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CONTENTS

3-4 EDITOR’S NOTE HELOISE GIRAUDON

5-9 PRACTICAL DIPLOMACY DAVID LANDSMAN

10-12 CRISIS AVERSION: HOW A BIDEN PRESIDENCY CAN REVERSE THE DECLINE OF THE WEST MAX MORPHEW

13-15 WHAT OF THAILAND’S DEMOCRACY KARTIKA MOHD ZAYAD

16-21 LEBANON – RISING FROM THE RUBBLE? KATIE WELLS

22-26 HUMANITARIANISM IN CRISIS ADELE BENSON

27-28 COULD AZERBAIJAN AND ARMENIA PROVIDE THE LATEST SAGA IN CENTURIES OF RUSSO-TURKISH CONFLICT?

TOM SCOTT

29-39 SIERRA LEONE: A DIPLOMAT’S PERSPECTIVE ON THE LONG ROAD TO PEACE

PETER PENFOLD

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Editor’s Note Heloise Giraudon

The fourth volume of the Diplomatic Post, Exeter’s student journal on international affairs, is on the very pertinent topic of ‘crises.’ ‘Crises’, times of intense difficulty or danger, in global politics are numerous, and the effects lasting. Almost everywhere we look, we can see their power and influence. This year, more than ever, we can appreciate this. After a year in which no part of the globe has been left unaffected by the coronavirus epidemic, we have experienced, and witnessed, not only the effects of the health crisis itself, but its ripple effects including the multitude of social, economic, and political impacts which have been triggered by it. Understanding the effects of crises is complex, as they impact places differently depending not only on economic, social and political landscapes, but are also dependent on individual state’s interests. This is explored by David Landsman in his article as he highlights the practicality of crisis diplomacy. Drawing on his experience working as a British diplomat in Athens during the Greek Debt Crisis, he reveals the hugely varied nature of the role of a diplomat, including classic bilateral diplomacy. In the second article, Max Morphew continues to explore diplomacy in international affairs, applied to America. As America faces the rise of China, and challenges to its status as the global hegemon, he discusses the damage done by Trump to the liberal international order. He argues that by re-establishing diplomacy and negotiation as tools to tackle global issues, Biden will re-build the relationships damaged by the Trump presidency. Moving on to a theme which will appear in many of the articles, both Kartika Mohd Zayad and Katie Wells explore in depth how crises, while having devastating impact, can bring hope by revealing inequalities and dissatisfaction with government. They can therefore act as a catalyst for change. Kartika Mohd Zayad questions the political implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in Thailand, and the possibility of reform. With an already deteriorating economy and increased censorship, the impact of COVID-19 on the country has heightened tensions, and Kartika argues that there is a possibility that demands for reforms could be met so that the monarchy can keep its grasp on power. Katie Wells explores the history of government corruption, along with social and economic inequality in Lebanon which has been brought even further into the spotlight following the explosion in the Port of Beirut. The explosion reveals both incompetence and disregard from the government, and in this moment of political and economic crisis it reveals not just the need for reform, but the demand for it too. Crises are not always visible events with tangible effects, which can be seen in the world around us, there can also be crises in systems. Adele Benson, in her article highlights this in relation to humanitarian intervention, as she argues that due to its flawed system, it continues to fail the most vulnerable. States have remained indifferent to the plights of vulnerable people, a pattern which will continue unless reform occurs. She evidences this with an analysis of the plight of the Rohingya. She believes they have been largely ignored, and states should be doing more to condemn the Myanmar government. The final two articles focus on the issue of political violence. Focusing on the possibility of conflict, Tom Scott explores the implications of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia for surrounding countries, and the possibility of it becoming internationalised. Tom argues that further conflict in the region cannot be ruled out, and the threat of Russia becoming involved is the best deterrent against this. 3

Building on the focus of war in the international system, and for the final article, we go back to the practical role of a diplomat. When crisis approaches, a continuation of traditional diplomacy is bolstered with more urgent efforts to mediate, encourage dialogue, and ‘facilitate a nonviolent resolution.1’ Peter Penfold emphasizes this as he discusses his experiences in Sierra Leone as the British High Commissioner during the civil war. He highlights the role he played when violence broke out, and the contribution diplomacy made to restoring the elected government and political stability to the country. This volume of the Diplomatic Post develops a broad exploration into some of the multitude of effects triggered by crises. It combines both student and ex-diplomats insights into the traditional study of crises, and the role, and importance, of diplomacy during these times.

1 Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Preventing deadly conflict: Final report with executive summary. Carnegie Corp New York, (1998) p. 11. 4

Practical Diplomacy in a Crisis: the Example of Greece David Landsman OBE

Diplomats are involved somewhere in all almost all crises, directly as negotiators or mediators, protecting their countrymen and women or just observing and reporting2. The diplomat’s role is determined by the nature of the crisis, its importance globally and on how it impacts on the home country’s interests, political, economic, strategic, consular, commercial.

While historians may regard the role of an individual official in a major negotiation (e.g. US diplomat Richard Holbrooke in the Former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan) as significant, other kinds of crisis diplomacy are unlikely to attract much public attention unless there is a significant failure. In the UK and some other developed countries, public and media attitudes have evolved in recent years to expect diplomats, particularly Heads of Mission, to be personally visible at the site of a crisis affecting significant numbers of their nationals. Their presence as quickly as possible after the arrival of international journalists, their demeanour and their ability to deliver practical results are among the principal criteria on which a Foreign Ministry’s performance is judged, even when governments’ perception of their duty of care to their employees prevents officials from operating as freely in dangerous areas as, say, freelance or citizen journalists.

*****

As a former British diplomat, I worked overseas during two crises: in Belgrade in the late 1990s and in Athens from 2009-13, which is the subject of this article. After some comments on the origins and evolution of the crisis, I focus on the practical considerations impacting on diplomatic activity. I argue that crisis diplomacy consists of multiple operational activities premised on a strategic appreciation of the crisis in the context of the interests of the diplomat’s home country, but is often only distantly related to the object of a classic study of the crisis by scholars of international relations.

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The Greek Debt Crisis (known in Greece simply as “the crisis”) can be thought of as a delayed aftershock of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. The chronic structural weakness of the Greek economy which had been covered up since Greece’s entry to the Eurozone in 2001 – politically, economically and literally (through the use of misleading statistics) - could no longer be concealed once market liquidity evaporated. When Greece joined the Euro, few realised that a small (2.5% of Eurozone GDP at the beginning of the crisis) and largely closed economy could create a systemic threat to the whole Eurozone. However “sui generis” (a much-used

2 In this article, by “diplomat” I refer only to those serving overseas and do not include officials posted to their home Foreign Ministries or other Government Departments. 5 phrase at the time) Greece might be, a Greek default was a potential challenge to the irreversibility of the Eurozone project, which had become a cornerstone of European integration3.

Responsibility for the origins and handling of the crisis has been extensively discussed4. As far as Greece itself is concerned, the structural weaknesses of the economy date back at least to the restoration of democracy in the mid-1970s and were exacerbated throughout the 1980s and beyond. The political system throughout the period was heavily based on patronage – leading to weaker fiscal control – and confrontational – making consensus impossible even in a crisis. The scale of the necessary economic adjustment called for immense sacrifice from a people who had generally become used to a comfortable standard of living. As the Euro is a political as much as an economic project, decisions which in other continents would have been made by the IFIs on a largely technocratic basis, were heavily infused with European politics. As a result, Greece and its Eurozone partners more often than not behaved as though they were engaged in a political negotiation rather than a technical stabilisation process, in a context in which the survival of the Eurozone and several of its “peripheral” economies at one time or other appeared at stake. Finally, the crisis was genuinely novel: a member of a developed world currency union seeking unprecedented support from the IMF was something for which no one had a playbook.

*****

I was British Ambassador in Greece from the beginning of 2009 to early 2013. Before I left London, Peter (now Lord) Ricketts, Foreign Office Permanent Under-Secretary, told me that I should expect a classic bilateral job, encompassing a bit of everything, from politics – mainly the Aegean, Cyprus and the Balkans – to trade promotion and consular protection, with responsibility for around two million British visitors to Greece every year. I took this to mean that I shouldn’t very often expect my reports to reach the top of his intray. In my first posting to Greece in the early 1990s, I had worked on economic policy. In the interim, the Greek economy had grown considerably, had benefited from an Olympics boost in 2004 and most importantly had adopted the Euro. When I arrived as Ambassador, I had not expected that economic work would take up much of my time. In hindsight, my early visits to the economic Ministries felt all too familiar – too little had changed in the behaviour of the public sector to match the growth visible outside. In those early weeks, I met a businessman who seemed to derive some pleasure from commiserating with me about the state of the British economy in early 2009. He assured me that Greece would not suffer such problems. Unlike their British counterparts, he informed me, Greek banks had been sensible and invested in low-risk assets like Greek Government debt5.

3 I would argue that, for all its critics, recent Greek foreign policy has been remarkably successful in securing broad de facto European support for its vital interests (its Euro membership, its relationship with Turkey, Cyprus and the name of – now – North Macedonia). 4 For the earlier period then Finance Minister George Papaconstantinou’s Game Over (CreateSpace, 2016) is a first-hand description of the shock from the first day and his own response. Adults in the Room: My Battle with Europe’s Deep Establishment (Bodley Head, 2017) is a controversial account by Finance Minister Yannis Varoufakis of the second half of the crisis. A more critical Brussels-based account of the Greek role in the later period is in The Last Bluff: How Greece came face-to- face with financial catastrophe & the secret plan for its euro exit by Viktoria Dendrinou and Eleni Varvitsioti (Papadopoulos Publishing, 2019).

5 He was right: Greek banks were conservative and Eurozone sovereign debt was almost universally regarded as a safe bet. 6

On 4 October 2009 the fantasy came to an end. George Papandreou’s PASOK socialist party won the general election by a solid majority, leaving observers confident that Greece would have a stable government for the next four years. Within a few days, Finance Minister George Papaconstantinou had informed his Eurozone colleagues that he had gone through the books and Greece’s fiscal deficit was at least twice as large as the previous government had claimed. Jokes about “Greek statistics” were already familiar currency in Brussels. The European Commission had long known that the numbers were inaccurate but chose not to raise the issue before the election. The reality was even worse than the Commission’s figures suggested. The shock to the markets was the beginning of the worst crisis Greece had faced since the restoration of democracy in 1974. During the period I was in Greece GDP declined by more than 25%. Unemployment reached around 25% and youth unemployment around 50%. Although these figures must be interpreted in context (an important part of the diplomat’s role – see below) they are by any measure staggering.

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A diplomat’s first task in a crisis is to understand as best they can what’s going on and where their home country fits in. In our case, Britain has a long and generally very good relationship with Greece but being outside the Eurozone was not part of the crucial European decision-making. On the one hand, this made me a less sought-after figure than say my German or French colleagues, but equally I was not the target of Greek popular frustration. I reflected that in my early days in Athens if I had heard the sounds of a demonstration outside my window, I would assume that we were the object of someone’s anger, but by the time I left it was almost certainly directed at my German colleague across the road. On only one occasion was the UK briefly in the direct line of fire, after Prime Minister David Cameron and Home Secretary Theresa May indicated that they would consider restrictions on Greek citizens entering the UK if the crisis caused a mass exodus. This led to me being summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to receive an official complaint – a very rare occurrence between two friendly European countries and another small indicator of the exceptional situation.

This incident was a reminder that the UK did have a strong interest in what was playing out in Greece. Britain was still a member of the European Union and of the IMF. As an IMF member Britain would have to contribute to any bailout. As a non-Euro EU member, Britain could have made a further contribution, but in terms of domestic politics it was important for the British Government to be able to distance itself from such a commitment.

Many other British interests in Greece were potentially in play: not just strategic, but commercial and consular too. My task was first to understand what was really going on, keep the authorities at home informed and plan for a range of eventualities, both political and practical. Understanding what is going on is the classic part of bilateral diplomacy, both through direct contact with decisionmakers and those close to them and to those with diverse insights. A question on which diplomats sometimes disagree is on how much effort to put into engaging with fellow diplomats. In my view, diplomatic colleagues can add

7 considerable value to one’s own analysis, as the best will bring insightful and diverse perspectives based on their home country’s interests and relationships, as well as their personal experience around the world.

