150; Messerschmidt, Zeit der Indoktrination, 241-242. 3 NARA T-77/1026 OKW677. Tagesweisung für die militärische Zensur. No.34, n.d., Sept.1939; NARA T-77/964 OKW519 WPr.Id 2196-39, Propagandaanweisungen No.28, 28.9.1939. See also NARA T-77/1036 OKW1511. OKH Genst.d.H O Qu IV. 302/39. 26.10.1939. 196 creating another popular hero cult like that of 1914-1918. A central ethos by which he had run the

WPr since its foundation was to avoid disturbing the balance and harmony within the Wehrmacht by focusing too much attention on any one group or individual – which he said would only result in competition and disunity.4

Wedel’s character and views on creating war heroes became significant in October when he witnessed the treatment of Günther Prien, the Reich’s first “true” Ritterkreuzträger. As alluded to in Chapter II, Prien’s triumphal return to Germany after his victory in Scapa Flow and subsequent investiture with the RK was a showcase of the regime’s preferred style of hero- construction, one which drew heavily on their previous experience with the Legion Condor.

Indeed, the two events were remarkably similar. Like the Spanienkämpfer, Prien and his crew returned to a harbour filled with ships flying parade-pennants, a quay lined with cheering crowds and assembled dignitaries lined up to honour them in front of the newsreel cameras. The following day, Hitler dispatched his personal pilot Hans Baur to collect them in and fly to

Berlin, where they marched along the same triumphal route along streets lined with more crowds throwing garlands and shouting praise, once more in front of photographers and cameramen.

Prien, of course, took center stage, standing in an open-top Mercedes during the procession and then receiving the RK from Hitler at the Reich Chancellery (like the holders of the SK-B) in

4 Reference to and evidence of Wedel’s character and propaganda philosophy can be found not only in WPr records (e.g. BAMA RW 4/239, 30-31. WPr. Betr. Richtlinien für die Werbung von Freiwilligen und von Bewerbern für die Offizierslaufbahnen, 6.2.1938), but also the recollections of his former subordinates. See BAMA N 558/64 (2). Nachlass Hesse, “Die Persönlichkeit des Leiters der Abt. Wehrmacht-Propaganda im OKW,” n.d., ca. 1947; ibid., Überblick über die 6.Ablieferung von Abschnitten der Untersuchung “Die deutsche Wehrmacht-Propaganda im zweiten Weltkrieg,” 12.3.1948; Hans-Leo Martin, Unser Mann bei Goebbels. Verbindungsoffizier des Oberkommando der Wehrmacht beim Reichspropagandaminister, 1940-1944 (Neckargemünd: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, 1973), 18-20; Sommerfeldt, Augenzeugenbericht, 49. See further, Robert Geoffrey Willis, “The Wehrmacht Propaganda Branch: German Military Propaganda and Censorship in World War II.” Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1964), 231. 197 front of yet more cameras.5 Thereafter, Joseph Goebbels rushed him into a press conference to tell of his daring feat to the international media, including the American journalist William L. Shirer, who described him as confident bordering on “cocky.”6 These events, of course, were just the beginning. Over the following weeks the Propaganda Minister unleashed a wave of newsreels, radio broadcasts, magazine featurettes and countless newspaper articles that could not but echo the focused adoration experienced by his forebears in 1914-1918 like Otto Weddigen, to whom the press quickly likened Prien as mandated in the daily press instructions.7 In short, Prien’s overnight elevation to national hero took the country by storm and established a precedent for an even more media-involved style of wartime hero culture.8

Yet for Hasso von Wedel, such unbridled adulation represented precisely what his philosophy of propaganda sought to avoid. (Indeed, it was perhaps because of this fact that Hitler gave the role of organizing the festivities to Goebbels and not the WPr).9 The latter’s records reveal that, for his part, Wedel made no special effort to aid in the media frenzy and some documents could suggest that he tried to hinder it, such as his ban on any propaganda describing or depicting warships entering Scapa Flow.10 What’s more, he was not alone in his distaste for the event and

5 See DW, 477 (5.10.1939); “Der Sieger über Scapa Flow,” BIZ, 26.10.1939. 6 Shirer, Berlin Diaries, 237. 7 See BAB ZSg.109-4, 65. V.I. 236/39, 17.10.1939, 2; ibid., 67; ibid., 109-5, 1. V.I. 249/39, 1.11.1939; GTb I.7, 159- 160. 18.10.1939; BAMA RW 4/241.2 f.3, 152-155. OKW. Rundfunk Lagebericht 37/39 (6252/39g), 21.10- 26.10.1939. Numerous press-clippings about the occasion and its star are found in BAB R 8034-III/351. 8 It should be noted here that, as mentioned in the introduction, reference to these events and Prien’s prominence (though usually in less detail) is the most oft-cited example of the wartime Heldenkult in scholarly literature (e.g. Schilling, “Helden der Wehrmacht,” 552-554). Besides General Erwin Rommel, Prien is also arguably the most referenced in literature on propaganda or military culture (e.g. Hadley, Count Not the Dead, 82; Uziel, Propaganda Warriors, 272-275). Once again, though, demonstrating the inadequacy of this near exclusive analysis of Prien as a methodology to understanding that Heldenkult is one of the central contributions of the current study. 9 See GTb I.7, 154-157 (15.10.-17.10.1939). 10 Censors began implemented this order the following day, in fact, by preventing an article about Prien’s foray into the anchorage. See NARA T-77/1026 OKW677. WPr. Tagesweisung für die Zensur, No.35, 29.10.1939; NARA T- 77/1007 OKW607. WPr. IIIa, 3433/39. 29.10.1939. By the same token, in December 1939 Wedel personally rejected a petition from a Bavarian cultural association to include an honourary exhibit about the “Bull of Scapa Flow” in its upcoming holiday festival. See NARA T-77/1011 OKW615. Neue Welt an WPr.Ia “Bayrischen Feste,” 23.12.1939. 198 its celebrity-tone. In addition to his own class-based resentment discussed in Chapter II, Prien’s superior Admiral Erich Raeder also harboured dislike for Goebbels and his flashy style.11

Celebrity-treatment, in his view, did not befit junior naval officers and thus the OKM even directed their own propagandists to focus elsewhere, stating that for a subsequent photographic series attention should be paid to “auxiliary vehicles, pilotage [and] lighthouse operation.”12 According to one of Prien’s colleagues after the war, moreover, his own direct superior Admiral Karl Dönitz reprimanded him privately, saying: “Remember Prientje [‘my little Prien’], you are a U-boat commander, not a movie-star!”13

This immediate distaste notwithstanding, like Raeder Wedel soon realized that the frenzy around Prien could set a dangerous precedent. Other Wehrmacht branches had seen the publicity

Prien had generated for the Navy (whether they wanted it or not) and now sought their own. The

Air Force’s propaganda unit (who were on closer terms with the RMVP) was soon holding press conferences and arranged portraits to be painted of fighter pilots who had repelled early Allied air raids on the German coast. Furthermore, these men also soon appeared in feature magazine articles in the service’s publication Der Adler which compared them to Boelcke, Immelmann and

11 Goebbels’s Wehrmacht liaison Hans Leo Martin observed years later that leading Wehrmacht officers (like Raeder) often “saw red” when discussing the use of war propaganda (Martin, Unser Mann bei Goebbels, 20). Since the beginning of the war, in fact, there had been several other U-boat commanders who could have been publicized as a reincarnated Weddigen, but thanks to orders from Naval High Command they had remained un-heroized. Otto Schuhart, for example, sank a British aircraft carrier a month before Prien’s raid on Scapa Flow. The event received some attention in the German media but Schuhart’s name was never mentioned – the article referred only to “a U-boat commander” (“Der Ubootkommandant erzählt,” BIZ, October 12, 1939; DW, 474 (4.10.1939)). In his post-war memoirs, moreover, Raeder later spared little venom for Goebbels and the RMVP, whose actions he regarded as Party interference in the Wehrmacht. See Raeder, Grand Admiral, 292-297. 12 NARA T-77/1026 OKW785. OKM MI an WPr. (IIc) 26.11.1939. That same month the Navy even left out Prien from a collection of portraits of the “characteristic” faces of the U-boat service it commissioned from war artist Wolfgang Willrich, choosing instead to display twenty “simple soldiers.” See BAMA RW 4/272a f.3, 184. Volksbund für das Deutschtum im Ausland an militärischen Adjutant des Führers, Oberst Schmundt, 23.11.1939. 13 Interview with Horst Bredow, 16.6.1991, in Vause, Wolf, 53. 199

Richthofen.14 Consequently, at roughly the same time that Erich Raeder decided to propose a change to phaleristic policy, Wedel too endeavoured to use his authority to curtail this burgeoning

Starkult before it could start.

At a conference in February 1940, a WPr spokesman made it clear that the department would not foster, much less create, the kind of celebrity culture which had recently surrounded

“certain men.” The “ever more concerted highlighting of an individual,” they said, was neither helpful nor desired, and in future the WPr would impose stricter control over the reporting of exemplary actions by officers of the Wehrmacht. The WPr also encouraged all to use caution when making any direct connections between the current conflict and the First World War.15 The press soon heard the same point reiterated in its daily instructions, which stressed that drawing links between current Wehrmacht personalities and past heroes, many of whom had died in combat with negative impact on popular morale, would only lead to similar problems. As a less than subtle example, comparisons to Otto Weddigen (such as those made for Prien) were deemed especially dangerous in this regard given the approaching twenty-fifth anniversary of his disappearance at sea in 1915.16 For these reasons, the spokesman at February’s press-conference stated explicitly that as far as the WPr was concerned, there would be “no hero cult” (Kein Heldenkult).

With his position now official, Wedel soon came into open conflict with the RMVP and its attempts to popularize the few young Ritterkreuzträger who began to spring up after Günther Prien.

The spark for this conflict came in early March in the person of Herbert Schultze, another

14 BAMA RW 4/272a f.3, 190. Luftgaukommando Ic.Pr – Gr/Kr (5857/39) an WPr. Betr. Kunstmaler Wolfgang Willrich, 18.12.1939; Herbert Scharkowski, “With the Victors of the Air War,” Der Adler, 1. January 9, 1940; ibid., 2. January 23, 1940: J. Grabler, “Der Jäger und seine Waffe”; Falck and Braatz, Falckenjahre, 120-122. 15 Conference referenced in NARA T-77/1026 OKW785. WPr. Bericht an Pressebesprechung, 17.3.1940; BAMA RH 1/81. WPr. Vortragsnotiz, 13.2.1940. 16 BAB ZSg.109-9. 64. V.I. 66/40, 18.3.1940. 200 decorated U-boat commander who had already begun to develop a following of his own with help from Party propagandists. Articles in the Völkischer Beobachter detailed his humble origins and

(contrary to WPr warnings) proclaimed his successes in the Atlantic as “worthy of the great examples of the [First] World War.”17 When Joseph Goebbels’s head of radio propaganda Eugen

Hadamovsky approached Schultze and asked him to appear as a special guest at a broadcasted concert in Berlin, however, Wedel intervened. In a heated exchange of messages, he accused the

RMVP of overstepping its bounds by approaching Schultze without permission and disobeying

WPr guidelines.18 Hadamovsky, meanwhile, replied with equal force that given their symbolic importance, such “specially decorated members of the Wehrmacht” (i.e. young Ritterkreuzträger) should not be hidden; they “belonged to the people.” It was precisely because Wedel and his department had done so little in this regard, he added, that it was necessary for the RMVP to step in and “introduce the names of such famous individuals to the population.”19

Yet, even before the two agencies had reached this collision, Wedel’s position on the visibility of Ritterkreuzträger was already being undermined by processes within his own department. These processes stemmed from the creation of separate, semi-autonomous sub-groups within the WPr following (ironic) complaints late in 1939 from the Army’s chief propagandist,

Dr. Kurt Hesse, that Wedel played favourites and gave disproportionate publicity to the smaller

17 “Die Glanzleistung des Kapitänleutnants Herbert Schultze und seiner Besatzung,” VB, February 27, 1940; ibid., February 29, 1940: “Kapitänleutnant Herbert Schultze: Der Lebenslauf des erfolgreichen U-Boot-Kommandanten.” See further BAB ZSg.109-6, 73. VI. 292/39. 21.12.1939; ibid., 8, 101. V.I. 40/40, 26.2.1940. 18 NARA T-77/1015 OKW629. WPr.IIc. Wedel an Hadamovsky. Betr. Heranziehung von Wehrmachtsangehörigen zum , 7.3.1940. 19 NARA T-77/1015 OKW629. Reichssenderleitung Hadamovsky an Major Martin (OKW), 4.3.1940. Wedel’s spat with Hadamovsky and the RMVP is especially noteworthy given than, in all post-war writings, the WPr chief is described as inclined to compromise whenever possible and avoid conflict (a trait in line with his aforementioned attitude towards equality in propaganda-coverage, see nt.4). For Wedel to dig his heels in over Schultze and the popularization of Ritterkreuzträger, therefore, thus speaks to the special importance (and foreboding) which he ascribed their role in propaganda and the creation of a “Heldenkult.” 201 services and men like Prien.20 Under Hesse’s command, the newly created WPr.V (Army

Propaganda) quickly set about improving its branch’s public image, but in a way that ran counter not only to Wedel’s philosophy but the Party’s Frontkämpfer-ideology.21 To capture the public’s attention, Hesse favoured a “trickle-down” approach by directing focus onto the Army’s successful generals. He dispatched PK units to gather materials that extolled their decisiveness and front-line leadership in the victory over Poland, thereby winning publicity for the Army as a whole.22

Through numerous articles, photo-series and radio-broadcasts the WPr.V helped to establish the archetype of the “fighting general” in wartime media. Furthermore, since many of the campaign’s subjects were also among the country’s then few Ritterkreuzträger, it also represented the first organized usage of them for propaganda purposes.23 However, the campaign also had the unintended effect of creating a mandated role for the RK in propaganda policy. Even after the frenzy over Günther Prien, given the elitist identity of most early-war Ritterkreuzträger the RK held only a little importance amongst many journalists. During the winter, for instance, official instructions to the press repeatedly reprimanded publications for lazy or inaccurate reporting about

RK awardings.24 By March, however, this became an issue for Hasso von Wedel after complaints reached his desk from several generals participating in the WPr.V campaign who felt insulted by the fact that some publications had not bothered to obtain current photographs of them wearing

20 BAMA RW 4/260 f.2. Rundschreiben Halder (409/39), 7.10.1939; BAMA RW 4/242b f.4. HG.A an WPr. Betr. Weisung für Wortberichter (822/40), 29.1.1940. 21 BAMA RH 1/81. WPr. Lagebericht, Blatt 5/40, 19.2.1940; ibid., OKH Genst.d.H.Abt z.b.v. (O Qu IV). No.221/1.40 geh Betr. Besondere Dienstanweisung für die Gruppe V (Heer), 25.1.1940; BAMA N558/64 (2). Entwurf, Teil C. V.6. “Ausbau des Heerespropaganda.” n.d., ca. 1947; NARA T-77/1014 OKW622. Geschäftsverteilungsplan der WPr. Jan. 1940. A more general discussion of the reforms to the WPr in 1939-1940 can be found in Uziel, Propaganda Warriors, 190-191 and Willis, “Wehrmacht Propaganda,” 13-18, 211-213. 22 See Hesse’s statement in BAMA RH 1/81 Übergabe, 20.3.1941. 23 NARA T-77/969 OKW535. WPr.V. Farbenaufnahmen der Armeeführer durch PK, 13.2.1940; ibid., Wedel an AOK für PK des Heeres und Prop.Staffel-Ost (OKW1300/40), 21.2.1940; BAB ZSg.109-9, 14-15. V.I. 55/40, 5.3.1940; “Gesicht eines deutsches General,” Leipziger Illustrirte Zeitung (LIZ), March 7, 1940. 24 According to press instructions, several publications had even credited RK awardings to the wrong men, including once to a wanted deserter. BAB ZSg.109-6, 6. V.I. 276/39, 2.12.1939. 202 their awards. Consequently, Wedel gave notice that, in future, publications should depict any

Ritterkreuzträger with their Halsorden on prominent display.25 When the practice did not stop, moreover, he made the mandatory showcasing of the RK in war propaganda an official policy of the WPr, thus guaranteeing its visibility when the Wehrmacht unleashed its Blitzkrieg campaigns over the following months.26

As German forces conquered all before them, the surge of RK awardings to both junior and senior officers took center stage as new evidences of the Wehrmacht’s historic victory and superiority. This combination of increased visibility and the changing demographics of Halsorden culture proved such an effective combination, in fact, that by late May the SD reported a high demand for Ritterkreuzträger-news across the country. Press instructions reported that military authorities were so “flooded by requests for interviews” that, as a result, they had to be temporarily banned.27 This undeniable popularity even forced the reluctant Hasso von Wedel to concede that

Ritterkreuzträger (he wrote “Ritterkreuzler”) could be valuable tools for the WPr, writing in one document that they could potentially serve to draw attention to Wehrmacht branches in need of publicity. Thus, by the end of the French campaign each of its sub-groups directed their PKs to focus attention on Ritterkreuzträger, to the point that there simply was not enough space in publications to fit all the news about them.28 After a slow start, in short, the Blitzkrieg campaigns

25 NARA T-77/1011 OKW614. Gauverlag Bayerische Ostmark GmbH an Wedel, 4.3.1940; ibid., WPr.IId. Vortragsnotiz, 2.4.1940; ibid., Wedel an Presse-Illustration Heinrich Hoffmann, 23.3.1940. 26 The rule also extended to descriptions of Ritterkreuzträger in print and excluded only images pertaining to pre-war careers. See ibid., WPr.V an Wedel, 18.4.1940; ibid., Wedel an RMVP (WPr. IIIc 4850/40), 18.4.1940; NARA T- 77/1026 OKW677. Tagesanweisung für die militärische Zensur No.75 (2570/40), 22.4.1940. 27 MadR, 4, 1177. No.91 (27.5.1940); ibid., 1221. No.94 (6.6.1940); BAB ZSg.109-11, 27. 28 NARA T-77/1015 OKW629. WPr.IIc. Zusammenstellung von Frontberichten, 29.5.1940; BAMA RW 4/339, 66. WPr. Lagebericht (4200/40), 16-31.5.1940; ibid., 73. WPr. Lagebericht (4570/40), 16-30.6.1940; ibid., 77. WPr. Lagebericht (5300/40), 1.7.1940-15.7.1940; BAB ZSg.109-12, 97. V.I. 145/40 24.6.1940. 203 had effectively reawakened and repurposed the spirit of popular heroism from the First World War surrounding PLM holders in the new mould of the Ritterkreuzträger.

IV.2 Ritterkreuz-Mania

The remainder of 1940, generally considered the climax of wartime hero culture, saw propaganda seem to match reality; the Wehrmacht’s bravest and best, swept up by a wave of national euphoria, stood as the embodiments of victory. Yet, while this fact has long been acknowledged, there has been less focus on the central importance of the RK in the “particular form of celebrity mania” that defined this triumphal period.29 During the summer, the WPr had fielded an ever-increasing demand for stories about Ritterkreuzträger and their exploits, and by the fall enthusiasm for them had reached a fever pitch. Indeed, they continued to receive so many requests for details, pictures and personal information from journalists, publishers and admirers of all ages that Hasso von Wedel put limits on the number the department would process each day.30

Likewise, the RMVP issued a formal reproof against the growing practice of simply drawing in

RKs with pencil (often quite crudely) for photographs among publishers eager to get their stories to the ravenous public instead of waiting for official versions.31

29 Moorhouse, Berlin at War, 65. Though indirectly, the RK is also mentioned in Willis, “Wehrmacht Propaganda,” 146. 30 BAB ZSg.109-15, 67. V.I. 282/40, 19.9.1940; NARA T-77/985 OKW585. Notiz Wedel. Betr. Veröffentlichungen von Ritterkreuzträger, 15.8.1940. One request, for example, asked for permission to create a series of photo- exhibitions which could be “held in thousands of events across the whole territory of the Reich [to] make known the deeds of German war heroes decorated with the Knight’s Cross.” NARA T-77/1008 OKW780. WPr.VI an Wedel (1244/300), 29.10.1940. See also NARA T-77/1008. OKW609. Wedel an Paul Richter, 21.8.1940; BAMA RW 4/245, 77. WPr. Lagebericht (5300/40), 1.7-15.7.1940; ibid., 94. WPr. Lagebericht (6400/40), 16.8.-31.8.1940; BAMA RW 4/275 f.1, 27. WPr.V an Duisberger Allgemeiner Zeitung (9008/40), 27.8.1940; BAMA RW 4/274 f.1, 27. Redaktion Dr. Metger an WPr, 27.8.1940. 31 E.g. “Neue Ritterkreuzträger,” Der Adler, 13. June 25, 1940. The instructions to stop: BAB Zsg.109-13, 45. V.I. 162/40, 13.7.1940. 204

As this rudimentary form of “airbrushing” demonstrates, in other words, the wave sweeping the country that famous summer of 1940 should more accurately be termed a

“Ritterkreuz-mania.” Furthermore, their centrality was no accident, not simply the reflex of a nation eager to celebrate its victory. As shown above, the RK had, in part, been created for this very purpose. At the same time, though, a closer inspection of this “mania” also reveals that its scope and impact were not solely the product of Nazi Heldenpolitik, either. Rather, the true driving force behind the outpouring of hero-worship of this period, one that would establish

Ritterkreuzträger as fixtures in popular culture for the remainder of the war, was the combined effort of many different groups, organizations and individuals who now saw Ritterkreuzträger as a source of capital to be harnessed for their own aggrandizement.

First among these was, of course, the Party itself. Represented by Goebbels and his RMVP, it sought to reap what it could from its successful creation. For the Propaganda Minister specifically, the emergence of an RK-centered Starkult represented the dividends of what had been almost a year of perseverance and effort, both to popularize this medal as a symbol of egalitarian heroism and to overcome the opposition of men like Hasso von Wedel and Erich Raeder. Thus,

Goebbels did his best to insert himself into Wehrmacht propaganda during this period to further stoke the media fire around them. At one of his daily briefings on September 1, for instance, he declared to his military liaison, Major Hans Leo Martin, that the extent of WPr propaganda surrounding Ritterkreuzträger was still too limited. He complained that it was “too schematic and boring,” and emphasized the need “to introduce a continuous number of our [new] Knight’s Cross winners to the nation” in order to display its “colourful array of war heroes.”32

32 Boelcke, Kriegspropaganda, 478 (1.9.1940). 205

Acting on his feelings and in the interest of the Party, Goebbels strove to use his influence to highlight specific individuals amongst the country’s heroes. At another conference three weeks later, he singled out Ritterkreuzträger Herbert Ihlefeld, the son of a farm labourer and now an Air

Force fighter ace. Rags-to-riches stories like his (and Günther Prien), he said, should take center stage in propaganda. To this end, Goebbels demanded the creation of a “general statistical index” that could summarize the origins and backgrounds of all Ritterkreuzträger (thus possibly the inspiration for Hitler’s later Sonderbetreuung indices) through which propagandists could “find further examples that make apparent how [social] origin today is no longer critical.”33 Goebbels beamed in his diary over his arrangement for “Knight’s Cross winners from the common people to be popularized in the press.”34 However, his self-congratulation was premature, for his proposed

“index” failed to get off the ground.35 Nevertheless, Goebbels still spent the rest of the fall attempting to find and promote Ritterkreuzträger who suited the ideological aims of the Party, showing “how a transformation has taken place in popular sentiment and how our National

Socialist thought today takes things for granted, which would not earlier have been possible.”36

The presence of Hans Leo Martin at the Minister’s briefings, though, was a firm reminder that, for all his authority within the political hierarchy, Goebbels and the RMVP were not in ultimate control of propaganda about Ritterkreuzträger. Jurisdictionally, this authority lay with

Wedel and the WPr, and during the early fall the former made an important decision that would

33 Ibid., 519 (21.9.1940). As its own records show, the newly formed Ordensgruppe within the OKH was tasked with aiding in this effort (BAMA RW59/360, 33. Tätigkeitsbericht der Ordensgruppe für die Zeit vom 1.9.1940 – 31.10.1941). Likewise, on September 28, the press received orders that it was particularly desirable to publish stories about Ritterkreuzträger from the lowlier ranks of non-commissioned officers. BAB ZSg.109-15, 100. V.I. 229/40, 28.9.1940. 34 GTb I.8, 339 (22.9.1940). 35 For details regarding this failure and Goebbels’s frustration see Boelcke, Kriegspropaganda, 526 (25.9.1940), 528 (26.9.1940). 36 Ibid., 528 (26.9.1940). See also “Die Heldentaten tapferen Ritterkreuz-Unteroffiziere,” VB, September 30, 1940. 206 have far greater impact upon these men and their public persona. Specifically, in September he once again succumbed to pressure and granted the different Wehrmacht branches increased autonomy over their own propaganda and self-promotion. This decision facilitated the development of what both he and Kurt Hesse would later describe in terms of a publicity war between the different services.37 Unsurprisingly, Ritterkreuzträger soon became the primary focus within this “footrace” (Hesse), for the service that could harness their popularity and market it effectively to the hero-hungry public could gain more of the spotlight and reflected prestige for their contribution to Germany’s continuing success.

The Air Force and Navy quickly demonstrated that they enjoyed several unique advantages. First, as discussed in Chapter II, in U-boat commanders and fighter pilots (and bomber pilots to a lesser degree) both services possessed groups whose combat activity could be easily quantified for awardings of the RK and thus a disproportionate access to the growing Ritterkreuz- mania. More important, though, both submariners and aviators also possessed the extra, unique allure of technological modernity and adventure that had been pioneered by their forebears with the PLM in 1914-1918. Combined with RK-distribution, in other words, the romance of flight and submarine-warfare ensured that the two smaller services could thereby draw upon another layer of marketable capital to celebrate and popularize their dashing young heroes.

Capitalizing on this advantage was particularly important for the Navy because of a need to repair its public image after the campaigns in the spring. Not only had the country’s surface fleet been severely damaged during the Norwegian campaign, but it had also been relegated to a

37 BAMA N 558/64 (1), Nachlass Hesse. Entwurf, 15.9.1947; ibid., Entwurf, §7. “Der Wettlauf zwischen den Wehrmachtteilen auf dem Gebiet der Propaganda,” n.d.; BAMA N 558/69-70, 49. Typescript. “Die Wehrmachtpropaganda, 1939/1945., n.d. See further GTb I.8, 326. 11.7.1940; Martin, Unser Man bei Goebbels, 10. For further detail on the organization and reform of PK units and the WPr during 1940-1941, see Uziel, Propaganda Warriors, chap.4. 207 spectator during the victory over France in May and June. As a result, though Erich Raeder still represented a restraining influence38, the OKM had become more amenable to the popularization of its U-boat commanders as a means to reclaim some of the navalism achieved early in the war through the achievements of men like Günther Prien and Herbert Schultze.39 Conveniently, at this time such men were achieving remarkable success against Allied merchant shipping in the Battle of the Atlantic and winning the RK in growing numbers.40 During the fall, therefore, the naval sub- group within the WPr (WPr.VII41) worked feverishly to produce heroic propaganda about these men, a staple feature being the image or scene of a beaming, bearded U-boat commander receiving the RK from Admiral Karl Dönitz after sinking the requisite 100,000 tons of enemy shipping.42

The Air Force, meanwhile, had never had any inhibitions against the aggressive use of propaganda, and thus embraced Ritterkreuz-mania with equal gusto.43 The service had played an important role in the Blitzkrieg campaigns and by the fall of 1940 was fighting its own purely aerial battle over southern England (the first ever), in which a growing number of its pilots were receiving the RK for reaching their own threshold of twenty kills. As a result, the Air Force sub-

38 See GTb. I.9, 303 (10.5.1941); ibid., II.1, 430-431 (16.9.1941). 39 E.g. BAB ZSg. 109-11. 68. V.I. 112/40, 16.5.1940; ibid., 12. 64. V.I. 139/40 17.6.1940; NARA T-77/965. OKW525. WPr Fernschreiben (4356/40), June 1940. 40 NARA T-77/966 OKW528a. OKM Lagebericht, 1-7.7.1940; ibid., OKM Lagebericht, 15-21.7.1940; ibid., OKM Lagebericht, 22-28.7.1940; NARA T-77/967 OKW528. OKM MI Rundschreiben, 23.8.1940 41The exact timing at which this designation came into being is a matter of some interest. Post-war studies of the WPr point out that it was not included among the sub-groups created by Wedel in early 1940, meaning that naval propaganda continued to be administrated through the liaison system originally put in place to coordinate with the various Wehrmacht branches (in this case the OKM). According to these studies, “WPr.VII” only came into being in mid-1941 as part of another departmental reorganization (discussed here shortly). However, in his own research the author has found the designation in deparmental documents dating to the fall of 1940 and early 1941, suggesting at least its unofficial existence by this point, and thus supporting its usage in the present study here as well: e.g. BAMA RW 4/273, f.6; RW 4/274, f.1 and f.3-4; RW 4/248a, f.3. 42 E.g. BAB ZSg.109-21, 33. V.I. 119/41, 13.5.1941; ibid., 83. V.I. 131/41, 27.5.1941; DW 529, 18.9.1940; ibid., 534 27.11.1940; ibid., 550, 19.3.1941. 43 In contrast to his statements about Raeder and the Navy, for example, Joseph Goebbels wrote in his diary that “one can work best and most speedily with [the Air Force], because they are the most modern and revolutionary” (GTb I.8, 280. 14.8.1940). Kurt Hesse, meanwhile, referred to his Air Force counterparts in WPr.VI as “ruthless” in their self- promotion. See BAMA N558/64 (1). Nachlass Hesse. Geistige Kriegführung, n.d., ca.1947. 208 section of the WPr (WPr.VI) produced its own revived cult of aces, drawing links to the pioneering

“Blue Max” winners of 1914-1918 and publishing images of their RK-wearing descendants standing next to their aircraft and their painted kill-markings.44 The success of this effort also owed much to the active participation of the Air Force chief Hermann Göring. Unlike Erich Raeder, the former pilot and PLM holder (now also the RK and GK) actively encouraged the promotion of this culture, often awardings RKs himself and even facilitating the publicized competitions between the most highly decorated among his pilots.45

Things were different for the Army, however. Though this largest branch received the most

RKs of all, it could not connect to the contemporary mania in the same way. On one hand, it did not lack for young, dynamic Ritterkreuzträger (i.e. those created in the aftermath of Blitzkrieg) and the propagandists of WPr.V produced just as much propaganda proclaiming their heroism as their counterparts in WPr.VI and VII.46 Nevertheless, the current lack of operations for the Army meant that such men were yesterday’s heroes, and yesterday’s news. More important, as discussed at length in Chapter II this service as yet lacked the twin advantages of a quantification system and the extra benefit of highly marketable mechanical modernity. As a result, the Army continued to rely on the “trickle down” philosophy of Kurt Hesse and a sizeable amount of its contribution to

44 Boelcke, Kriegspropaganda, 486 (3.9.1940); BAMA RW 4/276 f.4, 299. WPr. Presseübersicht, 12.2.1941. Each issue of the popular Air Force illustrated magazine Der Adler, for example, had to contain a dedicated page on published profiles on new recipients entitled “How they won the Knight’s Cross” (Wie sie das RK erwarben). See Der Adler, 19. September 17, 1940; ibid., 20, October 1, 1940; 21, October 15, 1940; 22, October 29, 1940. Regarding the links to the First World War, it proclaimed that: “The young successful fighter pilot of the new German Air Force knows to continue the tradition of Richthofen, Boelcke and Immelmann” (“Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring besucht das Mölders,” Der Adler, 3. February 4, 1941). See further “Nach dem 22 Luftsieg,” BIZ, September 10, 1940; “28 Striche – 28 Abschüsse,” VB, September 14, 1940; BAB ZSg.109-16, 13. V.I. 235/40, 5.10.1940; MadR, 5, 1711. No.137 (24.10.1940). 45 Photo, Der Adler 20. October 1, 1940, 9; Cover, BIZ, November 28, 1940; DW, 534 (22.1.1941); ibid., 547 (26.2.1941); ibid., 569 (30.7.1941); Adolf Galland, The First and the Last. The German Fighter Force in World War II, trans. Mervyn Savill (London: Metheuen & Co., Ltd., 1955), 88. 46 E.g. “Brüder tragen das Ritterkreuz,” Die Wehrmacht, 25. December 4, 1940; “Mein Bataillon. Ritterkreuzträger Hauptmann Leo Drossel,” Die Wehrmacht, 24. November 20, 1940; Willy Kahlery, “Feldhaubitzen in der vorderster Linie. Gegen alle artilleristische Theorie – Major Siefert erhielt das Ritterkreuz,” Allemanne (Freiburg) (n.d., ca. fall 1940); “Ritterkreuzträger des Heeres,” Unser Heer, January 20, 1941. 209 contemporary propaganda was focused on the generals and field marshals whose genius and daring, it said, had won the country its victory. During the fall and winter of 1940-1941, Hesse and his men produced thousands of picture postcards of Ritterkreuzträger-generals and drew particular attention to the exploits of one such man, a divisional commander named Erwin Rommel who also happened to be an old friend of Hesse’s.47 Even so, it became clear to all within the WPr (as Wedel himself wrote in one report) that the Army simply could not compete with the smaller services.48

This disparity, though, was most apparent when it came to the small number of elite heroes to emerge during this period, namely those who had won the RK-E that Hitler had first awarded in July to General Eduard Dietl. His elevation had marked an important turning point in the evolution of the RK’s symbolic meaning, but it had also created a new stratum within war hero culture even above that of the ‘ordinary’ Ritterkreuzträger. If the latter now represented the stars of the Wehrmacht, then Dietl represented a new form of “superstar” whose singular fame resembled that of Günther Prien the year before. Drawing on the propaganda image of the “fighting general” created by Kurt Hesse and his WPr.V, the “Hero of Narvik” became the subject of countless articles and featurettes following his investiture in July. He also took center stage in the weekly newsreels, was approached for a book contract about his life (like Prien) and embarked on

47 Boelcke, Kriegspropaganda, 528 (26.9.1940). See BAMA N 558/64 (1), 7 Nachlass Hesse. “Die Einflussnahme auf den deutschen Verleger,” n.d.; BAMA RH 1/81 Kurt Hesse, Heerespropaganda, 20.3.1941; RW 4/240 f3 250 WPr Prop.Blatt 7/40 (OKW 1 r WFSt/WPr.IId 9500/40), 5.10.1940; BAMA RW 4/251a f.3, 188. Gen St H, Pr V. Betr. Serie “Der Fűhrer und seine Generale des Heeres (1996/41), 14.6.1941; “Ritterkreuz für tapfere Generale und Regimentskommandeure,” VB, September 15, 1940; back cover, Die Wehrmacht, November 20, 1940. Regarding this early focus on Rommel, see BAMA RH 1/81 Kurt Hesse, Heerespropaganda. “Filmwesen,” 20.3.1941; BAMA N 117/1, Nachlass Rommel. Rommel an Hesse (WPr.III-21-a-14/14), 21.9.1940. 48 See BAMA RW 4/240 f.3, 250. WPr Blatt 7/40 (OKW 1 r WFSt/WPr.IId 9500/40), 5.10.1940; BAMA RW 4/248b f.1, 25. WPr Lagebericht (7600/40), 18.10.1940. See also GTb. I.8, 383 (19.10.1940). For further discussion of the development of Army propaganda in the fall and winter of 1940-1941, see Uziel, Propaganda Warriors, 120, 277- 278. 210 publicity tours during the summer where he received special honours from locales and groups across the country.49

By the fall, though, Dietl had been overshadowed by a series of younger Eichenlaubträger who further developed this hierarchy in war hero culture, a more rarified class of “Volkshelden”

(people’s heroes)50, in whom Ritterkreuz-mania became concentrated and personified. One of the first, in fact, was Günther Prien himself. His continued success at sea and commensurate propaganda value had only increased since Scapa Flow, and despite any surviving animosity from his superiors he was now a central figure in the Navy’s new publicity campaign.51 His receipt of the RK-E in October 1940, moreover, coincided (one must assume intentionally) with his famous raid the previous year, and according to SD surveillance it redoubled his already considerable fame. Shortly afterwards, Prien’s long-awaited autobiography Mein Weg nach Scapa Flow (My

Journey to Scapa Flow) appeared on shelves across Germany.52

Alongside Prien, though, came two other successful and popular U-boat commanders to receive the RK-E, Joachim Schepke and Otto Kretschmer. Together, the trio became an attractive package for WPr.VII, the “Tonnage Kings” whose comradely competition to become the war’s most successful submariner was soon a fixture in the newspapers, magazines and newsreels.53 At

49 E.g. “Danktelegramm des Siegers von Narvik, General Dietl an Dr. Pachneck,” Kärntner Grenzruf, August 1, 1940; “Graz Ehrt den Sieger von Narvik,” Grazer Tagespost, July 13, 1940; “Ein Brief des General,” Leipziger Tageszeitung, October 12, 1940; “Der Held von Narvik in Kärnten,” Kärntner Grenzruf (Klagenfurt), December 11, 1940; “Der Sieger von Narvik General Dietl, wird bei seiner Fahrt durch Kärnten begeistert umjubelt,” Aschaffenberger Zeitung, December 16, 1940 (these and more press clippings found in BAMA RH 53-18/179). 50 For usage of this term to denote these new heroes, see GTb I.8, 347. 26.9.1940. 51 BAMA RW 4/276 f.2, 104. WPr. Presseübersicht, 2.1.1941; J.C.Schmidt, “Prien,” LIZ, October 29, 1940; “Das Eichenlaub für Prien. Anerkennung des Führers,” Hamburger Allgemeiner Zeitung, October 21, 1940; “Eichenlaub zum Ritterkreuz für Kapitänleutnant Prien,” VB, October 21, 1940. 52 Günther Prien, Mein Weg Nach Scapa Flow (Berlin: Deutsche Verlag, 1940). 53 BAB ZSg.109-17, 68. V.I. 302/40, 20.12.1940; BAMA RW 4/276 f.4, 282-3. WPr. Presseübersicht, 6.2.1941; DW 531(1) (6.11.1940); ibid., 545 (12.2.1941). See further Robertson, Golden Horseshoe, X, 92-93, 110-114, 126-129; Hadley, Count not the Dead, 84; Uziel, Propaganda Warriors, 84. 211 the same time, moreover, Hitler had also elevated a trio from the Air Force to match them. In

September and October, he named three of the most accomplished fighter pilots (or “Experten” in

Air Force parlance) to the elite brotherhood of Eichenlaubträger: Werner Mölders, Adolf Galland and .54 Like Prien, Mölders was beloved by Goebbels, who pushed for his elevation because of his belief that he represented an ideal counterpoint to British demonization of German pilots. With the Minister’s support, the SD reported that his fame had come to “rival that of

Prien.”55

The Tonnage Kings and Experten became the most celebrated of all Ritterkreuzträger during the fall of 1940. Besides having their names and faces constantly heralded in the media, they also rubbed shoulders with other “Prominenten” (prominent personages) in the military, politics and the arts, as well as Hitler and his entourage. At this stage of the war, the dictator decorated each man and often received them for private luncheons and talks where, according to his Air Force Adjutant Nicolaus von Below, he enjoyed spending time with them in frank discussion rather than the obeisance of his sycophants and generals.56 In their everyday lives, moreover, these superstars of the Wehrmacht enjoyed the benefits and trappings of their fame.

