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Florida State University Libraries Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School 2013 Embodied Free Will Beliefs: The Relationship Between Bodily States, Psychological Reactance, and Belief in Free Will Michael Ent Follow this and additional works at the FSU Digital Library. For more information, please contact [email protected] THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES EMBODIED FREE WILL BELIEFS: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BODILY STATES, PSYCHOLOGICAL REACTANCE, AND BELIEF IN FREE WILL By MICHAEL ENT A Thesis submitted to the Department of Psychology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science Degree Awarded: Spring Semester, 2013 Michel Ent defended this thesis on December 3, 2012. The members of the supervisory committee were: Roy Baumeister Professor Directing Thesis Ashby Plant Committee Member Michael Kaschak Committee Member The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members, and certifies that the thesis has been approved in accordance with university requirements. ii I dedicate this to my wife, Carrie Beth Ent. iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I gratefully acknowledge the feedback provided on this project by my major professor Roy F. Baumeister. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS List of Figures vi Abstract vii 1. INTRODUCTION 1 2. STUDY 1 13 3. STUDY 2 19 4. STUDY 3 24 5. STUDY 4 28 6. GENERAL DISCUSSION 35 APPENDICES 40 A. FIGURES 40 B. HUMAN SUBJECTS APPROVAL LETTERS 42 C. SAMPLE INFORMED CONSENT FORMS 48 REFERENCES 52 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 56 v LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Condition X reactance predicting belief in free will 40 Figure 2. Condition X reactance predicting belief in scientific determinism 40 Figure 3 Condition X reactance predicting helpfulness 41 vi ABSTRACT The present research suggests that people’s bodily states affect their beliefs about free will. The more intensely people felt sexual desire, physical tiredness, and the need to urinate, the less they believed in free will (Study 1). People with epilepsy and people with panic disorder, which are disorders characterized by a lack of control over one’s body, reported less belief in free will compared to people without such disorders (Study 2). In Study 3, among people who were not especially resistant to attempted manipulation by others (i.e., low in trait psychological reactance), those who had their involuntary reflexes triggered reported less belief in free will compared to those who demonstrated a voluntary response. In Study 4, trait reactance moderated the effect of an essay-reading task (pro-determinism vs. control) on people’s self-reported beliefs about determinism (a construct related to free will) and on people’s level of helpfulness (a variable that has been shown in previous research to be related to belief in free will). Thus, this research supports two claims: 1) bodily states affect free will beliefs, and 2) trait reactance moderates the effects of free will belief manipulations vii INTRODUCTION Belief in free will has important behavioral consequences. People’s aggression, dishonesty, helpfulness, job performance, and conformity have all been found to be related to their beliefs about free will (Alquist & Baumeister, 2010; Baumeister, DeWall, & Masicampo, 2009; Stillman et al., 2011; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). Therefore, the factors that shape people’s free will beliefs may have far-reaching effects. However, research about the factors that affect free will beliefs is scarce. A growing body of literature suggests that people’s bodily states and sensations affect how they process information (Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). Preliminary evidence suggests that free will beliefs are related to people’s bodily states. In a longitudinal study, people reported less belief in free will on days in which they had vomited compared to days in which they had not vomited (Lambert, Ent, & Baumeister, 2011/unpublished). The primary purpose of the present research was to test the hypothesis that people’s bodily states would affect their free will beliefs. The second goal of the present research was to test the hypothesis that trait psychological reactance would moderate the effect of a free will belief manipulation involving the body on self-reported free will beliefs. When people sense that others are trying to manipulate them, they tend to experience a state of psychological reactance, which may cause them to display behaviors and attitudes that rebel against the attempted manipulation (Brehm, 1966). People differ in the extent to which they experience psychological reactance (Hong & Faedda, 1996). Perhaps, one’s response to bodily manipulations may depend on his or her level of reactance. Specifically, people low in reactance may report diminished belief in free will following a manipulation 1 designed to make participants experience a lack of control over their bodies. However, because people high in reactance tend to rebel against attempted manipulation by