From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

British Naval Policy 1964-70

Edward From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies Series Series editors: Professor Greg Kennedy, Dr Tim Benbow and Dr Jon Robb-Webb, Defence Studies Department, Joint Services Command and Staff College, UK

The Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies Series is the publishing platform of the Corbett Centre. Drawing on the expertise and wider networks of the Defence Studies Department of King’s College , and based at the Joint Services Command and Staff College in the UK Defence Academy, the Corbett Centre is already a leading centre for academic expertise and education in maritime and naval studies. It enjoys close links with several other institutions, both academic and governmental, that have an interest in maritime matters, including the Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC), the Naval Staff of the Ministry of Defence and the Naval Historical Branch. The centre and its publishing output aims to promote the understanding and analysis of maritime history and policy and to provide a forum for the interaction of academics, policy-makers and practitioners. Books published under the eagis of the Corbett Centre series reflect these aims and provide an opportunity to stimulate research and debate into a broad range of maritime related themes. The core subject matter for the series is maritime strategy and policy, conceived broadly to include theory, history and practice, military and civil, historical and contemporary, British and international aspects. As a result this series offers a unique opportunity to examine key issues such as maritime security, the future of naval power, and the commercial uses of the sea, from an exceptionally broad chronological, geographical and thematic range. Truly interdisciplinary in its approach, the series welcomes books from across the humanities, social sciences and professional worlds, providing an unrivalled opportunity for authors and readers to enhance the national and international visibility of maritime affairs, and provide a forum for policy debate and analysis. From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic British Naval Policy 1964–70

Edward Hampshire The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, UK © Edward Hampshire 2013

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Hampshire, Edward. From east of Suez to the eastern Atlantic : British naval policy 1964–70. -- (Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies series) 1. Sea-power – Great Britain – History – 20th century. 2. Great Britain – History, Naval – 20th century. 3. Great Britain. Navy Dept – History – 20th century. 4. Great Britain. – History – 20th century. 5. Great Britain – Politics and government – 1964-1979. I. Title II. Series 359'.03'0941'09046-dc23

The Library of Congress has cataloged the printed edition as follows: Hampshire, Edward. From east of Suez to the eastern Atlantic : British naval policy, 1964–70 / by Edward Hampshire. p. cm. – (Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7546-6972-2 (hardcover) 1. Sea-power – Great Britain–History – 20th century. 2. Great Britain–History, Naval – 20th century. 3. Great Britain. Royal Navy – History – 20th century. 4. Great Britain – Politics and government – 1964-1979. 5. Naval strategy – History – 20th century. I. Title. VA454.H26 2013 359'.03094109046--dc23

ISBN 9780754669722 (hbk) ISBN 9781409466130 (ebk – PDF) ISBN 9781409466147 (ebk – ePUB) V Contents

List of Tables vii List of Abbreviations ix Glossary xi Preface xiii

Introduction 1

1 The Royal Navy in 1964 7

2 Emerging from Mountbatten’s Shadow 41

3 The Navy Alone 77

4 The Cancellation of CVA-01 107

5 The Navy and the Defence Expenditure Studies 141

6 The Mediterranean Strategy 165

7 Building a New Fleet 191

8 Conclusion 223

Bibliography 235 Index 245 For Ellie. List of Tables

1.1 Major RAF aircraft programmes 20 1.2 Aircraft carriers, in service and planned 1964 27 1.3 Strike and fighter carrier aircraft, in service and planned 1964 28 1.4 Breakdown of carrier programme costs (1965–75), 14 December 1964 30 1.5 , and , in service and under construction 1964 31 1.6 Major weapon systems in service and under development 34

4.1 Proposed programmes 1964–66 129 This page has been left blank intentionally List of Abbreviations

AAC Army Air Corps ACAS (Pol) Assistant Chief of the Air Staff (Policy) ADA Action Data Automation: computer command system for larger British warships AEW Airborne Early Warning AUS Assistant Under-Secretary of State CAAIS Computer Assisted Action Information System: computer command system for smaller British warships CAS Chief of the Air Staff CDS Chief of the Defence Staff CENTO Central Treaty Organization (‘Baghdad Pact’) CGS Chief of the General Staff CinCCHAN -in-Chief, English Channel (NATO) CNS Chief of the Naval Staff CoS Chiefs of Staff CSA Chief Scientific Adviser (Ministry of Defence) DCNS Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff DNP Director of Naval Plans DPS Defence Planning Staff DOAE Defence Operational Analysis Establishment, Byfleet DOPC alternative abbreviation for OPD DS 1 Defence Secretariat, Branch 1 – Policy (Ministry of Defence) DS 4 Defence Secretariat, Branch 4 – Naval Policy (Ministry of Defence) DS 12 Defence Secretariat, Branch 12 – Defence Staff (Ministry of Defence) DS 22 Defence Secretariat, Branch 22 – Policy (Ministry of Defence) DNTWP Director of Naval Tactical and Weapons Policy (Naval Staff) DUS Deputy Under-Secretary of State EASTLANT Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic (NATO) EEC European Economic Community EFTA European Free Trade Association FAA (of the Royal Navy) FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office x From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

FO Foreign Office GDP Gross Domestic Product GNP Gross National Product LTCs Long-Term Costings M1(N) Military Branch 1 (Navy Department of Ministry of Defence) MoD Ministry of Defence NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation OPD Oversea (sic) Policy and Defence Committee (of Cabinet) OPD(O) Oversea Policy and Defence Committee – official (i.e. Civil Servants only) sub-committee OPDO(DR) OPD: defence review sub-committee of official sub-committee ORC Operational Requirements Committee (Ministry of Defence) PEG Programme Evaluation Group (of Ministry of Defence) PUS Permanent Under-Secretary of State (except where stated, at Ministry of Defence) RAF SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (NATO) SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (NATO) SAS Special Air Service SEATO South-East Asia Treaty Organization SSBN Nuclear-powered ballistic-missile carrying SSN Nuclear-powered ‘hunter-killer’ submarine STOL Short Take-Off and Landing aircraft STRIKEFLTLANT Commander NATO Strike Fleet, Atlantic VCAS Vice Chief of the Air Staff VCDS Vice Chief of the Defence Staff VCGS Vice Chief of the General Staff VCNS Vice Chief of the Naval Staff VSTOL Vertical and Short Take-Off and Landing aircraft VTOL Vertical Take-Off and Landing aircraft WDC Weapon Development Committee (Ministry of Defence) WESTLANT Commander-in-Chief, Western Atlantic (NATO) Glossary

AS-12 French-built helicopter-launched anti-ship missile Broomstick Codename for Type 988 radar Buccaneer British-designed maritime strike aircraft. Modified versions: Buccaneer 2, Buccaneer 2* and Buccaneer 2** C-130 US-built transport aircraft (known as Hercules) Comet British-built passenger aircraft, modified for maritime reconnaissance or anti-submarine warfare Commando ship helicopter carrier specialising in amphibious operations Confessor early designation of Sea Wolf CoS (62)1 Chiefs of Staff paper no. 1 of 1962: strategy paper accepting the possibility of the need to support the anding of substantial troops against a ‘dug-in’ enemy CVA-01 British-planned strike aircraft carrier CVA-02 sister ship of CVA-01 ET.316 early designation of Rapier British-built land-launched light anti-aircraft missile system F-111 Large US-designed swing-wing strike aircraft GWS-1 British-built Sea Slug area defence anti-aircraft missile system GWS-30 British-designed Sea Dart area defence anti-aircraft missile system GWS-31 pared-down version of GWS-30 Hercules see C-130 HS.681 British design for a STOL transport aircraft Ikara Australian-designed anti-submarine torpedo launching missile system J79 Original US-designed engine for Phantom aircraft Lynx British-design for small naval anti-submarine helicopter Ondine British design for submarine launched anti-ship missile system P.1127 Subsonic VSTOL British-designed aircraft, developed into the Harrier P.1154 Supersonic VSTOL British-designed aircraft Phantom US-designed fighter aircraft PX.430 Early designation of Sea Wolf Scimitar British-built maritime strike aircraft xii From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Sea Cat British-built anti-aircraft point defence missile Sea Dart British design for an anti-aircraft area defence missile Sea King US-designed, British-built large helicopter, successor to Wessex Sea Skua British design for a helicopter launched anti-ship missile Sea Slug British-built anti-aircraft area defence missile Sea Sparrow US-built anti-aircraft point defence missile Sea Wolf British design for an anti-aircraft point defence missile Sea Vixen British-built maritime fighter SH-3D US-designed helicopter (known as Sea King in British naval service) Spey Rolls Royce engine for Phantom aircraft Sub-Harpoon US design for a submarine-launched anti-ship missile TSR-2 Large British-designed swing wing strike aircraft design Type 12 British-built 1st rate anti-submarine Type 14 British-built 2nd rate anti-submarine frigate Type 15 Anti-submarine frigate converted from British-built Type 19 British design for a light frigate Type 21 British design for an anti-submarine frigate Type 22 British design for an anti-submarine frigate Type 41 British-built 1st rate anti-aircraft frigate Type 42 British design for an air-defence destroyer Type 61 British-built 1st rate aircraft direction frigate Type 81 British-built general purpose frigate Type 82 British design for an air-defence destroyer Type 902 British-built guidance radar for Sea Slug Type 965 British-built air search radar Type 988 Dutch-designed large air search radar Victor RAF tanker aircraft Wasp British-built small naval anti-submarine helicopter Wessex British-built large anti-submarine or commando helicopter Preface

The period of the 1964 to 1970 Labour governments was pivotal one for the post-war Royal Navy, not least because of the cancellation of the strike carrier programme and the decision to phase out fixed-wing aviation, but also because the years immediately following these decisions saw the rebuilding of the Navy’s position and self-confidence within the defence bureaucracy. The subject also has numerous contemporary resonances, with rolling defence reviews, expensive strike carrier procurement, inter-service rivalry and involvement in conflicts east of the Suez Canal being present both within the papers of the archives I researched and also in the news as I wrote this book and the dissertation on which it is based. The quotation from the Zuckerman papers in Chapter 1, p. xx, has been made with permission, University of East Anglia Archives. I would like to thank the Trustees of the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives for permission to cite the Mayhew papers in Chapters 4 and 5, p. xx and p. xx; and to thank Sir William O’Brien for allowing me to use quotations from his unpublished memoirs. I would also like to thank Professor John Young for pointing me in the direction two very useful collections of private papers, and for sending me copies of the diaries of David K.E. Bruce. I would also like to thank the Virginia Historical Society and Dr Nelson Lankford of that body for permission to consult these copies and to cite from them. I could not have completed the work without all of those who have helped and supported me over this period. My supervisor, Professor Joe Maiolo, helped me through the highs and lows of research and writing, and the late Professor Saki Dockrill and Professor Ken Young provided help and support during the early and middle stages of research respectively. I would like to thanks Professors Geoffrey Till and Eric Grove for their helpful advice and constructive criticism, and for Dr Tim Benbow for accepting my manuscript for publishing. Drs Dan Gilfoyle, Ceci Flinn, Matt Ford and Duncan Redford were all generous with their time by reading chapters and commenting on drafts of this book. I would like to thank my colleagues and managers at the National Archives for allowing me the time off to undertake and complete this work, in particular Dr Stephen Twigge, Caroline Williams and Ann Morton. I would also like to thank my parents for their help and support throughout the process and in particular to my father for helping to stoke my interest in naval history from an early age. Above all I would like to thank my wife Ellie and daughter Florence for bearing with my naval history obsessions, the late nights working and the visits to archives across the country. Without Ellie’s support and steady editorial hand the doctorate and this book would never have been completed. This page has been left blank intentionally Introduction

One of the British government’s oldest collective decision-making bodies met for the last time in its 300-year existence on Thursday 26 March 1964.1 Around the table in the Board Room of the Admiralty building were sat the eight Commissioners for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral, collectively and commonly known as the Board of Admiralty. First appointed when the ancient position of Lord High Admiral was split and replaced by a Board in 1673, the Board conducted its business for the last time under the gaze of Lord Nelson. The First Lord of the Admiralty, a civilian minister in the government, chaired the Board and at this last meeting the First Lord was appropriately enough Lord Jellicoe, son of the commander of the Grand Fleet in the Great War. Jellicoe ruminated on the previous First Lords who had sat in his seat, from Lord Barham, who had received the news of the victory at Trafalgar at one in the morning from that room, to Sir Winston Churchill. Around the table sat the other Lords of the Admiralty, five of whom were ‘Sea Lords’, naval officers at the height of their profession, each with a specific responsibility for different aspects of naval administration and policy. Photographs were taken and television pictures recorded for broadcast as the Board of Admiralty dissolved itself, the Commissioners rescinding their Commissions and the post of Lord High Admiral being ceremonially re-created with the Queen now incongruously the holder.2 Britain’s wealth, Empire and very survival had been built on seaborne communications and their successful defence. It might therefore appear to be appropriate that the dissolution of the Board of Admiralty, the historic centre of British world naval command, occurred in the midst of the most intense period of retreat from Empire, commitments and world power. Between 1949 and 1964 most major British territories were given their independence, whilst from 1964 to 1971 most of Britain’s overseas commitments – often supporting recently independent former colonies – were given up. During the same period the Royal Navy dropped from being the next largest navy after the United States Navy to third in size, slipping behind the rising power of the navy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Did not the end of the Board of Admiralty signal both the real and the formal end of British world naval power? The reality was not as straightforward. Less than two months later the same men sat around the same table in the same room discussing the same types of

1 National Archives (TNA), Public Record Office (PRO): Admiralty and Navy Department papers: ADM 167/163, minutes 5649–5650, meeting of 26/3/64. 2 Ibid. 2 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic matters that the Board of Admiralty had done before it.3 This new body, with the deliberately similar-sounding title of the Admiralty Board, obtained its powers and remit from a new committee called the Defence Council, rather than directly from the Queen. In 1964 the Royal Navy might numerically be inferior to the Soviet Navy, but alongside the United States Navy, it was the only maritime armed force with a global reach, bases across the planet, a powerful amphibious capability and an aircraft carrier strike force: the ultimate symbol of naval power projection. The Soviet Union lacked a worldwide reach, its vessels rarely venturing into the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the Southern Atlantic or the Southern Pacific. It had neither an ocean-going amphibious capability nor any aircraft carriers, both vessel types being the main way in which modern navies projected their power ashore. The men around the Board table reflected the importance of the aircraft carrier in the Royal Navy’s self-image and its internal networks of power and influence. Admiral Hopkins, the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff – and effectively the executive deputy head of the naval staff system in Whitehall – had been in the Fleet Air Arm in the war.4 The first professional head of the Navy to bea Fleet Air Arm officer, , had recently retired: his appointment had finally broken through the long-term ascendancy of gunnery officers in the naval leadership. Hopkins had followed in his fellow pilot’s slipstream onto the Board of Admiralty and then the Admiralty Board. It was symbolic that the officers of the traditional offensive weapon of naval power were now sharing this power with an officer of one of the emerging offensive weapon systems. The other emerging offensive weapon was the submarine, and the new First Sea Lord, , had been a submariner for 10 years and was the first professional head of the Navy to come from that service. Luce had left 20 years previously, and he like all but one of the other non-Fleet Air Arm members of the Board had commanded an aircraft carrier in the post-war years at least once.5 Commanding a carrier, alongside other plum naval jobs (such as Head of the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth, and Director of Naval Plans at the Ministry of Defence), marked out an officer destined out for ‘higher things’ in the naval leadership. The key members of the naval staff also included an increasing number of former naval flyers, and many more who strongly supported carrier air power.6

3 ADM 167/164: A/M (64) 1, 14 May 1964. 4 Hopkins had been a FAA pilot until 1950 and then Flag Officer Flying Training 1960–62, Who’s Who, various editions (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1965–75). 5 Royston Wright (Second Sea Lord) had commanded the light carrier HMS Triumph 1953–54, Michael Le Fanu (Third Sea Lord) the fleet carrier Eagle 1957–58, J.B. Frewen (Fifth Sea Lord/VCNS) the fleet carrier Eagle 1955–57. R.S. Hawkins (Fourth Sea Lord) was another submariner and had been Nuclear Propulsion as this was being introduced into the fleet. Who’s Who, various editions. 6 For example, George Baldwin, Director of Naval Air Warfare in 1965–66. Also note the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Warfare) from 1966 and Third Sea Lord from Introduction 3

The aircraft carrier was therefore at the centre, not only of British naval power, but at the naval leadership’s perception of what the Navy meant, the centre of its planning, strategy, operations, and to a very large extent its aspirations and world- view of the United Kingdom as a world power. The existing carrier fleet was aged or facing obsolescence and would need replacing. As would be expected for such a totemic piece of equipment, the naval leadership had lobbied hard for many years to get new aircraft carriers built. In early 1964, they had appeared to be successful: the Conservative government had provisionally approved the construction of a new carrier, the 60,000 ton CVA-01, to be named HMS Queen Elizabeth.7 Two years later, however, CVA-01 was cancelled, the First Sea Lord and the Navy Minister resigned and the Navy’s totemic fleet of aircraft carriers would be phased out by 1975 (later reduced to 1971, but in the event given a reprieve to 1977). Why and how was the carrier cancelled? This is the first of three core questions to be investigated by this thesis. This has been addressed – with limitations – by a number of historians over the last 20 years. Eric Grove, author of the most substantial study of the cancellation of CVA-01 provided the following reasons: primarily poor presentation of the arguments by the naval leadership and insufficient ruthlessness in fighting the Whitehall battle, but also budgetary pressures, Treasury hostility, RAF fears of dissolution and resentment at losing the deterrent role, inconsistencies in costings, naval acceptance of the need for land- based strike, a refusal to countenance a smaller carrier and the new institutional structure of the Ministry of Defence.8 Philip Pugh’s analysis of carriers has focused on the costs of carrier airpower – the increasing costs and size of carrier aircraft and therefore the concomitant rise in the carrier size and cost until the aircraft carrier becomes unaffordable. He argued that the comparison between carrier-based air strike and land-based air strike is finely balanced and that in the case of CVA-01 and the F-111 both were cancelled because the cost advantages of each were unclear and both were prohibitively expensive.9 In this context, he argued, personalities, inter-service rivalries and the detailed technical merits were secondary. Paul Kennedy’s analysis of the decline of British sea power stated cost as the key factor in deciding not to build CVA-01, but this was embedded in a much wider argument that stated that Britain’s naval power was a result of its economic

1970, Admiral A.T.F.G. Griffin was the nephew of Admiral Phillips, who had commanded the force (despatched without any carrier air cover) sunk by Japanese torpedo bombers in December 1941. He was a strong advocate of carrier air power, as was (later First Sea Lord) whose father had been captain of the Prince of Wales, Phillips’s flagship. Former naval pilots who were staff officers in this period later to become Sea Lords included Empson, Treacher and Lygo. 7 ADM 1/29044: minute sheet by Head of Mat 1, 23/3/64. 8 Eric Grove, Vanguard to Trident (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1987), pp. 267–79. 9 Philip Pugh, The Cost of Seapower (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1986), chapter 7, in particular pp. 197–208. 4 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic strength and that when that began to decline its naval power would inevitably decline also.10 Cost, inter-service rivalry, the end of the East of Suez strategy and making a case poorly have been given as significant factors by a number of other writers and historians in much shorter analyses.11 The autobiographies and other reflections of contemporaries involved in the carrier decision highlight a similar set of reasons to those set out by Grove, Pugh and Kennedy: , for example, cited cost, manpower, a case better put by the RAF leadership and an inability to demonstrate significant lost capabilities.12 Why analyse this again? All of the analyses referred to above did not benefit from direct access to government records, and those that have – mostly published in the period 2000–2010 – have been short and necessarily generalistic assessments over a few pages in works dealing with other or wider subjects.13 How were the

10 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Penguin, 1976), chapter 12, in particular pp. 343–4 for cancellation of carriers. 11 Both C.J. Bartlett, The Long Retreat (London: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 207–209, and Michael Dockrill, British Defence since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988), pp. 91–2, state cost issues and Denis Healey’s belief that the F-111 / island strategy could replace the role of the carrier; Norman Friedman, British Carrier Aviation (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1989), p. 344, highlights cost and a better case made by the RAF; Peter Nailor, ‘The Development of the Royal Navy since 1945’, in Geoffrey Till (ed.), The Future of British Sea Power (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1984), p. 20, gives the secondary relevance of carrier airpower in a NATO operational context where land-based air power and US carrier air power is available; David Steigman, ‘Aircraft Carriers’, in Norman Friedman (ed.), Navies in the Nuclear Age (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1993), p. 30, gives the acceptance of the RAF island strategy by the government over the carrier as the key reason; Sir William Jackson and Lord Bramall, The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff (London: Brassey’s, 1992), pp. 366–8, cites over-confidence, reliance on amphibious support operations to justify CVA-01 and ambivalence within the Navy Department. 12 Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (London: Michael Joseph, 1989), pp. 275–6. Other published works by contemporaries are Lord Hill-Norton and John Dekker, Sea Power (London: Faber and Faber, 1982), p. 72, which mentions cost, and Group Captain H. Neubroch, ‘The Great Carrier Controversy 1964–65: A Defence Planner’s Recollections’, Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal, 27 (2002): 63–7, cites arguments poorly put and poor use made of staff planners. 13 The most substantial (although all are under 10 pages in length) recent analyses using primary sources are Ian Spellar, ‘The Royal Navy, Expeditionary Operations and the End of Empire, 1956–75’, in Greg Kennedy (ed.), British Naval Strategy East of Suez 1900–2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2005) and the same author, ‘The Seaborne/Airborne Concept: Littoral Manoeuvre in the 1960s?’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 29/1 (February 2006): 53–82, who in both articles cites cost combined with a lack of utility as the key factor in cancellation; Richard Hill in his biography of Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin, Lewin of Greenwich (London: Cassell, 2000), pp. 266–73, who regards cost combined with utility as the most important reason; and Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 138–44, who states cost and cost-effectiveness, the long time taken to procure the vessels and utility as the main reasons for cancellation. See also Introduction 5 arguments played out? How significant really was each of the different reasons given above? Are there reasons not yet considered by any authors? No substantial and detailed analysis has yet been undertaken using primary sources of the year and a half in which the battle to procure the carrier was fought and lost: such an analysis now allows for a more nuanced and rounded assessment of the reasons for the cancellation of the carrier, and a testing of the Grove, Pugh and Kennedy theses.14 The other important reason for addressing this question is that this work will assess it in tandem with a much less analysed and just-as-important question: how did the naval leadership react, adapt and evolve in the four years after the cancellation? What lessons were learnt, how did the Navy change? This forms the second major question to be addressed in this book. A few historians have analysed part of the attempt to move beyond CVA-01 by reviewing the work of the Future Fleet Working Party.15 However, this was only a part of a much more complex and wide-ranging process. In any case existing accounts of the Working Party have emphasised the rejection of its conclusions by the naval leadership, suggesting a lack of imagination or timidity on the part of the Admiralty Board, or have concentrated on the warship design options proposed by the Working Party.16 The post-CVA-01 years involved much more than the work of an unsuccessful warship procurement committee, including the total reorientation of naval strategy and operational concepts, the procurement of a number of major new classes of warship and the emergence of an unexpected operational theatre as the stage for the Royal Navy’s revival: the Mediterranean.17 Addressing these two questions together and in detail then produces a unique analysis of the process by which the leadership of the Royal Navy negotiated its greatest crisis of self-confidence in the post-war period, and the most significant reorientation in British naval strategy since the start of the Cold War. This will then enable an analysis of the last of the three major questions to be investigated

John W. Young, The Labour Governments 1964–70 International Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), pp. 44–5, who states cost and the small number of carriers available east of Suez as the main cause of cancellation. 14 This book will not analyse in detail the design history of CVA-01; this has already been undertaken by other authors. See Tony Gorst, ‘CVA-01’, in Richard Harding (ed.), The Royal Navy 1930–2000 Innovation and Defence (London: Frank Cass, 2005), pp. 170–92, and D.K. Brown, A Century of Naval Construction (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1983), pp. 229–30; the general design aspects of the carrier will only be raised where they are relevant to the wider policy context. 15 Grove, Vanguard to Trident, pp. 280–83; D.K. Brown and George Moore, Rebuilding the Fleet (London: Chatham Publishing, 2003), pp. 62–8, 91–3. 16 Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p. 282–3; Brown and Moore, Rebuilding the Fleet, pp. 62–8, 91–3. 17 No historian has analysed the reason why the Mediterranean emerged as an important theatre for naval deployment from 1968 onwards. Grove, Vanguard to Trident, pp. 296–8, discusses the Mediterranean role and the ‘flanks’ but not the policy reasons for this emphasis aside from increased tension with Spain over Gibraltar in 1969. 6 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic in this book: the extent to which there actually was a withdrawal from east of Suez in this period – was the Royal Navy really an ‘EASTLANT’ navy in 1970, or even in 1975 just prior to the following defence review? Did the decade that saw the dissolution of the Board of Admiralty and the cancellation of CVA-01 really see the end of the world role for the Royal Navy?18

Structure

This study will start in Chapter 1 by providing the political, financial, administrative and strategic context to the issues discussed in the rest of the work. It will be followed by an overview of personnel, procurement and the defence industry. The next three chapters will analyse chronologically the battle over CVA-01 and the carrier force during the defence review of 1965–66. Chapter 2 covers the period from the start of the Wilson government in October 1964 to the second Chequers defence discussions in June 1965, a period in which Mountbatten’s powers were gradually eclipsed. Chapter 3 deals with the progress of the review up to and including the pivotal Defence Council meeting of 5 October 1965 in which CVA-01 was given a stay of execution, and the fourth chapter finishes with the final months of the battle to save CVA-01 including its progress through Cabinet Committees and its final cancellation following the February 1966 Defence Review. Chapter 5 deals with the aftermath of the Defence Review and the naval leadership’s attempts to rebuild its position within the Ministry of Defence up to the defence economies of January 1968 when the withdrawal from east of Suez is accelerated to 1971 and the F-111 is cancelled. Chapter 6 assesses the creation of a naval strategy in the Mediterranean from January 1968, whilst Chapter 7 reviews the problems of materiel and procurement after the 1966 defence review. Chapter 8 provides conclusions to the analysis in previous chapters.

18 Saki Dockrill’s definitive study of the process by which the decision to withdraw from commitments east of Suez was made (Britain’s Retreat) does not directly deal with the reality of withdrawal after the final decision was taken in January 1968. Dockrill’s analysis of the Defence Expenditure studies concentrates on the broader policy issues; it does not review the Studies from the naval perspective. Chapter 1 The Royal Navy in 1964

Six months after the Board of Admiralty consigned itself to history in front of television cameras, the Conservative government of Alec Douglas-Home was narrowly defeated at a general election in which the rhetoric of self-conscious modernity and technological innovation had played a significant part. The Labour Party had wandered in the political wilderness for over 13 years, seemingly unable to provide a plausible alternative vision to the ‘affluent’ consumer society that been promoted by the Conservatives. Finally, under the leadership of Harold Wilson, and taking advantage of a tired government, a recently appointed Prime Minister of anachronistically aristocratic lineage, and a nagging awareness that Britain was slipping behind its European competitors, the Labour Party managed to secure a four-seat majority in the House of Commons.

The Political Context

Harold Wilson became Labour leader only a year and a half before the general election, using the rhetoric of what has been often misquoted as ‘the white heat of technology’. The application of modern ‘scientific’ methods of ‘planning’ would revitalise the British economy and society. This same rhetoric was used to considerable effect in the election campaign. As will be seen this rhetoric and the last flowering of the optimistic, positivist attitude towards science and technology had an underlying impact on naval policy in this period. Even more important was the man who Wilson had chosen as his Defence Secretary. Denis Healey, MP for Leeds South-East, was in his early 40s and very squarely on the right wing of the Labour Party. Although a student Communist, this grammar-school educated Oxford graduate in Art History had served with distinction in the Army during the war and became the Labour Party’s international secretary in the immediate post-war years. There he forged links with continental European socialist parties, particularly the German SPD, and with diplomats and politicians in the United States. He became a firm Atlanticist, strongly supporting US involvement in Western Europe, British involvement in NATO, and the counteracting and containment of the Soviet Union and Communism. Healey became a Member of Parliament in 1951, specialising in foreign affairs. A combative parliamentary performer with a keen intellect, he rapidly rose to 8 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic prominence within the parliamentary Labour Party, joining the shadow cabinet in 1959 and becoming defence spokesman in 1963.1 In opposition Healey had become a strong advocate of giving up the British nuclear deterrent, but remaining fully engaged within NATO and maintaining other defence commitments worldwide, whilst supporting the need for a NATO deterrent operated by the United States.2 This became, after much controversy, Labour Party policy. For the party it kept enough of those on the left – unilateralists – who took what they saw as a moral stance and favoured both giving up Britain’s nuclear weapons and withdrawing support from the US deterrent, quiescent. For Healey it was a pragmatic issue of cost and of scrapping a weapon system that seemed to do little for NATO unity.3 Healey became Wilson’s youngest cabinet minister in October 1964 and would serve as Defence Secretary throughout Wilson’s near six-year first tenure as Prime Minister. Unlike the Conservative Party, Labour did not have a phalanx of former career servicemen on its backbenches, and consequently knowledge of defence matters, and in particular naval matters, was not strong in the parliamentary Labour Party. Other senior figures had an interest in defence issues: the deputy leader George Brown had been an opposition defence spokesman, whilst two of Harold Wilson’s inner coterie of confidants, Lord Chalfont and George Wigg, were also interested in defence. Chalfont’s primary interest was in the deterrent, and he became Wilson’s Minister for Disarmament under the Foreign Secretary. George Wigg was a former Army officer with strong views – particularly in favour of the Army and conscription – and direct access to Wilson.4 Jim Callaghan, the new Chancellor, who had grown up in the dockyard town of , and become a junior minister at the Admiralty in Attlee’s government, fully understood the flexibility and strengths of sea power; nevertheless as Chancellor he would be at the forefront in attempting to rein in defence spending.5 The junior ministers who were to serve under Healey were a mixture of those with a foreign policy interest on the right of the party – such as Christopher Mayhew, a former junior minister in the Foreign Office, or those serving constituencies with large defence related industries – such as David Owen, the MP for Devonport, the home of the Navy’s second dockyard. Overall, however, those with an interest in defence, beyond the controversial nuclear deterrent, were thin on the ground in the parliamentary Labour Party.

1 Healey, Time of My Life, chapters 5–12. 2 Healey, Time of My Life, pp. 234–9. 3 Ibid., pp. 240–5. 4 Woodrow Wyatt, ‘George Edward Cecil Wigg, Baron Wigg, 1900–83’, in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), vol. 58, pp. 833–4. 5 James Callaghan, Time and Chance (London: Collins, 1987), pp. 17–36, 99–117, 377. The Royal Navy in 1964 9

The 1964 Labour Party manifesto gave few clues to Labour’s plans once in power.6 The manifesto decried the Conservative government’s concentration on high-tech aircraft and conventional and nuclear missile projects at the expense of more practical areas such as Army personnel, warships and helicopters. This implied a criticism of the British effort in the Indonesian Confrontation on behalf of the Malaysian, Singaporean and Brunei governments, then in its first year and requiring large numbers of the relatively low-tech equipment needed for jungle counter-insurgency, rather than the flagship technological projects of the 1950s and early 1960s. The manifesto also regretted British dependence on the US for some equipment, in particular helicopters. The document also set out Labour’s proposal to give up the independent deterrent, but it also opposed the US-backed Multilateral Force of a surface nuclear fleet with a mixed NATO crew, but with the weapons and ships effectively under US operational control. Labour instead proposed internationalising both the deployment and control of the NATO deterrent amongst its members. Aside from the scrapping of the British nuclear deterrent, to be centred on nuclear-powered submarines launching US-built Polaris ballistic missiles, there were no hard commitments to cancel any of the major defence projects then being developed. The manifesto did not once mention reducing defence expenditure. This document was no blue-print for Labour’s defence policy once in power. In the event, Polaris would be retained as a national nuclear deterrent, the control of defence expenditure would become a key aim, dependence on US equipment would increase and Army personnel and Navy warships would be reduced significantly under the new government. Once in government, Healey and the Labour leadership were gradually persuaded by civil servants and the military to keep Polaris, and after attempts to internationalise control of the deterrent through the ‘Atlantic Nuclear Force’ failed, operational control of the British nuclear deterrent remained wholly with the United Kingdom.7 The rest of this chapter will address the following factors affecting naval and defence policy decision-making: first, the role and influence of Lord Mountbatten, the Chief of the Defence Staff, will be reviewed; second, the significance of the economy and government finance will be analysed; then the administration of British defence; followed by the significance of inter-service rivalry; and as mentioned above, the culture of technological positivism exemplified by Wilson’s

6 Labour Party General Election Manifesto 1964: http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/ man/lab64.htm. 7 The discussions and arguments over the Polaris deterrent in the first year of the Labour government have been analysed by others, and will not addressed in detail here, as they do not add materially to the main arguments and questions being addressed. John Young, The Labour Governments 1964–70, International Policy (Manchester: Manchester University Press 2003), pp. 116–20; Susanne Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigge, ‘Trick or Truth? The British ANF Proposal, West Germany and US Non-Proliferation Policy 1964– 68’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 11/2 (2000): 166–91. 10 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

‘white heat’ speech. Foreign policy is then discussed; then the naval policy, strategic and operational context; then materiel and naval personnel, and finally the defence industry.

Lord Mountbatten

Admiral of the Fleet Louis Lord Mountbatten of Burma, former Viceroy of India and the Chief of the Defence Staff, dominated defence policy-making in a way that had not been seen in the post-war era. His royal lineage, charm and charisma combined with superb organisational, negotiating and networking skills to ensure that during the Second World War he glided gracefully from the command of a destroyer flotilla to the head of combined operations, and then to Supreme Commander of all British forces in South East Asia. He then became the last Viceroy of India, negotiating partition and independence, and on returning to Britain rapidly worked his way up the naval hierarchy to become First Sea Lord in 1955. Having already filled a range of roles across the politico-military spectrum each of which would have provided a summit to a career for almost any other military figure, in 1959 Mountbatten became the Chief of the Defence Staff. The role and significance of this position is elaborated below, but it should be realised that Mountbatten’s own prestige and connections made him a uniquely powerful player in Whitehall defence politics. He was a ruthless and perhaps even devious operator in this environment, inspiring devotion in some but in many others – particularly outside the Navy – enduring mistrust and suspicion. A perceived bias towards the Royal Navy, something he was supposed to rise above, helped to breed this mistrust. As will be seen, his dominance sheltered the leadership of the Royal Navy from the full force of the inter-service rivalries that characterised the defence policy-making apparatus. At 64, Mountbatten was also past his prime, his biographer noting that he was beginning to nod off or ramble in a few of the innumerable meetings he chaired and attended.8 How would the Navy fare in its battle for the carrier in a world without the protection of a now declining Mountbatten?

The Financial and Economic Context

Between 1945 and the 1980s the United Kingdom suffered a relative economic decline compared to other Western countries, particularly those such as Germany, Italy and Japan which had been defeated in the war. In some respects this was not unexpected as countries whose economies had been destroyed or considerably damaged in the fighting, and who had less developed economies in any case,

8 Philip Zeigler, Mountbatten: The Official Biography (London: Collins, 1985), p. 327. The Royal Navy in 1964 11 rapidly ‘caught up’ with Britain. Nonetheless, from the late 1950s, as comparative international statistics became available, it became clear that France, Italy and Germany were not just catching up, but also poised to overtake the United Kingdom in terms of exports of manufactured products and gross national product. In 1954 the United Kingdom produced 20.5 per cent of the manufactured products exported by the 11 most developed Western economies, but by 1963 this had shrunk to 15.1 per cent and by 1969 this would shrink further to only 11.2 per cent.9 The United Kingdom’s gross national product, a measure of national economic output, also failed to grow as fast as major competitors such as France, Germany and the United States. In 1954 the GNPs of France and Germany were 64.0 per cent and 74.0 per cent that of the United Kingdom, by 1963 they were 100.9 per cent and 115.0 per cent respectively, and by 1969 129.1 per cent and 137.3 per cent.10 The GNP growth of the United States by comparison to the UK was more erratic, but GNP had also risen from 730.0 per cent to 846.4 per cent between 1954 and 1969.11 The United Kingdom seemed to be increasingly left behind by the other Western nations, most gallingly by the vanquished states of the Second World War. The reasons for this are complex – not only were such countries building their industrial capacity from a much lower level after the devastation of war, but other factors were also working against the United Kingdom. The UK traded heavily with non-industrialised nations and primary product producers in the Empire, Commonwealth and sterling area, whereas most post-war trade growth was amongst the industrialised nations of Western Europe, the USA and Japan.12 Another factor affecting Britain’s comparative economic growth was its slow growth in population, and its already highly urbanised workforce.13 In the post-war period, the UK’s main trade competitors either benefited from a significant increase in population or from the move of significant numbers of (relatively unproductive) agricultural workers into the (much more productive) urban industries. The UK in the post-war period experienced neither the population growth of the USA or USSR, nor the flight from the rural economy into the urban industrial or service sectors that occurred in France and Germany, to provide an enlarged workforce and an enlarged domestic consumer market.14 A further factor was high defence spending itself. The United Kingdom spent a higher proportion of its GNP on

9 G.C. Peden, Arms, Economics and British Strategy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006), p. 298, table 6.1. The 11 nations were the USA, Canada, UK, France, Italy, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and Japan. 10 Peden, Arms, p. 300. 11 Ibid., p. 300. 12 Ibid., p. 298. 13 Ibid., pp. 300–1. 14 Ibid., p. 301. 12 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic defence than any of the other major countries in Europe, leaving fewer investment funds available for the more economically productive civilian sector.15 In addition there were concerns, as the UK was overtaken by its competitors, about complacency, inefficiency and low productivity in British industry.16 Both the Conservatives and Labour in the 1960s saw the answer in indicative economic planning based on the French model. Targets for economic growth would be set, economic plans would identify barriers to growth and, it was hoped, trades unions and employers would cooperate to remove such barriers in order to reach the planned growth figures.17 The Conservatives created the National Economic Development Council as a planning body, whilst Labour created a new Department of Economic Affairs incorporating NEDC in an attempt to repeat the perceived success of France in planned growth. Unfortunately, the power and effectiveness of French planning had been overestimated by British observers, and the setting of ambitious growth targets, combined with little movement from unions and employers to remove ‘inefficiencies’, only served to achieve the opposite of what was intended.18 An inflationary boom then resulted in balance-of-payments crises, followed by public spending cuts in 1966, which failed to rein in inflation, and finally in November 1967 by devaluation against the dollar to stop further sterling outflows. Even after all this, yet more government spending cuts were required in early 1968. That sterling was also an international reserve currency, with government and corporate holders across the world, made it even more difficult to prevent speculative sales that could produce a balance-of-payments crisis, particularly as exchange controls had been relaxed in the 1950s. Strong political imperatives prevented a devaluation early in the new government: Labour politicians dreaded being branded the party of devaluation as Attlee’s administration had been forced into the same position in 1947, whilst within government and the civil service keeping sterling as a reserve currency by avoiding devaluing was strongly believed to be a vital lynchpin in international economic stability. So much so that in 1956 a committee of senior civil servants chaired by Sir Norman Brook had declared that maintaining the value of sterling was ‘the greatest single contribution’ to Britain’s position as a world power.19 The status of sterling was perceived to be essential for the UK’s status as a world power. It was in this economic and financial climate that the leadership of the Royal Navy lobbied for the introduction of a wide range of highly sophisticated and expensive vessels and systems to replace ageing Second World War and early post-

15 Ibid., pp. 306–9. In 1964 the UK spent 6.8 per cent of GNP on defence; the European average at the time was 5.5 per cent with France spending 6.3 per cent and the FRG 5.4 per cent (table, p. 306). 16 Ibid., p. 301. 17 Ibid., pp. 301–2. 18 Ibid., p. 302. 19 Ibid., pp. 303–4. The Royal Navy in 1964 13 war equipment, but the economic climate forced the government into a prolonged run of public spending cuts up to and until just after the devaluation. For the Ministry of Defence, this meant a Defence Review which was completed in February 1966, followed by a series of further defence expenditure studies and Reviews running until the end of January 1968. Total defence spending as a percentage of GDP reduced as a result from 6.5 per cent in 1963/64 to 5.3 per cent in 1969–70.20 Given that GDP was rising during this period, in terms of actual defence expenditure, the reduction was much less dramatic, but the defence cuts were extremely painful nonetheless. The Reviews were conducted on the basis of reducing defence expenditure to a particular level by a certain year in the not too distant future – in the case of the 1966 Defence Review this was £2,000 million (at 1964 prices) by 1970. As a result, future expected expenditure was cut, and given the escalation in the cost of procuring increasingly sophisticated equipment by all three services (as will be seen below), this meant that new equipment procurement was one of the main casualties. As equipment procurement often took many years to come to fruition, the cancellation of defence programmes would often involve short-term cost increases as contracts and business commitments were cancelled and development and production facilities closed, with cost-benefits only revealing themselves in the medium-to-long term. Attempts to wring short- term savings from cancelling procurement programmes could often be stymied by the short-term costs of cancellation. The defence economies of 1964–70 therefore meant not just difficult decisions over procurement and other priorities within the Royal Navy – submarines over carriers and aircraft, carriers over escorts, and so on – but also prioritisation amongst the three services. The need to save thus set the favoured procurement projects of services in competition with each other. Another feature of the economic and financial environment of the time was the balance-of-payments pressure on sterling. Spending money abroad on defence facilities, stores and local manpower meant more sterling leaving the UK, another factor that supported an argument for scaling down non-UK deployments and bases. The purchase of foreign defence equipment, say from the United States, also had balance-of-payment implications, but these had to be weighed against the costs of procuring home-developed equipment. In short, the economic climate inevitably impinged on almost every significant spending decision. The way in which defence expenditure was measured was also undergoing a dramatic change. The arrival of Robert McNamara at the US Department of Defence had brought into fashion the ‘functional costing’ of defence equipment from the world of American business. Healey was an acknowledged admirer of McNamara’s efforts to add ‘rationality’ to defence procurement.21 Functional costing was adopted for the first time for the 1964–65 estimates and had been developed by the Ministry of Defence after the visit to the UK of the US Controller

20 Ibid., p. 308. 21 Healey, Time of My Life, p. 256. 14 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic of the Budget Charles Hitch in 1963.22 Rather than splitting defence spending between different ‘Votes’ in Parliament for each service – Vote 1 for pay, Vote 2 for reserves pay, Vote 7 for production and so on – the estimates would be combined into a single vote, and with each ‘function’ separately costed. In the past it had been almost impossible to obtain a full cost for producing and running a piece of equipment – a carrier or aircraft, say – from the votes. The central Ministry of Defence had been forced to approach the service departments for bespoke calculations, a time-consuming activity that placed the initiative, and in many respects the power, with the service departments.23 The new system meant that defence spending was now split between nine ‘major programmes’ including ‘strategic retaliatory’, ‘home defence’ and ‘general- purpose forces,’ amongst others. Most naval spending came under general- purpose forces with the amphibious force, carriers, submarines, escorts and others each costed individually, and each having an analysis of expected costs 10 years into the future.24 Functional costing was clearly a planning tool, its aim being to provide more accurate comparisons between different types of equipment. It also enhanced the control of the central Secretariat over the service departments, and this was made explicit when the process was set out for the Defence Council: ‘functional costings can be used as a means of identifying areas of investigation for the purpose of management control’.25 There were limitations to the usefulness of functional costings: they worked less well for forces that had multiple roles and tasks, perhaps creating the illusion of straight cost comparisons, when in fact such financial comparisons were in reality more expensive. Thomas Balogh, Wilson’s economic adviser, for one, had strong doubts about the usefulness of functional costing for these very reasons.26 For the Navy, it meant that for the first time the costings of the carrier would be exposed to more detailed scrutiny and comparison.

The Administrative Context

The abolition of the Board of Admiralty described at the start of this book was part of a much wider reorganisation and centralisation of defence administration in 1963–64. Up to 1964, the three armed forces came under the control of three separate ministries, each controlled by a board or council chaired by a civilian government minister, but dominated numerically by the professional military heads

22 The National Archives, Ministry of Defence papers: DEFE 10/510, Defence Council Paper DC/P (64) 28, Functional Costings System, 5 November 1964. 23 DEFE 10/510, DC/P (64) 28, pp. 1–2. 24 Ibid., pp. 2–3. 25 Ibid., pp. 4–5. 26 The National Archives, Prime Minister’s Office papers: PREM 13/837, Thomas Balogh to George Wigg (copied to Harold Wilson), 19 November 1964. The Royal Navy in 1964 15 of that service. In the case of the Navy, the separate ministry was the Admiralty, the governing board the Board of Admiralty, the civilian head the First Lord of the Admiralty and the service members, the Sea Lords. Each Sea Lord had a different area of responsibility: the First Sea Lord had a leadership role and in the dual capacity as the Chief of the Naval Staff formed one of the four Chiefs of Staff who were the government’s advisers on military matters. The Second, Third and Fourth Sea Lords had responsibility for naval personnel, naval procurement and naval supply/transport respectively.27 In 1964, there were two further Sea Lords: the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff and the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff. These were the leading staff positions under the First Sea Lord and could be categorised as the ‘Chief Executives’ of the Navy. The former dealt with policy and operational matters, and the latter ‘the shape of the fleet’: the characteristics of ships, aircraft and weaponry under development. In addition to the three separate ministries, there was a small Ministry of Defence, led by a cabinet minister (the ministers in the three service ministries were not of cabinet rank), which had the task of coordinating defence policy and defence estimates across the three services. Finally, there was the Ministry of Aviation, which in addition to civilian aviation responsibilities, coordinated the design, development and construction of military aircraft and guided missiles. The merger of these disparate military departments had been considered for some years. The United States had achieved this in the 1940s when the Department of Defense had been created, and in 1957 the Ministry of Defence had been given additional powers in order to encourage inter-service coordination.28 However, the small size of the Ministry of Defence, and its inevitable reliance on the service ministries for information and analysis, made it impossible to assert the administrative coordination of the three services that had been the intention.29 In 1962 the White Paper, the ‘Central Coordination of Defence’ had finally proposed the merger of the three service departments into the Ministry of Defence, which would be headed by a Secretary of State.30 The driving force behind the proposed merger was Admiral Mountbatten, the Chief of the Defence Staff – the fourth member and chair of the Chiefs of Staff – and Peter Thorneycroft the Conservative Minister for Defence.31 Despite the opposition of the three service ministries, the merger was approved and completed by April 1964. At first glance, the structure that was adopted changed little, and it has been argued that it merely transferred inter-service arguments that had been conducted

27 The Third Sea Lord was also known as ‘The Controller’. 28 George W. Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), chapter 12; Jackson and Bramall, Chiefs, pp. 314–24. 29 Adrian Smith, ‘Command and Control in Great Britain – Defence Decision-Making in the United Kingdom 1945–84’, 20th Century British History, 2/3 (1991): 300–12. 30 Lord Ismay and Sir Ian Jacob, The Higher Direction of Defence 20/2/63 Cmnd 2097. 31 Zeigler, Mountbatten, chapter 47. 16 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic between ministries to arguments conducted within a single ministry.32 Although subsumed within an enlarged Ministry of Defence, the three service ministries lived on as the Navy, Air Force and Army Departments within the new Ministry with responsibility for the administrative and ‘executive’ aspects of running the three services. A central Secretariat replaced the old smaller Ministry of Defence, with the civilian policy staffs of the three service ministries transferred to the new Secretariat. In the case of the Navy, the Admiralty policy civil servants were largely transferred to DS4 (Defence Secretariat, branch 4) within the central Secretariat.33 Centralised control was theoretically provided by the Defence Council, which consisted of all the government ministers, all the Chiefs of Staff, the department’s Chief Scientific Adviser (in 1964, Solly Zuckerman) and the leading civil servants in the department. On the authority of the Defence Council a series of committees undertook the day-to-day running of the ministry. The Admiralty Board, Air Force Board and Army Board ran the three service departments, whilst numerous cross- departmental committees such as the Operational Requirements Committee, the Weapons Development Committee and the Defence Establishments Committee coordinated and made decisions on different aspects of Ministry of Defence administrative work. For example, the Operational Requirements Committee reviewed and approved the ‘staff requirements’ created for new procurement items. Staff requirements set out the required capabilities and functions of each new procurement item. Such staff requirements would have been set within each service department (or between departments if they were joint requirements), but were now ratified and approved by a committee consisting of representatives of each of the three armed services, the civil service and the scientific adviser’s office. In practice, this web of committees did not function as well as had been intended. The Defence Council met rarely, as Denis Healey preferred to make decisions bilaterally with senior servicemen and civil servants.34 A series of exceptions to standard practice made the cross-departmental committees less effective than they might have been, and at least one senior civil servant criticised the impulse of the central Secretariat to work through a myriad of standing and ad hoc committees and working parties rather than trusting the three service departments.35 Just as importantly, the committees provided other fora for inter-service rivalries to be played out. The centralisation of defence, however, resulted in one significant change in the administrative landscape. No longer were civil servants largely subject to military-dominated direction. In the old Admiralty, the Permanent Secretary

32 Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (London: Pimlico Press, 1990), p. 417. 33 Jackson and Bramall, Chiefs, pp. 340–2 and 356. For the detail of the above changes see The Imperial Calendar (London: HMSO, 1963, 1964 and 1965 editions). 34 DEFE 10/511, Defence Council Minutes DC/M (65) 7, item 2, 7 October 1965. 35 DEFE 24/509, enclosure 3, C. Wallworth, Assistant Under-Secretary (Organisation), Navy Department to Sir Michael Cary, Second Permanent Under-Secretary (Navy Department) 15 February 1966; and enclosure 5, Wallworth to Cary, 4 March 1966. The Royal Navy in 1964 17 had been one member of the Board of Admiralty whose membership included a majority of servicemen. All civil servants in the Admiralty reported to the Permanent Secretary, who himself was subject to the authority of the Board of which he was a member. Now, all the civil servants in the new Ministry of Defence would report not to the service boards, but to the Permanent Secretary of the whole Ministry of Defence, who formally reported to the Secretary of State. Loyalty and the source of promotion and patronage were no longer tied to a single service.36 Some, particularly within the military, have argued that the new structure gave increased power to civil servants against the military.37 That this was at least an aim of the senior civilians in the Ministry is borne out by the unsuccessful attempts by the Permanent Secretary to remove the service Chiefs from the Defence Council in 1967.38 The Navy, more dependent on its civilians in the Admiralty for policy and ‘staff’ work, have been said to have suffered more than the other services as a result of the new structure: it now had to formulate its own arguments unsupported by a high quality administrative cadre.39 In the period under analysis one of the key areas of contest between the military and civilian was the right to advise on military matters to government ministers. Traditionally this could only be undertaken by servicemen in staff positions on the rationale that only the military had the knowledge and expertise to advise on military matters. In reality, the point at which ‘military’ became the ‘political’ was never clear, but an attempt to keep this split had been maintained. One of the main sources of military advice and analysis was the Defence Planning Staff attached to the Chiefs of Staff. As will be seen, because the Defence Planning Staff and committees chaired by servicemen did not provide the policy answers Denis Healey wanted, there was pressure to turn to ad hoc groups dominated by civil servants. This helped to increase the momentum of ‘civilianisation’ by breaking the taboo of civilians providing advice on matters such as the choice of military equipment.40 The importance or otherwise of the new administrative environment and the ‘civilianisation’ that accompanied it in shaping the decisions and actions of the naval leadership in this period will be analysed in the following pages.

36 Jackson and Bramall, The Chiefs, pp. 356–7. 37 For example, see National Maritime Museum, Lewin papers, LWM/2/22/45 Rear Admiral James Kennon to Lewin 21 February 1980: for a naval view of the increase in civilian power: the centralisation of the organisation of defence was used to increase civil service control. 38 DEFE 23/45, enclosures 109A and 110A, James Dunnett, Permanent Under- Secretary, Ministry of Defence to Denis Healey, Secretary of State for Defence 4 January 67. 39 Jackson and Bramall, The Chiefs, p. 357. 40 See Chapters 2, 3 and 4. 18 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Inter-Service Rivalry

As discussed above, inter-service rivalry was a highly significant factor in the bureaucratic politics of the Ministry of Defence. The aspect of that rivalry most pertinent to this study is the competition between the leadership of both the Royal Air Force and the Navy for control of airpower over the sea. The rivalry had originated in the years following the formation of the Royal Air Force in 1918 when the control of all air power (including shipboard aircraft) passed to the new armed service. In 1924, the Fleet Air Arm was created within the RAF, as the distinct unit specialising in naval aviation. During the interwar period the Admiralty had expended considerable energy trying not only to regain control of shipboard aircraft but also at times even to disband the RAF entirely and return its aircraft and men to the Army and Navy.41 In response to this challenge to its professional existence, the theory of ‘strategic bombing’ was created by leaders of the RAF and aviation theorists. The long-range bombing of the core centres of enemy industry, leadership and civilian residence was advanced as a war winning strategy that required neither the support of the Navy or Army. The strategy has been shown to be flawed, not just due to the limitations in accuracy of high level bombing and the moral ambiguity of deliberately targeting civilians, but also because of the continued need to hold territory in order to win a war, which could only be done by soldiers, and the need to transport and supply them by sea, which could only be done cost-effectively by ships.42 Despite this, however, strategic bombing has proved highly attractive to civilian leaders, and has helped to provide a justification for an independent air force. Just prior to the Second World War, and after considerable lobbying, shipboard aviation was returned to the Navy. Naval aviation emerged from the war with the aircraft carrier confirmed as the new naval capital ship, and a strong sense of its own identity. The immediate post-war years saw a burst of creativity by naval pilots, with three major innovations (see below) helping to make the use of jet aircraft practical on board aircraft carriers. The RAF had also emerged from the war having proved itself in the eyes of the public, not only in the air defence of the United Kingdom during the Battle of Britain, but also in the popular (but only partially effective) strategic bombing campaign. The explosion of the first British nuclear bombs in 1952 also gave the RAF responsibility for deploying the most potent weapon available, the epitome of the war-winning ‘strategic bombing’ weapon. The rivalry between the Navy and RAF intensified during the 1950s, as the former tried unsuccessfully to procure new large and highly capable ‘strike’ carriers – the first of which became known as CVA-01 – and the latter attempted

41 Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars (London: Collins, 1968–76), vol. 1, chapters 6, 10, 13; vol. 2, chapters 7 and 13. 42 Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win (Ithaca: Cornell, 1996). The Royal Navy in 1964 19 either to prevent carriers being built or to reassert control over shipboard air power.43 The rivalry was no less intense in the 1960s. The Air Staff developed an ‘island strategy’, where air bases on the territory of allies and British controlled islands in the Indian Ocean and South East Asia would provide a web of ‘unsinkable aircraft carriers’ from which air power could be projected over the sea obviating the need for the Navy’s strike carriers.44 The projected TSR-2 bomber would be the main aircraft flown from the island bases and the Air Staff argued that instead of strike carriers the Navy would need only operate smaller 20,000–40,000 ton ‘close support’ carriers to provide any amphibious operations or convoys with local air defence.45 Such smaller carriers might operate light aircraft such as the Mirage 3 or the new VTOL designs then being developed which would ideally, from the Air Staff’s perspective, have RAF aircrews.46 Various joint studies between the air and naval staffs between 1961 and 1964 had reached no agreed conclusions – both sides becoming more entrenched as the arguments developed. The types of vessels proposed by the Air Staff in place of the strike carrier would change in name – from the ‘close support’ or ‘dual purpose ship’ known informally as the ‘Pike ship’ after the Chief of Air Staff, to the ‘off-shore support ship’ or ‘Thorneycraft’ named after the then Minister of Defence – but the arguments and outcomes remained unresolved. As will be seen, the Air Staff began to move to a more radical position with the arrival of the new government: dispensing with the need for a support carrier altogether and arguing that even close support or convoy defence could be carried out by land-based aircraft many hundreds of miles from their bases.47 As can be seen in Table 1.1 below, the Royal Air Force also had a substantial tranche of aircraft procurement programmes in the pipeline; in any Defence Review they would be expected to defend such programmes and deflect cuts onto those of the other services. The Navy was also expanding the capabilities of its strike aircraft, impinging on territory formerly left to the RAF. The Sea Vixen strike/fighter, introduced in 1959, could be equipped with nuclear bombs, and was succeeded in the nuclear role by the highly capable Buccaneer in 1963.48 The first jet strike aircraft designed for low-level bombing, it could also carry nuclear weapons, and a new version proposed

43 Jackson and Bramall, The Chiefs, p. 279. 44 Eric Grove, ‘Partnership Spurned: The Royal Navy’s Search for a Joint Maritime Air Strategy East of Suez 1961–63’, in N.A.M. Rodger (ed.), Naval Power in the 20th Century (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 227–41. 45 AIR 8/2328 First Sea Lord to Chief of the Air Staff 23 November 1961, covering ‘Present Status of Admiralty/Air Ministry Study of Close Support/Commando Carrier’. 46 AIR 8/2328, undated note, ‘Principles which it would be desirable to agree with the First Sea Lord’ [from surrounding correspondence probably dated October 1961]. 47 See Chapters 2–4. 48 Owen Thetford, British Naval Aircraft since 1912, 6th edn (London: Putnam Aeronautical, 1991), pp. 64–5, 113–14, 254–7. 20 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic for development, the Buccaneer 2*, would have the navigational radar and other equipment to enhance its ability to make bombing attacks on ground targets.49 An even more advanced version, the Buccaneer 2** with the ability to undertake deep strikes in a manner similar to RAF bombers, was also being considered.50 Previously the Buccaneer had only been able to engage effectively targets at sea. Ground strike was a major incursion on operational territory guarded jealously by the RAF, just as the latter service was trying to procure a new strike aircraft.

