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Hirose, Y and Jasutis, G 2014 Analyzing the Upsurge of Violence and stability Mediation in the Nagorno- Conflict. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 3(1): 23, pp. 1-18, DOI: http://dx.doi. org/10.5334/sta.du

RESEARCH ARTICLE Analyzing the Upsurge of Violence and Mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Yoko Hirose* and Grazvydas Jasutis†

This article aims to explore the mediation and upsurge of violence in the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict in order to introduce new elements into the mediation focused on the structure of violence. It analyzes the definition of violence and its stages, structure, and retrospective dynamics within this conflict. The research demonstrates that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict includes three kinds of violence manifesting through physical-behavioral deeds, structural-institutional and cultural violence. Physical-behavioral violence reached a peak again in January 2014, after a few years of relative silence. Current political structures and institutions are largely saturated with historical context based on negative memories (i.e. , massacres) and violence, accompanied by external posture and interests of international actors. This context constitutes cultural violence leading to antagonism and negative attitudes which result in violent behavior. The role of mediators (OSCE) in curbing violence seems to be insufficient largely because of its overwhelming focus on direct violence. It needs different strategies, resources and attitudes to find a proper solution to incorporate means dealing with the structural and cultural dimensions.

Introduction from their positions located both in the Tensions and violence over the disputed territory of and in the occupied territory of Nagorno-Karabakh escalated in areas–the number reached 250 a day later. January 2014, with a number of incidents In the meantime, Armenia claimed that it between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces at did not respond to indiscriminate firing, it the line of contact (Kucera 2014). The num- responded only to precise shots (Interfax ber of incidents skyrocketed to hundreds 2014). The dramatic upsurge of incidents per day, involving periodic exchange of fire and irreconcilable positions between the and casualties on both sides. According to two Caucasian neighbors made it clear that the information provided by ,1 the region is neither at peace nor stable. on January 28, 2014, the armed forces of Additional measures should be undertaken Armenia violated the ceasefire 196 times to curb volatile actions and provide a final solution for reconciliation. Armenia and Azerbaijan have been engaged in a feud * Keio University, over Nagorno-Karabakh, a 1,700 square [email protected] mile autonomous district of Azerbaijan with † Harriman Institute, USA [email protected], a population of 38,000, since the beginning [email protected] of the 20th century.2 Art. 23, page 2 of 18 Hirose and Jasutis: Analyzing the Upsurge of Violence and Mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

The ethnic conflict embedded in Nagorno- something which itself is by no means cer- Karabakh is, in part, due to the relationship tain (Cornell 1999). Scholars tend to pay that both groups have with the territory– attention to the mediation efforts, primarily they argue it is the cradle of their distinctive the role of OSCE. religious, cultural and linguistic identities According to Esmira Jafarova’s recent (Kuburas 2011). The most active military analysis, despite all the good work that has engagement, along with outburst of inci- been done so far, by treating both states dents by uncontrolled groups, volunteers the same–one being a victim of occupation and mercenaries, occurred from 1989 to and the other seeking to maintain its ter- 1994. This resulted in ethnic cleansing and ritorial acquisitions–risks the appearance an unresolved territorial dispute: killing of impartiality of the mediator (Jafarova and injuring thousands, displacing hun- 2014). Melita Cuburas analyzed the conflict dreds of thousands, and resulting in serious through the lens of identity and underscored human rights violations.3 After the active that the rebellions and violent clashes may phase of the conflict, the Armenian side of not have exploded into a full-scale war had it Nagorno-Karabakh established ‘the not been for mobilizing elites in Azerbaijan of Nagorno-Karabakh’ (in Armenian, The and Armenia who commanded the armed ),4 with its own govern- forces. They implemented military strate- mental structure and armed forces. The most gies that simultaneously took advantage of active phase of the conflict was over in 1994 Azerbaijan’s political instability and Armenia’s when a ceasefire agreement was concluded nationalist ambitions (Kuburas 2011). between the parties to the conflict, under Anastasia Voronkova analyzed the relation- the mediation of . However, it has not ship between , territory, and ended violence and tension over the dis- organized violence in the ethno-national dis- puted territory. pute over Nagorno-Karabakh and advocated The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been that a consideration of these dimensions widely analyzed by scholars, conflict man- has the potential to provide a fuller explana- agement practitioners, international secu- tion of territorial rigidity than a single focus rity experts and politicians. However, the on the indivisibility of territory (Voronkova conflict still poses a real threat to regional 2013). Yoko Hirose analyzed retrospectively security and to communities. The trend the issues in the conflict and dis- and structure of its violence have not been covered reciprocal ethnic slaughters (Hirose addressed sufficiently. George W. Breslauer 2006). There are many social media web- claims that while some issues have long sites and blogs that monitor the situation since calmed down but that the dispute over in Nagorno-Karabakh and provide multiple Nagorno-Karabakh only remains stalemated views and analysis on the role of external due to the advantage of Armenia. But, he actors, negotiations, socio-economics, refu- argues, it could flare up again if political gees and political-military developments. circumstances changed (Breslauer 2011). The aim of this article is to thoroughly Many researchers have devoted themselves analyze the upsurge of violence in the con- to the search for a resolution to this conflict. flict by explaining the structure and stages Various options have been analyzed exten- of violence and suggest the introduction sively by Svante E. Cornell who concludes of new mediation elements focused on the that the final solution to the conflict is natu- structure of the violence. The article consists rally dependent upon the evolution of the of three main parts. The first part explains positions of the parties and upon domestic the definition of violence, its stages in eth- and international pressures on the nego- nic conflict and its structure. It provides an tiators—should negotiations be undertaken, analytical and methodological tool for the Hirose and Jasutis: Analyzing the Upsurge of Violence and Mediation Art. 23, page 3 of 18 in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict research. The second part is focused on the lowering the real level of needs satisfaction Nagorno-Karabakh conflict which is analyzed below what is potentially possible (Galtung to understand its context, structure and 1990). Following armed conflict, the interna- current stage of violence. The third part is tional community and society tend to focus focused on mediation and its role in curbing exclusively on visible violence (its empirical violence in the disputed region. The authors objectivity and factuality), resulting in kill- have employed conflict