While the bilateral diplomat’s primary role is to understand the local dynamics, it is important to keep in mind the bigger picture: what matters to the people in the street outside your office may bear little resemblance to what concerns leaders in Brussels, Washington or London. In the case of an economic crisis, markets are interested in geopolitics to the extent that they impact on investments, often short term. From the global perspective, Greek hardship was neither here nor there: what mattered was the unexpected systemic threat to the Euro.

There’s another dimension to many foreign crises which diplomats forget at their peril: the domestic political dimension. Even back in 2009 Europe was a big issue in UK politics and the Greek crisis risked further disturbing a delicate debate. The big decisions on the first bailout coincided with the 2010 British General Election. In the last days of the Labour Government Chancellor Alistair Darling had to agree the policy direction with his Conservative counterpart George Osborne to ensure that it had the support of a possible alternative Government. When Osborne became Chancellor a few days later, it was in a coalition government in which the approach to the EU was to become the deepest fault line between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats.

Though career diplomats rarely engage with politics at home, they need to bear in mind that their reporting will be read – by Ministers and the officials advising them – at least in part through a domestic political prism. Conscious of course that the prevailing view in the UK – and especially the Conservative Party - was against joining the Euro, I needed to be explicit that a substantial majority of Greeks wanted to remain in the single currency at almost any cost. Frustrated by the scepticism with which my advice landed, I attempted at one point to put the debate to bed with a report on “ten reasons why Greece won’t leave the Eurozone voluntarily”. I equally urged caution about reports that Germany was about to force Greece out. Sitting in Athens, it wasn’t my place to second guess German policy. But I could confidently assert that Greece wouldn’t quit easily – like a man clinging onto a rock for dear life, they wouldn’t fall unless pushed very hard – and, I wondered, did Germany have the appetite for that?

You might think that as a diplomat the first thing you should do in the morning is read the local press (if you can, or at least a translated summary). Equally important is to read media from your own country (before the internet, someone in London would be charged with faxing press cuttings to Embassies). You need to read the “home” press because that’s what your Ministers and senior officials will be reading. You should consider quickly whether you agree that your own press has got the nuances right and if not say so quickly in order that Ministers read your comments soon after they’ve seen the papers. The same applies to interpreting the graphic images from the broadcast media. I lost count of the people watching British television who thought I was risking my life in a war zone after they’d seen carefully-prepared television footage of a demonstration. “Ah yes”, I’d say, “I know where you mean: I was sitting outside drinking coffee 100 meters from that one…. Don’t worry, it’s safe.”

It’s important to remember that while the diplomat on the ground is the “expert” on the country, they write for a broad readership at home, from Foreign Ministers to officials in many government departments with specific interests and probably little detailed knowledge of the country in question. Information needs to be interpreted for the audience. For example, Greek civil servants at one point suffered a 25% nominal cut

8 in their salaries as part of the fiscal stabilisation programme. This was indeed dramatic and caused considerable suffering. But it was important to remind a British official reading such statistics that many Greek civil servants would have a second part-time job as well as the possibility of some financial support from an extended family; and they’d be unlikely to have the size of mortgage their British counterparts have to service.

The more of a country’s citizens close to the crisis, the more the consular dimension dominates political thinking. What if Greece were to crash out of the Eurozone in mid-summer, potentially leaving thousands of British tourists stranded without access to money and a way home? The fact that we spent a great deal of time on contingency planning (along with colleagues from London and elsewhere) doesn’t mean that I thought this was at all a likely outcome, just that if it did come to pass, the impact would be severe.

This Greek crisis was without a doubt desperately serious both for many Greek citizens and for the Eurozone. At the same time, for the diplomat, the headline crisis may not be the only preoccupation. Sometimes, it will be all-absorbing, as I found in Belgrade in the late 1990s. But in Greece, tourists still came and business was still being done. In 2012 a day or so after the fall of one of the interim governments, we participated in the Olympic torch lighting ceremony for London 2012 and were joined by a large delegation led the Princess Royal, Boris Johnson then Mayor of London, the Minister for Sport and David Beckham. In the weeks beforehand, as half of the Embassy was following the latest political and diplomatic activity, the other half was planning a Royal visit and a host of Olympics celebrations. In a sense, for us each became as important as the other.

What does the Greek story tell us about a diplomat in a crisis? First, the diplomat is carrying out a wide range of tasks in parallel. What they do and how they do it has some similarity with the roles of others, for example journalists, but the tasks are much more diverse. It became fashionable in the 1970s and since to argue that in the modern world a country doesn’t need Ambassadors, only a copy of the FT and a fax machine (before the age of the internet). It wasn’t true then and isn’t now. Finally, while a strategic understanding of the crisis and of one’s own country’s interests in it is absolutely necessary for the diplomat, it is not by any means sufficient. Crisis diplomacy is usually a very practical business.

David Landsman OBE is a former British Ambassador to Albania and Greece. He is now Chairman of Cerebra Global Strategy (www.cgstrategy.org)

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Crisis Aversion: How a Biden Presidency can Reverse the Decline of the West Max Morphew

For many observers, the West is seen to be in decline. Or rather, the United States is declining when compared to the accelerated growth of China. To go with this, the recent swathes of anti-establishment rhetoric has also brought into question the continuance of international institutions such as the European Union. What once was a cornerstone of the international order is now being questioned as it struggles to justify itself in a world which increasingly seems to not want it. Recently, we have seen more examples of the world moving away from the Liberal International Order, most prominently in the promotion of America First by Donald Trump. There is no question that there are challenges facing the international order, but a Biden Presidency would tackle these head on and restore America’s standing on the world stage while reasserting its commitment to the liberal international order. For the past four years we have seen Donald Trump present an America First agenda in International Relations. In this time the United States has pulled out of the Iran Nuclear Deal, World Health Organisation and the 2015 Paris climate change agreement6. Alarmingly, it seemed to take a big effort from his staff to get him to stay in NATO, as he questioned its necessity and the cost the US was contributing as opposed to its other members7. Again, this shows the strength of the United States and the reliance its allies have on it. What we have seen then draws parallels with the United States’ various flirtations with isolationism throughout history but in a slightly different way. In the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s the US was largely absent from international affairs. It did not join the League of Nations and sought to avoid getting involved with “Europe’s problems” but as we all as know this changed after 1945. However, the difference with Trump is that America is retreating because it doesn’t see the point. Despite being the architect of the international system, it feels as if this liberal world order is not a good deal for the United States and that it can do better alone, where it can put America First. Arguably, these traits have been present throughout history. For example, The US pushed ahead with the invasion of Iraq, despite not gaining United Nations approval8. Seen here, the US cooperates when it can and does what it thinks is best despite a lack of approval. While some see this as good for America, it has weakened the Western alliances and undermined relationships. What was once a dependable ally is now more unpredictable, causing a nightmare for strategic planning and long-term partnerships. Within the America First rhetoric there is also harm in the cases where it is ambivalent. For example, the United States still remains in a unique position and is still massively influential but there is no concerted effort to build on this, leading to a lack of leadership and direction. In recent years, the United States has gradually fallen in

6BBC, “Coronavirus: Biden vows to reverse Trump WHO withdrawal” 8 July (2020), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada- 53332354 BBC, “Iran nuclear deal: Trump pulls US out in break with Europe allies” 9 May (2018), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us- canada-44045957 Louise Boyle, “Trump calls it a 'disaster'. But what does the Paris Climate Accord mean for the US?” Independent, 1 October (2020), https://www.independent.co.uk/infact/paris-accord-climate-change-environment-2020-presidential-debate-trump- biden-b719296.html 7Andrew McDonald, “John Bolton: Trump could pull US out of NATO” October 1 (2020), https://www.politico.eu/article/john- bolton-trump-could-pull-us-out-of-nato/?ref=hvper.com 8“The war on Iraq is illegal and illegitimate” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, accessed 24 October (2020). https://www.wagingpeace.org/the-war-on-iraq-as-illegal-and-illegitimate/ 10 terms of its soft power due to this and yet to no avail9. Why is this the US’ role and why can’t someone else do it? Because no one can match the strength of the United States and what more, it is has built a system that uniquely benefits itself. Yet, in the era of Donald Trump, it is not using this in a time when it is needed most. However, with the election of Joe Biden, we will see a return to the previous status quo and a return to an American commitment to the international order. Biden has already committed to re-joining the World Health Organisation and the Paris Climate Change agreement in a complete reversal of Trump’s rejection of them. With this would come the restoration of American leadership and a restatement of commitment to strengthening and expanding the Western alliances that have endured for so long. For in Biden is the belief that cooperation creates the best outcomes for all and in a time when we face some of the most pressing issues in a generation it is needed now more than ever. At home, Biden plans a nearly USD$2trillion deal to transform the economy into one that is carbon neutral and internationally he plans to work with countries through diplomacy and negotiation to aim just as high10. Here then we see how Biden understands that in the current world we need global solutions to global issues and not just policies that benefit one nation. Some still question the Biden presidency’s possible effect on the special relationship. With the United Kingdom seeking to abdicate from at least parts of the Withdrawal agreement, Biden has made it clear that he does not approve and would not seek a deal with Britain if it undermined the Good Friday Agreement11. Of course, this still largely depends on an EU-British trade deal if one were to be agreed. At the time of writing, both sides are still engaged in a deadlock where it looks increasingly unlikely that a deal will be reached, but this is politics and anything could happen. A Biden presidency would not look kindly upon the undermining of the Good Friday Agreement but despite this I think it remains a possibility that a deal could happen. There are many competing views on the matter and for those that choose to follow the American decline narrative there is even more disagreement about how to combat it. From a primarily neoconservative viewpoint, the United States’ best option to prevent decline is to push further outward to spread key American values12. Conversely, there are also those who advocate restraint and shifting emphasis to other state’s so that it is not just the US providing security13. For many though the real prospect of decline in the face of a rising China has become a reality and so the strategy is more about managing the decline. Of course, when I talk about decline, I mean in terms of superpower level, it is still entirely plausible and likely that the US would remain at the number two spot. It is important to remember though the fact that the current international system is one of American design and so can, in effect, act as a failsafe against any decline. Regardless though, a Biden presidency would restore US leadership and provide a much more focused strategy even in the face of decline. Having been in office as Obama’s Vice-President and hence a key decision maker in the Obama administration it is a safe bet to assume that Biden will follow Obama era policies, including the pivot to Asia and the Trans Pacific Partnership. In fact, much of Trump’s abdication from the world stems from

9“Soft Power 30 rankings” Soft Power 30, accessed 24 October (2020). https://softpower30.com/country/united- states/?country_years=2017,2018,2019 10“The Biden plan for a clean energy revolution and environmental justice” Joe Biden, accessed 24 October (2020). https://joebiden.com/climate-plan/ 11Luke McGee, “Joe Biden reminds Boris Johnson the world is watching Brexit -- and some are not impressed” CNN, 17 September (2020), https://edition.cnn.com/2020/09/17/uk/joe-biden-brexit-tweet-intl-gbr/index.html 12Stephen McGlinchley, “Neoconservatism and American Foreign Policy” E-International Relations, 1 June (2009), https://www.e- ir.info/2009/06/01/neo-conservatism-and-american-foreign-policy/ 13Barry R. Posen, "The Case for Restraint," The American Interest, Vol. 3, No. 1, November-December (2007). http://www.the- american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=331 11 contradicting Obama’s foreign policy, of which we know Biden was heavily involved in. Overall though, Biden would restore American leadership and tackle the most pressing issues through diplomacy and negotiation. In return, the United States would be able to restore its reputation and regain the lost years of the Trump administration as America sets about combatting its and the West’s decline. There are many who disagree with Joe Biden, and not everyone will agree with him on every issue, but this is a defining moment for the future of the world. We are at a crucial moment where the US is now facing challenges from other states to remain the global hegemon, climate change action is scarce and limited, not to mention lacking a global response, and there are some who question the very foundations of the international system. A Biden presidency means that these challenges can be met head on and solved together. More consequentially, a Biden presidency marks the end of the America First agenda that has been thoroughly damaging to the United States’ leadership and reputation abroad.

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What of Thailand’s Democracy

Kartika Mohd Zayad

If there’s anything that the COVID-19 pandemic has brought (besides the over 1 million deaths up to date), it is revealing the long kept hidden anger and dissatisfaction towards governments. Thailand presents a unique case for how it has fared throughout the COVID-19 pandemic. This pandemic has exposed existing faults in government effectiveness, and led to a monumental amount of crises globally.