Table 1.1 Major RAF aircraft programmes

Aircraft Notes TSR-2 Long-range swing wing strike aircraft to replace existing V bomber fleet. P.1154 Supersonic VSTOL (Vertical or Short Take-Off and Landing) fighter. P.1127 Subsonic VSTOL fighter. Early version known as ‘Kestrel’, later the ‘Harrier’. Jaguar Anglo-French light/training fighter. HS.681 Large STOL transport aircraft to replace existing Belfast aircraft. Comet Development of civilian Comet as maritime patrol and airborne early warning aircraft to replace Shackleton aircraft. Eventually to become the Nimrod.

The power of Mountbatten, and his support by Peter Thorneycroft the Conservative Minister of Defence, made the Air Force leadership feel particularly vulnerable. Air Marshal Elworthy’s private secretary even stated that the RAF was on the ‘brink of a precipice’.51 The Army Air Corps had only recently been created, and if the carrier-capable Buccaneer was chosen as the RAF’s new strike aircraft, there might not be any justification for a separate air service. The strike role had always been essential to the RAF’s self-image, its own totem, and if that role was fulfilled by an aircraft designed to fly from the Navy’s carriers, what rationale might there be for retaining the extra bureaucracy of a separate British air force? Both services were therefore raising the intensity of inter-service rivalry by straying into areas which the other regarded as core territory. For the RAF the threat seemed existential in its seriousness.

49 Thetford, Naval Aircraft, pp. 256–7; The National Archives, Cabinet Office papers: CAB 148/25 Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, OPD(66) 6th meeting, 21 January 1966. 50 CAB 148/25, OPD(66) 6th meeting, 21 January 1966. 51 National Archives, Air Ministry and Air Force Department papers: AIR 8/2355, Michael Quinlan, Private Secretary to Chief of the Air Staff to Sir John Elworthy, Chief of the Air Staff, 12 November 1964. The Royal Navy in 1964 21

This study will investigate how inter-service rivalry influenced the behaviour of the naval leadership during the period in question, and the extent to which it can explain the carrier cancellation and the subsequent behaviour of the naval leadership.

The Cultural Impact of ‘White Heat’

One of the most significant underlying assumptions of those involved in the battle over CVA-01 was the inevitable obsolescence in the coming decades of the aircraft carrier as a weapon system – even by those advocating the aircraft carrier programme. This assumption is striking given the increasing presence of aircraft carriers in the inventories of most major navies today, and in all those with, or with pretensions to, a worldwide reach. The reasoning behind such assumptions reflected the scientific positivism that had informed Harold Wilson’s famous conference speech at Scarborough in 1963. Wilson stated that ‘the Britain that is going to be forged in the white heat of this [scientific] revolution will be no place for restrictive practices or for outdated methods on either side of industry’.52 The speech embodied both optimism about what science and technology could achieve, and argued the need for radical social change to accommodate that promise. The achievements of the previous 20 years in science and technology – from medicine and transport through to the unprecedented destructive power of the hydrogen bomb – encouraged many to extrapolate ahead and predict even more rapid change. The nuclear-powered submarine, with the ability to remain submerged for months on end, was an innovation that seemed to presage the end of the surface going warship or even merchant ship. Surface ships, able to make a maximum speed of only 25–30 knots in a moderate sea state, seemed slow and vulnerable compared to the supersonic jet flying above, and the almost undetectable nuclear submarine cruising below. Britain had been quick to adopt nuclear propulsion technology for its submarines, using a US reactor to power its first vessel, then developing its own reactors in succeeding vessels. It seemed reasonable to assume that the slow, seemingly vulnerable, surface vessel would inevitably give way to navies consisting wholly of submarines and even merchant fleets of submarines able to evade poor weather. In 1963 Solly Zuckerman had discussed this matter in more detail with senior naval figures. Playing devil’s advocate, he put forward the case for land-based air power to protect shipping. With developments in range, radar and armament was there any need for aircraft carriers, if cheaper land-based aircraft could be available? He then extrapolated to 2000: ‘must we not envisage the disappearance

52 ‘Speech opening the science debate at the party’s annual conference, Scarborough 1963’, in Harold Wilson, Purpose in Politics: Selected Speeches (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p. 27. 22 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic of a surface Navy, and suppose that all naval craft will be underwater craft?’53 Zuckerman did not fully accept this view himself – for he went on to advocate carriers to support amphibious vessels which he thought would always have to be surface ships. He was stimulating debate with the naval leadership and was perhaps priming them for the likely questions from carrier doubters, but it does demonstrate that this was a view that held some general currency at the time. As will be seen, when the battle for CVA-01 reached its height and the naval leadership was forced to contemplate a Navy without carriers, it assumed that guided missiles would be able to be developed to fulfil the offensive role of carrier aircraft, and that their development was only a matter of time and investment. The arguments over carrier airpower were therefore developed in the context of an expectation of future obsolescence. This study will investigate how important this was in both the battle for the carrier and the period of recovery and reconstitution afterwards.

The Foreign Policy Context

The United Kingdom might have lost almost all its Empire, but it still retained an extensive network of commitments to allies and former colonies across the globe. Most importantly the United Kingdom was a leading member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, a politico-military alliance created to provide mutual defence against potential Soviet or Eastern bloc aggression. The Alliance formally tied the United States into the defence of Western Europe, and provided a multinational framework for unified defence planning for its members.54 The British Army of the Rhine, supported by Royal Air Force squadrons based in Germany, formed a major part of a standing military shield within mainland Europe. NATO also provided a standing cross-alliance military command structure, with only an advisory role in peacetime, but which would take control of almost all the members’ military forces in the event of war and provide theatre level command. The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), based in Norfolk, Virginia, would take command of the North Atlantic Sea Area (but including some land commitments such as Portugal), whilst the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), based in Paris and later Brussels, would be the theatre commander for continental Europe including the Mediterranean and the Baltic sea.55 The most important member of NATO was the United States, a ‘superpower’ by virtue not only of its economic might but also because of its enormous defence

53 University of East Anglia: Zuckerman Archive, SZ/CSA/52/1 Solly Zuckerman, Chief Scientific Adviser, Ministry of Defence to Sir Caspar John, First Sea Lord, 27 March 1963. 54 David Miller, The Cold War: A Military History (London: Pimlico Press, 2001), Appendix 2, pp. 394–7. 55 Ibid., chapter 5, pp. 45–53. The Royal Navy in 1964 23 capability (including since 1945 the largest arsenal of atomic and hydrogen bombs and missiles), created during the Second World War and expanded and maintained due to the Cold War. The United Kingdom had positioned itself as the USA’s leading ally, particularly since the Suez crisis, when independent Anglo-French action against the nationalist regime in Egypt had been halted by the United States through the agency of its financial and economic hold over the UK. Harold Macmillan, the architect of the rebuilding of Anglo-American relations after Suez, termed this a ‘special relationship’ with the UK playing Greece to the United States’ Imperial Rome.56 The United States was increasingly committing itself to a major counter- insurgency war against Communist-nationalist forces in Vietnam, drawing in hundreds of thousands of troops and huge defence expenditure.57 In this instance, when the modern ‘Rome’ asked for assistance from the modern ‘Greece’, Greece was not forthcoming.58 Both Conservative and Labour governments resisted direct involvement in Vietnam. Up until the end of the Indonesian Confrontation in early 1966, the United Kingdom’s main justification for avoiding entanglement in Vietnam was its commitment to defending Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei against the Communist-backed regime of Sukarno in Indonesia. Even after the end of the confrontation, Harold Wilson resisted direct involvement in the conflict in Indo-China. Vietnam was largely outside the UK’s core networks of formal defence commitments; involvement would have added an extra foreign exchange strain on sterling, required additional defence spending and would have been deeply unpopular with Labour back-benchers.59 It seemed a potential quagmire in which British forces could ill-afford involvement. On the continent of Europe, the UK had initially held aloof from the nascent European Economic Community, forming its own free trade bloc (the European Free Trade Association – EFTA) with non-EEC members. Macmillan’s attempt to join the EEC in 1963 had been rebuffed by France’s independently minded leader, General de Gaulle, whose long-term aim was to place his country at the centre, politically and economically, of Europe. General de Gaulle would eventually lead France out of the military structures of NATO, as an act of nationalism with the aim of asserting France’s military independence from the United States.60 Wilson,

56 Michael Middeke, ‘Britain’s Global Military Role: Conventional Defence and Anglo-American Interdependence after Nassau’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 24/1(2001): 143–64. 57 Brian van De Mark, Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press 1995). 58 Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, pp. 106–7, 118–19; Alistair Horne, Macmillan 1957– 86: The Biography (London: Macmillan, 1989), vol. 2, p. 282. 59 Young, International Policy, pp. 77–9; also Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, pp. 106–7. 60 Young, International Policy, pp. 120–2; James Ellison, ‘Defeating the General: Anglo-American Relations, Europe and the NATO crisis of 1966’, Cold War History, 6/1 (2006). 24 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic like Macmillan, felt the pressure to take Britain into the EEC, this time in much more precipitous economic circumstances, but was met by a further rebuff.61 Much of the Commonwealth was gradually drifting away from the British orbit. Canada had already moved away from the United Kingdom in currency, foreign policy and much else, and would move much further during the 1960s.62 South Africa’s apartheid regime had caused much opprobrium among the newly independent African states of the Commonwealth, and as a result had withdrawn from the Commonwealth in 1961, although the Simonstown Agreement, an Anglo-South African defence agreement that primarily involved the British use of South African naval facilities, remained in place. Under this agreement British naval defence equipment was also sold to the new Republic of South Africa.63 On 11th November 1965, after four years of increasing white settler determination to preserve their power, the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia broke away from Britain in protest against impending independence under black majority rule.64 Throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s, the British government would attempt to end the ‘Unilateral Declaration of Independence’ through negotiation and compromise, aware that there might be doubts about the loyalty of British armed forces fighting their white ‘kith and kin’.65 From late 1966 the Royal Navy maintained a blockade of the port of Beira in Portuguese Mozambique in an attempt to enforce oil sanctions against the breakaway colony.66 The UK also had defence agreements with newly independent colonies in Africa and the Far East. In January 1964 British troops were involved in putting down ‘barrack revolts’ in newly independent Tanzania, and from 1962 to 1963 British and Commonwealth forces were involved in the Indonesian Confrontation.67 In the Persian Gulf, a series of Arab protectorates depended on Britain for their defence. During 1961 British forces, including British carriers and commando ships, had deterred a threatened attack on Kuwait by Iraq.68 In Aden, Britain was in the difficult position of attempting to combine a Crown Colony (the city of Aden)

61 Young, International Policy, pp. 142–55; O. Daddow (ed.), Harold Wilson and European Integration: Britain’s Second Application to Join the EEC (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Helen Parr, ‘Britain, America, East of Suez and the EEC: Finding a Role in British Foreign Policy, 1964–67’, Contemporary British History, 20/3 (2006): 403–21. 62 David Mackenzie, ‘Canada, the North Atlantic Triangle and the Empire’, in Judith M. Brown and William Roger Louis (eds), The Oxford History of the British Empire: Vol. 4: The Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 594–5. 63 Young, International Policy, pp. 166–8. 64 Ibid., pp. 166–73. 65 Ibid., pp. 174–9. 66 Ibid., pp. 181–3. 67 Ibid., p. 89; David Clayton, ‘Deceptive Might: Imperial Defence and Security 1900–68’, in Brown and Louis, British Empire, p. 303; ADM 1/129053, Preliminary Report on Operations in Tanganyika, 8 February 1964. 68 Clayton, ‘Deceptive Might’, p. 303; Grove, Vanguard to Trident, pp. 246–9. The Royal Navy in 1964 25 and a protectorate (the hinterland), and prepare them for independence under the optimistic assumption that a stable pro-Western regime could be sustained whilst a guerrilla war was being fought against nationalist and Communist rebels. British forces would be withdrawn in 1967, with fleet carriers and commando ships covering the retreat. Soviet-backed Communists would take over Aden, the port becoming a base for the Soviet fleet in the 1970s.69 Through organisations such as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which were attempts to extend the NATO mutual defence concept outside Europe, Britain had various other commitments in the Middle East and Far East. CENTO covered most of the Western-leaning Middle East and British forces centred on aircraft in Cyprus and naval and military forces in the Persian Gulf. SEATO covered much of South East Asia. With the US and other states involved in Vietnam, and Britain and the Commonwealth fighting Indonesian forces, there was considerable direct Western involvement in defending SEATO countries. There were fears of ‘spillover’ into other states, particularly pro-Western Thailand.

Naval Policy, Strategic and Operational Context

The prevailing naval policy and strategy as the Labour Party regained power was based on what was known as ‘East of Suez’. This had been formulated by Mountbatten when First Sea Lord as a response to the changing nuclear balance of power between East and West. With the explosion of the first Soviet hydrogen bomb in 1955, a long-running continental war supported troops and resources from the United States seemed unfeasibly remote. This left the Navy, whose strategy since 1945 had been to fight a second against Soviet submarines, in a difficult position to justify its equipment and operations. The short-lived ‘broken backed warfare’ approach, which envisaged a Royal Navy fighting on against the USSR after a mutual nuclear holocaust wasboth dispiriting and difficult to use in arguing for resources.70 Despite a hostile Minister of Defence – Duncan Sandys – Mountbatten was able to construct a strategy which meshed with the British policy of granting independence to colonies and other governed territories. In conducting orderly retreats, the British retained defence commitments and the aim of maintaining influence. This meant that Royal Navy warships could ‘show the flag’, aid newly independent regimes and fulfil defence agreements with the minimum ‘footprint’. Large amphibious ships were needed, as were the air support and strike capabilities of aircraft carriers. This created a rationale for a ‘warm’ and ‘cold’ war force dealing with limited wars, peacekeeping and low-level deterrence.71

69 Young, International Policy, pp. 89–98; Clayton, ‘Deceptive Might’, pp. 301, 304. 70 Grove, Vanguard to Trident, pp. 78–126, 174. 71 Ibid., pp. 174–7, 200–204; Jackson and Bramall, The Chiefs, p. 317. 26 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

The strategy provided the Navy with a plausible raison d’être that directly supported foreign policy when it had seemed that much of the Navy might become irrelevant in the nuclear age. British naval power provided the core response to a series of crises including the threat to Kuwait from Iraq and the support of the pro- Western regime in Aden.72 The effect of the strategy was to produce a Navy whose ‘centre of gravity’, much more so than the other two services, was in the Far East, Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, rather than the European theatre facing and deterring the Soviet threat. The reducing or relinquishing of the East of Suez strategy would therefore be a much more difficult pill to swallow for the Navy than for the Army or the RAF, both of which had considerable forces based in Germany. The extent to which East of Suez dominated naval deployment can be seen in the numbers of vessels that were required to provide a Far East Fleet of 22–24 ‘escorts’ (a term covering medium-sized warships such as destroyers and frigates whose main role was to escort and defend larger warships, amphibious vessels or convoys). Two escorts were required to support a further one on station: while one vessel was on station, two others were either in refit, working up, working down or on transit to or from the Far East. This process was known as ‘roulement’. It meant that most of the escort fleet – nearly 70 out of 90 vessels – appeared to exist solely to produce a 23-escort force on the other side of the world. In reality, the situation was more complex: those vessels on transit or working up could participate in exercises, and undertake some ‘showing the flag’ duties in home waters, whilst working up or down, or on transit. However, the ability to do this was increasingly circumscribed as escort numbers slowly declined: as will be seen, newer vessels were more expensive and therefore available in fewer numbers. This strain told in two major ways: an inability to respond to diplomatic requests for even a minor increase in the naval presence in the Mediterranean, and difficult inter-service relations as the Navy refused to take part in joint-service exercises, partly because of roulement commitments.73 The study will analyse how the Royal Navy dealt with the gradual undermining of the East of Suez strategy and the commitments undertaken during the six years of the first two Wilson governments. It will show how the Navy was able to protect its interests during the longest defence strategic reorientation until the end of the Cold War, and how and to what extent the policy and strategic changes affected actual naval deployments and operations.

Materiel

The Labour government of Harold Wilson came to power at a critical point in post-war naval procurement. The original generation of post-war warships – constructed or converted from the early 1950s onwards to replace obsolescent

72 Ibid., pp. 246–9, 298–300. 73 See Chapter 2. The Royal Navy in 1964 27 wartime equipment – was rapidly becoming obsolete itself. A second generation of vessels, from aircraft carriers and guided missile destroyers to frigates and submarines, had been on the drawing board for a number of years but, with the exception of the submarine programme, had not yet been approved. Ordering, building and making these vessels operational in enough numbers over the next decade was a key objective of the Admiralty Board and the Navy Department of the Ministry of Defence. Warship procurement is part of the complex web of total naval and defence spending, where the balance of current operating and manning costs must be made with investment in research and development and the maintenance of the construction of new ships, aircraft, weapons and sensors. The aircraft carrier was the centrepiece of British post-war naval power. Its aircraft (fighters such as the Sea Vixen or Phantom) could defend other vessels in the vicinity from enemy air attack by intercepting enemy aircraft, whilst other aircraft (such as the Scimitar and Buccaneer) could strike against sea and land targets. The carriers also included anti-submarine aircraft (Wessex and Gannet) and increasingly, airborne early warning aircraft (Gannet) equipped with powerful radars to replace radar picket ships (see Tables 1.2 and 1.3). Aircraft carriers also had the sophisticated command and sensor capabilities necessary for commanding a squadron or task force of naval vessels. All the carriers in service were wartime designs modified to a greater or lesser extent. Hermes, the most recently completed, had been substantially modified from the original wartime design, whilst Victorious, the oldest, had been completely rebuilt at great expense in the 1950s.74

Table 1.2 Aircraft carriers, in service and planned 1964

Tonnage Strike and fighter aircraft – planned Ship Construction dates (standard) for 1970s Victorious 1937–41 30,500 tons 11 Buccaneer 2*, 12 Sea Vixen 2* Eagle 1942–51 45,000 tons 18 Buccaneer 2*, 12 Phantom Ark Royal 1943–55 43,000 tons 18 Buccaneer 2*, 12 Sea Vixen 2* Centaur 1944–53 22,000 tons [to be withdrawn 1966] Hermes 1944–59 23,900 tons 7 Buccaneer 2*, 12 Phantom CVA-01 (1966–72) 53,000 tons 30 Buccaneer 2*, 12 Phantom Source: Friedman, British Carrier Aviation; Gardiner (ed.), Conway’s All the World’s Fighting Ships 1947–82, Part 1 (London: Conway Maritime Press,1983), strike and fighter aircraft numbers from DC/P (65) 20 Appendix, 5/10/65, DEFE 10/511.

74 Friedman, British Carrier Aviation, pp. 305–9. 28 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Table 1.3 Strike and fighter carrier aircraft, in service and planned 1964

Type Aircraft Notes Strike Scimitar [to be withdrawn 1966] aircraft Buccaneer Mk 1 [Engine underpowered. Replaced by Buccaneer Mk 2 by 1965] Buccaneer Mk 2 Current standard naval strike aircraft Buccaneer Mk 2* Proposed modifications of Mk 2 with land strike capability Buccaneer Mk 2** Fighter Sea Vixen Mk 1 [to be withdrawn 1967] Sea Vixen Mk 2 Current standard naval fighter F 4 Phantom US design powered by Rolls-Royce Spey jet engine. Source: Francis Mason, The British Fighter Since 1912 (London: Putnam Aeronautical, 1992); Thetford, Naval Aircraft. In the early post-war period a number of innovations had allowed larger and more capable aircraft to be operated from essentially wartime vessels: the angled flight deck allowed for more efficient management of aircraft landing and launching; the steam catapult enabled the launching of large jet aircraft from the ship’s deck; and mirror landing aids aided efficient and safer aircraft landing.75 All the existing carriers were equipped with these technologies. The most modern aircraft, however, were getting larger, heavier and more powerful, and few recent technological developments were accommodating this increase in the size of aircraft. Centaur was too small even to operate the soon-to-be-withdrawn Scimitar, so had been equipped solely with the Sea Vixen fighter leaving her with a very limited strike capability. The new Hermes would be too small, even after a large refit, to operate enough of the new Phantoms and Buccaneers to ensure both a sufficient combat air patrol and a credible strike capability, whilst both Eagle and Ark Royal would have to undergo substantial alterations to operate the Phantom.76 In short, of the existing carrier fleet, only two ships were large enough to operate the most modern aircraft, and even these at levels barely large enough to provide an effective strike capability. Both these vessels would be approaching the end of their operational lives within 12 years. The CVA-01 design, approaching 60,000 tons in 1964, was considered by the naval leadership to provide the most cost-effective combination of the fighter and strike aircraft; and they consequently argued that an aircraft carrier any smaller would not be worth the expense. As discussed previously, attempts by the Air Staff, with varying levels of support from the previous government, to propose a smaller or simpler carrier had been repeatedly rejected by the naval leadership, and this perhaps hardened the Navy’s strong support for the large carrier.77

75 Pugh, Cost of Seapower, p. 200–202. 76 DEFE 13/477, Carrier Options table, and note from Private Secretary to First Sea Lord to Pat Nairne, Private Secretary, Secretary of State for Defence, 30 November 1965. 77 Spellar, ‘Expeditionary Operations’ sub-section: ‘The Joint Seaborne Force versus The Island Strategy’; Grove, ‘Partnership Spurned’, pp. 228–9. The Royal Navy in 1964 29

The only new technology that might be effectively deployed from a smaller carrier was the vertical/short take-off and landing (VSTOL) aircraft (P.1127) being developed by Hawker Siddeley. This revolutionary innovation, which used rotatable exhaust nozzles to provide adjustable vertical and horizontal thrust thus allowing for much shorter, even vertical, take-off and landing, had been developed on behalf of the RAF, and it had been the RAF that had suggested a ‘navalised’ P.1127 flying from a small carrier.78 Such was inter-service rivalry at the time, that the RAF’s sponsorship of the P.1127 was enough not to recommend the aircraft to the Navy. In pure performance terms, the P.1127 was a subsonic aircraft with inferior speed, rate of climb and operational ceiling than the Phantom.79 The Navy was therefore seeking approval for the largest warships ever built in the United Kingdom to replace a number of ageing Second World War carriers. In cost terms the whole carrier programme including building CVA-01 and a sister ship, along with modernising some of the remaining carriers, would cost between £1,288m and £1,406m over 10 years, and around 10 per cent of the total defence budget during this period (see Table 1.4).80 In comparison the TSR-2 programme was estimated to cost £1,083m for 110 aircraft and a proposed purchase of the same number of F-111 strike aircraft in lieu of the TSR-2 £805m.81 In the East of Suez strategy, the aircraft carrier was linked to the amphibious vessel, a warship specifically designed to land troops ashore – usually marines – against varying levels of enemy opposition. The revival of the Navy’s amphibious capacity had begun in the mid 1950s, particularly after the operational success of helicopter landings from light carriers during the Suez expedition in 1956.82 Two obsolescent light carriers, Albion and Bulwark, were subsequently converted to ‘Commando Ships’, whilst two new landing dock ships were now under construction. Fearless and Intrepid discharged most of their troops from landing craft despatched from a floodable dock at the rear of the ship. Such wasthe importance attached to the new dock landing ships, that it was even suggested that one should be named after the recently deceased Winston Churchill. The Churchill

78 Ibid. 79 Francis Mason, The British Fighter since 1912 (London: Putnam Aeronautical, 1992), pp. 406–7. 80 The £1,288m–£1,406m figures were first produced as a result of the functional costings programme; originally the costs had been estimated at between £600 and £800m (excluding operating costs). AIR 8/2355, AIR 8/2355, Assistant Under-Secretary (Air) to various 28 June 1963, Quinlan to Elworthy, 12 November 1964, for the pre- and post- functional costings. The total cost of the carrier programme was never fully nailed down; for example, in just two months, November/December 1964, the functional costings estimates suggested £1,380m, the total produced at the first Chequers meeting 21 November 1964 was £1,406m, and the total produced for George Wigg 14 December 1965 was £1,288m: AIR 8/2355 Head of F1 (Air) to Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Policy) 15 December 1964. 81 CAB 129/121, Cabinet Memorandum C (65) 57, Table: ‘Costings 1965–78’. 82 Spellar, ‘Seaborne/Airborne concept’, pp. 55–8. 30 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Table 1.4 Breakdown of carrier programme costs (1965–75), 14 December 1964

Cost type Capital costs Operating costs R&D costs

New carrier construction £89.1m ) £119m Improvements to existing carriers £22m £14m Afloat support ships (5 vessels) £22m 1 Shore support for ships £9m ? Operational aircraft £408m £207m Training aircraft £100m £60m Shore support for aircraft £11m £119m

Total £661m2 £519m £108m Grand total £1288m3 Source: ‘Answers to Paymaster General’s Questions’, Navy Department 14/12/64, AIR 8/2355. Notes: 1 Not given in paper. Elworthy’s private office noted that about £60m in ashore spares had not been included in these figures, some of which could have contributed to this unfilled category.2 Total of above capital costs actually = £651m. Difference to figure given due to discrepancies in Navy Department paper itself. 3 See other notes for discrepancies in total figures. family were not impressed by this gesture and the newest hunter-killer submarine was named Churchill instead.83 The ‘escort’, the generic term then coming into fashion to describe a , a destroyer or a frigate, was the mainstay of the fleet (Table 1.5). In peacetime they undertook much of the worldwide ‘showing the flag’ work that Royal Navy vessels had undertaken for many hundreds of years, such as visiting ports, taking part in exercises with local navies and generally protecting and promoting British interests. In wartime, the escort would provide protection and support for a task force or squadron often centred on an aircraft carrier. Some escorts were specialist anti-aircraft ships, others anti-submarine and yet others performed the role of ‘picket’ ships providing long-range radar coverage for the force. This last type of vessel was gradually being replaced by airborne early warning Gannet aircraft. The cruiser was the largest escort type, and only three such vessels – begun during the war – were fully active in 1964 (Table 1.5). The three Tiger class vessels had been laid down during the war, their construction had been suspended in 1945, and the design recast in the early 1950s with what were then a state-of-the-art armament of 6- and 3-inch guns. Delays in completion meant that they only joined the fleet between 1959 and 1961, when the lack of any guided missile armament marked them out almost immediately obsolescent. Conversion of the first of the class into a helicopter cruiser had been given in 1964, half the gun armament being replaced

83 DEFE 69/325, Head of M1(N) minute note 8/2/65; and Private Secretary, Navy Minister to Private Secretary, First Sea Lord 31/3/65. The Royal Navy in 1964 31 by a hangar for four anti-submarine helicopters.84 In such a role they could act as an anti-submarine command ship and allow the aircraft of the carrier to concentrate on the air defence and strike role. It had been hoped by the Admiralty as late as 1963 that newly built ships would fulfil this role, but lack of ship design capacity in the

Table 1.5 Cruisers, destroyers and frigates, in service and under construction 1964

Type Completed and Armament and comments displacement 3 Tiger class 1959–61, 9,550 All gun main armament (mix of 6-inch and cruisers tons 3-inch). 1 vessel approved for conversion to helicopter cruiser 1964. 28 Converted 1943–47, 2,000– Various gun and mortar armaments. Destroyers and modernised 2,300 tons of the Emergency, ‘C’, Weapon and Battle wartime classes. Converted to radar pickets or anti- destroyers submarine frigates between 1951 and 1963. A further 8 modernised between 1955 and 1962. 7 Daring class 1952–54, 2,830 All gun main armament (4.5-inch). Wartime destroyers tons design, completed post-war. Planned modernisation dropped 1959, obsolescent. 35 first-generation 1955–61, 1,500– Various gun and mortar armaments. 15 Type 12 post-war frigates 2,500 tons (anti-submarine, 1st rate) 12 Type 14 (anti- submarine 2nd rate), 4 Type 41 (anti-aircraft) and 4 Type 61 (radar picket) vessels. 14 general- 1961 onwards, 2 medium guns, Sea Cat AA missile system; purpose frigates 2,000–2,300 tons Wasp helicopter and A/S mortars. Cost: £4.5– (+ 7 building or 5.3m each.1 7 Type 81 Tribal or Ashanti class ordered) and 14 Leander Class. Both classes had similar armament. Type 81 programme discontinued. All vessels under construction of Leander type. 4 guided missile 1962 onwards, 4 medium guns, Sea Slug and Sea Cat AA destroyers (+ 4 6,200 tons missile systems; Wessex helicopter. Cost: building/ordered) c.£15m each.2 8 County Class. Notes: 1 DEFE 69/327, papers 2 and 7, A.A. Pritchard to V.I. Chapman 14/7/65. 2 Ibid. constructor’s department had meant pushing these vessels back a number of years. So an interim conversion of the Tiger class was approved instead.85 The destroyer and the frigate were smaller than the cruiser, at between 2,000 and 6,000 tons. Differentiating between these two types was difficult as the escalation in warship size since the war had made the most modern frigates larger than the oldest destroyers, and not much smaller than some of the oldest pre-war cruisers. During the period in question, the Admiralty Board suggested that a vessel over

84 DEFE 24/1, enclosures 5/1 and 5/2, Paper by Head of Military 1, 7 February 1964. 85 DEFE 24/1, enclosures 5/1 and 5/2, Paper by Head of Mil 1, 7 February 1964. 32 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

4,000 tons would in future be termed a destroyer, and under that tonnage a frigate, although this was not subsequently held to and by the early 1970s vessels armed with medium range anti-aircraft missile systems were designated destroyers, and vessels with a general-purpose and anti-submarine role, frigates.86 Designations used in this book are those given in the documentary evidence. The escort fleet consisted of a mix of Second World War destroyers that had either been converted to anti-submarine frigates or radar pickets, or had been given more limited modernisations. The Daring class destroyers were a class of wartime-designed destroyers finally completed in the 1950s, but already close to obsolescence. These ships had been supplemented by the first generation of post- war new construction. Various classes of specialised frigates had been succeeded by two classes of general-purpose frigates, the Type 81 and the Leander class. The latter had proved most successful and in 1964 they were the only frigates in production. The County class guided missile destroyers were large vessels operating the Navy’s first medium range anti-aircraft guided missile system, the GWS-1 Sea Slug. Four had been completed, and another four to a slightly modified design were either on order or under construction. Design work had been in progress for some time on the successors to the County and Leander classes. The Type 82, which had been under development for some years, had been designed around the Sea Dart anti- aircraft and Ikara anti-submarine missile systems, and had grown to be close in size to the County class. The Type 82 was envisaged as the main fleet escort for the CVA-01 carrier, and the naval leadership was seeking to have the design approved and ordered alongside the new carrier. The Type 19 frigate was envisaged as a minimum ocean-going escort with a small crew and light armament for East of Suez patrol and ‘flag-showing’ duties. As will be seen below manpower levels were a major constraint on this design, almost making the class an unfeasible proposition. The nuclear submarine was an increasingly important part of the new high- tech fleet. Given names to reflect their new capital ship status, five Polaris boats of the Revenge class were under construction or order, whilst the programme of nuclear-powered and conventionally armed ‘hunter-killer’ nuclear submarines was proceeding at a rate of one vessel ordered every nine months, with the long-term aim that 12 would be in service by 1975.87 The first such vessel, HMSDreadnought , had been built with a US reactor, but subsequent vessels had been equipped with British-built nuclear propulsion. They were armed with conventional anti-ship or anti-submarine torpedoes. The fleet also included nearly 20 modern conventional submarines, quieter than nuclear vessels and better able to operate in shallow waters.

86 ADM 167/165, A/M 9650, item 15, 18 November 1965. 87 AIR 8/2445, Luce to Healey, 17 September 1965. Annex D – ‘currently planned’ column. The Royal Navy in 1964 33

The Navy Department had ambitious plans for naval construction up to 1975. In July 1965 it envisaged that by March 1968, one carrier, three guided missile destroyers, seven frigates, four nuclear hunter-killer submarines and various support craft would be ordered totalling £200m in expenditure on ship and engine builders. The carrier alone would be worth £50m to the ship building industry. Between 1968 and 1975, a further 50 major vessels of various types from carriers to frigates were envisaged, totalling £500m in shipbuilding orders.88 This was an enormous and ambitious programme. The cost of warship construction was gradually increasing as weapon and sensor systems became more sophisticated and complex to operate. Before the Second World War, the key determinant of space for weapon systems on a warship was weight – the weight of mechanically and hydraulically operated guns, torpedoes and depth charges, now it was the volume of space dedicated to the various electronic systems controlling and coordinating weapons (guns, guided missiles, mortars, guided torpedoes and helicopters) and sensors (radar, sonar, ‘electronic warfare’ and communications systems) which were increasingly dependent on electric power. These interconnected systems were space-intensive and expensive to build, maintain and operate, with the result that ships increased in size and to the casual observer looked under-armed compared to pre-war ships. In fact their capability lay largely hidden within the ship’s hull and superstructure.89 The major weapon systems listed in Table 1.6 demonstrate the range of capabilities available and the different ‘platforms’ (aircraft, ships or submarines) from which these weapons could be launched. These weapon systems would be useless without the sophisticated sensors associated with them and the semi- automated command systems to coordinate and control the different pieces of equipment. For example, the Sea Slug anti-aircraft missile was dependent on the ship’s long-range Type 965 air search radar to first spot an aircraft. Then IFF sensors (‘interrogation: friend or foe’) might then determine whether the aircraft was an enemy, and next the Type 902 guidance radar would guide the missile, once launched, onto its target. The Sea Slug missile would ‘ride’ along the radar beam the Type 902 created as it tracked and held the enemy aircraft. The ADAWS-1 computer system would provide the rapid numerical calculations required to allow the ship’s operations room staff to make informed decisions by coordinating and assessing the information provided by these different sources and predicting the estimated position of enemies, in addition to any other streams of data available. Almost every weapon in Table 1.6 was, like the Sea Slug, part of a complex interrelated system of electronic sensors and weapons. The detail of these weapon systems will not be discussed here, but it is necessary to understand

88 DEFE 69/327, A.A. Pritchard to V.I. Chapman, 14 July 1965, paper 1. 89 Brown, Century of Naval Construction, p. 230, for comparison of Type 19 and Daring. 34 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Table 1.6 Major weapon systems in service and under development

Weapon type Weapon system In Notes service Anti-submarine Squid A/S Mortar 1944 Wartime development of depth charge thrower. Mortars armed with fuses set to detonate a set depth Limbo A/S Mortar 1948 Development of the Squid with longer range and sheltered reloading position. Wessex HAS 1 1961 Helicopter equipped with ‘dipping’ helicopter sonar winched down from the aircraft, and armed with anti-submarine torpedoes. Wasp helicopter 1963 Helicopter equipped with anti- submarine torpedoes only, and dependent on target information from warship. Ikara A/S missile Australian missile system that delivers system an anti-submarine torpedo to proximity of target by air, targeted with dual radar/sonar guidance on board ship. To be fitted on Type 82 escorts. Anti-ship Bombs etc. launched various Unguided bombs dropped from naval from strike aircraft strike aircraft (such as the Buccaneer). Soviets had developed aircraft-launched anti-ship guided missiles (Such as the AS2 Kipper launched from the Badger C bomber). Similar systems under development by France and other countries. Anti-ship torpedoes 1943 Although nuclear technology had fired from submarines revolutionised the operational capabilities of submarines, their anti- ship weaponry still relied on WWII vintage anti-ship torpedoes. 4.5” Mk 6 in twin 1945 Late-wartime semi-automatic mounting, mounting standard medium gun on most post war ships. Anti-aircraft capability. 4.5” Mk 8 in single Automatic gun mounting under mounting development. To be fitted on Type 82 and 19 escorts Helicopter launched 1960s Wire-guided lightweight missiles fired SS11 and AS 12 from Wasp and Wessex helicopters guided missiles The Royal Navy in 1964 35

Table 1.6 Cont.

Anti-aircraft/ Missiles or cannon various Carrier borne interceptors armed either from fighter aircraft with cannon, or more recently short range anti-aircraft missiles Seacat short range 1962 Cheap and effective short range anti- anti-aircraft missile aircraft missile system. Early versions system visually guided by above decks operator. All versions had missiles loaded on launcher by hand. Seaslug medium range 1962 Large and sophisticated radar beam anti-aircraft missile guided medium range system. Missiles system part assembled and loaded onto automatic launcher from large ‘hangar’ like magazine. Seawolf short range Planned successor to Seacat under anti-aircraft/missile development. Staff requirement included missile system ability to intercept guided missiles as well as aircraft. Seadart medium Planned successor to Seaslug under range anti-aircraft/ development. Simplified magazine missile missile system and loading arrangement, more sophisticated guidance and ramjet propulsion of missile. their complexity and inter-related nature in order to appreciate the expense and difficulty of developing armaments and sensors for modern warships.90 Much of this book is concerned with the interaction between defence policy- making and the procurement of naval vessels and weapon systems. It will analyse the reasons for a number of the procurement decisions eventually taken. The most significant procurement was that of the carrier, which forms the first major question asked in this book, but the procurement of escort vessels will also be analysed, not least because such vessels impinged on the carrier decision and were linked to other significant matters analysed here: manpower, procurement costs, naval deployment and East of Suez. The procurement of hunter-killer nuclear submarines will be addressed, but in much less detail as that programme came under much less scrutiny than carriers and escorts during this period. Other warship types will not be mentioned unless they impinge on other matters analysed.

Personnel: The Naval Leadership

Denis Healey described the senior officers of the Royal Navy during his period as Defence Secretary as being dominated by a tight group of traditional naval

90 Norman Friedman, Naval Radar (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1981); Willem Hackmann, Seek and Strike (London: HMSO, 1984), chapters 13 and 14, pp. 325–58. 36 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic families.91 This was certainly true. Of the 36 men who sat on the Admiralty Board between 1964 and 1982, 12 were sons of naval officers, almost all of whom had been captains or admirals.92 This trend was more prominent in the 1960s. Half of the Admiralty Board members in 1964 were sons of captains and admirals.93 By 1969 this had risen to three in five, the other two being a descendent of Nelson and the son of a colonel.94 Several others had naval relatives or ancestors.95 And many more had joined Dartmouth College as schoolchildren.96 Of the rest, most had attended second-tier public schools in the south of England, many of which had traditions of sending boys into the Navy.97 No Sea Lords in the 1960s had come from a grammar school or other state school, and none had been to university. Many of these naval leaders would then have sons who would in turn join the Navy.98 The naval leadership was also almost exclusively made up of officers from the fighting arms, even though the position of Third Sea Lord (Controller of the Fleet: responsible for naval construction) might suggest that a naval engineer might be appropriate, whilst the Fourth Sea Lord role (transport and supply) might suggest a ‘Pusser’ (Supply and Secretariat Officer). The naval leadership in 1964 was therefore a relatively closed elite of the upper middle-class, many with a naval family background, wholly made up of ‘fighting officers’ from the gunnery, navigation, Fleet Air Arm, and submariner branches of the Navy. There were no professional administrators/logisticians or engineers, and no state-educated members either. This was in strong contrast to the Royal Air Force, many of whose leaders were from the same grammar-school and university background as the new Secretary of State.99

91 Healey, Time of My Life, p. 263. 92 Admirals Luce, Le Fanu, Frewen, Dreyer, Turner, Ashmore, Trewby, Clayton, Leach, Cassidi, Kennon, Staveley. Sources: Who’s Who, various editions (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1965–85), Obituaries (various dates), The Times. 93 Admirals Luce, Le Fanu and Frewen. 94 Admirals Le Fanu, Turner, Ashmore, with Law (Nelson descendent) and Colonel Twiss. 95 For example, Admiral Horace Law, a distant descendant of Nelson (Obituary 1 February 2005, The Times); Admiral Griffin whose uncle had been an admiral. Sources: Who’s Who; Obituaries (various dates), The Times. 96 Admirals Pollock, Lewin, Eberle and others. 97 For example, Admirals Hawkins (Bedford School), Hopkins (Pangbourne College), Begg (Malvern College), Bush and Eberle (Clifton College), Lewis (Haileybury College) Empson (Eastbourne College), Williams (Cheltenham College), Treacher (St Paul’s School), White (Dover College), Pillar (Blundells School). Who’s Who, Obituaries (various dates), The Times. 98 For example, the sons of Admirals le Fanu, Janvrin, Ashmore and Twiss amongst others. 99 Healey, Time of My Life, pp. 264–5. The Royal Navy in 1964 37

Personnel: Sailors

Although the total manning figures for the period show only a gradual shift downwards in numbers over much of the post-war period, this actually hid a much more serious manning problem that impacted dramatically on the numbers and types of ships that the Navy could hope to operate and man in the future. The increased sophistication of naval warfare required highly trained naval ratings and this threw into sharp relief the gap in pay between the Navy and equivalent work in the civil sector, which had seen more than a decade of economic growth and rising living standards. The end of conscription had hit the Navy much less hard than the Army, but it had also had an effect on manning numbers. Retaining sailors in the Navy was also taken seriously and significant advances in habitability and living standards had been undertaken from the late 1950s onwards.100 The introduction of separate living and eating spaces for ratings was introduced in the early 1960s, and the total space allocated to ratings was increased. New vessels such as the three Tiger class cruisers and the County class destroyers, and the planned CVA-01 and Type 82 would all need large crews, and combined with increases in crew numbers in escorts and in nuclear submarines over their conventional counterparts, this would produce a potentially serious shortage of manpower in the early 1970s. Such was the expected strain on manpower that the First Sea Lord wrote a letter in 1968 to retired senior officers admitting that recruiting had ‘seriously dropped away’ and asking them to encourage their young relatives and acquaintances to consider a career in the Navy.101 The manpower problem was just as acute in 1964 and 1965. As will be seen, this would have a significant impact on the arguments for and against approving CVA-01. It also had a less well-known but equally important knock-on effect for the escort designs then under development.102 This work will investigate the impact of the manpower problem on the carrier decision and on the development of the Navy thereafter.

The Defence Industry

The materiel needs of the Navy would for the most part have to be supplied by the British defence industry. Although the British government was willing to contemplate the acquisition of some aircraft, missiles and Army equipment from foreign sources, building warships in foreign yards would not be politically acceptable for many years, and even today seems only to be considered for auxiliaries.

100 Admiralty, Brinestain and Biscuit (London: National Archives, 2006), Introduction, pp. 4–12. 101 National Maritime Museum, Lewin Papers: LWN/2/22/6 Varyl Begg, First Sea Lord, to retired senior naval officers, 9 August 1968. 102 See Chapter 4. 38 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

The British shipbuilding industry, after a 13-year period of sustained mercantile demand, was entering a slump in orders. In the early post war years it had been planned that the use of warship orders to compensate for any drops in merchant orders would help ensure continuing employment in the industry.103 In fact, orders for merchant ships enjoyed a sustained boom throughout the 1950s, as merchant fleets expanded not just to replace lost wartime vessels but also to take advantage of the growing international economy. Naval shipbuilding during this period made up a very small proportion of the main shipyard’s building activities, and as a result the Navy was unable to impose the competitive tendering that it would have preferred (and had operated in the interwar period), relying instead on the wartime method of fixing a final price only on delivery.104 Competitive tendering did not return until 1959 when the international merchant market had begun to weaken.105 In the late 1950s the Admiralty also began to worry about the inability of the shipbuilding industry to adapt to new methods of construction such as prefabrication, and to improve their productivity by introducing the more efficient double shift system used by Japanese and European shipbuilders.106 By the early 1960s, the decline in mercantile orders made to UK shipyards, resulting from the inability to meet delivery dates demanded by ship owners and brokers, combined with the rapid expansion of shipbuilding in countries such as Japan, was turning into a collapse.107 A situation in which the Navy had difficulty placing orders now became one in which some of the weaker shipbuilders were desperate to accept warship orders, even at a considerable loss, in order to stay open.108 The incoming Labour government instigated the first independent public enquiry into the shipbuilding industry since the war. Commissioned by the Board of Trade, it tasked Raey Geddes, the Chairman of Dunlop, with investigating the state of the industry with a particular emphasis on the large number of small shipbuilding companies and rapidly increasing over-capacity.109 The Geddes report was completed in 1966 and its recommendations are discussed in Chapter 7, but this book will analyse the importance of the problems of the British shipbuilding industry and their relationship to the fate of CVA-01 and to rebuilding the fleet following the cancellation of the carrier and escort programmes in 1966.

103 Anthony Gorst and Lewis Johnman, ‘British Naval Procurement and Shipbuilding 1945–64’, in David J. Starkey (ed.), Exploiting the Sea (Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1998), p. 131–2. 104 Gorst and Johnman, ‘Naval Procurement’, p. 132–3. 105 Ibid., p. 133. 106 Ibid., p. 136–7. 107 Lewis Johnman and Hugh Murphy, British Shipbuilding and the State since 1918 (Exeter: Exeter University Press 2002), chapter 5. 108 Gorst and Johnman, ‘Naval Procurement’, p. 142. 109 Johnman and Murphy pp. 159–60; DEFE 69/348, Head Mat1(N) minute sheet, 24 March 1966. The Royal Navy in 1964 39

Warship construction was coordinated and controlled by the Navy Department under the supervision of the relevant committees of the Ministry of Defence. The procurement of aircraft and missiles was, however, a more complicated matter. This was undertaken by the Ministry of Aviation (and later the Ministry of Technology) with whom the Ministry of Defence had to negotiate and engage rather than directly with defence companies. An added complication was that although the development of guided missiles was the responsibility of the Ministry of Aviation, the ‘guided weapon system’ – the launcher, the guidance radars, and any other ship-borne systems associated with the system – was the responsibility of the Navy Department.110 This split of control required constant and effective communication between the two bodies to ensure the effective development of the missile and system combination. This book will explore the significance of this area in weapons development, particularly during the development of new warship types following the cancellation of CVA-01.

Conclusion

The Royal Navy in 1964 was a large, self-confident if rather enclosed organisation, operating in an environment of continued world commitments but strained financial resources. It planned to equip itself by means of a highly ambitious programme of sophisticated and expensive military hardware to meet the challenges that it considered essential for Britain to be a modern sea power. The central piece of hardware around which most of the others were subordinated or related was the strike carrier. This was the nature of the organisation with which the new Labour Defence Secretary would have to work with when he entered the Ministry of Defence in October 1964.

110 For example, see DEFE 10/483, Operational Requirements Committee Paper OR/P(66) 49, 30 November 1966, Sea Dart: development costs split between missile (Ministry of Aviation/Ministry of Technology) and system (Navy Department). This page has been left blank intentionally Chapter 2 Emerging from Mountbatten’s Shadow

With the arrival of a new Labour government in October 1964 the Admiralty Board, only six months old, would have been optimistic about its chances of procuring the aircraft carrier. The previous administration had approved the vessel in principle, and with Lord Louis Mountbatten as Chief of the Defence Staff at the height of his powers the Navy had a most powerful and influential advocate. Mountbatten’s political sympathies were progressive and there was no reason to believe that he would not be able to win over the new Labour Defence Secretary as he had his Conservative predecessor. It soon became clear, however, that this would not be the case. Mountbatten was rapidly sidelined and a formidable coalition of the Secretary of State, the Permanent Secretary and the Treasury were all soon pushing for the carrier’s cancellation. Why and how did this happen? Why and how did Mountbatten’s power fade so quickly? Why did the Navy’s attempts to persuade fail when they had succeeded so well only months earlier? How significant were the Treasury and the Foreign Office in the battle for the carrier in these early stages and what position did they take? This chapter will cover period from the arrival in power of the new Labour government to June 1965 when Healey breaks the impasse with the Foreign Office by proposing what became known as the ‘Healey plan’ at the 2nd Chequers meeting. It will start with the Navy Department’s first moves to make its case for the carrier and Healey’s initial investigations into the carrier issue. It will analyse the response of the Treasury and the central Ministry of Defence to the Navy’s digging in, in defence of the aircraft carrier. The chapter will then follow on to deal with the sidelining of Mountbatten and then the new studies launched under the aegis of the Permanent Secretary. The Navy’s early modified carrier plans will be assessed, as will the devising and launching of the Healey Plan.1

1 As stated in the introduction, this chapter will not cover the arguments and discussions over the Polaris (including the Multi-Lateral Force and Atlantic Nuclear Force) that were occurring concurrently to most of these discussions, as they have been analysed elsewhere. Susanne Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigge, ‘Trick or Truth? The British ANF Proposal, West Germany and US Non-Proliferation Policy 1964–68’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 11 (2000): 166–71. 42 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Reducing Defence Expenditure

When the Labour Party came into power, in a ritual that would become all too familiar for new Chancellors of the Exchequer over the next decade, they found that the finances were in a much worse state than had been envisaged. As explained in the previous chapter, inflationary growth targets and the inability to resolve inefficiencies in the economy were resulting in significant outflows of sterling causing a balance of payments problem that if not resolved could force a devaluation of the pound. In addition, the incoming government had ambitious plans for social and domestic public spending. Reducing defence spending could therefore help to ease the financial problems of the United Kingdom and perhaps help fund social policy as well. Within weeks of taking office Wilson had requested information on the sources of government overseas expenditure, almost certainly to see where cuts could be made. The answer from the Treasury was that £500m was spent overseas by government and £350m of this by the military (although sterling receipts from overseas military expenditure provided a net military overseas spending of £250m).2 Burke Trend, the Cabinet Secretary, in briefing Harold Wilson for a planned meeting at Chequers to discuss defence and foreign policy, set out the current plans for defence expenditure. In 1960/61 total defence spending had been £1,596m: by 1963/64 this had increased to £2,141m and by 1969/70 this was projected to rise to £2,400m at 1964 prices. Large parts of this substantial increase over the next five years would be attributable to the major procurement projects then under development including the TSR-2 strike aircraft, the P.1154 supersonic VTOL aircraft and the CVA-01 aircraft carrier. Trend saw this increase in spending as a burden both on the balance of payments and on skilled manpower in the economy as a whole. He recommended a reduction of defence spending to £2,000m by 1969/70, and then keeping it at that level until 1974/75. This would result in the percentage of GNP being spent on GNP falling to six per cent in five years and five per cent in ten.3 The meeting at Chequers, which has been described by other authors in detail, saw the reluctant and tentative acceptance of the £2,000m figure by the Defence Secretary and the Ministry of Defence. The new defence spending ceiling provided the key parameters for the launch of the defence review, whilst giving the Treasury an agreed figure with which to force the Ministry of Defence into making cuts. The Navy’s leadership began taking the first steps in a campaign to win government acceptance of the new carrier.

2 PREM 13/18, folio 37, answer to request for information from Prime Minister, November 1964. 3 PREM 13/18, folios 19–34, Burke Trend, Cabinet Secretary to Harold Wilson, Brief for Chequers meeting, 19 December 1964. Section A – future defence policy. Emerging from Mountbatten’s Shadow 43

Defending the Aircraft Carrier: The First Moves

Within days of Healey arriving at the Ministry of Defence, the new Secretary of State was probing the largest elements of the Navy’s procurement programme. Only two weeks into his new role he requested information on the new aircraft carrier, the nuclear submarine programme and the Buccaneer 2* strike aircraft.4 Healey nodded through the proposed hunter-killer programme of ordering one boat every nine months with little discussion, and received a series of briefs on the carrier and Buccaneer, but not before the RAF leadership had managed to get in first.5 Charles Elworthy, the Chief of Air the Staff, knew that Healey had started asking questions about the planned carrier, and his private secretary, the extremely able Michael Quinlan, suggested getting the Air Force Minister to talk to the Secretary of State before the planned defence discussions at Chequers. Lord Shackleton would not be able to attend, so under the pretext of putting forward issues before a meeting at which he would not be present, he would raise concerns about the carrier programme: that all aircraft programmes need to be closely examined, that value for money was vital, and that the new functional costings had very recently calculated the total cost of the carrier programme at £1,400m (compared to £1,150m for the TSR-2). Above all, RAF projects had ‘over a period of years been subject to the most exhaustive joint-service scrutiny, and have been discussed and agreed unanimously by the Chiefs of Staff. This is not true of the carrier’. The RAF leadership was ensuring that its case was heard, and also that these issues did not first arise at the Chequers meeting, where ‘if the subject comes up for the first time in circumstances in which its raising could be interpreted as merely desperate wriggling by the RAF on the brink of the precipice’.6 The RAF leadership saw itself fighting for its very existence in difficult circumstances, and it was approaching the task of winning over the new Defence Secretary with great care. The first naval brief on the carrier came from the Second Sea Lord and concentrated on the costs/benefits comparisons of different aircraft carriers, with the aim of demonstrating the necessity of building a large carrier. He stated categorically that a 35,000-ton ship would ‘not [be] cost effective for such a big investment’ providing merely a surplus of 16 aircraft for-strike operations after the protection of the carrier and its escorts had been provided for.7 A 53,000-ton carrier, however, would provide 36 surplus aircraft giving a cost of £1.6m per aircraft compared to £2–2.5m in 35,000- to 42,000-ton carriers – the approximate size of the largest existing carriers. Larger was quite definitely better, in the case of procuring a new aircraft carrier.