management meth- ing, maiming, deporting and displacing con- odology to explain and analyze the research flict-affected population. However, Michel findings. This includes violence stages in eth- Wieviorka suggests that we recognize the nic conflict and the ABC violence triangle, way subjectivity influences how violence is which shows the structure of violence and experienced, lived, observed, represented, helps identify the areas which need to be desired or undergone by individuals, groups addressed to tackle the violence. The article and societies. Therefore, an objective defini- is based on an extensive review of literature, tion of violence will speak of a violent assault field interviews and practical experience on the physical, intellectual or moral integ- from the region. rity of an individual or group of individuals The article concludes that the conflict is (Wieviorka 2009: 5). Every conflict is rife with not frozen and that the level of incidents is violence manifested in different forms. The not a sheer coincidence which will reduce roots of violence can be traced to social con- in the near future. The efforts of mediation texts, preferences, structural causes, psychol- to reduce the level of violence are focused ogy, and interests. The list of factors may well exclusively on the behavioral part, leaving approach infinity. Tatu Vanhanen has pro- aside structural-institutional and cultural posed employing a five-level scale to meas- factors. It is of tremendous importance to ure the extent of ethnic violence in single address cultural and structural violence countries (Table 1) (Vanhanen 2012). across the communities and the political Tatu Vanhanen originally conceived a elites through social media, media, commu- five level scale (the authors added 4 levels nity, joint discussions, reconciliation initia- related to the post-crisis period) which is tives, small economic projects, an exchange based on exponentially-increasing acts of of visits between the community leaders violent, gradually involving more territory and joint NGO projects which would estab- and larger parts of ethnic groups in the con- lish a framework for increasing contact flict. It begins at the level of the individual between the communities in order to stop and continues through to clashes between the violence. ethnic groups, leading to ethnic cleansing and genocide. Conceptualizing violence and its The current scale is a valuable instrument components to assess the level of violence however it Violence is an inseparable element of social needs to be linked to intervention seek- interactions and it nearly always accompa- ing to reduce violence. In other words, it is nies conflicts. Violence and conflict have not enough to assess the level of violence always played an important role in politi- because pure assessment does not lead to cal and social processes, from the build- actions for intervention. Each stage has its ing of empires, states or private armies to intensity, features, indicators and potential the consolidation of identities, the draw- responses that can be linked to national or ing of borders or the creation of enemies international actions. Moreover, a six level or allies (Thorup et al 2008). John Galtung scale covers only one part of the violence to sees violence as avoidable insults to basic be addressed. It can be supplemented with human needs, and more generally to life, additional indicators deriving from sources, Art. 23, page 4 of 18 Hirose and Jasutis: Analyzing the Upsurge of Violence and Mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Level Indicators Potential response 1 Minor incidents at the level of individuals Grass-root level initiative, NGO projects 2 Serious incidents and attacks at the individual level, National level interventions leading to death and destroyed property 3 Repeated ethnic violence in some parts of the coun- National level interventions with try resulting in forced deportation and death some external support 4 Extensive ethnic violence in significant parts of External level interventions the country; ethnic rebellions or guerrilla move- ments; hundreds of people killed in ethnic violence; relatively large numbers of ethnic refugees; ethnic cleansings 5 Violent conflicts between ethnic groups or between External level interventions with ethnic groups and the government-dominated poli- offensive instruments tics; ethnic civil war or serious separatist rebellion; thousands of people killed; number of refugees and displaced people rises to hundreds of thousands; genocide 6 Sporadic acts of violence in some parts of the ter- Combined national and external ritory; cease-fire agreement ensures fragile peace interventions involving NGOs and however it does not completely solve the issues civil society 7 Violence does not seem to be an appropriate tool to Reduced external interventions, the conflict parties that obey cease-fire agreement or national and NGO efforts peace plan 8 Some incidents occur at a community level leading National level interventions with to violence NGO efforts 9 Some volatile incidents occur at an individual level NGO efforts Table 1: Levels of violence.5 structure, context and systems. Conflict to stop such violence. Behavioral violence, management literature offers some insights in other words, can be defined as physical. It to improve our knowledge and research of is easy to define, to identify and to prepare violence. John Galtung proposed the widely an intervention plan to control the situation. used ABC (Attitude, Behavior and Context) Large scale behavioral violence does not usu- triangle which can be a very good analytical ally last for a long time and, in most cases, it tool to objectively perceive and analyze the involves highly intense violence and fighting. phenomenon of violence (Galtung 1990). It can be identified at the earlier stages of the It consists of three parts, covering behav- conflict as well. However, pre-crisis stages ioral violence (direct), structural-institutional involve tension between the conflicting par- and cultural (indirect violence). The most ties, avoidance of contact, polarization and visible and obvious part of the violence is skirmishes on a limited scale. Nevertheless, the behavioral one which results in death, the concept of violence is to be understood intimidation, injury and torture. These acts in a broader way to include all its dynamics of violence receive much of the attention and causes. during the course of conflict and the inter- As mentioned before, the duration of national community makes directed efforts direct violence is rather limited and it is Hirose and Jasutis: Analyzing the Upsurge of Violence and Mediation Art. 23, page 5 of 18 in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict triggered from by the structure and attitudes people. We believe this would be of the society. Attitudes, feelings or values absolutely legitimate (Lally 2014). causing direct violence belong to the sec- ond part of the triangle–cultural violence. The former president of the Republic of Cultural violence forms and manipulates Mikheil Saakashvili also quite often people’s attitudes, values, mentality and employed culturally violent language, cre- feelings, transforming them into hatred, ating negative vs. positive images across enemy-construction, suspicion, mistrust Georgian internal politics. Saakashvili com- and direct violent behavior. According to mented once that: John Galtung, cultural violence is when aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of It’s beyond doubt that Ivanishvili took our existence – exemplified by religion and two billion dollars from Russia dur- ideology; language and art, empirical sci- ing the elations. He doesn’t deny this ence and formal science (logic, mathemat- and even if he does, there’s no sense ics)–are used to justify or legitimize direct as confirm