PART 1 WARAND INTERVENTION

SierraLeonebecameindependent in1961 andbecameaone-party statein 1978.Opposition grewandthe civil warbeganin1991,withthe Revolutionary United Front (RUF)launchingarebellion. Acoup in1992 broughtamilitary government which cameunderincreasingdomestic and international pressureandfinallyagreed to multi-party elections. Ahmed TejanKabbah waselected in1996,but the civil warcontinued, withthe RUF controllingmuch ofthe countryside.InMay1997 therewasasecond military coup; anArmed ForcesRevolutionary Council (AFRC)tookpower, andformed analliance withthe RUF.The Kabbah government fled to Conakry inneighbouringGuinea. The military government wasstronglyopposed domestically. Strikeskept the banksclosed.Internationally,othergovernments andinternational institutions continued to recognisethe Kabbah government inexile.The Economic Community ofWest AfricanStates(ECOWAS)andthenthe UN imposed sanctions on the junta, andthe sanctions werewidelysupported. Eventually,aWest Africanmilitary force –ECOMOG, which wassanctioned byECOWAS andcomposed ofNigeriansoldiers –expelled the AFRC and RUF from Freetown (the capital)inearly1998andKabbah returned in March aftertenmonthsoutside the country.The warcontinued for another four years,seeingthe United Nations andthenthe Britishintervene, with the warfinallyendingin2002. The sanctions thatwereimposed on SierraLeoneproved to be highly controversial.Thisisbecausethe sanctions,unusually,included humanitarianassistance, namelythe delivery offood(especiallyrice, which wasthe staple foodofSierraLeone)andmedicine, unless specifically authorised bythe special ECOWAS sanctions committee. Britain,withthe encouragement ofits Department for International Development (DfID)andForeignandCommonwealthOffice, refused to fundhumanitarianaid.Bycontrast,the United StatesandEuropean Commission continued to fundhumanitarianagencies. ECOWAS delayed organisinganexemption mechanism for humanitariangoods,andthe Guinea authoritiesdisrupted goodscrossingthe borderinto SierraLeone. Whywasrice –afoodstaple –included inthe sanctions? The reason is becauserice had becomeade facto ‘currency’ inwar-torn SierraLeone, and wasseenasaresource thatcould be fuellingthe continuation ofconflict. For many years,rice had beenused for barterwithinthe economy.Infact,the 1997 coup tookplace, inpart,becauseKabbah had reduced the rice allocation to soldiers andjunior officers,which meant theycould no longer sell ittosupplement theirsalaries. Afterthe 1997 military coup,the widespread strikesandboycotts against the military government meant bankswereclosed andso rice becameade facto currencyaswell asafood. The inclusion ofrice inthe sanctions wasfiercelydebated atthe time, and continuestobe ahighlycontested issue.Lookingback, thereisnow general agreement thathumanitarianaid wasreduced aspart ofanattempt atwhat isnow called ‘regimechange’. Bothsidesonthissanctions debateclaimto be defendinghumanrights. Opponents arguethatany block on

28 2 THE CONTEXT OF WAR humanitarianaid violatesneutrality andthe GenevaConventions. Proponents arguethatitwasanecessary action to defendanelected government against asadistic andbrutal military juntawhich was responsible for egregioushumanrights violations. Letusnow take alookatthe range ofissuesandopinions thatareraised in thisdebate. Alfred Carew,acivil society leaderwhom you’ll meetinthe first video, arguesthat‘aid could havecontinued, humanitarianassistance could have continued –thatwould havesoftened the blow on the people’. Bycontrast AbuBrima, also acivil society leader,arguesthat‘sanctions were respondingto the demandsofthe people’. Infact,whenmakingthe audio- visual materialsinSierraLeone, wefoundthatmost civil society leaders we spoke withsaid theysupported sanctions on rice, asyou will see.Yeta major international humanitarianorganisation in2003 called the rice sanctions ‘shameful’and‘distressing’,andin2000 the BritishHouseof Commons International Development Committee said the sanctions had ‘catastrophic humanitarianconsequences’ and‘resulted inahigh level of civiliandeathanddestruction’. Similarly,the Henry Dunant Centrefor HumanitarianDialoguecalled the SierraLeonesanctions ‘oneofthe most shamefulepisodesregarding international humanitarianaction inmodern times’. The Centreisahighly respected organisation ‘dedicated to the promotion ofhumanitarian principles,the prevention ofconflictandthe alleviation ofits effects through dialogue’(see Box 1.1). Itseems,however,thatmany SierraLeoneans had a different view. Box 1.2 givesquotesfromthree menwhohad beencivil society leaders in1997. In2004whentheywereinterviewed for the course, two werestill civil society activists andonewasagovernment minister.