4 DEFE 13/436, enclosure 2, Healey to Hardman, 10 November 1964. 5 DEFE 13/346, enclosure 7, Hardman to Healey, 20 November 1964. 6 AIR 8/2355, Quinlan to Elworthy, 12 November 1964. 7 DEFE 13/346, enclosure 5, Luce to Healey, 17 November 1964. 44 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

The second brief providing the arguments for the carrier came from Patrick Nairne, the civil servant heading up the DS4 branch of the Ministry of Defence Central Secretariat. DS4 dealt with naval policy issues and at this time largely consisted of former Admiralty civil servants who had been extracted from the Admiralty when it turned into the Navy Department in the recent reforms. Pat Nairne, himself a former Admiralty civil servant, was considered one of the most able of the younger generation of rising civil servants.8 His briefing provided a justification for the carrier that went much wider than just the Second Sea Lord’s rather tight comparison of aircraft carrier sizes. Nairne argued that the aircraft carrier was a weapon that deterred limited aggression, provided air support when land-based air power was unavailable, and defended merchant ships and other sea forces. Another vital aspect of the vessel’s effectiveness was the political flexibility of the carrier: it ‘can be positioned and held poised – either unobtrusively or with the maximum political effect – as the situation requires’. The paper also cited the examples of Korea, Suez and Lebanon/ Jordan where carriers provided a vital quick on-the-spot response to threats. It also attempted to deflect the regular criticisms of the carrier: smaller carriers, less sophisticated ships or guided missiles would not be able to fulfil the same functions, and a switch to guided missiles would result in an unacceptable capability gap between the withdrawal of carriers and development of sufficiently capable guided missiles. Regarding the carrier’s vulnerability, the most serious threat was seen to be that of the submarine, but that ‘experience has shown that the aircraft carrier deployed within a balanced task force is an extremely difficult target to disable’.9 Nairne’s defence of the carrier – that it embodied flexibility in unexpected crises, and that a large carrier was necessary to do this effectively – would be at the core of all the Navy’s arguments in favour of the carrier over the next 15 months. It is also notable that Nairne’s defence of the carrier against replacement by guided missiles, implicitly accepted the fact that guided missiles would eventually replace the carrier-borne aircraft, but that this had not yet occurred and would not occur in the lifetime of CVA-01. This assumption would also be accepted by almost all advocates of the carrier – no reports categorically stated that carrier-borne aircraft had a very long-term future. Nairne also admitted to one of the key weaknesses of the Navy’s case: two carriers east of Suez were considered the minimum to provide an effective striking force and meet existing commitments in the region, but the three-carrier force that the Navy was planning could not maintain two such carriers east of Suez. A second East of Suez carrier would only be available six months a year. The Head of DS4 also sidestepped the most important issue about the carrier programme: its cost.

8 Not least by Healey himself: Healey, Time of My Life, p. 268, also by Lord Carrington when Nairne was his private secretary as First Lord of the Admiralty: Peter Carrington, Reflect on Things Past: The Memoirs of Lord Carrington (London: Collins, 1988), p. 147. 9 DEFE 13/346, enclosure 10A, ‘The case for CVA-01’, covered by Nairne to Hardman, 18 November 1965, para. 7. Emerging from Mountbatten’s Shadow 45

He concentrated purely on the unit cost of a single carrier which was estimated by the Navy Department to be only £65.25m, spread over the construction dates of 1964/65–1972/73. The majority of the costs would fall in 1967/68 – £7.35m; 1968/69 – £13.1m; 1969/70 – £16.95m; 1970/71 – £13.3m; and 1971/72 – £8.45m.10 As will be seen, the unit cost of the vessel was only a very small aspect of the total costs of the carrier programme, and the naval leadership was keen that the analysis of the costs were kept under its control as much as possible. The third brief on the carrier took the form of carefully choreographed presentation, by Captains Cassidi and Lewin of the naval staff involving speeches supported by slides, to invited senior political, civilian and military attendees within the Ministry of Defence.11 Smoothly presented and intricately planned (down to the seating plan for the rows of attendees, and scripts for each of the presenters), the part ‘corporate-style’/part ‘military briefing’ slide presentation certainly impressed the RAF attendees, one of whom regarded it as ‘quite skilful’, but then went on to note that it ‘begs many questions and evades many problems’.12 The arguments that Nairne had put forward were reiterated, but this time the main line of argument was that the ships themselves were not the most expensive part of the whole programme, it was the aircraft. The Navy argued therefore that the aircraft procurement element should be regarded as an inter-service matter and if the Fleet Air Arm and RAF integrated their aircraft requirements and operated the same aircraft significant savings could be made.13 This neatly, if rather transparently, transferred the largest cost element in the programme from being a purely naval matter to one of inter-service capability. This was a clear attempt to settle the question of land strike alternatives – a choice between the Buccaneer 2*, TSR-2 and F-111 – in favour of the Buccaneer 2*, the naval option, not just robbing the RAF of its leading procurement item (its own ‘capital ship’ project) but also getting rid of its last major ‘strategic’ capability – conventional long-range strike – after nuclear strike had already been taken over by the Navy with the purchase of Polaris. To a service whose core justification to existence was understood in terms of its unique strategic strike role this seemed almost akin to declaring war on the existence of a separate air force. This should not be seen as far-fetched – the Templar committee commissioned by the previous government was considering the future of airpower across the three services, its remit including not just interoperability but also the future of the three services’ provision of air power. Forty senior military figures, civil servants and politicians attended the presentation, but there were significant absences, not helped by the presentation

10 Ibid. 11 DEFE 13/346, enclosure 10, Private Office, Navy Minister to Pat Nairne, Head of Central Secretariat, Branch 4 – Naval Policy, 23 November 1964. 12 AIR 8/2355, Quinlan to Elworthy, covering text of aircraft carrier presentation, 6 January 1965. 13 DEFE 13/436, enclosure 16, presentation on carriers, 21 December 1964, p. 25. 46 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic itself being scheduled for the week before Christmas. Lord Shackleton, the Air Force Minister, and Fred Mulley, the Deputy Secretary of State and Army Minister, made their apologies.14 The Navy’s approach, aggressively attacking the RAF’s favoured alternative for the land strike aircraft, was an audacious move, but by placing the F-111 and the carrier/Buccaneer 2* combination in direct competition, it was dramatically raising the temperature of inter-service rivalry even if it might be one of the most effective arguments in favour of building the carrier. The RAF leadership was careful in planning its campaign to cancel the carrier. It not only ensured that its message got to the Secretary of State early and effectively, it deliberately played the early stages of the battle in as unaggressive a manner as possible. Elworthy prevented the Deputy Chief of Air the Staff, Air Marshal Christopher Hartley, the most vocally anti-carrier of his Air Marshals, from attending the naval carrier presentation, despite Hartley being extremely keen to go. Those who did attend were under instruction to ‘sit quiet’ and only correct plain mis-statements of fact, and above all not engage in argument with the Navy.15 The RAF could not afford to look desperate, it must calmly put its case and bide its time. Elworthy and his staff also prepared a five page memo entitled ‘the case against the strike carrier’ – never distributed outside the Air Force Department. It set out in summary the RAF leadership’s key arguments against the carrier programme, and was constantly updated to take account of developments.16 Each version was then distributed to the relevant senior RAF and Air Force Department staff so they were each kept up to date and knew the fundamentals of the RAF case. It ensured that the Air Force Department’s message was consistent and easily at hand, and also helped to ensure a single approach, coordinated from the centre. As will be seen, the naval leadership’s case would never be this coordinated or consistent. The Air Force Department was also adept at obtaining ‘black market’ photocopies of limited distribution notes and memoranda from the Chief of the Defence Staff’s office (after Mountbatten had retired), usually notes destined for Healey.17 A further contrast that might be pointed out is the treatment of middle-ranking staff officers by the two services during the battle for the carrier. A young RAF staff officer in the Defence Planning Staff recalled the difference between his treatment at Air Force Department planning meetings and that of his opposite number in the Navy:

14 DEFE 13/346, enclosure 11, Private Office, Navy Minister to Nairne et al., 30 November 1964. 15 AIR 8/2355, Quinlan to Elworthy, 10 December 1964. 16 See AIR 19/997, Elworthy to Lord Shackleton, Air Force Minister, 26 October 1964; Elworthy to Shackleton 26 November 1964; AIR 20/11561, Quinlan to Vice Chief of the Air Staff 30 March 1965, for examples of early versions of the note. 17 For example: AIR 8/2445, Quinlan to Elworthy covering Luce to Healey 10 September 1965; Healey to Luce ‘Carrier Plan’, 17 September 1965. Emerging from Mountbatten’s Shadow 47

I had a seat at the table [at regular Air Force Department planning meetings]; I rarely felt I had anything useful to contribute, but when I did, I was encouraged to speak up. How different for my naval colleague. At the Navy’s planning meetings he would sit at the back, his brief being to listen and to ensure that the dark blue prevailed. The ‘or else’ was clearly spelt out: ‘if you don’t succeed, do not expect to remain in the Navy’.18

RAF Concessions and Naval Special Treatment

The RAF leadership took the initiative in the new environment of defence austerity, by being the first to make concessions whilst proposing cheaper alternatives that appealed to the Defence Secretary. Despite considerable resistance from the Ministry of Aviation the RAF leadership agreed to the cancellation of the TSR-2 strike aircraft programme, the P.1154 supersonic VSTOL fighter and the HS.681 STOL transport aircraft in favour of the US F-111 strike aircraft, the P.1127 (later the Harrier) and the US Hercules transport.19 By buying US aircraft ‘off the shelf’ rather than the highly expensive, low production-run British developments, Sir Charles Elworthy and the Air Force Board were in effect killing off large elements of what remained of the British military aircraft industry, but the preference for the US-built F-111 appealed to Healey’s instinctive Atlanticism. Buying US equipment was not just cheaper, it was also a way of showing the United Kingdom’s commitment to its military partnership with the United States. As will be seen, Healey’s feeling of indebtedness to the RAF leadership was such that he would fight in cabinet throughout 1967 and January 1968 almost to the last ditch to save the F-111 purchase.20 In contrast the Admiralty Board was giving the impression of not just petty intransigence, but also of demanding and getting special treatment for its programmes and problems. Early attempts to cut expenditure included reviewing the reserves of all three forces, like the RAF and its procurement concessions; the Army leadership had conceded 25 per cent cuts in its reserves, partly in order to save the existence of the Territorial Army, which was then under threat. The RAF also conceded some, albeit token, reductions in its reserves. It was only the Navy that refused to countenance any reduction its reserve forces whatsoever. The Navy Department stated that the bulk of the reserve fleet, consisting of six escorts, 21 coastal minesweepers, one escort maintenance ship and one minesweeper maintenance ship, could not be disposed of without jeopardising the strength of the ‘peacetime active fleet’ due to the roles they played in covering for the active fleet and providing forces for some international exercises. None of the remaining reserve fleet (consisting of 1 cruiser, 10 coastal minesweepers, one escort maintenance ship and six seaward defence boats) could be withdrawn as they had all been recently refitted and

18 Neubroch, ‘The Great Carrier Controversy 1964–65’, p. 65. 19 Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, pp. 80–104. 20 See Chapter 6. 48 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic therefore should be kept in reserve until the end of their useful lives.21 These two statements posed the rather obvious question, that if there was a total of 31 coastal minesweepers in reserve, 21 of which were required to maintain the active fleet and undertake other important roles, and 10 had just been refitted, why not dispose of 10 and ensure that the remaining 21 included all 10 minesweepers that had recently been refitted? The Navy Department by such statements did not give the impression of even attempting to come up with intelligent counter-arguments or concessions to the £2,000m requirement, and if their arguments were justified, even taking any care to explain properly why they were so. The Navy also appeared to be able to obtain special treatment over the other services even when their leadership was proposing air strike interoperability with the RAF. Examples include the procedures of the new Operational Requirements Committee (‘ORC’) of the Ministry of Defence, an important committee made up of representatives of each of the three services, the civilian and the scientific arms of the Ministry. It reviewed the specific operational capabilities laid down for each development project and procurement programme, and was an attempt to bring an inter-service perspective to this matter and was the official forum for the approval of capabilities. The Navy Department had been able to obtain a special arrangement whereby warship designs would not have to be passed to the ORC until much later in the development process than the equipment projects of the other two services.22 As a result the designs were presented to the committee as almost a fait accompli, preventing it from providing the sort of oversight to counter the ‘capabilities creep’ of many defence projects. This concession to the Navy was eventually counter- productive: the grossly over-sized and over-sophisticated Type 82 was put before the ORC when the design process had been ongoing for over four years and what had originally been planned as a mid-priced vessel not too dissimilar in size to the Leander class frigate, ended up more than twice the displacement and more akin to the cruiser-like County class ships.23 This special arrangement was eventually rescinded in 1967, but not before it had caused both inter-service resentment and the building of one ship of the flawed Type 82 design. There was a much wider perception that Mountbatten had, in his many years dominating the Chiefs of Staff, favoured the Navy over the other services. Some of this was exaggerated, but there was much truth in it.24 Mountbatten was an unabashed advocate of the aircraft carrier, opponent of the island strategy and the F-111. His instrumentality in smoothing the way for the Polaris agreement, making the RAF aircraft-delivered nuclear deterrent unnecessary had caused much resentment, and smaller often niggling issues such as the ORC concession and the joint-exercise problem built up into a much wider view that the Navy Department

21 CAB 148/42, OPD (O) (65) 16, Annex 3, Appendix 4: Reserve Forces. 22 DEFE 10/484, OR/M(66)14, item 3 – Naval procedures, 8 November 1966. 23 DEFE 10/457, OR/M(64)12, item 1 – Type 82, 29 July 1964. 24 Jackson and Bramall, The Chiefs, pp. 343–5. Emerging from Mountbatten’s Shadow 49 not just favourably treated, but that this was done in a high-handed manner.25 Mountbatten’s personality – charming, charismatic but also professionally devious – had resulted in a situation where trust was low amongst his professional colleagues.26 It also seems clear that too many years under the protective cloak of Mountbatten had made the naval leadership used to this situation. The ORC and issue remained until 1967, two years after Mountbatten had gone. These attitudes therefore did much to drain any sources of inter-service (and even ministerial) goodwill that might have existed and did little to lessen the resentment of the RAF leadership and to a lesser extent the Army leadership to Mountbatten’s favouritism. Mountbatten’s pervading influence over the Ministry of Defence was also something that Healey quickly became determined to counteract.27

The First Sea Lord

The First Sea Lord, Sir David Luce, therefore had a considerable challenge to maintain cordial relations with the other service chiefs, counteracting some of the distrust that Mountbatten engendered, whilst also fighting hard to put the Navy’s case and retaining the trust of the other Sea Lords and the naval staff. Luce’s own character partly made this difficult to achieve. According to Rear Admiral William O’Brien, the Naval Secretary at the time, Luce was a ‘tall, slender, quiet – almost diffident – submariner’.28 His reserved nature, ‘which prevented him from developing any very close relationships with his fellow Board members, was a disadvantage in the great aircraft carrier controversy’.29 O’Brien was well placed to comment: the role of Naval Secretary had traditionally been that of serviceman-private secretary to the First Lord of the Admiralty. On the abolition of both the Admiralty and the position of First Lord, the Naval Secretary moved under the First Sea Lord but its role and influence was still somewhat undefined. Under the old arrangements the Naval Secretary had managed the patronage element of the First Lord of the Admiralty’s role, but under his new boss O’Brien found that Luce preferred to keep patronage and promotion to himself, not being keen to delegate or ask advice.30 This attitude had important consequences right at the start of Luce’s term as First Sea Lord. As O’Brien as explains:

25 Ibid., pp. 343–4. 26 Healey, Time of My Life, pp. 257–9, Ziegler, Mountbatten, pp. 528, 586. 27 Healey, Time of My Life, p. 258. 28 Royal Naval Museum Manuscript Collection, 2004.48. Unpublished memoirs of Admiral Sir William O’Brien, ‘My Bit of Navy: A Love Story,’ p. 347. 29 Ibid., p. 348. 30 Ibid., p. 347. 50 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

David Luce’s reticence and difficulty in communicating with his brother Board members or other senior officers was the cause of many problems, the most difficult case was that of Sir Richard Smeeton, Flag Officer Naval Air Command, to whom I had written with the sad news that he was not to be promoted to Admiral. Dick Smeeton read this as an affront both to himself and to the Fleet Air Arm and was convinced that it stemmed from the First Sea Lord’s supposed dislike of Smeeton and lack of understanding of naval aviation.31

In fact, at that time the process for promotion to full admiral was ‘simple and moderately democratic’ in that all serving admirals were asked to vote on all vice admirals when positions arose and place them in order of promotion. Smeeton was fourth on the list when three positions were available.32 Luce refused to explain the system to Smeeton, and nor did he allow O’Brien or anyone else to do so. As a result, Smeeton and important elements of the Fleet Air Arm hierarchy believed that Luce had blocked the promotion due to anti- naval aviation bias. This incident at the start of Luce’s period of office cannot have engendered trust with the one group of officers the First Sea Lord needed to have fully behind him if he was to ensure that the carrier programme was successfully defended in the defence review. Luce’s character is one of the keys to understanding both why the Admiralty Board was so prone to disagreement and often unable to find a common approach as the battle for CVA-01 intensified and perhaps why opportunities that presented themselves to the naval leadership were seemingly never grasped.

Mountbatten’s Influence over the Chiefs of Staff Structure

Mountbatten had been the guiding architect of the unification of the four defence ministries, and if centralisation had gone further with the ‘functionalisation’ of major areas, his influence and control would have been even greater. Mountbatten as Chief of the Defence Staff had considerable influence over the judgements and position of the Chiefs of Staff as a whole. The Chiefs of Staff consisted of Mountbatten and the three service chiefs. In coming to decisions, however, Mountbatten had the casting vote: it only needed Mountbatten and one other chief to outvote the other two. Mountbatten also had considerable influence over the writing of defence policy analysis in the Ministry. Since the creation of the Defence Planning Staff, which reported direct to the Chiefs of Staff, most bi- or tri-service studies had been commissioned by this body via the Chiefs of Staff.33 The DPS was theoretically unbiased by single-service considerations, but was small and therefore relied on much analysis and legwork from the service

31 Ibid., p. 348. 32 Ibid., p. 348. 33 See Defence Planning Staff reports in DEFE 6. Emerging from Mountbatten’s Shadow 51 departments; in collating and shaping the final reports it had considerable influence over any debates that ensued.34 The Head of Defence Plans, a serviceman, reported direct to the Chief of the Defence Staff. In 1964 and much of 1965 he was Dunbar-Nasmith RN, and mirroring the Chiefs he had three service Heads of Plans reporting to him. Like the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Head of Defence Plans had the casting vote and therefore, in concert with only one other service Head of Plans, could largely determine the conclusions and outcomes of studies. In this environment, Mountbatten as Chief of the Defence Staff therefore had, in many circumstances, control over not just the official conclusions of the Chiefs, but also, with a naval officer as Head of Defence Plans, strong influence over the conclusions of DPS studies. Even by November 1964, the inter-service acrimony over the carrier had resulted in the removal of all three members of the D (Overall Strategy) Team from the Planning Staff, after the naval and air members were no longer on speaking terms with each other.35 Mountbatten had few scruples about using his power to shape the collective view of the Chiefs of Staff and his influence over the Defence Planning Staff. Meanwhile the civilian element had difficulty directly contradicting what were officially the collective views of the government’s professional military advisers. Regarding purely military matters it was the Defence Planning Staff, not the civilian central Secretariat, that had the responsibility for analysing matters of a military nature.36 In addition, if there were a clear and public difference of opinion between the collective assessment of the Chiefs and the civilian side of the Ministry this would have been uncomfortable for both Healey and Hardman and an indication that they were not in control of either the Defence Review or their new and large department.

The 1st Intervention Study

For the first major study of the Defence Review, Mountbatten did not hesitate to use his powers to determine as much of the assessment as he could to help the case for the carrier. In December 1964 the Chiefs were, at the behest of the Oversea Policy and Defence Committee of the Cabinet, asked to produce a study into the military implications of reducing the ability to ‘intervene’ overseas. The Defence Planning Staff undertook the work on behalf of the Chiefs. British overseas intervention policy was based on the principles set out in a paper endorsed by the

34 Neubroch, ‘Recollections’, pp. 63–4. 35 Ibid., p. 63. 36 See AIR 20/11561, Assistant Under-Secretary (Programmes and Budgets) to Hardman, 8 April 1965 (also copy in DEFE 69/481) for the distance that civil servants were aware that they should keep from military policy decision-making. However, what comes through in this note is AUS (P&B)’s scepticism of the Naval leadership’s arguments in favour of the carrier. 52 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Chiefs of Staff at the beginning of 1962 (in CoS (62) 1); one of the key principles of the 1962 paper was the primary justification for the aircraft carrier, namely the need to intervene independently by assault ashore against an organised opposition with sophisticated weaponry. This requirement was the primary plank on which the carrier had been justified. The intervention study requested by the Cabinet Committee investigated implications of the removal of this ability to intervene by assault against organised opposition with sophisticated weapons, resulting in British forces only being capable of intervening at the request of friendly governments against ‘lightly armed and unorganised’ forces. These new categories essentially provided tighter and more explicit definitions than had been given in 1962, whilst also taking a further step in that any intervention where points of entry were controlled by the enemy, Britain would not operate without allied support.37 In short, it investigated removal of the core operational justification for the aircraft carrier. The writing of the intervention study rapidly became fraught. Viewing the internal Ministry battles from outside, Treasury officials saw this as a confrontation between the military and the civilian sides of the new Ministry, in fact the picture, as we shall see, was more complicated than that.38 By early February, with the study nearing completion, it appeared clear from the conclusions of a Chiefs of Staff meeting on 4 February that collectively the Chiefs were opposed to this proposed downgrading of the overseas capability. For a number of the Chiefs of Staff the problem of too many commitments and too few resources to deal with them properly was of paramount importance. The Chiefs, in discussing the various studies under preparation, requested that account be taken of the need to consult with the political departments about the necessity of cutting commitments as a result of the capability cuts implied by the terms of reference of the intervention study.39 In discussion an (anonymous) chief noted that ‘no further minor reductions or parings of the planned force levels [ie those set out by the Chiefs of Staff in CoS (62)1] were possible. There was no intermediate option. This was not a hypothesis to be tested but a fact to be faced’.40 This emphatic statement, even if it had been made by neither of the Naval Chiefs (Mountbatten or Luce), chimed well with their positions. It directly linked the commitments issue with that of intervention, and made clear that any downgrading of the intervention capability, although it would in theory mean the maintenance of political agreements with allies such as Malaysia, Kuwait and Libya, would in practice make fulfilling commitments to such states almost impossible and probably counter-productive.

37 DEFE 4/181, Chiefs of Staff Minutes, CoS (65) 9, 16 February 1965. 38 Treasury files show that internal MoD drafts of reports were obtained without the direct consent of the MoD: T 225/2600 memo to Sir R. Clarke, 9 March 1965; it states that the draft was obtained ‘sub rosa’. 39 DEFE 4/180, CoS(65)7, 4 February 1965, item 2. 40 Ibid., item 4. Emerging from Mountbatten’s Shadow 53

Over the next month, the Chiefs collectively made it clear that they saw the terms of reference of the intervention study, and the probable downgrading of the intervention capability and therefore the need for carriers that it implied, as an ‘artificial hypothesis’.41 At a Chiefs meeting chaired by Luce, the Chief of Naval Staff reiterated the ‘artificial hypothesis’ charge and noted that the ‘lightly armed and unorganised’ scenario was a highly unlikely one.42 It therefore seemed that the Chiefs were unanimous on this point, but under the placid surface implied by the Chiefs of Staff minutes, there were considerable tensions between the three services. The Chief of the General Staff, General Hull, raised in an informal meeting of the Chiefs the issue of a disagreement within the Defence Planning Staff. The Director of Naval Plans had inserted into the proposed terms of reference without the knowledge or consent of the Directors of Army and Air Force plans, the proviso that in intervention operations, opposition from an organised enemy with sophisticated weapons might develop after an initial unopposed landing.43 This, on the surface, rather minor disagreement, actually showed that the apparently unified front of the three services in favour ofthe carrier was in fact far from the truth. The insertion in effect strengthened the case for a carrier: the need for which would be that much greater if it were assumed that landing a force would face concerted opposition soon after it landed and for which the carrier’s strike aircraft would be best placed counter. What is more significant is that the Army and RAF directors of plans opposed this insertion, and the Chief of the General Staff and Chief of Air the Staff also disagreed with it. They, in effect, had no objection to a study based on the suppositions, handed down by the Oversea and Defence Policy Committee that in effect undermined CoS (62)1. This directly contradicted the tenor of the Chiefs of Staff meeting in February and the intervention report itself in which it appeared that the Chiefs as a whole opposed the dropping of CoS (62)1. In response to the protests from the Chiefs of General and Air Staff, Mountbatten concluded that he was ‘opposed to giving too rigid direction to the Planners’ and that he ‘felt it important that the paper should indicate the effect of enemy opposition developing earlier’.44 In other words the Director of Naval Plans would get his way, even though only one of the three services supported the inclusion of this new sentence in the terms of reference. This was solely due to the ability of Lord Mountbatten, as the fourth and chairing member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, to cast his vote directly in favour of his service’s interests, and within the DPS the parallel ability of Dunbar-Nasmith to cast his vote in favour of his service’s interests as well. The Elworthy’s office was particularly indignant about the poisonous atmosphere

41 DEFE 4/181, CoS(65)9, 16 February 1965, item 1. 42 DEFE 4/182, CoS(65)11, 2 March 1965, item 1. 43 Annex to CoS(65)7 4/2/65 DEFE 32/10, enclosure 14. 44 Ibid. 54 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic within the Defence Planning Staff. The ‘present state of affairs … is in my view profoundly harmful’, stated Quinlan.45 It is particularly notable that the Army, who presumably would be providing most of the troops for such interventions, did not even at this early stage believe that CoS (62)1 could be supported. The nature of Chiefs of Staff Committee had hidden the real divisions, and it also partially hid the ability of the Chief of the Defence Staff, Lord Mountbatten, to ensure that the Chiefs followed his preferred option.

The Civilian Side of the Ministry of Defence Responds to the Navy

The refusal of the Chiefs (in reality just Mountbatten and Luce) to even be prepared to investigate the intervention question asked by the Oversea Policy and Defence Committee exasperated Henry Hardman the Permanent Secretary,46 not least because it gave the impression that the new department was intransigent to such an extent that it even refused to address questions, let alone consider changes to policy or strategy. As will be seen, Hardman’s scepticism of the Navy’s case for the carrier programme, as it stood, was mounting, probably not least because the new functional costings had revealed in November that the cost of the carrier programme (both building and operating the vessels) over the next 10 years to be £1,400m rather than the £600–700m propounded by the Navy Department.47 Early requests for information from Healey suggest that his initial response was that the carrier was too expensive: the Secretary of State asked about alternative sizes or types of carrier, including smaller vessels or unsophisticated ‘platform’ carriers.48 Hardman was emphatic, however, and directly linked the carrier with the world role. In his note Hardman linked the need for the carrier programme with Britain’s total strategic capabilities and world role. He stated that, if the need to intervene alone against well-armed enemies was justified, then ‘given this need, it is hard to fault the case for a substantial carrier force’. Hardman, however, then went on to make it clear that he was not convinced that the carrier force as then planned would be up to the task. Hardman rehearsed what had been ascertained over the last few months and years: first, that only a force of four carriers would provide the minimum necessary force of two vessels permanently east of Suez, but

45 AIR 8/2355, Quinlan to AUS(AS), 11 February 1965. 46 DEFE 13/436, enclosure 25, Hardman to Healey, 26 February 1965. 47 DEFE 10/510, DC/P (64) 28, 5 November 1964, for overall results of functional costings exercise; see AIR 19/997 two versions of the ‘Case Against the Strike Carrier’ paper dated 26 October 1964 and 26 November 1964. The costs of the carrier programme change from £700m in the former to £1,405m in the latter. 48 DEFE 13/346, enclosure 7, Hardman to Healey, 20 November 1964, and enclosure 25, Hardman to Healey, 26 February 1965. Emerging from Mountbatten’s Shadow 55 that it had been accepted by the Navy that a force of only three carriers could be afforded or properly manned. Second, that according to the Navy Department, the 50,000 ton carrier design being developed at present was the cheapest and most cost-effective available: a smaller carrier would mean a disproportionately larger reduction in intervention capability, whilst a basic ‘floating aircraft platform’ would be impractical and end up as nothing of the sort. Hardman’s line was therefore harder than Healey’s: the latter at least being willing to consider the practicality of cheaper or smaller carriers. The Air Force Department managed to get hold of a copy, and were cautiously optimistic. Hardman’s approach seemed to Frank Cooper, the Air Staff Assistant Under-Secretary, to be ‘a rather different one from that which have usually been discussed. At least the partial reason for this is to try and persuade the Navy themselves to think more constructively than has been the case in the past’.49 By setting out the two sides of the coin, as he saw them, and within the context of the commitment to reduce defence spending to £2,000m by 1969/70, the clear implication of Hardman’s argument was that the United Kingdom did not have the monetary and manpower resources either to create or maintain an adequate carrier force, and therefore by extension to operate its current global military strategy. As a result, if this ability to intervene alone was dropped, the justification for the carriers was therefore much weaker, thus paving the way for their cancellation and the reduction in defence spending by just under £2,000m in the key year of 1969/70. Hardman then proposed that two studies should be commissioned to set alongside the stalled intervention study. A quick ‘coordinating’ study would bring together the conclusions of other work being undertaken in the Ministry of Defence with the existing intervention study. The second study would evaluate the need for carrier based airpower to provide the fleet’s maritime airpower needs, analysing the extent to which land-based airpower could provide such needs. A final study, which in the event was not commissioned until mid April, would analyse the threat to shipping posed by enemy aircraft and ships and the role of carrier based aircraft in defeating that threat. Healey agreed and approved the launch of the studies. Although Hardman described the first study as being done ‘by the Navy’, he in fact set up a working group with a mixed membership from across the Ministry of Defence, only two of whom were in fact from the Royal Navy: the chair, Hopkins, the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff, and the Head of Naval Plans. This had the effect of not only tempering the naval voice in the paper, but also created a precedent for civilian involvement in defence policy analyses.50 Another significant development was the appointment of Pat Nairne as Healey’s private secretary. Nairne, gamekeeper now turned poacher, had been one of the most effective civil servants involved in fighting the case for the carrier, his skills and knowledge of the Navy and the naval leadership’s arguments both

49 DEFE 13/436, enclosure 25, Hardman to Healey, 26 February 1965. 50 DEFE 13/436, enclosure 25, Healey to Luce, 5 March 19. 56 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic gave Healey valuable support and robbed the Navy Department of an important advocate. Nairne himself recalls one of his roles being to prevent Mountbatten calling on Healey unannounced, a task he seems to have been successful in undertaking.51

The Coordinating Study

The coordinating study, as envisaged by Hardman, would force the Navy Department to recognise work undertaken within other parts of the Ministry of Defence, but in the event it was hijacked completely by Mountbatten. Ironically the conclusions of the intervention study would end up being less pro-carrier than the coordinating study’s. When the coordinating study was produced it baldly stated that the circumstances for intervention should still be based upon the Chiefs paper of 1962 and that the concept of functional costing was invalid when most defence equipment had a multi-role capability, but it could not alter the findings of the intervention study itself, which were stark.52 The intervention study had analysed two theoretical cases. Case A, which assumed the ability to intervene against only an unorganised enemy with unsophisticated weapons (with the Director of Defence Planning’s proviso that sophisticated opposition might develop later on), made clear that the Parachute Brigade (except one battalion), the Royal Marines, all commando ships, assault ships and aircraft carriers (in their intervention role) would not be needed as part of the inventory of British armed forces.53 In response to this clear statement the coordinating study asserted that ‘since [it is] militarily unsound to plan on anything less than the retention of an ability to withstand early attack, when intervening against sophisticated opposition, the hypothesis, on which the reduction under Case A of an intervention capability is based, is unrealistic and there would be no savings’.54 In effect, the coordinating study rejected Case A out of hand, stating that Case B was the only feasible option out of the two. Case B assumed that the United Kingdom would only intervene at the request of friendly governments against ‘lightly armed unorganised opposition’. This time, what would be needed was listed: 1 brigade of commandos and/or paratroopers, airlift capability, a commando ship, unsophisticated close support and reconnaissance aircraft (perhaps flown from the commando ship), assault ships (or logistic landing ships), frigates and patrol vessels.55 What was conspicuous by

51 Telephone interview with Sir Patrick Nairne, 20 August 2006. 52 CAB 148/42, Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee, OPD(O)(65)16, 18 March 1965, Annex 3, p. 2, paras 19–20. 53 CAB 148/42, OPD(O)(65)16, 18 March 1965, Annex 3, Appendix 12. 54 Ibid., Annex 3, p. 20. 55 Ibid., Annex 3, Appendix 12. Emerging from Mountbatten’s Shadow 57 its absence was an aircraft carrier. The need for ‘unsophisticated close support and reconnaissance aircraft’ did not appear to be a strong basis on which to justify building CVA-01. Although by emphasising what would be needed in Case B, the stark statement that an aircraft carrier would not required at all was avoided. The result from the Navy’s point of view was only a little better than Case A: but at least the amphibious capability would be retained. Even Case B was considered to have considerable military and political implications. The coordinating study stated that if Case B were accepted the UK would no longer be able to deter even minor powers with sophisticated weapons (and that in four or five years’ time there might not exist any minor powers that did not have sophisticated weaponry implying that almost all the British military presence east of Suez would be worthless), that commitments to Kuwait, Libya and SEATO could not be kept and nor could joint US–UK intervention plans east of Suez be carried out.56 The coordinating study was unequivocal: policy implications would be a loss of confidence in the UK by the Commonwealth and allies, it would affect Britain’s worldwide standing, its ability to re-enforce any areas worldwide and finally its ability to protect Britain’s merchant shipping at sea. To conclude, the coordinating study stated that ‘we have shown that it would be militarily unsound and politically inadvisable to seek large-scale reductions in our force levels East of Suez’, that there were very few savings to be had in the Mediterranean and also that it was ‘inadvisable’ to abandon Cyprus or end agreements with Libya and Kuwait.57 This was incredibly strong language, and came extremely close to trying to forbid civilian politicians from reducing defence spending in a particular theatre. As was noted by a Treasury official reviewing the coordinating study, it appeared that the Chiefs were refusing ‘to contemplate any change in our role East of Suez’.58 Perhaps Mountbatten had gone too far; it was not the military’s place to advise on political matters, let alone in such strident tones. Possibly by coincidence, two days after the memorandum had been passed to the Permanent Secretaries of the Official Committee, Harold Wilson offered Mountbatten to lead a mission investigating immigration to the United Kingdom from the Commonwealth.59 This was an area which Mountbatten had little previous expertise, and given the issue in question, a potentially controversial one. Mountbatten’s biographer attributes his, on the surface surprising, decision to accept such an unusual commission to the ‘frustration he was enduring in Whitehall’ referring to the problems he was encountering in trying to press through functional centralisation of the Ministry of Defence. He also notes that Healey wrote to the Chief of the Defence Staff encouraging him to take up the position. However, the results of the intervention study, and the realisation that support for the carrier programme was increasingly

56 Ibid., Annex 3, pp. 21–2. 57 Ibid. 58 T 225/2600, Downey to Bell, 11 March 1965. 59 Zeigler, Mountbatten, pp. 633–5. 58 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic difficult to find beyond the Navy Department, could also have been important in reaching this decision. From 9 February to 1 June Mountbatten would attend only 3 of the 21 Chiefs of Staff meetings held.60 His last Chiefs meeting was on 13 July by which time his power had ebbed away completely; Mountbatten now more concerned with securing his legacy and arranging, in considerable detail, his own departure.61

The ‘Divide and Rule’ Approach to Defence Economies?

The Treasury, observing the battle within the Ministry of Defence, realised that obtaining the £400m cuts by 1969–70 would not be straightforward, and that a more concerted strategy would be necessary to encourage the Ministry to reduce spending. The struggle just to expose the Navy Department’s carrier costings figures to central Ministry of Defence let alone Treasury scrutiny was proving difficult enough, the Navy Department steadfastly sticking to its estimate of £1,280m over 10 years for the whole programme, in defiance of the centrally calculated £1,405m from the functional costings process.62 Either way, it was double the figure – which had probably excluded operating costs – calculated by the Navy Department that had been currency within the Ministry of Defence until November.63 Richard (‘Otto’) Clarke, the influential Second Secretary at the Treasury suggested to William Armstrong, the Permanent Under-Secretary, two possible approaches to reducing expenditure: either attack the whole British defence commitment east of Suez directly and persuade ministers to drop the international role, or attack different expenditures ‘piecemeal’ until the budget could be fitted within the £2,000m target for 1969–70. Clarke argued that the second option would have most chance of success with ministers, given the substantial defence needs of the Indonesian Confrontation, and the impact on allies in that conflict if the United Kingdom announced a withdrawal from the region. In assessing the different expenditures, Clarke concentrated on the major procurement programmes. He also noted that the planned expenditure on the carrier programme and its aircraft had the unfortunate – for the Navy – coincidence of peaking at nearly £200m in 1969– 70, the year in which the Ministry of Defence needed to reach the magic £2,000m

60 DEFE 4/181–5. 61 See DEFE 23/25 for the elaborate arrangements for Mountbatten’s retirement. 62 For resistance to costings see: T 225/1599, folio 97, Downey to Nicholls 23 February 1965, for Navy Department estimate see DEFE 13/436, enclosure 19, ‘Costings of the Carrier Force’ covered by Hockaday to Bancroft, 27 January 1965. The £1,280m figure first emerged in the Navy Department’s response to a series of questions on the carrier programme asked by George Wigg, the Paymaster General. See AIR 8/2355 ‘Answers to Paymaster General’s Questions’ Private Secretary to Navy Minister, 14 December 1964. 63 AIR 19/997, ‘Case against the Strike Carrier’, 26 October 1964. Emerging from Mountbatten’s Shadow 59 figure.64 As the cancellation of the TSR-2 and the other aircraft procurement programmes given up by the RAF had reduced expenditure in that year down to £2,225m the cancellation of the carrier would come very close to closing the gap in one stroke.65 Aware of the splits within the Ministry of Defence over the carrier issue, the Treasury knew that they were much more likely to achieve their aims by concentrating on a single procurement item, rather than an approach of ‘equal pain’ for each service which would only serve to unite the three Chiefs against the Treasury. As will be seen, from this point on, the ‘Clarke approach’ defined the Treasury’s strategy for dealing with the Ministry of Defence in squeezing it for defence cuts over the next three years: cutting out each procurement programme at a time, rather than pressing outright for a strategic reorientation, although in the long term the former would probably, and in the end did help, result in the latter. In short, despite the strong support for keeping commitments East of Suez from the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for Defence, the Treasury used the defence cuts between 1964 and 1968 in such a way to ensure that those commitments could not be maintained – with respect to East of Suez the Treasury was following its own foreign and defence policy. To place pressure on the Ministry, the Treasury imposed a freeze on approving any new major expenditure items. The greatest sufferer of the freeze perhaps not co-incidentally was the Navy’s Leander frigate programme, three ships of which would need to be ordered each year to maintain escort numbers in the fleet.66 Unlike orders of other equipment, such as say, aircraft, tanks or rifles which would be ordered and approved by the Treasury in batches of maybe hundreds or thousands, each major warship was approved by the Treasury singly or perhaps in pairs. In the end the length of the Defence Review meant that there was almost a gap of a year before the next order of a Leander class frigate was placed.67 Although the Treasury was consciously adopting a ‘divide and rule’ approach to the defence review, was this also the politicians’ strategy as Peden has suggested?68 There is no direct evidence that this was consciously adopted by Healey, but the effect was the same, in that following the cancellation of the TSR-2 he gave his unswerving support for the F-111, the RAF leadership’s chosen aircraft and very soon saw the carrier as the prime target for cancellation. The impact of ‘divide and rule’ was not lost on the professional heads of the three services, not least the Chief of the General Staff, whose relatively neutral position as regards the carrier was

64 T 225/2600, folio 122C, Clarke to Armstrong, 12 March 1965. 65 T 225/2599, folio 76, Downey to Nicholls 10 February 1965. 66 DEFE 13/436, enclosure 26, Christopher Mayhew, Navy Minister to Chief Secretary to the Treasury, 23 March 1965. 67 The next warships to be ordered were FSA 36 (Bacchante) and 37 (Scylla) in January 1966, approved by Treasury September 1965: DEFE 13/436, enclosures 50 and 51, Redman to Bell, 19 August 1965 and Bell to Redman, 2 September 1965. 68 Peden, Arms, p. 279. 60 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic counteracted by the realisation that if the carrier was not cancelled the economies would have to be found elsewhere and that as a result the Army would come under renewed pressure to cut expenditure.69

The Maritime Airpower Study

This study, launched by Healey and Hardman in early March as a result of Hardman’s note, started a trend that would be followed for most analyses of the carrier during the defence review: it had to be completed in a very short time frame, in this instance only one month.70 It would be chaired by the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Frank Hopkins, regarded by Elworthy’s office as the leading advocate of the carrier within the naval leadership, but its membership was cross-ministry, including representatives from the other services, the civilian staff and the Chief Scientific Adviser’s Office.71 The terms of reference required the Study Group to compare the ability of sea-based or land-based aircraft to perform ‘purely maritime operations’.72 This was defined as ‘maritime tactical reconnaissance, surveillance, probe, identification, early warning, the destruction of enemy reconnaissance and jamming aircraft, and defence against missiles’.73 The RAF leadership were worried about the outcome of any such report: the Navy’s leading advocate was in the chair and the splitting of the maritime role of carriers into a separate study would not aid the RAF’s case. They felt on stronger ground challenging the intervention role, and therefore preferred to have the two roles studied together.74 Things appeared to go from bad to worse for the RAF leadership when it became clear how Hopkins wanted to proceed. Rather than commissioning individual detailed scenarios, which would have favoured the RAF, by allowing the allocation of a limited number of the different (and specialised) aircraft at the RAF’s disposal, Hopkins preferred a more general ‘model’ approach to the studies. Picking two broad areas, the Far East and Tanzania, Hopkins wanted to evaluate a ‘gross estimate’ of what capabilities the carrier force would have, and then work towards a ‘net estimate’ by subtracting any contributions land- based air power could provide. The naval leadership publicly argued that there were too many variables in a strategic situation than to allow the most general of assessments.75 It was also the fact that the flexible and multi-role capabilities of the carrier would be most likely to shine when not restrained within limited scenarios.

69 DEFE 32/10, enclosure 32, CoS (informal meeting), 5 August 1965. 70 See above, pp. 54–5. 71 AIR 8/2355, Quinlan to Frank Cooper (Assistant Under-Secretary, Air Staff), 11 February 1965; AIR 20/11561, Minutes of Aircraft Carrier Study Group, 19 March 1965. 72 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 1, Healey to Luce, Annex A, 5 March 1965. 73 Ibid. 74 AIR 8/2355, Quinlan to Frank Cooper, 11 February 1965. 75 Ibid. Emerging from Mountbatten’s Shadow 61

The Air Force Department representative initially refused, but eventually acquiesced and the report was finally produced in early April with a separate section written by the Air Staffs, as requested by the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff setting out the military and financial implications of using land-based air power in the maritime role. What should have been a victory for the naval leadership, as had been feared by Elworthy’s office, in was in fact the opposite. Hopkins’ chairmanship had been seen as unbalanced and clearly partisan to the civil servants attending and this had made its way back to Hardman.76 In addition, the Air Staff paper on land-based air power, which Admiral Hopkins had commissioned from the Air Force Department, came to the not unexpected conclusions that this could be done for only additional £100m RAF expenditure and that there were few maritime tasks that land-based air power could not do.77 In effect, Hopkins had subcontracted the most important part of his report to the people least likely to produce an outcome to which he would have approved. The working party did, however, manage to extract from the RAF representative that the effectiveness of a combat air patrol of land-based aircraft beyond 400 nautical miles began to reduce.78 As a result, the basic conclusion was equivocal, but it was definitely not what the Navy had wanted or hoped for: ‘the broad conclusion of the study is that … fixed wing carriers may not be indispensable for purely maritime tasks’.79 There were many caveats and the detail of the report raised a large number of broader questions. The paper examined the following areas: the maritime tasks ‘for which reliance is now placed on fixed wing aircraft’; the ‘military and financial implications of relying solely on land-based aircraft for these [maritime] tasks’; and finally if there were no sea-borne fixed wing aircraft and land-based aircraft were put to ‘best use’ on maritime tasks, what would be the monetary and timescale implications regarding alternative naval weapon systems.80 The study included a ‘theoretical analysis’ of the ability of land-based aircraft to replace the role of sea-borne aircraft in the maritime role.81 This was based on just the maritime role requirements (that is, excluding the troop intervention and airborne intervention ashore) of the two ‘model’ situations. The analysis confirmed that land-based aircraft could undertake the roles of reconnaissance and surface strike effectively, but that air defence would be limited by the radius of action of RAF aircraft types, resulting in a need for additional in-flight refuelling aircraft. The East African model posed no problems for land-based aircraft (assuming development of an air base at Aldabra in the

76 AIR 20/11561, Assistant Under-Secretary (Programmes and Budget) to Hardman, 8 April 1965. 77 AIR 20/11561, Report by joint service group ACSG (P) 8, undated. 78 AIR 20/11561, Aircraft carrier study group 5th meeting, 31 March 1965. 79 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 1, Hopkins to Luce, 8 April 1965. 80 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 1, Report by Joint Service Group, section II. 81 Ibid., section V. 62 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Indian Ocean), though there were a few limitations relating to a postulated Far East scenario. These were, first, that the study had assumed that all available air bases had the facilities available to mount major operations using the full range of modern aircraft, and second it was concluded that ‘the operational efficiency of land-based fighters at their extreme ranges is uncertain and would require further examination’.82 Both these limitations were potentially very significant. As will be seen, the first assumption proved to be incorrect and the second contentious. The next section followed up the theoretical analysis with a review of the needs for the Navy if it did not have aircraft carriers. This was where the differences between the RAF and the Navy positions began to be made explicit. The Navy believed that 400 nautical miles was the maximum effective radius of land-based aircraft, whilst the RAF placed this at 900 nautical miles.83 As the Navy did not believe that land-based air cover would be effective over more than 400 nautical miles, they held that between a distance of 400 and 900 nautical miles from air bases the fleet, depending on land-based air defence, would be vulnerable to air-, surface- and submarine-launched missile attack, if the Navy did not have its own weapons to counter the threat.84 The possibility of developing short- and long-range surface-to-surface anti- ship missile systems was put forward, but it was estimated that it would take 10– 20 years to develop such systems from a standing start, leaving a gap between the possible retirement of aircraft carriers and the introduction of the new anti-ship missile systems. In addition, the Navy believed that the cost of new ships with new missile systems to replace sea-based air power would cost between £350m and £650 m, and therefore would not be economically worthwhile to develop. In effect, this was a fleshing out of Nairne’s argument sketched out in November 1964: missiles might eventually replace carrier aircraft, but not yet and in any case would probably be prohibitively expensive. The next two sections made clear that the current RAF frontline forces had no margin above those required for treaty commitments and contingencies, and that if there were multiple demands on RAF aircraft the Navy should ‘be able to rely on land-based aircraft for maritime operations whenever and wherever they might be required: the maritime requirement would have to be given equal priority with all others’.85 Additional aircraft were therefore requested including 8 F-111s, 32 Phantoms and 6 Victor tankers at a cost of £100m. The difficulties of drafting the report can be seen in paragraphs that doubted the availability of shore- based airfields (a Navy concern), were followed by rebuttals that island air bases were being developed and that US might contribute 50 per cent of costs (an RAF counter-argument).86

82 Ibid., section V. 83 Ibid., section V. 84 Ibid., section VI. 85 Ibid., section VII. 86 Ibid., section VII. Emerging from Mountbatten’s Shadow 63

The report again brought up the inability of a three-carrier force to guarantee two carriers east of Suez, the limited aircraft capacity of carriers compared to land bases, and limited speed and endurance of carriers.87 As if in answer, succeeding sections pointed out the need to maintain the operational flexibility carriers provided and the political vulnerability of relying on land bases in foreign territory. Sections of the report even looked ahead to a future in which the logistic support of island bases would be provided by submarines and aircraft rather than ships.88 The results of the study landed blows on both the carrier concept and the concept being put forward by the RAF leadership in lieu of the carrier programme: the island strategy. This report was the first time the island strategy had been properly enunciated within the Ministry of Defence since the Labour government had come to power, and unlike previous assessments of the island strategy under the Conservative government, it appeared to gain the upper hand in the succession of arguments and counter-arguments, and the overall conclusions of the study appeared to favour the island strategy, if only by default.89 Although the RAF leadership could be pleased that a potentially treacherous situation had been retrieved, Elworthy knew where the key weakness in the RAF case lay: the assertion that land-based aircraft could operate effectively with warships at 900 nautical miles range – there were doubts about command and control and crew fatigue, and the concept was untried. He was briefed prior to the Chiefs of Staff meeting to discuss the study, to avoid at all costs a decision to commission of a study on the subject from the Defence Operational Analysis Establishment at Byfleet as it ‘might not be in the best interests of the RAF’.90 RAF representation at Byfleet was still low, and if the issue was raised Elworthy was advised to state that a DOAE study would take too long and that the Air Force Department had already produced a large number of studies on the area.91 In the event, no request for such a study was put – by Luce, Mountbatten or by Zuckerman. Luce was not pleased that his leading advocate for the carrier had failed to keep control of his working group and saw the report as ‘highly controversial’; the Chief of General Staff declared that ‘it was not a paper on which any conclusion should reached in isolation’.92 Zuckerman, also present,

87 Ibid., section VII. 88 Ibid., section IX. 89 AIR 8/2354, Report: ‘Comparison of land-based and carrier-borne force capabilities in limited war 1970–80’, Chief Scientific Adviser, Air Ministry, February 1963. 90 AIR 20/11561, Brief for Elworthy for CoS meeting, 12 April 1965. 91 Ibid. 92 DEFE 4/183, CoS(65)19 item 2A, Report by Joint Study Group, 13 April 1965. No DOAE study was actually commissioned until November 1965 – by which time the RAF staff so controlled the debate that they drafted the terms of reference. The study, analysing the use of land-based aircraft to support maritime operations and to ‘facilitate subsequent costing’ was to last six months – by which time CVA-01 had been cancelled. See AIR 8/2426 appendix to OASD/P(65) 4, 30 November 1965. 64 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic concurred that it was ‘stimulating but extremely theoretical’ and had doubts about the assumptions made on the viability of overseas airfields as staging posts. Mountbatten finally concluded that no conclusions could be drawn. Elworthy had managed to escape unscathed. Hardman, who was also present, was not convinced by the Navy’s assertion that over £650m might be needed in expenditure on naval equipment to replace carrier air power in the maritime role. He requested a study into the threat posed to shipping, to probe whether such a threat required such a high level of expenditure. Mountbatten meekly agreed.93 Perhaps sensing that he was on weak ground Luce tried to have this study either postponed or cancelled, but was unable to achieve either.94

The Threat to Shipping Study

The civil servant member of DCNS’s group was adamant that any future committees should not be chaired by members of the ‘interested services’.95 As a result, Hardman ensured that the Threat the Shipping Study Group was chaired by a civilian Deputy Under-Secretary with only one naval and one RAF member counterbalanced by three Army members. The Joint Service Team underneath the new Study Group, although led by Captain Mansfield RN, the Director of Naval Plans, had five Air Force Department, three Navy Department and four central Secretariat members.96 DCNS’s perceived overt partisanship during the maritime airpower study, in stark contrast to Elworthy’s ‘sit quiet’ strategy and deliberate reining in of his strongest anti-carrier advocates, had resulted in a situation where the naval voice in the working groups was lessened considerably. The study, after another month of inter-service acrimony, effectively concluded that the threat to shipping was slight in the scenarios studied. The study had modified the conclusions of the maritime study, for the worse from the Navy’s perspective. Four situations were analysed: (A) the threat with existing bases, (B) with no bases outside Europe at all, (C) with no Aden or Singapore bases but with island bases and , and (D) with no Aden but with Singapore, islands and Australia. The conclusion was that in all situations except (B) RAF land-based maritime Comets and F-111 strike aircraft would be within range of most of the relevant sea areas east of Suez. Situation (B) was dismissed as a situation in which Britain’s foreign policy would be completely different and where the UK ‘would avoid situations in which a prolonged threat to her shipping would arise unless she had the support of her allies’.97

93 Ibid. 94 DEFE 4/184, CoS(65)20, item 1B, 22 April 1965. 95 AIR 20/11561, AUS(P&B) to Hardman, 8 April 1965. 96 AIR 20/11561, Threat to Shipping Study Working Group meeting, 6 May 1965. 97 AIR 20/11561, Threat to Shipping Study, Working Group Report TSWG/P(65)5 final; and DEFE 4/185, CoS(65)26, 21 May 1965, item 2. Emerging from Mountbatten’s Shadow 65

Even though the conclusions were watered down, they still implied that much of the maritime role – defending vessels against enemy warships or aircraft – was one for which there was not a great threat, and this was reinforced by Elworthy in the Chiefs of Staffs meeting that considered the report: ‘the threat to shipping was small and then only existed in certain specific places’.98 Even though the Navy questioned the validity of the assumptions of the study, not least the RAF assumption that its aircraft had an effective radius of 900 nautical miles, this did not prevent the Chiefs, with Mountbatten present, accepting its conclusions. The Navy had the difficult task of attempting to justify the carrier whilst also suggesting that an alternative in the maritime role – the long-range surface-to- surface guided missile – was not a feasible option. All that the Navy could say was that such weapons, although much cheaper to develop than the carriers and also to become available at about the same point as the existing carrier fleet was withdrawn, were ‘hardly justifiable’ without clearly answering why this was the case when new carriers were considered very justifiable by the Navy Department.99 The net was tightening around the carrier.

