and the United Kingdom’s Africa Policy

Thomas Cargill1

Introduction Africa was never going to be the most important of British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s concerns. That it received as much attention as it did was largely due to Clare Short’s activism, as the first secretary of state at the Department for International Development (DfID), and secondly to the need to demonstrate the United Kingdom’s positive role in international affairs in the aftermath of policy failures in the Middle East. The new DfID offered the prospect of a break from an entrenched neo-colonial attitude in Whitehall that saw Africa as little more than a politically and socially bankrupt target for Western commercial exploitation, almost regardless of the economic or political cost to its people. Unfortunately the more humanitarian- and development-centred approach that the DfID has followed since 1997 is proving problematic and a new model is needed, one that goes beyond exploitative and ‘charitable’ attitudes into a more multilateral approach to UK-Africa relations. Meanwhile, the lobbying power of the increasing number of UK residents of an African background will compel the government to spend more political capital addressing African issues; furthermore, London remains an important centre for African political activity, with all the opportunities and challenges associated with fund-raising and campaigning by African politicians and political interests.

Blair, the ‘New’ Labour Party and Africa In 2004 a mere 1.6% of global foreign direct investment went into Africa,2 more than half of it to Nigeria and Sudan. In an international system where national self-interest is the key to political expenditure, investment in Africa is unlikely consistently to figure highly, unless the UK defines its core national interest more broadly. That said, some of the British government’s dealings with Africa changed when ‘New’ Labour (a term applied, sometimes pejoratively, to the modern, centre-right party) took power in 1997, despite the oft-remarked fact that in opposition, Blair had demonstrated little interest in the continent. Prominent among the new factors at work were the internationalist instincts of

SA Yearbook of International Affairs, 2006/7 324 Cargill: Tony Blair & UK Africa Policy many ‘old’ Labour Party members, including many MPs, who viewed themselves as having been allied with people in Africa against colonialism and apartheid and therefore saw African leaders as natural allies of their party in government. The fact that this has not always proved to be the case has left many in the party baffled. A second, related and reinforcing element pushing Africa towards the head of the government agenda was the decision to establish the DfID, and the revolving door that this created between the government and the UK’s powerful non-governmental organisations (NGOs). British-based NGOs such as Oxfam, Save the Children, the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development and Global Witness, while theoretically international in composition and purpose, tend to adopt a UK perspective. A further aspect to be considered is the role of the UK as an international media hub, with the BBC, Reuters, CNN, more recently Al- Jazeera, and others being staffed largely by British citizens and running much of their Africa coverage out of London. These factors, together with the shared outlook, background and social groupings of many people across these organisations and the growing numbers of political activists of African background in the UK, has ensured a higher profile for African issues than unalloyed realpolitik might dictate. In government itself, however, in 1997 there was more enthusiasm than knowledge regarding African matters. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) had long been noted for an attitude towards Africa frequently referred to by insiders as ‘robust’. That word carried a sense that African countries were little more than collectives of corruption, poverty, war and incompetence that needed to be controlled and, when convenient, used. It is true that this attitude was changing by the time came to power, but remnants of it remained in the upper echelons of the FCO; hence some strong resistance to the creation of DfID, which held out the prospect of foreign relations pursued along lines somewhat different from before. 3 Indeed, given the long decades of Britain’s retreat from its colonies it is uncertain whether the FCO had the means and skills to run an effective and informed foreign policy with regard to Africa, even had it wanted to. The failure to arrest, or even to address, this diminishing internal expertise and capacity has had a severe impact on the UK’s approach to relations with the continent’s governments. From its establishment, DfID suffered an identity crisis regarding its mandate. Clare Short, her immediate successor Baroness Amos - during a brief tenure - and the current incumbent , quickly became known as the ‘real’ ministers for Africa (Clare Short in particular built up strong personal relationships with several African leaders4). This was in contrast to their formally mandated predecessors, who were ministers in the FCO with Africa as only one part of their brief. In 10 years there have been six Ministers for Africa in the FCO, who appear to have had minimal influence over levels of staffing and