this every time. or structural violence (Galtung 1990). This Who will jail who, I’m not Ivanishvili’s leads to the classification and categorization zebra for him to catch and cage me or of social groups and communities (i.e. liber- any other domestic animal. One thing als, homosexuals, Russians, Muslims, Native is their wish and the other what will Americans, leftists), ascribing negative con- be in reality. The reality will be that notations and images to them and making the Georgian people will give eve- them intolerable. ryone their place. As for me, History For example, the Russian president will judge me and not a Zoo Director currently crafts cultural vio- (Saakashvili 2013). lence speeches, targeting the new govern- ment of (right vs. wrong approach). The third element of the violence triangle is He claims that the current government is related to structures and institutions. A con- illegitimate because Yanukovych was not flict does not occur in a vacuum. Contexts, properly removed from power by a formal systems and structures provoke volatile and impeachment. Putin said: unpredictable behavior. Essentially, struc- tural violence stems from rigid systems We see the rampage of reactionary imbued with discrimination, segregation, forces, nationalist and anti-Semitic colonialism, a denial of rights and liberties forces going on in certain parts of and the globalization of economies. Wherever Ukraine, including Kiev. We under- systems discriminate between groups, com- stand what worries the citizens of munities and nations to the point of threat- Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian, ening lives and livelihood, this is structural or and the Russian-­speaking population institutional violence (Fisher 2000). In prac- in the eastern and southern regions tice, it is closely related to the North-South of Ukraine. It is this uncontrolled dilemma, gender issues, or a caste system, crime that worries them. Therefore, just to name a few. Violence can occur at any if we see such uncontrolled crime part of the triangle. However, it takes differ- spreading to the eastern regions of ent forms, scales and manifestations which the country, and if the people ask us need to be understood when analyzing the for help, while we already have the situation on the ground. The triangle of vio- official request from the legitimate lence depicted above is a very useful tool for president, we retain the right to use conflict management analysis, demonstrat- all available means to protect those ing its parts, interconnectivity and visibility. Art. 23, page 6 of 18 Hirose and Jasutis: Analyzing the Upsurge of Violence and Mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

A clear understanding of violence in conflict Empire of Safavi and the , management may serve well for an interven- then the major powers of the East and West. tion to bring peace and stability. Later on, the , the major Any intervention aiming to establish sta- northern power, joined the struggle for the bility and peace requires a well-elaborated Caucasus region and in 1724 the Russian Tsar, plan addressing all three dimensions of vio- Peter the First, encouraged the to lence. It is an egregious mistake to address migrate to the land of , resulting direct violence, setting aside the structural in Russian control over Nagorno-Karabakh. and cultural parts that may be causing physi- Then Russia began to control Azerbaijan cal violence in the long term. In other words, administratively, after concluding the it is not possible to eradicate weeds by cut- Gulistan Treaty with Persia in 1812. Russia ting their stems, leaving the roots in the soil. proceeded with an invasion of Caucasus, Structural and cultural violence embedded pursing Azerbaijan and colonizing Armenia in the society and communities will not van- with the Turkmanchay Treaty (1828), Edirne ish by itself. It calls for different strategies, Treaty (1829), and by capitalizing on the resources and attitudes. While direct vio- Armenian Genocide7 by the Ottoman Empire lence can be dealt with by introducing a vari- (1895 and 1915). The latter significantly ety of measures like peacekeeping missions, contributed to the forced migration of the neutral monitoring and demilitarized zones, Armenian population and largely increased indirect violence requires different tactics. their numbers in Nagorno-Karabakh and its Work needs to be done to change struc- surrounding area. tural factors and positively influence deeply The 19th century marked the start of con- entrenched attitudes, feelings, and values. frontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan communities for various reasons includ- Violence and its stages in the ing economic, social, political and ethnic conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh clashes. It is also worth noting the religious The violence in Nagorno-Karabakh is closely dimension incorporating the confrontation linked to the elements of structural violence. between Islam and Christianity which stim- A thorough analysis of the history of the ulated the antagonized relations between conflict will help better perceive its volatile Armenia and the Tatars (old name of Azeris). character and links. The historical dynamics The conflict expanded, eventually involving relevant to the conflict can be observed from all major nations of southern Caucasus by the 7th century onward. The Armenians and 1905. The war escalated, resulting in indis- the Albanians6 were mixed and assimilated criminate mutual massacres all over the with each other, and forming ‘the principality South Caucasus by 1907. The clashes which of Artsakh – Armenian.’ Their neighbors, the took place in 1905 (in February in , in Azeris, were formed through the influence May in , in August in of Islamization forced by the Arabian occu- and in November in Elizavetopol) were the pation in the 8th century and by the Turkic most serious and left many towns, includ- advance from the 11th century onward. ing the Baku oil fields, in ruins. Although, Nagorno-Karabakh experienced extensive on a smaller scale, there were some clashes migration for various reasons and a large that occurred even in Tbilisi. It seems that portion of the Armenians in the area moved both sides were accountable because the from the mountainous area. The Islamization Azerbaijanis fired the first shots in Baku and of the area progressed despite the Armenian in Elizavetpol but the Armenians started resistance and it became a tributary state of violence in Shusha and in Tbilisi. There is the Persian Empire in 1639, as a result of sev- some speculation that this war was part of eral territorial conflicts between the Persian a Russian plot to suppress nationalism. The Hirose and Jasutis: Analyzing the Upsurge of Violence and Mediation Art. 23, page 7 of 18 in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict revival of was one of (Coalson 2013). Armenia kept requesting the factors that also contributed to the frag- to modify the borders and return Nagorno- ile and tense relationship between the two Karabakh and Nakhichevan to Armenia, nations. The nationalistic policy echoed and which would have helped to support an idea accounted for the Aremenian genocide con- of ‘Great Armenia’ extending from Black Sea ducted by Ottoman Empire in 1915. to . In addition, for the Armenian The genocide itself led to increased nationalists, it would have served as revenge Armenian nationalism and the inclusion of against the Turks who were linguistically and the Azerbaijani community into a negative culturally similar to Azeris.9 narrative, due to their ethnic similarity to During the soviet times, the two commu- the Turks. The next stage of violence in the nities cohabitated with no significant erup- Armenia-Azerbaijan confrontation occurred tion of violence. This was due in large part to right after the Russian revolution