The 2nd and 3rd Intervention Studies and Mountbatten’s Final Humiliation

The first report on the intervention study not been a success; little hadbeen resolved and the Chiefs of Staff, dominated by Mountbatten, had ensured that the carrier programme would not be costed. The second intervention study (dubbed the ‘additional studies’) would be a different beast. It was initiated directly by Healey rather than through the Chiefs of Staff. Hardman would ensure that the terms of reference this time were drafted by his civil servants rather than by Mountbatten’s Defence Planning Staff. Mountbatten, on returning from overseas, was not pleased to see that Hardman had taken control of the terms of reference – which had been, as would be usual for ‘military’ studies, circulated by the Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff. He convened an informal meeting of the Chiefs to propose the sending of a letter of protest to Hardman. The Chief of the Defence Staff told the Chiefs that he regarded this as ‘an indication that control of the military machine was tending to slip from the hands of the Chiefs to those of the civil service’.100 His fellow Chiefs disagreed – it was commented that this study had been initiated by the Secretary of State because it covered non-military areas, such as scientific research, thus justifying the circulation by the Permanent Under-Secretary, and that in any case the Director of Defence Plans had been involved in the drafting. It was also commented that Mountbatten’s increasingly long absences from Whitehall had been a factor in the taking of the initiative by the civil servants. Mountbatten no longer dominated the

98 DEFE 4/185, CoS(65)26, 21 May 1965, item 2. 99 Ibid. 100 DEFE 32/10, enclosure 20, CoS (I), 15 April 1965. 66 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Chiefs: he was forced to withdraw the written protest, having been informed that the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff and the Chief Scientific Adviser would not support it either. Mountbatten’s grip on both the Chiefs and the Defence Review was gone, with Hardman’s civil servants taking the advantage of the Chief of the Defence Staff’s absence to bypass the military heads, not without the tacit agreement of at least some of the service Chiefs. A short discussion amongst the Chiefs following what must already have been an awkward meeting made it clear the reason why Mountbatten objected to the terms of reference to the study. Admiral Luce baldly stated that the terms of reference had been made on the ‘wrong basis’ and that the ‘model’ situations proposed were too theoretical to allow for a realistic and useful study of the intervention issue. Air Marshall Elworthy retorted by dismissing Luce’s objections as having ‘no relation to the political realities’ (it is not clear whether this meant the political realities of the Indian Ocean area, or the political realities of the environment within the Ministry of Defence relating to the defence review). Mountbatten, powerless to modify the terms of reference, could only note that the studies should not be unnecessarily rushed.101 The 2nd intervention study, when finally produced, ended up being another report that chipped away at the Navy’s case, but still pleased nobody, despite being chaired by Professor Cottrell, Solly Zuckerman’s deputy in the Chief Scientific Adviser’s Office and a stronger doubter of the efficacy of sea-based air power. The study set out a number of scenarios and the forces needed.102 The most contentious was Case 1, an intervention alone in the Far East against a well-armed enemy, a scenario probably not too far away from a full-scale Indonesian invasion of Borneo or the Malayan mainland. This was the only scenario that required the full resources of both the RAF and the Navy and in which the carrier appeared to play more than a walk-on role and was integral to the success of the intervention. At the meeting of the Chiefs which discussed this study, Air Marshall Elworthy felt that such a scenario would be highly unlikely to result in unilateral intervention by the British, and if this were so, ‘then it followed that they could not in honesty say that there could be no reduction in our intervention capability without a cut in commitments’.103 However, the Army’s representative, no doubt supported by the Navy, disagreed that intervention in such a scenario was unlikely. The Chiefs did note, however, that even relatively small reductions in equipment or troops in some of the scenarios would lead to a rapid dropping off in a capability, and the conversation turned to a rather gloomy consideration of whether remaining a world power was feasible at all. It was also realised that the study had not adequately resolved the underlying issue: whether carrier air power could be maintained, it merely set out scenarios and the equipment needed to make them succeed, in this respect, despite

101 Ibid. 102 DEFE 4/185, CoS(65)26, 21 May 1965, item 1. 103 Ibid. Emerging from Mountbatten’s Shadow 67

Mountbatten’s defeat over the control of the terms of reference, the report at least served as a holding action even if it did little to advance the case of the Navy. The Chiefs had been aware that another report based on the 2nd intervention study would be inevitable, this time looking at what could be achieved with just carriers or just land-based aircraft, or a mixture of the two.104 Two weeks later this is what happened: a quick study to be written by the Defence Secretariat was commissioned by Denis Healey to look at what could be achieved given the scenarios in the 2nd study if certain pieces of equipment were excluded from consideration.105 This in effect aimed to bypass Mountbatten and the Chiefs altogether but in practice the knowledge and expertise of the forces was required and the report ended up as a joint product of the civilian Defence Secretariat and the military Defence Planning Staff. The results of this 3rd intervention study were similarly equivocal: six options were investigated – intervening without the island bases, intervening without land- based Phantoms, without F-111s or RAF Buccaneers, without just F-111s, without carriers and finally without F-111s but with RAF Buccaneers. The results were a near bewildering array of conclusions applied to at least two scenarios in each theatre. Perhaps crucially, it was noted that intervention in the Far East would not be possible at all without F-111s (although this headline was not absolutely accurate as this only applied if bases in Australia, Gan or Chagos were not used). Without carriers, the more demanding of each the two theatre scenarios could not be met in the Far East, Aden, East Africa or West Africa, but each of these scenarios did involve considerable intervention effort and were not too far from the requirements of CoS (62)1, a strategy that did not seem to have a long-term future given the required cuts.106 None of this was a killer blow for or against the Navy, but it did build the impression, although superficially if one reads behind the ‘headlines’, that the F-111 was indispensable in the Far East (the one theatre in which there was currently a real conflict occurring: the Indonesian Confrontation). This was reinforced by the impression given that the Buccaneer could not compensate for the F-111, although again this conclusion was much more equivocal when one reads the backing notes.107 The 3rd study did appear to confirm the Permanent Under-Secretary’s understanding that the carrier force was essential for a strategy based on CoS (62)1, but definitely not for the more restricted and less ambitious basis for intervention that looked like emerging eventually from the defence review. The impact of this third study could also have been lessened by a note written the two people – Commodore Dunbar-Nasmith, the head of the Defence Planning Staff, and C.W. Wright, the Assistant Under-Secretary (Policy) who had led the study, questioning a number of the assumptions behind the 3rd (and by implication the 2nd) intervention study. It had given very little data on the practicality of in-

104 Ibid. 105 DEFE 13/746, folio 12, Healey to Hardman, 3 June 1965. 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid. 68 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic flight refuelling, or on the logistics of the various scenarios. In some cases,it was argued – resurrecting the pre-report arguments about terms of reference – the assumptions given needed confirming. For example, could 90 days of war maintenance reserves be placed on the islands of Gan or Chagos without building additional facilities? Account also had to be taken of the issue of acclimatising troops ferried by air, which had been ignored in the study.108 In many respects this, through the agency of Dunbar-Nasmith and Wright, could be seen as the Navy Department trying to put its points to Healey, but it also placed its finger on a key issue that the Air Force Department took care to ensure its assumptions and arguments were not investigated further: the expense and practicality of making the Indian Ocean bases capable of undertaking the scenarios. In addition, the Air Force Department had feared further probing of their 900 nautical mile radius assertions, but the Navy Department had not pressed home its case. Elworthy knew that in the intervention role the Navy’s best chance to keep the carrier programme was to prove that the F-111 and island bases alone would not be viable in the Indian Ocean.109 The naval leadership had not yet been able to explore this weakness in the RAF’s arguments.

The Functional Costings Trap

The issues raised here would be raised again in further studies over the next six months but no detailed assessment of such costs were put before the Chiefs or the Oversea and Defence Policy Committee until after the carrier had been cancelled. Part of the reason was the impact of the new functional costings system. Much of the carrier’s support infrastructure was wrapped up in the full £1,405m costing, whereas the F-111 costing had not included the cost of the airbases and other support needed to maintain and operate the aircraft. These were included under other categories. Neither could functional costing, as then constituted, split out the total cost of forces needed for particular theatres – such as East of Suez or the Mediterranean.110 This was a great disadvantage to the naval leadership – for they were unable to do two things. First, challenge effectively the costings assessment of 2.5 RAF aircraft to 1 Fleet Air Arm aircraft that was used by the Air Force Department throughout the carrier battle to highlight the cost of carrier airpower. Second, they could not request a straight cost comparison between the F-111 and island bases and the carrier programme in undertaking the East of Suez intervention role. Healey was aware of some of the limitations of functional costings as they stood and commissioned in June an assessment of whether the functional costings

108 DEFE 13/114, enclosure 1/1, note by Wright and Dunbar-Nasmith. 109 AIR 20/11561, Brief for Elworthy by Director of Air Staff Plans, 12 April 1965. 110 DEFE 13/366, enclosure 6A, Bruce Millan, Under-Secretary of State (RAF) to Healey, 25 June 1965. Emerging from Mountbatten’s Shadow 69 system could be adapted or modernised to take account of these shortcomings. Unfortunately he chose the Under-Secretary of State (RAF) to lead the study, and the unsurprising recommendation was that change should not be attempted. Apart from being a major undertaking for staff in the middle of a defence review, the Under-Secretary of State, doubted the accuracy of any figures produced. He also noted that the current functional costings system allowed for questions such as ‘how much would we save if we gave up that particular commitment’ which was the ‘kind of question that we must often ask’ rather than ‘how much does a particular commitment cost’.111 It was answering the latter question that would have given the naval leadership a better chance of fighting its case, because the former question prevented a straight comparison with the island strategy. It also placed the carrier programme firmly in view for cancellation as it was the largest such single costings item still to be approved: if the question asked is only ‘how much does it cost’ then the carrier would always come top of any consideration.

The 2nd Chequers Meeting and the Healey Plan

Throughout March, April and May the Chiefs maintained the position that reducing the intervention capability without reducing commitments would be impossible whilst the political departments maintained their assertion that expenditure cuts would be impossible without commitment reductions, despite increasing Treasury frustration. The reasons for this impasse are complex and bear many of the hallmarks of a Whitehall farce. The eventual emergence of the Healey plan would help break this deadlock and at last bring Healey out from the shadow of Mountbatten and the Chiefs of Staff. The Chiefs of Staff and Hardman were at one that equipment could not be cut until commitments had been reduced, but the reasons for holding this position differed amongst the parties involved. As has been seen, for Hardman, Healey and the Chiefs of the Air Staff and the General Staff, the actual cutting of commitments East of Suez (or at the very least the changing in the meaning of what upholding these commitments actually meant) did not present a problem at all: this would then allow for what they saw as a rational and effective shrinkage in equipment, of which the carrier was the prime contender, thus sparing the Army and RAF from any further painful cuts. For Mountbatten and the Chief of the Naval Staff, the insistence on not cutting equipment before commitments is more obscure, but the most logical reason was that they knew the ‘political’ departments were against the short-term cutting of commitments, and therefore this insistence was regarded as a way of delaying the point at which equipment was considered, thus allowing more time for the case for the carrier to be strengthened and for the momentum for beginning construction on CVA-01 to build up.

111 Ibid. 70 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

The Foreign Office position was to force down defence spending to £2,000m without conceding any reduction in East of Suez commitments in the short-term, and they saw CVA-01 as a duplication of capabilities.112 The Foreign Office was, however, very sceptical about Ministry of Defence objections that the forces had no slack left to cut. The apparent ‘doubling up’ of air strike capabilities – with both carriers and land-based F-111 aircraft – was one of the main areas of Foreign Office concern, particularly in the Persian Gulf, a region the Foreign Office considered much more important to British interests, but in which the access to land air bases was good.113 In effect, like Healey and Hardman, the Foreign Office would largely welcome the cancelling of the carrier programme. The two sides essentially wanted the same thing, but their negotiating positions were diametrically opposed, and they were thus forced into opposition! Healey at the time was also ducking difficult questions from the United States about maintaining British commitments east of Suez. Rumours had spread to the US about the possible outcome of the defence review.114 The Defense Secretary, on his visit to the United Kingdom in late May pushed strongly for the maintenance of a presence in the Indian Ocean, and saw this in naval terms.115 McNamara was even willing to countenance a reduction in British naval forces in the NATO area in order to maintain its vessels east of Suez. Healey had to explain that almost all Royal Navy forces west of Suez were in fact on roulement to or from east of Suez, any vessels in the Eastern Atlantic or Mediterranean either on passage, working up or in refit prior to despatch to the Far East.116 A few weeks later, McNamara even suggested that the US-built F-111 might be an ‘unaffordable luxury’ for the Britain if it meant a reduction in naval capability.117 Although a strong Atlanticist, Healey was not going to be deflected from his aim of cancelling the CVA-01 to bring his departments spending within the magic £2,000m figure by 1969/70. Two notes in the private office papers of the Secretary of State show how Healey’s thoughts were developing over late May and early June.118 The first, typed but undated, stated that a ‘drastic reduction in commitments and capabilities’ and a ‘renunciation of independent national action without allies against even a minor

112 Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, p. 139. 113 DEFE 4/186, CoS, 22 June 1965, item 2. See also: FO 371/184520, paper 23/80/G, Preliminary comments on OPD(O)(65)37, 26 May 1965, for Foreign Office position on ‘over-insurance’ in scenarios. 114 PREM 13/214, folios 5–17, various notes dated 20 May 1965–30 May 1965; and PREM 13/215, folios 51–3, Patrick Dean, British Ambassador in Washington to Sir P. Gore Booth, 10 June 1965. 115 PREM 13/214, folios 13–15, note of meeting including Wilson, Healey and Trend regarding forthcoming meeting with McNamara, 28 May 1965. 116 PREM 13/214, folios 5–12, note of meeting between Healey and McNamara. 117 PREM 13/215, folios 51–3, Dean to Gore Booth, 10 June 1965. 118 These are almost certainly preparatory notes for the Chequers conference on 13 June. Emerging from Mountbatten’s Shadow 71 power with sophisticated weapons’ would be necessary to bring spending down to £2,000 m.119 This implied ‘purely national’ bases such as carriers or islands such as Aldabra or Diego Garcia (in addition to bases in Australia). It went on to state that some sophisticated weapon systems ‘might be required outside Europe as a deterrent against the escalation or even of an intervention against unsophisticated opposition … eg long range air strike [ie the F-111] or hunter-killer submarines’. Such a capability would allow the provision of assistance to a ‘smaller or poor friendly state’.120 The aircraft carrier was clearly not part of the equation. The second note took the matter further.121 Two ‘key issues’ were outlined. First was the type of intervention capability: existing East of Suez strategy as outlined in CoS (62)1 required ‘v[ery] expensive elements from all 3 [services],’ and that the review ‘could & should degrade this,’ even though present commitments to Malaysia, Libya and Kuwait were inviolable at the present time. The note continues: we ‘owe part of this problem in land vs. sea-based a/c [that is, aircraft] – carriers [are] much more expensive but not vulnerable politically, [and are] more flexible if in the area, but may not be in the area [when needed]’. The second key issue was the extent of the reliance on allies. Australia, New Zealand and (preceded by a question-mark) Canada were mentioned, and unsurprisingly the United States, although Healey did note the potential but ‘v[ery much] smaller’ likelihood of a gap in capabilities if ‘UK–US policy differs’. These notes show that Healey was working through the issues and broadly accepting the arguments that Hardman had put to him in late February: that the rationale for carriers was weakened if, as was considered necessary to get within the £2,000m target, CoS (62) 1 was dropped, and that carriers were a ‘much more expensive’ option than any of the others available. The acknowledgement both of the reliance on a congruence with US policy to achieve objectives, and that a major US–UK disagreement was unlikely, also helped to frame the eventual decision that the UK would not intervene East of Suez without its allies. It is also striking from the first note how Healey’s conception of the British presence in the Far East tallied closely with the outcome of the January 1965 Foreign Office report noted earlier in this chapter: even if short-term priorities differed across departments, there was considerable consistently in visualisations of the medium and long-term picture. It is from these notes that the ‘Healey plan’ to break the policy deadlock emerged. The Secretary of State produced prior to the second Chequers meeting a ‘personal note’ for Harold Wilson: a set of proposed commitment reductions (produced without consultation with the political departments) from which Ministry of Defence planning for the Defence Review would be based: this was

119 DEFE 13/114, enclosure 1/1, unsigned, undated note (file chronology suggests 10 June 1965). 120 Ibid. 121 DEFE 13/114, enclosure 1, unsigned, undated handwritten note (file chronology suggests 10 June 1965), in Healey’s hand. 72 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic what would be called by Wilson, the ‘Healey plan’.122 They went far beyond what the political departments had contemplated and in effect was creating new foreign policy in order to ensure that defence reductions could be justified to take the budget under £2,000m in 1969–70. In the note, Healey first set out the problems of commitment cuts: the difficulty in predicting the future, the complexity of measuring the military cost of a particular commitment and the concern that too quick a reduction in commitments could lead to instability resulting in even greater commitments than had been in place previously.123 However, having set this out Healey then proceeded to list commitments that should be reduced. The Territorial Army would be abolished, the British Army on the Rhine and the Hong Kong garrison reduced, there would be almost complete withdrawal from the West Indies and South Atlantic, Mediterranean bases would become only ‘unprotected staging posts’, and the RAF would rely on the ‘westabout’ aircraft route to the Far and Middle East via the United States. Intervention capabilities (down below the minimum needed to protect either Libya or Kuwait) would be reduced and Far Eastern deployments revised so that Australian and island bases provided the core of any land base commitments in the region. ‘If we should achieve it all, we might find it possible to cut expenditure well below our current target,’ Healey stated at the end of the report.124 Wilson could not have been averse to Healey’s attempt to break the impasse regarding defence spending. The day before Healey presented his note to Wilson, Thomas Balogh, the Prime Minister’s special economic adviser had written to the Prime Minister in near hysterical terms: heavy cuts in defence spending would be ‘absolutely indispensable for national survival’ without resorting to devaluation.125 Prime Minister’s ‘no devaluation’ policy was coming under immense strain. The pressure was firmly on the Ministry of Defence to deliver up significant cuts, and quickly. What Balogh had not grasped was that cutting defence spending in the short term would prove to be extremely difficult: cancellation costs and the expense of leaving overseas bases were actually high in the short term. Most substantial savings from defence would only be felt in the medium-to-long term. In three meetings at Chequers stretching over the whole of 13 June, the members of the Oversea Policy and Defence Committee (belatedly joined by George Brown, the First Secretary of State, in the evening), supported by the Chiefs and their Permanent Secretaries, discussed the progress of the defence review.126 Following an opening statement from the Chancellor of the Exchequer driving home the economic necessity to control defence expenditure, particularly given the large sums of money borrowed from other countries to support increased government expenditure, Healey laid out his proposals, first set out in his personal

122 PREM 13/215, folios 39–44, Healey to Wilson, 11 June 1965. 123 Ibid., folios 40–42. 124 Ibid., folios 42–4 for ‘programme for future action’, folio 44 for quotation. 125 PREM 13/215, folio 56, Balogh to Wilson, 10 June 1965. 126 CAB 130/213, MISC 17, meeting of 13 June 1965. Emerging from Mountbatten’s Shadow 73 note to Wilson two days before, for dramatically reducing Britain’s commitments and then as a consequence its equipment. The Secretary of State for Defence suggested these proposals as a ‘basis for further action’ and was followed by the Foreign Secretary who predictably argued that economies in defence should occur before commitments were reduced. At the second meeting after lunch the implications of Healey’s radical suggestions with respect to the intervention capability and the equipment the Ministry of Defence required were discussed. The arguments for and against the carrier force were played out again. It was stated that ‘broadly’ air strikes from carriers were more expensive than from land, but that carriers were less vulnerable to political restrictions and were more flexible.127 This was countered with the problem that such flexibility could not be brought to bear if the carrier was not in or near the operational area, a distinct possibility in the wide possible areas of operation east of Suez. Although it was noted that the short notice visit of a carrier to Mombasa helped to diffuse a potential coup threat to President Kenyatta of Kenya, it was countered that it would be ‘difficult to have both an adequate land- based and sea-based strike force within the limitations on defence expenditure’ especially as a carrier force of three vessels would not be cost effective.128 The need for escorts for a carrier force was also highlighted. A total of between 6 to 11 ships would be required, implying a total of up to 33 escorts for all three carriers if all carrier groups were active. Given that roulement requirements meant that for every one ship on station east of Suez two more (working up, in refit or in transit) were needed to maintain capability over a long period this implied a need for an escort force of over 90 ships. Not stated directly, but implicit in this statement, was that if the carrier programme was abandoned and carriers withdrawn, the escort requirement could also be cut, providing further economies. A sign of Mountbatten’s diminished power was the concession by all the Chiefs – including Mountbatten and Luce – that the F-111 was superior to the Buccaneer 2* and essential to meet current defence commitments.129 This was a vital retreat, and demolished the argument initially put forward in the Navy presentation in December that air resources should be combined with the Buccaneer 2* at the centre of this. The carrier could now only supplement the F-111, not replace it. Even when a report by the Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser comparing the Buccaneer and the F-111 stated that two Buccaneers were the equivalent both operationally and cost-wise to one F-111, the Navy Department did not make much of this potential crutch for the carrier programme.130 Meekly, the naval leadership accepted an unproved assertion and gave up one of their best negotiating positions. Discussion then moved onto the capabilities implied in the ‘Healey Plan’ as set out in the first meeting. This was summarised as contributions to United Nations

127 Ibid., 2nd meeting, p. 6. 128 Ibid., 2nd meeting, pp. 6–7. 129 CAB 130/213, MISC 17 2nd meeting, p. 7. 130 See Chapter 4. 74 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic peacekeeping forces, intervention against unsophisticated opposition, intervention against sophisticated opposition only if land bases or carriers were in range, a contribution alongside allies to limited war situations, and a limited nuclear capability.131 In practical terms this meant a higher proportion of forces in Europe and possibly new bases in the Middle East, Australia and the Indian Ocean. The last two of these paid for by Australia and the United States if possible. Increased mobility would be provided by an enlarged RAF Transport Command and by commando carriers. The intervention capability would be ‘real though limited’ and at a lower level than currently was the case.132 In effect, although carriers still made an appearance, the ability to intervene alone against a sophisticated enemy, allowed if only obliquely in CoS (62)1, was being categorically dropped and with it the core justification for the strike carrier force. This was made clear in a summing up of this section, almost certainly by Healey, which mentioned aiding allies, such as India, with sophisticated weapons that they did not have access to, such as the F-111 bomber and the nuclear hunter- killer submarine.133 An aircraft carrier as a useful weapon system to aid an ally was not mentioned. At the third meeting, after supper, Wilson summed up by stating that those present were broadly in agreement with Healey’s proposals, and that the £2,000m figure by 1969–70 would be actively sought as a ceiling for defence spending, although the public announcement of this figure before the completion of the Defence Review would still need to be confirmed.134 The next day Burke Trend provided a brief for Wilson to inform cabinet of the outcomes of the Chequers discussions. It was explicit that one of the most significant conclusions was also that the United Kingdom should ‘not try to retain, as at present, the capability of mounting any intervention operations single-handed in the face of opposition’.135 The outcome, short of a straight decision to cancel the carrier there and then, could not have been any worse for the Navy. Intervention alone against a well- armed enemy was one of the core justifications for the carrier. Ministers had now decided that this should no longer be a capability that Britain would retain in the future. Mountbatten had argued that capabilities should not be cut without a reduction in commitments, whilst at the same time arguing that such commitments (particularly east of Suez) should be retained – in effect he had hoped to prevent a reduction of the defence budget to £2,000m rather than genuinely wanting a

131 CAB 130/213, MISC 17, meeting of 13 June 1965, p. 8. 132 Ibid., pp. 8–9. 133 The wording of this summing up statement (CAB 130/213 MISC 17, 13 June 1965, p. 9), is very close to the handwritten note mentioned above (Footnote 147, DEFE 13/114, enclosure 1/1) strongly suggesting that the handwritten note was Healey’s hastily written speaking crib for this meeting. 134 CAB 130/213, MISC 17, meeting of 13 June 1965, pp. 9–10. 135 PREM 13/215, folios 7–8, Trend to Wilson, 14 June 1965. Emerging from Mountbatten’s Shadow 75 reduction in commitments.136 Instead, Healey had broken the deadlock on commitments and therefore opened the way for the £2,000m limit to be accepted. With such a limit, the carrier, costing an inconvenient £200m in 1969–70 was the prime candidate for cancellation now that it was perceived to be without a core justification. Above all, Mountbatten, was quite clearly now a ‘lame duck’ Chief of the Defence Staff. His objections and attempts to cajole the Chiefs of Staff into accepting the carrier programme had clearly failed. Although Healey had now opened the strategic possibilities with is plan and the Prime Minister had supported him, the plan was stymied by a meeting of Permanent Secretaries, chaired by Burke Trend, who were keen that Ministry of Defence could not get away with forcing a reduction of commitments without at least some efficiency savings under the existing commitments structure. Hardman recounted to the Chiefs of Staff that the Permanent Secretaries of the political departments (who appear not to have been opposed by the Treasury or by Trend) wanted costs reduced ahead of commitments, in contradiction to the position of the Prime Minister and the majority of the ministers present at the Chequers meeting. And this, despite the apparent supremacy of the elected government over the permanent executive, is what happened: the Healey plan died. Hardman took it as read that the outcome of the meeting had meant that the Healey plan was no more, and the Chiefs did not demur.137 The Healey plan had, however, achieved its purpose. It had demonstrated that the Secretary of State could take a bold policy initiative over the heads of the Chiefs of Staff (and more particularly, Mountbatten) and dispel the impression of intransigence at the Ministry of Defence, forced on the department by the collective decisions of the Mountbatten-dominated Chiefs of Staff in the early months of the year. The dropping of CoS (62)1 and the acceptance of the £2,000m budget maximum was not reversed and Trend had no interest in so doing.

Conclusion

The Naval leadership would have been damned whether the Chequers meeting had accepted the Healey plan or not. The plan, if accepted, would have removed the strategic need to intervene abroad with forces heavy enough or against opposition strong enough to justify a carrier force. Instead, the Healey plan had been rejected on the grounds the Ministry of Defence could find further equipment efficiencies,

136 This position was effectively taken in the co-ordinating study of March 1965, and Mountbatten’s opposition to reducing forces east of Suez and to the abandoning of the ability to intervene alone against an enemy armed with sophisticated weaponry was re- iterated at the Chiefs of Staff meeting two days before Chequers: DEFE 4/185, CoS(65)30, 11 June 1965, item 1. 137 DEFE 4/186, CoS(65)32, 22 June 1965, item 2. 76 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic the largest of which and the one that appeared to provide most duplication of capabilities was the carrier force. Mountbatten’s power in the Ministry of Defence, so formidable on the day when Denis Healey arrived in the ministry, had been almost completely destroyed. Mountbatten was a charismatic and commanding figure, but he was not trusted by many of those around him and Healey knew that he would not grasp real control of the Ministry until Mountbatten had gone. This coincided with the reluctance of the service Chiefs to lose their respective departments under the full functionalisation that Mountbatten had advocated, and the opportunism of Hardman in creating precedents for civil service involvement in military analyses. The carrier inevitably became drawn into the push to denude and remove Mountbatten, so associated was it with the Chief of the Defence Staff and his East of Suez policy. The Naval leadership had not played its hand well initially; the Maritime Airpower and the Threat to Shipping studies had partially undermined what should have been the Navy’s strongest card – the maritime role of the carrier. The importance of the Treasury and the Foreign Office in affecting the early months of the carrier battle should not be underestimated. The Treasury consciously adopted a plan to pick off defence projects one by one rather than attack the East of Suez policy, and the carrier project was the largest and the one best able to fill the £200m-sized hole in the projected budget for 1969/70. The Foreign Office also wanted defence economies, but was convinced that East of Suez could still be viable in the short-term if capability duplication was ended. Given the naval leadership’s acceptance of the F-111 and the constrictions of the functional costing system, the carrier now became the main cause of ‘capability duplication’ in the defence programme. With the strategic underpinning of CoS (62) 1 rejected, the £2,000m ceiling accepted, Mountbatten about to retire, the acceptance of the F-111 as essential, the opposition of not just the Air Force Department, Army Department, but also the Foreign Office and Treasury, and a gathering pile of reports and analyses placing doubt on the efficacy and relevance of the aircraft carrier, the naval leadership was in an extremely weak position to continue the fight in favour of CVA-01 and the carrier fleet. Healey and Hardman had now emerged from Mountbatten’s shadow, but Luce and the naval leadership had not. Chapter 3 The Navy Alone

This chapter covers the four months after Chequers, which saw a reframing of the strategic and policy picture coupled with an important power shift within the Chiefs of Staff in which the Army, now that Mountbatten had retired and the Chief of the Defence Staff was an Army general, held the pivotal position. It also saw the entry into the debate by the Chief Scientific Adviser, Solly Zuckerman and finally a meeting of the Defence Council on the carrier programme and the Defence Review. How did the naval leadership make its case in this increasingly hostile environment? How effective were they? What impact did Zuckerman’s intervention have on the debate? How important was the Defence Council meeting of 7th October? This chapter begins with an overview of the increasing external pressures on the Ministry of Defence to come to a decision over the aircraft carrier, and a short indication of the intense inter-service rivalries that framed the increasingly acrimonious bureaucratic fighting. The new ‘alternative carrier plan’ is then analysed, followed by the straight ‘case for’ and ‘case against’ the carrier written by the naval and RAF leaderships. The Navy without carriers paper is followed by further debates on costings, the Buccaneer 2* and then Zuckerman’s intervention in the debate. The chapter ends with the Secretary of State’s meeting with his Chiefs on 5th October 1965, followed by the Defence Council meeting the two days later that provided a major watershed in the carrier battle.

External Pressures on the Ministry of Defence

The Healey plan, despite its rejection by the permanent secretaries, enjoyed a partial afterlife. Its proposals were worked up in more detail and presented to the Official Committee of the Oversea and Defence Committee. With defence spending down to £1,900m a year and a 15 per cent reduction in manpower it had pushed overseas expenditure to the level of only £150m–£160m.1 Officials in the Treasury were not impressed with these results: it was noted that a 14 per cent reduction in the defence budget had resulted in a 20 per cent reduction in front-line forces and that although the result was an absolute minimum presence east of Suez, these forces were no more than a token peacekeeping element.2 Otto Clarke was blunt in his assessment: ‘a very cost-ineffective defence effort’ with a worldwide presence

1 T 225/2604, folio 2, Clarke to Armstrong, 21 July 1965. 2 T 225/2604, folios 4–8, Downey to Bell, 22 July 1965. 78 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

‘spread so thin that it is effective only if we don’t have to fight’.3 He concluded that a cost-effective defence budget would only be possible once the world role had been given up. A further Treasury assessment of these plans the next month painted an even more worrying picture: the 14 per cent reduction in budget and 20 per cent reduction in overall forces actually produced a 50 per cent reduction in East of Suez capabilities.4 The worked-up Healey plan also excluded any conclusions from the intervention studies, and as a result both the carrier and F-111 were still present in the plans, even though the naval escort force had been reduced by 25 per cent, the approximate reductions considered appropriate if the carrier force were withdrawn from service.5 The exclusion of any conclusions from the intervention studies meant that little could be done to develop the Healey plan further, although it now became clearer than ever that the alternative was between the carrier and the F-111. In the Treasury, a consensus of figures involved in defence spending matters – Clarke, Downey and Bell – were now all arguing for the cancellation of the carrier.6 Downey, hoping to move on the resolution of the intervention issue suggested that the Ministry of Defence be asked to answer which operations would be denied if the carriers were dispensed with, and which operations would be denied if the F-111 were cancelled.7 As will be seen, these studies were put to Healey, and would add to the multiplicity of separate studies being undertaken as part of the Defence Review.8 External pressure on Healey was not just coming from the Treasury, but also from the Prime Minister himself. At a meeting in early July, Wilson pushed Healey to speed up the intervention studies.9 The Prime Minister was well aware that completed intervention studies would add the final piece to the jigsaw and allow the Defence Review to be completed. Healey candidly responded that the intervention studies ‘raise very difficult issues within my department’ and that completed studies would not be available any earlier than September.10 The potential costs of the Indonesian Confrontation were also impacting on plans for the Defence Review. In early August a report from Hardman showed

3 T 225/2604, folios 15–16, note by Clarke at bottom of note by Bell, 27 July 1965. 4 T 225/2604, folios 66–7, Nicholls to Armstrong and Bancroft, 4 August 1965. 5 T 225/2604, folios 4–8, Downey to Bell, 22 July 1965. 6 Clarke: T 225/2604, folios 15–16, note by Clarke at bottom of note by Bell, 7 July 1965; Downey: T 225/2604, folios 4–8, Downey to Bell, 22 July 1965; Bell: T 225/2604, folios15–16, note by Bell to Clarke and Walker, 27 July 1965. 7 T 225/2604, folios 4–8, Downey to Bell, 22 July 1965. 8 In fact, the large number of studies in progress caused Healey to request regular tabular updates on these studies: DEFE 13/114, enclosure 20, Assistant Private Secretary to Secretary of State to Private Secretary to Hardman, 27 July 1965. 9 DEFE 13/114, enclosure 10, Healey to Wilson, 2 July 1965; see also T 225/2603, folio 53. 10 Ibid. The Navy Alone 79 that instead of achieving an annual budget of £1,900m in the long term under the Healey plan as had been proposed, the costs of the Confrontation, if it still continued, would mean a minimum of £2040m, with much of the increase coming from the requirements of the Navy and Army (£56m each). Manpower would have to rise from a planned 337,710 to 373,910: nearly 22,000 of this increase coming from the Army and nearly 10,000 from the Navy.11

The Templer Report and Inter-Service Rivalries

In July, the Templer Report on the future of military aviation was completed.12 It had been commissioned by the previous government and the tenor of its conclusions strongly contrasted with the prevailing mood in the Ministry of Defence, and as such most of its conclusions had little direct impact, but a number of its asides and conclusions shed interesting light on the intensity of inter-service rivalry during the period of the carrier battles. The Templer committee consisted of three retired heads of the services: Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Caspar John, a former First Sea Lord, and Air Chief Marshall Sir Denis Barnett. They had been given terms of reference to investigate and provide conclusions on the future of military aviation – including the overall role of the RAF, the Fleet Air Arm and the Army Air Corps and to the possibilities for future interoperability or convergence between the three air forces. The report of the committee stated that it had been overtaken by events somewhat and that the Defence Review made working on the matter very difficult. The ‘carrier versus land bases issue spilt over into the committee’ and as a result the RAF representative felt compelled to write his own minority report (from which the Army and Navy representatives disassociated themselves), calling for the integration of naval aviation into the RAF.13 The main report itself recommended further interoperability amongst the services, but neither did it recommend the minority report’s ‘pan aviation-ism’ nor the other extreme of dissolving the RAF and splitting its roles and equipment between the Navy and Army. However, its rationale for not proposing the latter could not really be regarded as a ringing endorsement for the concept of a separate RAF: it noted that air services split between the Army and the Navy would have some problems in recruiting pilots, and that the RAF possessed a ‘tradition and identity’ (no doubt referring to the RAF’s World War II role in the Battle of Britain and the bombing campaign against Germany) attractive to young men that the FAA and AAC to some extent lacked.14 There was no mention of a strategic or efficiency rationale for a separate RAF. Unsurprisingly, the Navy Department

11 DEFE 13/114, enclosure 26, Hardman to Healey, 9 August 1965. 12 DEFE 69/343 Templer Report 1965. 13 DEFE 69/343 Templer Report, para. 85 and enclosure 1, Annex 2. 14 DEFE 69/343 Templer Report, introduction, paras 14–17. 80 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic regarded the report as ‘extremely favourable’ but the split conclusions and the changed environment meant that it did little to alter the embattled position of naval carrier aviation.15 The report’s introduction noted that ‘self-preservation and single service views dominated the evidence given’ and that the Navy saw RAF proposals as a ‘takeover bid’ due to a ‘certain lack of tact and reticence in the drafting of papers affecting another service [that] may have lent colour to this suspicion’. It continued by stating that it was ‘deplorable that the mistrust and lack of confidence was such that the Navy Department and the Air Force Department were rarely, if ever, prepared to find any single point of merit in proposals submitted by the other’.16 This level of mistrust and intense inter-service rivalry should therefore be taken into account when analysing the battle over the carrier.

Rewriting the Carrier Plan

It was therefore no coincidence that within five weeks of the Chequers meeting, Healey was tackling the Navy over its carrier plan. He did not hide his scepticism about the need for the new carrier and made it clear that for the carrier to remain a viable option, a number of issues needed resolving. The Secretary of State was not happy with the existing plan, most notably the lack of operational availability that only two and a half carriers (that is, Eagle, CVA-01 and the smaller Hermes) could provide. He set out for the Chief of the Naval Staff four conditions that he felt would have to be fulfilled to make the carrier feasible: the new plan would have to be cheaper, it would have to ensure ‘a level of operational availability sufficient to enable us to count on fixed-wing carrier-borne aircraft for contingency planning’, it would need to ensure greater interoperability with the RAF to lessen the number of aircraft needed in total, and finally it would have to resolve the problems with recruiting pilots into the Fleet Air Arm. This was a tall order and Healey, in the same document also noted that ‘if we should discard from our range of options an intervention operation on CoS (62)1 lines, the essential tasks for which we might need carriers in the 1970s would be likely to be significantly reduced’.17 Just to ensure that the Chiefs of Staff were not in any doubt that the Secretary of State would need quite some convincing to ensure that the carrier survived, a few days later (and before the Naval Staff paper had been completed) he noted to the Chiefs that: ‘I understand the general case for mobile air bases [ie aircraft carriers]; but, on the evidence of studies done, I have become doubtful about the value of the return we can expect from our 10-year programme for aircraft carriers and fixed-wing naval aircraft’.18 Healey was driving home to the Admiralty Board

15 DEFE 69/343, enclosure 2, note by P.W.B. Ashmore, 9 July 1965. 16 DEFE 69/343, Templer Report, introduction, para. 6. 17 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 3, Healey to Luce, 29 July 1965. 18 DEFE 13/114, enclosure 21, Healey to Chiefs of Staff, 3 August 1965. The Navy Alone 81 his view that they would have to produce something impressive to convince him that the 50,000–60,000-ton carrier was a viable option.

The New Carrier Plan

The day after meeting Healey, and initiating a format that would be followed for the next nine months, the members of the Admiralty Board met following the monthly Admiralty Board to discuss how the Secretary of State’s economies could be achieved.19 The main advantage of meeting ‘informally’ after the Board rather than at the Board itself was that the discussions would not subsequently be printed and distributed across the senior echelons of the Ministry of Defence, as was usual for the meetings of the Board itself. These meetings, whose minutes had a severely restricted circulation, would essentially become the Navy’s council of war during the following months of the carrier battle. Sidestepping Healey’s main intent in a rather transparent manoeuvre, the Board members offered cuts in other naval programmes to produce the necessary savings: the Tiger class cruisers would be retired early (largely to free up manpower), the planned escort cruisers would be cancelled, and the total number of escorts would be reduced by five. This would result in savings of £250m over the Long-Term Costings period of 10 years. To deal with Healey’s concerns about operational availability, the completion of CVA-02 would be brought forward to 1974, whilst existing carriers would be kept on until both the CVAs were operational. This approach of reducing as many costs as possible around the carrier, rather than tackling the costs of the carrier itself indicates the belief that costs could not be squeezed any further from the CVA-01 design, and nor could smaller carrier designs be contemplated. Regarding inter-service interoperability, this matter was still under discussion with the Air Department, and therefore it was felt that unilateral decisions on this front were therefore not possible. Regarding manpower, the Board members felt that the findings of the Templer Report – the addition of new inducements to airmen – if implemented would resolve this issue. It was also argued that a manpower vote of 100,000 men would be the minimum necessary to fulfil the requirements of the Navy with the new carrier force.20 By the time Christopher Mayhew had presented the Admiralty Board’s plans to Denis Healey, the savings had increased to £400m and Mayhew explained that the Navy was confident that ‘even if Naval manpower does not more than hold its own in the next decade, we could still sustain a viable carrier plan’.21 The additional savings came from some further trimming combined by the cancellation and reduction of helicopter projects, the most dramatic of which

19 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 5, Private Office note: Admiralty Board members meeting, 30 July 1965, ‘Alternative carrier fleets in the 1970s’. 20 Ibid. 21 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 8, Mayhew to Healey, 6 August 1965. 82 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic was, under Joint Naval/Air Staff Target 358, the replacement of most Wessex III helicopters by the US Chinook. The results of speeding up the ordering of CVA-01 was now made clear: instead of replacing Hermes with CVA-02 in 1978–79, the required operational availability would be increased by replacing Hermes in 1974, by having CVA-02 ordered at the same time as CVA-01 and completed only 18 months after her sister ship.22 A further economy measure was suggested through the use of American J79- engined Phantoms rather than the Rolls Royce Spey, as had been planned since mid 1964. The Admiralty Board members argued that the inferior performance of the J79 engine over the Spey would be more than compensated by the additional total number of seaborne aircraft made available by the early retirement of the small Hermes and introduction into service of CVA-02 four years earlier than had been originally planned.23 This reversion to the US J79 engine in place of the Spey, betrayed more than an element of desperation in the Admiralty Board’s plans. The Spey had been regarded, until only a few months previously, as essential to allow the Phantom to operate from British carriers.24 It had been considered that the less powerful or efficient US J79 engine would require the expenditure of so much fuel to get the aircraft off the smaller decks and catapults of existing British carriers and up to an operational altitude that it would have a dramatically reduced combat air patrol or strike radius. In fact, such was this deficiency that the shorter of the two catapults on Eagle and Ark Royal would be operationally almost unusable, and Hermes could not operate the J79 Phantom in any realistic sense at all.25 Even the much larger CVA-01 design operating J79s would have its combat air patrol times reduced from 3 hours and 12 minutes to 2 hours and 42 minutes, and the strike range reduced from 590 nautical miles to 495 nautical miles.26 The former reduction would have a significant knock-on in terms of aircraft usage and turn- around times, increasing the likelihood of problems maintaining a full combat air patrol over a sustained period in an operational environment. The reason for accepting this reduction in capability was cost. The J79 engine was estimated at £107,000 per unit whilst the costs of the Spey had recently jumped from £130,000 to £185,000 as development complications at Rolls Royce mounted.27

22 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 7, ‘Alternative Carrier Fleets in the 1970s’, 6 August 1965. 23 Ibid. 24 DEFE 69/340, enclosure 34, Harbord to Assistant Under-Secretary (Programmes and Budget) ‘Spey engines for Phantom F4K – First order’, 9 March 1965. 25 DEFE 25/173, ‘Alternative carrier fleets in the 1970s’, Annex C, 6 August 1965. 26 Ibid. 27 DEFE 69/340, enclosure 26, Brightling to Stanford, 2 March 1965; and enclosure 36, Healey to Roy Jenkins, Minister of Aviation, 16 March 1965. The Navy Alone 83

Rejecting the Spey meant a significant reduction in capability. Even though the Admiralty Board argued that a J79-equipped carrier force of CVA-01, CVA-02 and Eagle was more capable than a Spey-equipped force of Eagle, Hermes and CVA-01, this did not really ring true. The previous plan had meant that all three carriers could operate Phantoms adequately, whilst the new plan accepted that one of the three carriers (Eagle) would not have an operationally effective combat air patrol at all. Relying on one catapult to maintain a very short-lived air patrol with a small number of Phantoms did not seem like a realistic option, particularly as the carrier would often be operating alone without the support of the larger CVA- 01 and CVA-02. Operationally, this was not too far away from proposing a two- carrier fleet. Cancelling the Spey was also opposed by the Ministry of Aviation: it had been estimated by Rolls Royce that up to 2,000 jobs would be lost if Admiralty Board proposals, supported by the Air Force Department, went ahead.28 Taking the proposed Phantom and other reductions into account, the total savings over the Long-Term Costings period (up to and including the financial year 1975/76) would be at a level of £344m over current plans, reducing to £260m if the Spey Phantom went ahead. Notably only £92m and £21m of the savings would occur before 1969/70 on both of these estimates.29 Mayhew presented the new carrier plan to Healey on 6 August, but it was quite clear that the Secretary of State had set ideas as to the future of CVA-01. In a note written the same day, but referring to a meeting with the Chiefs on the 5th, Healey admitted the lack of clear guidance from the Foreign Office as to future commitments was a problem in framing the Defence Review, but a note of part of Healey’s discussion makes it clear that in his mind the carrier was going to be cancelled. Referring to future studies that needed doing, Healey stated:

I have no doubt that there will be other matters on which we shall eventually require some study: for example, the effect on the Navy in general, and the Fleet Air Arm in particular, of any decision in the near future to abandon CVA01 and (from the end of this decade) the carrier fleet, the likely effect of such a decision on other countries (e.g., Indonesia); and industrial implications of dropping the Spey/Phantom project and the development of the Buccaneer 2*, and of the other possible changes in the aircraft programme. But I am not asking that any work should be done on these matters now.30

28 Ministry of Aviation, AVIA 65/1901, enclosure 110B, Meeting between Rolls Royce and Ministry of Aviation, 29 September 1965; draft paper to Weapons Development Committee October 1965, para. 31. 29 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 7, ‘Alternative Carrier Fleets in the 1970s’, 6 August 1965. 30 DEFE 13/114, enclosure 25, Healey to Chiefs of Staff, 6 August 1965, relating to meeting of 5 August 1965. 84 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

There is no clearer indication of the Secretary of State’s position, before even the revised carrier plan had been presented to him for which he had specifically asked, and it indicates the mountain the Navy would have to climb to try to save CVA- 01. It is not the fact that the carrier was cancelled that is surprising, but that the Admiralty Board and Navy Department decided in such circumstances to fight so hard for it and were so successful at preventing its cancellation, thus delaying the Defence Review by nearly six months, for so long. At this same meeting on the 5 August, Healey asked the Navy and Air Force Departments to produce arguments for and against the carrier fleet. This was the first time that the carrier issue had been approached directly, rather than under the cover of intervention or maritime studies, and it is clear that Healey and his office wanted a resolution of the matter as soon as possible. The Chief ofthe General Staff would then give his comments on the two studies, whilst the Navy Department was commissioned to write another study, this time to look at the future shape of the Navy without a carrier fleet. The commissioning of this study, again pre-empting the other studies provides further strong signals of the answer that Healey wanted from this work. In addition, the exclusion of the consideration that the carrier (plus Buccaneers and Phantoms) might be regarded as an alternative to the F-111, did little to help the Navy’s position.

The Case for the Carrier

The Navy’s case in defence of the carrier, written by the Chief of the Naval Staff, was straightforward and was arranged under six headings. Under the ‘continuing need to deploy air power overseas’ the Chief of the Naval Staff’s paper emphasised the need to fulfil commitments, and that the ability to do so would be ‘rapidly diminish[ed]’ by the withdrawal of carriers. It was also emphasised that the US would not necessarily honour its commitments and that the carrier would maintain an effective presence, and an East of Suez rearguard to allow for a withdrawal with dignity. Second, the carrier’s deterrent value was emphasised. Described as the most powerful ship in the fleet, it was argued that the mobility of naval airpower made it difficult for the enemy to plan for and allow for unexpected routes and positions of attack. Thirdly, the limitations of shore-based airfields were set out. Although it was acknowledged that land-based air power was more ‘economical and effective’ than carrier airpower when airbases were within range, it was argued that once the distance reached more than a few hundred miles ‘a degree of uncertainty’ was introduced. New airbases would have to be constructed to provide the necessary coverage east of Suez, and their political security was not guaranteed.31 The advantages of the carrier were set out next: politically invulnerable, capable of a wide range of operations up to and including limited war, can still

31 DEFE 25/173, Luce to Healey, 12 August 1965, ‘The need for aircraft carriers’. The Navy Alone 85 be used as a weapon system whilst on transit to the operational area, a quick reaction capability and the ability to maintain high sortie rates in close support of land operations, it could preposition in periods of tension prior to conflict, and finally it could pose a nuclear threat. Under the fifth heading, the question of the effectiveness of the carrier force (a matter that had been under question ever since the Navy had conceded in 1963 that a minimum of four carriers was needed to maintain a viable force east of Suez, but had also conceded a year later that it could man a force of no more than three carriers) was neatly sidestepped by noting that it was not how the British assessed themselves but how other nations saw them that was important. The invulnerability of US naval airpower in the Vietnam conflict was highlighted as a recent example of a successful deployment that had changed perceptions of the effectiveness of US intervention capabilities. Finally, the cost issue was addressed by noting that the cost of the carrier itself was dwarfed by the cost of its aircraft, and that the totality of aircraft needed to fulfil British defence and foreign policy requirements should be considered, not the separate equipment of different services. The carrier would also incur minimal foreign exchange costs unlike the F-111.32 The case as a whole was concisely put, but just about every element was contestable for a sceptical Secretary of State. Would Britain really lose much of its ability to intervene East of Suez? The Chief of the General Staff and Chief of the Air Staff both disagreed.33 Were island bases more vulnerable than carriers and did land-based airpower become much less effective beyond ‘a few hundred miles’? The RAF leadership disagreed on both counts and could legitimately argue that both these factors were within their remit of expertise and professional judgement, not the Navy’s. Was the carrier the most powerful naval vessel? Surely the newly acquired submarine-launched ballistic-missile deterrent was a more powerful weapon system.34 Was it legitimate to split the cost of the carrier from its aircraft given the move towards costing equipment units by ‘weapon system’ (that is, the carrier and its aircraft)? All costings so far had seen the carrier and its aircraft combined as a single cost item. Was the carrier a useful expenditure in money if its main role was east of Suez, the first vessel would appear in 1972, and it was difficult to envisage a large East of Suez presence after 1985 at the latest? Was all this money worth only 13 years of service?

32 Ibid. 33 DEFE 25/173, Cassels to Healey, 17 August 1965, para. 11. Cassels saw cancelling the carrier as essential to free up money to maintain army (and to a lesser extent RAF) forces East of Suez. 34 DEFE 25/173, Luce to Healey, 12 August 1965, ‘The need for aircraft carriers’. 86 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

The Case against the Carrier

Chief of the Air Staff produced his memorandum putting the case for dropping aircraft carriers at the same time as the Navy paper.35 This was a very effective challenge to the Navy’s Department’s position. The memo, echoing Healey’s own inclinations, started by stating that ‘the time is long since past when major economies could be achieved by trimming uniform slices off the programme of each service. This can only lead to weakness everywhere’.36 Elworthy pointed out that the actual cost of the aircraft carriers themselves in the proposed new plan had not been segregated from other figures but that it had probably not decreased at all: the cost coming to around £1,300–1,350m. Summarising the total aircraft availability the new three-carrier fleet would provide, Elworthy was clear: ‘put shortly this means that in the 1970s – or at least in the second half of the 1970s – the normal position would be 12 fighters and 18 strike aircraft overseas (that is, 9 fighter and 14 strike aircraft serviceable assuming 75 per cent serviceability) and that within 15 days this average number might be doubled except for two months every year. These results would be obtained from an average expenditure of about £150m a year over the next 10 years’. The Chief of the Air Staff then went through the various perceived limitations of carriers: their slowness, their limited operational endurance (even with under-way replenishment), the risks of mishaps and their vulnerability, the expense of self- defence, the fact that of the planned contingencies that the Ministry of Defence had put together ‘not one depends for success upon carrier-borne aircraft’. He also argued that because of these problems the real minimum effective carrier force was two carriers in a single theatre of war, but that a three-carrier fleet would not ensure that this could be deliverable (in other words, a four-carrier fleet was the practical minimum).37 The Chief of the Air Staff then attempted to counteract one of the main arguments in favour of aircraft carriers as against land-based air power: that an aircraft carrier is a mobile air base free from political restrictions and operating in international waters. Elworthy noted that aircraft carriers were not wholly independent of base facilities themselves, needing over a week of shore maintenance for every 35 days operational, that their aircrews often need land air bases to transit to the carrier or for training purposes and he argued that the new possibilities of airlift and in-flight refuelling for combat aircraft were making most of the traditional roles of the aircraft carrier obsolete. The second standard criticism of land-based airpower was the problem of over-flight of other nation’s territories, but Elworthy argued that the many ‘eastabout’ and ‘westabout’ flying options made this argument obsolete.38

35 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 13, Elworthy to Healey, 12 August 1965. 36 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 12, ‘Defence Review – the case for dropping carriers’, 12 August 1965. 37 Ibid. 38 ibid. The Navy Alone 87

Many of the Chief of the Air Staff’s arguments could be challenged, and many of his valid assertions could be counteracted by the additional or perhaps even more problematic drawbacks of land-based airpower, but the fact that stood out was the great expense of the aircraft carriers and the seemingly small quantity of aircraft that was produced for such a large outlay. James Peters, Christopher Mayhew’s private secretary, noted on the front of the Chief of the Air Staff’s cover sheet that this was ‘a good paper’.39 It certainly placed the Navy on the back foot again, forcing the carrier’s supporters to defend the rationale for the carrier a second time. The comments of General Cassels, the Chief of the General Staff, on both papers was, although sympathising with some of the Navy’s arguments, unequivocal. He characterised the essential question as whether Britain needed to have an ‘ability to take military action [that] is vital to us in circumstances where overflying rights and/or the necessary airfields are denied to us’. He continued: ‘the conclusion I have drawn (though not necessarily all the arguments) appears to approximate very closely to those reached by CAS [the Chief of the Air Staff]. If we have got to economise on the projected scale then, provided that aircraft of the F-111 type are forthcoming in adequate numbers, the smallest reduction in the options open to us and the retention of a capability adequate to meet the most likely vital defence commitments can least harmfully be achieved by dispensing with the carrier strike force’.40 What Cassels did not mention, but what must have been an important factor, was that, as we have already seen, if the carrier was cancelled both the Army and RAF would escape further cuts in the Defence Review. The traditional ‘equal pain’ approach where each service suffered similar-sized cuts would mean more painful reductions for the Army leadership, who were themselves relieved to have saved even part of the Territorial Army in the Defence Review process. As with many, if not most, contentious policy issues where outcomes and costs are uncertain and spread over a wide timescale, arguments for and against are coloured by existing preconceptions and opinions as much by provable information. Much of the Navy’s case rested on challenging assumptions held by the RAF regarding land-based air power, but this was difficult to achieve when the RAF held all the necessary information to reach such decisions. This was just as legitimate the other way around – Mountbatten had resisted the costing of the carrier programme for as long as he could, and the Navy Department would make incredibly pessimistic cost calculations for long-range guided missiles and other equipment types as replacements for carriers: much of the RAF’s case also rested on challenging Royal Navy assumptions. In the end, institutional weight and the inclinations of the Secretary of State to believe and feel comfortable with one service rather than another helped lead to the cancellation of the carrier and the adoption of the island strategy.

39 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 13, Elworthy to Healey, 12 August 1965. 40 DEFE 25/173, Cassels to Healey, 17 August 1965. 88 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

The Navy without Carriers Study

This study, looking into the Navy without carriers, was put into train under the head of DS4 – the naval section of the Central Defence Secretariat. This was specifically a real study of how the Navy could look or operate without aircraft carriers, not a defence of CVA-01.41 The initial results proposed a fleet for the late 1970s consisting of 2 commando ships, 2 assault ships, 15 destroyers (7 Type 82, 8 County class), 69 frigates (19 existing types, 28 Leanders, 19 Type 19s and 3 medium anti-aircraft escorts), 4 ballistic-missile, 15 nuclear hunter-killer and 21 diesel submarines.42 Of this fleet, 11 escorts would be in the Far East, 3 in the Middle East, 3 in the Mediterranean and 3 in the South Atlantic and West Indies, still a substantial proportion.43 The members of the Admiralty Board, with the exception of Mallalieu who was abroad at the time, met on 15 September to discuss the Navy without carriers memorandum prior to its submission to the Secretary of State. Mayhew suggested that a cover note be added to the report that would emphasise the two main issues that would result from a decision to cancel the carrier. The first was the ‘capability gap’ that would result between the point at which the carriers were withdrawn and completion of the reshaping of the fleet to accommodate the lack of carrier- borne strike and air defence capability, including the arrival of surface-launched missile systems. The second was the potential manpower implications associated with doing away with aircraft carriers, in particular the ‘complications involved in the run-down which would make a sizeable proportion of naval manpower unemployable’ during the changeover period.44 Both of these additions to the report were designed to make the nettle of cancelling CVA-01 a more difficult one to grasp for the Secretary of State and the Central Secretariat. However, the Admiralty Board had misunderstood the extent to which Healey was willing to make radical decisions and actually grab hold of prickly issues that had been shied away from over the last 10 years. Negatively phrased appeals setting out the ‘associated difficulties’ were much less likely to convince the technocratic Healey than a closely argued and convincing positive case for efficiency and effectiveness. The writers of the report could not resist putting the Navy’s argument in defence of the carriers, but the conclusion betrayed the Navy’s difficulty in thinking beyond the style of ‘salami slicing’ cuts of the late 1950s and early 1960s. ‘The role of the Navy depends entirely on the strategic assumptions. On the assumption made in this paper there is, therefore, no revised role. It is the capability to fulfil the Navy’s

41 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 16, D.A. Nicholls (of DS4): ‘The fleet without carriers costing exercises’, 3 September 1965. 42 Ibid., appendix 1 to Annex. 43 Ibid., appendix 3 to Annex. 44 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 20, Private Office note: meeting of Admiralty Board members, 15 September 1965. The Navy Alone 89 role which is diminished’.45 This was a vital question, and one which Mayhew, as we shall see, would try to drive home at every opportunity, but in a unified Ministry of Defence the concept of a role being inevitably the responsibility of a single service was one that had difficulty in being sustained. If the RAF could argue, however justified, that that role could be carried out more efficiently and effectively by land-based aircraft, then the Navy’s equipment for the task – the aircraft carriers, its aircraft and its escorts – would be an unnecessary duplication of resources.