Thailand has faced a long history of government protests. Much of what we know about the crisis in Thailand is probably from media that has been approved by the local Thai government. Hence, we know from little to almost nothing of the real truth of what’s really happening. I will try my best to sum up the political implications of the protests though it deserves much longer length of recognition. This article will examine how the current protests are more powerful than ever as well as exploring the COVID-19 effects in the current crisis. Towards the end, I will briefly discuss whether these protests will bring reforms and change, or the downfall of the Thai monarchy and the current military junta.

While most of Europe and the world has been kept indoors in the last few weeks to flatten the COVID-19 curve, tens of thousands of Thai protesters have been peacefully protesting against the current junta military and monarchy. Protests in Thailand are not uncommon, however these differ significantly as the crowd which have come out in defiance come from all ranges of society - from the old, to the young, to the students, all of whom are demanding for a more transparent democracy. Since the military takeover in 2014, Thailand has been facing a deteriorating state of economy which has been an effect not only from the China trade war but also from unstable economic policies contributed by political uncertainties. Additionally, in terms of access to free media and speech, the Thai people are also facing a heightened amount of censorship which aims to uphold Thailand’s section 112 royal defamation law14.

With all that’s going on in Thailand, despite the protests, the military junta are taking a different approach in handling the situation. With horrible memories of past protests, notably the ‘Red Shirt Protests’ in 2010 which ended violently and spilled blood on the streets15, the junta is adopting a more defensive strategy of waiting out on the demonstrators during the protests. Students are also joined by the prominent known ‘red shirts’ group which have been fighting for democracy for over 10 years16. However, lessons from the past have shown how these situations are capable of escalating violently. The protests currently going on differ greatly from past protests in Thailand because they are stronger than ever. Joined by groups of powerful voices and in an era where the youth are taking precedence in politics, the world is intently watching the crackdown in

14 Times of India, “What is Thailand's 'section 112' royal defamation law?”, October 15, (2020), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/what-is-thailands-section-112-royal-defamation- law/articleshow/78676387.cms (accessed October 18, 2020)

15 Human Rights Watch, “Descent Into Chaos: Thailand’s 2010 Red Shirt Protests and the Government Crackdown”, May 2, (2011), https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/05/03/descent-chaos/thailands-2010-red-shirt-protests-and-government-crackdown (accessed October 18, 2020)

16 The Nation Thailand, “Red-shirt leaders insists they will join Oct 14 protests, observers think otherwise” October 12, (2020), https://www.nationthailand.com/news/30396077?utm_source=category&utm_medium=internal_referral (accessed 18 October, 2020)

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Thailand. Pressures received from international critics and after a long battle for media transparency, people are understanding the atrocities of the military government which makes the protests much louder.

Certainly, the COVID-19 pandemic has also been playing a huge role in this fight for reforms. Despite much of the media we’ve read about how well Thailand has been handling the pandemic, the reality is much more harsh. The media information has little truth to how bad the economic impact has been. For an economy heavily reliant on tourism, there are gaps in which we can understand how the pandemic is impacting the economy. An effort made by the Thai Hotels Association (THA) in understanding the impact has hit a brick wall as there’s a “statistical black hole” as to the number of hotels operating in the country (data which is provided by the government)- again, this reverts back to the issue of transparency in the country17.

As COVID-19 ravages through societies and torments the young and the old, Thai people have been gaining wider access to previously banned media content on the secret expenditures of the royal monarch. Adding to the deteriorating living standards with the loss of jobs and livelihoods, this discovery of censored information couldn’t have come at a worse time. Under section 112 of Thailand's penal code, it has acted as a shield for the monarchy as they are protected from criticisms from the public. In 2017, UN special rapporteur David Kaye urged the regime to stop adopting lèse-majesté prosecutions as it had “no place in a democracy”18. I argue that the implications of COVID-19 in Thailand have the potential to create a new form of democracy in Thailand. I may be overestimating the Thai monarchy, however, in the cries of desperation and anger, amplified by the pandemic, demands and reforms may be met in order for the monarchy to continue its reign.

With weaker governments and global watchers, will that put enough pressure for the junta government to finally resign after 6 years? And will that be the time for Thailand to vote for a democratic state? Such an optimistic outlook isn’t impossible- after all, the government has been facing increased backlash since its takeover in 2014. For many hopeful Thais, this could only be the biggest opportunity for them to oust the junta government.

The other possible outcome could be monarchical reforms. However, the process for that to happen is long and complicated and conservative Thai royalists would undoubtedly make it extremely difficult to happen. An associate professor at Chulalongkorn University, Thitinan Pongsudhirak, has argued19 that the monarchical institution is deeply embedded in the Thai system which will delay even further for any progressive reforms. He suggests, “It is unlikely to change quickly and sufficiently to end up with the "genuine constitutional monarchy", as demanded by the student-led reform movement.”

It wouldn't be surprising if we learn that the government has lost popularity, however it’ll be sufficient enough for the junta military to stay in power long enough to sort its political unrest. This round of protests being stronger now because they are joined by the famous ‘red shirts’ isn’t concrete enough to oust the government, as previous memories have proven those efforts to be unsuccessful. We may see increased transparency in the way the government and monarchy operate, but there’s little confidence that will be enough to bring about substantial change.

17 Asia Times, “Thailand’s COVID success turns economic failure” August 14, (2020), https://asiatimes.com/2020/08/thailands- covid-success-turns-economic-failure/ (accessed 18 October, 2020)

18 International Federation For Human Rights, “UN expert calls for end to lèse-majesté prosecutions amid more arbitrary detentions” 10 October (2017), https://www.fidh.org/en/region/asia/thailand/un-expert-calls-for-end-to-lese-majeste- prosecutions-amid-more (accessed 18 October 2020)

19 Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Where to start Thai reform and change?” Bangkok Post, 2 October (2020), https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/1995051/where-to-start-thai-reform-and-change- (accessed 18 October 2020) 14

The world needs to know what’s going on in Thailand, because we’ve seen how international attention has the power to inflict an enormous change in times of crisis.

15

Lebanon – Rising from the Rubble? Katie Wells

Lebanon, a nation built on rich history and culture, moulded by imperialism and known for its religious pluralism. Lebanon, as we have seen in the past couple years has been struggling economically and politically, to the point where the Lebanese people have lost faith in the governing elite and subsequently in the system. Thus, the explosion on the 4th August 2020 in the Port of Beirut only exacerbated the rising tensions and the people’s demand for reform. However, to understand how Lebanon came to be at this watershed moment we must comprehend how and why Lebanon’s system of government was formed and the nature of the relationship between sectarian leaders and governance of the country. Lebanon is comprised of different sectarian groups, and 18 religious’ groups, all of whom originated before the Ottoman Empire and each had their own legal and governing system in accordance with the Ottoman’s millet tanzimat system. Today, this concept of religious pluralism is known as confessionalism.20 The sectarian makeup of Lebanon involves four Muslim groups of Sunni and Shia sects, twelve Christian groups, mainly Maronite Christians, who are either Greek Catholic or Greek Orthodox. There is also the Druze, an Arabic-speaking ancient ethno-religious group, Jews, Buddhists, Hindus and smaller Christian denominations including Mormons.21 Confessionalism was prominent even under the French mandate (1923 – 1946). It was in 1946, that Lebanon established its own governmental system in the National Pact of 1943, which involved a ‘series of compromises between the French mandatory power and indigenous elites’.22 A democratic political system was established in order to appeal to all these sectarian groups, and to provide the demographic of Lebanon’s population with the same rights and duties without discrimination and to balance the power.23 Furthermore, many people relied and indeed continue to rely on the leaders of their sectarian groups to not only provide political representation but economic assistance as well.24 However, with acknowledgement of the good intentions that established this system, the question that still stands is whether this system has retained its relevance thirty years after the end of the Civil War? The only certified census on the demographic of the Lebanese population was found in 1932, stating that 51% of the Lebanese population were Christians, hence why the Maronite Christians were granted more power in the original blueprint of the system.25 However, there is much to disparage this census as under the mandate many Muslims were not granted citizenship and so the census is not legitimate. Therefore, the

20 Seeker. February, (2017). “The 18 Religions That Make Up Lebanon’s Government”. Seeker. 0:33 – 1:01. https://www.seeker.com/the-18-religions-that-make-up-lebanons-government-2288207842.html.

21 Ibid. 1:01 – 1:45. 22 Hinnenbusch, Raymond, Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. 2014. “The Foreign Policies Of Middle East States”. 2nd ed. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. pp. 108 – 110. 23 Seeker. February, (2017). “The 18 Religions That Make Up Lebanon’s Government”. Seeker. 0:46 – 2:10.. https://www.seeker.com/the-18-religions-that-make-up-lebanons-government-2288207842.html.

24 TRT World. November, (2019). “It’s complicated: Lebanon’s political system”. YouTube. 0:20 – 0:50. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NMVVd97SEBE.

25 Hinnenbusch, Raymond, Ehteshami, Anoushiravan. (2014). “The Foreign Policies Of Middle East States”. 2nd ed. London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. pp. 108. 16 most powerful position in the Republic, the presidency was and still is reserved for Maronite Christians, despite the fact that now only around 30% of Lebanon is Christian and 70% are Muslim.26 As it stands still, the Prime minister is Sunni Muslim and the Speaker of Parliament is Shia Muslim. Moreover, Parliament seats are split at a ratio of 6:5 in favour of the Christians.27 Evidently this system, which was meant to be a platform of equality for these sects, inadvertently created an imbalance of power and intensified these divisions. It was the combination of the Palestinian refugee crisis in the second half of the 20th Century and these sectarian tensions over government that led to 15 years of civil war in 1975.28 After many years of destruction and chaos, these groups came together in 1989 to sign the Taif agreement, which moved much of the President’s authority to the cabinet and increased the number of Muslim MPs.29 This ended the civil war and created the Second Republic. The democratic election in 1992 propelled the business tycoon, Rafik Hariri, to the position of Prime Minister of Lebanon. Hariri aimed to rebuild Lebanon’s economy under a cabinet comprising of Muslims and Christians.30 However, in 2005 Hariri was assassinated, which was later said to be by a senior official of the Shia Muslim group, Hezbollah. Hariri was succeeded by his son Saad Hariri, who formed a unity government in 2009 with Walid Jumblatt. Jumblatt headed the Druze community of 300,000 in Lebanon and was said to be supported by Hezbollah as well as the Syrian Alawi government.31 From this alone, we can begin to see the complex nature of Lebanese governance and how reliant on precarious alliances it is. These alliances justifiably make the public in Lebanon question the incumbent government’s motives. There are seven major political parties, many previously born of militias, split into two camps. The first being the March 8 alliance, consisting of the Free Patriotic Movement, run by the Christians and Hezbollah.32 Hezbollah is probably the most widely spoken about parties in Lebanon established after the civil war, it represents the Shia sect in Lebanon and is sponsored by the Shia Islamic republic of Iran. There are two parts of the party, the political wing of the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc party and the paramilitary wing of the Jihad council.33 Thus, Hezbollah is treated with suspect and designated as a terrorist organisation by the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, the Arab league and the Gulf Cooperation Council.34 The other alliance is known as the March 14 alliance and comprises of the Future

26 Ibid. pp. 109. 27 TRT World. November, (2019). “It’s complicated: Lebanon’s political system”. YouTube. 0:50 – 1:20. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NMVVd97SEBE. 28 Ibid. 1:20 – 1:30. 29 Ibid. 1:40 – 2:00. 30 "Rafic Al-Hariri | Biography, History, & Assassination". (2020). Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Rafiq-al-Hariri. 31 TRT World. November, (2019). “It’s complicated: Lebanon’s political system”. YouTube. 2:10 – 2:20. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NMVVd97SEBE. 32 Seeker. February, (2017). “The 18 Religions That Make Up Lebanon’s Government”. Seeker. 2:30 – 2:35. https://www.seeker.com/the-18-religions-that-make-up-lebanons-government-2288207842.html. 33 TRT World. November, (2019). “It’s complicated: Lebanon’s political system”. YouTube. 2:10 – 2:20. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NMVVd97SEBE. 2:20 – 2:30. 34 AlJazeera. February, (2020). “Why Are The People Protesting In Lebanon”. YouTube. 6:00 – 6:30. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mtZC4vvZK8k.