which the soviet policy which sought to integrate resulted in a nationalistic response creat- segmented societies and satisfy their needs. ing three nationalist parties in the South It was primarily done through the principles Caucasus (Georgia’s Menshevik, Azerbaijan’s of totalitarian regime because the methods Musavat and Armenia’s Dashunaktun) and applied in pluralistic societies would not have established ‘The South Caucasus Federation’ worked. The potential use of force, imprison- on 22 April 1918 (it survived until 1920). ment, the increased role of the Communist The two years of relative independence were party, the creation and existence of external turbulent between Armenia and Azerbaijan, threat served well to curb the internal con- engulfed by armed conflict and violence. flicts and violence. Nevertheless, one event Consequently, Azerbaijan ceded the - showed that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue was district to Armenia on 29 May 1918. Armenia not over. On 24 April 1965, a ceremony com- ceded all of Surmalu and Nakhichevan, as memorating the 50th anniversary of the gen- well as the predominantly Armenian dis- ocide by the Turks was held, with permission tricts Akhalkalak and Akhaltsikhe to the of the authorities, in Yerevan and a crowd of Ottoman Empire, Georgia and Azerbaijan 100,000 people fell into disorder leading to according to the Treaty of Batumi which was many arrests and unrest in the city (Furman signed between the Ottoman Empire and 3 1992). The authorities began to intensify the South Caucasus states. The issue of Nagorno- oppression of nationalism and such demon- Karabakh erupted once the soviet strations did not gain any traction, except of Azerbaijan and Armenia were established. for leading to the arrest of organizers and an Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan, with open letter to soviet leaders which were both predominantly Armenian populations, generally ignored (Bohdan & Victor 1990: requested to be part of Armenia; however 367, 379–380). the USSR respected their relationship with The situation was radically shaken up , and decided Nagorno-Karabakh under the new leadership of Mikhail would be a part of Azerbaijan.8 This territo- Gorbachev who introduced a new system, rial decision should be considered one of the values and even ideology. This led to partial most complicated reasons for the present freedom of speech, mass movement, request Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Although it was for a reexamination of the history, democ- almost impossible for the USSR to accom- ratization, liberalization, and restoration modate the borders following a geographic of the ‘nation.’ The question of Armenia- distribution of nations, the principle of an Azerbaijan relations was at stake again. The antagonistic border policy as a means of con- retirement of was treated as trolling the Caucasus region was very clearly a moment of weakness in Azerbaijan which the then central Communist Party’s intension needed to be seized by Armenia. He had Art. 23, page 8 of 18 Hirose and Jasutis: Analyzing the Upsurge of Violence and Mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict entered the Politburo of the Communist Nagorno-Karabakh’s transfer to Armenia. Party of the under Andoropov, Azerbaijan rejected the request on the assuring the powerful status of Azerbaijan in grounds that the request was against Article the center. His retirement suggested the fall 78 of the constitution of the USSR. Established of Azerbaijan’s power in the USSR and their in 1977, it ruled that the territories of the control within the republic. Furthermore, republics of the USSR were changeable only relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan by mutual agreement between correspond- were strained as a result of the Armenian gen- ing republics and ratification by the USSR. In ocide and the lost territories. The Armenian response the Armenian intelligentsia formed intelligentsia and diaspora focused much ‘the ’ and started mas- of effort on promoting their interests both sive demonstrations and unrest. On 22 internally and externally. February 1988, two young Azeris were killed At the initial stage it brought about posi- by an armed soldier of the Dashunaktun Party tive results. Russian politicians along with (Armenian nationalist party), near Sakharov’s family took the Armenian side; of Nagorno-Karabakh11 and this information the successfully gener- spread to throughout Azerbaijan immedi- ated financial and political support for their ately and triggered Sumgayit incident. On ideas and in 1987, Armenia started a cam- the same day, more than 12 districts with pre- paign calling on the central government in dominantly Azerbaijanis, were attacked by Moscow, and unofficially the international armed members of the Dashunaktun Party, community, to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh forcing them to leave the area. problem. After the first demonstration in The situation pressed the central party Yerevan in October 1987, demonstrations into taking countermeasures and Gorbachev occured very often in Nagorno-Karabakh. sent a number of members of On 1 December 1987 and 5 January 1988, the party to Yerevan and on 23 the Nagorno-Karabakh delegation appealed February. In addition, he had a long talk with directly to the Central Committee of the the Armenian intelligentsia, who were lead- Soviet Communist Party. After that, hostility ing the movement, and convinced them to increased so much that many movements give up the border change to prevent a chain and campaigns for collecting signatures were reaction throughout USSR (Seiichiro 1996). began in Nagorno-Karabakh as well as at vari- While troops were sent to Yerevan, the dem- ous parts of Armenia. onstration did not lose its spirit or energy. On Azerbaijan claims that violence in the the contrary, the number of demonstrators Nagorno-Karabakh conflict appeared around exceeded one million and a half. Therefore, November 1987 in Armenia because Armenia Gorbachev issued the ‘Declaration of Self – tried to force Azerbaijani out. Then many Restrained Conducts’ to the residents in the Azerbaijani, having suffered violence, arson, two republics. However the declaration did plunder and , escaped to Azerbaijan not work. In Sumgayit, where many refugees to find shelter.10 Most of them being farm- were concentrated, Armenians were massa- ers, they wished to be moved to rural areas. cred on 28 February 1988. According to the However, an industrial policy resulted in most popularly accepted view, a riot brought their transfer to Sumgayit, the industrial city on by a group of hooligans developed into situated near from Baku. a massacre, though there are many differ- The Armenian movement reached its ent stories of the incident and Armenia and peak in February 1988. On 20 February, Azerbaijan disagree on the facts.12 As a result, the of Nagorno-Karabakh, 26 Armenians and 6 Azerbaijanis were killed, Autonomous Oblast, requested of the 197 injured and 86 Azerbaijanis arrested. Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan and Armenia, Sumgayit was the turning point of the and of the government of the USSR for violence in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Hirose and Jasutis: Analyzing the Upsurge of Violence and Mediation Art. 23, page 9 of 18 in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Azerbaijan claimed that the incident was the People’s Front and should be analyzed in planned by Armenian side and that they only the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. retaliated. Furthermore, Azerbaijan claimed This incident is remembered as being part that most of them did not participate in the of the conflict because it is linked with the genocide and they protected Armenians memory of the Azerbaijani massacre by the instead, insisting the number of Armenians Armenians and the Russians at the end March victims would have been much larger in 1918. Furthermore, it inspires resentment number had they not done so. On the other toward the Russians who supported Armenia. hand, Armenians underscored that the mas- In 1991, Azerbaijan and Armenia declared sacre had been planned systematically by independence just before the USSR collapsed Azerbaijani leaders. For example, the First in December 1991. After that, Armenia and Secretary of the Sumgayit City Communist Nagorno-Karabakh presented a united front Party was waving the Azerbaijani flag during against Azerbaijan and the conflict escalated the incident; Azerbaijan held a public meet- into the all-out war (although without the ing at Baku and Sumgayit on 21 February proclamation of war) in which Soviet arms (Raevski 1992). and mercenaries were used. Armed clashes While this article does not claim to pro- ensued and following the dissolution of vide the ultimate truth about the incident, it the USSR both sides began massive military presumes that the resentment of Azeri refu- operations. Both sides committed indis- gees and the characteristics of the time that criminate attacks including air-raids against strained nationalism and hostility were con- civilians. Many villages were razed and both tributing factors. USSR authorities reacted to nations endured many casualties and inju- the incident by introducing and ries. The ‘Khojaly-genocide,’ between 900 to by sending heavy armaments into the area; 1000 Azerbaijani, including elderly, women surveillance of intelligentsia was intensified and children, were massacred indiscrimi- and manipulation of information began. The nately on 26 February 1992, still remains one Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to put the brakes of the serious factors obstructing a peace- on the armed collision, instated a special ful settlement for the AZE. The period from administration placing Nagorno-Karabakh 1991–1994 was one of the most volatile under the direct control of the Kremlin— and turbulent of the conflict. In 1994 Russia temporally (the governor-general was Arkady played a major role in managing the conflict Boriskii) beginning on 20 January 1989. On and offered a ceasefire agreement ( 28 November 1989, administrative power protocol) to be signed. This protocol remains was returned to Azerbaijan due to the com- of tremendous importance being the only plaints raised by the Azerbaijan government. ceasefire agreement setting obligations for At that point Armenian increased the conflict parties. It curbed the scale of in frequency and became more radical. Also violence in the region which has remained in Azerbaijan, where the increase in nation- fragile and unpredictable. alism was relatively slow, the people’s front A short retrospective discourse clearly was gaining influence by the end of 1989. demonstrates that violence has prevailed Under these circumstances, a massacre of despite varying in intensity. Armenians occurred in Baku on 13 January As depicted in Table 2, the level of vio- 1990. Although the violence had been put to lence reached its peak three times, result- rest, on the entered ing in an outbreak of casualties, refugees Baku under the pretext of the settling the and destroyed property. It started between massacre, and many Azerbaijanis, including 1905 and 1907 with armed engagement women and children, were killed. This so- between the communities and was resumed called ‘,’ was the result of the in the 1918–1920 period and subsided in the Kremlin’s aim to contain the movement of Soviet period. Nevertheless, the beginning of Art. 23, page 10 of 18 Hirose and Jasutis: Analyzing the Upsurge of Violence and Mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Year Situation Parties involved Level of violence 1905–1907 Armeno-Tatar war Armenians and Tatars 5

1918–1920 Clashes between independent Armenians and Azeris 5 Armenia and Azerbaijan 1948–1953 Sporadic violence between Armenians and Azeris 2 Armenians and Azeris 1988–1990 , ethnic inci- Armenians and Azeris 3 dents, refugees 1991–1994 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict Armenians and Azeris 4–5 1994–2014 Ceasefire period involving Armenians and Azeris 6 periodic incidents

Table 2: Levels of violence over Nagorno-Karabakh. the collapse of the Soviet Union led to new structures and institutions are largely satu- narratives and a simmering feud between rated with historical context based on vio- Armenia and Azerbaijan which became more lence and they instigate cultural violence violent. It reached the highest level of vio- making the communities more antagonistic lence between 1991 and 1994. The period and providing them with cultural percep- from 1994 to 2014 was relatively calm with tions leading to behavioral violence. For some outbreaks of violence. For example, 16 example, both communities’ governments soldiers on both sides were killed along the contributed to the cultural violence in the cease-fire line in 2008. In June 2012 there case of Azerbaijan’s August 2013 pardon to was an escalation of violence along the cease- , an Azerbaijani military officer fire line and about a dozen soldiers from both who had killed an Armenian soldier (Gurgen sides were killed. Serious escalation in fight- Margaryan) in in 2004.13 ing started on 20 January 2014 along various Both men had been participating in front-line areas, with both sides blaming the a NATO-sponsored training seminar in other, and there was a return to hostile rhet- Budapest. Safarov killed Margaryan while oric by officials and in the media. Details sur- he was sleeping in his dormitory. Safarov rounding the 20 January clashes are unclear. insisted that Margaryan had insulted the Armenia claims Azerbaijan attempted to Azerbaijani flag (Grigorian 2006). Safarov was break through the front lines, vowing ‘retri- sentenced to life imprisonment in Hungary bution’ after 1 Armenian soldier was killed with a minimum incarceration period of 30 (Kucera 2014). years. However, he was later freed and wel- The ceasefire agreement partly reduced the comed by the Azerbaijani people as a great acts of behavioral violence and the scale of hero despite the criticism received from the the conflict. However, it could not deal with international community. This incident dem- structural and cultural violence which largely onstrates some of the feelings, values and prevailed within the communities. The con- attitudes the people in region hold that may text of the conflict implies a number of vari- lead to violent behavior. While this incident ables forming a system promoting violent did not result in the violence per se, it laid behavior. The conflict system involves regu- the foundation for additional violence. The lar clashes, massacres and confrontations level of violent incidents will increase unless between the two nations, supported by dif- the mediators (OSCE) make serious efforts to ferent international actors. Current political handle all three components of violence. Hirose and Jasutis: Analyzing the Upsurge of Violence and Mediation Art. 23, page 11 of 18 in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