SA Yearbook of International Affairs, 2006/7 Select Themes on Africa 325 budgeting in their Africa portfolio, particularly after the departure of , the most controversial among them.5 Lord Triesman, the current Minister for Africa, is not an elected Member of Parliament but a nominated member of the House of Lords. His departmental head, , was a noticeable absentee from the 2004 Commission for Africa on which sat Blair, Chancellor of the Exchequer , and Hilary Benn. It must be remembered, however, that DfID was established with the limited aim of delivering development, not managing a coherent overall policy for the UK and its multiplicity of external interests. In terms of protocol this is most obvious in the very limited official (as opposed to less formal) foreign visits of the DfID Secretary of State, in Africa and elsewhere: who is his foreign Government counterpart? Aside from these questions, it should borne in mind that the DfID was brand new in 1997 and inevitably has taken time to find its feet; in addition, stringent limits on personnel levels, dictated by the Treasury, have meant that it has not had enough staff properly to manage the large disbursements for which it is responsible. Hence since 1997 the UK’s Africa policy has fallen between the two stools of an atrophied and mistrusted FCO on the one hand, and a shiny new but poorly defined DfID mandate on the other. At the start of the new administration there were lofty expectations among many parts of the Left-leaning establishment and high confidence in a government that felt African solidarity in its blood; but there was extremely low capacity to propose or execute an informed, coherent policy. Understood in this context, in African policy terms the following ten years were perhaps rather more successful than might otherwise have been expected.

Sierra Leone to At the time of Labour’s 1997 election victory, UK government involvement in Africa had been so limited that there was little reaction from African leaders. Inevitably there was uncertainty over the implications of the DfID as a new department separate from the FCO, but much of the continent was too consumed with other challenges to pay much attention. Indeed, for the first year or so the lack of concern seemed justified, as UK policy inAfrica remained broadly the same as it had been under the previous Conservative Party administration: that is, support for British trade and business interests and minimal political intervention. In its position on the war in Sierra Leone and dictatorship in Nigeria the UK fell in with the Commonwealth consensus; on the Eritrea-Ethiopia border conflict it toed the line. On Zimbabwe nothing seemed to change initially, with President saying that he expected a continuation in policy from the Conservative administration.6 The first indication of a more robust approach came with the British military intervention in Sierra Leone in May 2000, following the failure of the

SA Yearbook of International Affairs, 2006/7 326 Cargill: Tony Blair & UK Africa Policy government there to counter the onslaught of the Revolutionary United Front rebel group. This was successful insofar as it brought the stability, security and authority needed to end the pandemic violence in that country; but it was also, perhaps, indicative of the Blair government’s propensity to cut through convention and precedent to reach a desired policy aim, and to then withdraw without addressing the underlying issues. As far back as May 1998 Blair had expressed irritation at criticism of Peter Penfold, the British High Commissioner in Sierra Leone, over alleged illicit supplies of arms to Sierra Leone, describing the affair as ‘hoo-ha’ compared with the ‘superb job’ Penfold had done in dealing with the events of May.7 It was noteworthy that despite being severely criticised by the UK Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Select Committee, many of the senior officials involved in the affair were subsequently promoted. The motives for, and consequences of, the UK military involvement and indeed Penfold’s actions as High Commissioner, were many; the intervention remains one of the more successful legacies of Blair’s premiership. Such bold and unilateral action, however, demands the bureaucratic capacity and sustained high level political focus that subsequently has so often been lacking in the policy sphere. Significantly, Sierra Leone has failed to reform its élite since 2000, thus replicating the very social divisions that contributed to the conflict in the first place. It was only a matter of time before over-confidence, inexperience and lack of capacity would get Blair’s government into trouble in Africa. In retrospect, it seems inevitable that it was in Zimbabwe that these weaknesses were first identified and then ruthlessly exploited by President Mugabe, one of the more adept and experienced politicians on a continent with more than its fair share of gifted political operators (as opposed, perhaps, to strategists). Mugabe, seeking to divert blame and under pressure to pay up for support received from other African governments, received a gift in the form of Peter Hain, who was appointed Minister for Africa in 1999. Hain appeared seized with the conviction that as a former high-profile anti-apartheid activist, born in Kenya and spending his early years in South Africa, he could understand and speak out for the interests of ordinary black Africans; what is more, that given his position he was mandated to do so. From the outset Hain took an uncompromising line with regard to corruption and reform in Africa. Speaking at the 585th Wilton Park Conference in September 1999, he said: ‘We will not support corrupt governments. We will not subsidise economic mismanagement. We will not fund repression or bankroll dictatorship. And we will not back failure. We will speak out against it and do all we can to help ordinary African people establish the rights and the future to which they are entitled.’ The problem was not so much with the message but the inherent problem, seen from an African perspective, of a former colonial power’s apparently unilateral donning of the mantle of champion of the ordinary African. Hain exemplified this, his first words in the same speech being ‘at dawn in Soweto,