17 movement, which represents the Sunni Muslims and was previously led by Rafik Hariri and then Saad Hariri. It also involves the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Christian Kataeb party.35 This political system may seem to be religiously diverse, but it evidently does not represent the people of Lebanon today nor does it address the matters and problems that the people face. In 2018 protests across Lebanon broke out, initially protesting against austerity measures proposed by the government, which included a tax on popular social media apps.36 The protests also campaigned for free medical care, lower food prices, tax cuts and most importantly the end to corruption.37 In response to these protests the cabinet approved of reforms, created an anti-corruption panel and the Prime minister Saad Hariri stepped down in 2019.38 However, this did not stop the people from protesting, as many wanted a complete refurbishment of the political system. These protests highlighted the change of attitude in political involvement. These protests were not at all sectarian nor was it class specific, just a new generation who were frustrated with the corruption that has thrived in this sectarian political system.39 So, the question is, how justifiable were these protests and how has corruption manifested in daily life in Lebanon? In Aljazeera’s interview with local activists and journalist, Tamara Rasamny and Habib Battah, in February 2020, highlight the domestic issues that the Lebanese people have to deal with every day, such as not having 24/7 access to electricity or clean accessible drinking water. Neither do they have a proper waste management or sewage system.40 Thus, they end up polluting their waters and the Mediterranean Sea, which further affects the previously successful fishing industry.41 Furthermore, Lebanon has around 220 km of coastline and 150 km of that is privately owned by former governmental officials or friends of. Privatisation of institutions or public affairs is not uncommon in Lebanon, the revenue of around 900 parking meters in Beirut go directly to a private company controlled by the Lebanese American consortium Duncan- Wead, in a contract with the Traffic authority; generating an annual income of 10 billion Lebanese pounds ($6 million USD).42 Theoretically, the revenue of the parking meters should be contributing to traffic light and road repair. However, as Zeina Khodr from Aljazeera highlights, the majority of the Lebanese populations choose to still support the sectarian system due to ideological reasons or because they benefit from the system; there are 400,000 people employed by the public sector.43 Yet, in 2019 Hassan Diab, computer engineering professor, became prime minister. Diab set up a new government that he described as government “made up of technocrats of no political loyalties”.44 However, in reality they were the same government just “with

35 Seeker. February, (2017). “The 18 Religions That Make Up Lebanon’s Government”. Seeker. 2:36 – 2:45. https://www.seeker.com/the-18-religions-that-make-up-lebanons-government-2288207842.html. 36 TRT World. November, (2019). “It’s complicated: Lebanon’s political system”. YouTube. 2:45 – 2:50. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NMVVd97SEBE. 37 Staff, Reuters. December, (2018). "Lebanese Protest Over Economy And Politics, Briefly Closing Some Roads". U.S.. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-protest-idUSKCN1OM0J0. 38 TRT World. November, (2019). “It’s complicated: Lebanon’s political system”. YouTube. 2:55 – 3:25. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NMVVd97SEBE. 39 AlJazeera. February, (2020). “Why Are The People Protesting In Lebanon”. YouTube. 1:15 – 1:35. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mtZC4vvZK8k. 40 Ibid. 2:00 – 2:15. 41 Ibid. 4:30 – 4:40. 42 MEO. (2020). "Beirut's Parking Meters: Where Does the Money Go? | MEO". MEO. https://middle-east-online.com/en/beiruts- parking-meters-where-does-money-go. 43 AlJazeera. February, (2020). “Why Are The People Protesting In Lebanon”. YouTube. 4:55 – 5:10. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mtZC4vvZK8k. 44 Ibid. 5:20 – 5:55. 18 different faces” as the government still have the support of the March 8 alliance, and so Hezbollah’s support.45 As both come hand in hand, we can understand the extent of Lebanon’s crises by their economic situation. Currently, Lebanon has the World’s third highest debt to GDP ratio.46 It has $94.3 billion USD in debt, with public debt growing from 131% GDP in 2012 to around 176% at the end of 2019.47 The former finance minister had previously expressed that Lebanon would need at a minimum of $20 billion USD from the IMF or World Bank.48 In 2018, international donors agreed to give $11 billion USD in loans and grants but have delayed their offers as a result of the ongoing political crisis.49 Thus, they are unsure as to where that money will go as well as acknowledging that for the money to be fully effective the system in Lebanon must be fully reformed. As Maya Yahya, from the Carnegie Middle East Centre, stated “The message Beirut is getting is enough is enough, you need to undertake painful but necessary reforms in order for this funding to be released”.50 Even before the blast, from 2018 to 2020, the value of the Lebanese pound had dropped by 60% and the banks were limiting cash withdrawal to $200 USD per week.51 This an immense amount of pressure to put on country of 6 million, whose economy has not totally recovered from the civil war and has the responsibility of taking in 1.5 million refugees from surrounding states.52 Therefore, this socio-political and economic battleground had already been created before 2020 and the conditions only became harsher under the Coronavirus pandemic. However, the explosion at the port in Beirut has undoubtedly pushed Lebanon to breaking point on 4th August 2020. Around 3000 tonnes of ammonium nitrate were stored in one of the warehouses at the Port and caught fire, leaving a crater with a diameter of 124m with around 1,800 tonnes of TNT (energy), which is roughly equivalent to 1/15th of the atomic blast at the Hiroshima at the close of the Second World War.53 At least 200 people were killed, 6000 injured and 300,000 were left homeless as result of this devastating incident.54 However, it has shone a light on the corrupt system in Lebanon that allowed this gross act of negligence. On the 10th August, Diab’s government resigned, after rejecting a proposal for an international inquiry into the incident, resulting in further protests. According to Aljazeera, for 6 years port officials had reportedly asked judges for an order to move 3000 tonnes that was stored in the warehouse, but they never received a response.55 Subsequently, some of the customs officials were put under house arrest. The mismanagement of the safety regulations for the storage of the ammonium nitrate as well as the aftermath, demonstrates the ineffectiveness of Lebanon’s government. This has been corroborated on a global scale, as the €253 million pledged by

45 Ibid. 5:50 – 6:05. 46 Ibid. 6:30 – 6:36. 47 Staff, Reuters. October, (2020). "Factbox: Lebanon's Spiralling Economic Crisis". U.K.. https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon- crisis-factbox/factbox-lebanons-spiralling-economic-crisis-idUKKBN2761M1. 48 AlJazeera. February, (2020). “Why Are The People Protesting In Lebanon”. YouTube. 6:39 – 6:50. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mtZC4vvZK8k. 49 Ibid. 6:50 – 7:00. 50 Ibid. 7:00 – 7:11. 51 Ibid. 7:11 – 7:25. 52 Devi, Sharmilla. August, (2020). “Lebanon faces humanitarian emergency after blast”. Lancet. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7426079/.

53 Chough, Vincent. August, (2020). “Beirut and Hiroshima – a comparison”. Third Millennium Man. https://3rdmillenniumman.com/2020/08/06/beirut-and-hiroshima-a-comparison/.

54 Devi, Sharmilla. August, (2020). “Lebanon faces humanitarian emergency after blast”. Lancet. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7426079/. 55 Ibid. 19 international donors has been held back until the government listens to the protesters’ demands for reform, which Emmanuel Macron reiterated in his speech in Beirut in August.56 Furthermore, this has put a huge strain on Lebanon’s healthcare system, which had already been suffering from Covid-19. From the World Health Organisation’s report, three hospitals in Beirut were deemed to be non-functional and two suffered severe damage as a result of the explosion.57 A further 17 containers of medical supplies with PPE were destroyed at the Port. 58Thus, the explosion caused up to an estimated $15 billion USD’s worth of damage to the city.59 The destruction to the port was incredibly harmful to the already declining economic and food security, being a major entry point for 80% - 85% of Lebanon’s food supplies.60 Consequently, the value of the Lebanese pound fell another 20% to -80% after the explosion, making the importation of medicine and medical equipment more expensive.61 In addition to the extensive damage to the port and the Lebanese economy, the blast also resulted in the release of a large quantity of harmful chemicals, some of which are known to be carcinogenic. Roy Harrison, Professor of environmental health at the University of Birmingham highlighted at the Lancet Journal, “The main long-term hazard is from combustion products such as polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, which are carcinogenic”.62 The blast has also released other chemicals such as asbestos and silica from destroyed buildings.63 Yet Lebanon does not have a pollution monitoring system to understand the extent of this chemical exposure. From Aljazeera’s interviews in August we can start to comprehend the hardships the people of Lebanon are now experiencing, not just in the immediate but for the foreseeable future. Karim Mahdisi, a political analyst and founding director of the Public Policy and international affairs program at the American University in Beirut, stresses the need to channel protesters’ anger into “productive change”.64 He highlights how “there are no real progressive voices”, its recreating the same system and despite having free elections, “there is not much choice”.65 Rama Khoury, a political activist and the founding member of Beirut Madinati, took a more intense approach, going as so far to say that it was not just okay for the government to resign but “the President [Michel Aoun] of the Republic needs to go”.66 She like many of those who are protesting, are demanding accountability and transparency, which they are unlikely to receive anytime soon in this current political situation. Alia Mouabayed, a Managing Director of Jeffries, Former Director of the Geo-economic and strategy at the International Institute for Strategic studies and a Former Senior economist for the World Bank, explained the situation very well: “Economics and politics are two sides of the same coin and therefore there is no way you can have economic progress and economic development without a proper governance environment, rule of law and strong institutions that hold people accountable and provide the right environment for businesses”, local and international.67 There are three points demonstrated in all three of these interviews; Lebanon is in need of political transparency, accountability and reform.

56 Ibid. 57 Devi, Sharmilla. August, (2020). “Lebanon faces humanitarian emergency after blast”. Lancet. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7426079/. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid 63 Ibid. 64 AlJazeera. August, (2020). “Will the Beirut explosion lead to political change in Lebanon”. YouTube. 7:00 – 7:23. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TR4RtJ5k6y4. 65 Ibid. 6:00 – 6:35. 66 Ibid. 7:45 – 9:05. 67 Ibid. 11:00 – 12:15. 20

The question remains, where does Lebanon go from here? The immediate solution to help the Lebanese people rebuild after the explosion is fast donations. However, they clearly cannot do that at a state level, instead people are donating through NGOs, charities and apolitical initiatives based in Lebanon, such as the Lebanese Red Cross, Lebanese Food Bank, SESOBEL, SOS Villages, Arcenciel and so on.68 The long term, however, is more complex. Mouabayed from earlier gave Lebanon two scenarios, the first being that Lebanon chooses to reform and has early elections, creating a transitional or new government and allowing an independent government to discuss relief with the international community and an immediate and long- term aid program, and so “an orderly exit from the financial crisis”.69 The other option being Lebanon survives off humanitarian aid, but this is not enough for repairing the destruction of the blast and the legacy of its failed economy.70 This will then lead to hyperinflation and further erosion of the Lebanese pound, and potentially even mass migration, which will erode Lebanon’s human capital - thus making it harder to reverse the crisis as they will never be able to recover the “growth potential Lebanon needs in the future”.71 The latter of these options will result in Lebanon taking much longer to recover – multiple decades rather than the single decade required by the first option. For Lebanon to continue to suffer from so much hardship, thirty years after the conclusion of its civil war, one simply has to question its governance. It is clear that Lebanon has reached a breaking point. The shocking explosion, as well as sweeping away large parts of downtown Beirut, has also swept away the charade of a functioning government. Therefore, these protests have rightly demonstrated that the Lebanese political system is in need of reform in order to survive. The economic crisis has reached such proportions that international aid is being held back. Instead of being bailed out by the international community, Lebanon must begin to help itself. It remains to be seen how Lebanon will do this and as Mahdisi stated above, the protesters need to use that anger to make effective change.72 Whilst some see the government’s resignation as a blank slate, others see a power vacuum developing which may be exploited by third parties, such as Hezbollah. This exploitation will only act as a deterrence; the United States has already proposed sanctions and blacklisting Michel Aoun’s son-in-law Gebran Bassil, who has served as minister of telecoms, of energy and water and of foreign affairs in Aoun’s Christian Free Patriotic Movement in the March 8 Alliance with Hezbollah.73 Therefore, in this moment of crisis, the international community waits expectantly for Aoun’s next move, and the reaction of the Lebanese populace to it. Hopefully this will result in effective change.