Costing the Navy’s Plan

On the day he received this report, Healey requested that the Programmes and Budget Branch look at the costings given in the Navy Department’s paper in support of the carriers (and their support and aircraft) alone.46 The resulting note by A.D. Peck, the Deputy Under-Secretary for Budget and Plans, confirmed the RAF’s assertion that carrier costs had not been reduced significantly.47 Peck’s calculations showed that with the costs of the carrier programme of the earlier plan at £1,453m, the new carrier plan had only reduced these to £1,347m with J79-engined Phantoms or £1,420m with Spey Phantoms. Most of the cost cuts given in the Navy’s proposed plan (£211m) had come from reductions in the naval programme including cancelling the cruisers and reducing the total of other escorts, not in the carrier programme itself. A margin note in the copy of this report, probably by J. Peters, Mayhew’s private secretary, commented that the £211m reduction was not totally related to reductions in ships, and that £80m of the savings would come from buying cheaper helicopters. However, the reality behind the Navy’s new plan was clear – reductions in the carrier programme itself, without dramatically recasting and reducing the carrier design, could only be relatively minimal. Any further savings would have to come from cutting other parts of the naval programme. Peck did, however, point out that further savings of £70m could be achieved if the Buccaneer strike aircraft was not upgraded, and a further £40m saved if the total number of Buccaneers purchased was 113 instead of 147 (an increase introduced in the recent Navy Department paper) at a cost of the number of strike aircraft available east of Suez reduced by a third. Peck also noted the Minister (RN)’s assertion that the cost to procure replacement ship-based missile systems to replace the carrier’s strike and air defence capability would be more than the savings made from not building the carriers, but made it clear that he could not

45 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 21, D/DS4/20/25, 15 September 1965 [their emphasis]. 46 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 10, Healey to Hardman, 12 August 1965. 47 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 14 (covered by enclosure 15), ‘Alternative Carrier Fleets in the 1970s’, 20 August 1965. 90 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic comment on the potential costs suggested by the Navy Department.48 The Navy’s attempt to reduce costs in other parts of its budget, rather than in the carrier programme, had been transparent from the start and now this had been confirmed.

The Buccaneer 2*

The Buccaneer 2*, a proposed development of the existing naval strike aircraft, had been put forward in mid 1964 as an alternative to the TSR-2 or the F-111. It would be equipped with technologies originally developed for defunct aircraft developments – such as on-board computers and ‘head-up displays’ from the cancelled P.1154 and a forward looking radar originally developed for the TSR-2.49 A cost effectiveness study had confirmed that the Buccaneer 2* would deliver a 100 per cent increase in lethality and effectiveness for only an approximate 10 per cent increase in price over the Buccaneer 2.50 A further version, the Buccaneer 2** would have even more sophisticated land-strike capabilities with many of the technologies developed for the TSR-2. These were options the RAF was not keen on: they were specifically naval aircraft and although they could be adapted for land use or interoperability, if adopted they might provide a further argument in favour of keeping the carriers. Many years later at a meeting of the RAF Historical Society, Healey, regretting the decision not to procure the Buccaneer 2*, attributed RAF hostility to a ‘not made here [that is, developed by or for the RAF] mentality’.51 An argument based on the Buccaneer and CVA-01 in place of the F-111 and the island strategy would be a much more difficult one for the RAF to counter. The difficulties in assessing the qualities of the different aircraft types meant that Sir Arthur Cottrell, the Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser at the Ministry of Defence, was commissioned to write a report comparing the capabilities of the two aircraft.52 The result, as described by Pat Nairne, was a ‘notable comeback by the Buccaneer aircraft’.53 It was shown that two Buccaneer 2* aircraft could do the job of one F-111, and as two Buccaneer 2* were estimated to cost the price of one F-111, without the added problems of foreign exchange costs, the issue became a much closer one.54 However, there was a problem: the Buccaneer 2* would not be ready until 1971–

48 Ibid. 49 AVIA 6/23078, ‘Effectiveness of Buccaneer 2 and 2*’, June 1965, Introduction, p. 5. 50 DSIR 23/33256, ‘Cost and cost effectiveness comparison of Buccaneer 2 and 2*’, July 1965. Conclusion, p. 7. 51 Denis Healey, ‘Recollections of a Secretary of State for Defence’, Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal, 31 (2004): 9. 52 DEFE 13/747, ‘Cottrell Report (Buccaneer/F-111)’. 53 DEFE 13/114, enclosure 31, Nairne to Healey, 18 September 1965. 54 DEFE 13/747, ‘Cottrell Report’, para. 30; DEFE 13/114, ibid. The Navy Alone 91

73, some years later than the F-111, with 50 aircraft available by the end of 1973. On the other hand, trials of the existing Buccaneer 2 against US aircraft had been favourable.55 A later assessment of the interoperability of the Buccaneer 2* between the RAF and Navy provided only a partially positive conclusion, with questions over the need for the regular change-over of aircraft to maintain interoperable efficiency, and the availability of sufficient deck space for training.56 Pat Nairne suggested studies on possible Buccaneer 2*/F-111 mixes and the firming up of Cottrell’s figures.57 At the Defence Council meeting of 7 October (see below), Healey requested that Elworthy look at possible mixes of strike aircraft did not ask for an investigation of the Buccaneer 2* as an alternative to the F-111, only as a complement to it.58 The RAF’s preference for the F-111 indicates that the Air Force Department was perfectly happy to see much of what was left of the British military aircraft industry die rather than accept an aircraft developed for the Fleet Air Arm – such was the level of inter-service rivalry and mistrust – even when the cost differences were negligible and the foreign exchange implications favourable. Healey was willing to bow to RAF demands in order to get the carrier cancelled, attesting to the continued power of the service departments: the Secretary of State could alienate one service department, but not two in order to push through his defence expenditure reductions. That the Navy Department did not make more of the re-emergence of the Buccaneer 2* as a viable alternative to the F-111 is one of the mysteries of the Defence Review. Pat Nairne did note that the resurrection of the Buccaneer still did not solve the Navy’s problem of ensuring that two carriers would be available east of Suez (the minimum number considered essential to provide a significant air strike capability), but at least raising British built Buccaneers and carriers as an alternative to the US-built F-111 could have turned the argument into one in which the carrier force was explicitly placed against a single alternative weapon system, rather than as an add-on to existing capabilities. This would have given the Air Force Department the more arduous task of defending the effectiveness of its chosen aircraft, rather than just criticising the Navy Department’s plans without the need to argue in favour of any alternative. As has been seen, Healey himself in retrospect thought that the Buccaneer 2* would probably have been a better option (it is probably less likely to have been cancelled as the F-111 eventually was). In short, it had the ultimately unrealised potential to weaken the case against carriers; and the proof of its effectiveness came from an independent report by someone who definitely could not be seen as a Navy sympathiser.

55 DEFE 13/115, enclosure 5/1, Hardman to Nairne. 56 DEFE 4/190, CoS 52nd meeting, item 2, 12 October 1965. 57 DEFE 13/114, enclosure 31, Nairne to Healey, 18 September 1965. 58 DEFE 10/511, DC/M (65) 7 item 2, p. 15. 92 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

The Chief Scientific Adviser Intervenes

In late September, Solly Zuckerman, the Chief Scientific Adviser at the Ministry of Defence, weighed into the sea-/land-based air power debate. Zuckerman was extremely sceptical about the Air Department’s arguments. Echoing Balogh’s concerns in the previous year, he doubted that it was realistically possible to compare two completely different weapon systems. Zuckerman used the example of trying to compare the effectiveness of an anti- tank gun with close-support aircraft. Although aspects of what they did fulfilled a similar role, the way they did it and the different circumstances in which they operated made straight comparison almost impossible. Leading on from this, Zuckerman argued that the argument had been too narrowly defined to the benefit of the less flexible and ultimately useful weapon system. ‘I can recall disputes on the relative merits of different target-systems for strategic air attack where the debate was made to focus on some particular isolate within a total situation, as opposed to comparing alternative functional systems of vast complexity as a whole. The outcome was always false, costly and tragic’.59 Zuckerman was also concerned that the Air Department were underestimating the difficulties of coordinating land-based aircraft and forces at sea. He madeit clear that making such coordination effective would be a particularly difficult and expensive task. This element of Zuckerman’s argument was perhaps the one that, in the long run, had the most significance and his description of the required system used a striking image from the natural world – a fascinating premonition of the network centric warfare concept of the late 1990s: ‘We are talking about the establishment for the first time of a vast system of interacting human and technical components more complex than any we have ever achieved – something almost akin to a new biological system. If we take that path, let us do so in the clear realisation of this fact, and of the additional fact that no one knows what the cost would be’.60 In addition, RAF land-based aircraft flying from bases many hundreds of miles from the ships that they would be operating with would be much less effective and flexible: taking longer to get into the operational arena, and requiring higher flying intensity (and thus placing greater strain on aircraft maintenance and pilot effectiveness). Zuckerman also argued that it was impossible to compare the comparative ‘vulnerability’ of carriers compared to airfields as there was ‘no fixed framework within which to make the comparison, and circumstances [can] alter cases’.61 Bearing all this in mind, Zuckerman therefore had considerable doubts about the ability to take on the tasks of naval air power with only a relatively few additions to the Royal Air Force. ‘My great fear is that for the RAF to discharge the responsibilities now ostensibly borne by the Navy, and for us to be certain that

59 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 22, Zuckerman to Healey, 22 September 1965. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid., paras 16–20 and 22. The Navy Alone 93 for all its flexibility the RAF would be there to do the job when required, it would be necessary to add to its strength not just an equivalent number of aircraft of various types, but probably twice that number’. Combined with the ‘establishment of a totally new system of operation’ as he had outlined above, he felt that it would be impossible to achieve this by just adding a small number of aircraft to the RAF’s inventory.62 Zuckerman’s note had put the anti-Air Force Department case in much more effective terms than the Navy had been, or appeared to be, able to do. However, there were three matters that limited its impact. The first was the distrust Healey had of Zuckerman. As with Mountbatten and Wigg, Healey had been trying to freeze Zuckerman out of defence decision-making since he had become Secretary of State in October 1964.63 Healey would eventually succeed by ensuring that Zuckerman was promoted out of the Ministry as Chief Scientific Adviser to the Government, but at this stage, the fact that the argument was coming from him lessened the likelihood that the Secretary of State could be persuaded. Second, and this was exploited to considerable effect by the Chief of the Air Staff in his response to Zuckerman: the Chief Scientific Adviser had only assessed the merits and demerits of a sea-based intervention strategy compared to a land- based one on a basis of what was operationally most effective; he did not once mention the need for defence expenditure reductions or the costings involved of the different options – the real driving factor in the defence review. In other words, he was not answering the fundamental question of which equipment must go to achieve the required reductions, only questioning the arguments of the RAF. Finally, from the point of view of the Navy Department, Zuckerman was not in fact a supporter of CVA-01 at all. In his note, Zuckerman had a pessimistic attitude regarding the ability of Britain to remain even a second-level world role over the coming decades and therefore recommended that the horizon for the requirement for carriers should not be any longer than up to 1980. This was a position that made CVA-01 (to complete in 1972) and CVA-02 (1974) almost impossible to justify. The best illustration of his ambivalence about the carrier was his comments toward the end of the note that ‘if carriers are likely to prove an unnecessary luxury in the near future, so, too, I fear, will long-range supersonic strike aircraft’. This sentence also makes clear Zuckerman’s real target. His real concern was to counter what he felt to be the strong weaknesses in the RAF argument, rather than any intrinsic strength in the Navy Department position. In particular, the expense of replacing carrier air power had been significantly underestimated: ‘I see ahead a vast region of unexplored costs … I can see savings if we eliminate our carriers and put nothing in their place. Once we embark on compensatory changes, I not only see our savings slipping through our fingers – I see a danger of costs rising’.64 He argued instead for the cancellation of the F-111, its replacement by

62 ibid., paras 26–7. 63 Healey, The Time of My Life, p. 260. 64 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 22, note, Zuckerman to Healey, para. 35. 94 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic the Buccaneer 2* (made interoperable between the Navy and air force) and an as ‘economic’ as possible carrier policy, although the Chief Scientific Adviser did not specify exactly what this meant. This last factor would have some impact on the battle for the carrier, but in not a way that would support the Navy Department case for CVA-01. It appears to have been partly responsible for leading to the consideration of buying a second-hand US carrier, Shangri-La as a cost-effective alternative, and to the Chief of the Defence Staff’s proposal of stretching the lifespan of the existing carrier force to 1975. The irony was, therefore, that the strongest case put in favour of carrier air power during the 15 months between the coming of Labour into power and the eventual cancellation of CVA-01, had not come from a supporter of that piece of equipment, and therefore, it in fact did little to advance the Navy Department’s case. Zuckerman’s note set off a train of correspondence over the next month, argument and counter-argument that added little to what had already been raised and probably did little to move the issue on further, not least because of Healey’s dislike of Zuckerman. The main weakness of Zuckerman’s report was keenly brought out by Elworthy in response: ‘we have a financial problem; deletion of fleet carriers is suggested as a contribution to the solution. CSA does not, so far as I know, deny the problem, but concentrates on attacking this suggestion; I shall study his criticisms, and comment further upon them. But what is his own solution?’65 Healey concurred with Elworthy’s assessment about the need to reduce costs being paramount, and replied to Luce noting that a re-examination of the maritime role would be necessary: ‘I can fully understand your concern about this issue, and I have noted the points which you have made. For my part, I believe that we shall have to set in hand, as I have said in my Defence Council paper, a closer study of the maritime air tasks which we can expect to arise, and the way in which it may be best to perform them in the longer term’.66

Buying the Shangri-La and Keeping the Carriers on until 1975

By mid September 1965 a reluctant recognition of some of Zuckerman’s arguments and the acceptance that there would be a ‘carrier gap’ led to the consideration of carrier options in the 1970s other than CVA-01. The first of these was the purchase of second-hand US carriers in placeof CVA-01 to provide an east of Suez presence until the mid 1970s. The response of the Admiralty Board was not positive. Conversion costs of the Shangri-La would be £18 m, the vessel would require 1,000 extra crew and the habitability of the American vessel was considered inferior to that of HMS Eagle, the second-

65 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 23, Elworthy to Healey, 23 September 1965. 66 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 32, Healey to Elworthy, 7 October 1965; Healey to Luce, 7 October 1965, enclosure 33. The Navy Alone 95 oldest active British fleet carrier.67 The Admiralty Board gave their findings to the Secretary of State, emphasising how much cheaper the revised carrier plan of 6 August would be. The worst option was the replacement of all British carriers except Eagle by two US carriers: it was agreed that though the disadvantages were obvious and quite out of proportion to the small annual savings likely under the most favourable assumptions, the minute to the Secretary of State would rate Option C as ‘technically feasible in the last resort’.68 The replacement of Hermes by one US carrier was regarded as ‘feasible’ if it were essential to improve the strike capability of the carrier plan up to 1974: but that detailed costings would be needed to confirm this. The second approach to filling the carrier gap was maintaining the existing carrier force until 1975 (instead of 1970s as had earlier been planned), but not replacing the vessels as they retired. The Secretary of State asked for a report looking into keeping the carrier force until 1969/70, 1971/72 or 1974/75 under a variety of assumptions that Shangri-La would be purchased but given minimum modifications, that ‘the future of FAA aircrew were suitably safeguarded … [and] that satisfactory arrangements were made for the performance of maritime air tasks after the carriers had gone out of service’.69 That the Secretary of State had conceded this much was a partial success and Luce intended to take full advantage: he produced a report that emphasised the overwhelming need for CVA-01 and CVA-02. Failing this option, running on the carrier force to 1975 would be difficult enough without adding in the complications, costs and manning problems produced by purchasing an old US carrier. He did not believe that keeping the carriers going in this way would be cost effective in any case. Luce used the example of Ark Royal, which would need a £30m refit to enable her to carry Phantoms, even though she would probably only have a few years of service left.70 The Chief of the Naval Staff also pointed out the recruitment problems for the Fleet Air Arm if new pilots knew that they might be joining a dying service and the throwing out of balance of the fleet as a whole by the withdrawal of the carrier force.71 Luce continued: ‘if therefore, the object of a decision not to build CVA-01 and to run down the carrier force is to contribute to the problem of the Defence budget in the period from 1969/70 to 1975/76, this particular scheme would evidently not have the desired result. I would not in any case recommend it’. Appended calculations for buying one US carrier and running on two existing carriers showed that from 1970–71 to 1973–74, the proposed plan to run on carriers to 1975 would cost approximately £20m a year more than the new carrier

67 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 25, Private Office note, 23 September 1965. 68 Ibid. 69 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 28, Luce to Healey, 1 October 1965. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 96 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic plan of August, and between £54m and £87m a year more than the Navy without carriers plan.72 In addition, there would be large capability gaps in the early seventies if running the carriers on and buying second-hand US vessels. In reviewing the capabilities if the carriers were run on, but a US vessel was not purchased, the results were not encouraging. Adequate air defence against high-flying enemies would not be available between 1970 and 1972, and air defence against low-flying enemies and surface strike would not be adequate until 1975–76 when projected replacement missile systems had been developed.73 CNS also noted that the F-111 would not be available until 1972, but that up to this point the RAF planned to allocate naval Buccaneers to take over the Army support role in place of the threatened P.1127. The various options involving buying a US vessel and keeping on a selection of the current carriers did not produce a much better result.74 In effect, Luce was giving Healey a stark choice: either approve CVA-01 or scrap the carriers as quickly as possible. Any sort of compromise would be a false economy and the worst of both worlds: ‘nothing I have seen in the various studies which have taken place during the Defence Review have altered my firm belief that in our present knowledge there are no satisfactory alternative means of performing the maritime air tasks now carried out by the aircraft carrier’.75 However, this foray into compromise options would not be the last of this sort, and would provide the kernel of the post-CVA-01 carrier plans under Luce’s successor. The Chief of the Defence Staff in particular tried to resurrect the proposal to extend the life of the carriers as long as possible, this time by turning the Buccaneer over to the RAF and operating Phantom-only carriers, with this aircraft operating in a limited strike capability in addition to its fighter role.76

Ministerial Manoeuvring in the Ministry of Defence: Vultures Circle and the Bystanders Scatter

By September it was becoming clearer, if it had not been the case in July, that Healey did not want the new carrier built. The manoeuvrings of the ministers under him demonstrate the extent to which this decision had become seen as a fait accompli. Christopher Mayhew was causing considerable frustration to his Secretary of State, as a dogged but perhaps not tactically adept defender of the Navy’s position. Mayhew’s main avenue of attack since June had been to emphasise, at nearly every

72 Ibid., Annex B. 73 Ibid., Annex A. 74 Ibid., Annex B. 75 Ibid. 76 DEFE 25/173, Air Chief Marshal Alfred Earle (Vice Chief of the Defence Staff) to General (Chief of the Defence Staff), Annex A, 28 October 1965; and undated draft. The Navy Alone 97 opportunity available, that an overall foreign policy picture and an understanding of future commitments was needed before any considerations of equipment were considered. Mayhew’s hope was that a Foreign Office confirmation that existing commitments had to be kept would then confirm the need to keep the carriers and build CVA-01. This general approach, without the preservation of carriers, is what had lain behind the Healey plan, but as has been seen had not gone any further due to opposition from senior civil servants in the ‘political departments’. Mayhew’s method of attack appears to have done much to use up any political capital he might have had. For example, he decided to raise the issue at Healey’s monthly defence ministerial meetings. These meetings, at which all Ministry of Defence ministers attended, served as an administrative ‘catch-up’ session and at which policy matters were expressly not discussed. Mayhew’s impromptu advocacy in favour of a commitments review and in defence of the carrier at one such meeting in September was met by a stony cold ‘this was noted’ in the minutes of the meeting, with no further discussion on the subject, and a speedy return to the routine administrative matters for the which the meeting was meant.77 Mayhew’s next approach in a memo was to suggest that the Ministry of Defence should ‘place the final emphasis … on the broad argument of commitments/capabilities, where the whole Ministry of Defence has common cause against the economic/political departments’. He continued by noting that the abolition of major equipment types (such as the aircraft carrier) without any concurrent cuts in commitments would send the wrong signal to enemies, and that: ‘As Service Ministers our first responsibility is to press for what we need, and leave the restriction of expenditure to others’.78 By advocating such an approach, Mayhew was fundamentally misunderstanding Healey. An ambitious, technocratic and activist Secretary of State in a two-year- old department, he saw himself as shaping the defence environment and the new department whilst pushing through difficult decisions as a platform for a successful cabinet career. Mayhew’s suggestion essentially appeared to propose that Ministers become no more than cheerleaders for service vested interests and defenders of the status quo; something that Mayhew was giving every impression of doing as Navy Minister. That Healey was having to compromise internally with Air Force Department interests and with the interests of his senior civil servants to bring about his desired ends, does not contradict the perceptions that must have been created by such a maladroit approach. It is not surprising that Mayhew did not have a united team behind him. Joseph Mallalieu, the parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Defence for the Royal Navy, Mayhew’s political number two, made clear that he saw submarines as the future for the Royal Navy, believing that both the carrier and the proposed command cruiser would not be relevant in the future. In a note to Mayhew, he stated that ‘my own hunch is that, over the next 15–20 years, the role of the submarine is likely to be paramount. Should we not, therefore, be thinking of

77 DEFE 13/392, enclosure 26, meeting of 13 June 1965. 78 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 17, Mayhew to Mallalieu and others, 14 September 1965. 98 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic submarines, not only as hunter-killers and replacements for strike aircraft, but as the all-purpose ships of the RN?’79 Whilst Mallalieu was absenting himself from politically contentious meetings on the carrier matter, Lord Shackleton, the Air Force Minister, implicitly assuming the decision to cancel had been made, sent a letter to Healey advising on how to deal with eventual decision to cancel from a public relations standpoint. He proposed mobilising ‘allies’ outside the Ministry of Defence (such as Jack Slessor, the retired Air Marshall) to write articles in magazines such as Flight, New Scientist and the Observer newspaper to help create a ‘favourable image of sensibly responsible and decisive decision-making of a kind that has been all but painfully lacking in the past’. Shackleton also suggested building up the role of the Navy to help restore naval morale, and cultivating those parts of the Navy who might welcome the cancellation of the carrier (such as submariners and ship- launched guided missile advocates).80 It was in this environment, in which the cancellation of the carrier was regarded as a fait accompli by a wide range of politicians within the ministry, that the Defence Council meeting of 7 October to place.

The Defence Council Meeting of 7 October 1965

Healey circulated a paper before the Defence Council meeting setting out what he saw as the main points of the carrier argument, and the decisions he wanted out of the meeting.81 The Secretary of State made it clear that ‘our forces are overstretched’, manpower was strained and making an ‘arbitrary cut of equal size’ in each of the services would not achieve the better balancing of ‘teeth and tail’ (that is, front-line and support) that would be necessary.82 At the forthcoming Defence Council, Healey stated in his note that he wanted to probe an area ‘where highly sophisticated capabilities, with heavy overheads, apparently overlap,’ namely the issue of the carrier.83 He reiterated that he believed that in the 1970s the United Kingdom would not engage alone in military operations against sophisticated opposition, and set out two questions that would need answering: first, the case for dropping carriers ‘not so much on the likelihood that the operational value of carriers will decline (though it may), but on the hard fact that we cannot have a carrier plan which will give us value for money where and when we can expect to need it’.84 Second, the ‘interim years’ as the existing carrier fleet is gradually reduced and new systems put in place to replace the

79 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 19, Mallalieu to Mayhew, 14 September 1965. 80 DEFE 13/115, enclosure 20, Lord Shackleton to Healey, 6 October 1965. 81 DEFE 10/511, DC/P (65) 20, 5 October 1965. 82 Ibid., pp. 1–2. 83 Ibid., p. 2. 84 Ibid. The Navy Alone 99 lost capability. Appended to Healey’s note was a short summary of the Navy’s alternative carrier plan: it would cost £1,350m and from 1971 there would be three carriers – one east of Suez, one in home waters and one in refit, and only from 1974 would the plan reach full maturity with the completion of CVA-02. Throughout the 1970s, only 18 strike and 12 fighter aircraft minimum would be available east of Suez out of a total aircraft buy of 100. It also seemed likely that there would not be enough ships available east of Suez for efficient interoperability between Royal Naval and RAF aircraft for efficiency savings to be made. Healey’s critique of the importance of the carrier in the intervention role east of Suez was strong: carriers might be ‘perhaps highly desirable’ but ‘would appear to be marginal in relation to the substantial costs of the carrier plan’.85 He pointed out that the functional cost comparisons of carrier-based and land-based aircraft put the former at a ratio 2.5 to 1 to the latter. Such high costs might have been worth it if land-based squadrons could be dispensed with, but the restricted deployment of carriers east of Suez – with only 1.5 available at any one time – would mean that no RAF squadrons could be sacrificed in the Indian Ocean.86 The strong assertions in Healey’s note of the case against the carrier programme made it seem likely that Healey would use the Defence Council as a forum to push for the cancellation of the carrier, and a full face-to-face discussion of the merits and demerits of the carrier. The members of the Admiralty Board met informally at their ‘council of war’ the day before to consider how to approach the Council meeting.87 They looked at four areas, dealing with the issues raised by Healey’s note. First, regarding the timing of the decision to cancel or approve the carriers, the Admiralty Board agreed a line that proposed that ‘we could hardly gain at this stage a positive endorsement of the new carrier programme: but we should aim at least to postpone a decision on the future of the carrier force until the large uncertainties of the review had been cleared up’.88 As with Mayhew’s arguments the previous month, the Admiralty Board was looking to a commitments study that might preserve the need to intervene in a form close to that required under CoS (62)1 in order to justify maintaining the carrier fleet. Second, the Board would emphasise the fact that the ‘British Government [would no longer be able] to apply sea power as a means of pursuing strategic aims,’89 even though a now often used counter-argument that land-based air power could deliver such strategic aims without the need for sea power would be the obvious rejoinder. Third, the board sought to counter claims that the Navy had insufficient manpower to man the proposed carrier force, by stating that much of the manpower if the carriers were cancelled would transfer to the RAF and would therefore not resolve that particular problem. This response really only dealt with

85 Ibid., pp. 5–6. 86 Ibid., p. 6. 87 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 30, Private Office note, 6 October 1965. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid. 100 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic the aircrew/air mechanic manpower issue; the general naval manpower shortage was not addressed. Fourth, with respect to savings and costs, the Admiralty Board sought to emphasise the much reduced costs of the new carrier plan, and the small differences of such costs to the ‘Navy without carriers’ alternative. The figures given in Healey’s paper were to be countered by pointed out that ‘the figures in the Secretary of State’s paper were based on most favourable assumptions’, and ignored the additional costs of running down the carrier force as well as the unknown costs of the coordination system to ensure that land-based aircraft could defend maritime forces.90 As will be seen, although the naval leadership was able to achieve its first objective, the Council meeting did not go as had been expected or hoped by the Admiralty Board. The Secretary of State, with his aggressive note circulated three days before, effectively wrong-footed Mayhew and Luce when he opened the discussion by stating that it was not the purpose of the meeting ‘to reach a decision’ on the carrier programme, nor that the Council should be ‘discussing the case for or against carriers as such’.91 Instead, Healey stated that the Ministry of Defence could no longer wait for the political departments to arrive at a reduced set of commitments; it had to show the political departments that even if a hypothetical decision not to procure were to be made on a programme – and he proposed the carrier programme as the hypothetical example – the £2,000m figure could still not be met by 1969/70. This, Healey stated, would then force the political departments into realising that capabilities would be lost and therefore commitments would have to be trimmed or a larger defence budget accepted. Healey then proposed that the meeting proceed with Luce and Mayhew setting out the operational and political consequences of a decision not to replace the carriers, Zuckerman would then lead a discussion on how land-based aircraft might replace carrier-borne aircraft in the role, Mayhew would then discuss how the Fleet Air Arm could contribute to a land-based maritime air force, and finally Hardman would follow up with a discussion on costs and finally Elworthy would discuss the impact of the carrier cancellation on the RAF strike and reconnaissance programme.92 This opening by Healey was both disingenuous and ingenious in the extreme. Perhaps aware that the naval leadership would not concede on the issue of the carrier at the meeting, the Secretary of State had decided to use the fiction of passing to the Oversea Policy and Defence Committee an hypothetical capability cut (conveniently, the carrier programme) in order to bring the political departments ‘to their senses’. This was nonsense: the political departments and the rest of the committee would have happily taken the cut in defence expenditure offered by the loss of the carriers, and then push for more, and Healey must have known this.

90 Ibid. 91 DEFE 10/511, DC/M (65) 7 item 2, p. 1, 7 October 1965. 92 Ibid., p. 2. The Navy Alone 101

It was certainly pointed out to him by Mayhew at the meeting.93 This approach allowed Healey to agree ostensibly that commitments would need cutting, whilst in fact offering the carrier programme on a plate to the committee. Healey’s opening also had the effect of moving the whole meeting away from the premises that Luce and Mayhew were preparing to argue under. Instead of a straight discussion of the arguments for and against the carrier programme, Healey now pushed the whole discussion towards the assumption that the carrier programme had been abandoned. The First Sea Lord and the Navy Minister were now being asked to state what capabilities would be lost with the cancellation of the carrier and how the Fleet Air Arm would be affected. Like many who are wrong-footed in a meeting and are unable to think quickly enough on their feet, Luce and Mayhew then proceeded to answer the question they had originally planned to answer – why the carrier should not be cancelled – rather than the one unexpectedly asked of them by the Secretary of State – what would be the direct operational consequences of not having carriers. Mayhew set out three main reasons for keeping the carrier programme: cancellation would increase overstretch, it would reduce the level of deterrent available in limited war situations and savings would be negligible. Mayhew stated that the plan given to him by the Secretary of State, which included the continuance of the P.1127, would cost £160m more over 10 years than the alternative carrier plan.94 Healey was, however, after direct examples of commitments that could no longer be carried out without carriers. Luce raised the significance of carriers for Plan Addington, the defence of Malaysia against a full-scale Indonesian invasion, but this was brushed aside by Healey, who asserted that that particular commitment could be undertaken by land-based aircraft. Luce could then only answer that carriers provided flexibility and the ability to have more than one way to undertake a task. He and Mayhew then continued by countering some of the criticisms levelled at the carrier plan. They disputed the 2.5 to 1 ratio for the cost against operational availability of RAF against FAA aircraft, by stating that it did not take account of the operational availability of those FAA aircraft at domestic airbases rather than at sea, which they argued took the ratio nearer to 1.4 to 1. They also took issue with some of the arguments about the amount of time carriers could remain operational – 30 days continuous operations being much longer than could be achieved by land-based aircraft operating from island bases providing air cover for surface vessels. Mayhew again stressed that guidance from the political departments on commitments would be necessary before any decision could be made on equipment. The argument that a shortage of carriers in the early 1970s would make a carrier presence east of Suez untenable was countered by Luce who suggested that the lease of the US carrier Shangri-La might be possible to cover the gap.95

93 Ibid., pp. 4–5. 94 Ibid., pp. 3–5. 95 Ibid., p. 6. 102 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Elworthy smoothly batted away the 30-day operational argument by stating that the RAF merely questioned how realistic 30 days of operations in bad sea states were, and on the cost/operational availability ratios of RAF and FAA aircraft, he added that other factors could be added to the land case to make the 2.5 to 1 ratio even higher in favour of RAF aircraft.96 The Deputy Secretary of State, Fred Mulley, weighed in to challenge Mayhew’s assertion that the political departments would have to make commitment decisions first by stating that ‘surely we did not need the guidance of political departments’ to realise that intervening alone east of Suez against strong opposition should not be attempted during the 1970s.97 Healey finished by stating that from Luce and Mayhew he had hoped for a more concrete and precise description of what would be lost if there were no carriers. For example, if certain air bases were no longer available, such as Cyprus, what would carriers be able to achieve – how much could they replace land-based air power.98 Without waiting for answers, Healey moved the discussion on to the issue of the maritime air tasks of aircraft carriers. Solly Zuckerman led this part of the discussion, but concluded that in the time frame available a full study of the ability of land-based aircraft to undertake maritime air roles would not be possible. No doubt Zuckerman’s early comments about the coordination of sea operations with land-based air power constituting a new ‘organism’ of military operations led to this assessment, but it did serve to draw the argument away from the weaknesses in the RAF’s case concerning land- based airpower operating at medium-to-long range and their ability to respond effectively to maritime challenges. Zuckerman instead then offered his solution to the problem – the purchase or lease of second-hand US carriers instead of building CVA-01. Even the Navy’s strongest remaining supporter amongst the senior officials at the Ministry of Defence was not supporting the carrier programme. Mayhew countered this by arguing that two US carriers leased until 1979 would cost more to convert and provide more manning problems than the alternative carrier plan and that British shipyards would lose out. The Navy Minister came close to contradicting Luce by his attack on the US purchase option, but seemed to pull back from this by finally suggesting the purchase of one US carrier to complement CVA-01 and CVA-02 after 1975 instead of operating Eagle.99 This incredible intervention not only set the Navy Minister against his most sympathetic ally, but appeared to suggest differences of opinion with the First Sea Lord. Mayhew then finished with a new and seemingly ad hoc modification to the alternative carrier plan, by adding a US vessel which he had just condemned as too expensive. In the confusion, Zuckerman withdrew his US carrier suggestion,

96 Ibid., p. 7. 97 Ibid., pp. 7–8. 98 Ibid., p. 8. 99 Ibid., p. 9. The Navy Alone 103 leaving the floor open to Elworthy to return to his favoured argument over the intervention role of carriers.100 The Chief of the Air Staff suggested that in the intervention role, supporting the landing of troops, the command and control facilities of frigates and the radar of Phantom aircraft combined the ‘normal RAF forward air control facilities’ could compensate for the loss of the command and control capabilities of an aircraft carrier.101 Eighteen land-based Buccaneers and 12 Phantoms flying from over 600 nautical miles away and refuelled during flight could undertake the sort of intervention a carrier might achieve. This drew strong responses from Luce who argued that frigates did not have the capability to control aircraft over land and only limited control capabilities at sea, and from Zuckerman that existing Phantom nose-cone radar was not capable of undertaking the role Elworthy was suggesting for it.102 Healey closed down this discussion by suggesting studies led by Zuckerman to explore these issues. Both Luce and Mayhew then started to stress the morale issues within the FAA of cancelling the carrier, followed by a response from Healey that recognised the significance of the morale issue, but swiftly moved onto the financial aspects of the carrier programme.103 Here the discussion became extremely contentious. From notes passed between Mayhew and Hardman after the meeting it seems that Hardman stated that the savings from cancelling the carrier programme would be £1,000m but given the additional spending by both the Navy and the RAF to provide the capability to replace the carriers, the net total savings would be either £300m if the Navy’s estimates were accepted or £700m if the RAF’s estimates were accepted. Mayhew disputed these figures and managed to get a change in minutes of the Defence Council meeting to state that the actual savings would be close to zero if the Navy’s numbers were correct or £430 if the RAF’s were.104 The meeting then went on to discuss the RAF strike reconnaissance role in the light of the recent Buccaneer 2*/F-111 study that suggested that ‘the new version of the Buccaneer 2* could do much of the work of the F-111’. Neither Mayhew nor Luce added to this discussion and allowed Healey to proceed with studies led by Elworthy looking at a modified ‘mix’ of new strike aircraft – procuring the F-111 but complementing it with small numbers of other aircraft types including the

100 Ibid., pp. 9–10. 101 Ibid., p. 10. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid., p. 11. 104 For notes between Mayhew and Hardman see: DEFE 69/481, enclosures 34 and 35, ‘Defence Review Costings Figures’, note by Hardman (covered by note dated 8 October 1965) and Hardman to Mayhew, 8 October 1965. The Defence Council minutes in DEFE 10/511, DC/M (65) 7 item 2, p. 12, give the modified figure after Mayhew’s alterations were accepted. 104 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Buccaneer 2*, rather than replacing the F-111 with the Buccaneer 2* completely.105 Probably the last significant chance to push for a radical argument combining the carrier and the Buccaneer 2* instead of the F-111 was not taken. Healey then outlined the studies he wanted undertaking as a result of the discussions: Zuckerman to review specific scenarios for maritime air operations, Mayhew to assess the problems for the Fleet Air Arm if carriers were phased out by 1970, Elworthy to provide recommendations on the strike mix, and Hardman to re-evaluate his numbers.106 The first immediate outcome of the meeting shows Healey’s attitude following the Defence Council meeting. At his next meeting with the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State confidently asserted that ‘it had become clear that not more than three carriers could be manned by the Navy in the 1970s and a force of this size would not be cost effective. It had also been established that the cost of having Royal Naval aircraft was three times as high as Royal Air Force aircraft’.107 He went on to state that if the ‘option of independent action’ in the Far East versus a sophisticated enemy (that is, the strategy of CoS (62)1) was abandoned, carriers could be withdrawn from service completely by 1970 and would also lead to substantial savings in the RAF and Army. All of these statements, with the exception of the fact that the Navy could not man more than three carriers in the 1970s, were deeply contentious. The Navy would certainly the challenge the comparison of naval and RAF aircraft costs – and even if the RAF and Healey’s own assessments were believed this would have been 2.5 to 1, not 3 to 1, whilst the assertion that large savings would accrue from the Army and Air Force if CoS (62)1 was dropped would certainly be strongly challenged and disputed by the Air Force and Army Boards. Healey’s private secretary, Pat Nairne, was aware that circulation of this minute could be potential dynamite and discretely noted at the bottom of the memo, written by Prime Minister’s office staff, that the note was ‘a bit broad and free’ and that there should be ‘no wider circulation’ and that it was ‘not an entirely accurate record’.108 That the Prime Minister’s office would completely mishear large parts of Healey’s discussions is difficult to believe; what is almost certain is that these notes were the reflections by a confident Healey of the arguments for and against the carrier right after attending the Council meeting that morning.

Conclusion

The Defence Council meeting of 7 October was an important watershed in the carrier debate. Although CVA-01 was not cancelled, and as a result the outcome

105 DEFE 10/511, DC/M (65) 7 item 2, pp. 13–14. 106 Ibid., p. 15; DEFE 69/481, enclosure 36, Healey to various, 8 October 1965. 107 DEFE 13/115, enclosure 21/1, folios 83–7, notes of meeting between Healey and Wilson, 8 October 1965. 108 Ibid. The Navy Alone 105 could not be regarded as a complete defeat for the Admiralty Board – although Healey had made sure that direct discussion of cancellation would not be on the agenda – it had two main consequences, neither of which boded well for the Navy Department. First, it marked a failure by Luce and Mayhew to convince the Secretary of State in a forum in which all the Chiefs, ministers and senior civil servants were present that CVA-01 was a viable option for maintaining Britain’s commitments either east or west of Suez, or at the very least that it was an option that at least had a strong argument behind it. Mayhew’s arguments in particular during the meeting had seemed to lack coherence, and Healey had controlled the discussion and outcome of the Council from start to finish. None of Mayhew or Luce’s arguments had appeared to strike home. Second, it put in train a series of rapid studies almost all of which assumed, implicitly or explicitly, the cancellation of CVA-01. Zuckerman’s intervention in the carrier debate had raised the vital issue of the coordination of land-based aircraft over the sea – a key argument to defend the maritime role of the carrier, and it seemed that one of the naval leadership’s most sympathetic civilian counterparts was now engaging actively in the bureaucratic battle. But Zuckerman was not in fact a CVA-01 advocate, he was just strongly sceptical of the RAF’s claims for the island strategy and high-level bombing. His suggestions for buying US carriers instead of building CVA-01 – a naval equivalent of the substitution of TSR-2 by the F-111 – did not find favour with the naval leadership. In the political and economic climate pertaining in October 1965, it would be a considerable, if not almost impossible, challenge to ensure not just that aircraft carriers carrying the White Ensign would be at sea beyond 1970 but also that two new state-of-the-art strike carriers, the largest ever built and operated by the Royal Navy, would be ordered, built and operational in the mid 1970s, and stay in service until at least the 1990s. This page has been left blank intentionally Chapter 4 The Cancellation of CVA-01

CVA-01 had survived the Defence Council meeting, but was now clear that there was almost no support for building the vessel in any of the relevant Ministries outside the Ministry of Defence, and nor within the Ministry of Defence, beyond the boundaries of the Navy Department. Even Solly Zuckerman had not supported the carrier programme. Over the next six months the naval leadership would fight an increasingly fraught battle against cancellation and against the various compromise options being offered by Healey, Zuckerman and Hull. The carrier question would be discussed within the Ministry of Defence, at Cabinet Committee and finally at Cabinet itself, but the final denouement was not until February 1966. The last desperate gambit of the Admiralty Board had been the hope that a Conservative government would come into power and save CVA-01. It was not to be. Denis Healey remained Defence Secretary, the carrier was cancelled, and both Mayhew and Luce resigned. Ten years of lobbying had failed and the Navy appeared to be with neither a capital ship nor a clear rationale and central focus. This chapter will chart these final six months in the careers of Christopher Mayhew and David Luce and in the strange half-life of a ship that was never ordered, never built and never sailed but in which the naval leadership of the United Kingdom invested their professional hopes, aspirations and strategic assumptions to such an extent that almost everything else the naval leadership dealt with was subordinate. The chapter will ask the following questions: how did the naval leadership keep the carrier alive for so long with so little support? Why were compromises on the carrier question offered by Healey and others but rejected by the Admiralty Board? How was the carrier finally cancelled (the question ‘why was the carrier cancelled?’ is addressed in the concluding chapter to this book)? The chapter will review the aftermath of the Defence Council meeting, including arguments over costing used in the meeting, the new working party study into carriers commissioned by Denis Healey, and the papers on the presentation and problems of cancelling the aircraft carrier. It will then briefly analyse the wider arguments between the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office over commitments, before looking at the various compromise options to CVA-01 suggested after the Defence Council meeting from buying a second US carrier, to procuring a smaller vessel, reducing the aircraft complement of the carrier, and finally running on the existing carriers to 1975. The various tactical dilemmas of the Admiralty Board will also be analysed including whether to push for four or three carriers or to favour or reject interoperability. This chapter will 108 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic then track the progress of the carrier argument outside the Ministry of Defence through the Cabinet Committee system and finally to Cabinet and then the eventual cancellation. The chapter will concentrate on the carrier battle to its climax, but will also analyse a few other issues related to it, including the progress of the Type 82 and Type 19 escort designs. The submarine programme has been touched upon in the introductory chapter and will not be reviewed here; neither will the other aspects of the 1966 Defence Review which affected the Navy, which will be summarised in Chapter 5.

The Aftermath of the Defence Council Meeting

The Defence Council meeting resulted in the commissioning of a number of studies, all of which took the cancellation of the carrier as if for granted. A working party was created to study – extremely rapidly – the strategic impact of phasing out carriers in 1970, another study looked at the presentation of the cancellation to Parliament, press and the Navy itself, whilst another study reviewed the replacing of the maritime role of carriers with land-based air power. Solly Zuckerman continued to press the Navy to investigate purchasing US carriers, and the Chief of Defence Staff attempted to prod the naval leadership into considering his own compromise option. First, the Navy Minister pursued the costing figures that Hardman had produced at the Council meeting.1 Mayhew argued that the Navy’s alternative carrier plan saved £360m over 10 years over the previous plan, whilst the savings from cancelling the carrier programme would amount to £760m. The additional costs to replace that capability were disputed between the RAF and the Navy, the former arguing that it would cost only £20m, the latter £430m.2 If the mid-point figure was taken between the two then the extra costs would be £225m, producing a net saving of £760m–£225m= £535m.3 With the savings produced from the alternative carrier plan the overall cost was now only £75m over the ‘without carriers’ option. Hardman had strong doubts about the figures of the alternative carrier plan: it ‘included savings derived, inter alia, from a change of plans for helicopters, cruisers and escorts; it could be argued that these elements should be excluded from the calculations and that the figure in your table should therefore be £110m, and not £360m’.4 Mayhew felt that the cancellation of carrier would in fact need additional escorts – no doubt armed the weapon systems necessary

1 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 37, Mayhew to Hardman, 11 October 1965. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 38, Hardman to Mayhew, 12 October 1965. The Cancellation of CVA-01 109 to replace the carrier capability – rather than the reduction that Hardman implied would be necessary.5

The Working Party Study: Phasing Out Carriers by 1970

Following the Defence Council on the 7th October, Healey decided to take the carrier studies forward under a working party reviewing the strategic options of phasing out the carriers in 1970. Initially Mayhew was in the frame for chairing it, but this later changed to the Vice Chief of General Staff, and Mayhew was also bypassed in the writing up of the terms of reference for the main studies, which were approved by the Chiefs of Staff collectively.6 When Mayhew saw the terms of reference for the working party study he noted to the Chief of Defence Staff dryly that ‘I agree that the terms of reference which have been agreed by the Chiefs of Staff should produce what is wanted by the Secretary of State’.7 The working group would consist of the Vice Chiefs of the General, Naval and Air Staff and the Assistant Under-Secretary (Policy). Mayhew had been pushed ‘upstairs’ to chair a high level ‘steering group’ to which the working party would report.8 The study, analysing a number of scenarios, covered the strategic options that would be unavailable if the carrier programme were cancelled and carriers withdrawn by 1970. It worked under two hypotheses: hypothesis A – that commitments would remain as they were now, and hypothesis B – that peacekeeping East of Suez would occur largely in partnership with allies, that no intervention operations would occur beyond land-based air cover, or when the points of entry were controlled by the enemy, it also assumed that after 1970 there would be no bases in Aden, the Persian Gulf, Malaysia or Singapore, but that there would be facilities in Australia, the Indian Ocean Islands and the Mediterranean. The study would also analyse the period up to 1970 when the carrier force would be running down.9 The report was produced at great speed only three days later.10 From a limited number of scenarios produced under the two hypotheses the following conclusions were reached. Land-based air power could replace carriers with the replacement of Fleet Air Arm squadrons by RAF Squadrons at a ratio of 1:1.5. The nuclear element of SEATO Plan 4 – the defence of Thailand against a major invasion, probably

5 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 38, Hardman to Mayhew, 12 October 1965, margin notes. 6 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 40, Hull to Mayhew, 11 October 1965. 7 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 41, Mayhew to Hull, 12 October 1965. 8 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 42, Secretary of Chiefs of Staff Committee to Luce, Cassels, Elworthy, 15 October 1965. 9 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 39, ‘Effects on our Strategic options of having no Carrier force in the ‘70s’, undated, but covered by enclosure 40 (of 11 October 1965). 10 DEFE 4/190, folios 224–37, CoS 2459/15/10/65. 110 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic by China – could not be carried out without carriers, and would have to be left to the United States or delivered by F-111 aircraft if they were procured. The US/ UK plan to defend Lebanon against invasion (‘Plan Bluebat’) could not be carried out unless equivalent land-based aircraft could be provided, or the United Kingdom would have to be released from that obligation. The working group noted that the maritime role of naval airpower was being addressed in a separate study (see below). Under Hypothesis B the working group noted that existing plans lost most of their relevance, but that SEATO Plan 4 could only be carried out with allied support from air bases in Guam, New Guinea and the Philippines. Defending Malaysia or Singapore against an Indonesian attack would only be possible if land-based aircraft could be made operational from air bases in Malaysia before the threat developed. If that were not possible, reliance on US carrier air power would be complete, aside from the ability to undertake retaliatory bombing raids on Indonesian air bases flying from Australia or Cocos. Intervention operations against Kenya and Tanzania, or Nigeria, would impossible without US carrier air support unless an airfield in the area could be made operational. The study clearly showed that if British bases in Aden, Singapore, Malaysia and the Persian Gulf were not available, even with the island bases, substantial intervention operations would only be possible with US carrier air power or access to local airfields in neighbouring countries. The study had not looked into the costings of any of the options considered. The Chairman of the study, VCGS, implying that there had been considerable inter-service disagreement over the study, stated that the results were the ‘highest common factor’ of service agreement.11 He noted that the tightly defined terms of reference had meant that the study had been ‘closely circumscribed by the hypothesis on which it was based,’ and that few useful conclusions could be drawn from the study. The only firm conclusion was that in areas within range (and that range was still under dispute) of land-based airpower ‘no options were lost by the absence of aircraft carriers’.12 Within the study itself, however, it had been acknowledged that ‘withdrawal to a few bases, more remote from the areas in which we may have to operate must, in the absence of carriers, complicate the problem of providing air support and increase the task facing land-based aircraft’.13 In essence, the conclusions of the study were not unobvious – if the UK withdrew from Aden and Singapore and there were no carriers, air support operations could only take place within range of land bases, or from US air power, or from an invitation to use allies’ air bases that came early enough to make such bases operational. In here there were the kernels of arguments that might be grasped upon to justify carriers after 1970, but whether they would be enough to justify CVA-01 was another issue.

11 DEFE 4/190, CoS 53rd meeting item 4 (confidential annex), 19 October 1965. 12 Ibid. 13 DEFE 4/190, para. 31, CoS2459/15/10/65. The Cancellation of CVA-01 111

Presenting the Cancellation of CVA-01

A paper on the presentation of the cancellation of CVA-01 and the carrier programme was the second the outcome of the Defence Council meeting. The paper was split into two parts. The Under-Secretary of State (RN) Joseph Mallalieu assessed the presentation of the cancellation to the press, Parliament and the public.14 The Second Sea Lord produced a paper on presenting the cancellation to the Navy itself.15 Mallalieu’s paper reviewed the possible questions that might be asked if CVA- 01 were cancelled: would it increase overstretch, would land-based aircraft be able to fill the gap, would there be any redundancies, and what would be the cost savings? Questions about how much cancelling the carriers would save, might be difficult to answer as current estimates vary so widely. Mallalieu pointed out that Healey’s speech stating the need for a ‘stronger and more effective Navy’ at Portsmouth in the election campaign could be used to attack the government. He also noted that consultation with allies might lead to leakage of the decision early. ‘The difficulties in presenting an anti-CVA-01 decision are considerable. They would be eased if it could be announced against a background of a firm decision to cut our commitments’. It would be preferable that the 1966 White Paper would not just list cuts but also a reduction in commitments, but ‘this ideal is unrealistic’. In practice, given the refusal of the political departments to consider commitment cuts, any indication of commitment reduction would need to be given in ‘extremely general terms’. The White Paper should clearly set out what the role of the Navy would be without carriers, and the government should expect the opposition to call a debate. Healey should be prepared to appear on the news on the evening of the White Paper’s unveiling and give press conferences. The time between a decision to cancel and the announcement should be as short as possible, and if the decision were leaked, the government should not stonewall, but immediately go ahead with the announcement and press conference.16 The Second Sea Lord’s paper was more apocalyptic. Cancellation would be ‘a very severe blow to officers and ratings of the Navy’. A statement on a new naval strategy and the ‘long term intentions for the Fleet’ would be necessary. The Ministry of Defence would have to answer the following questions: ‘why have we been subjected to this constant struggle to maintain carriers East of Suez in order to deal with confrontation and now, suddenly, with confrontation still going on and no replacement available, carriers are no longer necessary?’ Is the Royal Navy now merely an ancillary of United States Navy? How will the RAF

14 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 43, Mallalieu to Mayhew, 15 October 1965. 15 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 45, ‘Defence Review: Presentation to the Navy (Memorandum by Second Sea Lord)’, 19 October 1965. 16 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 43, Mallalieu to Mayhew, 15 October 1965. 112 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic replace maritime air role of the Royal Navy? What is being achieved by scrapping carriers? Are commitments being cut as well?17 If no convincing answers can be found, the additional question would have to be answered: ‘Why are ‘they’ (the Admiralty Board) letting this happen?’ The Second Sea Lord regretted ‘however that I am not able to suggest what answers could be given and guidance from the Secretary of State is essential. It is of the utmost importance that the answers are clear and unequivocal. I must emphasise the vital importance of not trying to deceive anyone with falsehoods or half truths’. The Second Sea Lord continued: ‘as regards the fixed wing element of the FAA who will see their careers capsized and who feel more strongly on this whole subject, no possible explanation will be acceptable. It will therefore be important to indicate how their futures may be redirected’. The Second Sea Lord then proceeded to set out how the decision might be communicated in terms of messages to -in-Chief and general messages to the fleet.18 Mayhew covered both of these reports with his own memorandum, which gives an indication of the movement of his thought at the time. ‘I am not sure that such decisions would not leave us with a military presence and commitment in the area both large enough to serve as a provocation and target for Communist propaganda, yet at the same time too small to be a worthwhile deterrent, or indeed to influence to any worthwhile extent the policy of the Americans: in fact, we should be heavily dependent on them. But in any case I am sure that these decisions should be taken on their own merits, and not simply to make cash savings of the order we have been considering’. Mayhew continued to push for the review of commitments first, Mountbatten’s old strategy from the early spring: ‘As you rightly said in the Defence Council on 7th October, we must compel the Political Departments to face the fact that the financial limits set by the Government cannot be achieved within the present scale of our commitments simply by reducing the capability of the forces’.19 These notes give an indication of what impact the naval leadership thought the cancellation of the carrier would have on the country as a whole and on the Navy. How much this equated with what really happened will be seen below.

