1 CONTENTS 3-4 EDITOR’S NOTE HELOISE GIRAUDON 5-9 PRACTICAL DIPLOMACY DAVID LANDSMAN 10-12 CRISIS AVERSION: HOW A BIDEN PRESIDENCY CAN REVERSE THE DECLINE OF THE WEST MAX MORPHEW 13-15 WHAT OF THAILAND’S DEMOCRACY KARTIKA MOHD ZAYAD 16-21 LEBANON – RISING FROM THE RUBBLE? KATIE WELLS 22-26 HUMANITARIANISM IN CRISIS ADELE BENSON 27-28 COULD AZERBAIJAN AND ARMENIA PROVIDE THE LATEST SAGA IN CENTURIES OF RUSSO-TURKISH CONFLICT? TOM SCOTT 29-39 SIERRA LEONE: A DIPLOMAT’S PERSPECTIVE ON THE LONG ROAD TO PEACE PETER PENFOLD 2 Editor’s Note Heloise Giraudon The fourth volume of the Diplomatic Post, Exeter’s student journal on international affairs, is on the very pertinent topic of ‘crises.’ ‘Crises’, times of intense difficulty or danger, in global politics are numerous, and the effects lasting. Almost everywhere we look, we can see their power and influence. This year, more than ever, we can appreciate this. After a year in which no part of the globe has been left unaffected by the coronavirus epidemic, we have experienced, and witnessed, not only the effects of the health crisis itself, but its ripple effects including the multitude of social, economic, and political impacts which have been triggered by it. Understanding the effects of crises is complex, as they impact places differently depending not only on economic, social and political landscapes, but are also dependent on individual state’s interests. This is explored by David Landsman in his article as he highlights the practicality of crisis diplomacy. Drawing on his experience working as a British diplomat in Athens during the Greek Debt Crisis, he reveals the hugely varied nature of the role of a diplomat, including classic bilateral diplomacy. In the second article, Max Morphew continues to explore diplomacy in international affairs, applied to America. As America faces the rise of China, and challenges to its status as the global hegemon, he discusses the damage done by Trump to the liberal international order. He argues that by re-establishing diplomacy and negotiation as tools to tackle global issues, Biden will re-build the relationships damaged by the Trump presidency. Moving on to a theme which will appear in many of the articles, both Kartika Mohd Zayad and Katie Wells explore in depth how crises, while having devastating impact, can bring hope by revealing inequalities and dissatisfaction with government. They can therefore act as a catalyst for change. Kartika Mohd Zayad questions the political implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in Thailand, and the possibility of reform. With an already deteriorating economy and increased censorship, the impact of COVID-19 on the country has heightened tensions, and Kartika argues that there is a possibility that demands for reforms could be met so that the monarchy can keep its grasp on power. Katie Wells explores the history of government corruption, along with social and economic inequality in Lebanon which has been brought even further into the spotlight following the explosion in the Port of Beirut. The explosion reveals both incompetence and disregard from the government, and in this moment of political and economic crisis it reveals not just the need for reform, but the demand for it too. Crises are not always visible events with tangible effects, which can be seen in the world around us, there can also be crises in systems. Adele Benson, in her article highlights this in relation to humanitarian intervention, as she argues that due to its flawed system, it continues to fail the most vulnerable. States have remained indifferent to the plights of vulnerable people, a pattern which will continue unless reform occurs. She evidences this with an analysis of the plight of the Rohingya. She believes they have been largely ignored, and states should be doing more to condemn the Myanmar government. The final two articles focus on the issue of political violence. Focusing on the possibility of conflict, Tom Scott explores the implications of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia for surrounding countries, and the possibility of it becoming internationalised. Tom argues that further conflict in the region cannot be ruled out, and the threat of Russia becoming involved is the best deterrent against this. 3 Building on the focus of war in the international system, and for the final article, we go back to the practical role of a diplomat. When crisis approaches, a continuation of traditional diplomacy is bolstered with more urgent efforts to mediate, encourage dialogue, and ‘facilitate a nonviolent resolution.1’ Peter Penfold emphasizes this as he discusses his experiences in Sierra Leone as the British High Commissioner during the civil war. He highlights the role he played when violence broke out, and the contribution diplomacy made to restoring the elected government and political stability to the country. This volume of the Diplomatic Post develops a broad exploration into some of the multitude of effects triggered by crises. It combines both student and ex-diplomats insights into the traditional study of crises, and the role, and importance, of diplomacy during these times. 