Tony Blair and the United Kingdom’s Africa Policy Thomas Cargill1 Introduction Africa was never going to be the most important of British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s concerns. That it received as much attention as it did was largely due to Clare Short’s activism, as the first secretary of state at the Department for International Development (DfID), and secondly to the need to demonstrate the United Kingdom’s positive role in international affairs in the aftermath of policy failures in the Middle East. The new DfID offered the prospect of a break from an entrenched neo-colonial attitude in Whitehall that saw Africa as little more than a politically and socially bankrupt target for Western commercial exploitation, almost regardless of the economic or political cost to its people. Unfortunately the more humanitarian- and development-centred approach that the DfID has followed since 1997 is proving problematic and a new model is needed, one that goes beyond exploitative and ‘charitable’ attitudes into a more multilateral approach to UK-Africa relations. Meanwhile, the lobbying power of the increasing number of UK residents of an African background will compel the government to spend more political capital addressing African issues; furthermore, London remains an important centre for African political activity, with all the opportunities and challenges associated with fund-raising and campaigning by African politicians and political interests. Blair, the ‘New’ Labour Party and Africa In 2004 a mere 1.6% of global foreign direct investment went into Africa,2 more than half of it to Nigeria and Sudan. In an international system where national self-interest is the key to political expenditure, investment in Africa is unlikely consistently to figure highly, unless the UK defines its core national interest more broadly. That said, some of the British government’s dealings with Africa changed when ‘New’ Labour (a term applied, sometimes pejoratively, to the modern, centre-right party) took power in 1997, despite the oft-remarked fact that in opposition, Blair had demonstrated little interest in the continent. Prominent among the new factors at work were the internationalist instincts of SA Yearbook of International Affairs, 2006/7 Cargill: Tony Blair & UK Africa Policy many ‘old’ Labour Party members, including many MPs, who viewed themselves as having been allied with people in Africa against colonialism and apartheid and therefore saw African leaders as natural allies of their party in government. The fact that this has not always proved to be the case has left many in the party baffled. A second, related and reinforcing element pushing Africa towards the head of the government agenda was the decision to establish the DfID, and the revolving door that this created between the government and the UK’s powerful non-governmental organisations (NGOs). British-based NGOs such as Oxfam, Save the Children, the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development and Global Witness, while theoretically international in composition and purpose, tend to adopt a UK perspective. A further aspect to be considered is the role of the UK as an international media hub, with the BBC, Reuters, CNN, more recently Al- Jazeera, and others being staffed largely by British citizens and running much of their Africa coverage out of London. These factors, together with the shared outlook, background and social groupings of many people across these organisations and the growing numbers of political activists of African background in the UK, has ensured a higher profile for African issues than unalloyed realpolitik might dictate. In government itself, however, in 1997 there was more enthusiasm than knowledge regarding African matters. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) had long been noted for an attitude towards Africa frequently referred to by insiders as ‘robust’. That word carried a sense that African countries were little more than collectives of corruption, poverty, war and incompetence that needed to be controlled and, when convenient, used. It is true that this attitude was changing by the time New Labour came to power, but remnants of it remained in the upper echelons of the FCO; hence some strong resistance to the creation of DfID, which held out the prospect of foreign relations pursued along lines somewhat different from before. 3 Indeed, given the long decades of Britain’s retreat from its colonies it is uncertain whether the FCO had the means and skills to run an effective and informed foreign policy with regard to Africa, even had it wanted to. The failure to arrest, or even to address, this diminishing internal expertise and capacity has had a severe impact on the UK’s approach to relations with the continent’s governments. From its establishment, DfID suffered an identity crisis regarding its mandate. Clare Short, her immediate successor Baroness Amos - during a brief tenure - and the current incumbent Hilary Benn, quickly became known as the ‘real’ ministers for Africa (Clare Short in particular built up strong personal relationships with several African leaders4). This was in contrast to their formally mandated predecessors, who were ministers in the FCO with Africa as only one part of their brief. In 10 years there have been six Ministers for Africa in the FCO, who appear to have had minimal influence over levels of staffing and SA Yearbook of International Affairs, 2006/7 Select Themes on Africa budgeting in their Africa portfolio, particularly after the departure of Peter Hain, the most controversial among them.5 Lord Triesman, the current Minister for Africa, is not an elected Member of Parliament but a nominated member of the House of Lords. His departmental head, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, was a noticeable absentee from the 2004 Commission for Africa on which sat Blair, Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown, and Hilary Benn. It must be remembered, however, that DfID was established with the limited aim of delivering development, not managing a coherent overall policy for the UK and its multiplicity of external interests. In terms of protocol this is most obvious in the very limited official (as opposed to less formal) foreign visits of the DfID Secretary of State, in Africa and elsewhere: who is his foreign Government counterpart? Aside from these questions, it should borne in mind that the DfID was brand new in 1997 and inevitably has taken time to find its feet; in addition, stringent limits on personnel levels, dictated by the Treasury, have meant that it has not had enough staff properly to manage the large disbursements for which it is responsible. Hence since 1997 the UK’s Africa policy has fallen between the two stools of an atrophied and mistrusted FCO on the one hand, and a shiny new but poorly defined DfID mandate on the other. At the start of the new administration there were lofty expectations among many parts of the Left-leaning establishment and high confidence in a government that felt African solidarity in its blood; but there was extremely low capacity to propose or execute an informed, coherent policy. Understood in this context, in African policy terms the following ten years were perhaps rather more successful than might otherwise have been expected. Sierra Leone to Zimbabwe At the time of Labour’s 1997 election victory, UK government involvement in Africa had been so limited that there was little reaction from African leaders. Inevitably there was uncertainty over the implications of the DfID as a new department separate from the FCO, but much of the continent was too consumed with other challenges to pay much attention. Indeed, for the first year or so the lack of concern seemed justified, as UK policy in Africa remained broadly the same as it had been under the previous Conservative Party administration: that is, support for British trade and business interests and minimal political intervention. In its position on the war in Sierra Leone and dictatorship in Nigeria the UK fell in with the Commonwealth consensus; on the Eritrea-Ethiopia border conflict it toed the United Nations line. On Zimbabwe nothing seemed to change initially, with President Robert Mugabe saying that he expected a continuation in policy from the Conservative administration.6 The first indication of a more robust approach came with the British military intervention in Sierra Leone in May 2000, following the failure of the SA Yearbook of International Affairs, 2006/7 Cargill: Tony Blair & UK Africa Policy government there to counter the onslaught of the Revolutionary United Front rebel group. This was successful insofar as it brought the stability, security and authority needed to end the pandemic violence in that country; but it was also, perhaps, indicative of the Blair government’s propensity to cut through convention and precedent to reach a desired policy aim, and to then withdraw without addressing the underlying issues. As far back as May 1998 Blair had expressed irritation at criticism of Peter Penfold, the British High Commissioner in Sierra Leone, over alleged illicit supplies of arms to Sierra Leone, describing the affair as ‘hoo-ha’ compared with the ‘superb job’ Penfold had done in dealing with the events of May.7 It was noteworthy that despite being severely criticised by the UK Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Select Committee, many of the senior officials involved in the affair were subsequently promoted. The motives for, and consequences of, the UK military involvement and indeed Penfold’s actions as High Commissioner, were many; the intervention remains one of the more successful legacies of Blair’s premiership. Such bold and unilateral action, however, demands the bureaucratic capacity and sustained high level political focus that subsequently has so often been lacking in the policy sphere. Significantly, Sierra Leone has failed to reform its élite since 2000, thus replicating the very social divisions that contributed to the conflict in the first place.