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South Africa, in 1994, the queue stretched far out of sight. Emotions welled up inside me as I watched people voting for the first time in their lives. Something of the same feeling is with me , standing before you as “Britain’s Minister for Africa”, setting out my strategy for a new partnership with Africa. Why? Because I am a son of Africa, born under the African sky in Nairobi and brought up in Pretoria’. Without analysing too closely the personal implications of this statement, the sentiment itself was symptomatic of a fundamental misunderstanding that extended beyond Hain to many parts of the Labour hierarchy: they believed that once in power they would not be identified internationally as inheritors of the colonial legacy and, by extension, neither would the UK government8. This irritated many Africans. Aside from its being absurd that a Labour government could somehow distance itself from the values and history of the society in which it is rooted, Hain’s speech itself carried a whiff of neo-colonialism in its implication that when African countries could not run themselves, the British government had a right intervene in their affairs. This, of course, invites a debate about the inherently neo-colonial nature of the donor-recipient power relationship in Africa, and in the light of that debate the direct nature of Hain’s pronouncements was likely to cause discomfort at the very least.9 Mugabe was able to turn this situation to his advantage, both by claiming that he was standing up to the ‘imperialists’ and by taunting the British government in order to provoke it into further outspoken remarks from its ministers10. This tactic was highly successful throughout the key period of the Movement for Democratic Change’s major challenge to Mugabe’s ruling ZANU-PF party in the Zimbabwean parliamentary elections of June 2000, and it continues to resonate. It was a major reason why other African leaders have found themselves unable to criticise Mugabe as they might otherwise have done.

Cultural Differences and the DfID Religion has proved another area of serious misunderstanding. Currently there is a marked tendency towards strongly evangelical Christianity, and Pentecostalism in particular, across the whole of sub-Saharan Africa, alongside the more recent revival in practising Islam that has become evident over recent decades. The reasons for, and the merits and demerits of, this trend are complex, but it now reaches into so many areas of life across the continent that to ignore it as a factor in international relations would be self-deceiving. Such an attitude, however, has largely informed the Blair government’s relations with the continent. This may seem strange, given Blair’s known Christian faith and New Labour’s domestic policy with regard to religious schools and the role of faith groups.11 The centre and left of the British political spectrum is, however, deeply divided on the proper role for religion; indeed it is one of the great unspoken schisms within the Labour movement, which was said by former Prime Minister Harold

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Wilson to ‘owe more to Methodism than Marx’. It may be tempting to respond that there does not seem much evidence of either weltanschauung in current UK policy, but this is not true. Among many Labour MPs and ministers there is a fervent, though often furtively held, belief that religion is less the opiate of the people than their crack cocaine, driving them to acts of irrational and anti-social behaviour ranging from the attempted enforcement of regressive moral codes to the denial of rational scientific thought, and violent crusade and jihad. From this standpoint, public religious belief is a symptom of inequality and ignorance, to be swept away by the advancement of social justice and education. The same beliefs, on balance, may be generally attributed to the more influential students and practitioners of development theory. In the DfID this tendency was clear from the very beginning, Clare Short being of a strongly secularist school, at least with regard to public policy. In the DfID’s inaugural 1997 White [Policy] Paper the social role of religion did not feature at all,12 nor has it appeared in any White Paper since. Religious groups find access to DfID funding very difficult, African faith-based groups near-impossible; yet it is often these very groups that in Africa serve as essential alternative social welfare systems when the state has failed to provide. Clearly there are questions to be raised over the desirability of encouraging or supporting faith-based organisations with public money. The point is, however, that such a debate has never seriously been entertained within the DfID, which has simply adopted the secularist position. This undermines the very basis of the UK’s claim to be working in partnership with Africa, just as, arguably, it reduces the effectiveness of donor support. Certainly it has had a definite, if non-quantifiable, negative effect on the public image of DfID, particularly in Africa. Scepticism about the DfID is widespread. The general impression is of an agency that is often seized with a missionary zeal and conviction that it has all the solutions, yet standing aloof from the concerns of ordinary people and evincing a disdain for existing practices. This is not to say that these impressions are wholly justified and certainly the valuable and innovatory work that the DfiDoften does undertake is recognised in many quarters; but on the whole it is the more negative perceptions that prevail. One reason is probably the sheer workload under which many DfID staff now labour. A criticism constantly levelled at DfID is that due to the tight control of appointments there is simply not enough staff adequately to plan, administer and monitor the vast sums flowing through the department. This is perhaps one reason for the DfID’s predilection for direct budgetary support; it sees it as a relatively cheap way of delivering aid.

