CHAPTER XI11 HAIG, When He Visited Foch 011 July Igth, Had Not Yet Replied to the Generalissimo's Request of July 12Th for An

CHAPTER XI11 THE ORIGIN OF “AUGUST 8TH” HAIG,when he visited Foch 011 July Igth, had not yet replied to the generalissimo’s request of July 12th for an early British offensive. Foch’s letter had pointed out that minor operations of the last few weeks had shown the Germans to be holding their lines with tired troops, below strength or of bad quality, in order to form behind them, for offensives, a mass of picked, strong, trained troops. This gave a chance, which should be seized at once, of launching important surprise offensives. The offensive that he now favoured for the British front was not the one to which he had chiefly inclined in May although it was one of the several that he had then discussed with Haig-an attack from Festubert and Robecq in the Lys area with the double object of shaking the enemy and driving him back in the region of the Bruay mine- field. Haig favoured another offensive: on July 5th lie had asked the commanders of his First and Third Armies (Generals Horne and Byng) to consider a limited attack east of Arras‘ by the Canadian Corps together with three or four other divisions. EnhSh o/&nsrrrs uidTpzdz Accordingly on the morning after am show” mur + seeing Foch he visited Horne and Bjiig but found them both opposed to the plan unless it was extended. As he had not yet sufficient reserves for this he ordered that the Canadians should reconnoitre and work 1 Towards Monchy-le-Prcux and the ridge beyond the Cojeul. 463 464 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [May-July, 1918 out a scheme, meanwhile making any useful minor advances. He then sent his chief-of-staff, General Lawrence, to Second Army to arrange for a counterstroke at Kemmel if Crown Prince Rupprecht, as the British staff anticipated, attacked there. Haig himself motored to Beaurepaire to discuss ano.her plan with General Rawlinson. Since the Battle of Hamel Rawlinson and Maj.-General Montgomery at army headquarters, like Monash and Brig.- Genl. Blarney in the Australian Corps, had been contemplating the possibility of a more important offensive on the Villers- Bretonneux plateau. Rawlinson and Montgomery were greatly impressed with the morale of the Australians which, as Mont- gomery wrote afterwards, “had undoubtedly spread to other Corps and Divisions.” It will be recalled that the general complaint of Australian officers and men in the Morlancourt and Hamel operations was that those successes had been largely wasted in as much as the plans had not allowed the troops to go on and capture the enemy’s guns, and so avoid their back- lash.2 The securing of an advantageous line from which to launch a big offensive had been one of the stated objects of the Peaceful Penetration campaign at Villers-Bretonneux. In one discussion Monash told Rawlinson that the Australian Corps was ready to undertake and maintain a long offensive, but only if its defensive front, then over ten miles wide and held by three divisions, was reduced to, say, a two-division front of 7,000 yards. “I took every opportunity,” says Monash in his book, “of pressing these views.” He believed he could advance five miles. “Couldn’t you go farther?” asked Rawlinson. “If you give me safe support on my right flank,” was the reply. Rawlinson suggested several corps for this purpose but Monash shook his head until the army commander mentioned “The Canadian~.”~ Monash leapt at this suggestion. He was unaware that two months earlier, as part of a *See pp. 240 and 332-3. *It cannot he definitely stated that the conversation of which this is Monash’s version ( ven to Keith Murdoch a few weeks later) occurred before Rawlinson spoke to %ai but Monash certainly believed that it did. The prOJCCt was also discussed wit!? officers at G.H.Q.. DUt at what stage is not clear. It was under- stood that Br.-Gen. J. G. Dill favoured it, but that Haig and Lawrence at drat had other plans. Mar.