1 Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. Preventing deadly conflict: Final report with executive summary. Carnegie Corp New York, (1998) p. 11. 4 Practical Diplomacy in a Crisis: the Example of Greece David Landsman OBE Diplomats are involved somewhere in all almost all crises, directly as negotiators or mediators, protecting their countrymen and women or just observing and reporting2. The diplomat’s role is determined by the nature of the crisis, its importance globally and on how it impacts on the home country’s interests, political, economic, strategic, consular, commercial. While historians may regard the role of an individual official in a major negotiation (e.g. US diplomat Richard Holbrooke in the Former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan) as significant, other kinds of crisis diplomacy are unlikely to attract much public attention unless there is a significant failure. In the UK and some other developed countries, public and media attitudes have evolved in recent years to expect diplomats, particularly Heads of Mission, to be personally visible at the site of a crisis affecting significant numbers of their nationals. Their presence as quickly as possible after the arrival of international journalists, their demeanour and their ability to deliver practical results are among the principal criteria on which a Foreign Ministry’s performance is judged, even when governments’ perception of their duty of care to their employees prevents officials from operating as freely in dangerous areas as, say, freelance or citizen journalists. ***** As a former British diplomat, I worked overseas during two crises: in Belgrade in the late 1990s and in Athens from 2009-13, which is the subject of this article. After some comments on the origins and evolution of the crisis, I focus on the practical considerations impacting on diplomatic activity. I argue that crisis diplomacy consists of multiple operational activities premised on a strategic appreciation of the crisis in the context of the interests of the diplomat’s home country, but is often only distantly related to the object of a classic study of the crisis by scholars of international relations. ***** The Greek Debt Crisis (known in Greece simply as “the crisis”) can be thought of as a delayed aftershock of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. The chronic structural weakness of the Greek economy which had been covered up since Greece’s entry to the Eurozone in 2001 – politically, economically and literally (through the use of misleading statistics) - could no longer be concealed once market liquidity evaporated. When Greece joined the Euro, few realised that a small (2.5% of Eurozone GDP at the beginning of the crisis) and largely closed economy could create a systemic threat to the whole Eurozone. However “sui generis” (a much-used 2 In this article, by “diplomat” I refer only to those serving overseas and do not include officials posted to their home Foreign Ministries or other Government Departments. 5 phrase at the time) Greece might be, a Greek default was a potential challenge to the irreversibility of the Eurozone project, which had become a cornerstone of European integration3. Responsibility for the origins and handling of the crisis has been extensively discussed4. As far as Greece itself is concerned, the structural weaknesses of the economy date back at least to the restoration of democracy in the mid-1970s and were exacerbated throughout the 1980s and beyond. The political system throughout the period was heavily based on patronage – leading to weaker fiscal control – and confrontational – making consensus impossible even in a crisis. The scale of the necessary economic adjustment called for immense sacrifice from a people who had generally become used to a comfortable standard of living. As the Euro is a political as much as an economic project, decisions which in other continents would have been made by the IFIs on a largely technocratic basis, were heavily infused with European politics. As a result, Greece and its Eurozone partners more often than not behaved as though they were engaged in a political negotiation rather than a technical stabilisation process, in a context in which the survival of the Eurozone and several of its “peripheral” economies at one time or other appeared at stake. Finally, the crisis was genuinely novel: a member of a developed world currency union seeking unprecedented support from the IMF was something for which no one had a playbook. ***** I was British Ambassador in Greece from the beginning of 2009 to early 2013. Before I left London, Peter (now Lord) Ricketts, Foreign Office Permanent Under-Secretary, told me that I should expect a classic bilateral job, encompassing a bit of everything, from politics – mainly the Aegean, Cyprus and the Balkans – to trade promotion and consular protection, with responsibility for around two million British visitors to Greece every year.