They gave frequent interviews, attended public events, were sent on state-funded publicity trips to the alps with their units, were approached for book-manuscripts, answered fan-mail and signed

54 “Der dritte Offizier der deutschen Wehrmacht mit dem Eichenlaub: Major Galland,” BIZ, October 10, 1940; “Major Mölders: 40 Luftsieg. Major Galland: 36 Abschüsse,” VB, September 22, 1940; MadR, 5, 1720-21. No.137 (1.10.1940). 55 MadR. 5, 1711. No.136 (28.10.1940). See further Boelcke, Kriegspropaganda, 552 (21.10.1940); GTb I.8, 341 (25.9.1940); Constable and Toliver, Fighter General, 132-133; “Gesicht des Kampffliegers,” Berliner Börsen Zeitung, September 14, 1940; “Nach 40 Abschüssen zum Ritterkreuz das Eichenlaub,” BIZ, October 31, 1940. 56 Below, At Hitler’s Side, 122. 212 countless autographs.57 In short, they represented not only a superior ideological archetype but also a more refined form of the celebrity culture created by their PLM predecessors of 1914-1918.

Yet, as much as the Wehrmacht’s propagandists (and Goebbels) facilitated the popularization of these heroes through their mutual competition, Ritterkreuz-mania was of course not exclusively a ‘top-down’ process. Rather, the efforts to reap its cultural capital were prevalent at many levels of German society and its power structures. For one thing, Halsordenträger were not just national heroes but also important symbols of local or institutional pride. Having one or multiple war heroes from one’s town, city or Gau became an important feather in local caps, and thus communities rejoiced when one of their own received the RK. They also showered local

Ritterkreuzträger with public honours, compiled comprehensive archives filled with collated newspaper clippings and petitioned the WPr for materials to create books and exhibitions about their lives and exploits.58 Similarly, the latter’s records also reveal that many organizations were equally committed to publicizing their contributions to the war effort. The SA, for one, was

57 E.g. “Wir laufen mit Mölders Ski!” BIZ, January 23, 1941; ibid., February 6, 1941: “Vom U-Boot in die Berge.” It is worth noting that some, like Joachim Schepke and Helmut Wick, embraced their celebrity status while others like Otto Kretschmer and Werner Mölders avoided it as much as possible. The editor of Der Adler, Josef Grabler, petitioned Mölders to emulate Günther Prien and pen an autobiography but was rebuffed, instead writing a series of feature articles which echoed Prien’s earlier series in the Berliner Illustrirte entitled “Major Mölders tells his Story” (“Major Mölders erzählt sein Leben,” Der Adler, 21. October 15, 1940; ibid., 22, October 29, 1940; ibid., 23. November 11, 1940). He found a more willing participant in Wick, whose diaries were soon turned into another series of articles that eventually formed a feature biography (see “Helmut Wick” Der Adler, 2, January 21, 1941). See also Galland, First and the Last, 78, 88; Herbert Ringsletter, Helmut Wick. An Illustrated Biography of the Air Force Ace and Commander of During the (Atglen, PA.: Schiffer Military History, 2005), 88; Constable and Toliver, Fighter General. The Life of Adolf Galland (Zephyr Cove, Nevada: AmPress Publishing, 1990), 124, 132, 133; Braatz, Werner Mölders, 218, 247-248, 254, 270, 284. 58 Some cities did not stop there. According to WPr records, in September it discussed the possibility of having a representative of the city of Königsberg visit its Berlin headquarters in order to cross reference records for any Ritterkreuzträger associated with the city. BAMA RW 4/274 f.1, 52-53. Oberbürgermeister Königsberg an Hptm. Judeich (WPr), 25.9.10.1940; NARA T-77/1008 OKW609. 21.8.1940; ibid., WPr.V an Thüringer Allgemeiner Zeitung. Betr. Lebensläufe der Ritterkreuzträger, 7.10.1940; ibid., OKW780. 29.10.1940; “Ritterkreuzträger aus der Ostmark,” Neues Wiener Tageblatt (Vienna), October 16, 1940; “Heimat der Tapfersten,” BIZ, August 8, 1940; “Tapfere Offiziere aus Bayern,” Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, July 21, 1940. E.g. BAMA RH 53-18/107. Betr. Bayerische Ritterkreuzträger, Schwäbische Ritterkreuzträger, VII-AK (München), XII-AK (Nürnberg) V-AK (Stuttgart). 213 particularly keen in this regard along with vocational groups like the National Socialist Teachers’

Association (Nationalsozialistische Lehrerbund, NSLB), each of whose bulletins (Der Deutscher

Erzieher and Der SA-Mann respectively) ran regular featurettes on those of the country’s heroes who came from their own ranks.59

Perhaps the most enthusiastic proponents of this culture were individual community, governmental and especially Party leaders who saw in Ritterkreuzträger a means for self- promotion. Aside from Hitler himself, who certainly used his frequent meetings with

Eichenlaubträger to bolster his own myth as patron of the Frontkämpfer, the Party’s Gauleiter took a leading role within this sub-culture. WPr files from August 1940, for example, contain repeated requests from the office of , Gauleiter of München-Oberbayern, for up-to-date lists of all the Ritterkreuzträger from his jurisdiction so that they could be celebrated.60 Gauleiter Fritz

Wächtler from nearby Bayreuth, meanwhile, organized a publicized series of events in honour of local Ritterkreuzträger, including an open air reception and rallies where he and one such hero spoke together to assembled crowds of residents and over 3,000 Hitler Youth (HJ) members.61

Indeed, being photographed with the Reich’s war heroes became a growing trend among Party leaders more broadly like Hitler’s deputy Rudolf Hess and Joseph Goebbels, who both endeavoured to make publicized appearances with Ritterkreuzträger.62

59 BAB NS 23/948. WPr. Obslt/Stand.F. Josef Riedl an Der SA Mann, 12.8.1940; NARA T-77/1011 OKW614. SA- Schriftleitung an WPr (6225/40), 22.10.1940; “Tapferkeit vor dem Feind,” Der Deutsche Erzieher. 9 (1940), 278; ibid., “Rektor Schwarting, Ritterkreuzträger,” 10 (1940), 307-308; ibid., “Ingehoven, Ritterkreuzträger,” 11 (1940), 341. 60 BAB R 187/256. Sammlung Schumacher. Gau München-Oberbayern. Betr. Ritterkreuzträger, 31.8.1940. 61 “U-Bootkommandant Korvettenkapitän Hartmann als Gast der Reichswalters des NSLB, Gauleiter Fritz Wächtler, in Bayreuth,“ Deutsche Erzieher, 8 (1940), 225. 62 GTb I.8, 312 (7.9.1940), 280 (20.8.1940); 344 (25.9.1940), 382 (18.10.1940), 384 (20.10.1940); 30 (2.12.1940); BAMA RW 4/276, f.4, 256. WPr. Presseübersicht, 26.1.1941; BAMA RW 4/435 f.1, 32. WPr. “Die Gauleiter an der Kanalküste,” n.d.. 214

In short, then, the summer and fall of 1940 had indeed been something of a golden age for

Ritterkreuzträger, securing for them a position as the primary conduit of wartime hero culture and the personifications of Wehrmacht superiority. Nevertheless, there were already signs that this golden age was unsustainable, and that Ritterkreuz-mania could become a problem if not handled with care, the most notable being the case of the fraudulent Ritterkreuzträger Adam Drayss. As intimated by the prosecutor at his military trial, the gullibility of the mayor of Frankenthal had highlighted the growing potential for scandal owing to locales and their leaders vying for self- aggrandizement.63 Though not mentioned at the trial, the same could be said about the regional

Gauleiter, Josef Bürkel. In his novella about the episode, Rudiger Kramer describes how both he and the mayor quickly became the butt of local jokes and satirical poems about “Ritter Drays von

Drayssenstein.”64 Likewise, the current website of the city of Frankenthal tells of how the arrested (though later released) a woman called “Christine M” for remarking on the stupidity of

Gauleiter Bürckel for being photographed with Drayss, and that he was “a big asshole.”65

Because of the growing capacity for such abuses, the country’s political and governmental authorities had to step in and create preventative measures to curb the negative effects of mania surrounding Ritterkreuz- and Eichenlaubträger. In July, the RMI had issued a formal cautionary notice against the overzealous awarding of honours to prominent military personalities except in

“very exceptional cases.”66 Less than a month after the Drayss affair, moreover, the Ministry

63 BAMA RW 4/300 f.1. 64 Kramer, Hauptmann von Frankenthal, 74, 131. 65 “Der Fall Adam Drays [sic],” www.frankenthal.de (Accessed 15.10.2014). It was the embarrassment about such remarks, in addition to the specific legal codes Drayss had broken, which primarily resulted in his harsh prison sentence of several years on the basis of “Volksschädigung” (damage to the popular morale). See BAMA RW 4/300 f.1. 66 BAB NS 6/820, 141. Bormann. Betr. Verleihung des Ehrenbürgerrechtes an verdiente Offiziere und Soldaten, 17.7.1940. Though not explicitly cited, it is possible that this provision was in response to the flurry of honours which greeted the return to Germany of Eduard Dietl and his Narvikkämpfer in early July. E.g. “Graz Ehrt den Sieger von Narvik” Grazer Tagespost, July 13, 1940 (see press-clipping collections in BAMA RH 53-18/178-179). 215 circulated a further decree that the naming of streets after Ritterkreuzträger was also to be done sparingly.67 Finally, Hitler himself stated that the specific practice of awarding honourary citizenships had gotten out of hand as well, and were thus to be subject to his express permission.68

Such preventative measures, however, were largely superficial. Unbeknownst to Hitler and his leadership, there were more fundamental issues at stake with the country’s hero-worship that lay just over the horizon.

No one was more aware of this than Hasso von Wedel. As mentioned earlier, one of the principal reasons for the WPr chief’s “Kein Heldenkult” stance was his fear that a new one would cause the same problems of volatility for the state as its First World War predecessor. Wedel’s prophetic warnings had been pushed aside, and now, by the winter of 1940-1941, the Third Reich boasted Halsorden-heroes comparable to Boelcke, Weddigen or Richthofen; indeed, they arguably had surpassed them in both scope and impact of fame due to the capabilities of the country’s now highly choreographed mass media. Since the start of the war, moreover, the ranks of these new

Halsordenträger had thus far remained remarkably intact, with only a few deaths and none amongst the Reich’s “superstars.” While this added to their symbolic value as personifications of

Wehrmacht invincibility, it would also make the fallout worse when, as Wedel feared, the harsh realities of war finally struck.69 For all his prescience, though, even Wedel could not have anticipated the degree or speed with which this process would occur.

67 “Erlass vom 19.10.1940 V a 807/40 – 1480,” referenced in BAB NS 6/337, 12143. RMI Betr. Benennung von Strassen nach Offizieren und Soldaten der Wehrmacht, 6.2.1942. Historians Alexander Braun and Manfred Dörr argue that the Drayss incident was also the inspiration for a law late in 1941 that revised the state’s statutes on the procurement of military medals. See Alexander Braun and Manfred Dörr, “Gefreiter Adam Drayss und das Verkaufsverbot vom 22.Okt 1941 für den Ordenshandel, das Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes und dessen höhere Stufen betreffen,” International Militaria Magazin, 125 (2006): 5-13. 68 See “Annahme des Ehrenbürgerrechts durch Offiziere. Vom 23 Sept. 1940 (OKW/WAllg. 3878/40),” in LVBl (1940) 634, No.41. 69 In fact, Wedel would have already seen evidence of this danger since the war’s beginning, such as in December 1939 and June 1940, when false rumours about the death of Günther Prien had momentarily caused panic among 216

IV.3 Déjà vu

The first to die was Helmut Wick, whose plane went missing over the on

November 28, 1940. As Wedel had predicted, within days the SD reported tearful mourning for the fallen hero across the Reich and laments about “the first loss from the number of popular heroes of this war.”70 WPr propagandists hurriedly tried to repair the damage and over the following weeks drew upon the familiar “Totenkult” rhetoric and imagery of the pre-war years, from whose heroes Eichenlaubträger like Wick were supposedly the spiritual descendants. Some articles declared that he had ascended into the company of Richthofen, Immelmann and Boelcke, while others framed his sacrifice as that of the National Socialist martyr, a militarized Blütordenträger like Horst Wessel who did not fear death and had absolute faith in the final victory – rhetoric reminiscent of that for the fallen of the Legion Condor.71 Moreover, with the bottle thus reopened, the early months of 1941 saw a renewed surge of nostalgic propaganda focusing on PLM heroes that reemphasized this ideological connection, including special attention on the anniversary of

Oswald Boelcke’s death in 1916.72

thousands of concerned Germans. See BAB ZSg.109-6, 84. V.I. 294/39 1 Erg., 26.12.1939; MadR 4, 1264. No.97 (17.6.1940); ibid., 4, 1324. No.101 (1.7.1940). 70 MadR 6, 1834. No.147 (5.12.1940). 71 One article in Die Wehrmacht, for example, read that like “the names of the glorious World War fliers Richthofen, Immelmann and Boelcke and others, the name of Wick will also live on as an exemplary champion and heroic flier among our people.” “Major Wick,” Die Wehrmacht, 26. December 18, 1940. See further “Hetzjagd am Himmel,” Der Adler, 26. December 24, 1940; “Major Wick vermisst,” VB December 3, 1940. See also BAB ZSg.109-17, 3. V.I. 286/40, 2.12.1940; ibid., 7. V.I. 288/40, 4.12.1940. 72 “Sieger von einst – Sieger von heute,” VB, April 1, 1941; ibid., April 3, 1941: “Berühmte Jagdflieger des Weltkrieges”; Rolf Roeingh, Flieger des Weltkrieges (Berlin: Deutschen Archiv-Verlag, 1941) Heft 1-6. See also “25 Todestag der Fliegerheld,” Dresdner Anzeiger, February 28, 1941; H. Möller, “Ich will ein Boelcke werden!” Strassburger Neuester Nachrichten, February 28, 1941. 217

Wick’s tragic loss, therefore, was not without a silver lining. Yet, any comfort in such effects disappeared in March when Günther Prien and his U-47 went missing while attacking an

Allied convoy in the North Atlantic. This was a monumental blow in itself, but no sooner had the shock registered when word came a week later that the two other “Tonnage Kings,” Joachim

Schepke and Otto Kretschmer, had been lost as well.73 The gravity of the situation rapidly brought the RMVP and WPr together, and after consultation they decided that to announce the loss of all three would be too overwhelming for the public. Rather, they would withhold the news of the most damaging loss, that of Prien, until a suitable moment appeared.74 The announcement about

Schepke and Kretschmer appeared shortly thereafter, wrapped in the now-revived themes of heroic martyrdom and immortality. “We know from the World War,” wrote the Völkischer Beobachter, that “many of the glorious U-boat commanders had to seal their accomplishments with their lives for the Fatherland [and now] stand recorded in the book of men who gave their lives on the sea for

Germany.”75

This damage control, however, did little to assuage public grief. Even more worryingly, the SD reported growing rumours about Prien among the public, many of whom had noticed his conspicuous and abnormal absence from the news.76 In May 1941, therefore, the OKM admitted publicly that the “Bull of Scapa Flow” had been missing for some weeks (and thus also that they had concealed the fact). As expected, therefore, despite the efforts of propagandists to hide it in

73 In fact, both were lost while attacking the same convoy. A British had rammed and sunk Schepke’s boat, killing him instantly, while Kretschmer had been captured along with most of his crew to spend the remainder of the war in prison camps in Canada. 74 GTb I.9, 238 (10.4.1941); BAB ZSg.109-20, 79. V.I. 104/41, 25.4.1941. 75 “Kretschmer und Schepke von Feindfahrt nicht zurückgekehrt.” VB, April 26, 1941, 1; ibid., April 27, 1941: “Schepke zum Gedächtnis” See further “Seehelden deutscher Vergangenheit” Kölnischer Zeitung, May 2, 1941. 76 Such rumours became far worse, though, with the appearance in May of a British aerial leaflet which read: “In 1914- 1918, Otto Weddigen was the best of the most celebrated German heroes. He died in 1915 […] Hitler has awarded the Knight’s Cross with Oak Leaves to three of his U-boat commanders: The Lt. Commanders Schepke, Kretschmer and Prien. Schepke is dead; Kretschmer is in English captivity. And Prien… Who has heard anything of Prien recently? Where is Prien?” See MadR. 7, 2271. No.184 (8.5.1941); ibid., 7, 2314. No.187 (19.5.1941). 218 small print or in the back pages of newspapers, this news compounded the fallout exponentially.77

A ray of hope appeared to soften the blow in the coming days when the Navy’s most powerful battleship, the Bismarck, made an initially successful foray into the North Atlantic. However, the ship and much of its crew perished shortly thereafter, which only made the situation far worse according to the SD.78 They noted how fresh rumours had begun amongst the public about a

“foolproof [new] anti-submarine weapon” that the allies must have developed. Moreover, it was even being asked whether it was not foolhardy to send out more brave crews when even the likes of exalted Eichenlaubträger had not survived.79

These enormous blows to the RK-centered Starkult, in short, had proven with tragic clarity the hypothesis of Hasso von Wedel about the volatility of living war heroes and the negative potential of unchecked hero-worship. The subjects of this cult, especially superstar

Eichenlaubträger, had been revealed to be inextricably linked to the public’s confidence in the continued superiority of the Wehrmacht. This was most apparent to the Navy, for whom the success of the Prien-Schepke-Kretschmer trio and the potential power of the Bismarck had been essential symbols of its ability to win its disadvantageous war at sea. Thus, this service once again found itself desperately trying to repair its public image by shining the spotlight on its successful submariners. In this they received help from Hitler who created an unprecedented number of new

77 BAB ZSg.109-21, 71. V.I. 128/41 1.Erg; ibid., 76, 129/41 2 Erg. 24.5.1941. E.g. “Günther Prien blieb vor dem Feind – Sein Geist beflügelt unsere U-Boot-Waffe zu neuen Taten,” VB, May 24, 1941; ibid., May 26, 1941: “Günther Prien steht für immer mitten unter uns.” 78 MadR 7, 2410. No.194 (16.6.1941); ibid., 2353. No.189 (29.6.1941); Boelcke, Kriegspropaganda, 756 (29.5.1941). It is perhaps worthwhile mentioning, moreover, that Erich Raeder spared hardly a word for the loss of Prien, nor even for the other prized U-boat commanders who had won the service so much glory in recent months. Instead, he gave all the credit for this to his fellow admiral, Karl Dönitz. See Raeder, Grand Admiral, 362. 79 MadR, 7, 2239. No.182 (28.4.1941); ibid., 2259. No.183 (5.5.1941); ibid., 2271. No.184 (8.5.1941). 219

Eichenlaubträger among this group that spring and summer, clearly in an attempt to replace recent losses and thus also demonstrating a growing overlap between RK-distribution and propaganda.80

For his part, meanwhile, the events of the past year had also clearly had an impact on

Wedel. Since the fall of 1940, the WPr chief had become dismayed not only at these events but also at the tensions and culture of internecine competition between his subordinate sub-groups. As a result, he had obtained Hitler’s permission to reform his department and re-establish what the former called the required “rigid centralization and united leadership” that produced effective propaganda.81 With the help of his second in command, Major Rolf Kratzer, Wedel announced a new structure for the WPr in June 1941, just before the launching of Operation Barbarossa, that not only restored the authority of the OKW but also reflected the central and complex role of

Ritterkreuzträger in the media and public sphere. Henceforth, the sub-group of each Wehrmacht branch would have a special unit specifically dedicated to the management of Ritterkreuzträger and their public display in propaganda (WPr.Va, VIb and VIIa).82

Such actions, and the events that had caused them, represented an important turning point in the role of Ritterkreuzträger in wartime propaganda, a fact made plain during the remainder of

1941 as the Wehrmacht began its long campaign on the Eastern Front. On one hand, as discussed in previous chapters, the invasion reignited the mania of the previous year. Within the first few weeks, and using his department’s reformed structure, Wedel announced that the WPr had been

80 Among them, for example, was Engelbert Endrass, an officer who clearly represented an attempt to transition to a post-Prien era. He had been the latter’s executive officer on the famous Scapa Flow raid and had now become a famous commander in his own right. As such, Endrass he became a focal point for the subsequent naval publicity campaign. See BAB ZSg.109-22, 118. V.I. 165/41, 30.6.1941; “Kapitänleutnant Endrass,” VB, July 15, 1941; NARA T-77/986 OKW759. BdU an OKM Betr. Veröffentlichungen U-Bootserfolge durch Wehrmachtberichte oder Sondermeldung,” 22.6.1941. 81 BAMA RH 1/81. Führererlass (WFSt. No.75/41), 10.2.1941. See also BAMA RW 4/250b f.1, 43. WPr Lagebericht (WPr.IVb. 3100/41), 8.5.1941; GTb. I.9, 150 (20.2.1941). 82 See BAMA RL 3/1774. WPr. Geschäftsverteilungsplan der Abteilung für Wehrmachtpropaganda (5715/41), Juni 1941. See further, Willis, “Wehrmacht Propaganda,” 29. 220 able to make “publications available continuously about Ritterkreuzträger from all three branches.”83 Similarly, the department once more received a commensurate flood of requests for information, biographical details and photographs of Ritterkreuzträger from the public, as well as complaints when these requests were not processed quickly enough.84 Such was the flood of letters to Ritterkreuzträger from adoring German youth, moreover, that the OKW demanded of the Party to ask HJ leaders to refrain from encouraging their groups to engage in the practice in such great volume.85

Still, these youths were only engaging in the kind of hero-worship that propagandists encouraged, and with ever more forcefulness. One article published in a newspaper that summer, for example, spoke of the “tone” (Klang) around the word “Ritterkreuz” as one that invoked:

the martial virtues of the German man, who […] puts the nation into the middle of the deciding phases of battle [and] provides an example to tip the balance whether they brought about victory through command leadership or represented a shining example of self-sacrifice through their personal actions.

The new awardings to senior officers, this article continued, reflected the continued and devoted service of the generation of Frontkämpfer who had fought in 1914-1918, while their accompaniment by NCOs and enlisted men within the brotherhood of Ritterkreuzträger represented the egalitarianism of the new Wehrmacht. Thus, more than any other medal, the RK

83 BAMA RW 4/339, 198. WPr Lagebericht (5590/41), 17.7-31.7.1941. E.g. “Für heldenhaften Einsatz im Osten,” VB, July 15, 1941; ibid., July 28, 1941: “Ritterkreuz für zielbewusste Führung”; ibid., October 28, 1941: “Der 20- jährige Ritterkreuzträger der Waffen-SS Fritz Christen”; NARA T-77/1025 OKW784 Notiz WPr.V (8617/41) “Der Gefreiter Heinz Berger erhält das Ritterkreuz,” 2.10.1041; ibid., Panzergruppe 3 Abt Ic/Z an WPr.V. Uffz. Schönewolf, “Ein vorbildlicher Spähtruppführer. Lt. Kress” 13.8.1941; “Junge Eichenlaubträger des Heeres. Bewährte Truppenführer des Heeres” in Bilder der Woche 109, December 14, 1941. 84 NARA T-77/986 OKW760 Reichspropagandaamt Königsberg betr. Veröffentlichungen über Taten von Ritterkreuzträgern, 8.11.1941. See further NARA T-77/1025 OKW784. Zensurstelle des OKW, 16.8.1941; BAMA RW 4/259 f.4, 364. WPr.V an WKK.IX Kassel betr. Ritterkreuzträger, 8.10.1941. Impatience on the part of publishers and authors also continued the practice of ‘retouching’ photographs with penciled-in RKs or RK-Es, which resulted in a restatement of formal condemnation from the WPr late in the year. See BAB ZSg.109-25. 72-73. 85 V.I. 28/247. “Auskunftserteilung über Ritterkreuzträger,” 26.6.1941, in Verfügungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben. III, 331. 221 filled the Volk with a “special pride” for delineating “an elite, a selection of the best of German manhood,” and “the German people are proud of each and every one of them.”86

For their part, each of the WPr’s sub-groups continued to shine as much light as possible on Ritterkreuz-, Eichenlaub- and soon also Schwerter- and Brillantenträger using their new special sections. While the Navy invested its effort in highlighting a new crop of recipients among its U- boat commanders to replace the Tonnage Kings, the Air Force continued to draw upon its inherent advantages and promote its “Experten” who were amassing ever higher numbers of kills against outclassed Russian opponents. The Army, by contrast, still attempted to make up for its disadvantages in heroic marketability, now increased with the growing influence of the Waffen-

SS in land warfare. Furthermore, it now had to do without the innovation and energetic advocacy of Kurt Hesse, who had fallen victim earlier that year to court intrigue spearheaded by Joseph

Goebbels.87 Finally, while the Russian campaign had already produced a number of young, energetic combat officers and even enlisted men who won the RK for daring feats of bravery, the majority of WPr.V material still focused on the higher ranking “Heerführer” (Army Leaders) whose grandiose strategic achievements offered the best chance to capture spotlight for the service.88 Even so, this continued usage of Hesse’s “trickle-down” publicity tactics, did result in

86 “Tapferste der Tapferen,” Pariser Zeitung, August 12, 1941 (found in a collection of Ritterkreuz-themed press- clippings, see BAMA RH 53-18/108 III-B 50 b – 67). 87 Hesse had been in the Propaganda Minister’s crosshairs for quite some time. As the latter’s diary attests, WPr.V’s attempts to expand its reach through relationships with filmmakers, broadcasters and publishers had been interpreted as unnecessary and unwanted encroachment onto RMVP territory. Thus, Goebbels had sought any excuse to secure Hesse’s downfall, finally succeeding only when the latter made the error of publishing a pair of articles critical of the war’s strategic direction. Goebbels pounced, and without the protection of Hitler or his erstwhile patron, Field Marshal Brauchitsch, Hesse was removed from command of WPr.V, spending the rest of the war in training duties. Goebbels wrote in his diary: “Bravo! One tormentor less!” See GTb I.9, 176-178 (8-9.3.1941); ibid., 171-174 (6-7.3.1941). 88 See BAB ZSg.109-24, 102. V.I. 217/41 21.8.1941; ibid., 91. V.I. 282/41 27.10.1941; “Für heldenhaften Einsatz im Osten,” VB, July 15, 1941; ibid., July 27, 1941: “Ritterkreuz für Zielbewusste Führung”; ibid., August 7, 1941: “Siegreiche Heeresführer in Ost”; BAMA RW 4/337 f.5, 301. Wkdo.XVII. “Lebensbilder grosser deutschen Feldherrn,” 8.8.1941; BAMA N 558/64 (1), Kurt Hesse. 7 Teil CV, 6.I. “Die Einflussnahme auf den deutschen Verleger.” 222 the continued popularization of his friend Erwin Rommel, who had assumed command of the small

German “Afrikakorps” the previous winter and had since achieved noteworthy successes which had earned him the RK-E from Hitler.89

At the same time, though, the new reality of heroes’ mortality was becoming an increasingly important and formalized component of their role in propaganda and popular culture.

Despite the scale of their new conquests, the toll on the Wehrmacht’s heroes after Barbarossa had been heavy. During the first month alone, the press reported the deaths of ten Ritterkreuzträger and another Eichenlaubträger, and by the end of the year the number of these decorated heroes fallen in combat or because of wounds and accidents stood at sixty-four.90 More worrying for the authorities, though, was the fact that news of such tragedies, and the health of Ritterkreuzträger more generally, was becoming an easy test for the public regarding the overall progress of the war.

After several highly decorated men had fallen in action against Soviet forces in the in

November, for example, SD reports noted that “losses of large numbers of Ritterkreuzträger in this area has prompted some to ask again about the [overall] state of German losses.”91 A similar report several weeks later noted that: “The populace is getting letters from the Eastern Front of strengthening Soviet resistance, something confirmed by the recent deaths of different

Ritterkreuzträger.”92

89 “Eichenlaub für General Rommel,” VB, March 24, 1941; ibid., April 18, 1941: “Begegnungen mit General Rommel”; See also Kubetzky, Mask of Command, 81, 364-369. 90 BAMA RW 59/360, 33. Tätigkeitsbericht der Ordensgruppe für die Zeit vom 1.9.1940 – 31.10.1941; BAB ZSg.109- 23, 47. V.I. 176/41, 23.7.1941. Examples of the increasing number of Ritterkreuzträger obituaries from the Party mouthpiece the Völkischer Beobachter include: “Ritterkreuz für einen gefallenen Offizier“ VB, July 12, 1941; 3; ibid., September 15, 1941: “Ritterkreuzträger von Schobert gefallen”; ibid., November 21, 1941: “So fiel Ritterkreuzträger Eske”; ibid., December 5, 1941: “Heldentod zweier Ritterkreuzträger der Waffen-SS.” 91 MadR, 8, 3008. No.239 (20.11.1941). 92 Ibid., 8, 3070. No.244 (8.12.1941). 223

This new and undesired component of wartime hero culture prompted the regime to develop a more established system of countermeasures to offset such negative effects and even spin them as positives. For one thing, during the latter half of 1941 the WPr and RMVP jointly constructed a cult of remembrance around the Wehrmacht’s fallen heroes centered around the

Eichenlaubträger lost during the spring. In October, the press commemorated the two-year anniversary of Günther Prien’s attack on Scapa Flow, and the following month his ghost-written autobiography received a national prize for youth literature.93 Likewise, the WPr encouraged requests from the public to enshrine these men’s memories, such as through the creation of portraits or a bust of the dashing Joachim Schepke.94 Most important, with Hitler’s support it became a common practice within the Wehrmacht to remove highly decorated heroes (i.e. those possessing the RK-E and now also the new RK-ES and RK-ESB) out of harm’s way to preserve their propaganda value. Speaking specifically of the Air Force’s “Experten,” Hitler said: “We should ensure […] that we preserve as many as possible from the guard of our Knight’s Cross bearers for the coming generation. If one of them achieves 100 kills, he must be held back from further operations as one of the bravest.”95

Even so, the tactic did not always work. In the summer of 1941 Hermann Göring removed

Werner Mölders (the first Brillantenträger) from combat flying and promoted him to the largely ceremonial role of “Inspector of Fighters.” However, in a sequence of events described at greater

93 “Hans Schemm Preis fűr Gűnther Prien,” VB, November 30, 1941; “Literaturpreis des NSLB,” Der Deutscher Erzieher, 12. (1941), 366; “Vor zwei Jahren: Priens Torpedoschüsse in der Bucht von Scapa Flow,“ VB, October 15, 1941. 94 E.g. NARA T-77/1011 OKW786. BdU-2470 an WPr.II., 2.9.1941; ibid., WPr.VIIc an BdU. Betr. “Porträts der Ritterkreuzträger (Schepke),” 22.9.1941. 95 Picker, Tischgespräche, 334. No.133 (27.5.1942). See further GTb II.12, 313 (18.5.1944); Vause, Wolf, 92, 162- 163 and Kurt Braatz, Walter Krupinski – Jagdflieger, Geheimagent, General (Moosburg: NeunundzwanzigSechs Verlag, 2010), 82. As Guntram Schulze-Wegener correctly points out in qualification, though, this was by no means a formal policy. Which heroes were removed from combat service varied a great deal, and the war claimed the lives of a great many of them. Moreover, sometimes they were put back into combat in the war’s latter stages such as the U-boat commander Erich Topp or fighter general Adolf Galland. See Schulze-Wegener, Das Eiserne Kreuz, 153. 224 length in the next chapter, Mölders died only months later in a plane crash (ironically whilst returning to Germany for the funeral of another Ritterkreuzträger). Trying to avoid earlier mistakes the authorities had announced the news right away. Still, the SD reported soon after that “the death of one soldier in this war,” had never “found so strong a reaction.”96 Nevertheless, unlike the deaths in the spring this time the regime had a body to bury, and consequently Hitler ordered a public funeral which became a grand propaganda spectacle that harkened back to the famous burial of

Horst Wessel in 1930. An honour guard of Ritterkreuzträger led Mölders’s cortege through crowded Berlin streets and laid his coffin to rest in the famous Invalidenfriedhof next to the grave of Manfred von Richthofen, reinforcing the clear and obvious message of symbolic ancestry.97

Delivering the eulogy, Hermann Göring declared that, like Siegfried entering Valhalla, Mölders had taken his place alongside earlier heroes as a “shining example of German youth and German heroism.”98

Even for Ritterkreuzträger of less singular significance, though, their deaths were also becoming a defined part of war hero culture. In concert with (and one can also reasonably assume causal relationship with) the surge in post-mortem benefits created for this group during 1941, spreading the news of their deaths became highly regulated and choreographed. The initial guidelines, created at the beginning of the summer as part of the “Sonderbetreuung” program, stated that relevant Wehrmacht personnel offices were to notify the appropriate WPr sub-group as quickly as possible, who would then write a suitably sanitized obituary that could appear in either

96 MadR, 8, 3015. No.240 (24.11.1941); GTb II.2, 351 (23.11.1941). 97 BAB NS 18/267, 967. Berndt an Goebbels, betr. Staatsakt anlässlich den Staatsbegräbnisse Oberst Mölders, 24.11.1941. See further Baird, To Die for Germany, 227; Behrenbeck, Kult um die toten Helden, 134-148. For examples of the eulogizing propaganda which accompanied the event, see BAB ZSg.109-27, 85. V.I. 309/41. 24.11.1941; “Oberst Werner Mölders,” VB, November 24, 1941; “Mölders aus der Nähe,” Die Front, December 4, 1941. 98 “Letzte Begegnung mit Oberst Mölders,” Berliner Zeitung am Mittag, December 6, 1941. 225

Der Adler, Die Kriegsmarine, or Unser Heer.99 However, such measures soon ran afoul of the public, who felt that they were draconian in the minimal amounts of detail provided;

Ritterkreuzträger deserved to be adequately memorialized. In December, the RMVP announced a compromise: full length obituaries would be allowed Reich-wide, but only for the rarer and

“exemplary military personalities,” i.e. Eichenlaubträger or above, senior generals of the highest rank, or any other Hitler personally deemed worthy. For regular Ritterkreuzträger, though, they could appear only in local publications.100

By the end of the year, in short, it was clear that Ritterkreuz-mania had entered a new phase. After undergoing transformative shifts during 1941, the role of Ritterkreuzträger as state- sponsored celebrities had become more complex and more volatile. Yet, the following two years would see even more profound changes. Whereas in the past their notoriety and moral authority represented a measure of prestige and pride to be harnessed by different groups for their own aggrandizement, the downturn in Germany’s military fortunes meant that this symbolic capital increasingly took on a more urgent tone and heightened level of importance. More specifically, as military and political authorities increasingly found themselves on the back foot, Ritterkreuzträger were soon confronted by both an intensification and diversification of their role in propaganda and popular culture.

99 BAMA RW 6/339 WZ.III (29c16/6852); BAMA RW 59/294, 11; ibid., 48. LPA an Z.A. Min Büro, 21.10.1941. 100 BAB ZSg.109-28, 69. V.I. 337/41. 23.12.1941. These rules would continue to evolve and were evidently not observed universally. In 1942, Hermann Göring decreed that all Ritter- and Eichenlaubträger in the Air Force were to receive mandatory public obituaries. See “Nachruf für gefallene und verstorbene Inhaber des Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes. Vom 7 Sept.1942,” LVBl. I (1942) No.36, 1208. No.2228. Likewise, see BAMA RH 55-18/86, 1. Handakte Ritterkreuzträger. Betr. Anweisung an den Sachbearbeiter für die Bearbeitung der Ritterkreuzträgerfälle beim Tod und Vermisstsein,” n.d., ca. early 1943. 226

IV.4 Heroes of Necessity

The first important change was the product of a growing level of encroachment by the Party into Ritterkreuzträger-themed propaganda. Of course, this had always been intrinsically political given the decoration’s symbolic function, but during 1942 and 1943 its tone became more overt and forceful, largely through new efforts by Joseph Goebbels. As noted earlier, the Propaganda

Minister had been trying to exert what influence he could over the popularization of

Ritterkreuzträger since 1939 and he had never stopped meddling in the affairs of the WPr, manipulating hero culture when and where he could. As mentioned earlier, Goebbels made a point to be seen with war heroes and by 1942 the practice became a regular part of his schedule.