others, they may report high belief in free will following the same manipulation. If trait psychological reactance moderates the effect of free will belief manipulations on people’s free will beliefs, then trait reactance might also moderate the effect of free will belief manipulations on behaviors that are tied to free will beliefs. Therefore, in Study 4, I tested the hypothesis that trait reactance would moderate the effect of a free will belief manipulation on people’s level of helpfulness (a variable that has been shown to be related to belief in free will; Baumeister et al., 2009). Belief in Free Will The experience of free will is an everyday part of human life. All people have the impression that they cause events and control their own actions. However, the term free will has been defined in various ways and both scholars and laypersons continue to debate what qualifies as a free action. Because free will and determinism are often regarded as opposite sides of the same coin, a precise definition of determinism is useful for any discussion of free will. The definitions of free will and determinism are somewhat different for specialists vs. laypersons. Although specialists tend to invoke complex issues surrounding causality and inevitability, laypersons tend focus on one’s ability to make choices and be responsible for them. People continue to debate whether free will is compatible with determinism. Although philosophers often regard belief in free will and belief in determinism as compatible, many laypersons tend to view the two as opposites. Because scholars and laypersons continue to debate 2 this issue, the present research utilized a measure of free will that treats free will and determinism as largely orthogonal as well as a measure that treats the two as opposites. In defining free will, I sought to accommodate disparate views by providing broad definitions that sidestep some of the controversial issues surrounding the idea of free will. Thus, I define free will as a form of causation in which a person is able to choose his or her actions from alternative courses of action (Baumeister, 2008; Monroe & Malle, 2010; Stillman & Baumeister, 2010). Although scholars often disagree about how to define free will, they tend to agree about how to define determinism. I define determinism as a form of causation in which the state of the universe at any given point in time along with the laws of nature can account for the state of the universe at any other point in time (Haggard, Mele, O’Connor, & Vohs, 2010; Van Inwagen, 1975). In a deterministic universe, if one knew the state of the universe at a given point in time and the complete set of the laws of nature, then one could predict all the events that would happen in the future (including people’s behaviors). Most evidence suggests that people generally believe in free will. For example, people’s responses to questionnaires generally indicate belief in free will (Rakos, Laurene, Skala, & Slane, 2008; Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 2005). In addition, the results of experiments in which free will beliefs are manipulated suggest that people tend to believe in free will. Researchers have manipulated people’s free will beliefs by having them read essays or statements that are either consistent with or in opposition to the idea that free will exists. In these experiments, participants in free will and control conditions tend to behave similarly, but participants in anti-free will conditions tend to behave differently from participants in both free 3 will and control conditions (Baumeister et al., 2009; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). People’s behavior was affected by reading anti-free will messages, but their behavior was not affected by reading pro-free will messages. This suggests that, independent of any manipulation, people tend to believe in free will. That is, people seem to naturally believe in free will, and their normal behavioral patterns will be altered if they are induced to disbelieve in free will. When people’s commonly held belief in free will is undermined, their behavior changes. Inducing people to disbelieve in free will has been found to increase lying, cheating, stealing, aggression, and conformity, and it has been found to decrease helpfulness (Alquist & Baumeister, 2010; Baumeister et al., 2009; Vohs & Schooler, 2008). These results suggest that belief in free will has important behavioral consequences. People’s beliefs about their own free will sometimes differ from their beliefs about the free will of people in general. For example, people tend to believe that they have more personal control over their actions than other people do (Pronin & Kugler, 2011). Conversely, some people may believe that their own free will is limited by their circumstances, but that others have complete control over their actions. People’s bodily states may affect both their beliefs about their own free will and their beliefs about the free will of people in general. Because one’s bodily states affect oneself more than they affect others, I predicted that people’s bodily states would affect their beliefs about their personal free will.