-May, 19181 ORIGIN OF “AUGUST 8TH” 465 scheme laid down by Foch, a similar project of an offensive by Australians and Canadians had by Haig’s The mcheme in May order been placed before the A.I.F. leaders, Generals Birdwood and White ;4 and though it differed in many important respects from the scheme eventu- ally elaborated by Rawlinson, AIonash, and the Canadians, this earlier scheme influenced the later one so vitally that the narrative must for a moment return to it. Indeed the plan of this offensive has been the subject of so much interest and speculation that its development must here be followed in detail. In the middle of May Foch asked for Haig’s co-operation in an Anglo-French offensive which was to be launched as a surprise if the enemy’s attack, then expected, was much longer delayed. Foch asked Haig to study a plan by which Rawlinson’s Army and the lefi flank of Debeney’s should drive back the Germans on a narrow front south of the Somme, and so create the opportunity for, and cover the flank of, a larger French attack south-eastwards across the Luce. This in itself was only part of Foch’s much larger scheme of two double or pincers-like offensives against the salients created by the German thrusts in March and April,6 the twin effort near Amiens to come first, that on the Lys to be prepared as a counterstroke to any impending German thrust.e In the Amiens offensive the part of the British, though important, would be small ‘See Vol. V, ). 680. ‘On ppr. a, a week beforg tbe German attack on the Lys. Focb began preparation for the double offensive against the salient created by “Michael.” e It would com rise an offensive b the French D.A.N. to retake Kunmel and a British attack prom the line Fcstutert-Robecq to disengage the coalfield. hese could if necessary. be undertaken separately, with smaller objectives. Foch asru6ed that, if separate. the attacks would need 18 divisions, if combined 28. 466 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [May, 1918 compared with that of the French who would provide more than half of the northern pincer and the whole of the southern one (to be made by the Third French Army and part of the First). This would advance on a front of about 17 miles, between Mont- didier and the neighbourhood of Lassigny, and move north- wards acrws the Avre to Arvillers. 7 miles behind Moreuil. In the northern pincer the Fourth British and part of the First French Armies would make a swift advance of five miles due east on the eight-mile front between the Somme and the Luce allowing another French army to strike southwards from Calx to le Quesnel to meet the southern pin~er.~The southern pincer, being more powerful and extensive than the northern, would be the first to move, the Somme-Luce operation-a swift stroke dependent on surprise-starting one or two days later. Under this early scheme of Foch's the Fourth Army was to form only part of the northern pincer. It would advance between the Somme and the Villers-Bretonneux railway,* but the thrust between the railway and the Luce, and subsequently across the Luce, would be carried out by the Tenth French Army under General Maistre, then acting as reserve behind the British front. Haig would supply tanks for the combined forceD- Foch estimated that the northern pincer would require zoo tanks, five or six British divisions,1° and many more French ones. On May zgrd in passing this scheme to Rawlinson Haig intimated that three Canadian divisions, then in reserve near Arras, would be sent to make up, with the Australian divisions and possibly some of the 111 Corps, the British force. The thrust was to go deep, some of the supporting divisions leap- frogging over those that started the attack, and so driving it deeper.'l Haig was especially insistent upon secrecy. On May 16th when Foch first mentioned the project to him, Haig urged 'A line would if possible, be established from Calx to Erchies. The French part in the prelikinary eastward thrust would he difficult unless the outstanding height (Hill 110) north of hloreuil, and others west of hloreuil, were taken. The First French Army would therefore attack these also, preferably at the name time but possilrly earlier. 8 The British flank lay at the Monument, a little south of the railway. 0 Foch asked that Maistre might be allowed to begin training his infantry with them. 1OThree to attack. a Fourth to hold tlie flank pushed forward along the Somme, and one or tu.0 more for reserve Whether the plan of leap-frogging divisions was suggested by Haia or by Xawlinsun the records availalile in Australia do not show. In addition there were to have been sonic divisions (apparently of 111 Corps) in reserve. The total British force available was estimated at various times to be 5, 6, 8, and IO divisions. May-June, 19181 ORIGIN OF “AUGUST 8TH” 467 him not to “write his plan nor allow the French commanders to talk about it. Success will depend mainly on secrecy.” Next day Haig personally imparted Foch’s project to Rawlinson and Montgomery and put them in touch with General Debeney ; and by Haig’s wish Rawlinson himself brought the outlined scheme to Birdwood and White at Australian Corps Head- quarters. Their suggestions, written by White, were duly sent to Montgomery and no copy retained at Australian headquarters.

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