Ritterkreuzträger would be invited to attend his propaganda briefings or join him for a meal – often photographed for the newspapers and noted in his diary for posterity. Though undoubtedly also attributable to self-aggrandizement by association, these meetings kept the Minister’s hand in the game, as it were. After meeting with one Eichenlaubträger in April of 1942, he wrote in his diary of his intentions to ensure that the young man “continues to progress down the […] path of a true people’s heroism [Volksheldentum].”101

Goebbels also still enjoyed throwing his weight behind men who could serve an ideological end. After losing two of his favourites in 1941 (Prien and Mölders), for example, he returned to his patronage the man he had once labelled the ideal Ritterkreuzträger, Herbert Ihlefeld. The

Minister was undoubtedly credited himself to some degree for the fact that this hero of modest

101 GTb II.4, 210 (30.4.1942). For further select examples of Goebbels’s notations about his frequent audiences with Ritterkreuzträger, see ibid., II.3, 167 (22.1.1942); II.5, 214 (30.7.1942); II.7, 478 (5.3.1943); II.10, 312 (18.11.1943); Wilfred von Oven, Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende I (Buenos Aires: Dürer Verlag, 1949), 26. Much the same went for other Party propaganda chiefs such as , who sometimes invited Ritterkreuzträger to his daily conferences to give reports on conditions at the front – i.e. to gain perspective on the realism of propaganda. See BAB R 55/20898 Protokoll No.84/42 (8-9) and No.88/42 (21). 227 origins had become one of the country’s most successful fighter aces, winning the RK-E and then the RK-ES. In April 1942, the SD reported that Ihlefeld’s elevation had evoked a positive reaction among the public (and especially workers) as a projection that merit and ability counted for more than education in the new Nazi Wehrmacht.102 Goebbels arranged for a meeting with the hero later that year to further develop his career while at the same time cultivating other new heroes of similar background such as Hermann Graf, another highly decorated fighter ace, to further support the symbolic meaning of the RK among the public.103

More important than these individually focused activities, though, were Goebbels’s wider efforts to alter the tone of Ritterkreuzträger propaganda to shore up the Party’s own public image.

By this point in the war, its reputation had sunk to a worrying low level among ordinary Germans.

While SD reports noted that most people still had faith in Hitler and some of his senior acolytes, there was a growing bitterness against much of the Party leadership, particularly at the local level.

Such “gentlemen in brown uniforms,” as Hermann Graf intimated in his memoirs, continued to aggrandize themselves through Ritterkreuzträger at every opportunity, but they had also drawn public ire for living flagrantly luxurious lifestyles even as they asked increasing sacrifice of ordinary Germans on the Home Front.104 Anger at this “Bonzentum” had reached a level deemed

102 MadR, 10, 3675. No.279 (27.4.1942). See also “95. Luftsieg von Hauptmann Ihlefeld,” VB, April 22, 1942; ibid., April 24, 1942: “Hauptmann Ihlefelds 101 Jagdsieg.”; ibid., April 25, 1942: Georg Brütting, “Erst Monteur – heute Gruppenkommandeur.” 103 GTb II.5, 581 (27.9.1942); Spick, Aces of the Reich, 210-211. 104 Graf, 200 Luftsiege, 106. One of the more popular methods of aggrandizement through Ritterkreuzträger employed by political elites and seems to have been the sending of open letters of congratulation to them on behalf of their region or municipality. For example, see BAMA MSG 2/12667. Friedrich Karl Florian (Gauleiter, Düsseldorf) an Oberst Wiese, 26.2.1942; ibid., 13467. NSDAP Ranheim an Frau Katharia Hudel, 9.6.1942; BAB R 187/256. Sammlung Schumacher, Bürgermeister Berchtesgaden a Gen.Lanz, 9.1.1943. For examples of reports outlining public frustration at the elites’ “Bonzentum,” meanwhile, see MadR, 9, 3350. No.262 (23.2.1942); ibid., 10. 3685, No.280 (30.4.1942). 228 dangerous by Hitler, Goebbels and others within the leadership, and they endeavoured to demonstrate that the Party was still morally reputable and worthy of the public’s trust.105

Thus, it becomes clear why, beginning early in 1942, a series of articles and essays about

Ritterkreuzträger appeared in publications over which the Party could exercise more control reinforced the connection of the RK to the Party and its mythology of German history. In January, long-time propagandist Otto Riebecke published an essay in an issue of the Reichskriegerzeitung

(newspaper of the Nazi Veterans’ Association) reminding all veterans, past and present, that

Ritterkreuzträger were the heirs of the “grey front” of 1914-1918 and symbols of its rescue from disgrace by the Party through the defeat of its “internal enemies.” As such the RK represented the fulfillment of its promise of steadfast fidelity to its ideals.106 Likewise, an article in the popular

SS magazine Das Schwarze Korps spoke of the RK as the objectification of the eternal “Kämpfer” spirit that indwelt the Party’s activists and united the Volk’s political and military history. In thinking of its recipients, it continued, “we recognize that they have stood on the narrow border between life and death,” and that they represented the “purer strength of life” (read National

Socialism) which propels the nation to victory.107

Even more directly, the Party also stepped up its efforts to highlight those Ritterkreuzträger who were members or belonged to its organizations. Such was the obvious purpose of a featurette in the Völkischer Beobachter on January 30 (the anniversary of the Machtergreifung) entitled

“Proven for the Party and Before the Enemy.” The piece profiled twenty-four Ritterkreuzträger

105 BAB NS 6/337, 12137. Erlass über die Lebenshaltung führender Persönlichkeiten vom 21.3.1942; GTb II.3, 567- 568 (28.3.1942). 106 Otto Riebicke, “Ritterkreuzträger,” Reichskriegerzeitung, March 29, 1942 (found in newspaper clipping collection BAMA RH 53-18/121 III – B 51 2/1). 107 Cornelius van der Horst, “Das Ritterkreuz,” Das Schwarze Korps, April 2, 1942 (BAMA RH 53-18/121. III-B51- 2/2). See also ibid., February 24, 1942: E. Willem, “Die Träger höchster deutscher Kriegsauszeichnungen.” 229 active in Party organizations like the SS, SA or HJ and declared that they were representative of the “law of the Party [that] requires one to stand, if necessary, with one’s own life for the fulfillment of its program.” They had already proven their reliability and trustworthiness “before the enemy in the Kampfzeit of the movement,” it continued, and now “in this war the NSDAP proves anew that its men stand by their words with action.”108 In fact, the article suggested in less than subtle terms that the ratio of Party members was disproportionately high among

Ritterkreuzträger, and such men “can be valued as the Party’s portion in the war.”109

Outside of the Party’s own mouthpiece newspaper, moreover, in the coming months

Goebbels and his liaison at the PKz, Walther Tiessler, began to exert pressure directly on Hasso von Wedel for the WPr to make special effort to highlight Ritterkreuzträger involved in political organizations (a connection they also accused Wedel of underselling). Reports from different Gau leaderships noted that such information was rarely, if ever, seen in WPr propaganda about

Ritterkreuzträger, which meant that the Party was losing a potentially valuable source of moral capital. “It is a small thing,” one report said, “to include whether they were a Local Group Leader

[Ortsgruppenleiter] or Gau Department Leader [Gauamtsleiter].”110 According to correspondence between the RRVP and RMVP during 1942, Wedel purposefully dragged his feet on these requests, and so Goebbels resurrected his idea from the fall of 1940 to create an index in each Gau of all Ritterkreuzträger for propaganda. They would include not only personal backgrounds, as before, but now also the heroes’ political histories as well, so that events or news involving

108 “Für die Partei und vor dem Feind bewährt,” VB, January 30, 1942. 109 Ibid. 110 BAB NS 18/502, 1305. Vorlage für den Herrn Minister. Betr. Erwähnung der Partei-Tätigkeit im Lebenslauf von Ritterkreuzträgern, 1.10.1942. See further ibid., 1302. Notiz an Schaudinn. Betr. Erwähnung der Partei-Tätigkeit im Lebenslauf von Ritterkreuzträgern, 10.5.1942; ibid., 1301. Notiz an Passe, 8.10.1942. 230

Ritterkreuzträger from the Party could be rapidly and comprehensively reported to the WPr in time to be included in official announcements.111

By 1943, Tiessler and Goebbels took their efforts further by pressing for the WPr to place a special spotlight on Ritterkreuzträger who also demonstrated the regime’s ideals in their family lives. In the spring, the pair placed their weight behind proposals from the Office for Racial Politics and the Reich League for the Consolidation of the German Family112 to have greater attention placed on those who exemplified the benefits of marriage and large families for the creation of a racially pure and healthy Volk. Even by including phrases like “Knight’s Cross winner X [sic] is the seventh son of ... and is himself already a father of ... children” in propaganda materials, the proposal said, could “spread the opinion that exemplary accomplishments and the abundance of children always belong together.”113 Tiessler and Goebbels pressured Hasso von Wedel to accept these new emphases, but did concede that it would perhaps be wiser to focus on Ritterkreuzträger with only one or two children, “so that our intentions are not too obvious, and the efforts lose their effect.”114

This increased politicization of Ritterkreuzträger was in itself representative of a broader undermining of Wedel, his authority over war propaganda and even his own department. Indeed, though promoted to in 1943, the establishment of a rival propaganda structure for the SS led by Gunter d'Alquen along with Goebbels’s continued interference meant that his

111 BAB NS 18/502, 1302.; ibid., 1296. Reichspropagandaleitung (hereafter RPL) an Tiessler. Betr. Politische Tätigkeit von Ritterkreuzträgern, 13.10.1942; ibid., 1290. Vorlage. Betr. Ritterkreuzträger aus der Bewegung, 4.11.1942. 112 The “Rassenpolitisches Amt” and “Reichsbund deutsche Familie,” respectively. 113 BAB NS 18/502, 1273-74. Passe. IIW (Rei/Ed) Betr. Erwähnung des Familienstandes anlässlich der Verleihung hoher Auszeichnungen an Wehrmachtsangehörige, 13.5.1943. 114 BAB NS 18/502, 1270. Rassenpolitischesamt an Tiessler, 31.5.1943; ibid., 1271. RPL/RRVP (Ti/Ge) an Rassenpolitischesamt (Dr. Gross). Betr. Erwähnung des Familienstandes anlässlich der Verleihung hoher Auszeichnungen an Wehrmachtsangehörige, 25.5.1943. For further details of this discussion see ibid., 1265-1268. 231 authority steadily weakened within the state’s propaganda apparatus.115 Nevertheless, despite its weakened influence it was still the WPr that adjudicated the public role of Ritterkreuzträger, and following the failure of Barbarossa the “footrace” between the Wehrmacht branches took on a new character. As the impetus of the war hung in the balance, the stakes for these competing groups rose exponentially. Securing public interest became more than a matter of simple prestige, as it had been in 1940; it was now tied to the growing need to cover-over military failure as well as to increase production and recruitment figures.

In this new version of the footrace, the Air Force retained the most favourable position.

Despite heavy casualties on the Eastern Front, it still enjoyed a slight advantage in training and aircraft over Soviet forces, and as a result numerous Ritterkreuzträger among fighter and bomber pilots continued to amass unprecedented success. At the same time, however, over the course of

1942 the inability to counter the Allied bombing campaign in the West was beginning to test its resources as well as its reputation amongst ordinary Germans. The Navy, meanwhile, was once again in greater need of public confidence in its ability to win the war at sea. It had generated publicity and prestige for the success of several U-boats along the American coastline in early

1942, but thereafter it became obvious that the once vaunted U-boat fleet was being systematically swept from the sea by superior Allied numbers and technology.116

The worst off, though, was still the Army. After failing to take Moscow, the attrition suffered by this branch (both in the east and increasingly also the Mediterranean) had not only had negative effects on the distribution of awards (as discussed in Chapter II) but had also created a

115 Daniel Uziel includes a discussion of the formation and development of d'Alquen’s SS propaganda department in his work Propaganda Warriors (n.b. pp.173, 180-81, 281). For a more detailed discussion of this unit in German, see Jochen Lehnhardt’s study of the propaganda surrounding the Waffen-SS: Lehnhardt, Geburt einer Legende. 116 See BAMA ZSg.109-29, 84. V.I. 20/42. 23.1.1942; MadR 9, 3219-3220. No.255 (29.1.1942). 232 crisis in the need for fresh recruits to help blunt or turn back ever stronger Allied counter offensives. Rudolf Schmundt encapsulated the problem in the HPA war diary in October 1942, noting that “the youth are ever prepared to become fighter pilots or U-boat officers or panzer officers [rather] than nameless infantry officers.”117 Consequently, with the added support of a concerned dictator, the Army’s dedicated propagandists within the WPr and the staff of its advertising and recruitment department (Abteilung Heeresnachwuchs, AHN118) strove ever more concertedly and creatively to find new ways of making this service more attractive.

This new context of more pressing self-interest understandably had profound effects on not only the quantity, but also the substance of Ritterkreuzträger’s involvement in propaganda work.

First and foremost, it exacerbated the growing stratification of the Heldenkult that had developed since the appearance of the first “superstars” in 1940. With each service seeking to capitalize on their singular propaganda potential, Schwerter- and the few Brillantenträger accounted for the most individual headlines, newsreel minutes and sound bites on the radio. For their part, the two smaller services produced what amounted to updated versions of their earlier elite heroes who had fallen or been removed from combat. Air Force propagandists facilitated the rise of new “Experten,” including aces like Günther Lützow and Joachim Müncheberg as well as Goebbels’s favourites

Ihlefeld and Graf, men whose kill totals doubled, or even tripled those of earlier years and dwarfed those of 1914-1918.119 One pilot in particular, Hans Joachim Marseille, briefly became a national sensation. Before his accidental death in September 1942, this handsome teenaged ace had shot

117 Bradley and Schulze-Kossens, Tätigkeitsbericht, 13. (26.10.1942); ibid., 17 (7.11.1942). See further GTb II.2, 380 (28.11.1941); ibid., II.5, 268 (7.8.1942). 118 This department was to increasingly gain in importance after the fall of 1942, when the WPr once again underwent a major reorganization and the three sub-groups representing the various Wehrmacht branches (V-VII) were disbanded and folded into its more thematically-organized units (I-IV). This, though, by no means erased the intensity of competition between the branches for publicity, merely its institutional format. 119 MadR. 9, 3236. No.256 (2.2.1942). See further Graf, 200 Luftsiege, n.b. 140-160; Spick, Aces of the Reich, 124- 125. 233 down over a hundred Allied planes in the North African desert, becoming the youngest

Brillantenträger and the darling of the public.120

Naval propagandists likewise fashioned yet another new generation of hero U-boat commanders (though their numbers, as mentioned, were not nearly as high as their aviator counterparts). These included several of the men who had taken part in aforementioned “Operation

Drumbeat” along the American coast such as Reinhard Hardegen, as well as other young aces like

Erich Topp, Jochen Mohr and Reinhard “Teddy” Suhren.121 Likewise, the Navy had its own counterpoint to Hans Joachim Marseille in the person of Wolfgang Lüth, a veteran of fifteen war patrols who delivered marketable success against Allied merchant shipping that earned him the

RK-ESB from Hitler.122 As an additional bonus, though, Lüth was a convinced Nazi and also a devoted family man who vocally extolled the virtues of marriage, which garnered him the support and patronage of Joseph Goebbels. As a result, he became the most famous submariner of the war next to the “Tonnage Kings,” enjoying not only considerable press coverage but a book contract and lecture opportunities.123

Despite still lacking the ability to field an array of such heroes, though, the Army could now boast of a “Volksheld” who outdid them all in headlines, popularity and prestige in the person

120 “16 an einem Tag!” BIZ, October 1, 1942; “Die Schwerter zum Eichenlaub für Oberleutnant Marseille,” VB, June 21, 1942; DW, 618 (8.7.1942); MadR. 10. 3876. No.296 (25.6.1942); ibid., 11. 4191. No.316 (10.9.1942). For a full recounting of Marseille’s remarkable, though regrettably short time in the spotlight before his death in September 1942, see Heaton and Lewis, Star of Africa. Regarding his fame and prestige, see especially pp.18, 80, 209, 267-271. 121 “Der Führer verlieh höchste Auszeichnungen,” VB, August 19, 1942; MadR, 9, 3412. No.265 (5.3.1942). See further Reinhard Suhren and Fritz Brustat-Naval, Teddy Suhren. Ace of Aces. Memoirs of a U-Boat Rebel, trans. Frank James (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011), 118-119; Vause, Wolf, 92-96; Hadley, Count not the Dead, 95- 97. 122 Vause, U-boat ace, 162-163. 123 Ibid., 71, 123; GTb II.10, 176 (27.10.1943); BAB ZSg.109-44, 19. V.I. 193/43 10.8.1943; ibid., 109-45, 67. V.I. 262/43, 25.10.1943. A series of widely syndicated articles about Lüth from 1942-1944 are contained as collection in the Bundesarchiv: BAB R 55/20066 “Zeitungsausschnitte den Korvettenkapitän Lüth”); Wolfgang Lüth and Claus Korth, Boot greift wieder an. Ritterkreuzträger erzählen (Berlin: Klinghammer, 1943). After receiving the RK-ESB, however, Lüth was transferred from active duty to prevent anything from happening to him – which nothing did until 1945 when he was killed accidentally in the final days of the war. 234 of the dynamic and daring Erwin Rommel, who had replaced Eduard Dietl as the war’s most famous “fighting general” (though the latter still commanded considerable prestige as well).124 As numerous biographies and monographs have outlined in the past, since his first appearance on the public stage in 1940 Rommel proved to be one of the Army’s greatest publicity assets as commander of the Afrikakorps between 1941 and 1943.125 His combination of individual courage, strategic mastery, a savvy mind for self-promotion as well as personal relationships with Hitler,

Hesse and Goebbels, ensured that even with resistance and jealousy from other army leaders,

Rommel’s star rose steadily until he reached the summit of the Wehrmacht’s Starkult.126

With their remarkable levels of fame and cultural significance, these “superstars” became important individual weapons in the arsenals of the different Wehrmacht branches. More important, they have thus remained the central focus of hero culture during the middle-war years in post-war historiography. However, just as in 1940 these singular personalities were only a part of a wider mania of hero worship. In different ways, the evolving role of ‘ordinary’

Ritterkreuzträger, now several thousand strong, was even more important and influential. With their increasingly urgent needs, Wehrmacht propagandists increasingly turned to these more accessible heroes and as a result, the years 1942-1943 marked a notable expansion in their role as

124 The two are not typically seen as rivals in post-war literature. However, according to Ferdinand Schörner, a famous wartime general in his own right, this was certainly not the case at the time. BAMA N 60/96. Nachlass Schörner, “Und Speidel Schweigt,” 24.10.1958. 125 For examples of the reams of newspaper clippings about Rommel, his victories and his receipt of the RK-E, RK- ES and RK-ESB, see the collections found in BAB R 55/469-471. 126 As a note on the large Rommel-historiography, historians and biographers have discovered and published as many of the facts about the man as we are likely ever to have. Moreover, they have studied him within the specific thematic context of the “media hero.” However, there has been substantially less effort to place the analysis of this latter topic into the wider development of war hero culture in Germany during the Second World War, much less to compare the importance of Rommel’s status as Ritterkreuz- and ultimately Brillantenträger, to that of other members of these groups. Among the best works to date studying Rommel’s fame and role as public figure are: Reuth, Rommel, n.b. chap.3, and Kubetzky, The Mask of Command. For a contemporary account, that includes details on Rommel’s stardom, see Heinz Werner Schmidt, With Rommel in the Desert (Toronto: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd, 1951). See also Boelcke, Wollt ihr den totalen Krieg, 210 (26.1.1942); GTb II.3, 38 (2.1.1942); ibid., 169 (23.1.1942); ibid., 182 (25.1.1942); MadR, 9, 3209. No.254 (26.1.1942); ibid., 9, 3236. No.256 (2.2.1942); ibid., 10. 3872. No.294 (24.6.1942). 235 public figures, primarily through three particular genres of propaganda that took hold during this period.

Heroes in the Classroom

The first initiative had actually begun in the fall of 1941 and, in its early stages, more out of annoyance than necessity. In September, WPr.V formally requested of the Minister of

Education, , whether schoolteachers could include materials about (Army)

Ritterkreuzträger and their exploits in their curricula and libraries. The reason was simple. So many

German school children were asking for testimonials, photographs and other materials from the country’s heroes that propagandists suggested reversing the process “whereby such requests can cease in future”127 Within days, moreover, the idea had evidently filtered up the chain of command all the way to Hitler himself who approved it wholeheartedly (and unsurprisingly given his contemporary issues with Army resentment about RK distribution). Several days later, therefore,

Rust and other ministers and department heads received notification from Heinrich Lammers of the RKz that the WPr.V’s request was now official policy: on the Führer’s orders, “the deeds of the bearers of the Knight’s Cross should be dealt with in a manner suitable to appear in school- lessons.”128

As Rust himself remarked in a subsequent internal memorandum to his subordinates in the

Reich Education Ministry (Reichserziehungsministerium, REM129), this new initiative would not

127 BAB R 4901/4375, 2. Eichhorn an Rust. Betr. Anfragen von Schülern und Schülerinnen über “Ritterkreuzträger,” WZ.III (7930/41), 18.9.41. 128 Ibid., 4. Lammers an Rust, RK.O.13959 A, 26.9.1941; BAMA RH 53-18/106, 73. GK XVIII AOK, Salzburger L, 27.12.1941. 129 Formally the Reichsministerium für Wissenschaft Erziehung und Volksbildung. 236 be, or at least should not have been, the first time Ritterkreuzträger and their deeds had entered the country’s schools and youth halls. Since 1939, the REM and OKW had cooperated to produce the popular book series Kriegsbücherei der deutschen Jugend, which had frequently told tales of decorated soldiers. Consequently, Rust noted that he was confident that most schoolchildren already knew many of the more prominent ones (i.e. Eichenlaubträger, etc.).130 This new campaign, therefore, represented more of an expansion that formalized Ritterkreuzträger propaganda into the education system, and over the following months the REM and WPr.V worked together to develop guidelines for the new initiative and assemble the vast quantities of necessary paper.131 Furthermore, they began contacting publishers across the country to design a list of texts about Army Ritterkreuzträger that would “create a more versatile body of material, which can be used in different schools and age groups.”132

By the following June of 1942, the two organizations decided on a list of reading materials that encompassed different categories for schools and youth organizations. The list comprised works of one to two pages containing short biographies of select Army Ritterkreuzträger and four types of longer works ranging from between four to six to fifty pages. Moreover, they featured several sub-groupings of Ritterkreuzträger, including senior officers, junior officers and NCOs, men from the SS and SA, veterans of 1914-1918, fallen heroes as well as students and HJ

130 BAB R 4901/4375, 8. REM Rundschreiben Rust (1 E I a 1284 III, 21.10.1941), Anlage 1; e.g. Kurt Parbel, “Gruppe Dietl verteidigt Narvik,” Kriegsbücherei der deutschen Jugend 75 (1940); ibid., 85 (1941): Carl Gustav Paul Henze, “Prien versenkt acht Schiffe aus einem Geleitzug.” 131 The amount of paper for just one series of books of 48 pages, with a production run of 30,000 copies, would amount to 2,800 kilograms of paper. Given the war situation, this was not a particularly easy feat and thus the REM and WPr pressed for these supplies to be marked as essential. See BAB R 4901/4375, 27. Aufwärts – Maxim Kleiber an REM Betr. Herausgabe einer Reihe über Ritterkreuzträger, n.d.; ibid., 98. OKH and OKW Abt.Inland Betr. Jugendschriften über Ritterkreuzträger, 2.12.1942. 132 Ibid., 21-23. OKW/Abt. Inland (Maj.Süssmilch) an REM (Oberstudiendirektor Schneider) Betr. Gesamtplanungen des Ritterkreuzträger-Schrifttums, 17.6.1942. Anlage OKH. Abt.Inland I/42, 5.6.1942. 237 members.133 Finally, there were also to be five books of over 200 pages dedicated to specific individuals and groups from the assorted branches within the Army.134 All told, the campaign was to introduce stories of over seventy men from all ranks, branches and theatres of the war, with the primary purpose (besides providing “a few good but cheap reading materials,” it said) of stirring the imaginations of future recruits with “a vivid and united picture of the deeds of [Army]

Ritterkreuzträger.”135 Editorial comments by the OKH and REM for incoming works from publishers showed that reviewers favoured those with the most “military educational value,” reinforcing the Army’s attempts to shore up its public image, that afforded a clear view of the superiority and noteworthy contribution made by the Army’s troops at the front.136

At the same time, it becomes clear from the different themes evident in the list of included works that the Party would also use the campaign to reinforce not only its contemporary efforts at self-legitimization but also the ideals then being damaged through RK distribution patterns (see

Chapter II.2). The Ritterkreuzträger involved were not just heroes, but embodiments of

Frontkämpfer-ideology and a Wehrmacht that represented a cross section of the

Volksgemeinschaft. There was considerable emphasis in editorial comments about the “inner

133 There were four component sections within this block. Section 1. was to be a short series of books on three senior officers with the RK. Section 2. was far more diverse, with proposed books entitled: Helden im Grossdeutschen Schicksalkampf (Heroes in the Greater German Fight of Destiny); Wir starben für Deutschland (We Died for Germany); Studenten als Ritterkreuzträger (Students as Knight’s Cross Winners); Die alten Soldaten bewähren sich wieder (The Old Soldiers Prove Themselves Once Again); Ritterkreuzträger der SS, Ritterkreuzträger aus der SA and Jugendführer erwarben das Ritterkreuz (HJ) (Youth Leaders Earn the Knight’s Cross); Leutnant an der Spitze (Lieutenant at the Fore); and Der deutsche (The German NCO). Section 3. encompassed two further volumes of a series already begun featuring biographies of specific Ritterkreuzträger, In Ost und West in treue Fest (Standing Fast in East and West), by Johannes von Kunowski. Finally, Section 4. was a single large work entitled Heldentaten by Clemens Lohr featuring eleven Ritterkreuzträger biographies. See BAB R 4901/4375, 21-23. 134 These were: Sechs von einer Division (Six from a Division), by Kurt Gloger; Die Gebirgsjäger (The Mountain Troops), by Percy Schramm; Afrikakämpfer (The Afrika Fighters), by Hanns-Gert Freiherr von Esebeck; Panzersoldaten (The Tank Soldiers), by Günter Heysing; and Lützow und seine Grenadiere (Lützow and his Grenadiers), also by Heysing. 135 Ibid., 63-64. REM EIIIa.1948 (Schneider) Betr. Schrifttum über Taten der Ritterkreuzträger des Heeres, 5.8.1942. 136 Ibid., 26. REM IIIa 1571/42 Betr. Schrifttum über Taten der Ritterkreuzträger des Heeres, 16.6.1942; ibid., 60 REM. Schneider an Wusterhausen (WPr.V) Betr. Das “Hotel zur Krim“ J.C.Lohr, 2.10.1940. 238 bearing” or “inner development” of the Ritterkreuzträger featured, that is those traits that gave them the ability to fight so bravely and effectively.137 Likewise, the REM’s editors highlighted

Ritterkreuzträger-stories that illustrated not only martial courage and skill but also how “the history of the Volk from the First World War, over the distress of the “Zwischenreich” [the interim empire, i.e. the Weimar Republic] to the resurgence through national awakening and into the Second World

War [sic] can be reflected in the life of an individual.”138

Two books singled out for being particularly effective (and which were thus rushed through the editing process) were from propagandists Johannes von Kunowski and Major Kurt Gloger, who had formerly been responsible for all matters pertaining to Ritterkreuzträger in the OKH.139

Gloger’s work illustrated the Party’s historical metanarrative through the story of Colonel Karl

Lohmeyer, a Ritterkreuzträger recently killed in action in late 1941. Being “raised as a boy to protect Germandom,” he wrote, Lohmeyer had fought as a Frontkämpfer during the Great War and then become a devoted Party activist during the Kampfzeit. Thereafter, he joined the

Wehrmacht and led his men against the “fanatical” Bolsheviks on the Eastern Front with bravery and skill, earning him the RK which was the “crowning moment” of his life.140 The REM and

OKH deemed Gloger’s biography so powerful that they used it as a model for later books in the series, including Kunowski’s biography of Eichenlaubträger Gerhard Hein. This work illustrated a younger generation of politicized military heroism. Separated with his family from the Reich by the shameful , Kunowski’s Hein grew up in the firm conviction in Germanic

137 Ibid., 46. Schneider an WPr.V. Betr. Gloger, “Ritterkreuzträger Oberst Lohmeyer,” 18.8.1942. 138 See ibid., 149. Hauptgutachte über Hauptmann Edgar Dünker, vom Ernst Krüger, n.d.; ibid., 177. Gutachten über Oberst. Otto Lasch, vom Ernst Krügerm n.d.; ibid., 192. Gutachten über Maj. Felix Hannig, vom Wilhelm Kallbach, n.d.. 139 The records of the various preparatory conferences for the literature campaign would suggest that it was Gloger who had brought the idea to Hitler the previous fall. One document, for example, recounted his having “discussed the matter at the Führer’s headquarters.” BAB R 4901/4375, 24. Vermerk REM (E IIIa 1571/42), 17.6.1942. 140 See Kurt Gloger, Oberst Lohmeyer (Berlin: Aufwärts-Verlag 1942), 12-13, 33-39, 48. 239 righteousness against the eastern oppressors. At the outbreak of war, therefore, he had joined the

Wehrmacht and now wore the coveted RK-E for his bravery and had been named inspector of HJ units training for military service. The hero was raising up the next generation to follow in his (and men like Lohmeyer’s) footsteps.141

After their combined editing process, the OKH and REM began to distribute these and many other works in late 1942 to targeted schools, youth halls and HJ camps across the country

(customarily somewhere with a link to the Ritterkreuzträger in question). However, by this time the already large campaign grew even larger. Evidently seeing the propagandistic potential now available to the Army, the Navy and Air Force requested to have materials about their

Ritterkreuzträger distributed as well. Rather than commission new works, the smaller services used the REM as a conduit to funnel pre-existing materials about their heroes directly into German classrooms. Lists of works involved included Günther Prien’s award winning Mein Weg nach

Scapa Flow, Joachim Schepke’s U-bootfahrer von Heute (The Submariner of Today) as well as a biography of Helmut Wick entitled Helmut Wick. Das Leben eines Fliegerhelden (The Life of an

Air Hero).142 By 1943, therefore, the campaign had almost tripled in size, and school bookshelves became infused with the lives and deeds of Ritterkreuzträger.

Following the disastrous defeat at Stalingrad, moreover, the need to secure even more recruits to fill growing gaps only increased the pace of the program. The REM and WPr produced

141 Kunowski, Gerhard Hein, 3-4, 6, 10, 33-39. See also BAB R 4901/4375, 53. RSU an WPr.V (1/763/42) Betr. Lohr, “Das ‘Hotel zur Krim’ in Eupatoria.” Das Ritterkreuz für Oberstlt. Ritter von Heigl 18.8.1942; ibid., 54. RSU an WPr.V (1/741/42). Betr. Gloger, “Ritterkreuzträger Oberst Lohmeyer,” 18.8.1942. 142 Joachim Schepke, U-Bootfahrer von heute (Berlin: Deutsche Verlag, 1940); Josef Grabler, Helmut Wick. Das Leben eines Fliegerhelden (Berlin: Verlag Scherl, 1943). Further examples of biographies and autobiographies published about leading Ritterkreuzträger during this period include F. Dettmann’s Mein Freund Marseille (Berlin: Verlag Die Heimbücherei John Jahr, 1943), E. Zschocher’s “-und so wuchsen Ihm Flugel!” Aus dem Leben des Jagdfliegers Hauptmann Baer (Berlin: Max Schwabe Verlag, 1943) as well as and Reinhard Hardegen’s autobiographical books Feind im Fadenkreuz: U-boot auf jagd im Atlantik (Berlin: Die Heimbücherei, 1942) and Auf Gefechtsstationen. U-Boote im Einsatz gegen England und Amerika (Leipzig: Boreas, 1943). 240 even more works such as the celebrated biography of Eichenlaubträger Harald von Hirschfeld by

Kurt Mittelmann, which told of a courageous infantry officer decorated twice for extreme gallantry on the Eastern Front. Wounded six times and receiving the rare golden wound badge in addition to his RK-E, the Hirschfeld portrayed by Mittelmann was immune to setbacks and always kept moving forward, just as Germany now had to do as well.143 Submitted just before the offensive at

Kursk in the summer of 1943, Hitler himself ordered, according to one report, that the piece be sped through the editing process and printed in 300,000 copies.144 Following the defeat at Kursk, moreover, the literature campaign took on even more importance and by 1944 the WPr and REM had expanded its reach still further, dropping earlier efforts to concentrate distribution on regions with links to each hero. Henceforth, it became a nation-wide effort to reach the next generation of recruits.145

“Homeland, listen to your heroes!”

The second major initiative of Ritterkreuzträger propaganda to blossom during the middle- war years was their usage as public speakers. Like their role in children’s literature, this new emphasis built upon pre-existing foundations. By 1942 it was already common for

Ritterkreuzträger to return from the front to give press conferences or deliver announcements about the Wehrmacht’s noteworthy successes; quite literally the harbingers of victory. Likewise, individual “Volkshelden” like Rommel or Lüth delivered recorded speeches before large audiences

143 Kurt Mittelmann, Ritterkreuzträger des Heeres. Eichenlaubträger Harald von Hirschfeld (Berlin: Aufwärts- Verlag, 1943), n.b. 12, 24, 33. 144 BAB R 4901/4375, 267. Schnellbrief Reichsstelle für das Schul- und Unterrichtsschrifttum (RSU) an REM Betr. Kurt Mittelmann, “Eichenlaubträger Major Harald von Hirschfeld,” 16.6.1943; ibid., 278. RSU an REM, n.d. 145 Ibid., 282. RSU an REM. E IIIa 2515, E Iva Betr. Klassenlesestoffe über Taten von Ritterkreuzträgers des Eisernen Kreuzes, 16.12.1943. 241 at major events in Berlin, a practice that stretched back to Günther Prien and Herbert Schultze in

1939-1940.146 Likewise, in order to highlight the union between the fighting and home fronts, on

Hitler’s orders Ritterkreuzträger had also become customary presenters and speakers at award ceremonies of their civilian equivalent, the RKVK.147 However, the years 1942-1943 were unique in their increased usage in collective groups as part of speaker campaigns organized by the military speaker system (militärisches Vortragswesen, mV).148

Ritterkreuzträger had been used by this organization since its inception in 1940 as a compromise between the WPr and RMVP’s speaker propaganda department (Amt Rednerwesen,

ARw), each of which had wanted to create their own network of speakers to give talks and speeches on their experience of the front and/or military affairs. In the fall of that year, the new speaker system launched its first campaign entitled “The Front Speaks to the Homeland” featuring the experimental usage of untrained soldiers from the front, so-called “Frontredner” (Front Speakers), to lend a measure of credibility that the Party’s trained political lecturers could not.149 The organizers were also able to enlist a small handful of Ritterkreuzträger to participate and speak at local Party rallies, HJ meetings and factories involved in war production.150 Amid the contemporary mania, the reviews of the campaign unsurprisingly noted that the few events featuring these heroes had found “particular resonance […] among the population, and above all

146 E.g. BAMA RL 7/149, 19. Luftflottenkommando 5. Abt.I-Ic. 7238/42. Betr. Erfolgsmeldungen und Pressevorträger von Ritterkreuzträger, 20.3.1942; Boelcke, Wollt ihr den totalen Krieg, 292 (19.10.1942). See further GTb I.9, 31 (2.12.1940). 147 Boelcke, Deutschlands Rüstung, 109 (6.5.1942); BAB ZSg.109-33, 56. V.I. No.129/42, 21.5.1942; ibid., 75. V.I. No.132/42, 26.5.1942. 148 The mV program remains one of the more underdeveloped genres of historical scholarship about wartime propaganda. For some of the most comprehensive research on this organization to date, and specifically that which mention the involvement of Ritterkreuzträger, see Uziel, Propaganda Warriors, 220-233; Steinert, Hitler’s War, 196- 197. 149 See BA-MA RW 4/339 f.4, 178. WPr Lagebericht. 21.6.1941. 150 Extant records do not say how many Ritterkreuzträger were involved in this first campaign nor where the idea came from. However, in a biography of Helmut Wick, Herbert Ringsletter alleges that the hero raised the possibility at a meeting with Hitler after his investiture with the RK-E. See Ringsletter Helmut Wick, 88. 242 among youth.”151 Indeed, they proved so popular that the WPr began to receive requests from different communities and organizations for them to come and speak to their people or workforces.152

After this success, the newly formed program authorities, the Representatives for the

Military Speaker System (Beauftragte für das militärisches Vortragswesen, BmV), began to work on incorporating Ritterkreuzträger more directly. By the winter of 1941-1942, official plans for a second speaker campaign called for “strong numbers” of such men to be requested of the OKW to speak “as much as possible” and promote “the incomparable accomplishments of the German soldier.”153 As before, the celebrity-speakers gave lectures at meetings, events and rallies across the country and once again proved the fan-favourites, prompting an even greater flood of requests for more speaking engagements.154 One particular type of event, though, had proven especially productive. During the middle-war years Ritterkreuzträger made increasingly frequent visits at the new network of military education camps for German youth (Wehrertüchtigungslager) established by the Wehrmacht and Reich Youth Leadership (Reichsjugendführung, RJF) as speakers or guest instructors.155

Having proven their worth yet again, the OKW and BmV specifically organized the following year’s “Front Speaks to the Homeland” campaign (the aim of which was to boost

151 BAMA RW 4/339 f.4, 178. WPr. Lagebericht. 21.6.1941. 152 NARA T-77/1008 OKW780. WPr an Gen.Kdo XI. “Vorträge an Schulen des Ritterkreuzträger Oberstlt. Berger,” 3.6.1941. 153 BAB NS 18/242, 1761-1762 and 1764. “Propagandaplan für Kriegswinter 1941-1942,” Leiter Pro., ‘Sinn und Zweck’; BAMA RH 53-18/376, XXV-B4-28. Generalkommando XVIII AK. WKK-XVIII. 2.1.1942, (6). 154 BAMA RW 4/340 WPr Tätigkeitsbericht, 238/42. 23.5.1942; NARA T-77/1008 OKW780 Az 1 t 20 WPr.V. “Vortrag Ritterkreuzträger Berger,” 28.11.1941. 155 BAB R 4901/12660, 13. REM EIa (6) an EIII u. EIV. Betr. Wehrertüchtigungslager, 26.5.1942; Doc. 3931-PS “Teletype to Bormann from Schirach (Exhibit USA-867),” in Nuremberg Trials XXXIII, 555; BAB ZSg 109-41, 294, 14.11.1942; “Ihr Grosses Vorbild: unsere Ritterkreuzträger. In den Wehrertüchtigungslager der HJ,” VB, September 2, 1942. 243 recruitment for the infantry), around Ritterkreuzträger as a kind of shock troop (Stosstrupp) among the wider body of Frontredner.156 Over a hundred Army Ritterkreuzträger were temporarily withdrawn from the front to take part, operating in rotating teams to speak in over 800 cities, towns and camps “about their accomplishment and the use of their weapons.” To maximize their star power, moreover, they were also spread out across the various Gau regions, with greater numbers allotted to those with higher population densities. Berlin, for example, received seven dedicated

Ritterkreuzträger while more rural areas received only two or three, and some none at all.157

Likewise, the RMVP mandated that every event at which Ritterkreuzträger were to speak was to be advertised by the press, who were also to attend the event and write glowing reviews afterwards about the positive impact made by these exalted heroes and their enthusiastic reception in the homeland.158

The surviving records of several of these local sub-campaigns allow for a picture of how they functioned. The city of Cologne, for example, played host to a team of five dedicated

Ritterkreuzträger during a campaign that winter. True to policy, the press presaged their arrival with an impressive advertising campaign that included the distribution of 12,500 “Front Speaks to the Homeland” posters. Likewise, local journalists contributed feature articles with titles including

“So fights the Führer’s infantry,” “How a sergeant won the Knight’s Cross,” and “Examples from which the homeland can learn” that introduced and celebrated the participating

156 BAB NS 18/250, 90. Rundschreiben Goebbels. Betr. Propagandaaktion. Ritterkreuzträger der Infanterie sprechen zur Heimat, 5.11.1942; ibid., 97. Froelich an Tiessler, 30.10.1942; ibid., 176. RPL. Redner Schnellinformationen. Lieferung 47, 17.11.1942. See also BAMA RH 53/9, 28. Stellv. GKdo IX.AK. WKK IX. Betr. militärisches Vortragswesen Kassel, 12.9.1942. 157 BAB NS 18/250, 90. 158 Ibid.. See further BAB ZSg.109-39, 3. V.I. 282/42, 2.11.1942; ibid., 109-40, 78. V.I. 7/43, IwM, 7.1.1943; ibid., 109-43, 26. V.I. 146/43, 16.6.1943; Dr. R. Kerber, “Ein Ritterkreuzträger sprach im Gymnasium Regensburg,” Bayerische Anzeiger, January 25, 1943; “Der Front spricht zur Heimat,” Wiedener Rundschau, June 7, 1943. 244

Ritterkreuzträger.159 The men themselves arrived shortly thereafter and were received in state by local dignitaries, lodged in one of Cologne’s finest hotels and given a bus-tour of the city, surveying its cultural sites and recent bomb damage. Armed with this “local knowledge,” over the following weeks they spread out in the city and its surrounding districts, speaking at Party rallies, meetings of the HJ as well as gatherings of Nazi women’s organizations to reach “as many people’s comrades [Volksgenossen] as possible from all ages and walks of life.” By its end, they had appeared at over 500 events, and the local campaign as a whole reached 245, 836 people according to official records.160

Another campaign around Hamburg in 1943 likewise provides detail on the specific usage of the individual speakers on a day-to-day basis. Over the course of two weeks, another small team of three Ritterkreuzträger (Erich Nürnberger, Hans Klärmann and Georg Briel) gave a more focused series of thirty speeches in ten different cities and towns attended by 60-65,000 people.161

Each day, the trio split into two groups, each delivering speeches to different audiences ranging from a half to a full hour, with the younger pair (Nürnberger and Klärmann) speaking more at factories, schools and youth assemblies while Briel spoke repeatedly at Party rallies and public events at regional city or concert halls.162 One day, for example, the former spoke at a factory on the value of its workers’ labour to the men at the front, while Klärmann spoke to a local HJ troop and, according to one report, hard a hard time leaving after attending youth “flocked to the captain, in order to be specially recognized by a look or a handshake.”163 That evening, all three men spoke

159 Ibid. 160 See BAB NS 18/83 1080-1098. BmV Köln-Aachen (Wehrkreiskommando VI) an Leiter der Hauptstelle Aktive Propaganda. Erfahrungsbericht über die Versammlungsgrossaktion “Front spricht zur Heimat,” 15.2.1943. 161 Briel and Klärmann were officers (major and captain) who had fought in Africa and in their early thirties, while Nürnberger was an NCO from the Eastern Front and just twenty-three. BAB NS 18/83, 1099-1105. Gauring Hamburg an RRVP. Betr. Propagandaaktion “Ritterkreuzträger sprechen zur Heimat,” 8.2.1943. 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid. 245 together at a public rally, and after taking questions from the audience enjoyed a guided tour of

Hamburg.