68 arab.org, “Lebanon: Where To Donate?” arab.org. (2020). [online] Available at: https://arab.org/portal/lebanon/where-to- donate/. 69 AlJazeera. August, (2020). “Will the Beirut explosion lead to political change in Lebanon”. YouTube. 15:00 – 16:00.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TR4RtJ5k6y4. 70 Ibid. 16:00 – 16:40. 71 Ibid. 16:40 – 17.10. 72 Ibid. 20:20 – 20:23. 73 Staff, Reuters. November (2020). "Lebanon's President Seeks Evidence Behind U.S. Sanctions On Son-In-Law". U.K.. https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-usa-lebanon-sanctions/lebanons-president-seeks-evidence-behind-u-s-sanctions-on-son-in-law- idUSKBN27N0BD.

21

Humanitarianism in Crisis Adele Benson

Humanitarianism is in crisis. There is no actor, other than states, that can effectively and legitimately address crimes against humanity and carry out acts of humanitarianism. Without the cognisant effort of states to have humanitarian interventions or hold perpetrators of crimes against humanity to account, the impact for vulnerable groups around the world is devastating and crippling. That is not to say that the current system of implementing humanitarian acts is perfect. Far from it. The system of implementing humanitarian acts for states is flawed, and the disingenuous motivations of states when intervening has resulted in a polarized stalemate of opinions, but only to the detriment of the vulnerable. Following the holocaust a slogan, “never again”, developed to become a universal phrase for the sanctity of life following genocide and crimes against humanity74. This phrase was reinvigorated during the Rwandan genocide and for various crimes against humanity since. These cases were often retrospectively thought of as triggers for proposals to fundamentally transform international law. However, despite new doctrine, such as R2P in 2005, there has been no progress in preventing or effectively punishing crimes against humanity. There are countless occasions where humanitarianism has been improvident or unresponsive, and consequently failed those that have needed protection the most. The Rwandan genocide of 1994, the Srebrenica Massacre of 1995, and the Darfur genocide which has been ongoing since 2003. However, this crisis of humanitarianism has found the final straw for the back of the proverbial camel: the plight of the Rohingya. Heywood (2014) defines humanitarian as “being concerned with the interests of humanity, specifically through a desire to promote the welfare or reduce the suffering of others”75. Humanitarianism, at the international level, is concerned with preventing and halting crimes against humanity, particularly en masse. This argument will not incorporate the acts of humanitarian aid agencies, including the United Nations’ agencies. Although there is no doubt that they continue to have their own humanitarian crisis76, states shall be the focal actor. It will, however, consider the frameworks and institutions put in place to facilitate and enable humanitarian acts, such as intervention. Firstly, there will be an exploration of how the current system of implementation for humanitarianism and acts of state humanitarianism is flawed. Secondly, delve into the motivations of states in humanitarian interventions and why states are discouraged from further interventions. Thirdly, examine the continued importance of humanitarianism and humanitarian acts for groups across the world, particularly in reference to the Rohingya and the refugee camp in Cox’s Bazaar, Bangladesh.

The current system of implementation for state humanitarianism. In early 2011 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorised the use of the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine (R2P) in response to the Libyan Civil War, which was instigated by an uprising as part of the Arab

74 G. Weiss, “RtoP Alive and Well after Libya,” Ethics & International Affairs 25, 8 (2011): 287 – 292, https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0892679411000220 75 Andrew Heywood, Global Politics, 2nd ed. (London: Palgrave, 2014), p. 325.

76 See Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power and Ethics. (New York, NY: Cornell University Press, (2008). 22

Spring. This was the first legitimate use of the third pillar of R2P, which encourages states to take collective action in protecting civilians if a state is failing to protect its population77. Resolution 1973 mandated the use of force by “all necessary measures”78 to protect the citizens of Libya. This was swiftly followed by an allied intervention led by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, blocking efforts from African Union representatives to negotiate a ceasefire79. Gaddafi was found and killed on the 20th October 2011, with the allied forces leaving Libya on the 31st October. This intervention altered the discussions around humanitarian intervention. There were polarised debates around whether it was a victory for the concept, or ‘death to R2P’80. In the short run, the intervention solidified R2P in the arsenal of states against crimes against humanity. Several years on however, there seems to have been little change, and R2P has been seldom used due to the polarisation. Obama, who was the US President at the time of the Libyan intervention, undermined the intervention by considering the Libyan intervention, and the failure of the allied forces to plan for state-building efforts, the worst mistake of his Presidency81. Prior to the Libya intervention there were the traditional debates around humanitarian intervention; the violation of the sovereignty norm versus the desire to protect individuals from crimes against humanity. R2P was designed to bridge the gap of those debates to create a practical framework for humanitarian intervention, administered through the UNSC. Although the intervention in Libya was a significant turning point for the concept of R2P, there are other issues that have prevented its further usage. Currently, the processes of utilization of humanitarian actions through the United Nations Security Council are flawed. The UNSC is highly selective in the interventions they choose. In the case of Libya, there were notable abstentions on the vote of Resolution 1973 from Russia, China, India, Brazil and Germany. Russia and China also being permanent members, and the associated veto powers, of the UNSC have since used the intervention in Libya to justify a non-intervention stance regarding R2P and crimes against humanity. The reluctance to act in cases of mass atrocities has meant that R2P does little to deter others committing such acts, as there is no guarantee of punishment. It is indeed true that these efforts have done considerable good in the past. Prior to Libya, R2P had been effectively utilized in its pillar one and two capacities in Kenya following violence in response to the 2007 presidential elections82. But since Libya, there has been no significant utilisation of the third pillar capacity, whilst crimes against humanity persist. In these cases there are no actors, other than states, that can effectively operate against perpetrators. International governmental organisations, such as the United Nations (UN), are inadequate to hold states responsible83, due to the lack of legitimacy and resources. As a result, it seems as though the institutions that were designed to help promote humanitarianism and

77 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, “The Responsibility to Protect,” (2001), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. 78 United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing ‘All Necessary Measures’ to Protect Civilians, by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Abstentions,” (2011), https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sc10200.doc.htm. 79 Sarah Brockmeier, Oliver Stuenkel, and Marcos Tourinho, “The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection,” Global Society 30, 1 (2016): 113 – 133. 80 David Rieff, “R2P, R.I.P,” The New York Times, November 7, (2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-rip.html

81 Dominic Tierney, “The Legacy of Obama’s ‘Worst Mistake’,” The Atlantic, April 15, 2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/04/obamas-worst-mistake-libya/478461/ 82 Michael W. Doyle, “The Politics of Global Humanitarianism: R2P before and after Libya,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, eds. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2016), 673 – 690. 83 Augusto Lopez-Claros, Arthur L. Dahl, and Maja Groff, Global Governance and the Emergence of Global Institutions for the 21st Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2020).

23 alleviate the suffering of individuals have failed. The UN may have pioneered the Millennium, and now Sustainable, Development Goals, but have been proven to inadequately hold states to account.

State motivation in humanitarian interventions. Following the intervention in Libya there were significant debates around motivations of state actors. Many countries were swayed in their decision making on the vote for Resolution 1973 in Libya due to parallels with previous incidents of mass killing and crimes against humanity and coercive influence from the US, UK and France. Notably, Gaddafi’s family had referred to rebels as “cockroaches”, a term used during the genocide discourse in the Rwandan genocide in 199484. The alliance of the UK, US and France emphasised the urgency of the situation, putting pressure on other states within the UN Security Council to decide in favour of Resolution 1973, with the US particularly calling for urgency in case there were to be another Srebrenica85. An elected member of the council once recalled “the information flowing in, and the discussions among diplomats outside the council, often took the following form: ‘Do you want to wake up tomorrow and there is no Benghazi?’”86. One issue of humanitarian intervention that is mentioned by Paris87 is the problem of mixed motives. Paris suggests that states do not intervene for purely altruistic motives, noting that there will always be several motives to an intervention. This has also been addressed by Morris88 in discussions around disingenuous interests. These arguments delegitimise humanitarian intervention and the concept of R2P by suggesting that states cannot be trusted to intervene, yet they are the only actors who can intervene on a scale significant enough to instigate change for civilians at risk of genocide and other war crimes. States rarely act from purely idealistic motives89, and there is a hypocrisy in states that ratify doctrine like R2P in order to save individuals, only to then require interventions to provide a benefit or worth from the act. Arguably, in the case of Libya, there was a motivation by particularly Western states to advance the value of democracy and gain a strategic ally in North Africa. Humanitarian intervention has been contended to superimpose western values in local societies. Western states can no longer disseminate these values, under these guises, with impunity. The debates around R2P, and those that have taken place since Libya have shown that there is an interest in states intervening to truly protect civilians, which is not in the interest of intervening states. Both during and following the intervention in Libya, Brazil raised concerns regarding the alleged abuse of the Security Council’s practices in relation to humanitarian intervention. Brazil’s president of the time, Dilma Rousseff, declared in a speech to the UN General Assembly on the 21st September 2011, that there must be more development towards a responsibility whilst protecting civilians90. The ‘Responsibility Whilst Protecting’ (RwP) initiative is a measure that is claimed to create checks and balances on these procedural issues91. According to Brockmeier et al.92,

84 Michael W. Doyle, “The Politics of Global Humanitarianism: R2P before and after Libya,” p. 680. 85 Brockmeier, Stuenkel & Tourinho, “The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection,” p 119. Adler-Nissen, and Vincent Pouliot, “Power in Practice: Negotiating the International Intervention in Libya,” European Journal of International Relations, 20, 4 (2014): 889 – 911. 86 Adler-Nissen & Pouliot, “Power in Practice: Negotiating the International Intervention in Libya”, p. 13. 87 Roland Paris, “Responsibility to Protect: The debate continues,” International Peacekeeping 22, 2 (2015): 143 – 150, https://doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2015.1017079 88 Justin Morris, “Libya and Syria: R2P and the Spectre of the Swinging Pendulum”, International Affairs 89, 5 (2013): 1265 – 1283. 89 Richard B. Lillich, International Human Rights: Problems of law, policy and practice. New York, NY: Little, Brown and Company, (1991). 90 Thorsten Benner, “Brazil as a norm entrepreneur: the ‘Responsibility While Protecting’ initiative,” The Global Public Policy Institute, March 2013, https://www.gppi.net/media/Benner_2013_Working-Paper_Brazil-RWP.pdf 91 Alex J. Bellamy and Stephen McLoughlin, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention. London: Palgrave, (2018), p. 109. 92 Brockmeier, Stuenkel & Tourinho, “The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection,”.

24 the proposal called for a renewal of the criteria for when and how force should be employed to protect civilians, and for greater accountability for those that implement the mandate by the security council. RwP revived these debates and was supported by a broad majority of states that criticised the course of regime change during the Libya intervention, including India and South Africa. Rather than the intervention in Libya being viewed as a failure of R2P, RwP suggests the actions of the states involved in the intervention should be subject to greater scrutiny, and should respond to any such criticism. Without the pillar 3 responsibilities of states, there is no reason that R2P should be taken seriously by states committing atrocities. The exploitation of states under the guise of humanitarianism and humanitarian intervention is no longer convincing, encouraging the denouement of humanitarianism in its current form and distrust in the international community.

Stopping interventions: at what cost? The implications of the lack of progress for R2P include the loss of life and displacement of vulnerable civilians across the globe. The Rohingya, described as the “world’s most persecuted minority”93 having faced ubiquitous human rights abuses, including ethnic cleansing, statelessness, and presenting a high risk of genocide. The lack of progress on R2P, despite the international community’s commitment in 2005, has resulted in the plight of the Rohingya being largely ignored despite the argued legal obligation to intervene94. August 2020 saw the three year anniversary of the fleeing of more than 730,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh. Since then, those that have settled in the refugee camp in Cox’s Bazaar have faced hostility by the Bangladesh government. A report in 201795 noted that the most common daily concerns faced by Refugees in Cox’s Bazaar were about attaining food (experienced by 95% of those interviewed), lack of freedom of movement, as well as concerns about safety or protection. This has been exacerbated by the recent covid- 19 global pandemic. The report also found high rates of trauma exposure, including torture. Before there were atrocities and crimes against humanity taking place and, despite the lack of action taken in these cases, the acts were condemned and considered to be acts abominable by individuals across the political spectrum. Today, atrocities are taking place with no condemnation from world leaders. In the case of the Rohingya, the United Kingdom is a penholder for Myanmar at the UNSC96. Instead of holding the state to account for the acts, they instead announced financial sanctions against individuals and sent financial aid97. Although this was designed to show that United Kingdom doesn’t tolerate what has happened and its support for the Rohingya, it did little to break down the systematic oppression the Rohingya have faced for decades in Myanmar.