Box 1.1 ‘Oneofthe most shamefulepisodes... in modern times’

[InSierraLeone, when]political andhumanitarianobjectivesappeared to clash, humanitarianconcerns unquestionablycamesecondto political ones. The clearest example waswhenajuntatookpowerinSierraLeonein1997, andthe withholdingofhumanitarianassistance to the countrywasused asa toolto tryandeffectthe political objectiveofregimechange. Adistressingfeatureofthis‘Conakry period’isthatthe withholdingof humanitarianassistance wasstronglysupported bythe UN political leadership,the UK government (includingDfID)andthe Humanitarian Coordinator.The policyofpreventinghumanitarianassistance fromreaching SierraLeonewasimplemented through acombination ofcuttingoff funding andblockingaid suppliesatthe borderwithGuinea.The policywas ‘coherent’ withthe political strategyofisolatingthe Armed Forces

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Revolutionary Council(AFRC). However,the political strategyofregime change wasnot ultimatelyachieved bydeprivingcivilianpopulations offood andmedicines,but bythe military intervention ofECOMOG, aregional force. Based on the reasonable assumption thatcivilianlivesthatmayotherwise havebeensaved werelost unnecessarily,thisperiodstandsasoneofthe most shamefulepisodesregardinginternational humanitarianaction in modern times. Thoseencouragingthe policymaywell havebeeninbreach ofthe GenevaConventions through attempts to block humanitarian assistance fromreachingacivilianpopulation. ‘PoliticsandHumanitarianism:Coherence inCrisis’,February 2003,p. 10. HenryDunant Centrefor HumanitarianDialogue, Geneva.

Box 1.2

The civil society; the people,the general populace werereadyfor anything. Theywereprepared to doanythingto makesurethe juntawasoverthrown, or atleast removed frompower. So,inthatparticularcontext the sanctions werelikerespondingto the demandsofthe people,so itwasvery useful.It helped because... whateverhumanitarianassistance would havebeengiven, wasgoingto be utilised bythe junta. AbuBrima, national coordinator ofthe NetworkMovement for Justice andDevelopment

If humanitarianassistance wasbroughthere, thosethatcarried out the war arefed andhavethe energytocarryon. If the warwastobe ended, humanitarianaid must be included[insanctions. InitiallyHigh Commissioner Peter]Penfold did not support humanitariansanctions,but weinsisted.[The AFRCgovernment neededfood] so theirfirst demandwasfoodaid.... Clearly,humanitariansanctions helped bringthe rebelstothe table for dialogue. Alfred Timbo,in2004MinisterofLabour,but in1997 acivil society leader.

We wereprepared to sacrifice.We knewitwasonlyaperiodoftime, and wewereright. Itwasthrough that[the sanctions]thatwegained the present stability.... We supported sanctions. Theywerecritical to stifle their[the AFRC’s]supportonthe ground.Without sanctions itwould havebeen difficultfor the [elected] government to comeback. Davidson Kuyateh, secretary general ofthe SierraLeoneTeachers Union anddirector general ofthe civil society movement. [All three interviews carried out inSierraLeonein2004.]

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Inamoment,wewill turn to videoandaudiomaterial thatfurther illuminatesthisdebate.The videointerviews civil society activists about the sanctions. Bycontrast,the audiocapturesadiscussion betweentwo people whotookactiveparts inthe sanctions debatein1997,andsevenyears later, whenthisdiscussion wasrecorded, continued to hold stronglyopposing views. Theyare:

. PeterPenfold, whoasBritishHigh CommissionerinSierraLeonetook refuge inConakry,Guinea, accompanyingthe elected government of SierraLeoneinto exile.He wasoneofthe most influential people inthe decision to include rice inthe sanctions.