Many of the participating factory owners and district leaders () submitted glowing reviews to local authorities about the campaign, one of which urged them to arrange for more visits by men “who have been tried and tested in such highly exalted ways.”164 These reviews are interchangeable with many others. Labour leaders in Essen wrote to local propaganda authorities in July 1943 that they thought it increasingly necessary to ask for Ritterkreuzträger speakers in factories because of the “great results” they had achieved in the past.165 The propaganda leadership of the protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia likewise noted that speeches by

Ritterkreuzträger had been particularly effective in lifting popular morale and asked whether it could have more.166 Perhaps most evocative, though, are the detailed records of speaker activity in the region of Bayreuth in 1943-1944, in which Party and municipal leaders from local villages and towns pleaded with propaganda authorities for “the honour” of a visit by a Ritterkreuzträger.167

The town of Heining, who succeeded in their request for example, later included in their

“Vortragsbericht” (Lecture Report) that:

The knowledge that a Ritterkreuzträger was to speak secured a completely filled meeting room. When the event began, however, all expectations were surpassed. The room was so overfilled that many people’s comrades could not find a way in.168

Collecting Heroes to Trade

164 Ibid. 165 BAB NS 18/131, 873. DAF Führungsamt 1. Einsatz von Ritterkreuzträger, 24.7.1943. 166 BAMA RH 53-13/101, 134. BmV. WKK.XIII an WPr.Ic Betr. Einsatz von Frontrednern, 18.5.1943. 167 BAMA RH 53-13/101, 32. Vortragsbericht, Neugedin, 14.2.1943; ibid., 89. Winterberg, 11.5.1943; ibid., 99. Eggenfeld, 26.5.1943. 168 Ibid., 82. Vortragsbericht Heining, 11.5.1943. 246

Arguably the most famous of the initiatives of 1942-1943, though the least plentiful in surviving textual documentation, was the increased usage of Ritterkreuzträger in visual media. The

WPr, and especially its Army section, had long used portraiture as an inexpensive and easily produced form of propaganda throughout the war.169 It had become common practice, for instance, for new Ritterkreuzträger to have their likenesses taken by a professional photographer (including

Hitler’s own photographer Heinrich Hoffmann) for usage by the WPr and the press for articles and featurettes.170 By 1942, moreover, Army propagandists saw that these photographs represented such an effective tool that they became a key component in its efforts to spur recruitment and popularize the unique heroism of German infantrymen and combat officers. Late in the year, the

AHN arranged for several dozen Ritterkreuzträger to feature on a series of small, pocket sized picture booklets for the annual drive of the War Relief Fund (Kriegswinterhilfswerk).171 They soon found their way into schools, HJ meeting halls and camps across the country, either given away for free or sold for a very small price. More important, once there they proved highly effective, as children and youth quickly began collecting and trading them, much as American youth did baseball cards.172

Alongside photographs, moreover, an even more useful medium for portrait-propaganda had begun to gain steadily in momentum in the form of postcards featuring sketches (both monochromatic and in colour) of Ritterkreuzträger by war artists, most notably Wolfgang

169 In 1940-1941, for instance, the OKH had commissioned several series of portrait postcards featuring Army generals that were not only spread within the Reich but several thousand also sent overseas to be distributed by German embassies. See BAMA RW 4/251a f.3, 188. Gen St H.Pr.V. Nr.1996/41, 14.6.1941. (or HVBl, 25.2.1941, 103). 170 James Wilson, Propaganda Postcards of the Luftwaffe (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2007), 9, 168. 171 “Versuch einer Bibliographie der Ritterkreuzträger,” Das Ritterkreuz 3. 1958. 2. 172 Moorhause, Berlin at War, 66-67. 247

Willrich.173 Willrich had volunteered his artistic talents to the Wehrmacht in 1939, and had since filled contracts from the different Wehrmacht branches, creating several successful series of postcards and books in the process in which prominent Halsordenträger like Prien, Schultze,

Galland, Mölders and Rommel took center stage.174 As a result of this experience, at the end of

1942 the AHN approached Willrich to work on a new series devoted entirely to Army

Ritterkreuzträger that it could use for more postcards as well as a new book on the model of his earlier works. They promised that it would be given top priority and distributed widely.175 Willrich took up the challenge and soon postcards featuring the faces of men of varying degrees of fame above the distinct black-and-silver RK at their throats began to appear in growing numbers alongside the KWHW booklets and other media in spaces frequented by German youth. The book, meanwhile, appeared the following year under the title Des Reiches Soldaten (The Soldiers of the

Reich), and proclaimed that the value of the images within was for youth to recognize the

“exemplary manliness and proven devotion to duty” of its subjects.176

Willrich’s work and its all-important utility in the publicity war received positive reviews from the AHN, and so the following summer of 1943 they commissioned him for another, more comprehensive postcard series that would form the basis for a new visual media campaign featuring both art and photographs. This time, to draw attention to the perennially publicity-starved infantry, he was to focus on several NCOs among the service’s Eichenlaubträger, creating several large paintings that the campaign plans, drawn up in July 1943, called to be hung on the walls of

173 Among the only authors to have investigated propaganda postcards is Otto May, in whose work Inszenierung der Verführung: die Ansichtskarte als Zeuge einer autoritären Erziehung im III. Reich (Hildesheim: Brücke-Verlag Kurt Schmersow, 2003) is a brief section on this medium’s connection to Ritterkreuzträger (p.455-461). 174 Both books are discussed by Klaus J. Peters in Wolfgang Willrich. War Artist. Kriegszeichner (San Jose: Bender, 1990), 47, 57-58. 175 HPA, Annahmestelle III. für Offizierbewerber des Heeres (B 22b10) an Verlag Grenze und Ausland. Betr. Zeichnungen von Wolfgang Willrich, 19.12.1942 – original copied in Peters, Willrich, 286. 176 Wolfgang Willrich, Des Reiches Soldaten (Berlin: Verlag Grenze und Ausland, 1943), 7; Peters, Willrich, 57. 248

Party organizations’ headquarters and HJ meeting halls.177 He was also to create smaller works that could be used for window-displays and that could be paired with a further series of larger photographs (30 x 40 cm) of Eichenlaubträger to be framed and hung on interior walls. Thirdly, the campaign would utilize 30,000 leaflets featuring these heroes’ faces for distribution anywhere

German youth could be found. Finally, drawing on the observed way in which the latter had created a material culture from propaganda postcards, the campaign included not only a new series of them featuring coloured Willrich-portraits but also a run of fifty “collector cards” (9 x 6 cm) specifically distributed in incomplete batches to foster the growing culture of trading and collecting.178

Together, these three programs ensured that during the years 1942-1943 Ritterkreuzträger reached an unprecedented level of impact upon popular culture, with their names, faces and voices pervading the country’s media. For the heroes themselves, propaganda and public appearances had become a normalized component of what it meant to hold the Reich’s most prestigious award; an unofficial part of the Ritterkreuzträger’s job description, so to speak. In his memoirs, Wolfgang

Falck recalled that being “roped in” for such work was an accepted fact of life among his fellow hero figures. He himself wrote of having to embark on a speaking tour for the BmV that included a visit to his former school in Berlin-Treptow. His former headmaster presented him with a portrait of himself (i.e. of the kind mentioned above) that was then hung with ceremony in the school’s

“heroes’ gallery” (Heldengalerie) of Ritterkreuzträger.179 Even so, as in 1940-1941 there were signs that the large expansion in the role of the Reich’s war heroes as a source of cultural capital

177 BAMA RH 15/220. OKH/AHN Gruppe I (3b) 267/43 Betr. Verleihung von Werbematerial f.d. Uffz Nachwuchswerbung, 31.7.1943. Several examples can be found in Peters, Willrich. 178 Ibid. 179 Falck and Braatz, Falkenjahre, 201. 249 was not without potential pitfalls. Specifically, the propaganda authorities soon found that their efforts had proven altogether too effective among their target demographic: German youth.

For some time, the OKW had begun to receive increasing complaints from their

Ritterkreuzträger that they were receiving ever higher quantities of fan-mail from youngsters, and specifically letters requesting autographs. This had of course been a part of Ritterkreuzträger culture since 1940, but with the expansion of the three programs mentioned above the practice had grown rapidly in both scope and intensity. For school children and teenagers Ritterkreuzträger had become, quite deliberately, a ubiquitous part of everyday life; they read about them in school, listened to their speeches in the evenings and traded their likenesses on the weekends. Even more directly, the AHN had actively encouraged them to pursue “autograph hunting”

(Autogrammjägerei) as a means to stoke their interest and provided them with the perfect medium to transform it from an occasional hobby into a national craze.

As a result, Ritterkreuzträger found answering autograph requests to be an increasingly burdensome side-effect of their broadened role in popular culture. Indeed, the sheer volume of letters prompted some to order bulk shipments of their own portraits to have a ready supply to sign. Highly decorated officers of senior rank such as Erwin Rommel or Eduard Dietl, moreover, resorted to employing subordinates as unofficial “publicity officers.” Hans Albrecht Schraepler and Heinz-Werner Schmidt, for example, were junior officers who assumed this role for the

“Desert Fox” in North Africa. In post-war writings, both attested to the vast amount of fan-mail he received (Schmidt records that he received up to forty per day), which they and their own clerks

250 had to sort and organize.180 However, while prominent Brillantenträger could employ a small staff to ease their celebrity workload, most Ritterkreuzträger could not and soon complained to their superiors that answering autograph requests was becoming too much of a distraction from their primary duties.

By the summer of 1943, the problem had reached the point that it necessitated a formal request from the OKW to the RJF for autograph hunting to be banned and a demand that there be consequences for any infractions.181 The former obliged, but it had little effect; indeed, by early

1944 the flood of letters to the front had only increased. Thus, the OKW took a different tack by approaching the Propaganda Minister, Joseph Goebbels, whom they evidently felt had much to do with the problem. Speaking for the Wehrmacht, decorated Air Force Colonel Torsten Christ outlined in a letter how some of his fellow Ritterkreuzträger “were receiving up to 10,000 autograph requests [per month] from youngsters.”182 What’s more, it was also placing an unsustainable strain on the Reich Postal Service. Nevertheless, he was sympathetic to the youth involved and lamented that “the enjoyment of collecting autographs from Ritterkreuzträger be taken from them.” Indeed, it would be to damage the “personal connection” that had been forged between the two from years of propaganda work.183 Consequently, he suggested that the OKW and RMVP pursue a “new path” in the form of a “central autograph office,” to which

Ritterkreuzträger could submit signed pictures of themselves and to which keen youth could also send their requests.

180 Schmidt, With Rommel, 72-74; Hans Albrecht Schraepler, At Rommel’s Side (London: Frontline Books, 2009), 104. For further examples of Ritterkreuzträger employing subordinates in this way, see Braatz, Mölders, 270; Robertson, Horseshoe, 128; Constable and Toliver, Fighter General, 133. 181 The details of this interaction between the OKW and RJF are contained in a memorandum to Goebbels from one of his subordinates in 1944. See BAB R 55/621, 43. Leiter Pro. Dr. Schäffer an Joseph Goebbels, 24.5.1944. 182 Ibid., 41. Chef des Generalstabs Luftflotte II an Reichsminister Goebbels, 14.5.1944. 183 Ibid. 251

This suggestion is a remarkable one in hindsight, both in its uniqueness and evidence of the degree to which the OKW believed autograph hunting represented a serious problem. Even so,

Goebbels rejected the idea. In a reply to Christ, one of his senior aides, a Dr. Schäffer, outlined how such an unprecedented structure would only increase the strain on the Reich’s administrative resources as it might just encourage the problem to become even worse. By the same token, it was likely that young autograph hunters would simply ignore it and continue to send their requests directly to Ritterkreuzträger because of the popular value placed on original signatures.184

Consequently, Schäffer informed him that Goebbels was willing only to toughen earlier sanctions.

Over the following weeks the press received instructions to refrain from referring to, or depicting, autograph collecting or Ritterkreuzträger signing pictures (previously a popular scene for magazine covers). At the same time, the RJF restated its ban, announcing that “all members of the youth movement were forbidden to collect autographs for the duration of the war.”185 Finally, the

OKW itself forbade Ritterkreuzträger from replying to any autograph requests.186

Even so, Schäffer himself confessed to Christ that he thought

a complete suppression will not be achieved through these measures, because ever more […] young boys and girls, in their enthusiasm for the heroes of this war, will turn to communication with those who bear a high and visible award from the Führer.187

Both logic and surviving evidence, moreover, would seem to confirm this negative prognostication. On one hand, Germany’s youth had already demonstrated their willingness to disregard such instructions, even in the face of punishment. On the other hand, propagandists themselves seem not to have listened either. Both references to and depictions of Ritterkreuzträger

184 Ibid., 46. Schäffer an, Christ, 5.30.1944; ibid., 43. 185 Ibid., 42. Notiz für Reichsbefehl. Betr. Autogrammjägerei, n.d..; ibid., 54-55. Entwurf an Referat Propaganda, Herrn Dietrich, n.d. 186 Ibid., 43, 55. 187 Ibid., 46. 252 autograph culture continued to appear in propaganda sources from 1944 and 1945.188 Likewise, as we shall see, they continued to supply the material means to foster that culture. For the regime and

Wehrmacht both, in other words, the autograph hunting crisis created by the expansion in

Ritterkreuzträger’s public role during 1942-1943 was a reminder of the potential consequences of becoming too effective in the use of Heldenpolitik. At the same time, their inability to stop it was representative of the challenges they were already beginning to face as the war entered its final year.

IV.5 Instruments of Delusion

After the decisive battles of 1943, the stance of both the regime and Wehrmacht began a descent towards desperation. The sustained pressure from the Eastern Front was soon compounded by the Allied invasion of France in June 1944, while at the same time Allied bombers were reducing German cities to rubble. The result of this was that military and political propagandists leaned even harder on Ritterkreuzträger as a proven and reliable means to produce a resolute optimism. Not only did their already considerable share of war propaganda thus increase still further from the climactic middle-war years, but with military propaganda falling increasingly under the power of Joseph Goebbels and the RMVP, it also took on an even more pronounced political tone and substance. Ritterkreuzträger and their role as media heroes, in short, became a primary vessel of the delusion that the Reich could still stave off the disaster that seemed increasingly possible.

188 See, for example, Der Adler 16. August 1, 1944; BIZ, August 3, 1944, October 26, 1944 and December 14, 1944. 253

First and foremost, this meant an even more pronounced level of stratification within the

Heldenkult, and an even greater gulf between its stars and superstars. By 1944 the final generation of “Volkshelden” were the holders of at least the RK-ES and especially the extremely rare RK-

ESB. The repeated and singular nature of their exploits allowed propagandists to demonstrate the continued fighting power and superior technology of the Wehrmacht. While there were precious few prominent U-boat commanders left alive189, the Air Force could still contribute a steady stream of Brillantenträger for this purpose. Even though lacking the novelty of the first Experten of 1940

(let alone that of a Boelcke or Richthofen), new fighter aces like Erich “Bubi” Hartmann, Helmut

Lent and Walther Nowotny could generate impressive headlines through their enormous scores of enemies downed, and using the latest aircraft which could finally bring a halt to the bombing.190

At the same time, the growing coverage of future “Goldträger” Hans-Ulrich Rudel loudly proclaimed how fanaticism could overcome all material odds. Having flown over 2,000 combat missions and destroyed countless vehicles on the ground in his distinctive, outclassed Ju-87 dive- bomber, Rudel was, as far as the media was concerned, a one-man army who was virtually holding back the single-handed.191

The Army, meanwhile, produced similar numbers of “superstars,” not only including senior officers but now, at long last, dashing young heroes in the form of tank or assault gun commanders. Driving vastly superior machines, men like or Otto Carius

189 The one example was Albrecht Brandi, who became the Navy’s only Brillantenträger in 1944. See “Brillanten für Korvettenkapitän Brandi,” VB 323. November 25, 1944. 190 E.g. “Hauptmann Nowotny,” Deutsche Illustrirte, February 22, 1944; “Der Dritte mit 250,” Die Wehrmacht 7. March 29, 1944; “Die Brillanten für Staffelkapitän Hartmann,” VB, August 27, 1944; “11 Männer, 1676 Luftsieg,” BIZ, September 21, 1944; ibid., October 26, 1944: “Bei seinen Jagdfliegern. Hermann Göring im Gespräch mit zwei Brillantenträgern der Luftwaffe”; DW 718 (7.6.1944); ibid., 721 (28.6.1944); ibid., 744 (7.12.1944). 191 “Kampfauftrag für Major Rudel,” VB, May 20, 1944; ibid., June 5, 1944: “Major Rudel zweitausendmal am Feind”; DW, 714 (5.10.1944); ibid., 717 (31.5.1944). 254 destroyed quite literally dozens of inferior Allied tanks at a time in and on the Eastern

Front. As such they received the higher RK-grades at extremely rapid rates, as well as the commensurate attention from the press, speaking tours and newsreel cameos that went with them.192 At the same time, propagandists marketed the command acumen and iron resolve of leading generals and field marshals of the Army and Waffen-SS who won the RK-ESB, and heralded their minor tactical successes as great victories against the encroachment of the enemy towards the borders of the Reich. These leader-heroes in the media included not only more traditional officers like Rommel and Walther Model, but increasingly also men known to be ruthless and fanatical in their devotion to the regime such as Herbert Otto Gille, Hyacinth Graf

Strachwitz and Ferdinand Schörner, whom Goebbels noted in his diary were among “the only commanders who correspond to the modern ‘Volkskrieg’.”193

Even so, the disadvantageous nature of the fighting meant that even as propagandists elevated singular Volkshelden as justification for optimism, their potency was offset by a rising mortality rate. Much as in 1941, in the span of several months during 1944 several of the country’s most highly decorated superstars were lost (either in combat or by accident), including Air Force aces Walther Nowotny and Helmut Lent along with popular Army generals like Eduard Dietl and

Hans Hube and a great many Schwerterträger including the aforementioned Michael Wittmann.194

192 E.g. “21 Britenpanzer in 20 Minuten vernichtet,” VB, June 19, 1944; ibid., June 26, 1944: “Die ersten Schwerter an der Atlantikfront. SS-Obersturmführer Wittmann schoss 138 Feindpanzer ab”; DW 712 (26.4.1944); ibid., 723 (12.7.1944); ibid.,727 (8.10.1944). See further Gary L. Simpson, Tiger Ace. The Life Story of Panzer Commander Michael Wittmann (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing Ltd., 1994), n.b. 267-269; Carius, Tigers in the Mud, n.b.190- 201. 193 GTb II.15, 617 (28.1.1945); ibid., II.11, 361 (26.5.1944). See further “Die Brillanten für Oberst Graf Strachwitz,” VB, April 17, 1944; ibid., August 20, 1944: “Generalfeldmarschall Model”; ibid., September 21, 1944: “Die Brillanten für General Ramcke”; DW, 715 (17.5.1944); ibid., 722 (6.7.1944). 194 E.g. “General Dietl tödlich verunglückt,” VB, July 2, 1944; ibid., July 5, 1944: “Der Führer beim Staatsakt für Generaloberst Dietl”; ibid., October 12, 1944: “Helmut Lent, “Der Staatsakt für unseren Fliegerhelden Oberstleutnant Lent”; DW, 742 (11.23.1944); ibid., 722 (7.6.1944). See also “Meldungen aus den SD-Abschnittbereichen vom 10.8.1944” in MadR 17, 6704. 255

Indeed, so many of these men were dying that Goebbels pondered how the RK-ESB seemed to be

“ever more connected to misfortune.”195 By far the most damaging loss, though, was that of

Rommel in October. While there was much happening behind the scenes (as discussed in the following chapter), Hitler and propagandists both did what they could to mitigate the potential effects in much the same way they had since the death of Helmut Wick in 1940. Widespread press coverage, speeches and the newsreel footage of his funeral proclaimed the death of the legendary

Desert Fox a clarion call for action to emulate his deeds and preserve the Fatherland. Still, there could be no mistaking the enormous blow to public morale.196

In contrast to the individual significance attached to these elite Volkshelden, meanwhile, the media role of Ritterkreuzträger and even Eichenlaubträger, whose numbers were growing rapidly thanks to inflationary distribution, had become more and more collective and anonymous in nature. Announcements about new presentations of these lower grades often appeared in large batches in newspapers and fewer and fewer of their names were widely known. Only a very few lucky Ritterkreuzträger graced a magazine cover or appeared by name in the weekly newsreels, and even when they were the men depicted were increasingly of the more atypical variety who embodied the changing dynamics of RK distribution discussed in Chapter II: the civilian, mine- clearance technician or the pilot of a suicidal one-man torpedo.197 Nevertheless, even though

Schwerter- and Brillantenträger commanded the boldest headlines, as in 1942-1943 on a local level it was still Ritterkreuzträger who carried much of the propaganda workload. Members of the

195 GTb. II.11, 168 (22.4.1944). 196“Volksheld und Heerführer Erwin Rommel,” Nationale-Zeitung (Reichausgabe), October 16, 1944; “Rommels ewiger Name,” VB, October 20, 1944. See further Reuth, End of a Legend, 203-208. 197 E.g. “Neue Ritterkreuzträger,” VB, March 16, 1944; ibid., June 28, 1944: “Neue Ritterkreuzträger”: ibid., March 9, 1945: “Neue Ritterkreuzträger”; “Zivilisten mit dem Ritterkreuz,” BIZ, April 8, 1945; “Ritterkreuz für einen Hitlerjungen. Neun Sowjetpanzer durch Panzerfaust erledigt,” VB (München), February 17, 1945. The few individual Ritterkreuzträger mentioned in the media were often those featured in segments of the newsreels. E.g. DW, 708 (29.3.1944); ibid., 714 (10.5.1944); ibid., 738 (10.26.1944) 256 public could worship the former from a distance, but the latter were still their most important point of personal interaction with the Heldenkult and were still the embodiments of regional, organizational or municipal pride.

On one hand, Ritterkreuzträger were still heavily utilized by the authorities as speakers at events across the country. Indeed, because their involvement in this genre of propaganda had grown so rapidly due to popular demand over the past several years, late in 1943 the OKW and

BmV had jointly established a special administrative structure and developed guidelines for their appearances and employment.198 Over that winter and into 1944, therefore, their presence only increased at youth halls and training camps as well as at factories, town halls and Party rallies in cities that had suffered damage from Allied bombing raids. Ritterkreuzträger, for example, made up the bulk of a team of fifty speakers sent to the region of Reichenberg for a “Frontredner Aktion”

(speaker operation) that lasted for a total of 217 days and involved meetings for youth, at factories and public rallies.199 Even so, securing large numbers of Ritterkreuzträger from their posts at the front was becoming harder and harder, not only because of the logistical difficulties which were now a routine part of life but also the need of every available man to fight. Consequently, those selected for speaker campaigns now increasingly featured wounded heroes who caused the least inconvenience.200

At the same time, following the Normandy invasion the AHN organized one of its most far reaching propaganda campaigns of the war, which focused on publicizing Ritterkreuzträger as

198 V.I. 41/515 “Einsatz von Ritterkreuzträger,” 16.9.1943, in Verfügungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben III. 139 v.4. 199 BAB R 55/603 f.2, 54. RPA Reichenberg. Dr. Schäffer. Betr. Frontredner Aktion, 4.12.1944. Likewise, see BAMA RH 54-6/82, 60. Gren.Ers.u.Ausb.Reg. (Mot). 16 Abt.Ia Betr. Allgemeine und Nachwuchswerbungen der Panzertruppen, 26.4.1944. 200 “V.I. 12/102 Rednereinsatz, 10.5.1944,” in Verfügungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben VI., 57; BAMA RH 53- 13/104. WKK XIII “Presse” Juni-Sept. 1944, 26.6.1944. Anlage 3 §1. 257 local heroes in their home regions to harvest another draft of young boys and so fill gaps at the front.201 The campaign combined successful elements of earlier versions, including the still- functioning partnership with the REM to produce children’s literature and school reading materials. Using the meagre rations of paper still available, the REM and OKH jointly produced several new types of publications about Army Ritterkreuzträger to the tune of 50,000 copies, ranging from fold-out pamphlets of two to three pages, to larger “brochures,” to books of up to forty-eight pages. They made these materials available free of charge at any Army recruitment office or sold for a pittance (.20 or .30 RM) at schools, youth organizations or other official locations.202 As the official guidelines stated, it was important “to inspire youth for fighting operations especially in the infantry which are shown through the deeds of Army Ritterkreuzträger; how great and manly, and thereby [also] how beautiful they are.” “The exposition of such heroism,” they continued “should arouse the qualities dormant in every German boy and spur him on to the same action.”203

At the same time, the AHN’s plans also incorporated an even greater visual component.

First, they demanded that each and every Army Ritterkreuzträger (several thousand by this point) arrange for a portrait photograph (in colour if possible) if they had not done so already – making sure to sit with all their medals easily visible. Likewise, calls went out to war artists for contributions including Wolfgang Willrich, who had become in effect the Reich’s greatest producer of Ritterkreuzträger-themed art. Heroes willing to sit for paintings, moreover, received special leave to visit their families.204 With the proceeds of these efforts, in turn, each Gau was to

201 BAMA RH 53-13/104. WKK XIII “Presse” Juni-Sept. 1944. Betr. Herausstellung der Inhaber des Ritterkreuzes in ihren Heimatgauen (AHN I/4 2233/44), 26.6.1944. 202 Ibid., Anlage 1-3. 203 Ibid. 204 Ibid. 258 produce and distribute 20,000 portrait postcards and also frame the paintings to create special

“Portraits of Honour” that were to be presented to the Ritterkreuzträger depicted at a special ceremony. Thereafter, they were to be hung in an “honourary position” at his former school, HJ meeting hall or the local Party headquarters in his hometown. Furthermore, the AHN decreed that another copy was to be brought to a specially demarcated “honour room” in each Gau capital reserved for the honouring of local Ritterkreuzträger and that was to be open to the public at any time.205

The AHN campaign was also demonstrative of the politicization that was now a fixed component of propaganda about Ritterkreuzträger. Instructions directed local organizers to be

“mindful” that in selecting men for the campaign, political considerations had to be paramount. It was preferable, they said, to include men whose lives exemplified service to the Party and its rule, including HJ leaders, SA men, veterans of the political battles of the Kampfzeit or those who had taken part in border skirmishes during the 1930s. Likewise, while it was good to highlight

“decisive” military virtues such as courage, superior leadership and determination, it was even more important to focus on subjects’ “attitude towards life” and their commitment to fighting for

“Germandom.”206 The campaign, in short, was to help streamline the public face of

Ritterkreuzträger into the new “Endkämpfer” style: the fanatical, militarized Alte Kämpfer whose resultant zeal for combat (Einsatzbereitschaft) could turn back enemy offensives, destroy thousands of soviet tanks, down hundreds of American and British bombers, and sink entire convoys of their shipping on the high seas.

205 Ibid. 206 Ibid., Anlage 2. OKH/AHN I/44 2233/44. Richtlinien für Faltprospekte, Lesebogen, Doppelhefte und Broschüren über Ritterkreuzträger des Heeres. 259

By such means, therefore, propagandists could keep alive the fire of “Ritterkreuz-mania” in local communities while the “Volkshelden” held the national spotlight. However, as ever this exposed the regime to problems they had grown to countenance as some of the unfortunate side- effects of the hero-worship they now sought desperately to generate. One such side-effect that became more serious by the fall of 1944 was the expansion of the kind of RK-fraud and forgery once demonstrated to great effect by the infamous Adam Drayss. Since 1942, references to similar

(if less spectacular) cases of Ritterkreuzträger-imposters appear with growing frequency in government and military records. In 1942 Hitler had personally directed the Ministry of Justice to inflict an “indeterminate sentence” on a seventeen-year-old boy, the son of a naval officer, who had been caught after committing “a series of frauds” wearing his father’s uniform and a false

RK.207 In another case, meanwhile, a man identified by the name of “Peter von Rauhenstein” appeared one day in the Sudeten town of Neubestritz208 in a black panzer uniform wearing another forged Halsorden. Instantly accepted by the local authorities, he immediately began to court local women using his unearned celebrity until he was caught a few days later.209

Even where authorities were more vigilant, though, the regime’s own success in stirring up enthusiasm for Ritterkreuzträger meant that even local police forces reported of being hesitant to arrest suspected imposters, even when they lacked the proper credentials or identification.210

However, by the fall of 1944 the rapid inflation in the number of Ritterkreuzträger as well as the increasingly chaotic and confusing situation on all fronts meant that the opportunity for this phaleristic-fraud became ever more acute, and the consequences ever more dangerous for both the

207 See BAB R 43-II/1559a f.1, 8. Reichsminister der Justiz. Führerinformation 1942, 15.5.1942. 208 Now the city of Nová Bystřice, Czech Republic. 209 BAMA MSG 2/11408, 1. “Ritterkreuzträger Peter von Rauhenstein,” n.d., ca. 1943-1944. 210 E.g. BAMA RW 59/363, 104. OKH/P5. Abschrift WKdo VIII. OKW 585/44 OKW an Chef des Wehrmachtstreifendienst, 6.6.1944. 260 regime and Wehrmacht. By late October, in fact, it warranted intervention by Martin Bormann and the PKz. In a circular to all Party offices, Bormann warned of increasing numbers of “deserters” and other “criminals” sporting false decorations, including the RK, to obtain “material benefits and other advantages” from gullible officials.211 Furthermore, he claimed that there were even reported cases of enemy agents managing to slip through German lines to commit sabotage simply with the aid of a captured or forged RK. Consequently, all authorities were not to spare caution for any soldier, no matter how impressive their decorations.212

Such concerns notwithstanding, the longevity of Ritterkreuzträger’s effectiveness as a source of unquestioned moral authority ensured that the regime continued to expend increasingly scarce resources to celebrate and popularize them in the vain hope that their “star power” could maintain some semblance of belief in German victory, or at least doubt that the walls of the

“Thousand Year Reich” were collapsing around them. As Joseph Goebbels remarked in his diary shortly before the war ended, heroism like that of Ritterkreuzträger “must not be regarded as individual examples, but rather must serve as an incentive for all and a call for the whole nation to emulate these shining examples in the fight for our freedom.”213

Thus, right up until May of 1945, few issues of the remaining newspapers like the

Völkischer Beobachter failed to feature news of Ritterkreuzträger. Bold headlines told of the superhuman accomplishments of the remaining “Volkshelden” like Hans-Ulrich Rudel until his crash in March, while smaller articles documented the creation of dozens more Ritterkreuzträger

211 BAB NS 6/348, 127. NSDAP. Bormann Rundschreiben (571/44). Betr. Unberechtigtes Tragen von Uniformen und Kriegsauszeichnungen,” 28.10.1944. 212 Ibid. Earlier that year, Joseph Goebbels noted in his diary an incident on the Eastern Front in which a German traitor, working for the Soviets, had infiltrated the headquarters of a regional SS official, the Higher SS and Police Leader (Höhere SS und Polizeiführer), using the credentials of a captured Air Force Ritterkreuzträger. According to Goebbels, the official only survived because the traitor could not go through with his intended assassination. See GTb II.11, 182 (27.1.1944). 213 GTb II.15, 187 (4.4.1945). 261 through bravery and the will to victory, or else their heroic deaths in defence of German soil.214

The WPr and SS-propaganda department still dispatched PK units to the front to film presentation ceremonies and document recipients in action against the invading Allied forces.215 Likewise, records from the REM reveal plans for new series of biographies and children’s literature about

Ritterkreuzträger being planned for the spring of 1945 and those of the AHN and OKH that heroes were still being recalled from their units to participate in speaker campaigns or sit for photographs and portraits for public display.216

In short, the role of these men as media heroes and public figures was among the last tools used by the Nazi regime and its propaganda apparatus to keep themselves alive. In this, of course, was a reasonable measure of expectation given their successful, if disjointed and sometimes counter-productive, experience in forging Ritterkreuzträger into effective sources of symbolic capital. Even Ritterkreuz-mania, however, could do nothing to stop the end that had overtaken

Germany. Still, as we shall see in a later discussion, its wide-ranging impact and effectiveness as

214 E.g. “U-Boot-Erfolge in harten Kämpfen. Das Ritterkreuz für erfolgreiche Kommandanten,” VB, January 27, 1945; ibid., February 2, 1945: “Schwerterträger Druschel vom Feindflug nicht zurückgekehrt,” and “Drei neue Eichenlaubträger.”; ibid., March 9, 1945: “Das Eichenlaub verliehen,” and “Neue Ritterkreuzträger”; ibid., April 7, 1945; “Schörner Generalfeldmarschall”; ibid., March 27, 1945: “Hohe Auszeichnungen verliehen,” and “Das Eichenlaub”; ibid., April 14, 1945: “Die Schwerter für Oberst Jüttner,” “Eichenlaubträger Oberst Bormann gefallen,” and “Ein neuer Eichenlaubträger.” Indeed, the number of new Ritterkreuzträger became so great that in November 1944 the HPA created a special four-page leaflet for such announcements to save paper. This was done on the advice of a private soldier named Rudi Neugebauer who had written to the HPA in November 1944, to point out that since the summer the nearly a third of Army’s regular ordinance bulletin, the HVBl, was taken up by Ritterkreuzträger news. Neugebauer calculated that if the Army absolutely had to keep publishing such news, it made more material sense to create a separate, supplemental leaflet that could be sent to central headquarters across the Reich for shared readership - which they subsequently did. See BAMA RW 59/312, 25. Wachtmeister Rudi Neugebauer. Betr. Vorschlag zur Papiereinsparung und Vereinfachung des Dienstbetriebens, 24.11.1944; ibid., 26. Chef HPA Betr. Vereinfachung des HVBl zur Einsparung von Papier, 12.1.1945 215 DW, 748 (4.1.1945); ibid., 753 (5.3.1945); ibid., 755 (22.3.1945); Zastrow, Gefreiter mit dem Ritterkreuz, 26. 216 BAB R 4901/4375, 375. RSU an REM Betr. Ritterkreuzträgerschriften, 2.1.1945; “Gebirgsjäger von Morgen. Ihr Vorbild,” BIZ, 15, April 1944; Bradley and Schulze-Kossens, Tätigkeitsbericht, 182 (28.7.1944); ibid., 283. (12.10.1944). See also Peters, Willrich, 58. 262 a tool of wartime propaganda was to have important consequences for the country when it began to reconstitute itself after the war.