New Maritime Role Study

The third major outcome of the Defence Council meeting was a further study of the maritime role of the aircraft carrier. Revisiting the same territory as the study led by Deputy Chief of Naval Staff six months previously, it was led by the carrier-

17 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 45, ‘Defence Review: Presentation to the Navy (Memorandum by Second Sea Lord)’, 19 October 1965. 18 Ibid. 19 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 36, Mayhew to Healey, 8 October 1965. The Cancellation of CVA-01 113 sceptical Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser Alan Cottrell.20 It reviewed only a single scenario: the defence of troop and supply convoys with surface escorts across the Indian Ocean in the event of a full attack by Indonesian armed forces including aircraft and warships on British and Commonwealth forces. In this circumstance, regarded as the most difficult that would have to be faced in the region, the study looked at the land-based air requirement to provide a ‘combat air patrol’ for air defence, an airborne early warning patrol, a maritime reconnaissance and a maritime strike or probe role, over convoys and shipping including their escorts within the range of Indonesian Soviet-built bombers; anti-submarine duties were not considered.21 The study concluded that the land-based forces could undertake the role, and would require the following aircraft: 10–13 Comet airborne early warning aircraft (rising to 23 if there were no vessel to act as ‘aircraft control ship’ to direct land- based aircraft), 17 F-111 or 24 Buccaneer 2* for maritime strike, 9 Comet aircraft for reconnaissance, between 15 and 21 Victor tankers, and finally 50–68 Phantom fighters to provide a combat air patrol. Some of the differences in numbers were the result of disagreements between the Air Force and Navy Departments over the aircraft required, not least for the combat air patrol.22 The conclusions were not good news for the naval leadership, but they were strongly hedged by a series of caveats that served to lessen dramatically the ostensible outcome of the study: A ‘critical assumption’ was that suitably placed airfields would be available, that suitable command and control between the land- based aircraft and the escorts would be necessary and that the costs of this had not yet been established, that the requirements for additional facilities, stockpiles and other support in the island bases (Cocos, Gan and others) had not been studied, and nor had the logistical flow that would be needed to maintain such land-based air operations. The study recommended that an ‘air defence control ship’ would be a necessity to control the combat air patrol and any maritime strike activities, and that this conclusion would be valid not just in the current scenario but also in any others.23 This final caveat heavily implied that land/sea command and control would be a problem in whichever scenario in whichever theatre. The report was covered by a commentary from Solly Zuckerman before it was submitted to Healey, strongly questioning the aircraft numbers set out in Cottrell’s report, the fact that nothing in the report had been costed and that it did not deal with the intervention or anti-submarine roles of aircraft carriers. He concluded that ‘we are essentially choosing here between major defence strategies, one of which at this point in time remains unproven in practice’.24

20 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 47, report by DCSA(S), 22 October 1965. 21 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 47, report by Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser (S), 22 October 1965, para. 51. 22 Ibid., para. 40. 23 Ibid., para. 51. 24 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 48, Zuckerman to Healey, 22 October 1965. 114 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

The Escort Programme: Defying Reality in Pursuit of the Impossible

What about CVA-01’s potential escorts: the Type 82 and the Type 19? The Type 82 had emerged from early 1960s sketch designs for a vessel of Leander class size armed with a planned light-weight successor to the Sea Slug anti-aircraft missile system. By early 1964 the size of the Type 82 had grown to over 5,500 tons as the volume and expense of its weapon systems and their attendant sensors, electronics and command systems grew, and the staff requirements for the design became more elaborate: as the vessel became larger it was difficult for the naval staff to resist the addition of features such as combined steam and gas turbine propulsion and flag officer facilities. The Type 19 first became known to the Treasury in early 1964 as the size and cost of the Type 82 ballooned. The design was for a smaller escort, largely to make up numbers as it became clearer that fewer Type 82s would be procured.25 By the middle of 1965 the naval staffs formulating the escort mix were working within a number of ‘hard’ parameters. The first was maintaining a total of 86–90 escorts in the fleet as had been set out in the 1964 costings. This would mean that as each of the older wartime frigates and destroyers was retired they would be replaced one-for-one by almost certainly much more capable and expensive modern escorts. Four new escorts would have to be ordered a year in order to maintain this figure. The other parameter was a restriction on manpower: no more than 18,000 of the Navy’s 95,000 manpower could be used to provide crew for the escort fleet. This meant each escort had to have an average crew of 200, and therefore with four escorts being ordered a year, these four new vessels – of whichever type – could only have total crews of 800.26 It had been decided to order eight Type 82s (which as currently planned would have a crew of 380) in the next five years to ensure that all were in service by 1975. Therefore the other 12 escorts to be ordered in the same five-year period, thus ensuring the maintenance of the 90-escort figure, could only have a crew of 80 each. This was clearly impossible to achieve for an ocean escort that it was insisted should have some form of ‘limited war’ fighting capability. The staffs had therefore initially worked to a 100-crew figure for the Type 19 – still extremely low compared to the Leander class which had a crew of 260 – but during the design process ‘it was shown that the Type 19 could be given a sprint speed of 40 knots’ with combined diesel and gas turbine propulsion to better enable to vessel to undertake peacekeeping across the wide expanses of the ocean. This increased the vessel to 2,000 tons displacement and the crew to 127, a further 8 were later added for ‘ship husbandry’ purposes. The cost of each vessel rose to £6.3m (at a time

25 T 225/2667 folios 4–5, Frazer to Mountfield, 30 January 1964, and folio 13, Gough (Under Secretary (Staff), Admiralty) to Lawrence-Wilson (Ministry of Defence), 3 March 1964. 26 DEFE 69/446, Director of Naval Plans to Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, 4 November 1965. The Cancellation of CVA-01 115 when a Leander class frigate cost £5.3m). This made complete nonsense of the manpower limitations over the next five years. It meant constructing two classes of expensive escorts, up to a fifth of which could not have been manned at all, thus negating the possibility of providing a 90-escort fleet. It was also increasingly expensive. Even if the slower 100-man crewed version were procured this would still mean that only 9 of the 12 Type 19s ordered between 1966 and 1971 could be crewed, or all 12 Type 19s would have a crew shortage of 20.27 Given the incredibly low crew numbers of these vessels anyway, this would probably not be enough to make the vessel operationally effective. The Type 19 had turned into a grotesque impossibility. Even the 40-knot speed was impractical: the constructors had estimated that the ship’s screws would not be able to take the strain of such speeds for more than a few hours before cracking.28 The 100-man crew was also wildly optimistic. The staff requirements for weaponry, sensors and capabilities for the Type 19 were very close to that for the succeeding Type 21 (the first of which was ordered in 1968), but even that class had a crew of 180 when it appeared in 1974. The Type 19 was the product of the inability of the naval leadership to realise that it could not maintain a 90-escort fleet, alongside a full carrier and nuclear submarine programme with the manpower limitations that it faced. That there seems to have been no cost limitation imposed on these escort designs when the carrier programme and defence spending as a whole was under such stringent financial review, demonstrates even further the sense of unreality that enveloped the escort programme.29 It was not until January 1966 that it was finally admitted that cost and manpower would have to constrain the escort fleet, even then the situation was not much improved. There would now be 70 escorts in the fleet (a 20 per cent cut), the reduction in manpower had largely been achieved by the deletion of the cruisers, 3 submarines and 27 minesweepers. Assuming that 18,000 men were still allocated for the escort fleet, and that 16 escorts would have to be built in the next five years (rather than 20), an average crew of 260 per ship would result in 4,000 crew being available to man the 16 new vessels. The Type 82s had been reduced to 6, and if the crew remained at 390 this left 166 men for each of 10 required Type 19 frigates. At a figure not too far from the 180 achieved for the light Type 21 frigate that was eventually built, this was now entering the realms of possibility, but it assumed the Type 82’s crew would remain at 390. In the event, the sole Type 82 eventually had a crew of over 430.

27 Ibid. 28 Brown, Century of Naval Construction, p. 230. 29 NMM: LWN/6/5/4 ‘My impressions of DNTWP’, Fax from Admiral Sir R. Macdonald to Admiral Lewin, 20 October 1998. 116 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Differences within the Admiralty Board

As the tension mounted within the Admiralty leadership it became clearer than ever before that the likelihood of the carrier programme being approved was rapidly shrinking, differences over the best way to defend CVA-01 emerged. These were brought out in the informal meetings of the Admiralty Board that preceded their formal distributed discussions. Vice Admiral Hopkins was convinced that a decision to run down the carrier force had been all but taken when the Minister (RN) and First Sea Lord secured at least a stay of execution at the Defence Council meeting on 7 October. He therefore argued for an aggressive strategy of counter-attack against the RAF. He saw the two areas of doubt being the cost effectiveness of a three-carrier force, and the wisdom of procuring ships that would last longer than would be needed. Here Hopkins was referring to a three-carrier force, not providing for two carriers east of Suez at all time, the accepted minimum for effective operations; and the fact that CVA-01 would be completed in 1973 when carrier airpower would only be needed up to 1980. Hopkins produced two reports arguing for four carriers through to 1980, up to 1974 the fourth carrier might be Shangri-La, or Victorious, or Ark Royal, after 1974 it would be Hermes.30 This was opposed by Admiral Frewen: four carriers had been mentioned as a possibility in the alternative carrier plan of 6 August 1965, but ‘the weight of opinion and the assumption of later defence studies was that a three-carrier plan represented the best balanced fleet the Navy could sustain in the seventies’. To change the Navy Department line this late would open up the possibility of further attacks whilst the trend towards the reduction of commitments was suggesting a gradual reduction in the ‘jobs which (sic) would have to be done’.31 Mayhew accepted Frewen’s line and agreed to shelve Hopkins’ proposals. A few days later at a further informal Admiralty Board meeting, Hopkins argued that interoperability should now be accepted as a possibility in order to save on the number of Buccaneer 2* to be ordered: it would deduct 21 aircraft from the alternative carrier plan. This was opposed by the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff, Vice Admiral Pollock, who argued that interoperability would ‘imply acceptance of the Air Force’s arguments about flexibility, which up to now the Navy has attacked as impractical. It was important that the Navy Department’s case, in this as in other parts of the review, should be maintained with consistency’. He continued: ‘one of the Navy’s strongest points was the cost comparison between the alternative carrier plan and our estimate of the cost of equipping the RAF to take over maritime tasks;’ this argument might be weakened by accepting interoperability. Hopkins countered that the change in approach could be covered by the recent

30 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 44, Private Office Note: ‘A Fourth Carrier in the Carrier Plan’, 18 October 1965. 31 Ibid. The Cancellation of CVA-01 117 working party report on interoperability, but to no avail, full interoperability was not accepted by the Admiralty Board.32 Hopkins’ inability to push the Admiralty Board towards a more aggressive strategy might well have been influenced by his disastrous chairmanship of the first maritime airpower study in March, which turned what should have been a strong-point of the Navy’s argument into a further weakness and painted the Navy’s position as unnecessarily and aggressively partisan. If his credibility had been damaged with the Board as a whole, he might well have nonetheless gradually convinced Mayhew, as the Navy Minister by 17 November was tentatively challenging Hardman’s assertion that only three carriers could be manned in the 1970s, ‘if manpower prospects improved’.33 This was a key caveat and certainly the unspoken weakness behind Hopkins’ plans.

The Build-Up to Chequers: New Intervention Studies

The first batch of results commissioned by Healey after the Defence Council, were rapidly followed by requests for more studies. The most significant of these was the new intervention study. The Defence Planning Staff were asked to produce this particular study, and its terms of reference indicated a development of the Working Group Study, but focused on force levels and costings.34 The stated assumptions of the study were that after 1970, the role of British forces east of Suez would be peacekeeping, with allies wherever possible. Any limited war operations would be with allies only and it would be assumed that there would be no bases in Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf and Malaysia and Singapore.35 The study would then analyse whether current commitments could be carried out within the assumptions above and at the costings set out by the ‘costings studies’ prepared for the Official sub-committee of the Oversea Policy and Defence Committee. The costings studies had produced a total of £186m a year maximum to be spent on military forces east of Suez, whilst another working party were analysing the expected tasks in the Indo-Pacific region in the 1970s.36 Members of the Admiralty Board considered this new intervention study ‘most fundamental in the whole defence review’. So important in fact that separate reports by RAF and RN should be written as they have ‘completely different views about the best contribution Britain could make to a joint role in an alliance East of

32 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 49, Private Office note: ‘Carriers – intervention tasks, inter-operability, Shangri-La, draft DOPC memorandum’, 22 October 1965. 33 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 65, Mayhew to Hardman, 17 November 1965. 34 DEFE 4/190, CoS 54th meeting item 1, 22 October 1965. 35 DEFE 4/191, CoS 56th meeting DP 77 (65) Final. 36 CAB 130/252, MISC 94, Defence Review Working Party on the Indo-Pacific theatre: ‘Military Tasks’, 22 November 1965 MISC 94/1(final). 118 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Suez’.37 This would be a forlorn hope. The Admiralty Board had no way of forcing separate reports on the Secretary of State and the Chiefs of Staff: a single report was produced by the Defence Planning Staff and it was clearly a compromise between the aims of the three services. The paper, produced towards the end of October, outlined the cuts in force levels necessary to fulfil operations with the given assumptions and the cuts were considerable for all three services.38 For the Navy, the assumptions given above would mean a reduction in major ships down from 141 to 113 (20 per cent), including a reduction in the number of escorts by 25 per cent and guided missile destroyers from 8 to 6, and a reduction in the number Royal Marine Commandos from 5 to 3. The report stated that the number of carriers, commando ships and assault ships would be unaffected – a clear sign that the naval leadership had been able to ensure that its core aim, the maintenance of the carrier force, was recognised. The ability for the Navy to intervene was unchanged, but its ability to sustain operations against opposition had been diminished. The Army saw a 22 per cent cut in manpower with a maximum deployment capability of 2 brigades east of Suez. This would be less than half the current capability and sustainability had been reduced dramatically. The RAF was reduced from 871 to 671 frontline aircraft (a 21 per cent cut, none of the reduction having come from the bomber force), with sustainability reduced. Overall, the report concluded that the ability to fulfil commitments would not be affected in the early stages of operations, but that the ability to sustain operations would be significantly affected, as would be the flexibility to deal with the unexpected.39 This showed the dramatic effect on the three service’s capabilities if the costings studies figures were adhered to. The reductions had been done on an ‘equal pain’ basis with the percentage cuts in levels similar across the three services. In discussion the Chiefs agreed that it should be made clear that the costings figures were only of a hypothetical nature, and that the force levels set out were neither ‘realistic’ nor ‘acceptable’.40 Healey was not happy with the ‘equal pain’ results of the intervention study and asked for two more studies from the Defence Planning Staff, providing a trio of options for the next Oversea Policy and Defence Committee meeting. The first option would assume that there was no Army presence east of Suez and the naval and RAF would increase their presence, and the second that the RAF and Army were increased and the naval presence reduced.41 Healey did not commission an option on the RAF presence being reduced and the Army and naval presence being increased.

37 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 49, Private Office note: ‘Carriers – intervention tasks, inter-operability, Shangri-la, draft DOPC memorandum’, 22 October 1965. 38 DEFE 4/191, CoS 56th meeting DP 77 (65) Final. 39 DEFE 4/191, CoS 56th meeting DP 77 (65) Final, Section I. 40 DEFE 4/191, CoS 56th meeting, item 1, 28 October 1965. 41 DEFE 4/191, CoS 58th meeting, item 2, 9 November 1965. The Cancellation of CVA-01 119

The ‘no Army’ option was the cheapest, with a cost of £167m east of Suez in 1969–70, and the Navy providing one carrier, one commando ship, one assault ship, 14 destroyers and frigates, six submarines and eight minesweepers in the region. The RAF would have 22 F-111, 24 Phantom, eight Comet, six C-130 (Hercules) transports and six helicopters or their equivalents. The ‘reduced Navy’ option was a little more expensive than the costings study ceiling used in the intervention study. At £189m (excluding the costs of providing additional capability to replace the carrier), the Navy would deploy a similar force to the ‘no Army’ option but without a carrier and two frigates, the Army deployed 14 and a third major units (most at battalion strength), and the RAF deployment was similar except that its transport capability was increased to 18 C-130, 6 Chinook and up to 42 helicopters or their equivalents.42 With the reduced Navy option it was clear that although the Navy had accepted the loss of the carrier from the force structures, it had dug its heels in with the rest of the force levels. That the reduced Navy option was also the most expensive, was partly a result of this digging in, but it also showed that naval forces, in the naval leadership’s view, could not be sacrificed completely East of Suez. The Ministry of Defence and the Foreign Office were meanwhile fighting over which commitments or capabilities should be reduced. The latter hoped to press the former into capability cuts without the need to reduce commitments, the former preferred commitment reductions first to then allow for commensurate capability reductions. Healey wanted commitments cut in order to provide more flexibility for the armed forces, with space for excess spending below the £2,000m in 1969/70 level. He recommended pulling out of the Middle East altogether, making a decision over whether in the Indo-Pacific area the UK retained some form of independent capability, or could just make a small contribution to a US force. His opinion was that in the Far East, the United Kingdom could no longer fight a sophisticated enemy alone.43 Within these wide-ranging discussions, the intervention role of the carrier came up repeatedly. In the Middle East arena, Trend posed two questions to Wilson prior to a meeting of the Oversea Policy and Defence Committee: can Middle Eastern commitments be discharged without carriers, and can Kuwait be defended with a single battalion with land-based air support? If the answer were yes to both questions then the carrier really was only a Far East or Indian Ocean weapon. The Cabinet Secretary also noted that relying on land-based airpower for intervention effectively meant relying on pre-emptive strikes to fulfil commitments, and that this would have to be recognised.44 In a later brief, Trend picked up on Healey’s earlier alternatives: the choice between an independent capability and a capability that was interdependent on the United States.45 Trend noted that the ministers

42 DEFE 4/191, CoS 59th meeting DP Note 17/65. 43 PREM 13/216, folios 48–57, Trend to Wilson, 12 November 1965. 44 PREM 13/216, folios 58–66, Trend to Wilson, 12 November 1965. 45 PREM 13/216, folios 38–40, Trend to Wilson, 14 November 1965. 120 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic of the Committee preferred the latter option, and it was this option that did not require the carrier. Trend also put forward moving the argument away from how land-based aircraft could take over the roles of the carrier, to the issue of being prepared not to undertake any military tasks that at present only carriers could do. In effect this was changing the question to one in which carriers were no longer relevant – at least in the sphere of intervention. Solly Zuckerman was also trying to influence the debate by contacting the Prime Minister directly. He argued that in almost every case Britain would be in alliance with the United States, Australia and New Zealand, but that a balanced force, including a carrier and amphibious vessels, would be more effective and give the British more of a say in any joint operations. A small long-range strike force of F-111s would not allow this. Warships were also less provocative and more independent and flexible than land bases. The Chief Scientific Adviser also argued that an aircraft carrier could not be precisely evaluated in cost/benefit financial terms – its capabilities were so varied and flexible that tightly defined scenarios would always favours those types of weapon systems that were highly effective in a single scenario, but ineffective in many others.46 The Defence Review Working Party, an offshoot of the Oversea Policy and Defence Committee, tasked with assessing the fulfilment of commitments globally, had been testing different scenarios and the equipment needed to fulfil them. The results that were emerging, as Zuckerman had predicted, were not favourable to the intervention role of the carrier. As Trend pointed out to the Prime Minister: the studies ‘have not shown that any of the tasks described … would make it essential for our contribution to include carriers’.47

Wilson’s Visit to the United States

The Johnson administration in the United States, gradually being sucked into ever greater commitments in Vietnam, was increasingly worried about rumours that the United Kingdom would withdraw from its commitments east of Suez, and that the cancellation of the carrier programme and the removal of the carriers would be greatest sign of this withdrawal.48 At a meeting with John McNaughton, the US Assistant Secretary of Defense, in late October, Healey had been pressed to produce the results of the Defence Review as quickly as possible.49 Initially it had been hoped that the decision on the carrier would have been made before Wilson’s visit, but the slow progress of the matter through the Cabinet committee structure

46 PREM 13/216, folios 32–7, Zuckerman to Wilson, 14 November 1965. 47 PREM 13/216, folios 10–14, Trend to Wilson, 23 November 1965. 48 PREM 13/216, folios 83–7, Note of discussion between Healey and Wilson, 8 October 1965. 49 PREM 13/216, folios 69–71, Note of meeting between McNaughton and Healey, 26 October 1965. The Cancellation of CVA-01 121 made this impossible.50 Healey recommended to Wilson that the carrier issue or the Canberra replacement should not be mentioned, but that it might be opportune to raise different options on the F-111 purchase. Wilson’s wry handwritten comment on this stated that ‘this appears to mean (a) we shan’t be ready to talk to the Americans, (b) we must be ready to buy the F-111!!?’51 Wilson well knew that Healey was trying to push the F-111 option, and Trend clearly advised him not to raise the F-111 with McNamara during his visit.52 The US government submitted a series of written questions via the embassy in Washington to the Prime Minister. After a number of questions concerning the maintenance of worldwide commitments, the sixth question asked directly about what UK thinking was on its ‘major weapon systems’.53 In the context of commitments, it is clear that the future of Britain’s aircraft carriers would have been part of what the US government was referring.

An Opportunity Not Taken? Hull and Healey Propose a ‘Maritime Role’ Carrier

As it became clear how steadfast naval support for the carrier was, the Chief of Defence Staff started developing a compromise option. Hull’s conception was that the only likely intervention role of the carrier in the 1970s would actually be in the ‘support’ rather than strike role. This would require no more than providing combat air patrols over the intervention zone to screen British forces from any enemy airpower, or providing light ground support. Air Chief Marshal Earle, Hull’s Vice Chief of Defence Staff, therefore came up with the concept of the Phantom-only ‘support carrier’, dropping the Buccaneer entirely, undertaking the ‘maritime’ tasks of CVA-01 plus the light ‘support’ tasks necessary for the sort of low level intervention role envisaged in the 1970s.54 To fulfil this it was suggested that a smaller and cheaper carrier with a possible dual role as a commando ship could be built instead of CVA-01. The Buccaneers could then be passed to the RAF who could operate these in place of the F-111 in the long-range strike role.55 Pat Nairne picked up on this idea and suggested this as an option to Denis Healey. While Healey was certain that the core intervention role in the 1970s would be undertaken by the F-111, he was also pondering the unyielding opposition of the naval leadership, and the untried and unproven concept of land-based aircraft providing the maritime air role to naval forces.56

50 PREM 13/216, folios 64–6, Trend to Wilson, 12 November 1965. 51 PREM 13/216, folios 16–19, Healey to Wilson, 19 November 1965. 52 PREM 13/216, folios 4–5, Trend to Wilson, 24 November 1965. 53 CAB 165/76, folio 1, Embassy, Washington to Foreign Office, 22 December 1965. 54 DEFE 25/173, Earle to Hull, 28 October 1965. 55 DEFE 25/173, Draft note: Hull to other Chiefs of Staff, October 1965. 56 DEFE 13/116, Nairne to Healey, 8 November 1965. 122 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

By late November, Healey was ready to approach the naval leadership to suggest different carrier options, and asked Luce, Mayhew, Frewen and Hopkins to meet him on 2 December with a menu of possibilities.57 Frewen prepared four different carrier plans for the discussion.58 The ‘base’ plan was that of the 1964 Long-Term Costings and accepted by the previous Conservative government. This meant the withdrawal of Victorious in 1971, Ark Royal in 1972 and the completion of CVA-01 in 1972/73. CVA-02 would not be provided for in these plans but might be built after 1975. Eagle and Hermes would be refitted to allow the operation of Phantoms. After 1974 this would mean a total of 36 Phantom and 55 Buccaneer aircraft aboard the carrier fleet. This would require a manpower requirement of 94,400 and tacitly assumed the escort and guide missile destroyer fleet of 88.59 Hopkins’ four-carrier fleet was also included in the options and given the tenor of the briefing note for Luce, this had now become the favoured option.60 It proposed to withdrawal of Victorious in 1972 and Ark Royal in 1974 to be replaced by CVA-01 and CVA-02 in those years. Eagle and Hermes would be refitted to take Phantoms. This would provide a total capacity of 48 Phantoms and 85 Buccaneers by 1974 and would require 97,700 manpower. The fourth carrier was paid for and manned by reducing the escort fleet to 14 guided missile destroyers (6 Type 82s and 8 Counties) and 64 other escorts, a cut of 10. The two other options were intermediate positions between the two: a three-carrier fleet of CVA-01, CVA-02 and Eagle by 1975, or a fleet with CVA-01, Hermes and Eagle by 1975 (plus running Ark Royal on to 1974).61 The four-carrier plan was clearly designed to meet one of the key objections raised in previous carrier studies: the lack of two carriers east of Suez, but in fact it was the original Conservative-approved three-carrier plan of 1964 that interested Healey the most. A few days after the meeting Healey sent a confidential note to Hardman asking the Permanent Secretary to keep in play an option to build CVA-01.62 This was not a tactical ploy, but a serious consideration of acceding to the Navy’s demands to build CVA-01. This would result in a three-carrier force, maintained until 1980, as set out in the 1964 Conservative-approved long-term costings. The force would primarily undertake a maritime role, protecting and supporting naval forces and would not have an intervention capability, which would be monopolised by the F-111, thus resulting in a smaller aircraft requirement.

57 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 69, Private Office Note: ‘Carrier variants, Type 82, warning notices for CVA-01 – meeting of Admiralty Board members on Tuesday 30th November 1965’. 58 DEFE 13/477, Carrier Options Table (covered by note from Secretary to CNS to Nairne, 30 November 1965). 59 Ibid. 60 DEFE 13/477, draft brief for Luce by Secretary to CNS, 30 November 1965. 61 DEFE 13/477, Carrier Options Table (covered by note from Secretary to First Sea Lord to Nairne, 30 November 1965). 62 DEFE 13/477, Healey to Hardman, 8 December 1965. The Cancellation of CVA-01 123

There would be the maximum rationalisation of aircraft with joint Royal Navy/ RAF facilities for Phantoms ashore and a joint RN/RAF supplementary list to allow for a smooth cross-over to land-based operation in the 1980s. At the end of his note, Healey stated that, however desirable this may be, it might not be possible because the ‘cost factor may be decisively against retaining a carrier programme in any conditions’.63 A week after writing this note, Healey sent a short note to Mayhew asking him to consider the possibility of building a new smaller carrier.64 Healey stated that he was not convinced that CVA-01 should be built, but the concept was the same as that outlined to Hardman: building a smaller carrier to complement a three-carrier force with a primarily maritime role operating until 1980. This was the furthest that Healey had officially moved towards the naval leadership’s position: a chance to procure a carrier was being placed before the Admiralty Board. Even suggesting CVA-01 with a reduced aircraft complement for a maritime role might gain acceptance. Everything rested being able to give up the intervention capability and accept Healey’s long-term assumption that the carrier force would wind down in the 1980s and its aircraft eventually transfer to the RAF. This might be a sufficiently distant point in time to persuade the naval leadership to accept the compromise. Two days later, the members of the Admiralty Board met informally to discuss a response. The Admiralty Board was in no mood to compromise: one (anonymous) member stated: ‘this was the first occasion when the Secretary of State had asked the Admiralty Board to comment on and cost a proposition which was in their view quite illusory; without CVA-01, the carrier force must run down by 1970 at the latest, as the Board had already advised the Secretary of State’. The Admiralty Board failed to understand the opportunity that was being presented them, and failed to recognise that Healey had essentially conceded the argument on the maritime role of the carrier, but that nothing was going to shift Healey from supporting the F-111 in the intervention role. In discussion the ‘maritime-role’- only carrier was dismissed, the Admiralty Board agreeing that a naval strike role in the 1970s would be essential for carrying out British policy in the Indo-Pacific region. Board then went on, in an almost wilful denial of the situation they were in, by discussing the potential ordering date of CVA-01.65 Christopher Mayhew formally replied to Healey and included many of the points discussed by the Admiralty Board members. The compromise proposals would not be workable. If there was to be no CVA-01, carriers should be withdrawn as soon as possible. It would be ‘unreal’ to believe that carriers in the 1970s would only operate in a maritime role, and as such the proposals were unrealistic. Replacing the carrier with other means would be extremely expensive and in such

63 Ibid. 64 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 70, Healey to Mayhew, 13 December 1965. 65 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 71, Private Office Note: ‘Transitional Carrier Programme – Tendering Date for CVA-01 – Public Announcement on Type 82’, 16 December 1965. 124 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic a context the carrier was the cheapest option. If the carriers were run on, using RAF supplementary list officers to fill any shortfalls in Fleet Air Arm, fixed-wing crews would produce similar retention problems in the RAF and would result in considerable quality problems. Mayhew saw a smaller carrier as unviable option: a 40,000-ton £55m carrier (with 12 Phantoms and 8 Buccaneers – a rather low complement given that the 43,000-ton Eagle could operate 12 and 14 respectively) was put forward as requested, but the Admiralty Board did not want this concept considered viable within the Ministry of Defence or its details distributed outside the Ministry. To design the ship would require a large amount of design work starting almost from scratch. In contrast, CVA-01 was a worked-up design, and CVA-01 would complete two years earlier for only £10–15m more. This failed to include the additional cost of the increased aircraft complement and crew.66 The savings provided by running on the fleet (without building CVA-01) and operating it in the maritime role with 12 Phantoms and 8 Buccaneers per carrier, would produce a saving of £41m in the key year of 1969/70 and a total saving of £85m between 1970 and 1975.67 Such meagre results looked rather underplayed given less than half the number of Buccaneers would need to be operational than existing plans allowed and that CVA-01 would not be built at all. The naval leadership’s response had effectively killed the ‘maritime role’ carrier option, and in fact any possibility of compromise even though this option was apparently still left open into January and the Treasury (informed of the maritime role carrier ‘sub rosa’ by Peck) was not averse to the concept in place of the strike carrier.68 The Admiralty Board had demonstrated that it was wedded to the intervention role despite the smaller capability requirement following the dropping of the need to intervene against sophisticated opposition, and the distance Healey was willing to move to compromise with the naval leadership. The naval staff concentrated on reducing the costs of the Navy’s budget within the defence programme in order to accommodate CVA-01, bringing the total defence budget down to £2,080m in 1969/70.69

The Navy Minister and Leaks to the Press

A controversy over leaks of information to the press, allegedly by Christopher Mayhew or his office, served to undermine almost completely both Harold Wilson and Denis Healey’s remaining trust in the man who in effect was leading the Navy’s defence of the carrier programme. The initial issue related to apparent leaks to a Daily Telegraph journalist, David McLachlan, about the Prime Minister being

66 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 73, Mayhew to Healey, 16 December 1965, para. 2. 67 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 72, Annex (to enclosure 73). 68 T 225/2711, folios 1–4, G.R. Bell to Mr Walker, 4 January 1966. 69 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 74, Private Office note: ‘Documentation of the Case for the ‘with carriers’ variant’, 21 December 1965. The Cancellation of CVA-01 125 in favour of the mixed-manning of the new Polaris missile-carrying submarines. Harold Wilson later heard that McLachlan had been meeting ‘service ministers’ at the Ministry of Defence and that certain views on the Polaris manning matter had been attributed to George Wigg, the Paymaster General. Wigg, Wilson’s close confidant, was a personal enemy of Mayhew’s of many years’ longstanding. Whether Wilson immediately assumed that this meant that Mayhew had been behind the leak (as Mayhew asserted) or that the Prime Minister just asked Healey to investigate the issue (as Wilson stated), the incident indicated not only declining trust but it also hastened that decline in trust to the point of breaking. Mayhew wrote to Wilson in December denying that he had leaked the information stating that a Ministry of Defence press officer had been present throughout an interview he had arranged with McLachlan.70 Wilson replied, ostensibly stating that the press officer had overstepped his brief in comments respecting Wigg, but reading between the lines, indicated that Mayhew might have been responsible. The Prime Minister, however, closed off in emollient terms by stating that he did not want leaks that in particular showed splits amongst government ministers over the defence review, that he applauded Mayhew for bringing a press officer with him to the meeting with the journalist, and that ‘I hope the matter can now be forgotten’.71 Over the Christmas break Mayhew typed out his thoughts, acknowledging that he had reached a low point in his political career. He saw that Denis Healey, Harold Wilson and George Brown were all hostile and that with Fred Mulley’s promotion to Minister of Aviation he had been passed over as Healey’s deputy in the department by Lord Shackleton, the Air Force Minister. In an increasingly pessimistic mood, Mayhew was already looking ahead to life after the resignation he fully expected to occur with the cancellation of the carrier programme. He also was beginning to develop his concept of a post-East of Suez foreign and defence policy.72 Christopher Mayhew was a man mentally if not yet actually burning the bridges of his career as a minister in the Labour government. Mayhew’s response to Wilson in the New Year was anything but emollient. He wrote that ‘a number of the statements … I consider misleading and unfair’ and perhaps unnecessarily closed off with ‘P.S. Your letter was not marked “personal”. Consequently it was opened and read by members of my staff’.73 This was perhaps not a considered phrase on which to end an letter to the Prime Minister – the leader of his party and man who had appointed him to his job – and inadvertently suggested that Mayhew could not be entrusted with such correspondence given its inference that he had allowed his whole staff to know about its contents. In career terms for Mayhew this was close to suicidal given Wilson’s own rather touchy

70 Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London, Mayhew 8/1, Christopher Mayhew to Harold Wilson, 7 December 1965. 71 Mayhew 8/1, Harold Wilson to Christopher Mayhew, 28 December 1965. 72 Mayhew 8/2, typed note by Christopher Mayhew, 29 December 1965. 73 Mayhew 8/1, Christopher Mayhew to Harold Wilson, 3 January 1966. 126 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic nature, and this was confirmed by Wilson’s response: ‘I am sorry you considered some of the statements in my letter to be misleading and unfair. Perhaps when you are less submerged you might care to explain this at greater length because I should be genuinely interested to know. With regard to my not marking my letter to you ‘Personal’, I should perhaps just mention that your original letter to me was also not marked ‘Personal’ and was, therefore, equally read by my staff’.74 Mayhew was at the point of no return with his Prime Minister and party leader (and as it would soon turn out, his party as well). However misrepresented he might have been, Mayhew had in the end provoked the chairman of both the Oversea Policy and Defence Committee and of the Cabinet, the two bodies he needed to convince of the case for the aircraft carrier. The naval leadership might have had an enthusiastic and combative defender of their cause, but it is not clear that by January 1966 Christopher Mayhew was actually acting in ways that would further their interests. Mayhew was still pursuing the issue of the McLachlan leak with the Prime Minister’s office some months after he resigned.75 He appears never to have received any further substantive replies from the Prime Minister on the matter.

The Navy’s Case for CVA-01

Only a few days after receiving Wilson’s reply over the leaks issue, Mayhew was making the case for carriers again to Denis Healey, focusing on costs and their operational effectiveness. The note was composed of three main sections: economic, military and political. Under the ‘economic’ section the note argued that the cost difference might be £80m in 1969/70 but reduced to only £10m by 1973–74 – with an average of £30m a year across the 10 year period. Mayhew, showing his growing scepticism of maintaining commitments east of Suez, stated that the £2,000m figure was artificial, which ‘permits only an “in-between” posture east of Suez which neither saves us substantial expenditure in foreign currency nor makes a worthwhile viable presence there possible’. He was also sceptical about the accuracy of costings as far as 10 years into the future.76 In the ‘military’ section of the note Mayhew argued that aircraft are Navy’s eyes and teeth. It would take 10 years to develop missiles to replace some of the functions of carrier aircraft. RAF believe that by early 1970s will be able to provide air cover and air recon[naissance] for a fleet 100s of miles from its bases. The Royal Navy disagreed with this assertion and that ‘scientific opinion supports us’. Even if developed, the fleet would still dependent on the availability of land bases and of RAF aircraft, which have other tasks and roles for which the operational

74 Mayhew 8/1, Harold Wilson to Christopher Mayhew, 5 January 1966. 75 Mayhew 8/1, Christopher Mayhew to Prime Minister’s Office, 19 April 1966 and 14 May 1966. 76 DEFE 69/481, enclosure 78, Mayhew to Healey, 7 January 1966 ‘Future carrier programme’. The Cancellation of CVA-01 127 leadership of the RAF might consider to be higher priorities. In effect, the Navy would not be able to protect itself and it would be ‘impossible to carry out maritime tasks implied by the new strategy without the help of USN carriers’. If this were to be the case, there would be serious logistic problems and the United States Navy is not planning to keep carriers available to help the Royal Navy. In effect British power would be tied to that of the United States: commitments could only be kept if ‘accorded in nature, timing and priority with those of the USA’. The United Kingdom would also lose a ‘visible deterrent of proved effectiveness’. Mayhew provided the examples of Eagle’s aircraft preventing Rhodesia challenging the setting up of a Javelin base in Zambia. A strategy based on airfields is easier to counter for a determined enemy: one act of sabotage and the whole airfield could be unusable. If there were no carriers, there would be no fallback.77 Mayhew went on to argue that carriers have a ‘unique capacity for dealing with unpredictable situations’. It is folly to predict too tightly what may occur in the future – enemies will not be predictable. For example, 10 years previously arguing the case for carriers with scenarios involving a conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia and suppressing mutinies in African armies ‘would have been laughed out of court’. It is also impossible to ‘opt out’ completely opt out from whole regions – ‘what I fear may happen is that on some future occasion the Fleet may be called upon, for political reasons, to try to deal with a situation alone for which the resources have not been provided and that this could lead to humiliation or to defeat’. The Navy Minister could almost have been describing the Falklands conflict 16 years later, albeit that campaign ended – perhaps with some luck on the side of the Royal Navy – in victory rather than humiliation or defeat. Mayhew’s argument to modern eyes sounds strong today: in a world of ‘asymmetric’ threats, following 40 years of unexpected and unpredicted conflicts in the Falklands, Iraq, Bosnia and Afghanistan, predicting future threats in a tight and logical way appears unduly optimistic.78 The final part of the chapter discussed the ‘political’ factors: ‘would the planned reduction in capabilities be so great as to make forces inadequate for deterrent role? If this is the case, then large amounts of defence spending east of Suez would be wasted. Forces need to be substantial enough to command respect of possible enemies, influence policies of allies and minimise the ‘risk of biting off more than we can chew’. A question that always needs to be asked is can we fight our way out? Not only ‘sophisticated’ oppositions can deny use of airfields’. Mayhew concluded by summing up: could the RAF provide equivalent of patrols over north Italy from bases in England (in other words the equivalent of 400 nautical miles distant from base)? Can they do this with aircraft not yet in service and using untried techniques? Will they be able to use land bases in the region in question? If any one of these factors is not fulfilled, then the United Kingdom cannot conduct operations overseas, or even deal with ‘quite small situations’. The

77 Ibid., paras 6–10. 78 Ibid., para. 12. 128 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic price for avoiding this loss of capability is only £30m a year.79 These would be the plans that Mayhew and the naval leadership would take to the Oversea Policy and Defence Committee, having spurned the compromise options devised by Hull, Nairne and Healey.

Bringing the Carrier to Cabinet

The next step up the chain of decision-making in Whitehall was to take the arguments for the carrier and the F-111 directly to ministers. The inter-departmental Oversea Policy and Defence Committee of the Cabinet was the first body that brought ministers outside the Ministry of Defence directly into play. The Committee was chaired by the Prime Minister and included the Secretaries of State of the ‘political departments’ – the Foreign Office, Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office – the Secretary of State for Defence and a Treasury Minister. The Chiefs of Staff also attended when military matters arose. The carrier proposals finally went to committee on 10 January 1966. The inability to resolve the future of the carrier force within the Ministry had finally led to Healey accepting that the decision would have to go to inter-departmental committee after the last ditch attempt at compromise with the ‘maritime role’ carrier had failed. Two options were proposed: option A was the ‘without carriers’ proposal put forward by the Ministry, Option B was the Navy Department’s proposal. The proposal was essentially the December four-carrier plan but without CVA-02 and with nine fewer minesweepers (see Table 4.1), although a dramatic decrease in manpower – by 8,000 over the December proposal – had been achieved by 1970 even though the force structures had remained essentially the same. In the first instance, the two options were put to the Defence Review Working Party, a sub-committee of senior officials. The working party produced a cover note summarising the two proposals, and these were then passed to the Official committee of the Oversea Policy and Defence Committee.80 The Official committee was also made up of officials, primarily the Permanent Secretaries in the relevant departments, and generally reviewed issues before they were passed to ministers at the main committee. The discussion in this forum was more prolonged and Luce, attending to present ‘Option B’ was able to put forward the naval leadership’s case.81 He admitted that the carrier was of no relevance in Europe and only of marginal utility in the Middle East: the key area for carriers was the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Luce argued that the maritime role of carriers could not be undertaken by land- based aircraft, that although F-111 aircraft were more effective against land targets

79 Ibid., paras 15–19. 80 CAB 148/54, OPDO(DR)(WP)(66)1, 10 January 1966. 81 CAB 148/68, OPDO(66) 1st meeting, 6 January 1966 and 2nd meeting, 7 January 1966. The Cancellation of CVA-01 129

Table 4.1 Proposed aircraft carrier programmes 1964–66

Long Terms Four Fleet options put to cabinet committee (Jan Costings Carrier Plan and Feb 1966) Plan (1964) (December Option A Option Option C Option D 1965) (without B (with (carriers to (new with carriers) carriers) mid-1970s) carriers) Victorious To 1971 To 1972 To 1967–69 To 1972 To 1972 To 1972 Ark Royal To 1972 To 1974 To 1967–69 To 1974 To 1974* To 1972 Eagle Through Through To 1969 Through To 1975* Through 1970s* 1970s* 1970s* 1970s* Hermes Through Through To 1969 Through To 1975* To 1976 1970s* 1970s* 1970s* CVA01 From 1972 From 1972 - From 1972 - From 1972 CVA02 - From 1974 - - - - Aircraft 1972: 36 1972: 48 - 1972: 48 1972: 36 Total buy of capacity at fighters, 43 fighters, 54 fighters, 54 fighters, 32 58 Phantom, sea+ strike strike strike strike reduced 1975: 36 1975: 48 1975: 36 Buccaneer fighters, 55 fighters, 85 fighters, 55 buy strike strike strike The rest 4 4 4 4 4 4 of fleet in amphibious amphibious amphibious amphibious amphibious amphibious 1975# 3 cruisers 8 County 3 cruisers 8 County 8 County 8 County 8 County 70 escorts 8 County 70 escorts 70 escorts 70 escorts 86 escorts 33 64 escorts 33 33 33 36 submarines 33 submarines submarines submarines submarines 36 mine- submarines 45 mine- 45 mine- 45 mine- 72 mine- warfare 45 mine- warfare warfare warfare warfare warfare Defence - - £2,055m (c. £2,120m (c. £2,040m £2,049m budget £2,000m £2,080m if P1127 if P1127 (1969/70) at if P1127 if P1127 cancelled cancelled 1964 prices cancelled) cancelled) (revised upwards to £2,060m) Naval £532m £554m £491m £579m £538m £547m budget (1965 (1965 (revised (1969/70) at prices) prices) upwards to 1964 prices £558m) Manpower 95,400 97,700 83,300 89,760 92,000 by - 1969/70 1977 Note: * refit to take Phantoms, + capacity in emergency, # ‘amphibious’ includes commando ships and assault ships, ‘escorts’ includes Type 82s and frigates, ‘mine-warfare’ includes minesweepers and minehunters. Compiled from: DEFE 13/477 ‘Carrier Options’ covered by note from Sec/CNS to PS/Sec/St 30/11/65; CAB 148/45 OPDO(65)82 20/12/65 130 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic they were limited to the range of their shore bases. There was also the risk that commitments could not be honoured without the carriers, but Luce had to admit that all the Cabinet Committee assessments had confirmed only a small number of scenarios where the intervention capability of the carrier was indispensable.82 The official committee met for a second time the following day to complete their discussion, Luce resumed his defence, noting that although carrier aircraft had a 300-nautical mile operational radius, the carrier gave the aircraft additional flexibility, and noting that command of the sea was essential to the transport of troops and equipment to the areas in question.83 The challenges came from Elworthy, who split the role of the carrier into three: intervention – which could be carried out by the F-111 and for which only one- and-a-half land-based squadrons were considered the equivalent of a carrier’s capability, the maritime role – which Elworthy argued could be undertaken by land-based aircraft up to 700 nautical miles, and general deterrence – which he felt was provided more effectively by land-based aircraft because they had greater flexibility and more ‘punch’. Luce was also forced to admit that four carriers would have been a more effective force, but that this could not be afforded and that only three were feasible on cost grounds.84 The Treasury remained silent in these initial discussions, but their own officials had already made up their mind: having accepted the Ministry of Defence line that the two options were ‘more or less equal’ in military terms, they favoured the ‘without carriers’ alternative: the reduced manpower requirements, the removal of the need to build a very expensive strike carrier that would only be in service for seven or eight years, and the slightly lower costs that made the £2,000m by 1969/70 target seem achievable were the main substantive reasons.85 Sir Burke Trend, the Cabinet Secretary, summed up the discussions stating that because of the professional disagreement between the heads of two armed services over the best route to follow, ministers would have to make the decision whether to accept the carrier plan or not. Trend’s assessment was cautiously favourable to the Navy: he noted that the decision could not be made on financial grounds alone given the breadth of issues that were raised and that the difference in cost between the two options was so little.86 Given the lack of support the naval leadership had inside and outside the Ministry of Defence beyond the Navy Department, it is perhaps surprising that an unlikely source of support for the Navy Department was emerging in the last desperate weeks of the carrier battle. Burke Trend was gradually becoming a guarded but unlikely champion. Trend’s brief to Harold Wilson setting out the options for these programmes essentially came down mildly in favour of the F-111 but against the

82 CAB 148/68, OPDO(66) 1st meeting, 6 January 1966. 83 CAB 148/68, OPDO(66) 2nd meeting, 7 January 1966. 84 Ibid. 85 T 225/2711, folios 5–10, P.L. Daniel to Henley and Wiggins, 5 January 1966. 86 CAB 148/68, OPDO(66) 2nd meeting, 7 January 1966. The Cancellation of CVA-01 131 approving the carrier or the P.1127, but his paper was also clear about the ambiguities in the cases for and against these three major procurement items.87 Trend was becoming somewhat sceptical of the RAF’s argument for the F-111. He noted that it was ‘well argued’, stating that it was preferable to any feasible alternative aircraft, the F-111 being the equivalent to two Buccaneer 2* aircraft.88 Trend did question whether the projected costs of £584m (including the expense of cancelling the aircraft at this stage) were ‘justified by the alleged need to maintain a strike capability, primarily in the Far East’.89 If the United Kingdom were only to operate in conjunction with allies in the Far East, was it clear that an independent long-range air strike capability would be needed? Trend recommended refraining from a decision until discussion had taken place with allies over who would be providing what equipment in any potential Far Eastern operation. A month later a week before the carrier and F-111 would go before the Cabinet, Trend’s language was stronger: ‘it is improbable … that we shall need a strike capability of the order implied by the F-111. Against whom are we likely to be carrying out deep (? and pre-emptive) strikes of the kind which this aircraft will make possible?’90 On the carrier issue, Trend outlined the two alternatives available. The first involved getting rid of all carriers by 1969–70 and paying for forces that would partially replace their capabilities. This meant converting Hermes to an anti- submarine carrier, converting three Tiger class cruisers as interim escort cruisers (eventually to be replaced by purpose built cruisers), developing or purchasing a long-range anti-ship, ship-launched guided missile system, and equipping the RAF with 36 Buccaneers, 24 Phantoms, 12 airborne early warning aircraft and 12 tankers to replace the Fleet Air Arm’s air capability. The second option, put forward by the Admiralty Board, proposed building CVA-01 only, to complete in 1973, and to keep the carrier force until at least 1980. Of the two alternatives, Trend recommended the first on the following grounds: the Admiralty Board’s required an extra 5,000 in manpower, the cost would be an extra £204m, it made no provision for further carrier replacement (that is, building CVA-02 and 03), there were question marks over the operational availability of sufficient carrier force east of Suez, and finally it would result in exceeding the agreed attributable cost limit of £186m for British forces in the Far East by £28m. The first alternative kept just within this limit.91 Some of the background papers written by Laskey that went into Trend’s briefings for Wilson flesh out the context to this conclusion and make clear how

87 CAB 165/28, folio 7, Trend to Wilson, 18 January 1966 ‘Defence Review’. 88 Ibid. Although Trend did not mention, or perhaps did not know, that the F-111 was also twice as expensive, therefore making the two options broadly similar in cost, although the Buccaneer 2* would not be available for another two years. 89 Ibid. 90 CAB 165/28, folio 16, Trend to Wilson, 8 February 1966 ‘The F-111 option’. 91 CAB 165/28, folio 7, Trend to Wilson, 18 January 1966 ‘Defence Review’, paras 2–14. 132 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic close the issue was. Laskey noted that both alternatives delivered broadly similar capabilities, but that the Admiralty Board alternative was more expensive and required a naval manpower figure of 89,760 (rather than 83,500 for the Ministry of Defence alternative whilst Army and RAF numbers stayed broadly the same) and would only prolong the carrier force for a limited amount of time. It did not provide for further carrier construction beyond CVA-01, yet Eagle would have to be replaced in the late 1970s and Hermes would be too small for effective operations.92 Laskey also elaborated to Rogers, the head of the Defence Review Working Party, on what the Navy Department had sacrificed to produce their plan: not developing the Buccaneer 2*, stretching the life of the existing carriers further and buying cheaper helicopters in place of the planned Chinook. He was also sceptical about the Navy’s costings for the period up to 1975/76, particularly when the older carriers needed replacing, but he stated that it ‘is not possible to prove this [potential underestimate] against the Navy Department’s objections’.93 Trend acknowledged that in the ‘maritime role’ of protecting shipping, aircraft carriers would probably be more efficient than land-based aircraft, the latter having not even been tried in this task, but he regarded the most critical part of the argument as being: ‘the difficulty of taking firm decisions about a pattern of forces in which the key element relates to our commitments in an area where we have already decided that we will only operate in conjunction with allies’.94 As with the F-111 decision, Trend was pointing Wilson towards consultation with allies. The two alternatives produced an overall defence budget of £2,000m and £2,080m respectively if the P.1127 were cancelled, but Denis Healey had proposed to Wilson and Trend a compromise option costing £2,040m, which would see the carriers operated until the end of their effective service lives and not building CVA- 01 (see Table 4.1 – option C). For the Cabinet Secretary it had the advantage of ‘resolving (by postponing) the present deadlock of professional opinion between the Naval and Air staff (sic)’.95 Trend suggested that during this period of ‘running on’ the existing carrier fleet it would be worth seeing if land-based air coordination with naval forces worked, but that if not it ‘may then be too late to change [back to carrier based airpower]’. Curiously, Trend then opined that if such coordination were shown to be not possible, then CVA-01 should in fact be built now. In effect he was acknowledging that the cancellation of CVA-01 could only be justified on arguments based on its replacement by unproven technology, but that the time taken to demonstrate the effectiveness of such technology would mean it would be too late to revert to carrier based airpower if such technology did not work. At best this was extremely equivocal support for Denis Healey’s position.