. MargieBuchanan-Smith, whowasbothemergencyandpolicyhead of the BritishNGO Action Aid andwasoneofthe most outspoken opponents. Action Aid wasalso oneofthe biggest criticsofthe sanctions inevidence to the International Development Committee. We interviewed thembothin2003 andtheymade theirpositions clear. Peter Penfold said:

The most important thingwastoremovethe junta.Sendinginrice allowed the AFRC juntato remainlonger. Bagsandcups ofrice had become money,so sendingrice meant sendinginbagloadsofmoney. People told us:‘Yeswearehungry,but don’tsendfoodbecausethe soldiers willtake it.’ People telephoned friendsandfamilyinConakry andItalked on the telephoneto church people, media, sports groups,NGOsandso on. I talked withDfID andweagreed wewereopposed to humanitarianaid.

He stressed the need ‘to demonstratethatthe juntacould not run the country.If itcould havegottenhospitals,schoolsandbusinessesrunning, it mighthaveled to someinternational acceptance, especiallyfromsomeWest Africangovernments.’ The political goal wastoback the elected government andforce the removal ofthe junta.Humanitarianassistance would have blocked that.

But Margie Buchanan-Smithargued that whileIagree thatitwasimportant to getrid ofthe junta, my starting point isthatyou sendinhumanitarianassistance impartially,accordingto need.Forgetabout the long-term impact. Itispurelyabout savinglives– reducingmortality andmorbidity.

We broughtthe two ofthemtogetherinaradiostudiowithRobinWhite, whofor many years edited the BBC’s Focus on Africa programme.This debateiscomplexbecausethe proponents arewell informed, experienced, andbelievetheyacted inthe best interests ofSierraLeone, yettheycameto totallyoppositeconclusions. Perceptions ofapparentlywell-informed people weresharplydifferent. Startingpoints,principlesandassumptions werealso different.

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Thereseems to be anunbridgeable gapbetweenthe two sides,but inthe discussion thatfollows,you mayalso findsomesurprisingareasof agreement. We take up thisdebateindetail here, for two reasons:

. First,becauseinterveners incivil wars andinpostwarpeace support operations areoftenfaced withsuch starkandcomplexchoices. We cannot provide you witha‘rightanswer’,becausethereareno ‘right answers’ or ‘magic formulas’ for effectivepeacebuilding.Interveners haveto make the best decisions theycaninthe face ofcomplexand contradictory pressures. However,our primary aimistoprovide you withperspectives,toolsandskillstohelpyou betterunderstandcivil wars andtheirroots,recogniseandunderstandthe different assumptions thatunderlie intervention choices,andtherebymake better,more reflectivechoicesinacontext ofpeacebuilding.

. Second, wehavechosenthisparticulardebatebecauseitistypical ofthe real, hardchoicesweexpectyou to haveto face.You could easilyfind yourself inthe position ofMargie Buchanan-Smithor PeterPenfold, or of theiradvisers or ofpeople inthe military or aid agenciesdebatingwith themoverthisissue.

‘The warandsanctions’.First,youshould watch the SierraLeonevideo‘The warandsanctions’. Thisvideosets the scene.Itprovidesyou withbasic information on the SierraLeonecivil warandanintroduction to the sanctions debate. Itopens withthe warover(‘wardon don’ inthe local language,Krio) andwiththe return ofrefugees. But you will rememberinSection 1ofthisStudyGuide thatwe introduced acoursequestion:Inany givenintervention,how mightadevelopment focus helptopromoteajust andstable peace?SierraLeoneans inthe videowarn thatthe causesofthe war,such asyouthunemployment,havenot beenaddressed. Civil society activist AmbroseJamesevensays thereisa40percent chance ofa return to war. PeacebuildinginSierraLeoneisnot just about stoppingthe fighting. We will return to theseissuesandinthe last section ofthe StudyGuide come back to preciselythe questions beingraised byspeakers inthe video–how do interveners helptobuild ajust andstable peace inSierraLeone? The secondhalf ofthe videolooksatanintervention whenthe warwasstill going on –the applications ofsanctions in1997. Onthe groundduringawar,interveners oftenface hardchoicesinwhich principlesandguidelinesclash, andthe sanctions wereaparticularlystarkexample overwhich people still disagree. ‘The sanctions debate’ .Thisisthe discussion betweenMargie Buchanan-Smith andPeterPenfold.Asyou listentothisdiscussion,andagainlaterwhenyou know moreabout the SierraLeonewar,askyourself whatyou mighthavedoneinlate 1997 if you wereinvolved asanoutside intervenerinSierraLeone. ListentoSL audio1‘The sanctions debate’again,or read the transcript,for the specific purposeofcompilingalist ofthe points on which PeterPenfold andMargie Buchanan-Smithagree,andthe points on which theydisagree.

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