263

Chapter V

When Heroes Misbehave: Ritterkreuzträger and the Problem of Political Reliability

Over the course of the previous four chapters, we have seen how the instrumentalization of the RK involved a range of actors including the military, state, Nazi Party and even the German public. The fifth and final chapter of this study, however, focuses on arguably the least-discussed contributor to this complex, and often volatile, process: Ritterkreuzträger themselves. These men have been the subject of many personal studies of varying length and depth. But while such works have dedicated much research into the exploits that gave them hero-status, and some of the expectations that it subsequently placed upon them, their own agency in shaping it has been left largely undocumented. The following chapter undertakes to do so. It explores how the conduct of

Ritterkreuzträger themselves, or more accurately their misconduct, affected their role as war heroes and, by extension, their relationship with the regime as its prized vessels of symbolic capital. What happened, in other words, when one of the Reich’s heroes failed to toe the Party line?

As discussed in the introduction to this work, the question of the relationship between

Ritterkreuzträger and the regime represents an area of particular debate in contemporary discourse and a key to these wartime heroes’ place in popular memory. Drawing principally on

Ritterkreuzträger-egoducuments as well as several unexplored collections of archival sources, this chapter therefore stands to add considerable nuance to a contentious issue. It begins by discussing what it argues to be a fundamental flaw in the regime’s phaleristically based Heldenpolitik, and thereafter traces how this flaw allowed the misconduct of Ritterkreuzträger (whether real or

264 imagined) to ultimately make the regime itself uncertain about the nature of this relationship and the political reliability of the symbolic heroes it had created.

V.1 The “Risky” Side of Nazi Heldenpolitik

The root of the problem with Ritterkreuzträger and their behaviour was the inconsistency in the way the regime, and particularly Hitler himself, attempted to ensure the reliability of the men who wore the medals it had imbued with so much symbolic weight. On the Home Front, for example, the PKz fought doggedly for several years to gain control over the adjudication of awards like the KVK and KVM. In 1940, Otto Meissner, the head of the PräsKz, answered several repeated entreaties from Martin Bormann about Party influence in this process, assuring him that no state organization would bestow a decoration upon “politically unworthy people.”1 Similarly, later exchanges between the PKz and other governmental departments attest that it became mandatory practice for local Party offices to verify the political reliability and personal character of those nominated for the KVK. By 1942, in fact, recommendations for this and other civilian awards required a “certificate of political clearance” to be processed.2

When it came to the RK (or any other military decoration), though, the regime failed to exercise the same level of diligence. Of course, Hitler and the Party leadership certainly wanted

Ritterkreuzträger to both sympathize with and embody the idealized image of the Nazi Kämpfer.

As demonstrated earlier, this desire had factored into Hitler’s decisions in naming several of the symbolic “firsts” in RK-distribution such as Günther Prien, Eduard Dietl and Hans-Ulrich Rudel.

1 BAB R 43-II/421, 81; Orlow, Nazi Party, 423. 2 BAB NS 6/337 f.5, 164. No.132. FHQ Rundschreiben (65/42). Betr. Verleihung von dem Kriegsverdienstkreuz, 6.6.1942. See also BAMA RH 15/437, 5-7. Chef der Heeresrüstung und Ersatzheeres (CHE) m.III. Nr.8197/42. Betr. Vorschlagsrecht für Verleihung von Auszeichnungen an Angehörige der Rüstungsbetriebe in Betreuung des Heeres, 30.10.1942. 265

Likewise, Joseph Goebbels strove to create the erroneous impression that Party members were numerous among Ritterkreuzträger, and that these heroes were models of German manhood both on and off the battlefield. However, not only did Goebbels have relatively limited influence over war propaganda, Hitler himself spent much of the conflict trying to prevent the RK from becoming a political award, even in the final chaotic months of the war. While there would always be “cases of favouritism,” he said once, its symbolic value had to be firmly rooted in the recognition of military virtue rather than allowing it to appear an object of political nepotism (like its merit-based equivalent, the RKVK).3

As a result, the primary responsibility for ensuring and projecting the political reliability of RK-recipients lay with the Wehrmacht, its propagandists and its administrators who, as we have seen, did not always exhibit a keen desire to enforce National Socialist dogma. To be sure, they did not go out of their way to recommend servicemen for the RK who were openly or privately incompatible with these ideals, but Hitler’s dogged loyalty to the principles of Frontkämpfer- ideology ensured that any member of the Wehrmacht could technically wear the RK, regardless of their political commitment to the regime (or lack thereof). Thus, while recipients included fanatical

Nazis wholeheartedly devoted to the regime like Rudel, Wolfgang Lüth or Ferdinand Schörner (as well as war criminals like , Joachim Peiper and Oskar Dirlewanger, to name a few), there were also men indifferent, dismissive, or worse.

Additionally, there was little concerted effort to ensure that these men behaved in a manner that would lend weight to the symbolic capital of their medal. To be sure, personal conduct in general became more strictly monitored within the Wehrmacht during the war, and behaviour

3 Trevor-Roper, Table Talk, 92-93, No.64 (10-11.11.1941). 266 deemed political more harshly punished (enter the hapless Adam Drayss). Yet military discipline still remained rooted in the traditional Code of Military Justice (Militärstrafgesetzbuch, MStGB), which included no special provisions or emphasis regarding the conduct of decorated soldiers frequently in the public eye.4 Only in 1943 did Hitler sign a decree that addressed the issue, albeit indirectly, by regulating the reversal or revocation of state orders. Even so, its stipulation of

“dishonourable” conduct as grounds for such measures was vague and rarely invoked in practice given the requirement of his personal approval.5

Despite this lack of safeguards, however, there were still reasons why the regime could expect behavioural or ideological rectitude from its war heroes (even if it apparently did not from civilians). Even today, such conduct represents a foundational principle of the role of orders and decorations in modern societies, especially under authoritarian rule. Sociologists such as Ludgera

Vogt, for example, have argued that even if not otherwise inclined to support the state, by accepting and enjoying the prestige and benefits of their awards recipients had a vested interest in doing so:

“the honouree vouches for the worth [of the award] with their biography and their actions in visible ways.” Failing to do so, by contrast, diminishes this status and prestige.6 Within this framework of

“prestige exchange,” in other words, the behaviour of Ritterkreuzträger not only represents an important component in the coherence of symbolic capital but is also linked to their own best interests, and thus not a matter of serious concern for the authorities.

Yet, there were lessons from the past which should have given the regime pause from the start. As demonstrated by Ralph Winkle, there had been a similar lack of safeguards for award

4 Kühne, Comradeship, 177-179. 5 MStGB (1872) §32, 39; RGBl. I 1937. No.77, 725; “Verordnung des Führers über den Verlust von Orden und Ehrenzeichen. Vom 8. Januar 1943,” RGBl I. 1943. No.100, 15; “Widerruf und Entziehung,” § 1-2, Sammeldruck, 277-278. 6 Vogt, “Zeichen der Anerkennung,” 188-192, 198. 267 holders during the First World War, and their behaviour had indeed become a concern for the imperial authorities. The increasing need to distribute awards for propaganda reasons and to put ever more emphasis on the heroism of recipients, he reports, had been one of the more “risky” aspects of their Ordenspolitik, one that ultimately weakened the value of the awards and the effectiveness of said propaganda.7 Twenty-five years later, and with a greater level of ideological importance invested in the RK, however, the National Socialists failed to take heed of this lesson, at least not in time. As a result, they gradually found themselves facing the same issues with similar results.

V.2 Swept under the Rug

The first problem was that many Ritterkreuzträger did not reflect the bearing in their personal lives that Goebbels and Party propagandists liked to showcase for the public. As fighting men often removed from their families in foreign lands, the Wehrmacht’s heroes proved just as prone to commit offences against the MStGB or the Party’s moral ideals as any other. Indeed, the prestige and star treatment they received because of their awards made such infractions easier. In their own words and those of their many biographers, younger recipients of the RK often, and quite openly, flaunted behaviour that contradicted the image of ideologically informed soldierly virtue projected by Goebbels and the RMVP. Much of the surviving evidence of such misconduct comes from the well-documented experiences of RK-holding fighter pilots and U-boat commanders, not only because of the disproportionate level of attention directed at their wartime activities (both

7 Winkle, Dank des Vaterlandes, 153-156. 268 then and since) but also because they belonged to groups that had elevated access to distraction and leisure when not in the air or on patrol.

Several historians, for example, have commented that the Experten of the Air Force were prone to conspicuous ostentation in their lifestyles. Some of the most decorated fighter pilots were among the Wehrmacht’s best known “playboys” and posterchildren for several vices condemned by the Party.8 After the war, Eichenlaubträger Walther Krupinski recalled that he and other hero figures had few qualms about enjoying the company of French women in Paris as well as bouts of public drunkenness, even when visiting the Führer’s headquarters with Erich Hartmann to receive the RK-E in 1944.9 Adolf Galland became famous for his trademark cigar, and while smoking was widespread at the time it was not in keeping with the Party’s emphasis on bodily, and thereby national, health. Hitler himself abhorred the habit and, according to one biographer, asked Galland to quit in order not to popularize it, a request he seems to have made of other leading heroes as well.10 Official guidelines for visual propaganda campaigns such as those organized by the AHN for portrait postcards included prohibitions on smoking or even holding a cigarette.11 Hans-

Joachim Marseille, meanwhile, famously exhibited open scorn for military discipline and enjoyed a lifestyle which mocked (sometimes deliberately) the regime’s moral policies. His former commanding officer, Johannes Steinhoff, for example, complained how the handsome young ace

8 Spick, Aces of the Reich, 204-205, 207. 9 Hartmann’s account of this incident appears in Heaton and Lewis, German Aces Speak II, 28, while Krupinski’s in Braatz, Krupinski, 119. Krupinski’s euphemistic description of his activities while on leave in Paris, in which he recalls taking full advantage of what the city had to offer, are also detailed in Braatz’s excellent biography (ibid., 82). 10 DW, 571 (13.8.1941); ibid., 588 (10.12.1941). According to his biographers several prominent manufacturers offered to provide Galland with a free supply of cigars in exchange for publicity: Constable and Toliver, Fighter General, 163; Fraschka, mit Schwertern, 25. On another occasion, Erich Hartmann told how while in Hitler’s presence the Eichenlaubträger Walther Krupinski had unthinkingly begun to smoke. Hartmann says Hitler immediately told him to “put away his filthy habit.” Heaton and Lewis, The German Aces Speak II, 29. 11 For the campaign-guidelines see BAMA MSG 2/12881. General Radowitz. OKH. Abt. Heeresnachwuchs. Gr.I/4a Ref. Ritterkreuzträger, n.d. 269 was constantly drunk, absent from his post, and entertained so many women on campaign that “he was sometimes so worn out that he had to be grounded.”12

This kind of playboy lifestyle, however, was matched and even surpassed by the exploits of some decorated submariners while on shore leave. Returning from weeks or even months at sea and seeking to unwind from the claustrophobia of a U-boat, these men, as one Ritterkreuzträger mildly put it, “weren’t always on our best behaviour.”13 Establishments like the Café Scheherazade in Paris or any number of similar cafes, restaurants and nightclubs in various ports along the French coast became well-known haunts for highly decorated U-boat commanders like Engelbert Endrass and Erich Topp, nicknamed “Castor and Pollux” (the twin, trouble-making Gods of the Greco-

Roman pantheon) to stage riotous evenings like that immortalized by Lothar-Günther Buchheim’s book and later film, Das Boot.14 As in his account, these nights often celebrated new awardings of the RK, for “when one gets a decoration round one’s neck a celebration is in order.”15

Ritterkreuzträger Jürgen Oesten, a mutual friend and fellow troublemaker, similarly recalled: “If for many it was to be a short life, it would at least be a happy one; the girls, champagne and late night revels all helped.”16

One area which post-war accounts mark as a common form of everyday rebellion among

Ritterkreuzträger was enjoying banned music, particularly American jazz. Joseph Goebbels and

12 Spick, Aces of the Reich, 204-207. The authors of one recent biography went as far as to describe Marseille as “the ultimate antithesis to the image of the German officer as commonly perceived in post-war rhetoric [i.e. of a kind more in line with Party propaganda],” while another pair similarly called him “the complete reverse of the classical German military hero.” See Heaton and Lewis, The Star of Africa, 14 (also 21, 33-37); Constable and Toliver, Horrido, 93, 101, 106. 13 Suhren and Brustat-Naval, U-Boat Rebel, chap. 5 and 7 (here p.92). 14 Ibid., chap. 5, 7; Erich Topp, The Odyssey of a U-Boat Commander. Recollections of Erich Topp, trans. Erich C. Rust (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992), 81-84. 15 Suhren and Brustat-Naval, U-boat Rebel, 94. 16 Quoted in Andrew Williams, The Battle of the Atlantic: The Allies’ Submarine fight against Hitler’s Grey Wolves of the Sea. (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 81. 270 the Reich’s cultural authorities had declared this genre “un-Germanic,” and ideologically upstanding Ritterkreuzträger such as the Wolfgang Lüth condemned it from their position of moral authority. Lüth said in one speech: “A German must not like Jazz,” and that it “has nothing to do with whether he really likes it. He must not like it just as a German man must not like a Jewess.”17

Biographers of other hero figures, though, frequently note their subjects’ enjoyment of this pleasure at every opportunity. Some ace U-boat commanders regularly played jazz records on war cruises to break the monotony, and Hans-Joachim Marseille is reported to have frequently played such records for his squadron mates.18 Even men known to have been less prone to risqué off-duty behaviour like Werner Mölders proved susceptible to this temptation. Despite being a favourite of

Goebbels, his biographer Kurt Braatz and historian Corey Ross describe how the country’s first

Brillantenträger not only kept and played his own records, but frequented underground jazz-bars in Berlin while on leave and once publicly announced his displeasure at the regime’s ban on his favourite genre while on a state-funded publicity trip.19

In short, there were more than a few of the Reich’s war heroes who felt little obligation to maintain a specific moral persona. More important, though, is the fact that in virtually all surviving recollections of such everyday misconduct there are few references to any punishment or reprimand from political authorities. This is likely due to several factors, the first being that such behaviour was not a direct challenge to the regime’s authority. Second, it mainly took place at or near the front, away from the eyes of the German public and thus not as damaging from a political perspective. Even when they wanted to, moreover, this distance from the heartland of the regime’s

17 Vause, U-Boat Ace, 152. 18 Michael Kater, Different Drummers. Jazz and the Culture of Nazi Germany (New York: 1992), 126-127; Heaton, Star of Africa, 121. 19 See Braatz, Mölders, 280; Corey Ross, Media and the Making of Modern Germany: Mass Communications, Society, and politics from the Empire to the Third Reich. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 359. 271 repression and control made it difficult to enforce behavioural standards. In a report to Walther

Tiessler in May 1941, Joseph Goebbels voiced his concern and frustration over reports that

Ritterkreuzträger stationed along the French coast were setting a bad example by illegally listening to enemy radio stations. Demanding that the practice stop immediately, the Minister threatened that despite their exalted status Ritterkreuzträger would be treated “the same as any other […] personnel.”20 Yet in the privacy of his own daily propaganda meeting, Goebbels lamented the difficulties in following through on this threat, since “one cannot have a gendarme or a political leader watching out next to every Knight’s Cross winner.”21

Third and most important, though, what made this especially difficult (as Goebbels well knew) was the issue of jurisdictional prerogatives. As one Ritterkreuzträger wrote after the war, on many occasions military authorities were remarkably willing to recognize their men’s need to let off steam, even in considerable or unsavory amounts.22 Indeed, they were even willing to do so when this steam drifted into the more sensitive sphere of the political and, crucially, were also willing to shield their precious heroes from potentially serious consequences. Casual acts or statements by impetuous Ritterkreuzträger which would have resulted in stiff punishment for civilians or ordinary soldiers, such as criticism of the Party, its ideals, or even Hitler himself, appear in multiple memoirs and biographies with little mention of consequences beyond, at most, a slap on the wrist.23

One notorious personality who offered several such examples was the Eichenlaubträger

Teddy Suhren. Besides numerous drunken binges at the Scheherazade, this self-described rebel

20 Reference to this circular can be found in Akten der PKz, II.4, 128. No.41071 (15.5.1941). 21 Boelcke, Kriegspropaganda, 731, 748 (13-14.5.1941 and 21.5.1941). 22 See Suhren and Brustat-Naval, U-boat Rebel, chap. 5-7, 10. 23 E.g. Heaton and Lewis, Star of Africa, 13, 143; Topp, Recollections, 101. 272 recalled having his more serious indiscretions, including several violent altercations which threatened to end in legal proceedings, excused by his superior, Admiral Karl Dönitz.24 In 1942, however, the rebellious young officer ran afoul of the (Military Intelligence) and found himself called to the office of the U-boat service’s Chief of Personnel, Admiral Hans-Georg von

Friedeburg. Friedeburg showed the young ace a sizeable file on his activities, containing, among other things, reports of his having gone drinking “in uniform with a black man,” associating with individuals who had previously fled from the Reich, as well as doing business with or even dating

Jews. Despite such damning evidence of ideological misconduct, however, Suhren claims that

Friedeburg agreed that the charges were “complete rubbish,” and got rid of them. By way of discipline, the Admiral simply warned the troublesome hero by saying: “Suhren, you are now a prominent figure with all your decorations whom people will listen to. Think carefully before you open your mouth and choose your language more carefully.”25

Such examples of protectiveness and leniency by Dönitz and Friedeburg (though both convinced servants of the regime, incidentally) as described by Suhren were evidently not singular occurrences. The following year these two men protected another of their young heroes from more grievous actions. Like Suhren, was a young U-boat commander with the more rarified RK-E, as well as a noted troublemaker. He was a frequent participant in the frivolity at the

Café Scheherazade and regularly enjoyed a rather large collection of illegal records.26 Most important, Henke was impulsive and possessed a quick temper which repeatedly drew him into altercations, both physical and verbal, with the SS and political authorities.27 In the summer of

24 Suhren and Brustat-Naval, U-boat Rebel, 92-93. 25 Ibid., 97-99. 26 Timothy Mulligan, Lone Wolf. The life and death of U-boat ace Werner Henke (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1993), 17, 21. 27 Ibid., 41-42, 156, 190. According to Mulligan, after consulting the Henke family papers, the young Werner had struck an SS officer in Danzig in after being accosted while on shore leave (p.41-42). Similarly, 273

1943, this problem-streak resulted in a confrontation with the feared Gestapo, from which only his status as an Eichenlaubträger and his superiors’ protectiveness saved him. While taking leave with friends in the Tyrol, the Proxauf family, Henke learned that they had recently suffered maltreatment at the hands of the local Gestapo.28 Incensed, Henke stormed into the offending office in Innsbruck where, according to the official report:

He described the actions of the Secret State Police as an injustice, because as far as he was concerned, the Proxauf family was one of the most respectable families in the entire Reich. It further made him uneasy to serve at the front while respectable families in the rear areas were being so ruthlessly and brutally treated.29

Henke then proceeded to the office of the Gauleiter, Franz Hofer, and in a manner “which one would not assume from an officer,” berated the most senior political figure in the region. The stunned Hofer managed to calm Henke by promising to investigate the matter personally.30 Within a week, however, Henke returned to the Gauleiter’s office, outraged after what he claimed to have been a fresh incident (not given in the report). Understandably, this time Hofer refused to see him, leaving the irate hero in the anteroom where he vented his rage on a secretary. She later testified that he called the Innsbruck Gestapo “gangsters” who were just as bad as the Soviet secret police, whereupon, “burning with anger, [he] left the room and slammed both doors behind him with a crash.”31

according to a 1992 interview with one of Henke’s comrades, Günter Altenburger (p.190), he had knocked an SA leader to the ground in a crowded Berlin streetcar over a minor insult. Lastly, while at a show in Paris with his crew, he became involved in public altercation with a superior officer who had complained about the crew’s conduct (p.156). 28 Ibid., 147-149. Mulligan does not describe the incident concerned, and the report of the event found by the author from Henke’s superior, Admiral Friedeburg, noted only that the Gestapo had “plucked a chicken” with Herr Proxauf (see BAB NS 19/922, 1. Friedeburg an Himmler, 19.10.1943). 29 BAB NS 19/922, 4. Bericht vom Geh.Staatspolizei Innsbruck (IIIL – 2421/43g) an Abwehrstelle Wehrkreis CVIII), n.d. ca. July 1943. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid., 5. MPA 5263 geh./43. Zeugnis v. Fräulein Leuk, 23.7.1943. 274

Henke’s outbursts prompted an immediate response. The secret police submitted a formal complaint to the Wehrmacht in August 1943, calling Henke’s conduct and his allegations “a denigration and insult to the Gestapo and its officers.”32 Given his status as an Eichenlaubträger, the case soon found its way to Friedeburg and Dönitz, now chief of the entire Navy. The two admirals gave their rebellious subordinate a dressing down (undoubtedly asking whether he was mad), whereafter Friedeburg personally wrote to Heinrich Himmler to de-fuse the situation.33

After several lines of flattery, he asked whether this “unfortunate incident” could be handled without the Gestapo’s involvement, not only because of the heavy stress such men as Henke endured daily, but also because he wore the RK-E which “is very difficult and tough to earn in the

U-boat service.”34 Himmler, whether out of a desire to deescalate the situation or a genuine admiration for war heroes, obliged and wrote letters to both Gauleiter Hofer and the Innsbruck

Gestapo. Not only did the Reichsführer instruct them “to regard the matter as closed and finished,” but even ordered that the latter’s agents, “who obviously did not act correctly,” were to be reprimanded.35

The protection of men like Henke and Suhren from the ramifications of political infractions, in other words, suggests an extreme length to the disciplinary leash that seem to have accompanied the receipt of the RK.36 At the same time, other accounts suggest that there was a

32 Ibid., 4. 33 BAB NS 19/922, 1. 34 Ibid. 35 BAB NS 19/922, 7-10. Himmler an Hofer, 26.10.1943; ibid., TGB, No.11/57/43g. Himmler an Innsbruck Gestapo, 29.10.1943. 36 While their accounts are among the most comprehensive in extant sources, one can find comparable examples of smaller length scattered across many other works on the Wehrmacht. In his contribution to the series Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, for example, Werner Rahn, wrote of an incident involving Ritterkreuzträger Rolf Johannesson, in which the latter openly called into question the regime’s promises of “miracle weapons” in 1944 in a letter to his superior, the then Chief of Naval Personnel, Martin Balzer. Balzer, a convinced Nazi (much like Friedeburg and Dönitz) reprimanded him in a reply, calling the remarks “stupid or criminal.” Still, though, as Rahn writes, he did not turn Johannesson in; indeed, he was soon promoted. Werner Rahn, “Die Deutsche Seekriegführung 1943 bis 1945,” in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg.Vol.10. Der Zusammenbruch des Deutschen Reiches 275 remarkable amount with which Ritterkreuzträger, and even their families, could get away with even without the direct help of their superiors. Air Force Eichenlaubträger Günther Rall, for instance, claimed to have been warned by Hermann Göring himself that the Gestapo intended to arrest his wife (and possibly himself) for an alleged involvement with a movement to smuggle

Jews out of Germany. After the war, the ace claimed to have replied that they could let him know

“when they had something that looked like proof,” but (correctly) predicted that nothing would come of it since “it would be very difficult to arrest the wife of a national hero, or even me, without raising unpleasant questions.”37 In similar accounts, Ritterkreuzträgers Helmut Lent and Max

Zastrow, each claimed at different times to have successfully secured the release of siblings from police custody for political offenses solely because of their appeals to the moral authority of the medal they both wore.38 It was, in this sense, quite literally a “get out of jail free card.”

In short, as Werner Henke’s biographer Timothy Mulligan argues, war heroes could be pardoned a great deal of activity that otherwise could have landed them in prison or worse. So long as misconduct (much of which seeming to have fallen most often into the clichéd categories of

“wine, women and song”39 as evidenced above) remained safely away from public view or could be swept under the rug by sympathetic superiors, they were allowed their eccentricities.40

However, this delicate balance became offset as propagandists began to lean more heavily on

1945. Erster Halbband: Die militärische Niederwerfung der Wehrmacht, ed. Rolf-Dieter Müller (Munich: Deutsche- Verlags-Anstalt, 2008), 42. 37 Interview with Günther Rall, in Heaton and Lewis, The German Aces Speak II, 158. 38 “Das Ritterkreuz rettet ein Leben,” in Berger and Habisohn, Gefreiter mit dem Ritterkreuz, 40; Hinchcliffe, Lent Papers, 148-149. 39 Interestingly, while these categories do fit with the general behaviour of soldiers behind the front lines, it is more than likely (given that the primary source of evidence is Ritterkreuzträger themselves) that these men engaged in other forms of ‘misconduct’ that they later chose not to record, whether out of a sense of propriety, embarrassment or their continued prohibition under German law after the war – such as . 40 Mulligan, Lone Wolf, 159. Furthermore, there are hints in sources discussed later in this chapter that even when a decorated hero did find himself in court because of political misconduct, he was awarded special dispensation on account of his battlefield service. See nt.107. 276

Ritterkreuzträger as sources of symbolic capital, a process which threw their behavioural shortcomings into ever sharper relief. More important, it was through a series of incidents and scandals involving these prized heroes during the years 1941-1943 that several leading figures within the regime became slowly but steadily cognisant of this volatility and the potential for it to cause serious damage.

V.3 Crossing the Line

Alongside his troubles with Air Force Ritterkreuzträger and illegal radio practices, in May

1941 Joseph Goebbels learned that two naval Ritterkreuzträger, Captains Hans Erdmenger and

Helmuth von Ruckteschell, were attempting to interfere with government policy on religious matters.41 The two men, who belonged to the small sect of Anthroposophy, had visited several government ministries and even the office of Hermann Göring to petition for the release of a specific pamphlet from a list of banned publications. The two naval heroes succeeded in convincing one government minister42 of their case, who subsequently sent them to Goebbels with a supportive note explaining that although their beliefs were “difficult to understand,” they seemed to be harmless and therefore deserved the requested exemption.43 The note, however, made

Goebbels supremely frustrated at the thought that officials at such high levels had been so easily

41 Ruckteschell was the successful commander of an auxiliary-raider who had won the RK in 1940 (and would win the RK-E in 1942). Erdmenger had also won his medal in 1940 in recognition of his command of a destroyer flotilla during the battle of Narvik. Both men had been well vetted by the press, and Erdmenger would later be among those early Ritterkreuzträger featured in Wolfgang Willrich’s 1943 work Des Reiches Soldaten. 42 From fragmentary evidence, this seems to have been Fritz Reinhardt, Deputy Minister of Finance and previous director of the Party’s speaker school. This would explain both his seemingly close ties to the RMVP and his subsequent cordial correspondence with Goebbels on the issue. 43 BAB NS 18/564, 1127-28. Abschrift. Reinhardt an Goebbels, 12.5.1941. The ban that this action was most likely in reference to was one implemented earlier in the year on “confessional magazines” in the Wehrmacht. See BAMA RH 1/81, Chef.H.Rüst.u.BdE. Vortragsnotiz Betr. Verbot konfessioneller Zeitschriften, 23.4.1941. 277 convinced to sacrifice Party policy simply because the supplicants were Ritterkreuzträger. When

Erdmenger and Ruckteschell appeared at his own office, therefore, the Propaganda Minister reproached them, declaring that military men, even highly decorated heroes like themselves, should not interfere with politics.44

Privately, Goebbels vented his frustration to Walther Tiessler at the RRVP, who responded with a suggestion for a possible circular to all Party offices to the effect that “with all due respect to Ritterkreuzträger […] the Party will not be influenced in its policies by them in any way.”45

Although the Ruckteschell/Erdmenger case was only a minor incident, it had demonstrated the capability of these decorated soldiers and their moral authority to influence men within the administration, even senior officials. Moreover, looking at the incident’s religious component, the virulently anti-Christian Tiessler emphasized the possibility that this authority could be further

“abused by certain groups.”46 That any such abuse could ever truly become a political threat, though, both Goebbels and Tiessler agreed was unlikely and consequently the latter’s proposal came to nothing. As Goebbels later intoned, even though the growing number of Ritterkreuzträger would mean that similar cases “will occur more frequently,” they would always find their way into the hands of less gullible Party leaders like themselves, who could prevent them from causing any real damage.47

Later that year, Goebbels expanded on these sentiments regarding the potential problems of doing in practice what he and his ministry did in propaganda: namely to conflate military merit on behalf of the state with loyalty to it. In October, he reflected in his diary on a petition from the

44 BAB NS 18/564, 1126. Vorlage, 16.5.1941. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 BAB NS 18/564, 1125. Notiz für Tiessler. Betr. Behandlung von Ritterkreuzträgern, 30.5.1941. 278

OKW regarding the possibility that combat soldiers “be entitled to a certificate of political reliability” on account of their sacrifice at the front.48 His initial reaction, he wrote, was to retort that “bravery in the face of the enemy is not the same as political reliability.” Just as holders of the

Party’s own Blood Order (BO) did not automatically assume the military credibility of a

Wehrmacht officer, neither did a decorated military man receive political equivalents. “Civil courage,” he wrote (and meaning that quality unique to NSDAP “Kämpfer”), was distinct from physical courage, and complained to himself how often others assumed them to be the same. As resolute as such statements would suggest Goebbels’s thinking on the matter to have been, however, he nevertheless concluded his entry by alluding to the delicacy of this question.

Maintaining a healthy delineation between “civil” and “physical courage” would not be easy, and thus “it is best to postpone it until after the war.”49

Unfortunately for Goebbels, such a postponement proved impossible. Within six weeks, both he and the rest of the Reich’s political leadership saw just how prescient were the words of

Walther Tiessler about Ritterkreuzträger being “abused by certain groups.” The precipitating event was the death of Werner Mölders on November 22, 1941. As discussed in the previous chapter, Goebbels and Hermann Göring endeavoured to transform this tragedy into a propaganda triumph, a bookend to a year of noteworthy fatalities though a process of Nazi beatification.

Mölders was to be the ideal Nazi fighter, “the symbol of the warrior spirit in the heart of the

German people,” or so they thought.50 Within days of his crash, a letter appeared apparently written by the hero to a priest in Stettin in which he denounced the regime’s persecution of the Catholic

48 GTb II.2, 73. (7.10.1941). 49 Ibid. 50 See GTb II.2, 387. 29.11.41. Goebbels’s self-congratulation was not unfounded. According to subsequent SD reports, the footage of the graveside ceremony shown in the newsreels had a profound effect upon audiences across the country. MadR, 8, 3078. No.245 (11.12.1941). See further Galland, First and the Last, 128-129. 279

Church and claimed that men at the front were turning away from National Socialist ideology and back towards religious faith. Even worse, it concluded by stating that he increasingly feared for his own safety because of his beliefs.51 When taken in concert with increasingly open tension between the regime and the Catholic Church at this time52, the appearance of the letter suggested that Mölders’ crash had not been accidental. The SD soon reported rumours circulating in first

Catholic, then Protestant, and then also secular circles that this beloved hero had in fact been a resistor silenced by the regime.53

In the subsequent early months of 1942, therefore, the “Möldersbrief” (Mölders-Letter) became the center of an immense scandal, which saw the rumours spiral out of control after the authorities initially dismissed it as an obvious forgery and thus no real threat. As a result, their half-hearted attempts to counteract its insinuations failed to check its dissemination across the country. Christian leaders (both Catholic and Protestant), began openly reading or quoting from the letter from their pulpits and thereby questioning the trustworthiness of the regime. As a result, the SD reported that the letter had begun to cause serious “ideological confusion” among the

51 A copy of the letter can be found in BAMA MSg 1/2397 or in Helmut Witetschek, “Der gefälschte und der echte Mölders-Brief,” in Vierteljahrhefte für Zeitgeschichte 16 (1968), 60-65. 52 This tension had arisen the previous summer of 1941, when several prominent Catholic leaders including the archbishop of Münster, Clemens Graf von Galen, denounced the regime’s T-4 Euthanasia program which was in the process of murdering tens of thousands of the terminally ill and mentally disabled. 53 In fact, the Möldersbrief was the tip of an iceberg of suspicion about a wider government cover-up. Even before the funeral on November 28, rumours had already begun to circulate regarding the circumstances of the accident. Both Ernst Udet, to whose funeral Mölders had been travelling, and another prominent Ritterkreuzträger, Hans von Werra, had died in similar ways only days before. This succession of tragedies stretched credulity, for which the regime had in part itself to blame. Udet had committed suicide and the regime had covered up the fact with a story of a plane crash, while Werra, who had died in a plane crash had done so some time before, with the news being released much later (likely in order to concentrate the bad news and subsequent grief into as short a period as possible). Three prominent Ritterkreuzträger dying ostensibly within days and under the same circumstances was too much for some Germans according to the SD. Thus, when a letter from Mölders appeared only days after his death (far earlier, in fact, than posited by previous historians) it seemed to confirm that there was indeed something underhanded happening behind closed doors. See MadR, 8, 3015. No.212 (24.11.1941); ibid., 8, 3029-30. No.241 (27.11.1941); BAB ZSg.109- 26, 91. V.I. 282/41, 27.10.1941; ibid., 27, 70. V.I. 304/41, 19.11.1941. See further Braatz, Mölders, 361-62. Regarding the dating of the first appearance of the letter, see BAB NS 18/267, 968. Albrecht to Müller. Betr. Gerüchte über Oberst Mölders, 1.12.1941. 280 civilian population, and soon the Wehrmacht as well.54 These reports quickly spurred the regime into action, and by March of 1942 Hitler himself intervened to order severe punishment to suppress the letter, which resulted in the arrest and incarceration of numerous pastors and priests. It also arranged for pubic denials by Catholic notables and even Mölders’ own mother, as well as offering

100,000 RM for the capture of the forger. Nevertheless, it took until August for the SD to conclude that it the spread of the letter had stopped.55

Yet, for Goebbels the controversy was particularly troubling. Not only had he failed to suppress the letter after taking charge of the affair in February, but it had demonstrated the reality of his fears that the investment of symbolic capital within the Heldenkult, even among his favourites, was not secure and could lead to potentially dangerous political consequences. In this case, of course, the problem had not been Mölders at all, but rather the moral authority attached to his name that had been so quickly bent away from its proper trajectory. This process had seen

National Socialist Germany’s reborn-Richthofen become a Catholic crusader against the regime and its worldview. According to SD-reports during the scandal, it was said in towns and cities across the country that Mölders had deserted, refused to fly missions for the regime, and had even freed priests from concentration camps. He was now an anti-Nazi martyr, and as a result another

54 MadR, 9, 3358-60. No.262 (23.2.1942); BAB NS 18/267, 969. Vorlage: Gerüchte über Oberst Mölders, Tiessler, 29.12.1941; ibid., 979. Stosch an Goebbels. Betr. Massnahmen zur Fälschung eines Briefes von Oberst Mölders, 27.2.1942. 55 For details about the evolution of the regime’s response to the letter, and eventually Hitler’s involvement, see BAB NS 18/267, 970-971. Tiessler u. Berndt an Goebbels. Betr. Konfessionelle Propaganda um den Tod Oberst Mölders,” 6.2.1942; ibid., 780. Vorlage vom Tiessler. Betr. Massnahmen zur Fälschung eines Briefes von Oberst Mölders, 4.3.1942; ibid., 982. NSDAP Rundschreiben Bormann (FHQ 37/42). Betr. Propaganda mit einem Brief des Oberst Mölders, FHQ, 18.3.1942; GTb II.3, 281 (10.2.1942); ibid., 358 (22.2.1942); ibid., 365 (24.2.1942); GTb II.4, 454 (11.3.1942); ibid., 473 (15.3.1942). For examples of instructions for counter propaganda against the rumours about the Möldersbrief, see BAB ZSg.109-30, 99. V.I. 52/42, 1 Erg. 27.2.1942; ibid., 31, 50. V.I. 65/42, 1 Erg. 12.3.1942. 281

SD report remarked that “sharp action” was required to prevent the further “besmirching of the image of [this] German hero.”56

More specifically, the controversy revealed some of the unmerited faith of the regime in the sanctity of its hero culture and that it had not seriously considered that the heroes themselves

(in perception or reality) could undermine it. Early records pertaining to the crisis reveal that the

Gestapo had had to conduct a thorough investigation to determine if Mölders was even a practicing

Catholic, let alone a subversive resistor.57 Moreover, as a sympathetic ecclesiastical leader pointed out to Heinrich Lammers, the Party itself had allowed and even encouraged the publication of propaganda that had helped to create his anti-hero persona, most notably in the biography written for the WPr by his cousin, Fritz Forrell, after the ace had refused for his story to be told by the

RMVP.58 Mölders und seine Männer (Mölders and his Men) had not been overtly anti-National

Socialist in character, but it was far from Günther Prien’s Mein Weg Nach Scapa Flow as well. It had emphasized qualities more closely associated with traditionally conservative values and had thus been more conducive to manipulation.59

Over the following year, therefore, the Reich’s propaganda authorities worked to rebrand and repurpose the memory of Werner Mölders back to what had been created at his funeral:

Mölders the stormtrooper rather than Mölders the crusader; the swastika rather than the cross.