The Commission for Africa Much has already been written regarding the genesis, progress and results of the Commission for Africa that Tony Blair established in 200413. What continues to surprise is the speed that it has dwindled in relevance and impact. The view

SA Yearbook of International Affairs, 2006/7 Select Themes on Africa 329 that it was just so many warm words and missed opportunities now appears so entrenched that it deserves some qualification. Today there is certainly more interest in, and awareness of, African political issues beyond the continent itself than there was prior to 2005. Whether this is sustainable is another matter, but the British media, for instance, now sometimes try harder to show a less simplistic picture than the humanitarian sympathy and sense of the exotic usually reserved for all things African. Hollywood is trying harder too, with increasing numbers of mainstream films trying to tackle more complex African stories (although the need to retain ‘bankable’ white leading actors will be with us for some years). The importance of such trends is not to be underestimated, for it is from them that current and future business leaders, politicians, journalists and the general public receive much of their information on Africa. International business, too, is looking more carefully at investment opportunities in Africa, its interest boosted not only by high commodity prices but also by an increasingly sophisticated grasp of economic situations particular to different African countries. Lastly, there is an increase in the quality and quantity of contributions from civil society organisations in the UK and United States to their governments’ Africa policy; it has been some time since policy makers in the UK and US and across Africa have had the breadth and depth of information resources that are currently available. While there has been a trend in this direction ever since the June 2002 Group of Eight (G8) summit in Kananaskis, Canada, the UK’s drive on Africa and the galvanizing role of the Commission, undoubtedly provided a boost. Overall, however, the Commission and its report typified the flashy, intermittent and insubstantial nature of much of Blair’s engagement on Africa. The roots of the Commission can be traced to his renewed enthusiasm for Africa in the immediate aftermath of September 11 2001, when he famously said at the Labour Party conference in October 2001 that ‘the state of Africa is a scar on the conscience of the world. But if the world as a community focused on it, we could heal it. And if we don’t, it will become deeper and angrier’.14 This theme strengthened after the UK-US intervention in in 2003 and reached fruition in the idea for a Commission on Africa, as suggested by the entertainer Bob Geldorf at the G8 Evian summit in June of that year. Announced to fanfare in early 2004, its members seemingly drawn from Blair’s contact book, the Commission quickly became bogged down in the British 2005 general election (it published its report a little over a month before election day). Many of the initiatives stemming from the Commission report failed to take off or have run into difficulty. In an attempt to recapture some of the rapidly dissipating momentum, Blair announced in June 2006 the formation of a ‘Mark 2’ version of the Commission, the Africa Progress Panel, to ‘maintain the international political profile of Africa achieved in 2005’. By January 2007 the only news on the Panel was that it was aiming to be up and running by July15. This failure to maintain momentum was not the only flaw. By initiating a

SA Yearbook of International Affairs, 2006/7 33 0 Cargill: Tony Blair & UK Africa Policy major push on Africa the UK upset a delicate process that had been under way since Kananaskis, and the uncertainties that beset Germany’s Africa agenda in its G8 presidential term are arguably a function of this insensitivity.