92 CAB 165/310, folio 11M, Laskey to Trend, 4 January 1966. 93 CAB 165/732, folio 1M, Laskey to Rogers, 14 January 1966. 94 CAB 165/28, folio 7, Trend to Wilson, 18 January 1966 ‘Defence Review’, para. 14. 95 CAB 165/28, folio 7, Trend to Wilson, 18 January 1966 ‘Defence Review’, para. 16. The Cancellation of CVA-01 133

Armed with Trend’s brief, the next day Wilson chaired the first of seven marathon Oversea Policy and Defence Committee meetings between the 19 January and 13 February. Healey led the discussions at the first meeting: the current four-carrier force cost a total of £140m per annum in functional costs (including aircraft and support), further cuts in other forces would not be possible without reviewing commitments, interoperability between Navy and RAF aircraft would not be possible, the Far East was the only relevant theatre for carriers, four carriers could be manned but only three afforded, two carriers could not be guaranteed east of Suez, carriers were vulnerable to air attack close to land, and carriers were only needed in the intervention role supporting the landing of troops on hostile territory against sophisticated opposition but this capability was no longer required. This formidable barrage of reasons to cancel CVA-01 and the carrier programme provided only one fig-leaf for Luce: Healey accepted that between 200 and 700 nm from their bases it was not clear whether land-based airpower could undertake the maritime roles of carriers – a study was being undertaken to analyse this issue but would not complete until the decision to cancel or order CVA-01 had been taken. Given that the maritime case was unproven, but that it would be difficult to envisage any role for carriers after 1980 at the latest, Healey suggested his compromise position of running the existing carrier force on to 1975.96 Luce responded by stating that developing the various weapon systems to replace carriers would cost a considerable amount yet even then would not be likely to completely replace flexibility of carrier air power. CVA-01 cost only an average of an extra £10m a year in the 1970s over Healey’s compromise option, and without it the Navy would be little more than a coastal defence force. Luce did not choose to pick up on ambiguities over whether land-based aircraft could undertake the maritime role, and the Prime Minister summed up by stating that it was impossible to fund a carrier programme within a £2,000m defence budget, but that the issues at stake were of such importance that further discussion was needed and cost could not be the only factor to be considered.97 On the 21st the committee discussed the F-111 and the Buccaneer 2** and 2*. Despite the Cottrell report stating that the Buccaneer 2** was the equal of the F-111 in capability and cost in a two to one ratio, there was one major disadvantage to the Buccaneer options, however. The Buccaneer 2** would not be ready until 1972–73 two to three years after the F-111 and only two years before the next generation Anglo-French variable geometry aircraft was expected to be ready. Procuring such aircraft for only two years’ service would not be cost-effective. Healey was strongly in favour of the F-111 and no opposition was given to his position, even though the argument in favour of procuring the F-111 for only five years’ service could hardly be said to be strong: the Buccaneer option had died.98

96 CAB 148/25, OPD(66) 4th meeting, 19 January 1966. 97 Ibid. 98 CAB 148/25, OPD(66) 6th meeting, 21 January 1966. 134 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

The next day, the committee returned to its consideration of the carrier question. Wilson started the discussions, but again Healey dominated. Healey argued that it was not worth keeping a carrier force after 1980, and as CVA-01 would enter service in 1972/73 she would only have a useful operational life of 7 years compared to the standard warship life of 20–25 years. Keeping up his barrage, Healey stated that the ‘tidiest plan’ would be to get rid of the carriers almost immediately, but time would be needed to assess whether land-based aircraft could undertake the maritime role and to develop anti-ship guided missiles. Luce countered with the fact that replacing carriers with land-based aircraft was not yet proven to work, and that it could not be predicted with certainty what defence requirements would be as far into the future as 1975. Luce also argued that it would be problematic to try to carry on the existing carrier force to 1975. Healey’s dominance of the meeting was such, however, that barely any other voice was heard contradicting the Secretary of State’s position, and he moved on to propose ‘provisional conclusions’: that CVA-01 should not be built, that carriers be run on to 1972/73 at the earliest, that the government should approach the United States to begin negotiations to buy 50 F-111 immediately and that the P.1127 should remain in the programme. No one on the committee appeared to demur, and the Prime Minister asked for costings to be prepared for the conclusions proffered by Healey.99 It looked like the next step was confirmation of the decision by Cabinet. The unbuilt carrier had been submitted to a sustained barrage by the Secretary of State and was clearly close to capsizing. The Navy Department had only small window of opportunity to save the situation. Two approaches were attempted. First, in an unprecedented approach to Harold Wilson, Christopher Mayhew requested permission to address the Oversea Policy and Defence Committee without the Chiefs of Staff being present. Wilson agreed, and elaborate procedures were put in place to ensure that the Chiefs did not know that this had occurred. Mayhew would arrive and leave the meeting from a different door – that going into the Secretariat’s room – and his presence would not be mentioned in the agenda.100 Despite achieving entry into the committee to put the Navy’s case, Mayhew’s performance did not live up to the expectations raised by the manner of his entrance. The Navy Minister said nothing new, and at the start of his speech even seemed to contradict himself by implying that he supported a smaller defence budget with fewer commitments, before launching into a defence of the new carrier and the additional spending required to build and operate it. Mayhew was still wedded to the intervention role for the carrier, and although his questioning of the term ‘sophisticated’ in relation to the types of powers that would no longer be confronted could have carried weight in earlier discussions, his arguments were vaguely put and even drifted into notions of the ‘non-white’ powers finding common cause against the ‘white’ powers in a conflagration engulfing the

99 CAB 148/25, OPD(66) 7th meeting, 22 January 1966. 100 PREM 13/744, Mayhew to Wilson, 28 January 1966 and WKR to Mitchell, 28 January 1966. The Cancellation of CVA-01 135 whole Far East. Such curious language, put to ministers in a progressive Labour government, and perhaps more appropriate to a Conservative ministry a decade before, could have done little to win over his colleagues. Wilson thanked Mayhew for his time but noted that he had added nothing new to the arguments.101 The Navy Minister’s dramatic though anti-climactic intervention had made little impact; the unbuilt aircraft carrier was still foundering. A further rescue attempt was made from that unexpected champion of sea power, the Cabinet Secretary. Burke Trend now advised the Prime Minister to avert what might have a catastrophic impact on the Navy. Trend noted to Wilson that ‘opinion in the Navy Department on this subject has recently been running very high’ and that the Sea Lords were willing to take unilateral cuts in its own budget to allow the carrier to be built. If this were the case, then Trend suggested that if the Navy pressed its case hard, then the government could face ‘a very difficult political decision’ that might be better postponed. Trend then went further, his ‘unofficial conscience’ would be untroubled if the carrier was approved, especially if the relatively small amount of £60m saved from cancelling the carrier would not ‘be worth the risk’ to the government.102 Trend expressed further scepticism of the need for the F-111 and raised the possibility that an alternative approach put forward by a ‘body of opinion which has hitherto been rather inarticulate may begin to express itself (even if a little belatedly) in support of the Buccaneer and an extra carrier i.e.: in support of sea- based rather than land-based air power’.103 Trend was laying the groundwork for the naval leadership’s final attempt to save the situation, although his hint that the Buccaneer option might be brought back from the dead was an overestimate of the radicalism that Luce and his fellow Sea Lords would be capable of producing. Three days before Cabinet was due to discuss the carrier, the Admiralty Board submitted a new carrier plan at short notice to the Oversea Policy and Defence Committee. The new plan was presented without the chance even for the Chiefs or Healey to review it. The proposals were not the radical attack on land-based intervention that Trend has foreseen, nor the radical acceptance of a maritime-role small carrier with a dramatically reduced purchase of strike aircraft that Healey and Hull had suggested in January. The proposals in fact looked like, as indeed they were, a last desperate attempt to squeeze CVA-01 into a reduced budget. The results were not that impressive (see Table 4.1): they would be more expensive than Option C by £9m in 1969/70 and by £24m between 1969 and 1976, would involve the cancellation of the airborne early warning replacement for the Gannet in favour of second-hand US aircraft, the reduction in the Phantom purchase from 102 to 58 in total, a reduction in the Buccaneer purchase to 19 fewer than in Option C, and the removal of any television guidance from the updated Martel missile. These would be offset by the use of 25 Jaguar aircraft in

101 CAB 148/25, OPD(66) 9th meeting, 1 February 1966. 102 CAB 165/28, folio 17, Trend to Wilson, 10 February 1966, page 3. 103 CAB 165/28, folio 16, Trend to Wilson, 8 February 1966, page 3. 136 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic the strike role after 1973, complemented by a carrier-borne version of the Anglo- French variable geometry aircraft in the mid 1970s. The whole carrier fleet would not be funded past 1980 and in the mid to late 1970s be equipped with three different types of strike aircraft, two of which had not yet been developed for carrier operations. The results also meant a slight diminishing in capability over Option C up to 1973, the period considered to be of greatest risk. The total aircraft purchase had been substantially reduced – but in both fighters and strike aircraft, making the maritime capability as well as the intervention capability weaker after 1972/73 and resulting in continued reliance on the Sea Vixen into the 1970s.104 In discussion, many of the weaknesses of the plan were raised, and Elworthy noted that research and development costs for modifying the Jaguar and Anglo- French aircraft had not been included: the Air Staff considered that these had been underestimated by up to £200m over 10 years. The Chief of General Staff supported Luce, as he doubted the ability of the carriers to be run on to 1975. Healey, however, damned the proposal with faint praise before attacking it directly. In many ways it was ‘attractive’, but it involved the heaviest expenditure in the late 1970s when the requirements for the carrier would be diminishing and nor could the Jaguar or Anglo-French aircraft be relied upon to be ready when planned.105 Wilson reserved judgement and asked Healey to analyse the new proposal further. A further leak, this time to Chapman Pincher of the Daily Express, which appeared on the 12th, served to make the Navy’s situation even more precarious in the two days whilst Healey reviewed the new plan. Christopher Mayhew suspected that one of the Sea Lords had leaked to Pincher that David Luce had exercised his right to see the Prime Minister over the carrier issue, that a new carrier plan was being proposed to Cabinet and that Luce had threatened to resign.106 In fact, this leak seems to have had more to do with intra-Admiralty Board infighting than trying to save the carrier if Mayhew’s assessment of the reason for the leak is to be believed. Luce, aware that the carrier was almost certainly going to be cancelled, had been prevaricating over whether to resign if and when it was. Both Healey and Mayhew had tried to talk Luce out of resignation, and according to Mayhew’s account the First Sea Lord had decided to stay until he was given an ultimatum by the other Sea Lords. They stated that if he did not resign, the other Sea Lords would all resign instead. Mayhew believed, but had no proof, that the Pincher leak was an attempt by one or more of the Sea Lords to force Luce’s hand by publicly stating that resignation had been threatened.107 In fact, only Mayhew had talked to the Prime Minister about resigning, and from Mayhew’s personal account written a few days after the event, the Navy Minister seems concerned about the coverage of Luce as it placed Mayhew’s resignation plans in the shade (this might also

104 CAB 148/25, OPD(66) 12th meeting, 11 February 1966. 105 Ibid. 106 Mayhew 8/2, Handwritten note by Christopher Mayhew dated 24 February 1966, p. 1. 107 Ibid. The Cancellation of CVA-01 137 explain Mayhew’s attempt to stop Luce from resigning a few days previously).108 Whatever the actual situation, and given the fetid atmosphere within the Admiralty Board at the time the source of the Pincher leak suggested by Mayhew seems plausible, this removed any remaining credibility from Luce’s attempt to put the final case for the new carrier plan.109 The committee met again on Sunday to discuss Healey’s findings.110 The Planning Staff had analysed the plan and Hull declared that the likely cost of Option D above Option C would be £20m in 1969/70 and £100m over the seven-year period. Accepting defeat, the beleaguered First Sea Lord stated that he had little to add. Nothing positive was said about Option D in the discussion that followed and the conclusion was clear. Although the carrier issue would go to Cabinet – with options A, B and C put forward – it was highly unlikely that the Cabinet would dissent from the view of the Committee.

Cabinet and Cancellation

The absence of any of the Chiefs or the Navy Minister meant that Healey could control the tenor of the debate and guide the Cabinet to the decision he wanted. The Cabinet met twice on 14 February 1966 to discuss the Defence Review. The first Cabinet discussion covered commitments and overall expenditure. Healey outlined the aims of the Review: the cut defence spending by 16 per cent compared to Conservative plans by 1969/70 to £2,000m, to the reduce foreign exchange burden and to reduce military overstretch. If the carrier were cancelled a further £100m savings would be needed. Half of these would come from reducing forces in the Mediterranean and Middle East even further, and the other half might come from retiring carriers in 1970, cancelling the P.1127 or further reductions in Germany or the Far East. Wilson stated that the East of Suez theatre was where the ‘real dangers in the world lay’ and that British forces must be prepared to play a part in it. The Prime Minister also suggested using the planned £50m contingency to plug the remaining £50 gap if necessary. At this first meeting the carrier was only mentioned once by Healey: he stated that ‘the carriers and the F-111 were in no sense alternatives’ and that all the Chiefs of Staff and Service boards had agreed that the F-111 was essential to carry out the tasks to be laid upon the military over the next 10 years, ‘The Chief of the Naval Staff and the Admiralty Board were alone in believing that the maintenance of the carriers was necessary for this task’.111 Later the same day, Cabinet met again, this time in the House of Commons, to discuss the carrier programme and the F-111 purchase. Healey started by reiterating that the decisions on the two purchases were not a case of ‘either/or’ and that

108 Ibid., p. 2. 109 Ibid. 110 CAB 148/25, OPD(66)13th meeting, 13 February 1966. 111 CAB 128/41, CM(66)8, 14 February 1966. 138 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic the Chief of Naval Staff and the Admiralty Board had accepted the necessity of purchasing the F-111. Healey stated that the aircraft carrier was not cost-effective and was only relevant in the Far East. In the Atlantic the carrier would be too vulnerable and in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf land-based aircraft could undertake its roles effectively. The Navy could not man more than four aircraft carriers, but even then could not afford more than three such vessels.112 The total cost of the carrier programme would be £1,400m over 10 years. The capability provided by carriers would not justify the expenditure involved: ‘the only operations for which carriers would be essential were the landing of withdrawal of troops in the fact of sophisticated opposition outside the range of land based aircraft’. The Defence Review did not call for the retention of this capability in the 1970s. For air strikes against land targets the Cabinet was told that land-based aircraft were more effective and cheaper by a ratio of 2.5 to 1. Healey acknowledged that an important part of the carrier’s role was the protection of ships at sea: ‘it was accepted that up to a range of 300 miles this task could be adequately fulfilled by land based aircraft’. The RAF claimed to be able to undertake this role up to 700 miles out but further study would be needed to investigate this. Healey stated that the Chiefs of Staff with the exception of Luce considered that the threat to shipping would not be great in the 1970s but the task could arise as long as the confrontation with Indonesia lasted, so the Secretary of State proposed maintaining the existing carrier fleet to 1975, but not procuring CVA-01. Healey recounted that the Admiralty Board had recently proposed a revised carrier plan, which had proposed the construction of CVA-01 whilst keeping costs down. A review of the costings had shown that the new plan would cost £150m more over a 10-year period than Healey’s preferred plans. Even then there would be no additional capability until 1973 when CVA-01 completed, and in any case the plan envisaged phasing carriers out in 1980, giving the vessel only a seven-year operational life. Healey then argued that it would cost £600m to provide the capabilities of the carrier force, when compared to the cost of the force at £1,400m.113 There was very little discussion after Healey’s long exposition against the carrier. One unnamed Cabinet member raised the flexibility and mobility of carrier air power, and Healey responded to this by stating that carriers were more vulnerable to attack than land bases, and that military operations needed land bases they could not be undertaken from the sea alone. During the 1970s it was planned that air bases would be concentrated on uninhabited islands and Australia. The Prime Minister summed up in support of Healey’s argument: the F-111 was essential and a defence programme with the carrier included could not produce spending at or below the £2,000m figure. As a result, CVA-01 should not be built, but the existing carriers run on to 1975.114

112 CAB 128/41, CM(66)9, 14 February 1966. 113 Ibid. 114 Ibid. The Cancellation of CVA-01 139

The carrier programme was dead, and the unbuilt aircraft carrier and her unbuilt escorts slid below the water only ever to re-surface to haunt the dreams of future generations of naval leaders, planners and analysts. Wilson, Healey and the Cabinet moved on rapidly to discuss the purchase of the F-111 long-range bomber. This page has been left blank intentionally Chapter 5 The Navy and the Defence Expenditure Studies

Eric Grove has described the cancellation of the carrier programme as ‘perhaps the most traumatic shock’ to the Navy in its post-war history.1 The senior service would have to adjust to the removal of its capital ship and the centrepiece of its strategic and operational planning. What made this more difficult to swallow was that this had been enforced on the naval leadership by government: it had not been due to an internal acceptance of the need to innovate spurred on by international naval rivalries, such as the all-iron warship HMS Warrior replacing the wooden line-of-battle ship, nor by the harsh but self-evident realities of war, such as the emergence of the aircraft carrier as the core of the fleet during the Second World War, but by defence economies that had seemed to some to single out the Navy and sacrifice its programme of aircraft carriers, a type of ship not yet demonstrated in battle to be obsolete. The end of the carrier controversy was also messy; the resignations of Sir David Luce and Christopher Mayhew were not dignified – at least as seen from behind the scenes. As has been described, the First Sea Lord, under pressure from supposed friends and enemies on all sides had reluctantly resigned after a threat of mass resignation from his fellow Sea Lords. Christopher Mayhew delayed his longed-for resignation after arguments with Henry Hardman prevented him from resigning with Luce, and after Harold Wilson implied that his reselection as a Labour MP for the 1966 general election might be in doubt.2 Mayhew’s reasons for resignation were different from Luce’s and centred on his opposition to remaining East of Suez. Given that he had defended the carrier programme to the hilt, and that CVA-01 was seen as the quintessential East of Suez weapon system this appeared baffling, but with Mayhew’s coming political reorientation towards the Liberal Party this made more sense in retrospect, at least from the perspective of Mayhew’s own career, if not from that of defence policy or strategy. His nuanced argument that an East of Suez strategy without carriers made no sense would have found supporters in the Treasury, but did not completely explain away this contradictory position. The new First Sea Lord, Varyl Begg, had the difficult role of rebuilding the Navy Department’s dignity, reputation, position and influence within the Ministry of Defence, and with the Secretary of State in particular, whilst also ensuring that

1 Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p. 280. 2 Mayhew 8/2, handwritten note by Christopher Mayhew, 24 February 1966, pp. 3–7. 142 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic urgent procurement requirements were driven through. This had to be undertaken in an environment where the East of Suez role appeared to be diminishing, but had not yet been abandoned altogether. The next four years would indeed be a long road, and it is this part of the book that will analyse the process of recovery and rebuilding. This chapter will analyse the higher policy and strategic picture from the cancellation of the carrier to January 1968 when financial constraints forced an acceleration of the withdrawal from east of Suez. This encompasses the Defence Expenditure Studies, which in effect became another Defence Review, and in which the Navy was still vulnerable to further cuts in spending, capability, manpower and equipment.3 How did the Navy fit into the new policy and strategic picture, in particular with respect to the reduced East of Suez capability? How did the naval leadership deal with the renewed pressure on spending from its position of weakness?

Renewed Pressure from the Treasury

In July 1966 Healey, given the recent increased weakness of sterling, and aware that the Treasury would soon approach the Ministry of Defence for further cuts, commissioned from the central Secretariat a study on what further economies might be possible in the Ministry of Defence and the extent to which they might affect commitments and strategy. The report was prepared by the second week in July and reached Healey’s private office in early August; it was covered by a long note from James Dunnett, the new Permanent Secretary.4 The prognosis was grim. Dunnett, had gathered that the Treasury was likely to ask for a total defence budget in the region of £1,750–£1,850m (at 1964 prices), a cut of approximately £200–300m from the £2,070m level by 1970/71 agreed by ministers as part of the outcome of the 1966 Defence Review. Such a figure, like that for the previous review, had been chosen almost arbitrarily – without any consideration for foreign policy and commitments – by a Chancellor under acute financial pressure.5 He noted that ‘we believe that they [the Treasury] would agree with our view that such a review would involve giving up a major role and a consequential large reduction in at least one of the present services’.6 Dunnett did not elaborate as to which service might suffer such reductions. Dunnett noted that previous salami slicing tactics over many years had produced widely spread ‘penny packet’ forces across the various British bases around the world and had led to a ‘cost-ineffective

3 The policy and strategic picture after January 1968 is covered in Chapter 6, and the shape of the fleet over these four years in Chapter 7. 4 DEFE 23/12, enclosure 1, note by R.C. Kent, Assistant Secretary (Establishment and Organisation branch – DS1), 12 July 1966. 5 Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, p. 173. 6 DEFE 23/12, enclosure 1, Dunnett to Healey, 8 August 1966. The Navy and the Defence Expenditure Studies 143 structure’.7 In short, very large overheads for bases, logistics and long-range support were being incurred in support of increasingly smaller front-line forces. The report itself made clear that there was precious little slack in the recently pared-down force structure without giving up major commitments.8 The £330m cuts gained from the last review, the report explained, had been from a mixture cutting contingency funds (£75m), cutting funding for aircraft programmes that had been over-optimistic anyway (another £75m), the net cost of aircraft programme cancellations and their replacement with US types (£50–60m, largely from cancelling TSR-2 and replacing it with the F-111 on favourable credit terms), and a portion of capability cuts totalling £150m that included the cancellation of CVA-01, the fifth ballistic-missile submarine, reducing the Territorial Army and the planned run-down of parts of the Army. In terms of real capability reduction this had been judged in the report to be minimal: the Royal Navy could still, just about, maintain one ballistic- missile submarine on station; whilst the East of Suez strike capability lost with the cancellation of the carrier was believed to have been compensated by the F-111 order. The Army cuts had not significantly reduced front-line forces.9 This assessment was contentious to say the least: the cancellation of the carrier had to a large extent been based on the policy decision to give up the ability to intervene against well-armed and well-prepared enemies alone. The Secretariat civil servants who had written the note had conveniently forgotten the realities of the last 18 months of inter-service strife. The report stated that there was very little that could be cut: to begin with, the contingency fund was now at ‘rock bottom’ at only £30m. The report was blunt: with such a funding cut it would be impossible to maintain all five core capabilities – the deterrent, the currently planned NATO forces in Germany, a meaningful strategic reserve, an air transport capability and a worthwhile and balanced force east of Suez. In terms of realistic choices, it was assessed that this came down to either dramatically reducing forces in Germany or almost completely giving up on East of Suez commitments.10 The reduction of the German commitment by half, say to £100m, in order to maintain the East of Suez presence, would require a return to the tripwire strategy.11 Although not commented upon in the note, it would have been clear to all concerned that this would have been a formidable task to persuade the United States that this was a feasible option, not least as the NATO strategy was in the process of being rewritten to move towards the concept of ‘flexible response’ which provided much more scope for conventional warfare alongside controlled

7 Ibid. 8 DEFE 23/12, enclosure 1, note by R.C. Kent, Assistant Secretary (Establishment and Organisation branch – DS1), 12 July 1966. 9 Ibid. 10 DEFE 23/12, enclosure 1, Dunnett to Healey, 8 August 1966. 11 DEFE 23/12, enclosure 1, note by R.C. Kent, Assistant Secretary (Establishment and Organisation branch – DS1), 12 July 1966. 144 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic and gradated nuclear response as part of the NATO deterrence stance. After this, however, finding the remaining £100m would be extremely difficult, andcuts in air transport and logistic support would be impossible whilst attempting to maintain 1966 Review force levels east of Suez. In effect, therefore, ‘short of a complete withdrawal from Germany and the disbandment of all the forces now stationed there, the maintenance of our overseas commitments within a defence budget of £1750m appears insoluble’.12 Therefore the only realistic option open was significant reductions east of Suez. The report then sketched out a possible force structure. The remaining forces would be based around a single commando carrier, and an escort of four or five frigates. There would be no Army presence beyond the Gulf and a small garrison in Hong Kong, and the only significant RAF presence would be one F-111 squadron based in Australia ‘as evidence of our interest and ability to intervene in the Far East’. Respecting the maritime role of the RAF in support of the Navy, the report acknowledged that present studies had not yet produced satisfactory answers: The effect of the RAF’s maritime role is difficult to envisage since even the current situation is unclear; it is assumed, however, that the provision of the facilities in the Indian Ocean islands would be a necessary part of any plan to rely on reinforcement rather than forces actually in the theatre.13 In addition, existing weapons programmes such as a Sea Dart successor could be cancelled, and anti-submarine weapons development and warfare research could become a joint Royal Navy/RAF responsibility. Reducing the strategic reserve, and the numbers of ships assigned to NATO (or the reducing the capabilities of new ships – such as limiting their operational range or their sea-keeping) would ensure that the £200m figure could be met. Although this assessment was only speculative and uncosted, it was clear that the service most likely to be the subject of, in the Permanent Under-Secretary’s words, a ‘large reduction’, was the Royal Navy.14 The RAF’s island strategy in tandem with a lone commando ship would form the basis of any intervention capability that remained east of Suez. West of Suez it seemed both the quality and quantities of vessels would also be reduced. It also implied the early withdrawal of aircraft carriers from the East of Suez theatre, and by extension, from active service altogether, by 1970–71. Dunnett elaborated on what he felt would be possible with a £1,750m budget. Regarding the Navy, he was clear that its horizons and capabilities would have to be significantly reduced: ‘We do not see how we can get more than a relatively small reduction unless we give up the idea of a capability above a peace-keeping level (or perhaps a sophisticated capability confined to the Atlantic). If we gave up this idea, very large savings would accrue’.15 Similarly, giving up the RAF’s

12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 DEFE 23/12, enclosure 1, Dunnett to Healey, 8 August 1966. 15 Ibid. The Navy and the Defence Expenditure Studies 145

F-111s and the Navy/RAF Phantom, would also remove an expensive sophisticated capability and allow concentration on a peace-keeping role. Dunnett finished by putting his finger on one of the major problems of British defence policy since the end of the war: an unrealistic comparison with the armed forces of the United States. ‘The unpalatable fact is that we cannot hope to carry out as many roles (including the aircraft industry role) as does the USA and do it on the cheap. Something big must go, if we wanted to get down to £1,750m. What it should be is a matter of political and strategic judgement (putting it politely) or of hunch (putting it crudely)’. Dunnett, for rhetorical purposes, pointed to two options at either extreme: to ‘pull in horns’ and withdraw completely from East of Suez commitments, emphasising a Europe-only strategy and the deterrent (perhaps even increasing the ballistic-missile carrying submarine fleet to eight boats) or to go ‘worldwide and to do it in style and kill the Continental Army [leaving] a big RN plus a big RAF plus a few small garrisons and some marines, if you take it to the other extreme’.16 In effect, however, the choice was really only the European one. The report, coupled with Dunnett’s forceful cover sheet, had pointed out the impossibility of accepting a £200–300m cut whilst retaining a heavy east of Suez presence without a complete and total withdrawal from Germany, something that would almost certainly cause a crisis in NATO of considerable proportions. However difficult the choices that would have to be made in the Far East, they would pale into insignificance compared to the alternative of total withdrawal from continental Europe. That such a withdrawal would have been made to enable considerable forces to remain in the Indian Ocean and South East Asia, where it had been clear for a number of years that the United Kingdom’s economic interests were weakest compared to Europe and the Middle East, would have been politically and diplomatically impossible. The report and its covering note was a strange beast. Several times Dunnett came extremely close to advocating a withdrawal of all forces from east of Suez, but in the end the force structure tentatively proposed (one commando ship, four or five frigates, and one F-111 squadron) still envisaged some form of permanent force deployment to fulfil at least some commitments east of Suez. This was despite Dunnett’s assertion that the existing ‘penny-packets’ east of Suez were already cost-ineffective, and his strong inference that given a full withdrawal from continental Europe was politically unacceptable the only real choice was full withdrawal of forces from east of Suez. This curious contradiction in the report and note might be explained by a reluctance by Healey to consider yet the full withdrawal of forces from east of Suez. As will be seen, Healey’s later push for retaining forces in the Far East suggests that this is correct.

16 Ibid. 146 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Initial Studies for Further Reductions

The implications of these findings were highly significant for British foreign policy: further defence economies would not be possible without a reduction in commitments east of Suez. The same issue that had formed a significant part of the backdrop of the arguments over the 1966 Defence Review and the battle for the carrier was resurfacing. Previously, it had been only the naval leadership and Mountbatten who had argued that capabilities could not be trimmed at all without a review of commitments, whilst the other services and Healey had paid lip service to this but had also striven to demonstrate that the carrier duplicated capabilities available in other units. This time the Chiefs were united with Dunnett in this assessment.17 Disagreement with the line actually came from within the Ministry of Defence civil service. Deputy Under-Secretary Peck, with responsibility for Budget and Plans and a former Treasury official, was still convinced that economies would be possible from the military without compromising commitments. He presented to the Chiefs, as they discussed the contingency planning study, what he saw as an achievable plan to reduce the defence budget by £233m by 1970/71: £90m would be saved if the carriers were withdrawn by 1970/71 rather than 1975/76 as currently planned, and a further £37m if the Royal Navy East of Suez escort force was reduced by half in addition to cuts in support services and family accommodation. The RAF would suffer £57m and the Army £49m cuts largely from East of Suez capabilities as well.18 Not for the first time the Navy was being suggested as the main victim of economies, despite the rather optimistic assumptions about savings gained from withdrawing the carriers early. The Chiefs doubted that the optimistic cuts given in Peck’s report could be achieved, and the Acting Chief of Defence Staff, Air Marshal Elworthy summed up the Chiefs’ view: that they were ‘being asked once again to develop a structure for the United Kingdom defence force, based on an arbitrary financial ceiling unrelated to the task, roles or commitments of the forces’.19 Peck was very much in a minority with his civil service colleagues: a note written by the ‘Defence Secretariat’ that could only have had the full support of Dunnett, stated baldly that ‘there is no possibility of achieving savings of the order of £250m by 1970/71 without changing our overseas policy’.20

17 DEFE 4/205, CoS (66) 48 item 3, 8 September 1966; DEFE 4/206, CoS (66) 51 item 5. 18 DEFE 4/205, CoS 1893/31/8/66, Appendix 2 to Annex A, report by A.D. Peck, Deputy Under-Secretary (Programmes and Budget) appended to minutes of 48th meeting, 8 September 1966. 19 DEFE 4/205, CoS(66)48 item 3, 8 September 1966. 20 DEFE 4/206, CoS (66) 51 item 5, 27 September 1966, annex A ‘Defence Budget Contingency Study’, paper by Defence Secretariat. The Navy and the Defence Expenditure Studies 147

The official and service sides of the Ministry of Defence, Peck aside (although he may have been deliberately cast in a devil’s advocate role to force the Chiefs into proper discussion of alternatives), were in agreement. However, the conclusions they drew from this differed, and differed crucially. For the Chiefs, as will be seen, this meant that the argument should therefore be pushed out beyond the Ministry of Defence, using the support of the ‘political’ departments – the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office – to forestall or at least lessen the possible cuts. For Dunnett and his officials, however, as has been seen, the situation meant taking an active stance in pushing the political departments to accepting a reduction in commitments in the Far East to ensure that Britain could extricate itself from the theatre, except for a small almost token capability of F-111, a commando ship and five escorts.

The 4th Chequers Meeting and its Aftermath

Treasury pressure on the Ministry of Defence to actually undertake cuts eventually resulted in the Prime Minister calling a meeting of key ministers at Chequers. After a long day discussing EEC policy, and a hearty dinner, the ministerial members of the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee began discussing cuts in the defence budget. Denis Healey, without his civil servants and perhaps loosened up by the liquid refreshments served at the meal, made it clear that his department could make reductions amounting to half the British forces in the Far East and a third in Europe to reach the £1,850m level proposed by James Callaghan, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Savings in a range between £250m and £400m were possible.21 In effect, Healey, Wilson and the other ministers present had committed to another Defence Review in all but name. In fact, the decision not to describe the process as a review, but as ‘Defence Expenditure Studies’ was a deliberate attempt to prevent unwanted publicity from allies or within the armed services.22 The day after the Chequers meeting Healey debriefed Dunnett and Field Marshall Hull, the Chief of the Defence Staff. He emphasised that he had made ‘resistance noises’ about further reductions, noting the potential morale issues within the forces and that it would be essential on this occasion to get changes in political commitments overseas settled first’.23 Healey had also stated that he preferred no public announcement of a budgetary target as had occurred in the previous review.

21 Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, pp. 172–7; Richard Crossman: Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, vol. 2 (Hamish Hamilton 1976), p. 85, diary for Saturday 22 October 1966. 22 Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, p. 175. 23 DEFE 13/584, item 1/1, note of Secretary of States’s post-Chequers debrief to Permanent Under-Secretary and Chief of the Defence Staff, by Private Secretary, 21 October 1966. 148 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Healey noted that he had also outlined three options for reductions: a modified version of Dunnett’s either/or recommendations of four months earlier but with a crucial third addition. The first option was a very large cut in forces in Germany, the second a withdrawal from the Far East altogether; but the third would involve large cuts in our forces in both Germany and the Far East’.24 In this third option, the Ministry of Defence would assess whether it would be possible to keep a presence in the Far East to satisfy Australia, New Zealand and to ‘give cover’ to the United States in the region. Healey had emphasised that ‘we should resist any attempt to quantify the financial savings which would result from this [i.e., the third] approach until the planning work has been done, and viable forces for the three services worked out’.25 Healey was at the very minimum investigating an option that could realistically retain at least some, if only nominal, forces east of Suez. Dunnett seemed concerned that Healey had given the impression that cuts could be more straightforward than they might turn out to be in reality: he noted that ‘we should be careful not to let other ministers get the impression that it would be a relatively easy task to cut by, say, a third in Europe and, say, a half in the Far East; and that, when we had done this, a significantly lower defence budget could be achieved. The task of making the savings required could well prove a good deal more difficult’.26 The extent to which Healey had been over-optimistic to his cabinet colleagues about possible reductions he could make whilst keeping a presence in the Far East was made clear in a letter written to Trend a week later. Healey had to admit that ‘I feel on reflection that I went a little too far in quoting a figure as high as £400m; and, if we were able in the event to approach the figure of, say, £300m, I am quite sure that it would be in relation to a later date than 1970–71’.27 To add to the embarrassment, Burke Trend, probably the only civil servant present, had circulated minutes of the meeting, despite Healey having been under the impression that this would not be the case. Lowering service morale further was the reasoning given for his concern, in an unsent letter written by Healey to Trend, but the £400m figure must also have been a significant, if not the main, factor.28 Healey did not eventually send the letter about the minutes issue, but discussed the issue with Trend at the Cabinet Office. The distribution of the minutes appears to have been limited and Trend sent a mollifying letter after Healey’s visit to the Cabinet Office emphasising that the £1,850m figure was just an indicative one ‘plucked out of the air’ just as much as Healey’s own £400m figure.29

24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 DEFE 13/584, item 6, Healey to Burke Trend, Cabinet Secretary, 28 October 1966. 28 DEFE 13/584, items 2 and 4, Healey to Trend, 27 October 1966 (unsent). 29 DEFE 13/584, item 7, Trend to Healey, 31 October 1966. The Navy and the Defence Expenditure Studies 149

Starting the Defence Expenditure Studies

The Secretary of State, in the view of his Permanent Secretary, had given too much away at the Chequers discussions, and had certainly taken the heat off the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office to review commitments, but nonetheless the studies had to be started.30 When Dunnett brought together a group of senior civil servants four days after the Chequers conference to start initial studies into defence reductions, it was made clear to Frank Cooper, placed in charge of drawing together a statement of assumptions to work from, that the early withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia should not be ruled out even if this ‘would pose problems for the political departments’.31 The possibility of taking decisions that would put Far Eastern commitments at risk, like the defence of Singapore and Malaysia, were definitely not off the agenda. As yet, there had been no movement from the Foreign Office over the commitments issue they had been asked, as far back as July by the Chiefs of Staff what commitments in the Far East should be assumed for any future study of defence spending. Having analysed the answers given by the political departments when they were produced nearly four months later, there had been, in the view of Hull, ‘no critical change in the United Kingdom’s commitments in the theatre, the Commander-in-Chief is not relieved of any of his military responsibilities’.32 The Defence Expenditure Studies were taken forward by the Defence Review Working Party, re-activated when it became clear that further economies would be necessary. Healey formalised his preference for the ‘third option’ making it clear that he could deliver 50 per cent reductions east of Suez and 33 per cent in Europe.33 The vital study into force levels in the Far East had been numbered Study 7 by the Working Party, and responsibility had been given to the Ministry of Defence under the supervision of Frank Cooper. Without any changes in commitments and stated policy, Cooper decided that the only rational way to begin the framework was to start with a ‘blank slate’ in the Far East, something that he candidly stated had ‘not been done before’.34 However, this was not a methodology that would help produce the 50 per cent Far Eastern cuts, whilst maintaining a viable force, to which Healey had committed himself. Very quickly, the Navy and Air Force were to be placed in competition with each other again for resources and equipment East of Suez. Deputy Under- Secretary Peck, in a note to Dunnett, gave some initial opinions on the terms of reference behind Cooper’s Study 7. He felt that they were ‘rather restrictive’. He

30 CAB 148/68, OPD(O) meeting 20, 24 October 1966, item 5. 31 DEFE 23/12, enclosure 11, note of meeting dated 26 October 1966 chaired by Dunnett, and attended by Assistant Under-Secretary (P) and others. 32 DEFE 23/12, enclosure 17, Hull to Healey, 2 November 1966. 33 CAB 148/68, OPD(O) meeting 20, 24 November 1966, item 5. 34 DEFE 23/12, enclosure 23, Assistant Under-Secretary (P) to Dunnett, 14 November 1966. 150 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic proposed the following: ‘Without, at this stage, producing a detailed framework for additional options I would like to see these further alternatives considered: – (i) a predominantly naval and amphibious presence with minimal ground and air forces stationed in the area (or even none at all permanently stationed there); (ii) the sort of ground and air forces which will come out of the study as it stands but with much smaller naval forces: – no strike carriers and minimum other naval forces’.35 Dunnett must have agreed with Peck’s suggestion, as soon afterwards, in his note to the Secretary of State a month after the Chequers talks, the Permanent Under- Secretary was suggesting the same thing.36 A scribbled pen comment, probably by Pat Nairne, noted that this either/or option for the Far East seemed somewhat extreme, but this new parameter for Study 7 was agreed by Healey and work started the following week. The Permanent Under-Secretary suggested a timetable of completion of work and circulation to ministers by the end of April, followed by preliminary decisions and communication to allies in June.37 The Navy and the RAF were now pitted against each other once more. Very early on, it also became apparent that there was some confusion as to what Healey had committed his department to at Chequers. The Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence eventually agreed that a cut of between £200m and £300m, to get costs in 1970/71 down from £2,100m to £1,850m (1964 prices), was what was being considered.38 However, the Foreign Office had interpreted Healey’s plan to cut Far East forces by half as a cut in total expenditure in that theatre by half. The Ministry of Defence’s line was that this was a cut in ‘teeth arms’ of half, which would probably not mean a cut in total spending by a half. Cutting infrastructure and logistic costs at the same rate and level as the military side of the forces was notoriously difficult. The Foreign Office was clearly hoping to push the Ministry of Defence further to produce cuts before any question of revisiting commitments was raised again. Cooper moved quickly to produce a compromise solution whereby the Ministry of Defence would work to a cut of 50 per cent in the teeth arms, but would reduce the figures further if the costs ‘seemed too high’.39 This suitably vaguely worded compromise went some way to squaring the circle, but also tacitly admitted that the studies were unlikely to produce the expenditure cuts that Healey had so confidently predicted at Chequers.

35 DEFE 23/12, enclosure 28, Peck to Dunnett, 24 November 1966. 36 DEFE 23/12, enclosure 33, Dunnett to Healey, undated draft. 37 Ibid. 38 DEFE 13/584, item 18, cover note to study by Assistant Under-Secretary (P). 39 DEFE 13/584, item 17, Assistant Under-Secretary (P) to Dunnett, 10 November 1966. The Navy and the Defence Expenditure Studies 151

Defence Expenditure Studies: Study 7 – The Far East

By late December it was becoming clear that Study 7 would not meet the £200m–£300m savings target. The Defence Review Working Party therefore commissioned a contingency study from the Foreign Office on the impact of a total withdrawal from the Far East.40 Towards the end of January, Nairne took the opportunity to update the Secretary of State on progress with the Defence Expenditure Studies. He made it clear that Study 7, the Far East study, was the most important because it was from the results of this that the other major studies would flow. Once force levels and costs in the Far East had been evaluated, then the studies into other areas such as force levels in Britain, the political and economic impact on Singapore, and consulting allies about Far East changes could go ahead. The additional work imposed on the civilian and military staffs meant that many lower level studies, including a number in the naval sphere had to be delayed or incorporated into the Defence Expenditure Studies work. Ironically, these included studies aimed at assessing the viability of naval forces east of Suez – including ones assessing the need for amphibious forces by the Defence Operational Analysis Establishment. They were also joined by Study 19, another DOAE study to see whether the RAF, operating from island bases, could provide adequate air cover for naval forces.41 This study was of the utmost importance for the Navy, as it would show whether land-based RAF aircraft could replace carriers – it was a study that should have been commissioned at the start of the previous Defence Review, and now looked like it might be pushed back even further until after the current review. When Study 7 emerged the results were equivocal, although Cooper had chaired the Study 7 Working Party, he had been dependent on the service departments and their staffs for capability assessments. Case A was the ‘naval option’ with air strike capabilities being invested in an aircraft carrier rather than two squadrons of F-111s. In addition there was to be an amphibious force of one commando ship and one dock landing ship. These were supported by three higher-quality vessels: one cruiser (presumably of the Tiger class), a hunter-killer nuclear-powered submarine and a guided missile destroyer; and by a number of lower-quality vessels including eight destroyers or frigates, two patrol submarines and eight mine-counter-measure vessels. For support there were two naval support ships (depot and repair vessels) and seven Royal Fleet Auxiliary tankers, stores and armament ships. The Army had one infantry and two commando battalions, plus support and reconnaissance units and the RAF one fighter squadron and a number of helicopter and transport units.42 These were still quite substantial forces, and a long way from Dunnett’s F-111, commando ship and four frigates suggestion.

40 CAB 148/55, OPDO (DR) (67) meeting 1, p. 1, 3 January 1967. 41 DEFE 13/584, item 37, Private Secretary to Secretary of State, 20 January 1967; the eventual report is in DEFE 48/40. 42 DEFE 13/584, item 38, interim report: Study 7. 152 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Case B set out the land/air option: the RAF gained two F-111 squadrons and a ground attack squadron, whilst the Navy lost the carrier and two frigates. These cases had therefore not created two cases that were extremes, but were in fact relatively close and bore many resemblances to the intervention options studies of November 1965. Aside from the lack of a carrier, the naval force in Case B was still quite capable – a total of 30 vessels including support ships.43 Frank Cooper professed disappointment with these results. In a note to Hull, he saw two main problems to the report. The first of these related to the two cases (the maritime and the air/land) that had been requested by the Secretary of State and originally proposed by Peck. Cooper worried whether the ‘forces proposed under Case A or Case B (or such adjustments as may be made to them) … [are] compatible with the commitments we shall still retain’. The second issue was ‘whether, given the further study on withdrawal from the Far East and the very great difficulty there will be in even approaching the figure of £1850m, the recommendations in the paper form a sound basis from which to conduct the Whitehall arguments over the next few months’.44 Cooper also had doubts about Study 7’s calculations that the ‘tail’ (that is, support and supply) could be reduced by 50 per cent, but the ‘teeth’ by less than 50 per cent and still provide viable forces. Hull wrote to Healey setting out what he saw as the substantial limitations that the new forces levels and mixes proposed by the naval and air/land options. ‘The forces in both Cases A and B lack the capability, without reinforcement, of undertaking major operations with a balanced force, even with allies’.45 In essence the studies were disappointing from the perspective of the capabilities lost, rather than the economies that had not been achieved. Cooper was more candid about his concerns with Peck a week later. As he had believed months before, he was adamant that some of the assumptions that the study had been based on needed to be changed to ensure that the relevant economies could be achieved. His view was that a nuclear or conventional strike capability (that is, aircraft carriers and F-111s) did not need to be permanently based in the Far East, but that facilities should be adequate for them to be deployed there if necessary; and that the Army’s presence should be ‘at the absolute minimum’.46 The Programme Evaluation Group (‘PEG’), the unit Healey had set up to study policy issues from outside the service department structures, had also submitted its own version of the force structure in the Far East. ‘In putting forward Case C … we have assumed that point of entry forces [i.e. skeleton military bases in Singapore and Malaysia] should be retained but that there is no need for strike

43 Ibid. 44 DEFE 13/584, item 39, Assistant Under-Secretary (P) to Hull, 27 January 1967. 45 DEFE 13/584, item 42, Hull to Healey, 8 February 1967. 46 DEFE 13/584, item 41, C.E.F. Gough, Assistant Under-Secretary (Personnel) to Peck, 8 February 1967. The Navy and the Defence Expenditure Studies 153 aircraft to be stationed permanently in the theatre’.47 Like Cooper, PEG was not keen on retaining carriers in the Far East even just for the next eight years. The report also argued for a smaller number of RAF strike aircraft. In effect it combined the Navy’s minimum stance from Case B with the RAF’s minimum stance from Case A. PEG itself was split over the required size of the naval element in the Far East. PEG praised the outcomes of the Navy Department’s Concept of Naval Operations paper that had been produced in December 1966 (see Chapter 7), stating that many of its recommendations regarding cheaper warships for low intensity operations had incorporated into PEG’S approach to the Study 7 problem. The need for frigates, patrol submarines and mine-counter-measure vessels, for presence and patrol purposes in the Far East was not contested, but the necessity for three different types of ‘higher quality’ vessels – a guided missile destroyer, a hunter- killer nuclear-powered submarine and in particular one cruiser – was doubted by some staff on PEG. PEG admitted that their report ‘almost certainly’ would be unacceptable to the Chiefs, but Case C ‘still contains some semblance of a military posture, and at the same time offers some prospect of further economies’.48 Peck himself was even more radical than either Cooper or PEG, and was disappointed with the interpretations that had been given on this request that two separate cases, one naval and one air/land, be set out. The two cases were meant to be ‘predominantly naval’ and ‘predominantly land/air’ but ‘in fact they are no such thing, the differences being very small. They could be made much more like what was presumably in mind by removing the “point of entry” forces in Case A and most of the “naval presence” in Case B. I call these variants D and E’.49 Peck also doubted the need for either the strike/reconnaissance capability provided by the carrier in Case A and the F-111 in Case B, as well as forces adequate to ‘create a point of entry’, in other words to take and defend either port facilities or airfields to ensure the safe arrival of further troops. Peck estimated that the five cases would produce the following savings, if the units brought home were disbanded: case A £70m, case B £55m, case C £90m and cases D and E more than £100m. Peck was certain that the Chiefs would not agree to the putative cases D and E being put to the Working Party or used to provide assumptions for various studies, but hoped they might be kept in reserve as they might be needed in the future. He succinctly summed up the situation the Ministry was in with Study 7 as it stood: ‘the politico-military parameters and the financial (£200–300m savings) parameters are far apart’.50

47 DEFE 13/584, item 44, R.J. Gossage, Chairman of the Programme Evaluation Group, to Healey, 10 February 1967. 48 Ibid. 49 DEFE 13/584, item 43, Peck to Dunnett, 7 February 1967. 50 DEFE 13/584, item 43, Peck to Private Secretary to Permanent Under-Secretary, 10 February 1967 (and cover sheet). 154 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Changing the Parameters

Addressing the Chiefs of Staff about the results of Study 7, Healey expressed doubts about the parameters of the study, although he did not mention commitments. He queried the need for either a nuclear strike capability and the need for ‘point of entry’ forces in Singapore and Malaysia. He even expressed some doubts about a conventional strike capability, for if a 30-day warning period was accepted then either aircraft carriers or F-111s could be sent to the Far East in time without the need for permanent stationing.51 This contradicted the Chiefs’ opinion a week previously that a strike capability was necessary in order to maintain a ‘convincing’ posture in the Far East.52 It was clear that something would have to give, and Nairne warned Healey of the problem ahead if the situation was not resolved. ‘We shall not be in sight of the scale of savings by 1970–71 which the Chancellor has envisaged – even if we were to make massive cuts in the home base’.53 Also, ‘if this impression is correct, we could – on the basis of the present programme – find that two further months had gone by in detailed studies on the wrong assumptions’. This would lead to an extremely short amount of time to rewrite the studies before the summer recess. Nairne proposed getting the Defence Review Working Party to produce a response to Study 7 before Chief of Defence Staff returned from his annual leave. ‘What we want to know is: do the Foreign Secretary, Commonwealth Secretary and Chancellor endorse your own impression that the Far East study has got to be put back on to a sounder road?’54 This would then allow for an early set of consultations with allies about the proposed changes. An orderly running down of the presence in Singapore was crucial in this respect, for it would be vital ‘to the success of our long term plan (of disengagement) in the Far East’.55 Healey had clearly decided that the commitments had to be reduced. However, even if this was part of ‘our long term plan’ to disengage from the Far East, he had not yet let this get beyond his private office.56 Although he had made his concerns about the parameters of the study clear to the Chiefs, he had not mentioned that he was considering making the running on commitments. Nairne, although keen to ensure that this manoeuvre would happen whilst Hull was away, also did not want the Chief of the Air Staff, Sir Charles Elworthy, who would be deputising for Hull, only to stonewall until Hull’s return. He therefore proposed that a quick meeting be called with both Hull and Elworthy in attendance, informing them of the possibility that the parameters of the Defence Expenditure Studies could change, but such a decision would depend on

51 DEFE 13/585, item 6, minutes of meeting held 15 February 1967. 52 DEFE 4/212, CoS (66) 9/3, annex B, 7 February 1967. 53 DEFE 13/584, item 46, Nairne to Healey, 16 February 1967. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. The Navy and the Defence Expenditure Studies 155 discussions that the Defence Secretary would be having with the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary over the coming days.57 This was disingenuous as it was really the Ministry that was pushing the process, but the aim was to open the way for Elworthy to accept an approach to the Foreign Office to reduce commitments in the Far East whilst Hull was on leave, as both would have been informed that such a change was a possibility. The meeting did not go well. Healey stressed the external pressures for the reductions to go further than what had been achieved so far. In addition to other government departments, he mentioned pressure from the Labour party, and a possible change in general and government opinion, pointing to a recent leader in The Times. The government ‘may want to change assumptions – before I see McN[amara, the US Secretary of State] on 6/7 April’.58 Healey also noted his disappointment, not just with Study 7, but also with another study, Study 1, on land forces in western Europe produced by the Army Department that he had felt had shied away from making necessary decisions. An earlier note by Cooper on Study 1 – whose own Study 7 had many shortcomings – had been disparaging of its many ‘assertions’ not backed up by any reasoning.59 Nairne’s handwritten note, probably written during or just after the meeting, makes clear that the raising of this last issue increased the temperature considerably.60 A clearly annoyed Hull proposed that if pressures on spending should continue, then a clear budget level should be set and then the Ministry could work out what forces could be afforded with the money available. Healey disagreed: ‘our experience during the Defence Review had shown that the right course for the Ministry of Defence was to do everything possible to make the political departments face up to the political and economic implications of cuts in defence spending’.61 Pushing the issue out into inter-departmental discussion in the way the Chief of Defence Staff wanted – in the form of straight refusal that cuts were possible with current commitments, thereby pressurising the political departments to lobby the Treasury for cuts to occur elsewhere in public spending – would have been the standard tactic of the service departments four years previously: but it would have been much less effective in 1967 with only three political and military departments rather than the six of 1963. It is also would make Healey look weak and not in control of his ministry if he had to backtrack on his promises at Chequers a few months before. He had already privately admitted to Trend that he had overestimated what was possible.

57 Ibid. 58 DEFE 13/584, item 48, note by Nairne of meeting attended by Healey, Hull, Elworthy and Dunnett, 17 February 1967. 59 DEFE 13/584, item 34, Frank Cooper, Assistant Under-Secretary (Policy) to Nairne, 23 January 1967. 60 DEFE 13/584, item 46, undated handwritten summary. 61 DEFE 13/584, item 48, note by Nairne of meeting attended by Healey, Hull, Elworthy and Dunnett, 17 February 1967. 156 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Nairne was keen that the minutes of the meeting were not widely distributed – such high level disagreements would be dynamite – but the path had been placed open for the Ministry to obtain a change in the parameters.62 Hull knew his position was weakening and the Chiefs were no longer united. The Navy was now acting the unusual part of pressing for a rapid reduction in commitments and forces east of Suez, against a reluctant RAF and Army. Varyl Begg, positioning himself to support Healey’s line, had already made clear his view that Britain should grasp the nettle of Singapore and decide to pull out entirely.63 Cooper presented the findings to the Defence Review Working Party in the last week in February, and he was clear about their implications. Although there were likely to be some savings in expenditure, and a saving in foreign exchange costs of £34.5m for Case A and £26.5m for Case B, the ‘trend of work so far [is] unlikely to produce savings of £200 or £300 million; the best guess at present was that savings would be around half this bracket’.64 Any further savings would only be possible through a reduction in commitments. Cooper raised the question of the necessity for a ‘point of entry’ capability, a permanent nuclear and conventional strike capability (either carrier- or F-111-based), the nature of the commitment to Malaysia and the extent to which Hong Kong and Fiji could assume responsibility for their internal security. In his summing up, the chairman reiterated the long-term aims in the Far East: ‘our objective in accordance with the priorities agreed in the Defence Review (a minimum presence in the Far East, little or none in the Middle East and Mediterranean, and a major presence in Europe), remained to extricate ourselves from the Far East in the long term’. He continued, aware that early negotiations with allies would be necessary:

While, therefore, we should look at further ways of achieving savings when the opportunity offers, we could go ahead with what was politically practicable, while recognising that this would not give us immediately the full budgetary saving required. Ministers should therefore be asked to decide whether the study of complete withdrawal or minimum presence should be pursued at this stage, or whether we should negotiate a partial presence, taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the forthcoming NATO and SEATO meetings to sound our allies.65

Ministers were going to have to now consider how much they felt they needed to maintain the British military presence based in the Far East.