56 MadR. 9, 3454-3455. No.267 (12.3.1942); ibid., 10, 3644-3645. No.277 (20.4.1942). Undoubtedly, though it is not mentioned in contemporary sources, the Möldersbrief incident prompted Goebbels and men like Walther Tiessler to be more attentive to other leading heroes known or suspected to have strong religious, and specifically Catholic, faith. Among the Air Force’s most highly decorated heroes, for example, was Günther Lützow, holder of both the SK-B and RK-ES whose fervent Catholicism had already made him hesitant to be vetted by the regime’s propagandists (much as Mölders had been) – a hesitation defeated only by his love of flying. Lützow’s struggle between these forces is described in detail in Kurt Braatz’s aptly titled volume of Lützow’s personal writings Gott oder ein Flugzeug – Leben und Sterben des Jagdfliegers Günther Lützow (Moosburg: NeunundzwanzigSechs Verlag, 2005), n.b. 233-234, 258. 57 BAB NS 18/267, 969; ibid., 982. 58 Fritz von Forrell, Mölders und seine Männer (Graz: Steirische Verlagsanstalt, Graz, 1941). 59 BAB R 43-II/173a, 49. Erzbischof von Breslau an Lammers. Betr. Verhaftung vor Geistlichen wegen Verwendung des angeblichen sogenannten Mölders-Briefes, 27.3.1942. 282

First, Forrell’s biography soon found itself blacklisted, with Hermann Göring forbidding its inclusion in the children’s literature campaign of 1942-1943 and for any new editions to be published.60 At the same time, new efforts were made to reinforce Mölders’ position as a Nazi hero by commemorating his death and funeral the following year with suitably politicized articles and essays in the press.61 More important, Forrell’s ideologically unpalatable version of the hero was replaced with a more appropriate one, demonstrated in works like Karl Holzamer’s published essay “Ein Heldenleben” (A Hero’s life) which appeared before the end of 1942.62

In his work, Holzamer addressed the main issues of the Möldersbrief controversy in a full- frontal assault. The hero, he wrote, had indeed been religious, but in the materialist sense of

Friedrich Nietzsche, that of being “at right angles of body and soul.”63 Mölders, he continued, was an ideal Nazi warrior who “fought not for a flag per se, but rather for the people united under

National Socialism and for its living space.”64 Finally, “Ein Heldenleben” also claimed

(erroneously) that Mölders had embraced the propaganda spotlight and affirmed its necessity as part of the responsibility of the decorated war hero: another of his contributions to the nation’s existential struggle. If it were possible, Holzamer wrote, Mölders had been “predestined” to be a

Nazi hero and now took his place “alongside the immortals from the first generation of German hero-fliers.”65

60 BAB R 4901/4375, 106. OKW Az 5d 2020/55. WPr.IIB an REM. Betr. Buch Mölders und seine Männer, 9.1.1943. 61 E.g. Helmut Grosse u. Siegfried Kappe, “So wirkt das Vorbild weiter. Das Vermächtnis des Jagdflieger Werner Mölders,” Der Adler, 25. December 8, 1942. See further the press-clipping collection in BAMA RH 53-18/106. 62 Karl Holzamer, “Ein Heldenleben: Werner Mölders,” in Ernst Adolf and Siska Dreyer, et al., Kämpfer, Künder, Tatzeugen. Gestalter Deutscher Grösse. Band III, Tatzeugen (Munich: Zinnen - Verlag, 1942), 365-390. 63 “Kein Zweifel, dass Mölders, mit Nietzsche zu sprechen, rechtwinklig an Leib und Seele war.” in ibid., 380. 64 At every opportunity, Holzamer strove to fortify this connection. Mölders, for example, as a young boy had passionately decried the unjust treaty of Versailles, he took flying lessons over the town where the Nazi hero Albert Leo Schlageter was killed by the French in 1923, and he scored his twentieth aerial ‘kill’ on the anniversary of the venerated Battle of Langemarck in 1914. See ibid., 371-372, 377. 65 Ibid., 366, 390. Holzamer’s work was followed in 1943 by another full-length biography by one of Mölders’ former comrades, Josef Fözö entitled Freie Jagd von bis Moskau - Ein Fliegerleben mit Mölders (Free Hunt from 283

The Möldersbrief controversy, in short, had provided further evidence of the regime’s ingrained assumption that its war heroes were secure in their political reliability as vessels of symbolic capital. Goebbels, for example, noted in his diary during the scandal about how grateful he was that Erwin Rommel (whose fame exploded during this period, effectively filling the gap left by Mölders) was ‘“ideologically grounded.”66 Still, though, the lesson had not been taken fully to heart by the Minister or the Party leadership. For all its significance, the Möldersbrief scandal had not truly involved the hero himself, only his memory. As such the regime continued to act secure in its ability to safeguard such men from further ‘hijacking.’ Only as Goebbels and his colleagues in the WPr increasingly placed Ritterkreuzträger in the public eye as part of the various propaganda campaigns described in Chapter IV.4 did the danger of their unchecked moral authority finally seem to have struck home as a broader issue.

From extant sources, it appears that this awakening took place primarily as a result of the growing usage of Ritterkreuzträger as speakers for the mV program; a usage that put them into intimate contact with the public as official ambassadors of the regime, the Wehrmacht, and the official narrative of the war. To be sure, since first using “Frontredner” in 1940, the PKz had tried to ensure that military speakers were politically ‘safe.’67 Even later on when they had become the dominant voice, moreover, mV organizers had decreed that such men were to cleave to “purely military questions,” and the RMVP insisted that they be screened for political reliability.68

Madrid to Moscow – A Flier’s Life with Mölders), which used much the same rhetoric (Berlin: Verlag Wehrfront, 1943). 66 GTb II.3, 219 (30.1.1942); ibid., II.6, 59 (4.10.1942). 67 BAMA RH 53-18/376, XXV-B4-17. Abschrift OKW WPr.IId Betr. Wehrmachtpropaganda, Blatt 7/40 (9500/40), 17.9.1940. The first speakers, in fact, had largely been former Party orators recalled from the front, or else soldiers who served only to break the proverbial ice for the seasoned civilian speaker who followed right behind, delivering an ideological message on the heels of the soldiers’ stories of battle. 68 BA-MA RH 53-18/379 XVIII AK, Propaganda. XXVI – B I “Wehrmacht und Propaganda” (12), see also BAMA RH 53-9/28 Stellv.G.Kdo IX.AK WKK.IX. 8999/42 Betr. militärisches Votragswesen, 12.9.1942; BAMA RH 62/10. OKW 34x18/20. WPr.IId 6000/42. It is worth nothing that the Party was also just as strict about its political speakers delving into military matters. This was not only because of the concerns identified early in the war that on these topics 284

Nevertheless, once speakers took to the podium there was little guarantee of their staying “on script,” and by 1942-1943 these political safeguards had become overstretched or overridden as platforms were given to decorated soldiers with questionable traits or beliefs. It was thus only a matter of time before the combination of a hero’s moral authority and a rapt audience produced negative results.

In January 1943, for instance, a Ritterkreuzträger deemed to be inappropriate as a speaker slipped through the screening process. Walther Tiessler of the RRVP received notification from a contact at the RMVP that a Christian pastor had been included among the Ritterkreuzträger assigned to an upcoming speaker campaign in the city of Insterbung.69 The man in question, twenty-six-year-old Otto Toll, was by all accounts “a harmless and un-political man,” but Tiessler was furious. Toll was a pastor, he replied, and with his mind no doubt returning to the recent

Möldersbrief controversy (and perhaps also the cases of Erdmenger and Ruckteschell the year before), argued that he was consequently prone towards “infractions” which the RRVP “cannot approve of for ideological reasons.” Indeed, Tiessler added that, to his knowledge, standing agreements with the OKW should have ensured that Ritterkreuzträger would have been “checked out for political reliability” like any other speaker.70 In affirmation of this judgment, an RMVP representative commented on the matter that they were “in agreement that a Knight’s Cross winner is a virtuous soldier,” and “ideologically he does not need to be a Nazi [sic].” However, he continued, measures had to be taken “to prevent such occurrences taking place in future.”71

the German people were found to prefer Wehrmacht grey to Party brown, they were also under their own pressure from the OKW to ensure the protection of military secrets, troop movements etc. See NARA T-77/1007 OKW608. WPr 20/10/41 Betr. militärische Zensur von Vorträgen militärischen Inhalts, 20.10.1941. 69 Ibid., 105. Bühler (RMVP) an Tiessler. Betr. Propagandaaktion für die deutsche Infanterie, 5.1.1943. 70 BAB NS 18/250, 100. Tiessler an Bühler, 20.1.1943. 71 Ibid. 285

Nevertheless, within months of the Toll-incident Tiessler received a report detailing how another problematic war hero had slipped through the safety net, and that this time the mistake had not been caught in time. In late April 1943, a decorated officer made damaging comments at a meeting of local HJ in the town of Büren. According to the report, the intended speaker, Sr.

Lieutenant Himmelbach, had been replaced at the last minute by another Ritterkreuzträger named

Jörgen who had subsequently spoken without proper vetting. In his speech, the replacement spoke of the lack of proper attentiveness among Wehrmacht administrators for the needs of troops on the

Eastern Front and dismissed the media’s portrayal of the fighting as misleading.72 More grievous, though, was the complaint from a local NSDAP official that after the event, while speaking with assembled dignitaries, he had made “misleading proclamations about the cause of the war […] and the present sovereignty of the Party.” The event, the official concluded, had been a political disaster and furthermore had “damaged the reputation of the Wehrmacht.”73

Only days later, though, an undoubtedly frustrated Tiessler received word of yet another and even more troubling Ritterkreuzträger-case. At a rally in the town hall of Luxemburg City on May

72 BAB NS 18/131, 903. Abschrift, SD Aussenstelle Paderborn, 5.5.1943; ibid., 902. Anlage, 26.7.1943. That the RPL had not had knowledge of Jörgen’s acting as a speaker in Gau Westfalen-Nord comes from another message to Tiessler in early August 1943 (NS 18/131, 899). 73 The Himmelbach-Jörgen case presents an interesting problem. The reports submitted to Tiessler on the matter list the names of the two men involved as “Himmelbach,” and “Jörgen.” However, a note from the OKH included with one report listed the latter as “Görgen” (compare, for example, BAB NS 18/131, 895. Scheffler (OKW) an Tiessler, 10.1.1944 and ibid., 899 Notiz für Tiessler betr. Rednereinsatzaktion “Front spricht zur Heimat,” 9.8.1943). It is possible, given that the first reports submitted about the incident were not written until late July 1943, almost three months after the event, that the Party’s representatives simply misspelled the name. Whichever organization got it right, however, seems of secondary importance given that neither the names “Himmelbach,” “Jörgen” or “Görgen” appear within the most up-to-date index of Ritterkreuzträger (Scherzer, Die Ritterkreuzträger (2005)). Although the initial SD report lists only the ranks of “Himmelbach” and “Jörgen,” without the “Ritterkreuzträger”-prefix, within the RRVP reports Himmelbach is referenced as one who had been assigned, along with a group of other infantry Ritterkreuzträger, to speak in Westfalen-Nord between 12.5.-18.5.1943, while Jörgen/Görgen, meanwhile, is also referenced as a Ritterkreuzträger in NS 18/131, 899. It is possible, once again, that the regime simply had their information wrong, either about the name or status of either man given the chronological gap between the incident and the reports. Still, despite this evidentiary puzzle, what matters most is that Tiessler and his colleagues believed that both men were indeed Ritterkreuzträger, thereby not only demonstrating why the case reached his desk as a senior PKz official but also why it evoked such concern, even after having gone through the courts. 286

19, distinguished Captain Thilo von Werthern had caused great embarrassment to local political authorities. Although intended to develop an “enthusiasm [among] the youth present on the deeds of the Wehrmacht and encourage them to enlist in its ranks,” once on the podium Werthern had proceeded to arouse “astonishment and indignation” among the organizers and over 800 attendees of the event when he departed from his assigned script. Rather than describing his combat- experience, he made scathing comments about the state of the Home Front and the unrealistic portrayals of the fighting front in the weekly newsreels. He also criticized the attitude of “the large number of able-bodied men” whom he described as “weaklings, unaccustomed to hardship,” who sat at home passing the time with “sparkling banquets […] dancing and gramophone music.”74

Like Jörgen, though, the damage did not stop there. Werthern went on to praise the fighting spirit of soviet soldiers and according to the SD described them in such a way as to produce “respect, if not admiration, for the accomplishments of Bolshevism.” Finally, evoking shades of the

Möldersbrief, he began to preach to the assembled youth, extolling Christian teachings and announced that “hundreds of thousands of soldiers had recovered their faith, which had been stripped from them in the homeland.”75

Predictably, the SD called Werthern’s appearance “extremely dangerous,” and concluded that “this man gives the impression of a ‘reactionary’ pushing old Prussian-aristocratic thoughts.”76

In a document included in his personal papers, Walther Tiessler described this incident as

“renewed proof” of the necessity of first carefully vetting and “aligning” such speakers before they

74 BAB NS 18/131, 879. Bericht der Kreisleitung Luxemburg betr. Kundgebung mit dem Ritterkreuzträger Freiherr Thilo von Werthern, 19.5.1943; ibid., 876. Berichte vom SD-Einsatzkommando Luxemburg, 24.5.1943. 75 BAB NS 18/131, 876. 76 Ibid. 287 could reach the stage.77 Likewise, word of the scandal (and evidently other such incidents) eventually reached the desk of Joseph Goebbels, who wrote in his diary:

The OKH has sent a number of Knight’s Cross-holding officers to the homeland for infantry recruitment. A few of these Knight’s Cross-holding officers have in no way shown themselves grown up to their task. Among others, a Freiherr von Werthern spoke in Luxemburg; so reactionary and provocative that I must intervene. I am inclined that in future Knight’s Cross bearers sent into the homeland be vetted not only for military, but also for political suitability.78

What form Goebbels’s intervention took (if it happened at all) is unclear, but as with Walther

Tiessler’s previous calls for action after the Toll incident, it appears to have had little effect.79

By September of 1943, documents from the RRVP note how reports of Ritterkreuzträger proving themselves ideologically unreliable, or “not sufficiently prepared or equipped,” were

“piling up.”80 Furthermore, such unreliability stretched outside of the Wehrmacht and into the supposedly more dependable Waffen-SS. One final report about a wayward Ritterkreuzträger speaker, dated mid-September, noted how SS-NCO August Zingel made inflammatory comments while speaking at an event near . Like Jörgen and Werthern before him, he poked

77 BAB NS 18/865, 110. RPL. Betr. Berichte über eine Kundgebung mit dem Ritterkreuzträger Freiherr Thilo v. Werthern, 29.6.1943. 78 GTb II.9, 37 (3.7.1943). What makes Werthern’s case all the more interesting is that it took place at all. Only recently, after being assigned to FHQ, the captain had been investigated by the SS on the direct orders of Reichsführer- SS Heinrich Himmler. According to an August 1942 notice from the latter’s personal staff files, an investigation of his family revealed a sister deemed politically unstable because of her “adventurous” lifestyle and close association with asocial elements such as psychics and fortune tellers. Despite having no doubts as yet about the ideological soundness of her brother, Himmler and the SD knew that he was close to his sister and this could become infected by her waywardness. Thus, Himmler had personally ordered an investigation to monitor brother and sister individually (BAB NS 19/3155, 1-3. Chef.SD an Pers.Stab.RFSS Betr. Oberleutnant Thilo v. Werthern vom Begleitkommando der FHQ, 1.8.1942). Despite this investigation being precautionary, it is nevertheless revealing that such doubts existed about his potential loyalties at such high levels, that he was entrusted with propaganda duties the following year. 79 There is no indication from the SD report, the Goebbels diaries, or any records found by the author, to indicate that Werthern was ever punished by the authorities for his remarks. Indeed, later in 1943 he was promoted to major and went on to command a in the prominent Grossdeutschland division as well as, ironically, sub-group 5 within the Army’s Ordensabteilung, which handled cases in which orders and decorations were revoked for unbecoming behaviour. Werthern survived the war and died in 2004. See BAMA RW 59/360, 22-26. 80 BAB NS 18/131, 868. RRVP. Vermerk, 14.9.1943. 288 fun at the local Party Bonzen who lounged in lavish comfort while the real sacrifices were being made at the front. Such comments were certainly not uncommon for the time, as noted earlier, but this only made the matter worse. Furthermore, Zingel “aroused displeasure” among Party members in the audience by describing the NSDAP’s rise to power “as if it had been [the accomplishment] of the SS alone.”81 Zingel’s performance in Lake Constance was enough for the author of the report to plead that any Ritterkreuzträger assigned to speaking events be issued “rules of conduct” to keep them on task.82

Because of these high-profile cases, it is not surprising that in the coming months speakers from the Wehrmacht as a whole were more closely monitored and vetted before being allowed such a potentially inflammatory public platform. All speakers were now to undergo a mandatory test by one of the state’s newly created National Socialist Leadership Officers

(Nationalsozialistische Führungsoffizier, NSFO).83 Likewise, in November 1943 Martin Bormann issued a circular to all Party offices in which he demanded that they insist upon the strict enforcement of political screening for speakers or, if possible, to push for a new process to be created within the Wehrmacht.84 As the Party Secretary and anyone else who had read the reports that summer could now see, though, the underlying issue went far beyond speaker activity but spoke to the nature of the Reich’s hero culture more broadly.

Four days after his first circular, moreover, Bormann issued another that effectively formalized the sentiments expressed by Joseph Goebbels in his diary two years earlier regarding

81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 83 BAMA RH 62/105 WPr. Befehle und Anordnung für militärisches Vortragswesen und Austellungswesen 1940- 1944. OKW 580/44 WPr. II.d 1/44. WPr.O, 3.2.1944. 84 BAB NS 6/343, 30. NSDAP Rundschreiben Bormann (161/43). Betr. Rednereinsatz bei der Wehrmacht, 22.11.1943. 289 the general issue of` “Bravery awards – political and moral reliability.”85 He began with the expected qualification that such medals were wholly beneficial and praiseworthy as symbols of laudable military conduct. Nevertheless, he cautioned that “it would not be right” to see in the possession of such honours or the acts they rewarded “an automatic political or moral reliability.”

After all, there had been “many examples” in the last war in which Frontkämpfer who had demonstrated similar superiority and virtue on the battlefield had subsequently failed to maintain this bearing once back in the homeland. Front experience, he concluded, “thus cannot translate into political or moral bearing, just as a political or a characteristically praiseworthy bearing conversely cannot substitute for missing military qualities.” The winners of high bravery awards, he concluded, should be subject to all the normal processes for “assessing their political character.”86

Such admonishments represented an important turning point for the regime and its wartime relationship with Ritterkreuzträger, one that adds a further layer of nuance to subsequent processes and events discussed in earlier chapters. The relationship had become surprisingly, and worryingly, complex for the former exactly when it needed Ritterkreuzträger to be most fruitful as symbolic war heroes. The incidents which prompted this reaction of course involved only a tiny fraction of the overall number of Ritterkreuzträger, but all the same they had sown a seed of doubt about the volatility of the whole as an unstable element in its political arsenal. The heavily politicized

Heldenkult had been revealed to rest upon unstable ground, and these incidents had been the first cracks. Still, they were nothing compared to the events that were to come in the summer of 1944,

85 Ibid., 38. NSDAP Rundschreiben Bormann (164/43), Betr. Tapferkeitsauszeichnungen - politische und moralische Zuverlässigkeit, 26.11.1943 (copy found in Verfügungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben, IV, 106-7). 86 Ibid. 290 which would strike and shatter the regime’s perspective on the reliability of its heroes and the security of the “prestige exchange” as a mechanism for securing loyalty and obedience.

V.4 Insult to Injury

On , 1944, a network of committed resistors to the Hitler regime attempted to assassinate the dictator at his field headquarters in East Prussia. Although unsuccessful, this failed coup was by far the most impactful act of open resistance against the regime during its existence.

Within days, the Gestapo had uncovered much of the network behind the plot as well as a great many others suspected of complicity. Some of the names, though, were difficult for the state’s leadership, and especially Hitler, to believe. Not only were there distinguished Wehrmacht officers among the conspirators who had received promotion or gifts from Hitler personally, but there were also more than a few holders of the highest awards, including the DK-G, RKVK and even the RK and its higher grades.87 That such men, so honoured by the state, would sully themselves and their prestigious decorations through an attempt on the life of the man who had, in many cases, bestowed them himself, was deeply disturbing. To date, the only comparable cases had been those of officers like General Walther von Seydlitz-Kurzbach, who, after capture by the Soviets, had been compelled to collaborate and publically work against their former regime.88 Yet this was far worse, and the disturbance quickly turned to anger.

87 This reaction was recorded by Goebbels in his diary in subsequent weeks. He records his own shock (no doubt exaggerated for posterity) as more names of senior military commanders were added to the list of conspirators in what he labelled “the largest military-conspiracy ever known in Prusso-German history.” GTb II.13, 167 (25.7.1944). 88 After capture at Stalingrad, Seydlitz-Kurzbach had become a co-founder of the collaborationist “Bund deutscher Offiziere” (German Officers’ League, BDO), an organization that ultimately included multiple Ritterkreuzträger and that eventually merged with the “Nationalkommitee Freies Deutschland” (National Committee of a Free Germany, or NKFD), which called for the end of Nazi rule and adoption of communist ideals. For this, he was sentenced in absentia by the Reichsgericht (Reich Court) for in April of 1944 and, among other things, stripped of his military 291

Heinrich Himmler, for one, claimed to have taken immediate steps to distance the traitors from the highly symbolic decorations bestowed on them by the state they had tried to overthrow.

The day after the coup, as he reported during a speech to assembled Gauleiter in early August, upon hearing that the conspirators who had been shot on the night of July 20 (Colonels Claus

Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg and Mertz von Quirnheim, Lieutenant Werner Karl von Haeften and General ) had been buried while still wearing their war decorations, he immediately ordered that their bodies be exhumed and stripped of these awards, then burned. The action, he explained, had been primarily directed towards Olbricht, whose speedy burial whilst still wearing the RK was completely unacceptable.89 Still, this post-mortem humiliation did not go far enough. Such men as these had had the privilege of having their families taken care of through the Sonderbetreuung program in the case of their death as a positive example of the regime’s commitment to honour Frontkämpfer. That being the case, Himmler suggested, the regime ought to consider taking a similar course in reverse and punish such families as a negative example.90

Beyond an obvious reaction to high treason, such a response was a further demonstration of the faith the state’s leadership had placed in the prestige-exchange system. A consistent theme

honours – one of the few wartime instances of this rare provision being invoked for a Ritterkreuzträger, though, as we shall see, not the last. See further Scherzer, Ritterkreuzträger, 107; Winfried Heinemann, “Der militärisches Widerstand und der Krieg,” in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg.Vol.9.1 Die Deutsche Kriegsgesellschaft 1939 bis 1945. Erster Halbband: Politisierung, Vernichtung, Überleben, ed. Jörg Echternkamp (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2004), 793-795. 89 “Rede Himmlers vor den Gauleitern,” 382, 384-385. General , a key leader of the conspiracy, had been allowed to commit suicide by General . He had also not worn his uniform or decorations for the coup. See Hoffmann, German Resistance, 511; Scherzer, Ritterkreuzträger, 104-5. 90 Goebbels, meanwhile, was similarly outraged. In addition to his ideological scruples, the participation of highly decorated men he held as a personal insult as well. After all, he had worked hard for years to try and develop both the RKVK and RK as powerful symbols of National Socialism and Frontkämpfer-ideology. As he remarked in his diary as well as to his military liaison, Wilfred von Oven, what hurt the most was the involvement of the Berlin Chief of Police and RKVK holder Wolf-Heinrich Graf von Helldorf. Helldorf was an Alte Kämpfer and a close confidant since Goebbels’s early days as Berlin Gauleiter. More important, it had been Goebbels himself who had recommended him for the RKVK, and he who strung its ribbon around his friend’s neck at a special ceremony at the Propaganda Ministry earlier that year. That ribbon, the Minister added, though, was probably not as tight as the noose which would soon replace it. See GTb II.13, 210 (3.8.1944); Oven, Mit Goebbels II, 106 (30.7.1944). 292 within extant sources in the aftermath of July 20 is a sense of disbelief that the conspirators (and not just the Ritterkreuzträger among them) had not held up their end of the bargain. They had accepted high awards, along with the commensurate prestige, benefits, and the promise of a privileged place in the new Germany but had not returned the favour with the loyalty and obedience which, to the regime’s way of thinking, it was logical to expect. They had bitten the hands that fed them. According to his long-standing Air Force Adjutant Nicolaus von Below, Hitler would remark bitterly in the coming months that:

After July 20 everything came out, things I had considered impossible. It was precisely those circles against me who had profited most from National Socialism. I pampered and decorated them. And that was all the thanks I got.91

In other words, it was one thing to promote smoking or drunkenness through poor behaviour, to ignore state laws, or even to utter defeatist or politically heretical comments in public. Such monstrous ingratitude, though, was quite another.92

As more names appeared almost daily on the list of suspected conspirators, Hitler and his senior leadership could see that the involvement of Ritterkreuzträger could not be ignored or swept under the rug; rather it needed to be contained and minimized. Consequently, symbolically discrediting them from being ‘legitimate’ members of this brotherhood became an important part of the regime’s subsequent efforts to divorce the military conspirators from the Wehrmacht. Hitler

91 Below, At Hitler’s Side, 223-224. Similar comments were also recorded from Goebbels and Himmler. See GTb II.13, 583 (28.9.1944); Oven, Mit Goebbels II, 106 (30.7.1944); “Rede Himmlers,” 382, 384-385. 92 Of course, had Hitler, Himmler or Goebbels known at this time just how many more Ritterkreuzträger were involved than those whom the Gestapo discovered, they would have surely been even more outraged and concerned. Two of the earlier organized attempts on Hitler’s life had in fact been undertaken by current and future holders of this award. In March of 1943, Rudolf Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff (who would receive the RK shortly after the July plot) had attempted to kill Hitler at a memorial ceremony by carrying explosives in his pocket. Likewise, in November 1943, Streithorst (who had even featured in the REM/WPr.V’s children’s literature campaign) had intended to do the same at a Wehrmacht demonstration of winter clothing which Hitler was to attend, but he could not obtain permission to go from his commanding general. These men, along with several more Ritterkreuzträger such as the brothers Philipp and Georg Freiherr von Boeselager, were never implicated. Hoffmann, German Resistance, 273, 283-289, 324-328. 293 intended a show trial for the conspirators in the now infamous People’s Court (Volksgericht).

However, it would not do to have these traitors appear in uniform, let alone with the further moral authority of Frontkämpfer-decorations like the EK, VA and RK. Thus, before the trials Hitler ordered the creation of a special Court of Honour (Ehrenhof) through which to eject them from the

Wehrmacht and thus try them as civilians.93 This special court, comprised entirely (and symbolically) of Ritterkreuzträger who had remained outwardly loyal, examined each case and stripped each man of his rank and the right to all military honours (Wehrwürdigkeit) if found guilty.94 For the Ritterkreuzträger among the condemned, the Ehrenhof decisions thus amounted to an act of phaleristic ex-communication, an ejection from the company of their fellows by a committee of truly worthy recipients.

Formally stripping them of the RK, however, did not go far enough for Hitler. During the following show trials, he had the fanatical judge further distance the accused from their prestigious medal. Before the trial even began, Goebbels recorded in his diary having told

Freisler on Hitler’s behalf to associate the conspirators with a previous assassination attempt in

Klessheim as well. On that occasion, Freisler was to say, they had vilely tried to make “three honest soldiers, who had been awarded the Knight’s Cross,” kill Hitler at a demonstration of Wehrmacht uniforms.95 As the trials proceeded, Freisler fulfilled his mission with gusto, especially when he interrogated the former General and Ritterkreuzträger Erich Hӧpner. To create the desired disassociation the judge seized upon the fact that on July 20, Höpner had not worn his RK. “[F]ate

93 BdF. “Bildung eines Ehrenhofes zur Überprüfung der Beteiligten am Attentat vom 20.7.1944,” 2.8.1944, in Moll, Führer-Erlasse, 439 No.346. 94 Scherzer, Ritterkreuzträger, 102-5. For the legal basis upon which the conspirators had their decorations stripped along with their rank and “Wehrwürdigkeit,” see Articles 1.1-1.2 of “Verordnung des Führers über den Verlust von Orden und Ehrenzeichen. Vom 8 Januar 1943,” RGBl I. 1943. No.100, 15. HM s.70; Widerruf und Entziehung” in Doehle, Sammeldruck, 278. 95 GTb II.13, 213-214 (3.8.1944). 294 had given you a hint,” he remarked scathingly, “namely that you had forgotten the Knight’s Cross, which […] in this case was certainly a good thing.”96 Freisler returned to the point later when reading out Höpner’s predictable sentence, praising fate for allowing the latter to avoid “the highest shame.”97 For any who had missed his earlier message about the Klessheim affair, the point was now crystal clear. The “highest shame” had been the act of sullying this medal and betraying its symbolic connection to the regime and its Führer.98

On top of this legal condemnation, it also helped that the majority of Ritterkreuzträger involved in the plot (those detected, at least) had been older and senior officers. This fact fit well with the image presented by the regime of a desperate bid for power by traitorous rear-echelon elites, old “hemorrhoid generals” (Hämorrhoiden-generäle) as Goebbels called them, who represented the reincarnations of the back-stabbers of 1918. In private, moreover, the Minister noted that their involvement only further demonstrated the frustrating reality of the ‘un- revolutionized’ leadership of the Army and its resistance to Party ideology, even now.99 Thus the image of the young, daring Frontkämpfer-Ritterkreuzträger still served as an effective counterpoint. One man who emerged as a new hero from the events of July 20 was Major Otto

Remer, an Eichenlaubträger and former HJ leader who had led the efforts to crush the coup on the ground. In thanks, Hitler received him personally and promoted him to colonel, while during the following weeks and months Goebbels’s propagandists publicized his achievements as evidence of loyalty and devotion. The weekly newsreel, for example, ran a special featurette on Remer that

96 Document 3881-PS “Stenographic Report of the trial before the German People’s Court on 7 and 8 August 1944,” (Exhibit GB-527),” Nuremberg Trials, XXXIII, 385. 97 Ibid., 516. 98 For his sins against the regime, Höpner was executed and Plötzensee Prison on August 8, 1944. 99 According to the SD, and generally agreed upon by post-war historians, this story of a small clique of senior officers was widely accepted among the German people and soldiery, who reacted to the plot with shock and horror. See MadR 17, 6697-6704. For Goebbels’s comments, see GTb II.12, 313 (18.5.1944); ibid., II.13, 170 (26.7.1944); 198-200 (2.8.1944); 213-214 (3.8.1944). 295 showed him addressing his men, saying: “we are today political soldiers […] a battalion of the

National Socialist idea.”100

While publicly the regime had thus created some measure of damage control to the image of the RK, in private it was reeling from the discovery of one conspirator whose involvement, if made public, would shatter these efforts and the value of the Heldenkult more broadly. Even the most legendary living heroes, it seemed, were capable of treachery, for the man in question was none other than the supposedly “ideologically grounded” Erwin Rommel.101 Upon hearing the news, Joseph Goebbels confided to his diary: “One would like to put one’s hands over one’s head given where we have come.”102 As unquestionably the Wehrmacht’s most famous “fighting general” and arguably its most famous Brillantenträger; the regime could not afford to lose

Rommel in his role as symbolic hero. He could not be put on trial and condemned publicly, for this could make the Möldersbrief scandal pale by comparison as grounds for the public to doubt the regime’s leadership. The fate of Germany’s most famous general, who at the time lay convalescing from wounds suffered in Normandy, became Hitler’s burden during the early fall of

1944. Ultimately, he secretly reconvened the Ehrenhof and, when it found Rommel guilty, decided

100 “Eichenlaubträger Otto Remer,” VB, July 28, 1944; ibid., August 4, 1944: “Major Remer zum Oberst befördert”; DW 728 (24.8.1944). Indeed, during the latter half of the year the Goebbels diaries reveal an even greater personal emphasis by the Minister on highlighting Ritterkreuzträger who displayed a similar level of ideological soundness as Remer. After one meeting in November with a large group of decorated commanders, he wrote glowingly that have extraordinary political receptiveness and they have honest desire not just to think national socialist thoughts but to conform their actions to it. E.g. see GTb II.14, 256 (22.11.1944); ibid., 278 (25.11.1944); ibid., 316 (2.12.1944). 101 As the Gestapo’s investigation progressed, it was determined that Rommel had been intended to play an important role in stabilizing the country when the coup succeeded, with his fame and status as a Brillantenträger adding moral authority to the new regime which would replace Hitler’s government. See Hoffmann, German Resistance, 351-53; Fraser, Knight’s Cross, 531, 537. 102 GTb II.13, 208-210 (3.8.1944). 296 on a course which would not only minimize the inevitable damage to morale, but also preserve

Rommel’s heroic identity and even affirm the RK-cult.103

In a now well-known sequence of events, Hitler deputized two officers to approach

Rommel at his home in Herlingen on October 14, 1944, and there coerced him to commit suicide.104 In the meantime, he ordered the press to notify the public that the Reich’s premier general had succumbed to his wounds (which had not previously been public knowledge) and that he would be given a state funeral in accordance with his status as a “Volksheld.”105 The ceremony, held on October 18 in , was thus an opportunity to reaffirm the closeness of the Party and state with true heroes and holders of the RK, and thus to further discredit the memory of the more than a dozen of its recipients executed for roles in the July conspiracy. An honour guard of

Ritterkreuzträger escorted the cortege and Field Marshal (Schwerterträger and

Ehrenhof-member) delivered a moving eulogy extolling Rommel as an example for all Germans and devoted National Socialists, sentiments repeated by Hitler (who did not attend) in a published communiqué.106

The regime had thus avoided a symbolic disaster, but Rommel’s murder was yet another nail in the coffin of its relationship with Ritterkreuzträger as a reliable vessel of Frontkämpfer- ideology and political ideals, something that became more and more evident over the remaining months of the war. Even though the former was awarding and publicizing more RKs than ever at this time, they were also beginning to whittle away some of the privileged and protected status that these heroes had come to enjoy. For instance, it appears that at long last the regime set to tightening

103 The proceedings of the Ehrenhof regarding Rommel’s case are discussed in Ralf Georg Reuth, End of a Legend, 193; Fraser, Knight’s Cross, 548. 104 Reuth, End of a Legend, 198-203. 105 GTb II.14, 180 (27.10.1944). 106 HVBl C. 34 (22.11.1944) 28.10.1944; DW, 737 (10.19.1944); Reuth, End of a Legend, 203-208. 297 the behavioural leash that had long been extended to Ritterkreuzträger and making it more difficult for their conduct to be swept under the rug. In early September, Heinrich Himmler communicated with the Reich War Court (Reichskriegsgericht) to request that any “ongoing support” provided for cases involving Ritterkreuzträger was henceforth to be dispensed with. At the same time, he demanded stricter handling of political misdemeanors by Wehrmacht personnel by the HPA, even for those who had proven themselves repeatedly in combat.107 Being a good Frontkämpfer or wearing the RK would no longer get men like Teddy Suhren or Werner Henke out of trouble quite as easily; the Reichsführer had revoked, at least officially, the unofficial ‘get out of jail free’ card for war heroes.

Likewise, the following month Martin Bormann issued another of his circulars retracting some of the specific benefits afforded to Ritterkreuzträger that were not only increasingly superfluous but, evidently, no guarantee of loyalty either. As discussed in Chapter III.3, Himmler had shut down the settlement program for all Ritterkreuzträger in August 1943, but it seems that the related practice of Party notables bestowing land within the Reich as well as private gifts upon

Ritterkreuzträger had continued. According to Bormann, Hitler now desired that all such

“subsidies on land and special endowments” given as tokens of “special appreciation” by the individual Gau to men with the highest war decorations be terminated for the rest of the war.108

Only after the conflict was over, he said, could the Reich leadership properly assess each decorated soldier’s deservedness, “not only on the assessment of military actions or bravery, but rather on a complete evaluation of personality, and also in hindsight on his political and ideological attitude.”109 If communities absolutely had to express their gratitude to highly decorated local war

107 Bradley and Schulze-Kossens, Tätigkeitsbericht, 239 (7.9.1944) and 245 (10.9.1944). 108 BAB NS 6/348, 50. NSDAP Rundschreiben Bormann (322/44). Betr. Betreuung von Trägern hoher militärischer Tapferkeitsauszeichnungen, 10.10.1944. 109 Ibid.; emphasis in original. 298 heroes, he recommended that they substitute more decorative or symbolic gifts, such as paintings or a special book, that represented the “cultural or scenic character” of each Gau.

Alongside these official measures, the troubled relationship between the regime and

Ritterkreuzträger after the events of the summer seem to provide a further degree of explanation to some of the policies and processes discussed in previous chapters from the war’s final months.

For example, it could help to explain why, despite his resignation to the general inflation of RK awardings, Hitler was willing to amend the official guidelines for the decoration to further limit the eligibility of men whose contributions were made behind the lines, especially staff officers.110

As seen in Chapter II, Hitler had been restricting recognition for these groups for years, most recently in the winter of 1943-44, but these new measures were among the most direct and comprehensive of his attempts to limit the “Etappenschweine” from the old officer corps, deemed responsible for the new “stab in the back” of July 20, to ever again possess the moral authority such as that afforded by the RK.

