CHAPTER SVI CHIPILLY, PROYART AND ETINEHEM THE narrative now returns to General Monash’s plan for advancing on both sides of the Somme-an operation which had important consequences. Shortly after midnight of August 9th General MacLagan of the 4th Division had been ordered to take over by 8 a.m. the front north of the river as far as the Bray-Corbie r0ad.l The 13th Brigade, which that night had relieved the 1st at CCrisy, was ordered to cross at Chipilly and take position behind the Americans, then holding that front. The 50th Battalion immediately did so, and the brigadier, General Her- ring, was summoned to MacLagan’s headquarters at Corbie to confer with Monash at 11.30 a.m. At the same time Monash asked Maj.-General Gellibrand of the 3rd Division which of his brigades was available for an attack south of the river, and having especial confidence in General McNicoll, was pleased when Gellibrand replied “McNicoll’s brigade,” and asked Gellibrand to bring the brigadier to the conference. At this meeting Monash explained an ingenious plan. “The German,” he said, “is in a condition of great confusion, and we have only to hit him without warning and roll him up.” This it was intended to do that night at two points, north of the Somme on the Bray-Corbie road and south of the river on the Roman road. He relied particularly upon the tanks. Although tanks had never previously been used at night (he says in his Ausfrolian Vicforzrs2) it was thought that the effect of the noise they made would lead to the speedy collapse of the defence. c ‘He was to take over with it command of the raist Regt US Infy. and also of parts of the 18th and 58th Divs. a mile behmd the 166. A hitch was caused by the I11 Corps ordering the 58th Div. to retain command of its troops, on the ground that they were reserves. Gen. MacLagan refused to complete the relief until the order given to him by Monash was complied with. which was done after reference to Fourth Army. ‘P. 139. Tanks, however, had been used at night at Roasignol Wood. 685 656 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [roth Aug., 1918 Brig.-Genl. Herring gave instructions to the effect that the machines on the Bray-Corbie road were only to go up and down the road and make a noise and overawe the Germans-they could fire a few grape-shot down the road on the first trip 3 The artillery would not fire that night on the front of the attack except for intermittent bursts of the heavies shelling Froissy valley and roads and bridges farther east. When the tanks with infantry following had broken through at the two points, the infantry would turn inwards behind the German outpost-line and march at right angles, south or north, to the Somnie where each force would fire a green flare as signal to the other. The German line behitid them would then be mopped up. The task of the 10th Brigade (3rd Divn.) forming the southern force, was much more extensive than that of the 13th. It was to march up the Roman road with three tanks at its head, then the 37th and 38th Battalions followed by three more tanks and the 40th and 39th. Part of the 10th Machine Gun Company and all the 10th L.T.M. Battery were attached. After hreak- ing through the German posts guarding the road, the column was to push on to Avenue Cross, three- quarters of a nile from the start, and then march northwards along the cross-road for 2,000 yards and thence another mile, mainly across country skirting Chuignolles valley, to the Sonime. When its head reached the Soninie the leading Battalion (gthj would halt and occupy the final mile of the line of route, the 38th halting on the sector south of it, the 40th reaching froin there to the Roman road, and the 39th hack along the Roman road to the old line. They would have enclosed an area of the German front 24 miles long and 13 miles deep, including a Quoted from an unofficial record compiled soon afterwards. loth Aug., 19181 CHIPILLY, PROYART, ETINEHEM 687 Proyart; and the new line would face Froissy valley. Mean- while the 9th and 11th Brigades (3rd Divn.) would have relieved the 4th Division on the front held since August Stli, and they would now help in “mopping up” the enclosed area.“ The attention of the enemy would be diverted during these operations by several arnioured cars dashing eastward along the Roman road with headlights full on, in order to give the impression that the incursion was in that direction. The plan was Monash’s and he gave instructions direct to the brigadiers, thus relieving their iinniediate superiors, Gelli- brand and hlaclagan, of responsibility for interpreting it. Gellibrand thought it feasible, but the regimental and tank officers, to whom McNicoll verbally passed the orders at a hurried conference near CCrisy, held a different view. Lieut.- Col. Knox-Knight, whose battalion, 37th, was to lead the southern column, returned from the conference looking very grave. The battalion officers (says its historian) received the orders quietly but “with some amazement.” Later, as they trudged along the Roman road after the start, Knos-Knight said to the tank Commander: There’ll be a train load of V.C‘s waiting for us when we get back, if it’s a success, but we won’t want them if we get through with our lives. The tank officers “thought the job was 111ad.”~ The com- manders of the 9th and 11th Brigades, Generals Goddard and Cannan, who had been hurriedly informed and conferred at a headquarters in their front line, did not like the prospects. Officers of the 10th Brigade, differently from those of the 13tl1, did not understand that their leading tanks were to advertise their approach and scare the enemy. Only oiie was to go along the road, the two others advancing over the fields beside it. The leaders indeed were anxious lest the noise of the tanks on the cobbles might warn the enemy, and also feared they might be seen. The commander of the other brigade, ‘lhe 9th Ude., holding the southern half of the old front, was to clear all ground dhead of it UP lo the 10th Bde’s new line. The two last battalions of the 10th Bde., thus released, would then clean up the northern part of the area in front of the 11th Bde. The 11th would clear the MCricourt peninsula. ‘Accordiy to a contemporary Australian record. The history of the 37th Bn. says: Someone’s confidence had overreached itself after the overwhelming success of 8th August. The opinion of the front line soldier was that the enterprise was ridiculous and stupid.” 688 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [Ioth Aug., 1918 Herring, asked by Monash when he would start, had chosen g 30 pm., intending his tanks to arrive while there was enough light for them to steer by? but Herring’s brigade was to start froni Gressaire IVood, which gave it a covered approach, whereas the 10th had to march across the open plateau to the Roman road. At 5.30. on going to his battle headquarters (at Hussar Farin on the Roman road), McNicoll noted a number of German balloons within sight, and was so impressed with the danger of warning the enemy that he delayed the march so that the head of the column would not reach the advanced posts at la Flaque till IO ~.m.~The leading battalions, already marching across the plateau, halted for a time in such shelter as they could find. When once on the main road they were hidden by its avenue of trees. The head of the column passed McNicoll’s headquarters on the Roman road at 9.15. The tanks, six from the 8th Tank Battalion, had joined it there. Behind them, through the trees of Morcourt valley and the roadside avenue, the sunset of a beautiful summer’s day was fading towards twilight. The tank officers now found that the ground beside the great road, covered with big dumps and criss-crossed by old trenches, was impossible for their machines ; they particularly dreaded the chance of the half-blind crews’ losing direction and firing on their infantry on the main road. Col. Knox-Knight there- fore necessarily agreed that all tanks should advance up the road. Lieut. hicNicol,8 intelligence officer of the 37th, would guide and point out Avenue Cross. By IO o’clock, when the head of the column passed the ruined factory at la Flaque, night had fallen, calm and clear. Lieut. McNicol with three scouts and Lieut. Jeffrie~,~com- mander of the leading tank, went first, having calculated the number of paces they must take before reaching the turning point and looking out for a clump of bushes known to mark e Herring, whose brigade was tired, having spent the previous night marching up and relieving the Ist, wanted the attack postponed till the night of the rith, hut hlonash could not permit this. 7 hfcNicol1 notified Gen. Gellibrand of this change. As 9.30 was the hour fixed also foi the 13th Bde. and for the 20th Bn (2nd Div.), of which Capt Portman’s company was to connect with the 3rd Div., Gellibrand countermanded the change. His order, however, reached McNicoll too late to be acted on. 8 Lt.