Assessment Unfortunately, there must be real concern as to whether the UK Government now has the capacity either to absorb new sources of information or make policy to take advantage of them. A continuing trend towards the centralisation of policy making around the Prime Minister has touched many areas of UK policy in general, but Africa in particular has been affected due to the gulf between Britain’s limited capacity and its grandiose ambitions. In the final analysis, this continued erosion of institutional memory and capacity might be the most damaging legacy of Blair on Africa. Nonetheless there have been some positive trends in the UK’s relationship with Africa during Blair’s premiership. The Sierra Leone intervention, with some qualifications, stands out, while the creation and evolution of the DfID, for all its faults, marked a welcome symbolic break from the previous subordination of a broad international perspective to narrow national commercial interest. UK efforts to bring stability to central Africa deserve credit, as does the growing role of people of African background in UK public life and policy making. Even the UK ‘Year of Africa’ and the Commission for Africa, marked out as they were by ‘celebrity’ grandstanding, domestic politicking, arrogance and posturing, did build a broader awareness and interest that one might hope will continue and grow. On balance, however, Blair’s legacy is likely to be remembered as one of missed opportunities; uniquely so, since the authority and goodwill that he commanded, domestically and internationally, until the Iraqi invasion of 2003 far exceeded those enjoyed by any other Labour Prime Minister. While acknowledging the central role of Mugabe in Zimbabwe’s current plight, for example, Blair and Hain must accept some responsibility for stoking the crisis that led to the current impasse. Ina wider international context, the £20 billion Al Yamamah armaments contract with Saudi Arabia offers telling evidence that Blair’s commitment to reform goes only so far when placed against the UK’s national interest. A Serious Fraud Office investigation into corruption in the award of the contract was curtailed on the grounds that it was contrary to the public interest; and not one case has been brought against a British company for acts of bribery abroad under the 2001 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act.16

Future directions It is a cliché that 24 hours is a long time in politics, and Blair’s successor as Labour leader will not be known certain until the Labour Party votes are

SA Yearbook of International Affairs, 2006/7 Select Themes on Africa 331 counted, and as Prime Minister until the next British general election. As things stand, however, it seems probable that Gordon Brown will be the next Prime Minister. If so, how is UK policy towards Africa likely to change? Those expecting a radical shift in the UK’s international relations are likely to be disappointed. Brown has so far shown himself even less interested in international affairs than was Blair before he came to power. He has only recently begun to intervene on international issues unrelated to economics, a move that has been widely interpreted as part of his bid for the party leadership (his visit to six African nations in January 2005 was seen in this light). Any changes in policy are likely to be gradual, rather than dramatic. The most immediately obvious difference will be in personal style. Brown has a more formal and managerial approach, which is likely to go down better among his peers in Africa. This attitude extends to precedent, law and custom, on which matters he is less impatient than Blair, overtly at least. More fundamentally, the subordination of the FCO (for which Brown is thought to have little time) to the DfID, is likely to continue. It is true that the more imaginative Brownite left of the Labour Party talks of folding DfID back into the FCO, on the basis that the latter has now been largely cleared of ‘old-fashioned’, conservative influences, and that to complete the transition the overwhelmingly progressive staff and practice in DfID should be absorbed into the foreign policy mainstream. Given, however, that the staffing cuts that so badly affected both the FCO and, more importantly, DfID’s image and performance, were pushed through by Brown’s Treasury moguls, little on that front is likely to change in the short term short of overturning a fundamental tenet of his term as Chancellor. Brown has spoken passionately and convincingly of his belief in poverty reduction and support for economic growth and development in Africa; hence the DfID, through direct budgetary support, is likely to remain central to the UK’s engagement with Africa as long as poverty levels on the continent remain high. Brown would also be likely to continue the trend begun late in Blair’s premiership of trying to stay clear of political entanglements on the African continent. This policy would be informed not only by a lack of expertise but also by the sense that the UK government has fewer levers for intervention in Africa than Western NGOs and media often seem to assume17. This of itself may be no bad thing, but in practice, given an increasingly interconnected world where ripple effects are complex and far reaching, the UK is unlikely to be able to remain as aloof as Brown may wish, not least because London is something of an ‘African capital’ in its own right. Concentration on humanitarian interests can support only a limited level of political involvement.18 Unless internal government commitment, expertise and capacity are addressed, it will simply mean that the UK response to the inevitable crises will be less likely to help and more likely to complicate the situation. The African Union (AU) will find itself increasingly left to its own devices in resolving continental political challenges, such as those it is currently