The role of mediation in curbing except Nagorno-Karabakh, and then (2) to violence in Nagorno-Karabakh start the negotiation on the final status of Violence consists of three main components. Nagorno-Karabakh. This is supported by However, ceasefire agreements, or non-use Azerbaijan. of forces treaties, focus mainly on cessation The second part is a package plan in which of hostilities dealing with only physical- all Armenian forces are to withdraw after behavioral violence. Ideally, such agreements the peace settlement. This is supported by should respond to the roots of cultural and the Armenians. The third step, known as the structural violence which remain within the common-state plan, provides that Nagorno- communities if not addressed. The Bishkek Karabakh and Azerbaijan will form a federa- protocol, which is a provisional cease-fire tion.16 This seems to be the most convincing. agreement signed in May 1994 sponsored by Lastly, the ‘Gobl Plan,’ which proposes the Russia, played a major role in the Nagorno- exchange of the zone between Armenia and Karabakh conflict. The following elements Nagorno-Karabakh called the corri- are set forth in the protocol (Blair 1996): dor, with the zone between Azerbaijan and the enclave Nakhichevan. 1. to grant a wide range of autonomy to Ultimately, the legal status of Nagorno- Nagorno-Karabakh, while maintaining Karabakh is the largest barrier for peace. of Azerbaijan14; Furthermore, the involvement of foreign 2. some measures to guarantee the secu- countries such as Russia, the US, , and rity for Nagorno-Karabakh; Turkey has complicated the situation and 3. Armenian withdrawal from the occu- stagnated the peace process. Concerning the pied territories in Azerbaijan; peace process, face-to-face meetings of the 4. to take special measures for the Lachin two presidents are considered most effective corridor to link Nagorno-Karabakh but both presidents have been extremely with Armenia (possibly coupled with sensitive due to their own domestic situa- similar measures between Azerbaijan tions and have been taking cautious attitudes and Nakhichevan); towards the peace process. This was particu- 5. to make arrangements between Azer- larly the case following the 27 October 1999 baijan and Armenia so that at least the assault on the Armenian parliament.17 major portion of the refugees on both Over the years, Armenia and Azerbaijan’s sides may return to their homes; positions have not modified much. 6. efforts to be made by the international Azerbaijan insists on territorial integrity community to support economic of Azerbaijan, and the withdrawal of the reconstruction of both nations. Nagorno-Karabakh army troops from the occupied areas as a precondition of the Unfortunately, this does not satisfy the con- peace negotiations. Nagorno-Karabakh flict parties and Armenia insists on the right must be under Azerbaijani sovereignty and of self-determination, while Azerbaijan refers the from Nagorno- to the principles of territorial integrity, non- Karabakh should not be expelled from the aggression at the border and respect for sov- peace process. Azerbaijan can agree neither ereignty. It asserts that Nagorno-Karabakh to the settlement of the Russian military should be granted the largest autonomy bases in Azerbaijan, nor to set the peacekeep- within Azerbaijan.15 This complicated situ- ing operation (hereinafter referred as PKO) ation is mediated exclusively by OSCE. The by Russia. A large number of Azerbaijani OSCE Minsk group proposed a two-step intelligentsia, such as Aydyn Mirzazade, approach, that called for (1) all Armenian Eldar Namazov, and Mubariz Ajgmedoglu forces to withdraw from Azerbaijani land (Karagyozian 2004), express their displeasure Art. 23, page 12 of 18 Hirose and Jasutis: Analyzing the Upsurge of Violence and Mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict that many of their past concessions, includ- relationship as the precondition for the peace ing a proposal to grant the highest autonomy settlement. Ordinary Armenians claim that to Nagorno-Karabakh, have been neglected Nagorno-Karabakh is their native land and by Armenians. However, some wish to secure they are conspicuously critical of the Azeris the peace settlement by with further consid- for their adherence to Nagorno-Karabakh eration of the question of human rights. despite their challenges managing it. For As far as the popular opinion of the Azeri, them, the history cannot be forgotten. They it is not simple. Some people tend to treat do not want to repeat it any more, and thus Armenia as good friends from the Soviet they are quite against concessions. However, period and do not have a negative opinion there are some constructive opinions sup- of them. Nevertheless, examples of cultural porting a plan to form the common-state on violence are widespread in Azerbaijan. For the premise of mutual concessions, giving example, TV channels broadcast the pic- priority to the comprehensive discussions of tures of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict Nakhichevan, another native land for them, almost every day. Some refugees are quite and starting efforts to construct a coopera- emotional towards Armenians, demanding tive relationship. revenge.18 Until the situation has been sta- In contrast with the situation in Azerbaijan, bilized, ‘the international PKO’ led by the UN the situation in Armenia is quite the oppo- will be deployed in and around the occupied site. Pictures of the conflict have rarely been area. However, Armenia has been against broadcast on TV and the civil population has the introduction of this PKO form the begin- almost forgotten the fact that the present ning, and it seems to be very difficult for all situation remains in a cease-fire. During field actors to be satisfied because of their diver- interviews, many responders mentioned that gent interests. the news about the peace talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia should cooperate the two presidents might lead people to in the economic realm, as they share similar be reminded, to a degree, of the Nagorno- business interests. Unfortunately, Armenia Karabakh conflict. Many other interview- holds a relatively strong positing and does ees from the opposition parties, NGOs not seem to be very flexible (University of and academic community stated that the Michigan 1996). Armenia demands respect Nagorno-Karabakh discussion should bet- for national self-determination and interna- ter be suspended.20 When the author asked tional recognition of the independence of again ‘If you had frozen the situation, you the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.’ The lead- could not resolve other occupied territories, ers of both Azerbaijan and Turkey should even if Nagorno-Karabakh had been admit- cease their belligerent statements and the ted under the jurisdiction of Armenia.’ Many blockade of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. interviewees said that ‘Armenia won the war, It would be necessary to stage a it is proper that Nagorno-Karabakh should on self-determination under the observation be transferred.’ of the UN. Armenians share the view that Nagorno- The Armenian government and intelli- Karabakh should be independent at the very gentsia stick to their position that the con- least, even if this would renew armed conflict; flict is an Azeri civil war and insist that peace they could surely win, since they have been negotiations should be held between Baku strongly supported by Russia. War-weariness and Stepanakert.19 In addition, throughout has been forgotten among Armenians in the peace process, they criticize Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh due to a social decline and over their policy not to join discussions, to aggravation of the political and economic stick to meaningless international law, and situation. Hatred towards the Azerbaijanis to propose the construction of a cooperating has eased, and Armenian businessmen, who Hirose and Jasutis: Analyzing the Upsurge of Violence and Mediation Art. 23, page 13 of 18 in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict prefer trading with the Azerbajianis on the the consequences of the Russia-Georgian eastern border, have increased. war and recognition of the independence The international mediation of the conflict of and South . This pro- has achieved some progress. However, due to voked Russia’s proposal to the Turkish Prime a lack of neutrality its outcomes are less clear. Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to lead the The current composition of OSCE Minsk peace plan in the Caucasus; thus, Turkey pro- group of co-chairmen does not seem to be posed a ‘Caucasus Stability and Cooperation neutral. and Russia quite obviously Platform’ just after the Russia-Georgia War.21 support Armenia, while US is making an Turkey then started a peace process with attempt to balance between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which resulted in a historical agree- Armenia. While French support is related to ment establishing diplomatic relations after the influence of the Armenian Diaspora and nearly a century of animosity – in spite of political context, the Russian Federation has strong opposition from both states. very strong military and political ties along Nonetheless, these initiatives never pro- with its strategic interests in South Caucasus. gressed to real peace between Turkey and Dr. Esmira Jafarova concludes that although, Armenia. Russia then began intensive medi- the OSCE has the ability to make a differ- ation between Azerbaijan and Armenia, ence in the conflict resolution process and facilitating some occasional talks between its co-chairs have been highly engaged with the Azerbaijani and Armenian sides, which mediation and facilitation work. However, in culminated in the ‘Declaration between its present format the group does not have the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic the capacity and necessary tools to achieve of Armenia and the Russian Federation a lasting peaceful solution to the conflict. (Moscow Declaration)’ and the Kazan Despite all the good work done so far, by summit. Russia also led talks among the extending the same treatment to both states Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Russian Foreign – one being a victim of occupation, while Ministers, which resulted in the ‘Moscow the other is seeking to maintain its territo- Declaration’ of 31 October 2008. The rial acquisitions – the OSCE runs the risk ‘Moscow Declaration,’ however, does not of losing its place as an impartial mediator address such important problems as state (Jafarova 2014). It is assumed that the best status. It also is remarkable because it was option would be to introduce a neutral party the first agreement between Azerbaijan and that could bring about a break-through in Armenia after the 1994 cease-fire agreement, the peace process. but it was not a substantial contribution to However, it is almost impossible to achieve the peace process. In addition, Medvedev agreement among all the parties concerned. held the Kazan Summit with the Azerbaijani Even if a commitment by the third par- and Armenian presidents in an attempt to ties were to be made without any kind of solve the Nagorno-Karabakh problem in June agreement among the parties concerned, 2011. Unfortunately, Azerbaijan refused to the Armenians would think that it was not the sign the proposed document. neutral and the prospect of a peaceful settle- So far the antagonism between Azerbaijan ment would be worsened. The mediation by and Armenia has been so strong that it OSCE has been stagnating for a long period; seems impossible to achieve a settlement at however the possibility for progress through the present time without mediation by third a peace agreement appeared in 2008. A parties. In terms of mediation, mediation by UN General Assembly resolution identified third parties or international organizations Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijani ter- would be better than that by any ‘country.’ A ritory and requested Armenia to withdraw peaceful settlement through the mediation its troops. Russia was pre-occupied with by OSCE Minsk group is uncertain. However, Art. 23, page 14 of 18 Hirose and Jasutis: Analyzing the Upsurge of Violence and Mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict it remains the most realistic hope for the of this conflict. The violence spiked (stage time being. The mediation should start 5) periodically, starting in 1905–1907 with with very little steps, addressing the issues armed engagement between the commu- on the ground. It is obvious that the ques- nities which was resumed in 1918–1920 tion of status is fundamental and to find a and again revived in parallel with the col- mutually acceptable solution is an extremely lapse of the Soviet Union. The period of tough assignment. Therefore it is important 1994–2014 can be characterized as having to address violence at a community level reduced violence with some outbreaks and through social media, media, community, it seems the volatile behavior will continue. joint discussions, reconciliation initiatives, The ceasefire agreement (Biskek Protocol) small economic projects, exchanges of visits partly reduced the acts of behavioral vio- between the community leaders, and joint lence and its scale. However, it did not deal NGO projects. This would erect a platform with structural and cultural violence which for establishing contact between the com- remain. Current political structures and insti- munities and setting aside cultural violence tutions are largely saturated with historical patterns which are embedded across the context based on negative memories (i.e. communities. Sumgait pogrom, Khojaly massacres) and violence, accompanied by external posture Conclusion and interests of international actors. This The article addressed the role of violence and context constitutes cultural violence leading mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. to antagonism and negative attitudes which Having analyzed the concept of violence result in violent behavior. and its structure and context in the conflict, The role of mediators (OSCE) in curbing together with the role of mediation in curb- violence seems to be insufficient because ing violence, the research would offer the fol- it does not address all three dimensions of lowing concluding points: violence. Structural and cultural violence The current methodological approach embedded in the political elite, society and towards the stages of violence needs to be communities will not disappear by itself. improved. A five-level scale to measure the OSCE needs different strategies, resources extent and importance of ethnic violence and attitudes to find a proper solution and has been updated to link it to intervention to influence positively attitudes, feelings, seeking to reduce violence and to demon- and values that have been strongly affected strate its reduction after the most active by the conflict. It is a mistake to concentrate phase of a conflict. Moreover, each stage only on direct violence, ignoring the struc- has its intensity, features, indicators and tural and cultural dimensions, which drive potential responses that can be supple- violent behavior. Behavioral violence is very mented with additional indicators deriving visible, capturing the attention of the inter- from cultural and structural violence. The national community. But concerted atten- Nagorno-Karabakh conflict includes three tion must also be addressed to structural and kinds of violence manifesting through phys- cultural violence. ical-behavioral deeds, structural-institutional Efforts to target structural and cultural and cultural violence. Physical-behavioral violence an employ social media, media, violence reached a peak again in January community, joint discussions, reconcilia- 2014, after a few years of relative silence, tion initiatives, small economic projects, the harsh rhetoric from both sides led to pro- exchange of visits between the community active intervention by OSCE. leaders, and joint NGO projects which would The analysis of violence demonstrates establish contact between the communities, that the 2014 violence was characteristic reducing violence. The conflict is far from Hirose and Jasutis: Analyzing the Upsurge of Violence and Mediation Art. 23, page 15 of 18 in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict resolved and the level of incidents in January Azeris and 6,000 Armenians). The esti- 2014 reflects the lack of attention to cultural mated number of injured: 50,000 (30, and structural dimensions of the violence. 