Likewise, these events also provide further reasons why the dictator began to place more emphasis on awards (and recipients) who more closely, and dependably, reflected National

Socialist ideals in the fall of 1944 (see Chapter II.4 and IV.5). First, he commissioned a special wound badge for those present on July 20 and heroized the three men who had died as a result, the most notable being his long-time aide and acolyte Rudolf Schmundt. In the manner of a Wessel or Mölders, the dictator ordered a state funeral for Schmundt at the country’s national memorial at

Tannenberg and for all intents and purposes it was every bit as grandiose in design as that held for

110 Bradley and Schulze-Kossens, Tätigkeitsbericht, 254 (15.9.1944); RW 59/360, 27. OKH/P5. Notiz, 24.9.1944; ibid., 324. OKH/P5. Tätigkeitsberichte, Befehle – Veränderungen: Verfügung OKH/P5.1 v 26.9.1944 Betr. Verleihung des Ritterkreuz des Eisernen Kreuzes an Generalstabsoffiziere, Sept. 1944. 299

Erwin Rommel in October, even if not in public sympathy.111 He also posthumously awarded

Schmundt his fabled and newly reintroduced “German Order” (DO), for which, as mentioned earlier, he created a new militarized grade and distributed to several others before the war’s end for their political devotion. Thirdly, in addition to losing some specific ‘perks’ like gifts of land,

RK-holders now saw their formerly unique privileges of special leaves and benefits given to other, more dependable, hero-figures including holders of the RKVK and NKS-G.112

Finally, the impact of the failed coup was undoubtedly a factor in Hitler’s decision to award the new RK-ESBG to the fanatical Hans-Ulrich Rudel, if not the creation of the award itself. As described earlier, Rudel was an ideal candidate not only because of his proven military abilities and bravery, but because Hitler and the regime could depend upon his fanatical loyalty and obedience. This had been established back in 1943, when Heinrich Himmler had ordered his staff to investigate and identify potential leaders for the SS after the war. As one of the men selected, investigators discovered that in addition to being an Air Force ace, Rudel had been a Party activist in his youth, first as a leader in the HJ before 1933 whereafter he had joined the SS (No. 206 953), only leaving to pursue his flying career.113 Finally and perhaps most important, Rudel allegedly served the regime committedly despite having expressed concerns about some of its inner workings. As Joseph Goebbels’s aide Wilfred von Oven remarked after the war, he was “critical

111 “Abschied von General der Infanterie Schmundt. Ein Vorbild unbedingter Treue. Feierliche Staatsakt im Reichsehrenmal Tannenberg,” Berliner Morgenpost, August 8, 1944; “Ein Vorbild unbedingter Treue,” VB, October 10, 1944; NARA T-78/41 H5-4B Gedenkrede für General der Infanterie Schmundt, 7.10.1944; Bradley and Schulze- Kossens, Tätigkeitsbericht, 225 (28.8.1944). 112 BAMA RW 6/136. OKW 9724/45. Betr. Betreuung der Träger des Ritterkreuz des Kriegsverdienstkreuzes und ihrer Hinterbliebenen, 17.2.1945; Lumsden, Medals and Decorations, 31. See further GTb II.14, 327 (2.12.1944). 113 BAB NS 19/394, 5. RFSS Pers.Stab an SS-Hpt.Amt (Berger) TB 35/198/43. Betr. Ritterkreuzträger aus der SS, 30.6.1943. 300 of the shadowy sides of our regime but strongly adherent to its principles, which he recognized as right and tested.”114

Yet his selection to receive the RK-ESBG was also likely connected to another act of rebellion by prominent Ritterkreuzträger that, though less significant than July 20, was arguably an even more symbolically damning demonstration for the regime of the lack of discernment in its approach to Heldenpolitik. Since 1943, there had been trouble brewing within the upper echelons of Rudel’s own service even though it had always been deemed the most politically reliable of the three regular Wehrmacht branches. For months, the inability of the Air Force’s fighter arm to turn back the thousands of Allied bombers carpeting the Reich with bombs day and night had reflected badly on its bombastic chief, Hermann Göring. In his embarrassment, Göring had blamed his beleaguered pilots and commanders, and particularly Adolf Galland, one of the country’s most celebrated and long-surviving heroes: Spanienkämpfer, member of the original “Experten” and the second Brillantenträger behind Werner Mölders.115 According to contemporaries among the Air

Force’s other leading aces, notably Johannes Steinhoff, Göring had told Galland that “your pilots do not deserve the medals they wear, including you.” At this, Steinhoff claimed, the latter “stood up, took off his Knight’s Cross with Diamonds, Iron Crosses, Spanish and Gold Crosses, and all the other medals and dropped them on the heavy table.”116

This act of phaleristic rebellion by a leading hero figure had of course been embarrassing, but manageable. The affair remained a private one and could be kept from the public, as

114 When writing this passage, the thoroughly unrepentant Nazi Oven also commented that he wished that Germany had “had more of his sort [… as] these men would have had important tasks in the inevitable transformation of our state after the final victory.” See Oven, Mit Goebbels II, 198-199. Indeed, such was Hitler’s admiration for Rudel’s combination of fanaticism and obvious military acumen, that he allegedly considered him as a successor. See Below, At Hitler’s Side, 225. 115 Galland, First and the Last, 320-324. See also GTb. II.13, 259-260 (18.8.1944); ibid., 315-316 (24.8.1944). 116 Heaton and Lewis, German Aces Speak II, 100-102. See also Steinhoff, Final Hours, 22-26. 301 demonstrated by subsequent photographs of Galland used in the press which violated standing

WPr regulations by showing the hero with his back turned or with his decorations (or lack thereof) covered by a scarf.117 However, the issue became more serious when many of the Air Force’s other

Eichenlaub-, Schwerter-, and Brillantenträger joined him in solidarity. Earlier in the war, Göring had allowed a cadre of these men to form a group to deliberate and make recommendations for the air war. This “Areopagus,”118 or alternately the “Parliament of Heroes,” had already pleaded

Galland’s case with various Party and governmental leaders, as well as Hitler himself.119 The dictator, however, though he loved to oblige such young heroes, supported his long-time friend and supporter Göring, who promptly sacked Galland and several other commanders and replaced them with more politically committed officers. In protest, members of the Areopagus launched what was a bloodless mutiny against Göring, and to symbolize the fact they too declared that they would no longer wear their RKs, nor take part in any of the essential propaganda work that went with it.120

According to Steinhoff, some of those involved (including himself) did wear their medals again before the end of the war, and even those who did not dropped their phaleristic protest afterwards. Likewise, there is no surviving evidence to suggest that the mutinous spirit embodied by these Ritterkreuzträger proliferated into the Air Force or Wehrmacht more generally. Still, it seems to have struck senior leaders like Goebbels. Not only were older generals willing to openly scorn the prestige-exchange with the regime symbolized by the RK, but now too its young, archetypal Frontkämpfer, even those from the service who had received high awards in such

117 E.g. DW 718 (6.7.1944); Cover, BIZ, October 26, 1944. 118 The debating council of learned men that had existed in ancient Athens. 119 See GTb. II.13, 361 (30.8.1944); ibid., II.14, 328-329 (2.12.1944); ibid., II.15, 194 (23.1.1945). 120 Ibid., II.15, 194 (23.1.1945); Galland, First and the Last, 320-324. See also Spick, Aces of the Reich, 176-179; Steinhoff, Final Hours, 54-60; Heaton and Lewis, German Aces Speak II, 160. 302 disproportionate numbers. Thus, writing in his diary after hearing of Hitler’s selection of Rudel as the first Goldträger, Goebbels remarked how relieved he was that Reich’s most decorated soldier had not been “spoiled” like other Air Force heroes. Rather, reflective of the gradual devolution of relations between heroes and their political patrons, through his loyalty to the regime and resolute desire to fight on, he considered Rudel an exception: “a first-class political soldier.”121

In short, by the end of the war several months later in May of 1945, the regime had come to a unique crossroads in its relationship with the country’s war heroes. As documented in earlier chapters, the latter were still an invaluable source of symbolic and propaganda capital. Yet, the events of the previous year, compounding the gradual realization in those previous, had solidified the former’s growing mistrust about their collective reliability as living symbols of National

Socialism. This process represents one of the most significant, yet underrecognized, aspects of their mutual relationship, and while it is impossible to know how it would have proceeded had the war continued, it does seem certain that it had become, to at least some degree, one of necessity over preference. Like the other aspects of the heroes’ service to the regime, symbolic or otherwise, it had forced the country’s leaders once more into introspection about the nature of their own

Heldenpolitik and the soundness of their assumptions.

121 GTb II.15, 32 (1.1.1945). See also ibid., 38 (2.1.1945); Oven, Mit Goebbels II, 198-199. 303

Epilogue

The Endurance of a Hero Cult: the Ritterkreuz after National Socialism

The collapse of the Hitler regime saw the end of the RK’s formal raison d’être. The vaunted

Volksgemeinschaft for which this medal and its recipients were supposed to act as symbolic vessels was gone, replaced by the uncertainty of defeat and occupation. Yet, “Stunde Null,” as it has come to be known, was not the end of their role or influence in Germany and its hero culture.

Through a variety of ways, both the RK and its recipients survived the transition to the post-war world and, as mentioned in places throughout this work, their legacy continues to be a source of controversy today, particularly within the Bundeswehr and its struggle to determine a “usable” tradition. The following Epilogue, therefore, provides a brief explanation of this survival, thus completing the narrative begun in Chapter I.

Aftermath, Survival and Revitalization

During the winter and spring of 1945, most of Germany’s surviving Ritterkreuzträger found themselves taken into captivity by Allied forces along with the rest of Wehrmacht and

Waffen-SS. For many of them, this transition and the subsequent process of demobilization went smoothly, but according to some accounts their now defunct status as war heroes could also mean a great deal in shaping their experience of this chaotic period. A few Ritterkreuzträger, for instance, found that the recognizability and prestige of their medal that had made them respected celebrities in their own country now made them targets for enemy soldiers during capture or confinement.

304

Alongside casual abuse, this often took the form of souvenir hunting by captors desirous of taking home a keepsake of having encountered one of the Wehrmacht’s elite.1

Such treatment by lower ranking enemy troops appears in the post-war writings of

Ritterkreuzträger captured by both Soviet and Allied forces. However, the same could not be said when it came to the more famous and revered among them: the Eichenlaub-, Schwerter- and

Brillantenträger. On one hand, many of those captured by the Western Allies like Adolf Galland and even fanatics like Hans-Ulrich Rudel appear in contemporary newsreels and photographs being treated with deference and even respect by British or American officers. On the other hand, those taken by the Red Army often found their status a severe handicap. Soviet authorities identified decorated soldiers among the millions taken into captivity and tried to utilize their influence. Brillantenträger Erich Hartmann, one of those sought out, recalled that after demanding his RK-ESB (which he had already sent home for safe keeping), his captors pressed him (and others) to work for them as a spokesman among the prisoners.2 Even so, their treatment was still better than that of Ritterkreuzträger from foreign nations who had fought for Germany in the

Wehrmacht or Waffen-SS, many of whom, as Rolf-Dieter Müller points out, were summarily executed by their own people after the war.3

1 E.g. Heaton and Lewis, German Aces Speak II, 166, 226; Allerberger, Sniper, chap.12 (loc.2459 of 2695), Kindle. See also Kathleen J. Nawyn, “Striking at the Roots of German Militarism”: Efforts to Demilitarize German Society and Culture in American-Occupied Württemberg-Baden, 1945-1949” (Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, 2008), 316-319. 2 This was famously the fate of Field Marshal Friedrich von Paulus (RK-ES) who had been captured at Stalingrad. See Hartmann testimony, in Heaton and Lewis, German Aces Speak II, 87-93. Further, in a published memoir, Stalingrad-survivor Albert Holl similarly claims that Ritterkreuzträger had their decorations stolen for propaganda use were turned against their comrades. Likewise, he also adds that the Soviet NKVD would sometimes place informants among German POWs wearing a fake RK in order to lend them credibility. See Holl, After Stalingrad. Seven Years as a Soviet , trans. Tony Le Tissier (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2016), 68, 79, 111. 3 Müller, Hitler’s Foreign Soldiers, 132. 305

No matter who their captor was, however, peace meant a transition into a new Germany, and new world. For those Ritterkreuzträger fortunate enough to have avoided shipment to Siberia now living in the new eastern zone, it became clear over the following decade that their former prestige in public life was a thing of the past, and possession of the RK was no longer something of which to boast. Like all other pre-1945 decorations, the new Moscow-controlled regime of the

German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik, DDR: est.1949) banned the

RK as a symbol of fascism and reactionary conservatism. Still, the DDR did not ban decorations outright as had the revolutionaries of 1918-1919, nor did it attempt to minimize their role in society as had the Weimar Republic. Instead, following the tradition of its soviet overlords, , and especially its military, became nearly as prolific as the Hitler regime in creating symbolic awards. What’s more, it also quickly established a new official Heldenkult that included, among other things, an inverted mythology of the Spanish Civil War.4 Even so, during the following four decades the DDR was never able to combine these two replacements for Nazi Ordenspolitik and

Heldenpolitik to rival the hero culture of the war years.5

By contrast, in the western zone things proceeded very differently. For the first few years after 1945 the occupying Allied powers also upheld a ban on the RK and all other symbols and awards of National Socialism.6 This changed in 1949, however, when the Allies sponsored the creation of a new democratic government based on Bonn, the Federal Republic of Germany

4 See Arnold Krammer, “The Cult of the Spanish Civil War in East Germany,” in Journal of Contemporary History. Vol. 39 No.4 (2004): 531-560 (n.b. 543). 5 As Andrew Bickford describes in his study Fallen Elites. The Military Other in Post-Unification Germany (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), the closest thing the DDR achieved in terms of creating popular war hero figures was a hero-culture surrounding the border guards who “defended” the “Anti-Fascist Protection Fence” state from would-be deserters to the West. For discussion of the GDR’s Heldenkult more broadly, see Rainer Gries and Silke Satkukow’s edited volume, Sozialistische Helden. Eine Kulturgeschichte von Propagandafiguren in Osteuropa unter der DDR (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 2002). 6 For detail as to the specific content and motivation behind these measures, see Nawyn, “Striking at the Roots of German Militarism,” 292-295. 306

(Bundesrepublik Deutschland, BRD). Unlike its Soviet-controlled counterpart, with their democratic mandate the new West German government under found it much more difficult to wash away the five years of newsreels, articles, autograph collections and the memory of public speeches that had sustained the wartime Heldenkult. As a result,

Ritterkreuzträger living in the West did not see the destruction of their social significance nor cultural influence to the same degree. Rather, over the following decade a number of mutually reinforcing factors would see not only their visibility but also a measure of their former prestige preserved, and even revived, despite their connection to the Hitler regime and its ideology.

The first of these factors was the preservation of the EK order as a legitimate symbol of

Germany’s military tradition, and the RK as a symbol of military heroism. This process arose, ironically, with marked parallels to both the Weimar Republic and Nazi regime’s own early relationship with phaleristic policy. Even before the creation of the BRD, the fate of the country’s orders and decorations, especially those of 1939-1945, had risen to the forefront of public issues.

Much as his republican predecessors had done, Adenauer had no interest in preserving the militarism and authoritarianism that were so closely associated with such objects. However, having himself witnessed the events of the 1920s and 1933-1934, he could also see the danger of issuing another “Ordensverbot.” Like their own forebears, many veterans came to view the issue as tied directly to the legitimacy of their experience of sacrifice and comradeship. As a result, before long new cries of “Ehrvergessenheit” and demands to wear old medals were being hurled in the direction of Bonn from veterans’ groups springing up across the country.7

7 Surveys of the public from the summer of 1951, for example, pointed to the conclusion that a majority of Germans sympathized with veterans who desired to wear their war medals, even those decorated with the swastika. A survey from a research institute from Allensbach, for example, revealed that 60 percent of former soldiers believed in blanket- reinstatement, compared to 25 percent against. See BAK B 122. ANH. Survey of Institute für Demoskopie, Aug.- Sept. 1951. For discussion of the BRD’s early struggle to decide on the future of these medals as well as the symbols 307

By the early 1950s, this early test for the new government had become so pressing in political discourse that the Federal President, Theodor Heuss, organized a special committee

(Sachverständigenausschuss) under the former Weimar Defence Minister Otto Gessler, which included representatives of various veterans’ groups and the military community to resolve the matter, with several Ritterkreuzträger (such as Generals Günther Pape, Edwin von Manteuffel and

Field Marshal (RK-ESB)) among them.8 Over the course of several meetings between 1951 and 1953, the members of the committee debated the merits of different solutions, while a watered-down version of the phaleristic activism of the 1920s was taking place on West

German streets. Just like the PLM holders before them, moreover, Ritterkreuzträger quickly became focal points of this process, making headlines for incidents like the public wearing of an original, swastika-bedecked Halsorden at an Oktoberfest parade in Munich.9

By this time, the Third Reich’s most decorated soldiers had also formed their own veterans’ association: the Ordensgemeinschaft der Ritterkreuzträger (Association of Knight’s Cross

Winners, OdR) under former Air Force General .10 The association quickly searched

of Germany before 1945, see Alois Friedel, Deutsche Staatssymbole. Herkunft und Bedeutung der politischen Symbolik in Deutschland. (Frankfurt am Main und Bonn: Athenäum, 1968), 21-22, 75-76, 103; Nawyn, “Striking at the Roots of German Militarism,” 316-319. 8 Details on the formation of the Sachverständigenausschuss can be found in Preuss’s personal papers, in BAK N 1221/585. See also , “Theodor Heuss. Die Frage der Kriegsorden und die Friedensklasse des Pour le Mérite,” VJZ 17. 4. (Oct. 1969): 414-417. 9 “Ritterkreuzträger im Trachtenanzug,” 8 Uhr Blatt (Nürnberg), September 21, 1953; “Mit dem RK geschmückt [sic],“ Revue October 3, 1953; “Streiflichter – Das EK,” Aachener Volkszeitung, September 28, 1953. Articles contained in newspaper clipping collections in the Bundesarchiv (B 122 ANH). Jörg Echternkamp briefly discusses the role of Ritterkreuzträger in the debate over the fate of Second World War decorations among German veterans in Soldaten im Nachkrieg: Historische Deutungskonflikte und westdeutsche Demokratisierung (Munich: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2014), n.b.157-161. 10 The association was formally established in 1954 but was built on top of the foundations laid by another Air Force officer, Adolf Dickfeld, who had created a smaller organization which had failed after a short time due to internal discord among its membership. Likewise, though since known as the OdR, the association began without the “Ordens”-prefix, merely as “Gemeinschaft der Ritterkreuzträger.” See BAMA R 72/2322. Aktennotiz, Gemeinschaft der Ritterkreuzträger; BAK B 136/6827, 10 Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), Az III/Z 2 32/31. BKA StS Globke and Bundesministerium der Verteidigung (BdV). Betr: Gemeinschaft deutscher Ritterkreuzträger, n.d., ca. 1955. See further See further Jay Lockenour, Soldiers as Citizens. Former Wehrmacht Officers in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1945-1955 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), 159-160. 308 out fellow Halsorden-recipients not only within the BRD but abroad in a widespread recruitment campaign that succeeded in seeing the enrollment several hundred members. As a result, even though the OdR by no means represented all former Ritterkreuzträger, especially at this early stage, it soon established itself as a leading voice among German veterans’ groups. Likewise, given the eminence and social influence of its members, it also quickly established ties to the government of the BRD including, according to surviving correspondence, the office of the President.11 For the latter, such links should be viewed in terms not too dissimilar as those between the National

Socialists and the ROPLM: a useful, if ideologically problematic, relationship with an influential element of the veteran community.

With the vocal support of the OdR, by 1955 the new “Ordensfrage” debate reached a boiling point, with the result that government took up a compromise solution from the Gessler commission. Veterans would be able to keep their original war decorations, as long as they did not wear them in public. Instead, the state would create a series of “de-Nazified” versions for this purpose that, in the case of the EK order, would feature an oak-leaf spread in its center rather than the swastika. That year, the recommendation was put before the , and, after some debate over keeping the National Socialist colours on the decorative ribbon (which ultimately were), passed into law on July 26, 1957.12 On balance, this legislation represented a victory for veterans and their new “struggle for recognition” (much like in 1934). More important, though, it was a major factor in the survival of the RK and its order as an officially sanctioned symbol whose

11 For documentation of the OdR’s early days and efforts to forge these aforementioned links, see BAK B 136/6827, 10 and contents of BAMA MSG 2 13599. 12 “Gesetz über Titel, Orden und Ehrenzeichen. Vom 26 Juli 1957.” Bundesgesetzblatt (BGBl) I. 1957. No.37. 844; Friedel, Deutsche Staatssymbole, 21-23, 78-82. 309 connections to the Hitler regime could be minimized with the help of a simple substitution of iconography.

With their medal thus preserved, the second, and closely related, factor in the survival of

Ritterkreuzträger as hero figures was their role in shaping the new West German military and its traditions. The creation of the Bundeswehr had been one of the key initiatives of the Adenauer government, which made it clear that the new military was not to be simply an ideologically updated version of the Wehrmacht but rather an Army of “citizens in uniform” and led by the democratic principle of “innere Führung” (inner leadership). However, it also needed to be both effective and well-led, and as a result its early recruitment efforts came to include a disproportionate number of Ritterkreuzträger, whose wartime reputation made them ideal for this purpose.13 Indeed, according to historians Andreas Düfel and Clemens Range, within a decade of its formal establishment in 1955 there were 700 such men serving in uniform once again, including many of the Wehrmacht’s former “superstar” recipients of the RK-ES or RK-ESB. The new Air

Force, for example, had Schwerterträger like Günther Rall and Johannes Steinhoff as figurehead leaders, and soon also Brillantenträger Erich Hartmann after his release from soviet captivity. The

Navy, meanwhile, similarly possessed former notables like Herbert Schultze and Otto Kretschmer, the only survivor of the “Tonnage Kings.”14

Alongside the practical need for such men, though, both the military and the civilian government in Bonn were also in need of a “usable” military tradition. Given its transgenerational history and cultural resonance (thanks in no small part to the work of Third Reich propagandists),

13 Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross. The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 52-54, 44-49, 72, 166. 14 For a more complete listing, see Andreas Düfel and Clemens Range, Die Ritterkreuzträger in der Bundeswehr (self- pub, 2000) or find a statistical breakdown by age and rank at discharge (along with a brief and unfortunately politicized historical summary) at www.das-ritterkreuz.de. 310 the symbol of the EK quickly found itself used for this purpose. Indeed, the first induction of volunteers into the Bundewehr in 1955 took place under a giant EK-banner, and soon it became the official emblem (Hoheitszeichen) displayed on all military vehicles and aircraft. More important, with so many of its first generation of officers holding the order’s most recent Halsorden grade, the wartime veneration for Ritterkreuzträger was quickly repurposed to serve the need for heroic role models. While a large number of the names of Ritterkreuzträger that soon became attached to ships, squadrons, barracks and bases across Germany belonged to men who had taken part in resistance against the Hitler regime, such as Erwin Rommel, Georg Freiherr von

Boeselager, Rudolf-Christoph Freiherr von Gersdorff and Erich Höpner (the man who had

‘forgotten’ his RK on July 20, 1944), they also included men known or thought to have been devout

National Socialists, including Eduard Dietl and Günther Prien.15 Furthermore, before long the

Bundeswehr had also developed ties with the OdR. It soon became standard practice for serving officers to attend OdR events and for honour guards to attend the funerals of Ritterkreuzträger, in effect designating the association a legitimate extension of the Bundeswehr’s military heritage.16

The third and arguably most influential factor in securing a legacy for the RK and its recipients in post-war Germany, however, was their reappearance in the media and popular culture.

This process not only acted alongside the aforementioned factors in maintaining its connections to legitimate military heroism, but also in reinforcing the memory of a non-Nazi, or even anti-Nazi

Wehrmacht that many veterans and non-veterans alike wanted to remember. This process had in fact begun even before the founding of the BRD with the growth of popular interest in conspiracy theories about the fate of wartime hero figures. Before the end of 1945 a brief but noteworthy

15 Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross, 166; Detlef Bald, Die Bundeswehr: Eine Kritische Geschichte 1955-2005 (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2005), 64. 16 For documentation of the OdR’s early efforts to forge and cultivate this relationship, see BAK B 136/6827, 10 and the contents of BAMA MSG 2/13599. 311 scandal unfolded in the wake of accusations of foul-play by the mother of Günther Prien. With the help of a war-crimes investigator, she publicly alleged that her son, having been persecuted by

Erich Raeder since 1939, had not died at sea in 1941 but had been secretly dispatched to a concentration camp for resistance activities.17 By 1950, interest in such conspiracies prompted author Jürgen Thorwald (real name: Heinz Bongartz, a former propagandist for publications like

Das Schwarze Korps) to compile a number of them into a book entitled Die ungeklärten Fälle

(The Unexplained Cases), including theories about the deaths of prominent Ritterkreuzträger including Prien, Rommel, Dietl and Mölders.18

This early process of resurrection and de-Nazification was soon compounded by a series of films that portrayed a “clean” Wehrmacht through the depiction of virtuous martyr-heroes (all

Ritterkreuzträger) who demonstrated the moral complexities of fighting an honourable war in spite of Nazi crimes and rule. The first in line was actually an English film about Rommel, The Desert

Fox (1951), that showcased his reluctant yet principled movement toward opposition and ultimate martyrdom. Shortly thereafter, though, appeared several films by German studios of similar moral tone including 1955’s Der Teufels General (The Devil’s General) starring Curd Jürgens, about Air

Force General (and Mischlinge) Ernst Udet, holder of the PLM and RK. Following this was Der

Stern von Afrika (The Star of Africa) in 1957 about the anti-regime rebel Hans-Joachim Marseille starring Joachim Hansen. Finally, U-47, Kapitänleutnant Prien, starring Dieter Eppler appeared

17 Copies of letters sent between Margarete Prien (now Margarete Bohsteht) and a Herr Raddatz of the “Wiedergutmachungswerk. Hilfsausschuss für die Opfer des faschistischen Terrors,” along with corresponding newspaper clippings can be found in BAB DY 55/V 278/6/1425. Interestingly, Raddatz’s investigation led him to believe that Prien and his whole crew had been court-martialed and sent to several military prisons, where he was killed by the authorities. Even so, Margarete urged him to stop investigating in 1946 after becoming overwhelmed by the positive as well as negative reactions to the story. 18 Jürgen Thorwald, Die ungeklärten Fälle (Stuttgart: Steingrüben-Verlag 1950). See also Wolfgang Frank and Hans Meckel, Was war wirklich mit Prien? (Hamburg: Köhler Verlag, 1950) and Henry Millard, “Mölders Absturz. Die letzten Tage des grossen deutschen Jagdfliegers,” in: Der Frontsoldat 3 (1952) 312 the year after and presented a somewhat sanitized version of the story told by his mother: a righteous hero resented by superiors and viewed with suspicion by the regime (though it did not portray the concentration camp theory).19

As in the Bundeswehr, though, this trend towards creating a ‘sanitized’ RK-hero cult soon came into the orbit of the OdR and other groups whose intentions ran closer to nostalgic glorification. In 1955, the former began to publish the illustrated magazine Das Ritterkreuz, which served not only as the association’s newsletter but a digest of Ritterkreuzträger war stories and a space for fans, past and present, to publish essays of admiration.20 More influential, though, was the popular pulp-magazine , which has since become a chief symbol of the “clean

Wehrmacht” myth. Begun by a former Air Force officer and published by the right- nationalist Pabel Moewig Verlag, the magazine and a small group of committed contributors wrote heroic tales of Wehrmacht soldiers, frequently Ritterkreuzträger, as examples of the honourable struggle that deserved to be celebrated, regardless of uniforms or political affiliation.21

Very soon, such tales had evolved into published books, the first being a work by veteran

Ernst Günther Krätschmer in 1955 profiling RK recipients of the Waffen-SS.22 Several years later in 1959, there appeared a collection of testimonials from Ritterkreuzträger edited by Hanns Möller-

Witten, a wartime propagandist and arguably the country’s chief Halsorden historian who had once

19 See further Robert G. Moeller, “Victims in Uniform: West German Combat Movies from the 1950s,” in Bill Niven, ed. Germans as Victims: Remembering the Past in Contemporary Germany (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 43-61. 20 E.g. “Die GdR teilt mit,” Das Ritterkreuz 3 1958. 1; ibid., 5: “Staatsbürger 2. Klasse.” A full collection of Das Ritterkreuz issues can be found in BAMA MSG 3 685. 21 “Siegfried Grabert. Der erste Ritterkreuzträger der “Brandenburger,” Der Landser: Erlebnisberichte zur Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Pabel Möwig Verlag), No.372; ibid., “Feldwebel Franz Juschkat. Das Porträt eines Frontsoldaten,” (No.349) and “Sturmartillerie. Der Einsatzweg des Ritterkreuzträgers Georg Bose” (No.521). 22 Ernst Günther Krätschmer, Ritterkreuzträger der Waffen-SS (Göttingen: Plesse-Verlag, 1955). 313 written a volume on PLM holders at Hitler’s request.23 To this book, which argued for the legitimacy of the RK as an apolitical symbol of military heroism, he soon added another comprising biographical sketches of several Eichenlaubträger. In turn, this work became a template for similar books over the following years by other authors including Günther Fraschka, whose active contributions to Der Landser easily shown through in his popular 1970 work, Mit

Schwertern und Brillanten.24 Over the following decades, this new genre accelerated rapidly until there were dozens of volumes by different authors celebrating RK recipients and thereby reinforcing the symbolic legitimacy of their medal; the most important being an enormous series of over fifteen volumes overseen by Franz Thomas and Günter Wegmann, Die Ritterkreuzträger der Deutschen Wehrmacht 1939-1945.25

Challenge and Decline

In short, thanks to these mutually reinforcing processes, the RK not only survived into the post-war era but had even regained some measure of the cultural legitimacy and moral authority it had once enjoyed. Yet, this survival had certainly not been without its critics, most significantly in connection with aforementioned and continued struggle to determine a “usable” tradition for the

Bundeswehr. By the 1960s, the “Traditions Debate” had grown steadily more intense as the concerns of the immediate post-war period faded and a new generation pressed for a more forceful

23 For Möller-Witten’s pre-war activities, see Chapter I.3. Now, after the war, he acted as the OdR’s primary contact with the PLM veterans’ association. See BAMA R 72/2322; Das Ritterkreuz 3. 1958. 1. 3 and 11, 103; Hanns Möller- Witten, Männer und Taten – Ritterkreuzträger erzählen (Munich: Lehmanns Verlag, 1959). 24 E.g. Hanns Möller-Witten, Mit dem Eichenlaub zum Ritterkreuz (Erich Pabel-Verlag. 1962); Günter Fraschka, mit Schwertern und Brillanten: Aus dem Leben der siebenundzwanzig Träger der höchsten deutschen Tapferkeitsauszeichnung (Rastatt in Baden: Erich Pabel Verlag, 1970). 25 Franz Thomas and Günter Wegmann, Die Ritterkreuzträger der Deutschen Wehrmacht 1939-1945. Series (Ornasbruck: Biblio-Verlag, 1985-1998). 314 break with the past and reorganization along the lines of “innere Führung.” Over the following decades, this resulted in the passing of two “Traditions Decrees” (Traditionserlasse), first in 1965 and then again in 1982, which sought to formally establish guidelines on the issue.26 In terms of the EK, while both decrees nominally upheld its status as a “national symbol” denoting “bravery, love of freedom and chivalry,” they simultaneously and categorically rejected the Third Reich as a legitimate source of tradition, thus placing the order’s 1939-1945 version in a position to be excluded from its “legitimate” tradition.27 More important, as the most important and respected grade of that version, the RK became an important and polarizing focal point of controversy within the broader process of the debate.

On one hand, there had long been controversy over the influence and activities of the OdR within the veterans’ community. Since its first meetings, in fact, the government had kept a wary eye on the association and periodically expressed concern through their established relationship at its veneration of the Waffen-SS and offers of membership to convicted war criminals like Sepp

Dietrich (RK-ESB), onetime commander of Hitler’s bodyguard.28 Outside of the association, moreover, there had been multiple occasions on which senior figures of the wartime Heldenkult like Goldträger Hans-Ulrich Rudel had made embarrassingly nostalgic references to the Third

26 The literature on the “Traditions Debate” and its evolution since the 1950s is vast and cannot be adequately reproduced here. Examples of works which have dealt with its specific relation to the Wehrmacht and Third Reich include: Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross; Hans-Joachim Harder and Norbert Wiggershaus, eds. Tradition und Reform in den Aufbaujahren der Bundeswehr (Herford: E.S. Mittler, 1985); Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, “Wehrmacht und Bundeswehr. Anmerkungen zu einem umstrittenen Thema soldatischer Traditionspflege,” in Rolf-Dieter Müller and Hans-Erich Volkmann, eds. Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realität (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1999), 1184-1191; Harald Potempa, “Bundeswehr und Tradition. 25 Jahre “Richtlinien zum Traditionsverständnis und zur Traditionspflege.” Militärgeschichte Heft 2 (2007): 12-16; Tradition für die Bundeswehr. Neue Aspekte einer alten Debatte, eds. Eberhard Birk, Winfried Heinemann and Sven Lange (Berlin: Miles Verlag, 2012). 27 Heinz Stübig, “Das Eiserne Kreuz und die Bundeswehr,” in Das Eiserne Kreuz. Die Geschichte eines Symbols im Wandel der Zeit, ed. Winfried Heinemann (Potsdam: ZMSBw, 2014), 55-58. 28 See BAK B 122 5612 f.3 Referat 3. Entwurf. Bonn, 9.11.1959. See further Lockenour, Soldiers as Citizens, 159- 160. 315

Reich at public events.29 Yet, it was in the years following that the survival of the RK came under its most intense scrutiny. The political and cultural changes of the 1990s and the appearance of new research by historians into the Wehrmacht’s links to National Socialist crimes brought with them a new wave of national introspection that quickly focused on the continued veneration of Ritterkreuzträger and their namesake medal.

Of particular interest was the youthful “fan” culture that was gaining new traction at this time and that bore a resemblance to the hero worship of 1939-1945, even if on a smaller scale.

Inspired by the apolitical-tales of Ritterkreuzträger’s heroic exploits from a new generation of prolific Ritterkreuzträger-biographers like Gordon Williamson and Franz Kurowski, young people both in Germany and around the world had begun travelling to attend OdR events. There they met their favourite war heroes, got their autographs and had photographs taken with them. However, while the OdR saw this support as further justification for its own legitimacy and importance30, a growing number of critical reports in magazines and television featurettes pointed to the celebrity surrounding the “Greise Popstars mit Ritterkreuz” (Aged Popstars with [the] Knight’s Cross) not only as a continued whitewashing of the past but as a potential haven for right-wing extremism.31

Thus, in addition to new fans the OdR soon saw protestors gather at their events to denounce their wearing of the RK (in some cases their originals, in defiance of the 1957 law) and proclaim their illegitimacy as hero figures.

29 One case involving Rudel, for example, took place in 1976 at a reunion of his old Air Force squadron. The incident caused a local scandal and the OdR lent its cultural and political weight in support. BAMA MSG 2 8140. OdR Präsidium. Anlage. Landesgruppe Bayern, Sektion Bayreuth an Herrn Gen. Horst Niemack, Präs. OdR, 5.11.1976. See further BAK B 122 5612 f.3 Referat 3. Entwurf. Bonn, 9.11.1959. See further Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross, 256-263. 30 See “Warum junge Menschen in der Ordensgemeinschaft aktiv sind,“ Das Ritterkreuz, 50. 2004. 4. 22. 31 “Greise Popstars mit Ritterkreuz,” 44. 1997. See further “Die Elite der Wehrmacht,” Preussische Allgemeine Zeitung. October 22, 2005; “Armes Deutschland – Hitlers Ritterkreuzträger feiern die eigene Tapferkeit,” Kontraste, October 10, 2004. 316

More impactful, though, was the scrutiny directed at the role of Ritterkreuzträger within the Bundewehr. Again, according to Erich Hartmann there had always been discussion as well as resistance regarding their original inclusion and influence in the service, and by the late 1980s the last of them had already retired.32 Following reunification, however, public pressure, citing similar reasons as those mentioned above, compelled military leaders and politicians to take more concerted steps towards eliminating their direct or indirect veneration as hero figures.33 Heated debates, for example, arose about the removal of names like Dietl, Prien and Mölders from bases, streets and official buildings – efforts which often succeeded.34 Even more galling to some critics than the use of such names, though, was the aforementioned presence of serving Bundeswehr personnel at OdR gatherings or the funerals of its members. It was one thing, they said, for private citizens or foreign nationals to attend such events, but for uniformed men and women representing the Federal Republic to do so was quite another. By 1999, therefore, Defence Minister Otto

Scharping had issued a formal ban for all military personnel on any contact with the OdR.35

32 Hartmann testimony, in Heaton and Lewis, German Aces Speak II, 100. 33 For works that speak to the criticism being levelled at the Bundeswehrt at the time, see Jakob Knab’s Falsche Glorie. Das Traditionsverständnis der Bundeswehr (Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag, 1995); Johannes Klotz, ed. Vorbild Wehrmacht?: Wehrmachtsverbrechen, Rechtsextremismus und Bundeswehr (Cologne: PapyRossa, 1998). 34 The name of Mölders, in particular, sparked one of the most heated debates. Critics (like Jakob Knab) have argued that his membership in the Legion Condor, and that unit’s involvement in the bombing of Guernica in 1937, rendered him unfit as a role model for the Bundeswehr. Such criticism, though, was met not only with scorn by the OdR (E.g. “Nun auch Oberst Werner Mölders,” Das Ritterkreuz 50. 2004. 2. 9; ibid., 51. 2005, 3. 4: “Wie man aus Helden Verbrecher Macht”) but also with strong counter arguments from military historians and Bundeswehr officers who rose to Mölders’s defence, citing not only his absence from Guernica but also the controversy caused by his alleged letter in 1941-1942 (though their descriptions have thusfar lacked a degree of thoroughness in their investigation into contemporary sources). See, for example, Hermann Hagena, Jagdflieger Werner Mölders. Die Würde des Menschen Recht über den Tod hinaus. Ein Beitrag zur Diskussion über Militärische Vorbilder und Traditionen (Aachen: Helios, 2008)); Wolfgang Schmidt, “Organisiertes Erinnerung und Vergessen in der Bundeswehr. Traditionspflege am Beispiel der „Causa Mölders,”” in Organisation und Gedächtnis. Soziales Gedächtnis, Erinnern und Vergessen – Memory Studies, eds. Nina Leonhard et al. (Wiesbaden: 2016), 183-223. In turn, for a recent characterization of the debate about barrack names, see Winfried Heinemann, “Kasernennamen und ‘neue’ Traditionsräume für die Bundeswehr,” in Tradition für die Bundeswehr. Neue Aspekte einer alten Debatte, eds. Eberhard Birk, Sven Lange and Winfried Heinemann, Berlin: Miles Verlag, 2012), 163-173. 35 “Debatte um Ritterkreuzträger. Scharping distanziert sich von Ordensgemeinschaft – Mitglieder meist über 80,” Die Welt, March 6, 1999. 317

This effective excommunication from Germany’s legitimate military tradition represented a blow from which the OdR never recovered. While it continued to function with the support of followers across the world for several more years, its dwindling membership and the continuance of negative press after the turn of the century eventually resulted in its effective disbandment by

2007.36 Even without this influential source of advocacy for the RK, though, there remains enough support to fuel further controversy and public debate about its proper role in popular memory.37

The most important demonstration of this began that same year, when the government of

Chancellor Angela Merkel, citing the activities of Bundeswehr personnel in , announced its intention to create a military medal for bravery (the first since 1945). The proposal quickly led to calls from a small but vocal group, including members of the Bundeswehr

Reservists’ Association (Verband der Reservisten der Deutschen Bundeswehr e.V.), for the resurrection of the EK order for this purpose.