SA Yearbook of International Affairs, 2006/7 332 Cargill: Tony Blair & UK Africa Policy facing (and, apparently, failing to meet) in Darfur, Zimbabwe and Somalia. To make sustained progress on continental growth and stability, a Brown government must look to its unarguable self-interest in helping to build a safe and prosperous continent. It must then develop a more flexible, multilateral approach to Africa, making an effort to understand what different African governments want and building strategic coalitions to produce results to match. This will take commitment, time and money, but unless Brown learns to see Africa as more than a generalised humanitarian recipient of aid,19 progress in the weaker parts of Africa is likely to remain fragile, while crisis-led interventions by the UK and other countries, including South Africa, become both more likely and more costly. There was an interesting close to the January 2007 meeting of the World Economic Forum at Davos entitled ‘Delivering on the promise of Africa’. Blair and President Mbeki of South Africa sat opposite each other, alongside Liberia’s President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf and other leaders in the debate on Africa. Blair had the last word in a rather unfocused conversation on what needed to be done. He spoke in a circumlocutory manner of the need, in pushing forward reform, to deal with ‘the hard end’ of capacity issues, suggesting that governance and corruption were what really needed improvement. He closed with the example of Darfur, saying ‘what’s going on in Darfur at the moment, and the absence of action internationally on it is not a great signal ... when we want to motivate the world in coming forward for Africa’. He appeared to be directly addressing President Mbeki. Sudan of course is set to take over the AU presidency shortly, and it appeared that by ‘internationally’, Blair was referring principally to the AU. It may be, then, that Tony Blair is leaving office with a rather more ‘robust’ view of Africa than he might have wished.

Endnotes 1 THOMAS CARGILL is the Africa Programme Manager at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, otherwise known as Chatham House, London. 2 Africa Development Indicators, World Bank, Washington, 2006. 3 See An Honourable Deception? New Labour, Iraq and the Misuse of Power, Clare Short, Free Press, London, 2004. 4 Indeed, Clare Short for some time subscribed to the US-inspired ‘New African Leaders’ thesis - placing great reliance on certain leaders, even when their commitment to democracy and human rights was under increasing scrutiny. 5 See ‘ Unkindest Cuts’, Africa Confidential, 46, 14, 8 July, 2005. 6 See ‘Zimbabwe: Mugabe Meets Blair Over Land Seizure Issue In Zimbabwe’. PNA 23 October 1997. 7 Tony Blair: ‘We did nothing wrong’, , London, 12 May 1998. 8 As late as mid 2006, Lord Triesman, Foreign Minister with responsibility for Africa, was still arguing that the Labour government could not be accused of neo-colonialism because he and others had fought against colonialism when young. See ‘Democracy and

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Security in Africa: Our Strategic Approach to Failed States’, Speech at Chatham House 21 June 2006. 9 This was not universally the case. Hain’s strong line against Jonas Savimbi’s Unita rebel movement in Angola won him firm friends in the MPLA government (and British Airways a lucrative route to Luanda). 10 For instance see President Mugabe in ‘Smith Mugabe & the Union Jack’, David Dimbleby interview; BBC, London, March 1999. 11 See ‘And on the seventh day Tony Blair created...’ Kamal Ahmed, The Observer London August 3 2003 http://observer.guardian.co.uk/politics/story/0,6903,1011460,00.html 12 ‘Eliminating Poverty: a challenge for the 21st century.’ White Paper on International Development London 1997 http://www2.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/whitepaper1997.pdf 13 For a more detailed account see Vines and Cargill: ‘Le monde doit nous juger sur l’Afrique’, Politique Africaine, Paris, April 2006. 14 For a report on the speech, see The Independent, London, 2 October 2001, see http:// news.independent.co.uk/uk/politics/article159950.ece. 15 Gleneagles Implementation Plan for Africa: November 2006 update http://www.dfid. gov.uk/g8/milestones.asp. 16 See Michael Peel, ‘Nigeria related financial crime and its links with Britain’, Chatham House Report, November 2006. 17 See Tom Porteous, ‘British government policy in sub-Saharan Africa under new Labour’, International Affairs, 81, 2, March 2005. 18 For a good explanation of this in relation to US policy in Africa, as well as a strong riposte to UK policy and the Commission for Africa, see ‘Beyond humanitarianism: a strategic US approach toward Africa’, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington. January 2006. 19 ‘Advice is judged by results, not by intentions: why Gordon Brown is wrong about Africa’, International Affairs, 81, 2, March 2005.

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