93 P. 1163 in Lindsey N. Kingston, “Protecting the World’s most persecuted: the responsibility to protect and Burma’s Rohingya minority”, The International Journal of Human Rights, 19, 8 (2015): 1163 – 1175, https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13642987.2015.1082831. 94 Katherine Southwick, “Preventing Mass Atrocities Against the Stateless Rohingya in Myanmar: A Call for Solutions”, Journal of International Affairs 68, 2 (2015): 137 – 156. 95 Riley, Andrew, Andrea Varner, Peter Ventevogel, M. M. Taimur Hasan, and Courtney Welton-Mitchell, "Daily stressors, trauma exposure, and mental health among stateless Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh." Transcultural psychiatry 54, 3 (2017): 304-331, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1363461517705571. 96 Security Council Report, “The Penholder System”. Research Report, (2018), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Penholders.pdf 97 Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, “Dominic Raab urges world ‘not to turn away from Rohingya’s suffering’ as the UK pledges life-saving support,” Gov, October 22, (2020) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/dominic-raab-urges-world-not- to-turn-away-from-rohingyas-suffering-as-the-uk-pledges-life-saving-support. 25

Conclusion Humanitarianism is in crisis. There is no actor, other than states, that can effectively and legitimately commit these acts of humanitarianism. If they remain indifferent, as they have been, then the impact for vulnerable groups around the world is devastating and crippling. Despite the long history of crimes against humanity, and the, arguably superficial, attempt of states to prevent these through international law and cooperation, they have ultimately failed to account for the lack of willingness of states to enforce these laws when it counts the most. However, it does not seem as though this historical tradition will break, and there will be a continuation of crimes against humanity in the 21st century. The Responsibility to Protect doctrine requires consensus in order to be used again. In this case, reform may be the answer, and a way forward for persecuted individuals globally. As Halberstam points out, “the right of people not to be killed should not depend on whether the state of which they are citizens is in a position to protect them, wants to protect them, or is itself the source of the danger”98. The crisis of humanitarianism is evident. Crimes against humanity should be denounced by all, transcending ideological and state boundaries. The International Community can, and should, do more to condemn the Myanmar government and their actions against the Rohingya. As optimistically stated by Bellamy and McLoughlin, “the crisis of human protection which international society faces today can be overcome, and progress on the further development of a human protection regime sustained”99.

98 P. 2 of Malvina Halberstam, “The Legality of Humanitarian Intervention,” Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 3, 1 (1995): 1 – 9. 99 Bellamy & McLoughlin, “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 207.

26

Could Azerbaijan and Armenia Provide the Latest Saga in Centuries of Russo-Turkish Conflict? Tom Scott

While fighting over the separatist territory of Nagorno-Karabakh has been a key feature of modern relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, September’s collapse of the U.S brokered ceasefire could have wider ramifications across the Caucus region, potentially sucking the region’s most powerful militaries into a small border dispute. Although formal war between the two caucus nations ended in May 1994, separatists propped up by Armenia have plagued the Nagorno-Karabakh region with desultory outbreaks of violence for the past twenty-six years. Mainly consisting of sporadic bursts of artillery bombardment, the small, enclaved province has mostly managed to evade global headlines in the past two decades. However, Azerbaijan’s recent mass assault has catapulted Nagorno-Karabakh onto the global stage with hostilities being at their most violent of recent times. Despite the familiar ‘deep concern’ commonly expressed by NATO and other Western institutions in similar situations, Turkish and Russian involvement will be the most likely external intervention, possibly with grave consequences for the region. From a Turkish perspective, Azerbaijan are a close and longstanding ally. Not only ethnically part of the Ottoman family, but the bordering nations also share a common political ambition, notably expressed by ex- president Heydar Aliyev. His philosophy of the ‘one nation, two states’ has pushed Turkey into a custodian role over Azerbaijan; it being a staunch supporter of Azerbaijan in its efforts to consolidate its independence since 1991, preserving its territorial integrity and helping fulfil its economic potential with the abundance of natural resources in the Caspian Sea. As for Russia, its involvement with Armenia is also deeply rooted. Even today Putin’s air force retains a base at Gyumri and the country has long been viewed as the chief protector of Armenia’s sovereignty from ‘Ottoman barbarism’. Among Armenian opinion polls, many still see the Russian’s as their saving force from Turkey. Recent conflict in Ukraine demonstrates that Russia isn’t keen to have a NATO neighbour, and Putin is prepared to resort to violence when foreign powers attempt to separate him, or in fact get too close, to his band of satellite states. Consequentially, the Georgian outcry for peace in the region has been by far the loudest, with memories of 2008 still fresh for Tbilisi. If Putin seeks to reinforce his troops, Georgia will provide the quickest route. 27

Turkey’s enthusiasm to get involved, for the moment, seems far greater than that of Russia’s. The Turkish foreign ministry has supplied the bulwark of anti-Armenian criticism thus far, condemning "inhumane attacks on civilians" in Azerbaijan.100 They stand staunchly behind Aliyev who has been flexing his alliance with his “Turkish brothers”.101 Erdogan is keen to prove himself on the global stage and Armenia may provide the perfect non-NATO victim of his neo-Ottoman ambitions. Fortunately, Russia’s potential involvement is curtailed by two overwhelming factors. Firstly, Armenia’s newest leader Nikol Pashinyan has made Russian involvement evermore unlikely, with frosty relations characterising affairs since he seized power in 2018. Some in the Kremlin fear that Armenia will soon join Georgia in fully embracing the West. The most worrying pro-European rhetoric from Pashinyan came when he greeted senior EU officials and declared that his country remains committed to developing its partnership with Europe. Pashinyan’s predecessor Karapetyan would have more than likely called for the Kremlin’s assistance, but this new premier is keen to avoid direct Russian interference. Nether the less, Pashinyan’s outcry against Turkish involvement may well force Yaravet closer to the Kremlin sensing defeat to Azerbaijan may well provide the perfect conditions for regime change. Secondly, the Kremlin fails to share Turkey’s aggressiveness when backing its ally, Putin has even attempted to draw Turkey into the peace talks bound to take place in Geneva later this month. A very promising sign of avoiding direct conflict for now. However, with the 2015 Su-24M incident over Turkey still fresh in the memory of both Putin and Erdogan, Along with Syria, Kosovo, Libya, and the legacy of the Armenian Genocide; Nogorno-Karabakh provides yet another crisis the two nations find themselves at opposing ends of. One reckless move from Ankara, could sour already fragile relations with Moscow and if Erdogan provides a strong military intervention in the province, Moscow may counter. The Russian Foreign Ministry has already affirmed that they will provide, “all necessary assistance” in the event that violence spills out of Nagorno-Karabakh. As the situation balances on a knife edge, this threat of Russian military support may well be the greatest deterrent in stopping the Caucus’s from plunging into crisis. Some may view recent events as a flash in the pan, but with Putin, Erdogan, and Azerbaijan’s sabre-rattling Aliyev all in the mix, it’s not foolish to rule out potential conflict in the region.

100 Faruk Zorlu, ‘Turkey Blasts Armenia For 'Inhumane Attack on Azerbaijan,’ Andolu Agency, October, 27, (2020), [Accessed 4 November 2020]. 101 TASS ‘Turkish F-16 May Be Used In Case Of External Aggression Against Azerbaijan — Aliyev’, October, 26, (2020), [Accessed 4 November 2020]. 28

Sierra Leone: A Diplomat’s Perspective on the Long Road to Peace Peter Penfold: Former British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone: 1997-2000

It was the 9th of March 1997 and I had arrived to start work as the new British High Commissioner – the 12th High Commissioner to be appointed by Her Majesty’s Government since Sierra Leone’s independence in 1961. At that time Sierra Leone was richer and more developed than many other newly emerging independent countries such as Singapore and Malaysia. Now 36 years on it was the second poorest country in the world and during my tenure it would officially become the poorest according to the UNDP’s country poverty index.

Poor Sierra Leone had, unlike several other African countries like Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Senegal, suffered from not enjoying a long period of stability after independence. Sierra Leone’s founding father, Milton Margai, had tragically died early on in his office as Prime Minister. This led to decades of military coups, instability, corruption and mis-management, exacerbated in recent times by a rebel war.102

A group of disgruntled teachers and students had taken to the bush to form the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) against the regime of President Momoh. However, this well-intentioned group was taken over by Foday Sankoh, a former army corporal and erstwhile photographer. In 1991, using techniques acquired fighting alongside the warlord Charles Taylor in Liberia, the RUF embarked upon a campaign of terror and violence, most noted for the systematic chopping off of hands and legs by drug induced youths, committing some of the worst atrocities ever seen in Africa.103

Nurturing the infant Democracy and Promoting Development

When I arrived in March 1997 there was an air of optimism about the future. Democratic elections in February of the previous year had removed the illegal NPRC military government and ushered in the civilian government of President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah. In November of that year he had concluded the Abidjan Peace Accord with Foday Sankoh and the RUF. There was little fighting going on in the country with the RUF forces confined to 3 small areas along the border with Liberia. Unlike my predecessor I was able to start travelling around the country and when I presented my credentials to President Kabbah, I noted that I had served in Nigeria in the 1960s during the Biafran civil war, in Ethiopia in the 1970s during the revolution, in Uganda in the 1980s during two military coups, so how nice it was to serve at last in ‘a peaceful African country’. These remarks were to prove somewhat ironic and prophetic but I set about my task with enthusiasm and optimism.

102 I do not accept that the conflict between the Sierra Leone government and the Revolutionary United Front was a ‘civil war’. This would imply two rival sides, both with political agendas and both vying for and enjoying support from the people. Once Foday Sankoh took over the RUF, it became more like a cult with Sankoh as its messianic leader whose motivation was personal power and greed. He was intent on becoming President at all costs with little regard for the people of Sierra Leone. He preyed upon the disaffected and unemployed youth, who called him ‘Pappy’, coercing them with drugs and a promise of riches, and even persuading some of them to kill their own parents. 103 Read Lansana Gberie’s ‘A Dirty War in West Africa – The RUF and the Destruction of Sierra Leone’ C Hurst & Co 2005 29

The British Government policy at the time was to help nurture the infant democracy and to promote the peaceful development of the country. As the leading bilateral aid donor Britain had a key role to play. We embarked upon a number of aid projects in support of our policy – support for the Parliament, the Public Service, the judicial sector, the press and media and various civil society and human rights groups. We also paid attention to the security sector through projects to support the police and military. A 2 man British military training team arrived along with a Commonwealth police advisory team.

I reported to London at the time that I felt that for once we were getting things right with our aid programme. One can have stability without development, but one cannot have development without stability. For far too long we had seen millions of dollars of aid money in Africa channelled into providing better healthcare, education, transport, communications and so on, but it was all wasted if the problems of insecurity, instability and corruption were not also addressed. The number of schools and hospitals destroyed and people made homeless and hungry as a result of coups and rebellions was endless. This would continue to be the case unless more attention was focused on security and good government. The previous Tory government under Douglas Hurd and Lynda Chalker’s guidance had recognised this and the New Labour government under Tony Blair and Robin Cook was continuing this policy.

Unrest, Corruption, Instability

However, two months after my arrival, on 25 May, we awoke to the sound of gunfire around the city. A group of 17 young soldiers, NCOs and privates, had broken into an ordinance depot, stolen weapons, released all the prisoners in the prison including some fellow military personnel, taken over the radio station and, when they heard that President Kabbah had fled the country to neighbouring Guinea, announced themselves as the new government under the acronym the Armed Forces Revolutionary Committee (AFRC), with one of the released prisoners, Major Johnny-Paul Koroma, its Chairman.