000 Azeris and 20,000 Armenians). There were about 345,000 Armenian refugees Author Information and about 1,000,000 Azeri refugees. Dr. Yoko Hirose is an Associate Professor of 4 The declaration of the independence was Policy Management at Keio University, Japan. issued on 6 January 1992 based on the She received her PhD from Keio University. ‘Referendum’ in 1991. She conducted research in Baku from 2000 to 5 Developed, supplemented and adapted 2001 as a fellow of United Nations University by the authors from Vanhanen 2012: and was a Visiting Scholar at Columbia 38–66. University, Harriman Institute in New York 6 It is thought to be one nation of the Cau- from 2013 to 2014. casus families of language, and there is Dr. Grazvydas Jasutis is a Visiting Scholar no relationship with the Albanian of the at Columbia University, Harriman Institute present . in New York. He received his PhD from the 7 Article Two of the UN Convention on University of Vilnius, . He is a con- Genocide of December 1948 describes flict management practitioner and held vari- genocide as carrying out acts intended ous positions in the EU Monitoring Mission ‘to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, in Georgia, the EU Monitoring Mission ethnic, racial or religious group.’ Argen- in Aceh (), the OSCE Mission in tina, , Canada, France, , Rus- , the OSCE Mission in FYROM, the sia and Uruguay are among more than 20 Permanent Delegation to NATO, and the countries which have formally recognised Ministry of National Defense of Lithuania. genocide against the Armenians. The and the UN Sub- Notes Commission on Prevention of Discrimi- 1 Letter dated 29 January 2014 from the nation and Protection of Minorities have Permanent Representative of the Repub- also done so. The UK, US and are lic of Azerbaijan to the United Nations among those that use different terminol- Office at Geneva addressed to the Presi- ogy to describe the events (BBC 2010). dent of the Human Rights Council. 8 Following the Kars Treaty which was United Nations. A/HRC/25/G/5. concluded on 13 November 1921, both 2 Historical dynamics relevant to the con- Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan flict can be observed from the 7th cen- became autonomous areas within the tury. ‘Nagorno’ means ‘mountainous’ Azerbaijan Republic. Nahichevan even- in Russian and ‘Karabakh’ means ‘black tually became an enclave of Azerbaijan garden’ in Azerbaijani. After the col- because Armenia acquired Zangezur-dis- lapse of USSR, Azerbaijanis call it ‘Dagliq trict in 1921. (mountainous) Garabagh’ or ‘Yukhari 9 This demonstrates the organization enti- (highlands) Garabagh,’ while the Arme- tled ‘Karabakh for Armenia’ which was nians refer to its old name ‘Artsakh.’ established in 1926. Although it was once Similarly, Armenians named the capital dissolved by the pressure from the center, of Nagorno-Karabakh ‘Stepanakert’ and it was reorganized in 1929 to escalate Azerbaijan – ‘Hankendi.’ anti-Turkism. In 1945 and 1949, the peti- 3 There are various estimations about the tions were sent to Moscow requesting number of victims. The estimated num- unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with ber of people killed is between 15,000 Armenia. Taking advantage of the unre- and 20,000 (approximately 17,000: 11,000 strained mood of the Khurshchev era, the Art. 23, page 16 of 18 Hirose and Jasutis: Analyzing the Upsurge of Violence and Mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

number of petitions were increased dur- minority problem should be resolved ing the first half of 60s, but the authori- within the present border, basing on ties answered only ‘we can not handle Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and this problem now,’ and the movement Political rights. However, the UN cannot fizzled (Bohdan & Victor 1990: 218). express the view clearly, because Article 10 Field interview by Yoko Hirose in Baku 1 respects ‘national self-determination.’ (2000). On the other hand, Armenia’s entry into 11 Although there are many testimonies the war without authorization of the UN that the people who killed the two Azeris Security Council is against the United were Azeri policemen, the authorities Nations Charter, Article 2 (4) about the maintained that the criminals were the prohibition using armed force between Armenians. Therefore some people insist states and Article 2 (3) which states that that the incident was planned by the the conflict between states shall be set- authorities with an aim to worsen the tled in a peaceful manner. In addition, relations between the Azerbaijan and the the occupation of the Azeri territory by Armenia. the Armenians is against the UN spirit 12 Field interview by Yoko Hirose in Baku (UN 1970). (2000). There are many rumors concern- 16 Field interview by Yoko Hirose with Rasim ing the Sumgayit incident, which trig- Musabekov on 25 December 2000. gered the armed conflict. Just before the 17 The armed group broke into the parlia- incident, more than 60 confirmed crimi- ment and killed 8 persons including nals were granted amnesty, then organ- the then Prime Minister Sarkisyan and ized as a group and taken to Sumgayit. speaker Dermichan. The perpetrators There were 50 unidentified hooligans explained that they were concerned who suddenly started a riot at a bus ter- about the economic and political situa- minal in Sumgayit. The USSR army did tion, and were against ‘peace in exchange not stop the riot. The Azerbaijani authori- for territory.’ ties reportedly instigated the riot. Despite 18 Field interview by Yoko Hirose in Baku tight information control, many journal- (2000). ists from the West as well as Russians 19 Field interview by Yoko Hirose in Yerevan and Armenians arrived there just before (2000). the riot and the details of the riot were 20 Field interview by Yoko Hirose in Yerevan reported vividly to western countries. (2000). 13 Although he was sentenced to life impris- 21 It was inspired by the Russian-Turkish onment in Hungary, he was extradited on cooperation and it was designed to 31 August 2012 to Azerbaijan after his serve as a supplemental body for exist- request under the Strasbourg Conven- ing regional mechanisms (i.e., the OSCE tion. He was greeted as a hero and pro- Minsk Group) to resolve regional dis- moted to the rank of major. pute as well as to reinvigorate the local 14 Azerbaijan express that they can give economies of countries in the southern Nagorno-Karabakh the same status to Caucasus, encourage development, coop- Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, but eration and integration with the world, there are no conditions to implement it promote free trade, support the private because of the occupation. The status of sector, protect the environment, realize Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the largest international pipeline projects, restruc- obstacles to a peace settlement. ture administrative organizations, ensure 15 The UN cannot allow that ‘national self- transparency, resolve refugee problems determination’ is given priority, because and maintain harmonization. See more the UN takes the position that the about the ‘Caucasus Stability and Coop- Hirose and Jasutis: Analyzing the Upsurge of Violence and Mediation Art. 23, page 17 of 18 in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

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How to cite this article: Hirose, Y and Jasutis, G 2014 Analyzing the Upsurge of Violence and Mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 3(1): 23, pp. 1-18, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.du

Published: 30 June 2014

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