Citing its long history as a symbol of courage and egalitarianism, and with the aid of several thousand signatures from a public petition, they argued that this order could be rehabilitated from its usage under National Socialism or, conversely, that this usage had been legitimate but unique from the regime’s criminality. However, the majority of Bundestag deputies and the media responded that the essential bond that had been formed between the two was irreversible; the Hitler regime had “burned” the EK order as a whole forever. Thus, when the Defence Ministry unveiled

36 A revealing example of the kind of attitude that led to this decision can actually be found in a 1993 essay by a Ritterkreuzträger who did not belong to the OdR. In a piece appropriately titled “Why I am not in the OdR,” Rudolf Witzig explained that to his mind, “today’s culture” and its lack of “national pride” had made the existence of such an association, and the commensurate ability of men like himself to wear their medals proudly, untenable. See BAMA MSG 2 15183 Rudolf Witzig, “Warum ich nicht in der Ordensgemeinschaft der Ritterkreuzträger?“ 7.11.1993. 37 Nor was this only about the RK. Focal points have included journalist Jürgen Busche’s call for a willingness to re- appraise select war hero figures in a much-debated book in 2004. Although it focused on heroes of the First World War, it also included discussion of their incorporation into Nazi hero culture. See Busche, Heldenprüfung: das verweigerte Erbe des Ersten Weltkriegs, (Munich: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2004). 318 the new “Cross of Honour” (Ehrenkreuz) in 2008, it did so with a special notation that it was to be an award “without historical reference,” and that it “was never intended to be, and nor should it be thought of, as a revived Iron Cross [sic].”38

Even this categorical public declaration of the order’s connection to National Socialism, though, has failed to definitively end the issue. As events over the years since demonstrate, the

“Traditions Debate” is by no means finished. In 2017, renewed allegations of right-wing extremism and open veneration of the Wehrmacht in the military prompted Defence Minister

Ursula von der Leyen to promulgate yet another “Traditionserlass,” a decision that has not been without criticism.39 Taken as a whole, moreover, it must be said that the past decade has seen an increased commitment among certain groups to preserve the memory of the EK order’s Halsorden grade as an apolitical symbol of military heroism and a legitimate military tradition, not just in

Germany but abroad as well. Biographies about the exploits of Ritterkreuzträger remain a growing genre of popular literature, one bolstered by the expansion of electronic publishing and augmented by a large online community and thriving market in RK-memorabilia including autographed photos and award-certificates. Such materials, in short, represent one of the most important legacies of Nazi “Heldenpolitik,” and serve as proof of its impact on phaleristic culture. More important, their prevalence only underlines the need to better understand the history of the RK as its most important and volatile symbol.

38“Die Rückkehr des Eisernen Kreuzes?” and “Kein Eisernes Kreuzes,” Frankfurt Allgemeine Zeitung March 6, 2008. See further Ehrenzeichen und Einsatzmedaillen der Bundeswehr (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung. Presse- und Informationsstab, 2017). 39 Among other things, this new version incorporated the aforementioned no-contact order instituted by Otto Scharping in 1999. “Die Tradition der Bundeswehr. Richtlinien zum Traditionsverständnis und zur Traditionspflege” (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung: 2018), n.b. § 4.6, 4.9. Accessible through www.bmvb.de. See further “Bundeswehr: Von der Wehrmacht lernen?” Zeit Online, August 8, 2018. 319

Conclusions

This dissertation set out to redress a surprising and pressing gap in historical scholarship surrounding the history of the famous “Ritterkreuz.” Building upon a large but uneven foundation of existing research, its component chapters have traced and evaluated the role played by this medal and its recipients as symbolic vessels of the National Socialist regime. In thus constructing the first “Symbolgeschichte” of the RK, they have not only presented new evidence but also challenged elements of existing knowledge and historiography, thereby advancing our understanding of its central importance within Germany’s hero culture during the so-called Third

Reich. At the same time, several of these chapters have also illuminated potential areas of future research into relevant streams of historiography or ways in which the analytical framework employed in this work could be applied elsewhere.

Chapter I began by revisiting the question of the RK’s origins, as well as the context of its creation by Adolf Hitler in September of 1939. This discussion expanded upon existing research by arguing that, while rooted primarily in the First World War and its creation of a new prestige- hierarchy of “front experience,” the intended symbolic function of this medal extended far deeper into Prusso-German history, to perceptions of socio-political change that had begun well over a century before 1914. Thereafter, it illustrated how Hitler’s eventual amalgamation of the Iron

Cross (EK) and Pour le Mérite (PLM) into the RK to create a new, egalitarian Heldenkult represented a culmination of the Party’s long campaign to harness these perceptions as a means of legitimizing their political and moral authority.

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The contribution of this introductory chapter, though, also lay in its incorporation of new evidence and a broader synthesis of research to highlight important aspects of this causal narrative that have previously been undervalued or neglected. First and foremost, it pointed to ways in which the RK was connected to the ‘lessons’ learned by Hitler and the regime in the development of their early “Ordenspolitik,” reflected in the “Hindenburg Cross” of 1934 and the “Flower War Medals” of 1938-1939. Similarly, its demonstration of the regime’s parallel popularization of holders of the

PLM and of its own Blood Order underscored its pre-existing pattern of using phaleristics as central vessels in the creation of a new hero culture. Finally, its demonstration of this overlap between Ordens- and Heldenpolitik in the “unveiling” of the Spanienkämpfer in 1939 not only revealed an overlooked component of the RK’s symbolic lineage, but also represents one of the first investigations of this archetypal figure and his significance in the evolution of Nazi

Germany’s Heldenkult.

Just how difficult it would be for Hitler and the Party to forge their Halsorden into an effective weapon of symbolic capital, however, first became evident in the following chapter.

While demonstrating that the distribution of the RK did achieve some effect as a representation of egalitarianism within the “new” Wehrmacht, Chapter II explained how this process ultimately proved an ideological loose cannon, and one that demanded increasing attention to maintain its initial success. As early as 1940, it had become clear that the culture of order hunting and the sway of the established “Wertesystem,” both inherited from imperial phaleristic culture, had not been eliminated after all. Indeed, they had been compounded by the realities of mechanized warfare, which privileged some groups and necessitated further compromises on ideological principles.

Despite repeated efforts to salvage its symbolic potential, therefore, Hitler’s experiment in

321 egalitarian Halsorden culture ultimately succumbed to the very fate of inflation and devaluation he had sought to prevent.

Through this narrative, Chapter II thus makes several original contributions. First, in demonstrating the centrality of Hitler in this process, it challenges the assumption that the Party and its ideology had little substantive importance in Wehrmacht phaleristic administration or culture. Largely omitted from previous accounts (in which phaleristic policy was directed simply by the “High Command”), it was the dictator’s politically motivated micromanagement of award distribution as the self-appointed chaperone of the EK order that prevented the RK from becoming more diluted, at least until his gradual abrogation of this responsibility. At the same time, though, according to his own administrators Hitler’s own narrow design of the phaleristic system in 1939 had helped to fuel some of the issues that limited its ideological effectiveness.

Just as significant is this chapter’s emphasis on the underacknowledged division and discord caused by unequal RK distribution. As demonstrated, early in the war this division had primarily been between the dictator and those who had always benefited most under the traditional prestige hierarchy; as such it had, in fact, been in service to the regime’s desire to “modernize” the old phaleristic system, a sign of progress. Its discussion of the growing discontent among ordinary

Frontkämpfer towards RK distribution, however, reveals not only their degree of agency in shaping phaleristic policy but also lends weight to the argument of Stephen G. Fritz regarding the influence of positive-ideological principles like egalitarianism among soldiers on the front lines.

Even if not framed in directly ideological terms, the anger that boiled over among ordinary

Landsers in 1941 and 1943 over RK distribution was a political statement, a commentary on the veracity of “Frontkämpfer-ideology” as the guiding principle within the new Wehrmacht. As the highest symbol of this ideology, a lack of access to the RK, especially compared to that of other

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“softer” groups, amounted to a damning betrayal of trust, a repeat of the neglect allegedly shown by the regime’s predecessors. In recognizing this it is easier to understand why Hitler and

Schmundt went to such lengths to mollify their anger, having realized (thanks largely to the

Ordensabteilung) that they had created a new framework of expectation that, in hindsight, would require concerted effort to be met in the context of modern, mass warfare.

Finally, though focusing on the EK order, this chapter also highlighted the potential space for further research into the political history of other orders and decorations of the Nazi period, especially with regards to their significance in the construction of heroic archetypes. Beyond short descriptions in reference works, for instance, very little has been written on the role of the Party’s

Blood Order (BO), and its later replacement, the “German Order” (DO) which, as demonstrated here, represented important developments within Nazi/Hitlerian Ordenspolitik. Similar cases could be made for the Spanish Cross (SK), the medal of the “Spanienkämpfer,” and even the War

Merit Cross (KVK), which not only served an important ideological function as the award for

“Etappenschweine,” but also played an instrumental role in Joseph Goebbels’s attempt to establish a rival Heldenkult for the Home Front.

Following this discussion, Chapter III’s investigation into the network of benefits and privileges created for Ritterkreuzträger displayed another aspect of the regime’s process of instrumentalization. Not only does this chapter fill a noteworthy gap in scholarly research regarding the nature and evolution of this network, but it also belies characterizations that it was but another set of incentives for German soldiers to fight harder. Rather, beginning with Hitler’s

“Sonderbetreuung” program and the smaller benefits that followed in 1941, it argued that the various initiatives within this network were rooted in the regime’s pre-existing campaign to fulfill, or be seen to fulfill, its promises to “carve out” a special place for Frontkämpfer within the

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Volksgemeinschaft. More important, though, it also demonstrated that the benefits created later, specifically the civil service promotions scheme and settlement privileges of 1942-1943, were of a different nature, paralleling a broader shift in the regime’s implementation of its ideological worldview.

Owing to the latter, in a post-war world in which the Third Reich had emerged victorious,

Ritterkreuzträger would have been among its professional and social elite, a new military caste that would (in theory) bring their proven battlefield virtues into civilian or colonial life. Instead, just like RK-distribution, by 1945 these and the rest of the diverse range of increasingly meaningless ‘perks’ attached to this medal had become further evidence of the hollowness of the regime’s ideology, as well as the toxic culture of nepotism endemic within its administration. Even with this new contribution to scholarship, though, this chapter also illuminates the fact that there are still grey areas in the development of Ritterkreuzträger-privileges and ways it could shed light on other events. Thousands of pages of records from the Sonderbetreuung program, for example, remain underutilized within the holdings of the Bundesarchiv, and, as mentioned, there remain questions to be answered regarding the exact nature of the secretive settlement program for

Ritterkreuzträger.

The penultimate chapter of this study focused on the oft-cited but rarely-analyzed role of

Ritterkreuzträger in wartime propaganda and popular culture. More specifically, it traced how, as the regime had intended, the RK became the principal ingredient in the construction of the

Wehrmacht’s “Starkult,” and then how its value as a source of cultural capital evolved over the remainder of the war. In the process, though, this chapter demonstrated several ways in which our understanding of the role of propaganda in helping to create wartime hero culture can and should be revised, beginning with its chronology. Through its discussion of the early friction between the

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WPr and Goebbels’s RMVP over the popularization of Ritterkreuzträger, for instance, it showed how establishing a “Heldenkult” of any kind was by no means a given in 1939, let alone one in which the recipients of the regime’s new Halsorden became the successors of the “Blue Max” heroes of 1914-1918. More important, its documentation of the evolution of the RK-Starkult over the following four years also challenges the prevalent assumption that the summer of 1940 represented the high-water mark of war hero culture. While not diminishing the remarkable explosion of “Ritterkreuz-mania” during this period, this chapter showed how it was not until

1942-1944 that this phenomenon reached its greatest usage and impact as a weapon of propaganda.

Constructing this narrative, moreover, also demonstrated a more nuanced understanding of the parameters and composition of the Starkult, as well as the unique roles of different groups and heroic archetypes within it. On one hand, following Hitler’s creation of the RK-E in 1940, the hierarchical structure of the RK’s supplemental grades very clearly became the metric for levels of prestige and propaganda involvement, with higher grades demarcating the ‘superstar’

Volkshelden from the thousands of ‘regular’ Ritterkreuzträger. The former, men like Erwin

Rommel, Werner Mölders or Wolfgang Lüth, became the most visible personifications of the perennial publicity war between the Wehrmacht branches and their efforts to harness the cultural capital of the RK. The latter, meanwhile, whose role has been markedly undervalued by post-war historians, was arguably even more important as the primary conduits of war hero culture for most ordinary Germans, and especially for youth.

On the other hand, this chapter also provided a similarly broadened perspective on the specific roles of archetypal groups like “technological heroes” in popular culture. There can be no doubt that such groups enjoyed a particular prominence, as historians have long proclaimed. Yet, the allure of technological modernity that they claim lay at the heart of this prominence must be

325 placed within the context of Ritterkreuz-mania. As demonstrated in this chapter, it was the possession of the RK that served as the point of entry into the Starkult; with it, even ordinary infantrymen could attain stardom and prominence, even if in smaller proportion. Besides their unique technological allure, therefore, one must also consider as key factors the disproportionate access of U-boat commanders and fighter pilots to this medal based on their ability to quantify success. Much the same can be said for the figure of the ‘fighting general’ who, though having his own unique allure, also benefited from the lingering advantages of the imperial value system to give him access to the RK and the “trickle-down” strategy of Kurt Hesse and WPr.V to give him publicity. The popularity of the Navy’s “Tonnage Kings,” the Air Force’s “Experten” and the

Army’s leading generals like Rommel or Dietl, in other words, should not be framed in isolation, but rather as examples of the additional layers of marketability within Ritterkreuz-mania that propagandists exploited for the benefit of their services.

Furthermore, through Ritterkreuzträger and their role as media heroes, this chapter also put forward the case that both Wehrmacht and political propagandists were less reliant upon the instrumentalization of fallen heroes during the war than has been suggested within relevant historiography. Such had indeed been their modus operandi for much of the interwar period, but since the appearance of the Spanienkämpfer in 1939 (representing the first war heroes the regime could truly claim as its own), the “Totenkult” (cult of the dead) took on a secondary role. Living heroes were more useful as both symbols and agents of propaganda than the fallen, and thus post- mortem heroization was largely absent until 1941. Even then, as we have seen, its primary function was as a stopgap to counteract downturns in popular morale after the deaths of the country’s leading Eichenlaubträger.

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Finally, besides its own conclusions, Chapter IV’s focus on the role of Ritterkreuzträger in propaganda and the wartime Starkult also highlights a potential avenue for further research into the development of celebrity culture in modern Germany. This work is not the first to utilize the terms “celebrity” and “stars” to describe the kind of popularity and adulation experienced by military heroes (including also the PLM heroes of 1914-1918), yet to date there has been no concerted effort to incorporate or compare their experience to that of contemporary film-stars, athletes and pioneering aviators, about whom there now exists a small but growing body of literature.1 Though it lay beyond the scope of this study, its findings suggest that there is, in fact, a marked similarity in the public roles they were expected to play for the Nazi state. Furthermore, there is also evidence of contact between members of these two celebrity-spheres, such as the remarkable wartime diaries of tennis star Paula Stuck (née von Reznicek), who even endeavoured to write a book about the Ritterkreuzträger she had met in the course of her duties as a celebrity figure.2

The fifth and final chapter of this study documented what might be called the underside of this celebrity culture as it pertained to Ritterkreuzträger. It documented how their misconduct (both real and imagined) as heroes and public figures against the ideological and moral standards of the regime impacted the latter’s perception of their utility as vessels of symbolic capital. In so doing

1 See, for example, Bernhard Rieger, “Fast Couples’: technology, gender and modernity in Britain and Germany during the nineteen-thirties,” Historical Research. 76, no 193. (2003): 364-388; Antje Ascheid, Hitler’s heroines: stardom and womanhood in Nazi cinema (Philadelphia: Temple University, 2003). One notable exception is an unpublished 1995 dissertation by Franz Bokel, who included war hero figures in his study of the function of celebrity as a mediator between the regime and public during the Third Reich. However, while he examines several military figures, Bokel followed in the erroneous footsteps of Heldenkult scholars by ignoring the commonality of the RK among them, instead focusing on the archetype of the fanatical, fallen, technological hero (namely Prien, Schepke and Lüth). See Bokel, “Great Days” in Germany: Third Reich celebrities as mediators between government and people” (Ph.D diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1995), n.b. ch. 6-7. 2 The voluminous diaries of Paula Stuck, which detail her wartime travels in the company of her race-car driver husband, Hans Stuck contain not only frequent references to individual Ritterkreuzträger but preserved correspondence between them complete with autographed portraits can be found today in the Bundesarchiv- Militärarchiv in Freiburg in collection MSG 2. 327 it adds a new layer of complexity to the relationship between the two, as being intrinsically more unstable than many contemporary characterizations have allowed. Even though the regime was not naïve enough to believe their heroes were all devout Nazis, their assumptions about gratitude and prestige-exchange meant that they were, at least partially, blind to the potential danger of

Ritterkreuzträger’s political reliability or lack of compliance with ideological standards. Only after a series of embarrassing episodes, scandals and finally outright revolt did the regime fully realize their lack of foresight; in building up a legion of non-politically defined war heroes armed with moral authority, they had created a potential vehicle for self-sabotage, or even self-destruction.

Armed with this narrative, we can now posit a more nuanced characterization of the relationship between the Hitler regime and Ritterkreuzträger. On one hand, it would most certainly be wrong to frame this medal and its recipients as apolitical, as an unfortunately high number of popular biographies have done in their efforts to sustain the myth of Wehrmacht

“Überparteilichkeit” (being above politics). As the previous chapters have clearly proven, the political and ideological function of the Halsorden they wore was an inherent component of their role and status in wartime Germany, and thus necessary for any characterization of their place in its historical memory. On the other hand, though, neither was it a guarantee that its recipients harboured sympathy, let alone loyalty, to the regime (as the latter found out to its cost). As such, there is a subtlety and nuance to their relationship that should not be ignored or overlooked, whether by Hollywood or historians, even though it should never override the symbolic connection of the RK to National Socialism.

Together, these five chapters thus make possible a more complete and more refined understanding of the RK and its instrumentalization by the Nazi regime. They reveal, for instance, that the creation of new orders like the KVK, DK or DO, the establishment of an administrative

328 system for promotions and financial benefits, as well as the organization of speaking tours and printing of tradable portrait postcards were all part of a large machine with many moving parts. It was also operated by many different actors at once, be it the dictator, the German people,

Ritterkreuzträger themselves or any number of various offices and departments within the

Wehrmacht, SS, Party and governmental system.

Just as significant as recognizing this complexity, though, the most significant original contribution made by this study is the illustration of the degree to which this process of instrumentalization, serving as the core of the regime’s wartime Heldenpolitik, was also frequently dysfunctional or even counter-productive. To be sure, it has shown how, at times, both the medal and its recipients proved highly beneficial for the regime, with their survival as a respected symbol of military heroism after 1945 serving as a testament to their joint impact and resonance in popular culture. However, it has also proven in different ways that, more often than not, this success was balanced by instances in which the regime’s efforts proved more hindrance than help, and the RK more headache than reward. Indeed, such was the case from the beginning.

Were it not for the success of Blitzkrieg in 1940, it is likely that the Third Reich’s most famous award would have ended as little more than a failed experiment in manipulating Halsorden- culture. Yet, from then onwards, the instrumentalization of the RK would foment or reveal divisions between various offices, departments and leaders, exemplifying the “polycratic” nature of Nazi rule. Likewise, even the seemingly great success of RK-propaganda proved too effective at times, leading to episodes like the scandal following the death of Günther Prien, the growth of

Ritterkreuzträger imposters like Adam Drayss and the unique autograph-crisis of 1943-1944. Most notably, though, were the numerous ways in which the attempts to harness the RK’s symbolic potential revealed flaws within the regime’s own ideology. The struggle with resentful and

329 disgruntled Frontkämpfer, the repeal of the civilian promotions scheme and settlement programs, embarrassing incidents like the Möldersbrief scandal, war heroes going “off script” and the open revolt of highly decorated officers, all contributed to this medal becoming a political liability whose drawbacks increasingly outweighed its symbolic benefits.

Even armed with this more refined understanding, however, the Epilogue that followed the five principal chapters of this study highlighted the fact that there is room for further research which could shed further light on the historical significance of this medal and its recipients. Though representing the most comprehensive account to date of how Ritterkreuzträger and their medal fared after 1945, this brief narrative was but a snapshot of their role in a complex post-war history of memory-construction and political controversy, one that unfortunately remains regrettably underdeveloped. There is no shortage of publications that acknowledge the relation of the OdR to contemporary debates around the traditions of the Bundeswehr, for example, but investigation into the development of this organization is fragmentary at best. In short, therefore, the Epilogue demonstrates that while the present work has filled in many of the heretofore missing pieces, there is still work to be done to complete the puzzle of the RK’s lasting historical significance.

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Media and Propaganda Sources

Primary Newspapers, Magazines and Periodicals Consulted:

Berliner Illustrirte Zeitung. Berlin: Ullstein Verlag (1939-1945) Das Ritterkreuz. Mitteilungsblatt der Ordensgemeinschaft der Ritterkreuzträger. Traditionsgemeinschaft des Eisernen Kreuzes, (1955-2007) Der Adler. Berlin: Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, (1939-1945) Die Wehrmacht. Berlin: Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, (1939-1945) Völkischer Beobachter. Berlin: Fritz Eher Verlag, (1920-1945)

Archival Collections of Newspaper Clippings:

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B 122 ANH Bundespräsidialamt - Presseausschnittsammlung BAB DY 55/V 278/6/1425 Zeitungsausschnitte BAB R 8034-III Reichslandbund-Pressearchiv, Personalia (Sections: “Boelcke” (41) “Dietl” (94); “Lüth” (293); “Mölders” (314); “Prien” (351); and “Rommel” (385)) BAB R 55/471 Sammlung von Zeitungsausschnitten des deutschen Lektorates in der Presseabteilung der Reichsregierung (RMVP) BAMA RH 53-18 Wehrkreiskommando XVIII (Salzburg). Zeitungsausschnitte.

Films: Der Deutsche Wochenschau (1939-1945) Ritter, Karl. Pour le Mérite. UFA. GmbH, 1938

Published Documents and Collections Akten der Partei-Kanzlei der NSDAP. Rekonstruktion eines verlorengegangenen Bestandes, Vols. 1-2, edited by Helmut Heiber. Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1983. Akten der Partei-Kanzlei der NSDAP. Rekonstruktion eines verlorengegangenen Bestandes, Vols. 3-4, edited by Peter Longerich. Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1992. Akten der Reichskanzlei. Die Regierung Hitler 1933-1938, Vols. 1-2, edited by Karl-Heinz Minuth. Boppard am Rhein: Boldt, 1983. Akten der Reichskanzlei. Die Regierung Hitler 1939-1945, Vols. 3-6, edited by Friedrich Hartmannsgruber. Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1999-2012. Boberach, Heinz, ed. Meldungen aus dem Reich. Die geheimen Lageberichte des Sicherheitsdienstes der SS 1938-1945, Vols. 1-17. Herrsching: Pawlak Verlag, 1984. Boelcke, Willi A., ed. Deutschlands Rüstung im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Hitlers Konferenzen mit Albert Speer, 1942-1945. Frankfurt/Main: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft Athenaion, 1969. -----. Kriegspropaganda 1939-1941. Geheime Ministerkonferenzen im Reichspropaganda- ministerium. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1966. -----. Wollt ihr den totalen Krieg? Die geheimen Goebbels-Konferenzen 1939-1943. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1967. Bradley, Dermot and Richard Schulze-Kossens, eds. Tätigkeitsbericht des Chefs des Heerespersonalamtes General der Infanterie Rudolf Schmundt. Fortgeführt von Gen.d.Inf. Wilhelm Burgdorf. 1.10.1942 – 29.10.1944. Ornasbrück: Biblio Verlag, 1984. “Die Rede Himmlers vor den Gauleitern am 3 Aug. 1944.” In Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 1 (1953), 357-394. Doehle, Heinrich. Orden und Ehrenzeichen. Sammeldruck der geltenden Bestimmungen. Abschnitt I: Kriegsauszeichnungen und –abzeichen (von 1939 und später) Neudruck der

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Fassung vom 1. Juli 1943. Republished. Ornasbruck: Biblio Verlag, 1992. Domarus, Max, ed. Hitler. Reden, Schriften Anordnungen. IV/2. (1.1932 – 3.1932). Munich: KG Sauer, 1994. -----. Hitler. Speeches and Proclamations 1932-1945. The Chronicle of a Dictatorship. Volume 3-4. Wauconda, Il.: Bolchazy-Carducci Publishers, 1997. Fröhlich, Elke, ed. Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels: sämtliche Fragmente. Im Auftrag des Instituts für Zeitgeschichte und mit Unterstützung des Staatlichen archivdienstes Russlands. Teil I Band1-4 – Teil II. Band 1-15. Munich: K.G. Saur, 1987-2008. Glantz, David M. ed. Hitler and His Generals. Military Conferences 1942-1945. New York: Enigma Books, 2003. Heiber, Helmut, ed. Reichsführer! … Briefe an und von Himmler. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags- Anstalt, 1968. Jäckel, Eberhard and Alex Kühn, eds. Hitler: Sämtliche Aufzeichnungen 1905-1924. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1980. Jacobsen, Hans-Adolf, ed. Generaloberst Halder, Kriegstagebuch. Band 1-3. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1963-1964. Mallmann Showell, Jak P.. Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2005. Maser, Werner. Hitler. Hitler’s Letters and Notes. Translated by Arnold Pomerans. London: Heinemann, 1973. Moll, Martin, ed. Führer-Erlasse 1939-1945. Edition sämtlicher überlieferter, nicht im Reichsgesetzblatt abgedruckter, von Hitler während des Zweiten Weltkriegs schriftlich erteilter Direktiven aus den Bereichen Staat, Partei, Wirtschaft, Besatzungspolitik und Militärverwaltung. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1997. Murawski, Erich. Der deutsche Wehrmachtbericht 1939-1945. Ein Beitrag zur Untersuchung der geistigen Kriegführung mit einer Dokumentation der Wehrmachtberichte vom 1.7.1944 bis zum 9.5. 1945. 2. (durchgesehene) Auflage. Boppard am Rhein: 1962. Picker, Henry, ed. Hitlers Tischgespräch. Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier. Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1977. Trevor-Roper, Hugh, ed. Hitler’s Table Talk 1941-1944. His Private Conversations. Translated by: Norman Cameron and R.H. Stevens. New York: Enigma Books, 2008. Trial of Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal. Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946. Volume IX (Nuremberg, 1947). Trial of Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal. Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946. Volume XXVII (Nuremberg, 1948). Trial of Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal. Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946. Volume XXVIII (Nuremberg, 1948). Trial of Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal. Nuremberg, 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946. Volume XXXIII (Nuremberg, 1949). Verfügungen, Anordnungen, Bekanntgaben. NSDAP. Vols. 1-4. Munich: Zentralverlag der

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NSDAP, 1942-1944.

Egodocuments and Assorted Primary Sources Allerberger, Josef. Sniper on the Eastern Front. The Memoirs of Sepp Allerberger. Knight’s Cross, edited by Geoffrey Brooks. Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2005. Kindle. Below, Nicolaus von. At Hitler’s Side. The Memoirs of Hitler’s Luftwaffe Adjutant 1937-1945. Translated by Geoffrey Brooks. Barnsley: Frontline Books, 2010. Beumelburg, Werner. Kampf um Spanien. Die Geschichte der Legion Condor. Oldenburg: Stalling, 1939. Bley, Wulf, ed. Das Buch der Spanienflieger. Die Feuertaufe der neuen deutschen Luftwaffe. Leipzig: Hafe & Koehler Verlag, 1939. Böttger, Gerd. Narvik im Bild. Deutschlands Kampf unter der Mitternachtssonne. Berlin: Stalling Verlag, 1941. Braatz, Kurt and Wolfgang Falck. Falkenjahre. Erinnerungen 1910-2003. Moosburg: NeunundzwanzigSechs Verlag, 2003. Braatz, Kurt and Günther Lützow, Gott oder ein Flugzeug – Leben und Sterben des Jagdfliegers Günther Lützow. Moosburg: NeunundzwanzigSechs Verlag, 2005. Bülow, Bernhard Fürst von. Denkwürdigkeiten. Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, 1931. Carius, Otto. Tigers in the Mud. The Combat Career of German Panzer Commander Otto Carius. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 1992. Dettmann, F. Mein Freund Marseille. Berlin: Verlag Die Heimbücherei John Jahr, 1943. Dincklage-Campe, Friedrich Freiherr von. Wie wir unser Eisern Kreuzen erwarben. Berlin- Leipzig: Deutsches Verlagshaus Bong & Co., 1900. -----. Wie wir unser Eisern Kreuz erwarben. Berlin-Leipzig: Deutsches Verlagshaus Bong & Co., 1916. Engel, Gerhard and Hildegard von Kotze, eds. At the Heart of the Reich. The Secret Diary of Hitler’s Army Adjutant. Translated by Geoffrey Brooks. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2016. Ertl, Hans. Hans Ertl als Kriegsberichter 1939-1945. Innsbruck: Steiger, 1985. Forrell, Fritz von. Mölders und seine Männer. Graz: Steirische Verlagsanstalt, Graz, 1941. Fözö, Josef. Freie Jagd von Madrid bis Moskau - Ein Fliegerleben mit Mölders. Berlin: Verlag Wehrfront, 1943. Galland, Adolf. The First and the Last. The German Fighter Force in World War II. Translated by Mervyn Savill. London: Metheuen & Co., Ltd., 1955. Gloger, Kurt. Ritterkreuzträger des Heeres: Oberst Lohmeyer. Oberkommando des Heeres. Genemigt vom Reichsminister für Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung auf Erlass vom 20.7.1942. Berlin: Aufwärts-Verlag, 1942. Grabler, Josef. Helmut Wick. Das Leben eines Fliegerhelden. Berlin: Verlag Scherl, 1943. Graf, Hermann, 200 Luftsiege in 13 Monaten (Nacherzählt von Berthold K. Jochim).

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Rastatt: Erich Pabel Verlag, 1970. Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. Translated by Constantine Fitzgibbon. New York: De Capo, 1996. Hanfstaengl, Ernst. Hitler. The Memoir of the Nazi Insider Who Turned Against the Führer. Translated by John Toland. New York: Arcade Publishing, 2011. Kindle. Hardegen, Reinhard. Auf Gefechtsstationen. U-Boote im Einsatz gegen England und Amerika. Leipzig: Boreas, 1943. Hartmann, Werner. Feind im Fadenkreuz: U-boot auf Jagd im Atlantik. Berlin: Die Heimbücherei, 1942. Hinchcliffe, Peter, ed. The Lent Papers. Helmut Lent. Bristol: Cerberus Publishing Ltd, 2003. Holl, Albert. After Stalingrad. Seven Years as a Soviet Prisoner of War Translated by Tony Le Tissier. Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2016. Holzamer, Karl. “Ein Heldenleben: Werner Mölders.” In Kämpfer, Künder, Tatzeugen. Gestalter Deutscher Grösse. Band III, Tatzeugen, edited by Ernst Adolf and Siska Dreyer, et al., 365-390. Munich: Zinnen-Verlag, 1942. Hoyos, Max Graf. Pedros Y Pablos. Fliegen Erleben Kämpfen in Spanien. Munich: Verlag F. Bruckmann, 1939. Immelmann, Franz. Immelmann. The Eagle of Lille. Translated by Claud W. Sykes. London: John Hamilton, 1935. Italiaander, Rolf. Manfred von Richthofen: The Best Combat Flier of the Great War. Berlin: Weichert, 1938. Jünger, Ernst. Der Kampf als innere Erlebnis. Berlin: Verlag Mittler, 1922. Kirchhoff, Hermann. Unsere Seehelden: Otto Weddigen und seine Waffe. Berlin: Marinedank- Verlag, 1915. Kohl, Hermann von. Deutsche Flieger über Spanien. Reutlingen: Englin & Laiblin, 1939. Korth, Claus and Wolfgang Lüth, Boot greift wieder an. Ritterkreuzträger erzählen. Berlin: Klinghammer, 1943. Kropp, Albert. So kämpfen deutsche Soldaten. von Rittern des Goldenen und Brillantenen Spanienkreuzes. 1 u 2 Aufl. Berlin: Wilhelm Limpert Verlag, 1939. Kunowski, Johannes von. Ritterkreuzträger des Heeres: Eichenlaubträger Hauptmann Gerhard Hein. Oberkommando des Heeres. Genemigt vom Reichsminister für Wissenschaft, Erziehung und Volksbildung auf Erlass vom 31.12.1942. Berlin: Aufwärts-Verlag, 1942. Lipfert, Helmut and Werner Gebirg. The War Diary of Hauptmann Helmut Lipfert. Translated by David Johnston Atglen, PA: Schiffer Military History, 1993. Martin, Hans Leo. Unser Mann bei Goebbels. Verbindungsoffizier des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht beim Reichspropagandaminister 1940-1944. Neckargemünd: Kurt Vowinckel Verlag, 1973. Mend, Hans. Adolf Hitler im Felde 1914-1918. Diessen vor Munich: Josef C. Hubers, 1931. Mittelmann, Kurt. Ritterkreuzträger des Heeres. Eichenlaubträger Harald von Hirschfeld.

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Oberkommando des Heeres. Herausgegeben in Verbindung mit der Reichsstelle für das Schul- und Unterrichtsschrifttum. Berlin: Aufwärts-Verlag, 1943. Möller-Witten, Hanns. Geschichte der Ritter des Ordens „Pour le Mérite“ im Weltkrieg. Berlin: Verlag Bernard u. Graefe, 1935. Oberkommando des Heeres, ed. Der Lohn der Tat, die Auszeichnungen des Heeres. Hamburg: Kommissions-Verlag Friedrichsen, 1943. Oven, Wilfred von. Mit Goebbels bis zum Ende. I-II Buenos Aires: Dürer Verlag, 1949-1950. Prien, Günther. Mein Weg Nach Scapa Flow. Berlin: Deutsche Verlag, 1940. Raeder, Erich. Grand Admiral. Translated by Henry W. Drexel. USA: Da Capo Press, 2001. Richter, Heinrich. Otto Weddigen. Ein Lebensbild. Leipzig: Velhagen & Klasing Verlag, 1915. Roeingh, Rolf. Flieger des Weltkrieges. Berlin: Deutschen Archiv-Verlag, 1941. Schepke, Joachim. U-Bootfahrer von heute. Berlin: Deutsche Verlag, 1940. Schmidt, Heinz Werner. With Rommel in the Desert. Toronto: George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd, 1951. Shirer, William. Berlin Diaries. The Journal of a Foreign Correspondent 1934-1941. Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1988. Sollender, Fridolin. “Erster Winter.” In Vier Jahre Westfront: Geschichte des Regiments List RIR 16. Munich: Max Schick, 1932. Sommerfeldt, Martin H. Das Oberkommando der Wehrmacht gibt bekannt. Ein Augenzeugenbericht des Auslandsprechers des OKW. Frankfurt/M: Westdeutsche Verlag- und Druckerei-Gesellschaft, 1952. Steinhoff, Johannes. The Final Hours. The Luftwaffe Plot Against Göring. Dulles, Virginia: Patomac Books, Inc., 2005. Suhren, Reinhard and Fritz Brustat-Naval. Teddy Suhren. Ace of Aces. Memoirs of a U- Boat Rebel. Translated by Frank James. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011. Topp, Erich. The Odyssey of a U-Boat Commander. Recollections of Erich Topp. Translated by Eric C. Rust. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992. Trautloft, Hannes. Als Jagdflieger in Spanien. Aus dem Tagebuch eines deutschen Legionärs. Berlin: Albert Rauck & Co., 1939. Udet, Ernst. Mein Fliegerleben: Die Autobiographie. Vollständige Ausgabe. Germany: E- artnow, 2014. iBooks. Werner, Johannes. Knight of Germany. Oswald Boelcke German Ace. Translated by Claud W. Sykes. London: John Hamilton Limited, 1933. Willrich, Wolfgang. Des Reiches Soldaten. Berlin: Verlag Grenze und Ausland, 1943. Zuerl, Walter. Pour le Mérite -Flieger. Heldentaten und Erlebnisse unserer Kriegsflieger. Munich: Curt Pechstein Verlag, 1938. Zschocher, E. “-und so wuchsen Ihm Flugel!” Aus dem Leben des Jagdfliegers Hauptmann Baer Berlin: Max Schwabe Verlag, 1943.

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Dissertations

Bokel, Franz. “Great Days” in Germany: Third Reich celebrities as mediators between government and people.” Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin., 1995. Garrett, Scott. “Iron Cross and Swastika: An Historical Interpretation of Military Symbolism in the Third Reich.” Ph.D. diss., University of Southern Illinois, 1990. Hütte, Otto Werner. “Die Geschichte des Eisernen Kreuzes und seine bedeutung für das Preussische und Deutsche Auszeichnungswesen von 1813 bis zur Gegenwart.” Ph.D. diss., Universität Bonn, 1968. Lewalter, Hannes. “Der Kampf ist hart. Wir sind härter!“ Die Darstellung deutscher Soldaten im Spiegel der Bildpropaganda beider Weltkriege und die Konstruktion des ‘Neuen Helden.’” Ph.D. diss., Universität Tübingen, 2010. Nawyn, Kathleen J.. “Striking at the Roots of German Militarism”: Efforts to Demilitarize German Society and Culture in American-Occupied Württemberg-Baden, 1945-1949.” Ph.D. diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2008. Tallgren, Vappu. “Hitler und die Helden: Heroismus und Weltanschauung.“ Ph.D diss., Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1981. Willis, Geoffrey Robert. “The Wehrmacht Propaganda Branch: German Military Propaganda and Censorship in World War II.” Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia, 1964.

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