The underlying reasons for the coup were mixed. There was certainly dissatisfaction between the officers and the rank and file and also with the Deputy Minister of Defence, at the time, retired Captain Sam Hinga Norman, whom many in the military felt was showing more support for the armed militias in the south, the kamajors. But also our British military training programme had revealed the extent of the widespread corruption going on within the army. We had discovered that instead of an army of 15,000 strong, for which the military authorities drew 15,000 salaries and rice rations every month, there were only approximately 8,000. I brought this to the attention of the President. He ordered a reduction in the rice ration.104 This led to further unrest in the army. My colleagues, the American and United Nations ambassadors, and myself went to see President Kabbah at his private home one Saturday morning to warn him that we had heard rumours of a coup being plotted against him. He played down our warnings and just over a week later he was deposed.

104 Rice is the staple food of the people. A Sierra Leonean measures his lifestyle by the price and availability of rice. At the time rice was very scarce and expensive for the average person. Under the corrupt army system, the more senior the officer, the more bags of rice he received. For example, a colonel would receive 33 bags of rice per month, a private only one bag. In effect the senior military officers were rice traders and only part-time soldiers! 30

Safety and Security of the British Community

As more and more soldiers joined in, there was total mayhem. As the British High Commissioner my prime attention was now focussed upon the safety and security of the British and international community.105 Meanwhile, the shooting and looting continued. At various times different, often drunken, soldiers came on the radio. All borders were closed, a dusk to dawn curfew was announced, all soldiers had to report to barracks and all senior officers were arrested. I monitored the situation, keeping in close touch with Sierra Leone contacts, members of my community and fellow diplomatic colleagues, reporting back to the Foreign Office in London. I continued to advise all members of the international community to stay indoors and keep their heads down. There was little sign that the situation was coming under control.

Negotiations with rebel soldiers and Evacuation of the international community

After consulting my Nigerian, American and United Nations colleagues, we sent a message to the soldiers inviting them to a meeting with us. My residence was selected as the venue as it was seen by the soldiers to be neutral ground.106 Johnny-Paul Koroma and his fellow coupists turned up the next morning looking somewhat tired and dishevelled. We invited Koroma to brief us. As if on cue a barrage of shots were heard as he assured us that the situation was coming under control. The looting would soon stop and all looted vehicles would be returned by the ‘Anti-Looting Squad’.107

We told Koroma that our main concern at that moment was for the safety of our communities. I noted that over 50 British homes had been looted and my colleagues reported the deaths of 2 Lebanese nationals and the rape of an expatriate wife. Ambassador Dinka of the UN reported on the vandalism at the UN offices and the looting of all the WFP (World Food Programme) stock of rice which had been designated to feed all the displaced persons and refugees in the country for 6 months. We pointed out that under the Vienna Convention they had an obligation to protect diplomatic and international communities.

I told Koroma that we wished to evacuate some members of our communities. Koroma said he hoped to open the airport and the borders by the end of the week in 7 days-time. I replied that I could not accept that. We had members of our communities including women and children who had been robbed of everything. I could not tell them to wait 7 days. If he did not open the airport the next day, I would announce over the BBC the total evacuation of the international community and seek military assistance from my government to achieve it if necessary. However, if he did open the airport only those in most need could leave on commercial flights without the need for military involvement. We asked Koroma what were his plans for forming a new government. He appeared puzzled by the question. He noted that he had invited Foday Sankoh to join them in Freetown as the Vice Chairman, i.e. de facto Vice President. Sankoh was at the time under detention in Nigeria and my Nigerian colleague diplomatically asked whether it was really in the AFRC’s interests to invite Sankoh and the RUF to join them.

105 As well as the British community, numbering over 1,000, I was responsible for all the Commonwealth and European Union citizens other than the Nigerian, Ghanaian, Gambian and German communities who enjoyed resident diplomatic representation in Freetown. 106 Although my Nigerian colleague was the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, the presence of so many Nigerian troops in the country left the Sierra Leone soldiers wary of the role of Nigeria. 107 Ironically the squad was using vehicles looted from the United Nations and the soldier most responsible for the looting, Sgt Sankoh, was presently sitting opposite us. His nickname was ‘Zagalo’ and ‘zagaloing became a euphemism for looting. 31

My attention as High Commissioner was now divided into two paths of action. Having secured the opening of the airport, my staff and I embarked upon a series of evacuations both by air and sea. In the course of the following week a total of over 4,000 members of the international community were evacuated, including over 1,000 British passport holders. This included, as part of the overall evacuation, 1,260 people lifted off Lumley Beach in Freetown by the American helicopter carrier, the USS Kearsage, in 4 hours - reportedly the fastest evacuation of civilians in history.

Whilst all this was going on, we continued to hold meetings with the AFRC at my residence. As most of the other diplomatic missions were ordered by their home capitals to close, including the Americans and the UN, it was left to my Nigerian colleague and myself to keep the talks going. By the end of the week we had persuaded the soldiers to stand down and allow the return of President Kabbah and his government. We noted that the soldiers had by their actions usefully highlighted the problems within the military which we the international community could prevail upon President Kabbah to rectify. The Nigerian government offered refuge and packages of assistance to Koroma and his colleagues in Nigeria if they stood down peacefully. We helped draft a statement for Koroma to make over the radio welcoming the return of President Kabbah.

Opportunity lost to nip the situation in the bud

My Nigerian colleague and I sat anxiously by our radios on the Sunday evening awaiting the broadcast from Koroma. It did not come. We subsequently discovered that when Koroma informed the deputy RUF leader Sam Bockarie, alias ‘Mosquito’, who had now arrived in Freetown with his followers, he ‘put a gun to Koroma’s head’ and held him captive to stop him making the broadcast. The RUF had been trying for years to get to Freetown. Now that the AFRC had opened the back door, there was no way they were going back to the bush.108 Thus we lost the opportunity to nip this difficult situation in the bud and what followed was a further long period of turmoil, instability and massive loss of life. Against my wishes, the four remaining members of my staff and myself were ordered to evacuate.

The overthrow of President Kabbah’s government had been widely condemned. The OAU (predecessor of the African Union), meeting in Harare at the time called for the restoration of Kabbah’s government. This was echoed by the United Nations Security Council, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the European Union and most governments around the world. As a clear statement that the British Government continued to recognise President Kabbah’s government as the legitimate democratically elected government of Sierra Leone I was asked to remain alongside Kabbah in Guinea Conakry where President Conte had provided him with a couple of presidential villas.

At first several of my diplomatic colleagues and other international agencies and NGOs from Freetown were deployed to Conakry. Many of us felt that it would be only a matter of weeks before we returned to Sierra Leone. There was no British Embassy in Guinea109 I thus set up home and office in Room 503 of the Hotel Camayenne. My job now, in addition to staying alongside President Kabbah and his ministers, was to assist with peace efforts to restore the legitimate government and to continue to monitor the situation within Sierra Leone, including overseeing and supporting our locally-engaged staff left behind (over seventy strong)

108 In the mid 1990s the RUF came within 50 kms of the capital, but the military government, in the absence of any other outside assistance, turned to a South African private security firm, Executive Outcomes, who pushed the RUF back to the Liberian border. 109 This had been closed decades earlier. The British Embassy in Dakar, Senegal, was designated to cover diplomatic relations with the former French territory. 32 and safeguard the substantial British Government estate there worth millions of pounds. The days turned to weeks and the weeks turned to months as efforts continued to find a peaceful solution.

The last Military Coup in Africa

Some of the younger Sierra Leoneans formed a new organisation – the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). I was invited to attend and address MRD and other Sierra Leone meetings, talking about democracy and urging them not to lose hope. These times were very inspirational. Many felt that we were not just fighting for the cause of democracy in Sierra Leone, but for the cause of democracy in Africa as a whole. In line with the statement issued by Kofi Anan, the UN Secretary-General, we were sending a message that military coups were no longer acceptable in Africa.

Hitherto, when military coups had taken place in Africa the usual reaction of the international community had been to chastise the soldiers and ask when they intended to have elections and return to civilian rule. Sierra Leone set the pattern for a new policy which we hoped would be replicated. From now on if a bunch of soldiers decided to take over a country’s government, they would be treated in the same way as the AFRC junta.110 Throughout this period not one country in the world, not Gaddafi’s Libya, Castro’s Cuba nor even Charles Taylor’s Liberia, recognised the AFRC junta. All continued to recognise the Kabbah government as the legitimate, democratically elected government of Sierra Leone. This was a remarkable diplomatic achievement, led by Nigeria on the African stage and Britain on the international stage through her membership of the UN Security Council.111

As time went on some countries began to waver in their support. It was important to demonstrate that the Kabbah government was indeed ready to reassume control. We organised a workshop in the UK and flew back several Sierra Leone ministers and officials. Their task was to prepare a ’90 day Action Plan’ outlining the first 3 months of President Kabbah’s government after its restoration. This plan was launched at a high- level conference in London, entitled ‘Restoring Sierra Leone to Democracy’ and attended by President Kabbah and several UK ministers. We also had to project an image of a semi- functioning government in Conakry. I rented a run-down building, which had been an Indian restaurant, on one of the main thoroughfares and stuck up a sign saying ‘Government of Sierra Leone’. It was staffed by Sierra Leone ministers and officials but I kept a very tight rein on the UK funds made available for the purpose. Various programmes were run from the Conakry Government Office to promote the cause for the restoration of democracy in Sierra Leone, including monitoring the UN and Ecowas sanctions imposed against the junta.

Civil Resistance

As difficult as things were for Sierra Leoneans in Conakry, for those left behind in Sierra Leone, life was even more miserable. Out of a population of over one million in Freetown, less than a third remained. Less than 10% of shops and businesses were open, the banks remained closed. Despite continuing threats from the

110 The next military coup to come along would be in neighbouring Ivory Coast in 1999. This time the French took the lead in the Security Council and regrettably they went back to the old policy, saying to the Ivorian soldiers ‘you naughty boys. Now when are you going to step down and allow civilian democratic elections?’ The result was continued instability and the economic decline of this once rich African country. 111 When the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting took place in Edinburgh later in the year, Prime Minister Tony Blair invited President Kabbah to attend as his personal guest and the British Government paid for his official delegation. 33 junta, very few people went to work, either to maintain their boycott of the regime or because there was no work to go to. As a result of the widespread looting and destruction, many of the offices were bare, devoid of even chairs and tables. With the banks closed, money was in short supply. Anyone receiving any income found themselves maintaining dozens of ‘relatives’.112

Perhaps the most remarkable show of solidarity against the junta was taken by the students. Notwithstanding the importance attached to gaining an education, they passed a resolution refusing to return to classes until the AFRC had stood down. As a result, all schools and colleges remained closed. When they attempted to mount a demonstration against the junta, it was ruthlessly put down by the soldiers and several students were killed. It became an offence against the junta to be a student.

The junta’s control in the rest of the country was even less tenuous. The main towns of Bo, Kenema and Makeni, where there were army bases, remained nominally under the control of the regime, but with even less government activity. Outside of Freetown the strongest AFRC and RUF presence was in Kono district, centre of the diamond mining industry where the local populace were forced to mine for diamonds. The AFRC’s writ did not extend to the south of the country where the kamajors kept control in support of the Kabbah government.

This civil resistance was to last nine months. It was a remarkable demonstration of determination and sacrifice. Monitoring this situation from Conakry, I was overwhelmed in admiration for the brave Sierra Leoneans. It was important to support them in their struggle and encourage them not to lose hope in the face of the sacrifices they were making. But how to get this message across?

Radio 98.1 Democracy

The AFRC had banned all newspapers and radio stations other than those which were controlled by the junta. With such a high illiteracy rate, radio was by far the most important media. Every day people tuned into the two BBC radio services, Network Africa and Focus on Africa. The situation in Sierra Leone dominated the African news and often the programmes carried heartfelt messages from Sierra Leoneans requesting help to rid them of the oppressive junta in Freetown.

We decided to fund a clandestine pro-democracy radio station. One of Sierra Leone’s leading academics, Dr Julius Spencer, was brought back from the United States to set it up. Radio 98.1 Democracy was an instant success. Operating initially out of a tent at Lungi airport behind the Nigerian lines, the radio broadcast to the people of Sierra Leone sixteen hours per day. It reported on the international support for President Kabbah’s government and the calls for the AFRC to stand down. Thanks to an effective network of informants, mainly students, the station was able to report in detail on the activities of the AFRC and RUF, highlighting their crimes and misdeeds.

The junta was continually trying to discover from where the radio station was broadcasting. They warned people not to listen to it. One 80 year old woman was killed for just doing so. Radio 98.1 became the main source of information to the Sierra Leone people about what was going on in their country and outside.

112 By continuing to pay our 70 staff at the High Commission every month by ingenious means, one of the few organisations to do so, we estimated that we were supporting over a thousand people. 34

Strengthened and encouraged, the residents of Freetown went to bed with their radios beneath their pillows to dampen the reception, listening to Spencer and his colleagues.

We deliberately did not publicise our support for Radio 98.1 for fear of reprisals being taken against our staff and properties but from time to time I would give a live interview by telephone from my hotel room in Conakry in which I encouraged the people to keep faith with democracy and not to lose hope. Because of these interviews and my other activities, I became one of the ‘enemies of the AFRC revolution’.

The Use of Force

Efforts persisted throughout 1997 to find a resolution to the impasse. The Foreign Ministers of Nigeria, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Guinea and Liberia (known as the C5) were designated by Ecowas to lead the negotiations. The C5’s policy to achieve the restoration of the Kabbah government was by a combination of negotiation, sanctions and if necessary force. The British Government supported this policy, happy to see ‘an African solution to an African problem’ but stopped short of endorsing the use of force.

In December the Conakry Peace Plan was signed between the AFRC junta and the C5. Kabbah’s government did not take part in the negotiations but Kabbah endorsed the proposed outcome which would see him restored by April of 1998. The British government welcomed the agreement. I advised that without the threat to use force if the AFRC/RUF did not comply with the terms of the Peace Plan, it was unlikely to succeed.

Over the Christmas and New Year period it became increasingly obvious that the junta was not sincere in stepping down. They continued to import arms and ammunition, bypassing the UN and Ecowas sanctions with the assistance of President Compare in Burkino Faso. RUF forces also continued to provoke attacks against the Nigerian forces in and around Freetown.

Finally the Nigerian President, Sani Abacha, had enough. It was ironic that the undemocratic, corrupt and some would say despotic Abacha was helping to restore democracy in a fellow West African country113 but he was not prepared to expend so much money in the cause (one estimate was $3 million per week) and to see so many of his Nigerian soldiers being brought back home in body bags. He decided to go for the military option. Whether he told President Kabbah in advance became a matter of debate but, given that Nigeria was calling all the shots, it mattered little. Sierra Leone had become a pawn in West African politics.

In February the Ecomog forces,114 led by the new commander, Col Maxwell Khobe advanced on Freetown. In quick time, with remarkably few casualties and little damage to the city the AFRC was forced out of Freetown and fled eastwards towards the Liberian border.

113 The irony was not lost on the British Government, not least because Nigeria under Abacha had been kicked out of the Commonwealth and sanctions imposed by Britain on Nigeria. However, we successfully argued that in Sierra Leone Nigeria was a force for good but that our support for them there would not preclude London from continuing to criticise Abacha for what he was doing in his own country. 114 The Nigerian forces been joined by other West African troops and redesignated by Ecowas as Ecomog. 35

History is made but British Government’s attention diverted

I returned to Freetown on board a Royal Navy warship, taking with me the Sierra Leone Foreign Minister. A week later President Kabbah returned accompanied by Presidents Abacha of Nigeria and Conte of Guinea. This was an historic occasion – the first time ever in Africa’s history that a civilian democratically elected head of state removed in a coup had been restored.

Britain could be rightly proud of the role she had played in achieving this but regrettably her attention was diverted towards a somewhat peripheral matter of whether a UN arms sanctions embargo had been breached by a British security firm, Sandline, and with my connivance. I spent most of 1998 back in the UK appearing before Official Inquiries set up by the British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, (from which I faced a potential 7 year prison sentence), instead of concentrating on helping to re-establish stability and democracy in Sierra Leone. The criminal charges against me and Sandline were dropped by HM Customs and Excise. However, by the time I returned to Freetown to resume my duties without interruption, the situation in the country had clearly deteriorated. With increased assistance from President Taylor in Liberia, the rebels had retaken large parts of the country including the diamond mining areas in Kono.

On 6 January 1999 the rebels re-invaded Freetown. There now followed 10 days of hell for the citizens – around 7,000 were killed, thousands more injured. A third of the city was totally destroyed. One in three of the population was displaced. I was again evacuated to Conakry and waited for the Ecomog forces to eventually regain control. Initially the Foreign Office would not allow me to live back at my residence. Instead I lived on board another Royal Navy warship and I commuted every day into the city by helicopter.

Once again we were the first from outside to render assistance. We flew in medical supplies to get the hospitals and clinics functioning and also food supplies and clothing for all the displaced persons, many of whom were camped out in the National stadium. Following the Freetown invasion, Kofi Anan announced a ‘dual track’ policy towards Sierra Leone – one track was to help the legitimate government to reassert its authority over the country and the other track to establish dialogue with the rebels; a policy to which the British government announced its support.

This seemed the right policy though I was wary that ‘dialogue’ should not move too quickly to ‘negotiations’. It was important that before the negotiation stage was reached, the government had indeed reasserted its authority over a bigger stretch of the country so that it could negotiate from a position of strength and not from a position of weakness.

Lome Accord and Power Sharing

President Kabbah faced intense pressure from outside to commence negotiations with Foday Sankoh and the rebels much to the consternation of the Sierra Leone public. A conference was organised in Freetown by the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights to give the Sierra Leone people a chance to voice their views on what they wanted from the peace process. Around 300 people took part from all the civil society groups – students, teachers, trade unions, ex and serving members of the forces, parliamentary parties, the amputees and the displaced – an impressive cross-section of society. I attended on behalf of the international community. After 3 days of debate and discussion the conference set out its various conditions for the start of negotiations. These included a cessation of hostilities, RUF recognition of the government, no

36 demands by the RUF for the withdrawal of the Ecomog forces, the unconditional release of abductees, and, picking up the strongest theme throughout the conference, no power sharing with the RUF.

Kabbah gave an undertaking to both Parliament and the people to adhere to these conditions and talks got underway in Lome, Togo, under the chairmanship of President Eyadema (another noted ‘democratic African leader’!) I was not permitted by my Foreign Office to join my other diplomatic colleagues from Freetown at the talks. Instead, I remained in Freetown with President Kabbah. His representative Solomon Berewa, the Attorney General, came under intense pressure from Eyadema and President Obasanjo of Nigeria, who had succeeded Abacha, to do a deal with the RUF delegation by offering ministerial positions under a power sharing arrangement. This pressure was amplified by the large American delegation present who not only insisted that Sankoh be made de facto Vice President but also he be put in charge of the diamond wealth of the country!

As word filtered back to Sierra Leone, the people demonstrated. But the die was cast and President Kabbah flew to Lome in July and signed the Lome Peace Accord with Foday Sankoh. Prime Minister Tony Blair sent a message of congratulations but there was little rejoicing back in Sierra Leone.

Betrayal of the Sierra Leone People

I felt that we had betrayed the Sierra Leone people and the cause of democracy. As the British High Commissioner I had gone all around the country to the towns and villages explaining about democracy. I used an aphorism of making democracy soup115 – the ingredients being a democratic government elected in free and fair elections, a truly representative parliament looking after the interests of the people and including an active opposition, an independent judiciary, a well-motivated and trained police force, a non- political and professional army, an honest public service, an independent and responsible media and an active civil society. I would note that certain things had no place in democracy soup – for example, corruption and coups, and that power should only come from the ballot box and not the barrel of a gun. The Sierra Leone people had embraced democracy, many had their hands and arms chopped off by the RUF just for voting in elections. The power sharing agreement established under the Lome Accord was a betrayal of all the Sierra Leone people had sacrificed for, and the international community, especially those ‘bastions of democracy’, Britain and the United States, had acted disgracefully in pushing through the Accord against the wishes of the people.

The reaction of the public was well illustrated in one of the Freetown churches where the clergy had been encouraged to preach reconciliation in support of the Lome Accord. After the priest had finished his sermon an elderly lady somewhat hesitantly walked up to the front of the church. She turned to face the congregation and said: ‘I am the headmistress of a school. I have been a teacher for 30 years. In all that time, I have been teaching my children about right and wrong. If a child is good, he or she is rewarded; if a child is bad or misbehaves, they are punished. But now it seems that if a child misbehaves, they should not be punished but rewarded, indeed taking the analogy of the ministerial positions under the Lome Agreement, I should make him a prefect. How can I reverse all that I have been teaching and practising all my life?’ In a simple but clear way she was voicing the concerns of so many Sierra Leoneans. They did not

115 This idea was later picked up by the Africa All Party Parliamentary Group in the House of Commons when they produced a Discussion Paper entitled ‘Democracy Soup – Democracy and Development in Africa’ in May 2014. 37 want vengeance. They did not want retribution for what they had suffered. They were prepared to forgive, though not to forget. But it seemed to them that ‘rewarding the RUF’ was wrong.

Sankoh and the RUF did not accept that they had done anything wrong. They either denied committing atrocities or said it was for the common good. To Sankoh the Lome Accord was not a peace treaty, it was a surrender document. It was the document by which he and the RUF were accepting the surrender of the Kabbah government, Ecomog, the UN and the international community. The blanket amnesty in the Lome Accord only encouraged this attitude even though the UN later refused to accept the terms of the amnesty.

Like the majority of the Sierra Leone population, most of us who had been closely involved with the Sierra Leone conflict felt that Sankoh could not be trusted. And of course so it proved. He dragged his feet with the disarmament of the RUF and then nine months after the Lome signing, fighting broke out again.116

British Military Involvement

The Ecomog forces led by Nigeria had left the country to be replaced by a 16,000 strong UN force. It was the largest UN peace keeping force in the world at that time but proved ill-equipped to deal with the RUF; it took a display of British military might against the rebels to finally bring an end to the conflict.117

‘Di Wor don don’

In 2002 President Kabbah declared ‘di wor don don’, the war is over, to much relief and rejoicing. Foday Sankoh and the senior RUF leaders were held in detention.118

Since then the country has enjoyed stability. To its credit, there have been four relatively peaceful and free and fair elections, including two changes of government. There have been set-backs such as the Ebola crisis, landslides and continuing corruption. The present government under President Bio grapples to promote prosperity and development for the courageous people of Sierra Leone, assisted by the international community, notably of late China, but Britain still remains engaged.

Lessons Learned

The Sierra Leone conflict became a benchmark for the British Government dealing with subsequent conflicts. It is now given as a positive example of how direct military involvement can save lives and end conflicts. Tony Blair cited the example of Sierra Leone as part of his reasoning for Britain’s involvement in Iraq and David Cameron may well have had Sierra Leone in mind in justifying Britain’s involvement in Libya.

But all conflicts are different and before one attempts to resolve a conflict, one should first try to understand it – a lesson not initially fully appreciated in Sierra Leone, and still not followed elsewhere. In

116 One week after I had left Sierra Leone as the British High Commissioner despite protestations from President Kabbah and against my wishes, 117 Taking Command, Chapters 7-9, Gen David Richards. Headline 2014 118 Less than a year after the Americans had been advocating that Sankoh be appointed Vice President, they now insisted that he be tried as a war criminal, and with the UN they set up a War Crimes Court to do so. 38 conflicts these days there is often little time or space for diplomacy. It seems that as soon as a conflict occurs, the troops are sent in. Yes, the British military involvement in Sierra Leone had a positive impact leading to an end to the conflict but diplomacy came close to resolving the conflict and it could be argued that if different decisions had been taken earlier, hundreds of lives might have been saved and there may have been no need to deploy British troops.

In any event there was a key difference between Sierra Leone and subsequent conflicts such as Iraq. In Sierra Leone there was a democratically elected civilian government, with all its faults on one side, fighting a bunch of thugs and rebels, whatever grievances they may have had, on the other side, and led by a crazed zealot, who had scant regard for Sierra Leone and its people. The deployment of the British troops in 2000 was warmly welcomed by the vast majority of the Sierra Leone people mainly because of the role Britain had played in the preceding 3 years119 – a reaction that is not common in other conflicts around the world where the presence of foreign troops is often viewed by the local populace with suspicion.

Peter Penfold Abingdon, Oxfordshire. September 2020.

119 Noted by Gen Sir David Richards, who led the British forces, in his Foreword to Peter Penfold’s book ‘Atrocities, Diamonds and Diplomacy – the Inside Story of the Conflict in Sierra Leone’, Pen & Sword 2012. 39