62 Ibid. 63 DEFE 4/ 212, CoS(66)6/3, 31 January 1967. 64 CAB 148/55, OPDO (DR) (67) meeting 9, item 2, 24 February 1967. 65 Ibid. The Navy and the Defence Expenditure Studies 157

The Peripheral Strategy

It was clear that the political departments were going to need pushing in order to accept that commitments in the Far East would now have to be dropped. In Nairne’s monthly note to Healey, the need for withdrawal from Far Eastern commitments was rammed home yet again: ‘radical reductions in our facilities in the Far East, and in our forces as a whole, will be essential if the savings are to be achieved’, although mischievously as a former Admiralty civil servant he did note the ‘special value of naval forces during a disengagement period’.66 Nairne attributed the failure to get the £200m–£300m reductions to the Chiefs of Staffs’ understandable conservatism in approaching any form of defence cuts, and Foreign Office reluctance to consider commitment reductions. The Defence and Oversea Policy Committee would have to be the forum from which any movement on the commitments issue would be initiated. The Prime Minister, as chairman of the committee, would have to be convinced, and the impact of the cuts on capabilities brought home to the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office. To ensure the latter, Healey asked Dunnett to produce a report to show ministers the consequences of cutting £200m–300m from the defence budget.67 Cooper’s bracingly logical approach to the studies when they had started in October had been to start from scratch in the Far East by basing force levels on commitments, and from that work out how much saving could be possible. This had turned up the figure from the Defence Planning Staff of savings of around £100m maximum. However, to clarify the implications of the cuts that had been requested, the other approach needed to be taken: to cut force levels to fit the budget and then analyse whether and how these force levels would allow the fulfilment of commitments.68 Healey, feeling that the RAF side of the budget was inviolate, requested three options be set out by the civilian Secretariat under Dunnett: the first was an ‘Army case’ requiring considerable cuts in the Navy, the second a ‘Navy case’ requiring similar cuts in the Army, whilst the third was an ‘equal misery case’ setting out equal cuts across the two services.69 Healey’s defence of the RAF budget is interesting. He justified this on the basis of the large proportion of that service’s procurement that had already been approved. However, with the F-111, the largest part of that procurement programme, the contracts had still not been signed with the US and could therefore be argued to be in play as much as the Navy or the Army’s forces. Healey was protecting the F-111. In supplying his answer some days later, Dunnett quietly ignored Healey’s request that the RAF budget could not be touched and prefaced his report with the

66 DEFE 13/585, item 2/1, Nairne, 6 March 1967. 67 DEFE 13/585, item 10, Dunnett to Healey, 10 March 1967. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 158 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic financial savings possible from the cancellation of either or both the Martel missile system and the P.1127 vertical take-off ground attack aircraft (later known as the Harrier).70 The F-111 was not mentioned. Dunnett then moved onto the pro-Army case. This provided £231m savings by 1970–71. It included the early withdrawal of the carriers from service by this date and a reduction in destroyers and frigates to the extent that a naval presence could not be maintained in the Far East. The amphibious force and the Royal Marines would be disbanded, the two planned command cruisers cancelled and the rate of hunter-killer submarine (‘SSN’) construction halved. A 50,000-strong Army of the Rhine was maintained, however, as were two or three major Army units in the Far East, but this raised the problem of their basing, as the Australians were not keen that British troops were based in their country.71 The pro-Navy case was described as ‘essentially a West European solution’ with the Army being largely confined to Germany and the United Kingdom, and a small naval and air presence in Australia.72 This produced savings of £198m. The equal misery case resulted in £225m savings and still resulted in the cancellation of the cruisers and the withdrawal of the carriers early but it did retain the frigate and SSN programmes and the amphibious force, although the last would be manned by infantry, the Royal Marines having been disbanded. As he had been doing for nearly eight months now, Dunnett made it clear what all three options meant for policy in the Far East: ‘The key question, as we see it, is whether we can plan that by, say, 1975 we shall not be physically in Singapore or Malaysia. I think myself that this is the only realistic assumption to be made’.73 The implications of a £200m reduction from 1966 Defence Review levels were clear. The pro-Army case, if proceeded with, would result in a dramatic cut for the Navy, not just in current force levels but also in future programmes, not least the cruiser and the SSN. Even the equal misery option would have been difficult to bear and have reduced the Navy to a small surface ship force. Yet further painful cuts in the Navy seemed very likely. The second prong to the plan to get Foreign Office acquiescence to commitment reductions was to gain the Prime Minister’s acceptance of this approach. Healey met Harold Wilson at Number 10 on 14 March to discuss what the Secretary of State called the ‘peripheral strategy’.74 The Chiefs were only informed after the meeting had taken place. The note of the meeting clearly set out the situation that would be put to the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee eight days later: only £100m savings could be achieved without cutting commitments. To reduce by £200m then Britain would have to withdraw from Singapore and Malaysia completely by

70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 PREM 13/1384, PS/PM to Nairne 14 March 1967; DEFE 13/585, item 19, note of meeting between Healey and Wilson, 14 March 1967. The Navy and the Defence Expenditure Studies 159

1975/76 (with half the forces gone by 1970/71), the Army reduced to 150,000 men and the Far East presence reduced to small number of ships and aircraft based in Australia. By 1975/76 there would be no Army presence and almost no stockpiles. Any presence east of Suez would be provided by the RAF deployed from island bases, and from Royal Navy vessels. Healey’s proposal was essentially the ‘equal misery’ case combined with a removal of the amphibious force. To ensure that announcements could be made in July, consultation with allies would have to start in April, to allow the studies based on new assumptions to complete in June.75 The RAF’s island strategy was now on the cusp of acceptance as the core British defence strategy east of Suez, even while the DOAE study to see whether land- based aircraft could support naval vessels had been sidelined once again. On the same day, the Chiefs of Staff Committee met to discuss a minute by Healey written the previous day, outlining what had been explained to the Prime Minister and asking for a study from the Defence Planning Staff within three days setting out what force levels would be needed using the assumptions Healey had set out to Wilson at Number 10.76 Two days later, the Chiefs met again, and with the rapid studies almost complete it was clear that the required cut would mean ‘large scale withdrawals from the Far East’, that negotiations with allies should begin as quickly as possible and that changes in commitments were essential.77 At a third meeting the next day, to finalise the text and add a cover note, Begg was again unusually vocal.78 In addition to a defence of the Royal Marines and the amphibious capability, which had appeared under threat, he asserted that the studies were producing over 80 per cent of their reductions from the armed services, despite the original conception of the studies in October as attempting to retain the ‘teeth arms’ and economise on the support and ‘tail’ side of the Ministry of Defence. He demanded that ‘an absolutely radical and drastic cut of the “tail” of the services should accompany the teeth reductions’. It was clear that by the ‘tail’ he meant civilian Ministry of Defence staff, which numbered 400,000 at the time. Begg suggested that these 400,000 should undergo cuts in numbers proportionate to the cuts now envisaged form the armed services.79 As it was the Army that was suffering most in manpower cuts this was an intervention quite clearly in support of the Army, rather than specifically a naval concern. There was no recorded dissent from this view at the meeting, and Begg’s call for a review of the civilian side of the Ministry was added, suitably toned down, to the note to the Secretary of State covering the Defence Planning Staff study.80 The results from this study were radical, and in some areas not too far from the initial study done by the civilian Secretariat a few days before Healey had

75 Ibid. 76 DEFE 4/214, CoS(66)21/1, 14 March 1967. 77 DEFE 4/214, CoS(66)23/1, 16 March 1967. 78 DEFE 4/214, CoS(66)24/1, 17 March 1967. 79 Ibid. 80 DEFE 13/585, item 33, Elworthy (Acting CDS) to Healey, 17 March 1967. 160 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic approached Wilson. The Army would be reduced to 150,000 by 1970/71, and adding other the services’ manpower reductions to this figure would mean approximately 35–45,000 officers and men being made redundant. For the Navy, the cuts meant a reduction in frigates and destroyers by 12 to 58, a loss of eight conventional submarines and four minesweepers. In the Far East, the RAF would be reduced to one Phantom squadron plus support aircraft by 1970/71, and then just one F-111 squadron by 1975/76. The Navy in the Far East would consist of two amphibious vessels, one guided missile destroyer, five frigates, two submarines and four minesweepers by 1970/71, and by 1975/76 this would force would have reduced by a further amphibious vessel, one submarine and one minesweeper.81 In some respects the Navy had come relatively well out of this – the Royal Marines and the amphibious forces had been retained – although the cut in one- sixth of the total escort force by 1970/71 was considerable, a one-third cut from the current level of 88. The real casualty was the Army. A note by the Chairman of the PEG to Healey commented on these results and noted that, although the majority of the Navy would now be based west of Suez, force level calculations were still extrapolated from the need for ships in overseas stations in the Far East, Mediterranean and West Indies, rather than from NATO force declarations as would be expected.82 To some extent this criticism was justified, as it indicated the continuance of an East of Suez mentality to force levels, but the roulement process as has been described does mean that although every vessel on station has to be supported by two others preparing to relieve (or having just relieved) the first vessel, the two additional vessels can be usefully deployed on exercises in home waters or on passage.83 The Planning Staff report indicated that the Navy had partly won its argument over the perception of roulement: the loss of six frigates stationed in the Far East had meant a total loss of 12 such escorts, not a potential 18; but yet again, as the Chairman of PEG pointed out, it seemed that the victory was increasingly irrelevant, as it had come just when the idea that overseas deployment should provide the basis for justifying escort numbers was being challenged by requirements relating to NATO needs and the theoretical threat of Warsaw Pact aggression.84 On seeing the report prepared by the Defence Planning Staff, Healey requested more detailed figures of the actual rates of withdrawal envisaged to help the political departments visualise the real impact of such cuts in forces.85 The Secretary of State also formally notified his senior civil servants of the new peripheral strategy,

81 Ibid. 82 DEFE 13/585, item 32, Gossage to Healey, 17 March 1967. 83 See Chapter 1. 84 DEFE 13/585, item 32, Gossage to Healey, 17 March 1967. 85 DEFE 13/585, item 34, Healey to Elworthy, 17 March 1967. The Navy and the Defence Expenditure Studies 161 and forewarned them of the work ahead to produce new studies based on the new assumptions.86 The final step, with the Prime Minister now behind the policy change, and the force structure worked out, was to ensure that the Foreign Office agreed to the peripheral strategy, preferably before the planned Oversea Policy and Defence meeting on 22 March. On the 21st the meeting between the Foreign and Defence Secretaries took place, also attended by Harold Wilson’s close confidant, Lord Chalfont.87 Not only did George Brown agree that Britain should leave the South East Asian mainland as early as possible, at the very least by 1975/76, but also that the possibility of an earlier withdrawal should be investigated. No date of withdrawal should be publicly announced until after discussions with allies and the completion of the Defence Expenditure Studies in July. This was the line given at the Oversea Policy and Defence Committee by the Foreign Secretary the next day. The Foreign Office had now accepted that Britain must disengage from most of its commitments in the Far East within 10 years.88

Conclusion

The work now had to start in convincing allies that Britain would, by 1976, no longer have a significant military presence in the Far East. As Dockrill has described, Healey’s pushing through of the peripheral strategy as the strategic bedrock of the new Defence Review, whose core assumption was a withdrawal from Singapore and Malaysia by 1976, produced the psychological leap that allowed for the eventual withdrawal from the region.89 It was also the moment of truth, in this atmosphere of impending withdrawal, for the island strategy which was now to be enshrined in British defence policy. For the second time, the main outcome of a Defence Review had been decided on what Dunnett had described as a ‘hunch’ rather than an in-depth capabilities analysis.90 In some respects this was inevitable in an economic climate in which rapid government expenditure cuts were necessary. This time, however, the Army was the main victim rather than the Navy. The Navy had played a low-profile role in these developments, but its stance shows how it was rebuilding its position in the new environment. Varyl Begg quietly aligned himself with the Permanent Secretary and the Secretary of State in

86 DEFE 13/585, item 34, Healey to Dunnett et al. (undated but placed between papers dated 17 March 1967 and 21 March 1967). 87 DEFE 13/585, item 47, note of meeting 21 March 1967 between George Brown (Foreign Secretary), Healey and Lord Chalfont. 88 CAB 148/30, ibid; and OPD(66)14, 22 March 1967. 89 Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, p. 185. 90 DEFE 23/12, enclosure 1, note by Head of DS1 12 July 1966. 162 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic the key question of the Defence Expenditure Studies: he was the earliest convert among the Chiefs that Singapore should be given up. At the same time he rebuilt bridges with the Army by firmly supporting the line that civilian numbers should reduce before servicemen (mostly in the Army) were cut. Not in a position to challenge the emerging island strategy because of the pushing back of the DOAE study, he nonetheless ensured that when the detail of the cuts from the peripheral strategy were worked out by the military staffs, the Navy’s new ‘capital ships’ (the hunter-killer submarine programme and the cruisers) were protected at the expense of the escort fleet. Dunnett’s suggestion that the SSN programme be cut in half and the cruisers cancelled were quietly dropped. Over the succeeding eight months, the United Kingdom would begin negotiations with its allies in the Far East over the terms of eventual withdrawal.91 The outcomes of the Defence Expenditure Studies would be confirmed and finalised with the production of a Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy.92 In the meantime, the feasibility of the island strategy was investigated further. With an existing base in the central Indian Ocean at Gan, and presumption of eventual withdrawal from Aden and Singapore, the strategy rested on the development of a new base in the western Indian Ocean island of Aldabra, in the Seychelles, and on a new base in northern Australia to cover the eastern Indian Ocean. Difficulties had emerged as early as 1965 with the Australian part of the strategy. The Australians wanted the British to stay in the region but much preferred the retention of Singapore as a base – leaving Singapore was regarded by the Australians as tantamount to the British giving up on the region altogether. A replacement base in northern Australia, as the British hoped for, was bringing the ‘front line’ of Australian defence onto Australian soil; therefore an Australian base would only be considered as an adjunct to Singapore, not a replacement for it. As it soon became clear that the British were considering retrenchment and eventual withdrawal from Singapore as the defence economies continued, the Australians felt aggrieved, betrayed and talks over the development of the Australian base fell away as the Australians moved towards the United States for defence in the region.93 The development of airfields on the other side of the Indian Ocean also came up against problems: the existing airfields to be used would need considerable capital expenditure to bring them up to the standards required to operate sophisticated

91 Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, pp. 185–93. 92 Ibid., p. 193. 93 Ibid., p. 186, 191; Healey, Time of My Life, p. 292; PREM 13/889, Arthur Greenwood to Prime Minister, 14 October 1965; British High Commissioner, Canberra to Commonwealth Relations Office, 25 November 1965; Sir Robert Menzies to Harold Wilson (via British High Commissioner), 19 January 1966; Harold Holt to same, 8 February 1966. For final British announcement of withdrawal and Australian reaction, see PREM 13/1323, telegram Harold Wilson to Harold Holt, 20 April 1967; record of conversation between Harold Wilson and Harold Holt, 13 June 1967. The Navy and the Defence Expenditure Studies 163 aircraft such as F-111s and Phantoms. The costs of modifying existing bases in Gan and other islands and building new bases in Aldabra multiplied: it soon became clear that the Air Force Department’s cost assumptions had been unrealistically low.94 Attempts to share 50 per cent of the costs of developing Aldabra with the United States came close to becoming a major embarrassment for both the British and US governments: the protection of the wildlife on Aldabra became a cause célèbre with conservationists and ornithologists on both sides of the Atlantic. Although this issue was dealt with, attempts to push the US side of the spending through Congress by hiding the issue under other headings failed, as defence expenditure came under increasing criticism and scrutiny from legislators reacting to increased public scepticism of US war aims and defence spending in Vietnam. The final confirmation in November 1967 that US money for Aldabra would not be forthcoming meant that the other leg of the island strategy had now failed – the island strategy as a whole was effectively dead.95 The island strategy depended upon the goodwill of other nations for its success. The British relied too much on its long-term links with Australia without realising the importance of Singapore to the Australian concept of its self-defence in the South East Asian region. Once the (correct) suspicion of British withdrawal from Singapore was planted in the minds of Australian decision-makers, British credibility and usefulness as a defence ally rapidly fell away. Why pay for a base on Australian soil for diminishing British forces when US cooperation would be much more effective? With Aldabra, the development of the base depended on part-US funding, and by late 1967 even the small amount of money required for its building could not be procured from a Congress rapidly turning against adventures in the East. Without US and Australian support, the island strategy was not a plausible option, and coupled with underestimates of the costs of developing the various islands to act as fully effective bases, this killed the strategy and ultimately the rationale for the F-111 bomber. At the moment of truth the island strategy did not work and a new approach for British naval strategy was needed.

94 Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, p. 200. 95 Healey, Time of My Life, p. 292; FCO 46/9, enclosure 137, telegram from Washington Embassy to Foreign Office, 13 September 67; FCO 46/10, enclosure 182, same to same, 11 October 1967; enclosure 192, telegram Wilford to Sykes, 12 October 1967; enclosure 232, Sykes to Permanent Under-Secretary, Foreign Office, 17 November 1967; enclosure 233, Permanent Under-Secretary to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 17 November 1967. This page has been left blank intentionally Chapter 6 The Mediterranean Strategy

Through the Defence Expenditure Studies, Varyl Begg, the First Sea Lord, had been pursuing a strategy of rebuilding the Navy’s position within the Ministry of Defence from as low a profile as possible. In January 1968 the opportunity was presented to take the initiative and use the changing policy environment actively to further the ends of the naval leadership. Perhaps the most unexpected aspect of this change was where this took place: the Mediterranean Sea. For many centuries the sea had been the stage on which British naval power had been established and fought over, from the capture of Gibraltar in the War of the Spanish Succession, the defeat of Napoleon’s fleet at the Nile and finally to the epic naval battles of the Mediterranean in the Second World War. However, the Mediterranean had been gradually downgraded in British strategic thinking since the mid 1950s. The Defence Review of 1957 had reduced the garrison and the size of the Mediterranean Fleet, whilst the 1966 Defence Review had recommended the dissolution of the Mediterranean Fleet.1 No British warships would be permanently based in the Mediterranean; dockyard would be downgraded, its naval command facilities being transferred to the United Kingdom or to Italy.2 In the battle for naval resources after the Second World War, East of Suez and home waters always came ahead of the Mediterranean. For example, attempts by both the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, Admiral Hamilton, and the British Ambassador to Rome, Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, in February 1966 and June 1967 respectively to persuade the Navy to allow ships on transit to east of Suez via the Mediterranean to spend a few extra weeks in the sea to increase the British profile in the area and counter a growing Soviet naval presence fell on deaf ears.3 Such a change would deplete the Far East Commander-in-Chief of the equivalent of half of one frigate from his escort fleet of 17, a reduction that could not be tolerated to provide additional vessels for a much less important command.4 The naval

1 CAB 129/86, C (57) 69, 1957 Defence Review: ‘Defence: An outline of future policy’, p. 8, 15 March 1957; CAB 129/124, C (66) 34 ‘Defence Review Part 1’, Annex A, p. 1, 11 February 1966 and C (66) 33, 11 February 1966, pp. 12–13, 1966 Defence Review. 2 CAB 129/124, ibid. 3 DEFE 24/509, enclosure 11, CinC Mediterranean to 2nd PUS(N), 17 February 1966; FCO 46/2, enclosure 1, Despatch no. 19 of Evelyn Shuckburgh to Foreign Office, 16 June 1967. 4 DEFE 24/509, enclosure 13, Director of Naval Plans to DS5A, 16 March 1966; DEFE 24/509, enclosure 17, Director of Naval Operations and Trade to DS5, 21 March 166 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic reductions in the Mediterranean would not be significant enough to jeopardise materially British interests in the area.5 Why then did the Mediterranean, just as the Ministry of Defence was beginning to implement the decisions of the 1966 Defence Review and withdraw forces, suddenly become a region of such intense British strategic interest that not only did the Secretary of State undertake a tour of the region, but the Defence Planning Staff departed en masse for a tour of the Mediterranean basin to better understand the strategic situation?6 Why did that sea become a major area for naval deployment up to the mid 1970s? What role did Britain’s strategic interests play in the creation of the strategy? Why did a defence secretary not noted for his sympathy for the naval lobby so wholeheartedly accept a strategy in which naval forces almost solely benefited? How did the Navy use this development to further its own objectives? This chapter will both investigate these questions and analyse the policy developments in this area as they unfolded from early 1968 to the change of government in June 1970. First, the NATO context will be set out, followed by the immediate domestic defence policy context in the first two months of 1968. The chapter will then follow through to the first investigations into the Mediterranean region in early 1968, and then the NATO reactions to this apparent reorientation. The impact of the Czechoslovak crisis will be analysed and will be followed by a review of the gradual creation of operational concepts, strategies and political analyses by different elements of government for the Mediterranean region. Finally the practicalities of making this policy change a reality will be analysed before the chapter is concluded.

The NATO Naval Strategic Background

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation had been formed in 1949 by 12 countries (joined by 3 more in the 1950s) in Western Europe and North America to deter the Soviets from military intervention in non-Soviet occupied Europe. Its aim was to provide a much stronger and consistent defence guarantee structure than the traditional web of bilateral or trilateral defence agreements of the interwar period. An attack on a NATO member state would be regarded as an attack on all NATO members, thus resulting in a full and committed response from all members.7

1966. 5 FCO 46/2 enclosure 6, note by Faber (Western Department), 30 June 1967, FCO 46/2, enclosure 4; PUS to Sir Paul Gore Booth, 30 June 1967. 6 DEFE 25/243, enclosure 31, Report of Defence Planning Staff tour to Mediterranean, December 1969, 16 December 1969. 7 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. See D. Miller, The Cold War: A Military History (London: Pimlico Press, 1998), Appendix 2, pp. 394–7, for the full text of the Treaty. The Mediterranean Strategy 167

Recently moved to Brussels from Paris following the withdrawal of France from the organisation’s structures in 1966, NATO’s headquarters had ambassadors and military representatives from each member state assigned to it, with policy being directed by periodic meetings of NATO member defence or foreign ministers. The organisation’s leading civilian was the Secretary General, the Italian Manlio Brosio. NATO was more than just an alliance of nations; it also ran an international military command structure that, in the event of an attack on one member, would assume control of those member’s military forces assigned to it and provide a unified strategic and operational command system. There were two key military leadership positions in NATO, both headed by Americans: the first was the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) a US Navy admiral, based in Norfolk, Virginia. In wartime he would fight a ‘Third World War’ battle of the Atlantic, having responsibility for the Atlantic area with subordinate Commanders-in-Chief in the Eastern Atlantic (EASTLANT – a British Admiral), the Western Atlantic (WESTLANT – a US Admiral), and the Commander of the US carrier strike fleet (STRIKEFLTLANT – a US Admiral). SACLANT’s continental counterpart was the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), a US Army general who had responsibility for continental Europe and its seas including the Mediterranean, Baltic and North Sea. Beyond both of the Supreme Allied Commanders there was also the independent Commander-in-Chief Channel (CinCChan), invariably a British Admiral. Although technically a second-tier command, he was treated as an equal to the Supreme Allied Commanders.8 The two Supreme Allied Commanders were potentially all-powerful theatre commanders who in time of war would command hundreds of thousands of soldiers, sailors and airmen from all NATO countries, but in the realities of the Cold War peace they only had responsibility for ensuring the readiness of the forces potentially under their command for war, to conduct training exercises (subject to national agreement) and to make recommendations on the notice level of forces to national commanders. In short, the role had the potential to be incredibly frustrating for the two Supreme Allied Commanders. In peacetime, their lack of real powers meant that they were not especially supreme and nor did they command much except their own staffs and temporarily NATO forces whilst on exercise. The role often became a military-diplomatic position in which greater allocations of forces were lobbied for in the context of war-fighting plans set out by the Supreme Commanders’ staffs. In early 1968, SACEUR was General L.L. Lemnier, US Army, and SACLANT Admiral E.P. Holmes, US Navy.9 In the naval sphere, forces were ‘committed’ to different NATO commands. In effect they would come under the command of the relevant Supreme Commander if a general crisis were to occur. There were different categories of commitment: Category A commitments meant that vessels would be able to arrive in their NATO

8 Miller, The Cold War, p. 47. 9 Ibid., chapter 5. 168 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic commands within 48 hours, Category B vessels in 30 days, whilst Category C over 30 days.10 Although most NATO navies only committed a portion of their fleets to NATO, the United Kingdom committed almost all the Royal Navy to NATO, but much of the fleet – on station in the Far East, Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf – was committed under Category B whilst also undertaking East of Suez duties.11 Since Mountbatten’s reorientation of naval strategy in 1957 towards East of Suez, the importance of the NATO area had, to some extent, fallen away in naval policy and strategic thinking.12 In the wider strategic context, over the previous two years both the United States and the United Kingdom had pushed other NATO members towards accepting a reduction in the numbers of their troops and equipment based in Germany.13 This had been justified by a better understanding and preparedness for a potential Soviet attack that would then enable US and British troops to rapidly reinforce continental Europe in the event of a Soviet troop build-up. In reality these arguments had been deployed as cover for the increased commitment of US forces to Vietnam, and the general reduction of British forces resulting from the two recent Defence Reviews.14 In parallel to this push for reductions by the British and the United States, NATO had also agreed to a new strategic concept (‘MC14/3’) in December 1967. This document was essentially a compromise between two contradictory positions. On the one hand, the US had been attempting to push the alliance towards a strategy of ‘flexible response’ – a gradated and controlled threat escalation from conventional force usage through to limited and then full nuclear exchanges – in place of the existing Eisenhower era ‘tripwire’ strategy of full and complete retaliation with all necessary weapons in the event of Warsaw Pact aggression. The US aim, heavily influenced by the Berlin and Cuban missile crises and by fashionable international relations and ‘game’ theory, was to reduce the chance of an uncontrolled escalation in a time of tension to a full nuclear exchange. Alliance members such as West Germany were strongly against ‘flexible response’ as it implied an increased willingness by NATO to sacrifice the front-line states – not least West Germany – in a brutal and sharp conventional war (or a conventional war combined with the ‘limited’ use of tactical nuclear weapons), rather than protecting against any aggression by a threatened escalation to full nuclear exchange. MC 14/3 was a compromise that enunciated the concepts of flexible response in a ‘ladder of deterrence’ but also gave assurances to West Germany that a general nuclear

10 DEFE 11/627, enclosure 12, Defence Planning Note April 1968: ‘Statistical Comparison of Contributors to NATO’. 11 Ibid. 12 Jackson and Bramall, The Chiefs, p. 317. 13 DEFE 13/365 enclosure 1, Secretary of State to DUS(Pol), 30 September 1966. 14 DEFE 13/635 enclosure 1, Head of DS12 to DUS (Pol) 30/9/66; DEFE 13/635 enclosure 5, paper by Head of DS12 12, October 1966; DEFE 13/635 enclosure 11, Defence Policy Staff Paper DP 71/66, 22 November 1966. The Mediterranean Strategy 169 response was still a strategic option, and that the use of tactical nuclear weapons in a largely conventional environment would be unlikely. One consequence of the renewed focus on conventional capabilities in the new strategic concept was an emphasis on NATO’s weak conventional ‘flanks’ in Norway and Denmark in the north, and Greece and Turkey in the south.15 As will be seen, this would provide an opening for Healey and others to demonstrate Britain’s continued usefulness in the NATO environment.

From Devaluation to the End of ‘East of Suez’

On 18 November 1967, sterling was devalued from $2.80 to $2.40 to the pound. The closure of the Suez Canal following the Arab–Israeli Six Day War, combined with civil war in Nigeria, had increased the price of oil and worsened the United Kingdom’s fragile balance of payments position. The United States was unwilling to intervene to prop up sterling and devaluation was therefore agreed – that which the government had been trying to prevent for three years had now taken place. The Chancellor of the Exchequer resigned and an immediate reduction in defence spending by £100m was demanded of the Ministry of Defence.16 These economies included the abandoning of plans to turn the island of Aldabra into an airbase which, combined with difficulties in persuading the Australians to allow British aircraft to be based in their country, effectively killed what remained of the island strategy.17 The pressure on sterling, even at its newly devalued level, continued. The new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Roy Jenkins, demanded a total of £800m cuts in public expenditure, and from the Ministry of Defence in particular a decision to withdraw from bases east of Suez by 1970/71 and the cancellation of the F-111.18 At three Cabinet meetings between 4 and 15 January 1968, Jenkins managed to force these changes on Healey and the Ministry of Defence. At the meeting on the 4th it was decided that withdrawal from Singapore and other major bases east of Suez would complete by 1970–71, later finalised to December 1971.19 Ministers were then dispatched to allies and Commonwealth members east of Suez to relay this decision, and at Cabinet 10 days later they relayed the responses of these states.20 Cabinet discussed the F-111 a number of times, Healey now justifying the aircraft as a NATO bomber and reconnaissance aircraft even though all the

15 Andreas Wenger, ‘The Politics of Military Planning’, in War Plans and Alliances in the Cold War, ed. V. Mastny, S. Holtsmark and A. Wenger (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 173–85. 16 DEFE 4/222, CoS(67)81, 21 November 1967. 17 Healey, Time of My Life, p. 292. 18 Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, pp. 200–201. 19 CAB 128/43, CC(68)1, 4/1/68 and CAB 128/43, CC(68)7, 15 January 1968. 20 CAB 128/43, CC(68)6, 12/1/68 and CAB 128/43, CC(68)7, 15 January 1968. 170 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic arguments he had deployed up to that point in defence of the F-111 had emphasised the bomber’s role east of Suez.21 The decision was close, and Healey’s arguments must have been persuasive, as the Cabinet was split over the issue with the casting vote, against the F-111, being wielded by the Prime Minister.22 The cancellation of the F-111 was a blow to the Secretary of State who had successfully shielded the aircraft from cancellation for nearly two years, ever since it had replaced the TSR-2 in the RAF’s procurement programme.23 His commitment to the aircraft had been considerable and reflected his commitment to the RAF for their cooperation in the reduction of the air force procurement programme in 1965 and their ability to provide what appeared to be a coherent and practical alternative to the carrier force in the F-111 as a limited intervention tool east of Suez. The cancellation was such a serious blow to Healey’s prestige and position in the Cabinet and he seriously considered resignation. Healey’s leaking of the detail of Cabinet discussions to the United States ambassador from late 1967 to early 1968 indicated his disillusionment with Wilson, and the latter’s increasing hostility to the procurement of the F-111.24 In any case, Healey managed to swallow his pride after the cancellation, and decided not to resign as, David Bruce the U.S. ambassador noted, ‘he would sink, at least temporarily, into political oblivion, which would not be to his liking’.25 Healey stayed, and perhaps to justify his continuing to hold office in government, reconsidered the position he had previously held on the F-111, acknowledging the errors he had made. Many years later, Healey would admit that the Buccaneer 2* would probably have been a better aircraft purchase than the F-111, but that he had pushed for the US bomber instead as the RAF would not have accepted an aircraft developed for the Navy.26 This was all but admitting that Healey’s feeling of moral obligation and instinctive support for the RAF leadership had led him to nail his colours to the wrong aircraft. Healey’s defeat in Cabinet had also left the Ministry of Defence without a strategic understanding and picture of the fast-approaching world in which East of Suez commitments would not form a significant part of defence policy. The Secretary of State admitted this to the Chief of the Defence Staff a few weeks

21 CAB 128/43, CC(68)1, 4/1/68 and CAB 128/43 CC(68)7, 15 January 1968. 22 CAB 128/43, CC(68)7, 15 January 1968; Richard Crossman, Diaries of Cabinet Minister: Vol. 2: Lord President of the Council and Leaders of the House of Commons 1966–68 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1976), pp. 648–53. 23 See Chapter 2. 24 John Young, ‘David Bruce, the US Embassy and Britain’s withdrawal from East of Suez’ (chapter for forthcoming book of essays in honour of the late Professor Saki Dockrill); also Virginia Historical Society, ‘Diaries of David Bruce’, 9 January 1968 and enclosed telegrams from London to US State Department. 25 ‘Diaries of David Bruce’, 17 January 1968. 26 Denis Healey, ‘Recollections of a Secretary of State for Defence’, Royal Air Force Historical Society, 31 (2004): 9. The Mediterranean Strategy 171 after the cancellation of the F-111.27 Healey stated that despite the clear signs for many months, if not a year or more, strategy would have to reorient, and that little thinking had been done on the subject in the Ministry. He now requested a study into NATO requirements and how British forces, following the withdrawal from east of Suez, could be fitted into these requirements. Giving the F-111 as an example, Healey stated that ‘so long as the political emphasis and the day to day operational demands were focused to varying degrees on our East of Suez requirement, these requirements tended to distort the nature of our contribution to NATO rather than the demands of NATO strategy’.28 This note is as close as Healey would get to a ‘mea culpa’ and was a near admission that he had been so bound up in pushing for the peripheral strategy and the battle to save the F-111 that he had spared little if any time on medium- term strategic priorities. Healey included two examples relevant to the Navy that he wanted analysed: first was the role of the NATO flanks in general and what contribution the United Kingdom could make – such as arctic warfare expertise in Norway; the second was a more specific matter – the role, if any, for forces such as the Parachute Regiment, the Royal Marines and SAS in a NATO context.29 In the aftermath of the cancellation of the F-111 the door had now opened to consider new possibilities for naval policy. The existing strategic cupboard had been so bare after January 1968 that Cooper had even suggested, to be quickly disabused of such a dangerously radical notion by Dunnett, the bringing in of outside defence analysts and academics to help formulate the new strategies that would be needed.30 The potential of the ‘flanks’ to justify naval spending, and fill the current empty space where the new defence strategies should be, would be taken and used to effect by the naval leadership.

The Financial Situation

Despite the November and January cuts, the Treasury was still placing pressure on the Ministry of Defence, not only to control spending, but also to increase its control over expenditure decisions. The Ministry of Defence had already conceded £1,600–£1,650 million at 1964 prices by 1972/73 – a real 20 per cent cut from the figure £2,000 million figure agreed in the 1966 Defence Review for 1969/70, and near to 40 per cent lower than what had been envisaged in the Conservative’s plans for the 1964/65 costings (£2,400m).31 Defence spending had fallen from seven per cent of Gross Domestic Product to five per cent, whilst civil

27 DEFE 24/32, enclosure 55, Healey to CDS, 6 February 1968. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 DEFE 68/20, enclosure 7, Cooper to DUS(P), 22 January 1968. 31 DEFE 68/20, enclosure 14, AUS(Pol) Cooper to Dunnett, 23 January 1968. 172 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic government expenditure had increased by 25 per cent.32 The Ministry of Defence had also agreed that from 1972/73 defence expenditure would not rise above 5 per cent of GDP.33 The Treasury’s aims seemed to the Ministry of Defence, however, not just to reduce defence spending further, but to increase control over defence decision-making. Number 11 was pushing for ‘bilateral’ matters that were relevant to two or more armed services, to go before the Oversea Policy and Defence Committee. This was an extension of OPD’s remit beyond matters that had an inter-departmental focus. The Treasury were also pushing for ministers to agree guidelines for future MoD costings. Cooper stated that he would fight these encroachments on what he saw as MoD prerogatives, as well as any attempts to prevent increases in the defence budget to improve forces available to NATO, ‘to the hilt’.34 Just as important, no additional money was forthcoming for enhancing forces west of Suez: the Treasury would maintain the pressure as long as they could, pushing for more procurement and expenditure decisions to be made in an inter-departmental forum such as the Oversea Policy and Defence Committee. The Treasury were adamant that there would be no additional commitment of forces to NATO.35 It was not clear how this could be sold to NATO allies who were expecting the British withdrawal from East of Suez to mean a reinforcing of west of Suez forces. The Ministry of Defence had a difficult task on their hands: the naval leadership for the first time since 1964 would be able to step in and provide an answer.

The Birth of the Mediterranean Strategy

The genesis of the strategy was in an analysis of the naval tasks for which Malta would be needed during the 1970s, following lobbying by SACEUR for an increased naval presence in the sea.36 Usually such requests would be quietly ignored, but the suggestion was picked up by the naval leadership who saw an opening through which to demonstrate the usefulness of sea-power and justify expeditionary vessels such as the amphibious forces and even the command cruiser. A report by the Director of Naval Plans pointed out that SACEUR had proposed that one commando ship and one or two County class vessels should be deployed to the Mediterranean between 1969 and 1973.37 Notwithstanding that the cuts in ship numbers meant that any increases would have to come from other

32 Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, p. 197. 33 DEFE 68/20, enclosure 9, E G Cass to DUS(P), 23 January 1968. 34 DEFE 68/20, enclosure 14, AUS(Pol) Cooper to Dunnett, 23 January 1968. 35 DEFE 68/20, DUS(P) to AUS (NS) et al., 29 April 1968. 36 DEFE 24/509, enclosure 50, ‘The Naval Task of Malta in the 1970s’ DS5B to DNPlans, 5 January 1968. 37 DEFE 24/509, enclosure 51, DNP to DI3 (Sea), DNAP et al. 18 January 1968: ‘An increased naval presence in the Mediterranean’. The Mediterranean Strategy 173 theatres – probably SACLANT’s command – such a deployment could be seen as a tangible re-enforcement of NATO without actually costing any additional money. Who was behind this attempt by the naval leadership to capitalise on the strategic vacuum? The sources are not clear, but Healey had asked Le Fanu, the First Sea Lord designate, to take a ‘fresh and penetrating’ look at naval strategy and produce a paper with the terms of reference set by Elworthy in early February.38 Le Fanu politely declined as it would have effectively sidelined and hence undermined the rest of the Admiralty Board, but it did demonstrate the trust and regard Healey had in at least one member of the Board – probably the first time this had been the case since the Secretary of State had taken up his role in 1964.39 The combination of an incoming First Sea Lord who was more of a natural counterpart for Healey, with a new suggestion to increase the British military presence in the NATO area without spending very much money, was placing the naval leadership in an unusual position of strength. Two weeks after Healey’s ‘mea culpa’, the Defence Secretariat had produced a paper for the Chiefs of Staff setting out the state of the NATO flanks.40 Both flanks were considered weak, but for very different reasons. The Northern Flank, essentially Norway and Denmark, was weak because it had little or no manpower to defend itself. The Norwegian and Danish armies were too small and the region too large to make a credible defence. At the Southern Flank the picture was different. The forces available were numerous but they were disjointed, ill-equipped and there were political spits between key nations. Greece and Turkey were extremely hostile to each other despite both being in NATO, whilst their equipment was dated and they lacked combined plans or any experience exercising together. The Soviet Union was increasing its influence in the region: selling arms to Syria, Egypt and Algeria whilst maintaining an increased presence. At the same time the British and French presence was reducing and the US 6th fleet (consisting of 2 carriers and 18 escorts) was having to bear an increasing part of the NATO burden, even though in a potential conflict its aircraft were allocated a nuclear rather than a conventional strike role. SACEUR was pressing for additional forces from NATO members in the Mediterranean: an amphibious force, an air mobile division and the creation of a NATO ‘standing naval force’ consisting of ships from NATO navies permanently constituted, and based on the recently created equivalent in the North Atlantic.41 The Defence Secretariat paper commented that SACEUR’s plans were based more on military requirements if there were to be a fighting war with the

38 DEFE 13/635, enclosure 15, Secretary of State to CDS and CNS, 9 February 1968. 39 DEFE 13/635, enclosure 16, Le Fanu to CNS dated 21 January 1968, but chronology and sense strongly suggests that 1 is an error for 2: therefore 21 February 1968. 40 DEFE 11/627, enclosures 1 and 4, Increased significance of the flanks of NATO, 14 February 1968. 41 Ibid. 174 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Warsaw Pact rather than ‘from the political desirability of deterrence’.42 This was the key factor underlying the new strategic position the defence establishment faced: military forces were to be deployed and positioned as much, if not more so, for their political impact rather than their military effectiveness. This had the potential to play to one of the advantages of surface naval power: its ability to provide a significant and credible visible deterrent ‘presence’ that a submarine or a squadron of aircraft on the tarmac at a distant air base could not. Attempts to go some way to meet SACEUR’s requirements would need a reversal of policy in the Mediterranean, and with respect to amphibious forces would require their NATO re-allocation from SACLANT.43 The paper also highlighted an area where naval deployment could help counteract an uncomfortable fact that the Ministry of Defence could not change: the impending withdrawal of an Army brigade from Germany, one of the main outcomes from the recent Defence Reviews. Retaining the brigade in Germany would be the obvious and most tangible way to demonstrate the United Kingdom’s renewed interest in deterrence in the NATO region. Unfortunately this would be impossible without increasing defence expenditure – impossible given the renewed Treasury pressure – and increasing foreign exchange outflows, another factor that pressed against the Ministry of Defence spending sterling abroad at bases, barracks and air stations. The paper recommended instead increasing the Navy’s NATO readiness and reducing reaction times in the event of a crisis. This would have one significant advantage: warships based in the United Kingdom but deployed to the flanks would spend relatively little sterling currency abroad compared to an equivalent RAF or Army deployment. It also had the advantage of retaining some consistency with earlier British policy regarding NATO: favouring flexibility and earlier deployment from the United Kingdom over the permanent deployment of forces abroad. The cheapness of naval power when the requirement was above all to assert a presence was finally being recognised.44 The Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff noted to Elworthy when reviewing the paper that it did not include any recommendations, and as such the Chiefs should note the paper rather than endorse it, and that it could form part of the basis for recommendations to be prepared for the NATO meetings in May, when increased British deployments in NATO would be announced.45 However, it is not surprising that the paper did not include any recommendations for the Chiefs as it had been prepared by civilian staffs and although the civilian military policy- making side had been strengthened in recent years, there was still a difficulty in civilians providing military ‘advice’. In fact, the recommendation reflected as much the unease of the Army and RAF sides of the Ministry of Defence. The NATO central front was where both the Army and the RAF had considerable

42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 DEFE 11/627, enclosure 5, ACDS (Pol) to CDS, 16 February 1968. The Mediterranean Strategy 175 forces, the new emphasis on the flanks and on non-foreign exchange rate depleting solutions meant that the Navy and the Royal Marines appeared to be the main beneficiaries of the new environment. The discussion of the paper by the Chiefs of Staff highlighted these concerns.46 It was stated that support of the flanks should not be at the expense of the central region of NATO, and also that reinforcing the flanks would be nothing more than something that could produce a ‘short-term plan’ and that it should not jeopardise any long-term plans in the process. These comments, although unattributed in the minutes, very much reflected the concerns of the Army and the RAF, whilst other comments – including the need for a conventional naval capability to support the nuclear role of the US 6th fleet, and also the noting that recent Anglo-Italian staff talks had mentioned the need to counter the increased Soviet presence in the Mediterranean, suggested an intervention by Begg.47 Rumours that the Ministry of Defence was considering an increased presence in the Mediterranean had quickly reached the Foreign Office. Fred Mulley, the new Minister of State, wrote to Healey making it clear that if it were planned to increase the British presence it should be done as soon as possible in order to improve NATO and Mediterranean opinion of the United Kingdom.48 Healey’s reply confirmed that he planned to announce the declaration of additional forces to NATO or at the very least an improvement in the state of availability of British forces for NATO operations. As increasing land forces was not a possibility, and that the position of the air forces was under review since the cancellation of the F-111, Healey was hinting that any deployment would probably more likely be naval than otherwise. He also made clear that the NATO flanks would be concentrated on from both a political and military perspective.49 The situation in NATO appeared in the first instance to provide an opportunity for the British to make significant positive contribution and improve its stock with its disillusioned European and American allies. The United Kingdom representative to NATO noted that the US position of withdrawing forces to allow increased deployments to Vietnam, whilst at the same time encouraging European NATO members to contribute more forces was becoming a serious threat to NATO cohesion. Any reduction in US forces could have ‘most serious consequences for NATO’, whilst the most that could be expected from the Europeans was a maintenance in force levels, let alone any increase.50 In this situation the representative suggested that Britain’s withdrawal from east of Suez would enable

46 DEFE 4/225, CoS 13 (68), item 2 20 February 1968; DEFE 11/627, enclosure 7, extract from CoS minutes, 20 February 1968. 47 Ibid. 48 DEFE 11/627, enclosure 2, Minister of State, Foreign Office (Fred Mulley) to Healey, 9 February 1968; another copy also in DEFE 24/666, enclosure 1. 49 Ibid. 50 DEFE 13/635, enclosure 22, Bernard Burrows to Viscount Hood (Foreign Office), 4 March 1968. 176 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic the British to make more forces available in an emergency, thus helping to fill the gap left by the Americans, militarily and perhaps also politically.51 In practice, achieving this, as will be seen, was much more difficult than it at first seemed. Real substantial increases to forces useful to NATO would be extremely difficult to achieve. Land-based deployments on the continent incurred foreign exchange costs, leaching sterling out of the United Kingdom. As a result, although Healey’s speech of 10 May mentioned 7,000 men being deployed to the NATO area, in fact 5,500 were already associated with NATO. The extra 1,500 would be the two Royal Marine Commandos deployed back from east of Suez, and although they had previously not been assigned, they and their landing ships were already categorised as being part of ‘other forces available to NATO’.52 The phasing out of the carrier force over the coming years would mean that increasing the naval contribution in real terms would be almost impossible. Almost all major British vessels were already assigned to NATO under Category B status (and a fair portion under Category A whilst working up or on exercise in home waters), so unlike other NATO navies no further vessels could be assigned to NATO. Healey’s announcement of having two frigates and one guided-missile destroyer on station in the Mediterranean in fact involved the moving of assigned vessels from SACLANT to SACEUR: no increase at all in NATO’s assigned warships. Increasing the proportion of vessels under Category A was possible, but this was a proportion of a much smaller fleet: which would number 68 escorts by 1971 rather than the previous 86. As a result there would in fact be a numerical decrease in Category A vessels, particularly in the short term.53 Despite this, the naval leadership had done well out of the new concentration on the ‘flanks’: three escorts would be on permanent deployment tothe Mediterranean, but more importantly a substantive justification for the amphibious force and the Royal Marines had been found. Since the decision to withdraw from east of Suez had been accelerated to 1971, the role of these vessels and the specialist troops they carried had had a question mark over them. The ‘flanks’ and the Mediterranean in particular had now provided a justification. With the vessels based in the United Kingdom, the extra cost to the Exchequer of this redeployment was minimal. One senior Army officer accurately noted that the deployment of land or air forces to Germany would in fact be a real and substantive increase in Britain’s contribution to NATO, and ‘cut more ice’ with SACEUR, and the NATO member governments.54 Foreign Exchange imbalances were the deciding factor, and extra land-based forces could not be deployed.

51 Ibid. 52 DEFE 13/635, enclosure 46/1, DS12 to Assistant Private Secretary to Secretary of State, 3 July 1968. 53 Ibid. 54 DEFE 25/253, enclosure 48A, UK NATO Military Representative to Chief of the Defence Staff, 29 October 1968. The Mediterranean Strategy 177

NATO Reactions to the Mediterranean Strategy

The rumours had obviously made their way to Shuckburgh, who reiterated his earlier requests, but was more specific: ‘a small, balanced and mainly self supporting British naval force based in Britain but operating in the Mediterranean with an agreed NATO role’.55 A year earlier, Shuckburgh had seemed hopelessly off-key, appearing almost as a throwback to earlier times, now requesting the same presence but this time deftly fitting in with current plans he seemed ‘ahead of the game’. In response Shuckburgh was informed of Healey’s planned announcement at the next NATO ministers’ meeting on 10 May (the announcement would already have been made by the time Shuckburgh received the letter, so this was in no way useful advance news for the ambassador): two frigates and a Canberra squadron would remain in the Mediterranean. He was also informed that a Standing Naval Force in the Mediterranean was unlikely.56 Shuckburgh was pleased with the announcement but other ambassadors noted that the response in the Mediterranean was not universally positive: the ambassador to Turkey noted that the notoriously anti-NATO press had not paid much attention to the announcement, whilst the Greek ambassador noted concerns in Greece similar to Shuckburgh’s.57 The response to Britain’s proposals across the Atlantic was muted: following a meeting with Clark Clifford, the incoming Secretary of Defense at the NATO ministers’ conference, Healey put the most positive spin on this discussion.58 He stated that his announcements had had ‘a very good reception’ with the US and had been welcomed by other NATO countries. He also called for a sympathetic attitude to the problems of the US – formidable problems were faced at home and abroad and it seemed likely that US forces would be deployed home to the US from abroad and that Britain should follow the US’s lead on the matter. More pessimistic heads at the Foreign Office noted that Clifford’s discussion had made it clear that the US wanted to make substantial and rapid cuts in Europe and that although they had welcomed Britain’s initiative in European defence cooperation, they could not publicly endorse it for fear of upsetting the French, and the Soviet Union would be unlikely to accept mutual reductions as long as the US was in Vietnam.59 The signals were indeed not good from Washington: Congressional

55 DEFE 24/666, enclosure 4, Shuckburgh to FCO, 10 April 1968, another copy in FCO 46/2, enclosure 16, and in DEFE 24/509. 56 DEFE 24/666, enclosures 6 and 10, notes dated 3 May 1968 and 9 May 1968 respectively; see also FCO 46/2, enclosure 17. 57 DEFE 25/252, enclosure 19B, letter from Ambassador in Ankara to Foreign Secretary, 21 May 1968; FCO 46/2, enclosure 20, letter from ambassador in Athens to Foreign Secretary, 31 May 1968. 58 DEFE 25/252, enclosure 13B, Secretary of State to Foreign Secretary, 13 May 1968. 59 DEFE 25/252, enclosure 15A, Foreign Office telegram to Ambassador, Washington, 15 May 1968. 178 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic pressure was mounting for a significant withdrawal of US forces from Europe, and the more isolationist legislators were even urging for a rapid and substantial withdrawal, coupled with the dissolution of NATO given the recent departure of France.60 A few days later these fears had been moderated somewhat, as it became clear that Clifford’s near-apocalyptic vision of a major US withdrawal was much less likely to go ahead. Nonetheless, a draft paper was prepared by the Head of DS 12, the MoD Secretariat branch dealing with NATO matters, set out policy options in the event of a major withdrawal of US troops, down to a maximum of 50,000 only troops.61 A meeting in late June between the UK and NATO defence staffs enabled MoD policy-makers to gain a clearer idea of NATO priorities.62 The message they came away with was one that clearly emphasised the need for more forces on the tender ‘flanks’ of the NATO front: the north and the eastern Mediterranean. Thenew forces already committed and based in the United Kingdom were acknowledged as an addition to the deterrent value of the reinforcement forces, but the main issue of interest to the naval staffs was the clear message that the deterrent value of deploying amphibious forces and carriers, in particular in the Mediterranean, would be particularly important. An amphibious force regularly deployed to the Mediterranean would make a concrete contribution to countering Soviet influence, and dramatically decrease response times. Moving the amphibious forces and carriers from Category B to Category A readiness (in effect stationing and deploying them west of Suez) would also have a strong deterrent effect.63 The UK’s Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic council in Brussels, B.A.B. Burrows, announced what Healey’s offers of more forces actually meant in reality for the flanks of NATO. Supplementary defence estimates were about to be announced which would provide the following forces for NATO in the medium term: a squadron of Shackleton anti-submarine aircraft would be retained in Malta past 1969, a guided-missile destroyer would be deployed to the Mediterranean from 1970, coupled with the presence of one amphibious vessel with a Commando on board for part of the year. The new RAF Rapier mobile anti-aircraft missile system would be earmarked for assignment to NATO in the same year. Twenty Phantoms previously based in the Persian Gulf would now be based in Britain and assigned to SACEUR in 1971, whilst all RAF Buccaneers and Phantoms entering service between 1969 and 1972 would be assigned to NATO. Finally, the brigade pulled out of Germany back to the United Kingdom would take part in a major

60 Ibid. 61 DEFE 25/252, enclosure 28F, Harbard (DS12) to Director of Defence Plans (B), 13 June 1968. 62 DEFE 25/253, enclosure 40B, note of meeting between UK and NATO staffs, 27–28 June 1968. 63 Ibid. The Mediterranean Strategy 179

NATO exercise in the autumn of 1968.64 Burrows could also have mentioned the two frigates to be deployed into the Mediterranean.65 Embarrassingly, it was soon noticed that despite all the discussion of increasing the number of Category A readiness vessels in the medium-and-long term, over the next year, the numbers of Category A vessels was actually going to fall below levels declared by the British for 1968: instead of 42 escorts at Category A readiness only 35 would be available.66 The biggest drop was in the vessels assigned to SACLANT, from 31 down to 21, some of the drop being due to the re-assignment of 2 frigates from SACLANT to SACEUR in the Mediterranean, but much of the rest due to the increased speed of paying off older vessels, and the reduced numbers of new vessels being completed. It was deemed unlikely that the NATO commanders would ‘make a fuss’ but there was a concern about how this would play at NATO Headquarters amongst the allies. The Ministry of Defence was perhaps optimistic about the attitudes of the NATO commanders: SACLANT soon had to be assured that the larger naval units would be raised to Category A as soon as possible. He also wanted the two commando ships, Albion and Bulwark, to be made available to his command as anti-submarine carriers (a nominal secondary role) as soon as possible.67 The Ministry could only reassure him that they were ‘alive to the shortcomings of NATO’s anti-submarine warfare resources in the Atlantic’ and state that such redeployment would not be possible until 1971 at the earliest (the date at which the East of Suez role theoretically disappeared), that the three Tiger class cruisers were undergoing conversion to helicopter cruisers to complete in 1969 and 1971 and that these would provide enhanced anti-submarine capabilities for SACLANT.68 NATO members were not as impressed by Healey’s announcements as had been hoped, not just because of the gradual reduction in Category A naval forces. The Military Representative to NATO reported to Elworthy that Healey’s announcements would not be enough to cajole the West Germans into making a supportive statement, or to get the representatives of other nations scaling down their defence posture in Europe – Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands – to use the UK’s new position to lobby for increased troop levels.69 In short, Healey’s initiatives were seen as insubstantial.

64 DEFE 25/253, enclosure 48E, Burrows to Manlio Brosio, 12 July 1968. 65 DEFE 13/635, enclosure 46/1, note of 3 July 1968. 66 DEFE 25/253, enclosure 48E, Head DS12 to J. Gibbon, UK Delegation to NATO, 11 July 1968. 67 Ibid. 68 DEFE 25/253, enclosure 3B, telegram from MoD to SACLANT, 24 July 1968. 69 DEFE 25/253, enclosure 48A, UK Military Representative to NATO to Chief of the Defence Staff, 29 October 1968. 180 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

The Secretary of State Visits the Mediterranean

Healey’s visit to the Mediterranean in July 1968 increased the momentum of the strategic shift to the hitherto neglected sea. At a meeting with the Chiefs of Staff on his return, the Secretary of State noted the inadequate defence facilities in the region: for example there was a lack of maritime reconnaissance (and strike) capability – British Canberras could not be used from Turkish bases as they could not use the spares held there.70 Aircraft based in Cyprus were committed to CENTO and a double commitment to NATO as well might cause difficulties for Britain’s Middle Eastern allies. There was also a lack of realistic plans to deal with a Soviet attack on Eastern Turkey, a Bulgarian attack on Greece or any form of Soviet combined operations on the Dardanelles.71 A way of responding to Soviet naval activity would also be necessary – their presence was primarily a political one; the best way to counter this presence would therefore have to take this into account.72 The Ministry of Defence would also need to gain a better understanding of SACEUR’s requirements in the Mediterranean and NATO’s thinking on the Mediterranean and the South Eastern Flank.73 The United Kingdom’s diplomatic representatives were not aware of how much work was being done by the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean: the Dartmouth training squadron undertook an annual cruise to the Mediterranean, but most other deployments were as part of NATO exercises; undertaking Royal Navy-only visits by surface vessels would heighten the impact of the British presence, particularly if coupled with a more effective method of making local British diplomats aware of the Royal Navy’s operations.74 In the case of Libya, the unstable regime of King Idris, although allied to the United Kingdom, wanted to downscale the British presence for fear of encouraging agitation from opposition elements. More frequent naval visits in lieu of the present British Army tank-training base and other land-based British military presences might be an effective way of maintaining a lower profile presence.75 From the naval point of view this discussion was highly positive: the ability of naval forces to provide a subtle and less intrusive deterrent presence was recognised as was the lack of air reconnaissance and strike capability in the Mediterranean and the

70 DEFE 13/635, enclosure 44/2, note of meeting held 3 July 1968: Secretary of State and Chiefs of Staff. 71 Ibid. 72 DEFE 13/635, enclosure 44/1, Broadbent to Secretary of State, 2 July 1968: briefing note for meeting with Chiefs of Staff, 3 July 1968. 73 DEFE 13/635, enclosure 45, ibid., and Secretary of State to CDS, 4 July 1968. 74 DEFE 13/635, enclosure 44/2, note of meeting held 3 July 1968 between Healey and Chiefs of Staff; DEFE 13/635, enclosure 45, Secretary of State to Chief of the Defence Staff, 4 July 1968. 75 DEFE 13/635, enclosure 44/2, note of meeting held 3 July 1968 between Healey and Chiefs of Staff. The Mediterranean Strategy 181 problems and limitations of relying on a ‘red carpet’ approach to air support: essentially relying on allies to provide air base facilities. The lack of a strike or reconnaissance capability even hinted at the possibility of a rebirth of the carrier. The arguments repeatedly lost between 1964 and 1966 in the arena of East of Suez were now being recognised and acknowledged in the new arena of ‘East of Gibraltar’.

Building a Policy and Conceptual Framework

The decisions and announcements regarding the Mediterranean had happened in a short space of time, and without any long-term and formal analysis of the wider policy and strategic context. The paperwork had to catch up with the public announcements and the already proceeding deployments. Completed a day after the Mediterranean strategy paper, a much wider study of the British contribution to NATO in the long term was produced.76 From the start it emphasised the importance of the flanks and of the naval contribution to these flanks: the paper rehearsed the weaknesses of the two flanks, and produced as counterpoint the recent withdrawals of US, British, Canadian and Belgian forces.77 A section analysing Soviet aims and intentions noted problems of cohesion within the Soviet bloc – pointing to problems with Eastern states such as Rumania, Albania and Yugoslavia, and the developing ‘Prague spring’ in Czechoslovakia. Soviet aims were highlighted as being the following: encouraging US withdrawal from Europe, opposing multilateral nuclear forces, gaining recognition for the German Democratic Republic, extending influence into Africa and the Middle East, influencing the non-aligned nations, and finally encouraging waverers in the Warsaw Pact. Armed intervention within the Warsaw Pact in order to retain cohesion – which did in fact occur in the case of Czechoslovakia – was not even considered as a likely option. Most importantly for the Navy, who had suffered from being seen as a secondary player in strategic analyses over the last four years, it was placed much more firmly centre-stage. ‘Maritime considerations are of growing importance’ – the Soviet navy had increased markedly in quality, training and experience over the last five to ten years, as well as increasing its scope of operations. This was supplemented by the statement that the US thought that the air and ground threats in central Europe were exaggerated: it is difficult to conceive of a set of statements that so expressly noticed the increasing importance of sea-power within British defence policy.78 NATO strategy to counter this was then set out: security through credible deterrence in the form of ‘flexible response’ to crises: moving from direct defence

76 DEFE 5/178, CoS 43/68 British contribution to NATO in the long term, 4 July 1968. 77 Ibid., part 1. 78 Ibid., part 2. 182 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic through deliberate escalation and then finally a general nuclear response. It was also acknowledged that flexible response had been interpreted in different ways by different NATO members. The flanks were emphasised again – the remoteness of these theatres meant that great importance should be attached to the ‘means of defence being evident and continuing’ to both the flank countries themselves – Greece, Turkey, Norway and Denmark – and to their adversary, the Warsaw Pact. The response in these flanks would consist of three stages: the local in-position response, reinforcement by local multinational standing forces (such as the ACE (Allied Command Europe) Mobile Forces and STANAVFORLANT (Standing Naval Force Atlantic)) and finally sea, land and air reinforcement by the national forces of NATO allies.79 The paper analysed how this three-stage concept could be interpreted within NATO sea areas. It was suggested that the Soviet navy could be used opportunistically in situations just short of general war, and that it would be necessary to meet such aggression at all levels to ensure deterrence. In the sea environment forces could be dispersed and could concentrate for war without the actions being necessarily ‘apparent or provocative’.80 Sea action would be less exposed to major risks of escalation (for example the use of nuclear weapons at sea would be much less likely to cause major civilian casualties and therefore cause escalation from tactical to nuclear weapons), and could be more easily called off without loss of face. Sea communications were more important to NATO than to the Warsaw Pact, but as on land the effectiveness of each step of deterrence depends on the ability to make the next step in escalation if necessary. At different levels of international tension the role of naval forces would differ. In peacetime naval vessels would gather intelligence, emphasise NATO solidarity and readiness, exert ‘counter-pressure in a neutral environment’ and deter Soviet adventures.81 In a period of tension, NATO strike fleets and Polaris submarines could counter Soviet deployments, escort groups could escort convoys and amphibious vessels could undertake landings to reinforce land forces. Escalation at sea, if the conflict had started at sea, would be slower than on land as centres of civilian population would be unlikely to be directly attacked, and tactical nuclear weapons could be used without enormous civilian casualties. In an environment of Soviet aggression where the conflict had begun in land, the pace of escalation would be at the much faster speed of escalation on land, with civilian centres of population highly likely to be caught in battlefield tactical nuclear exchanges, therefore pushing leaderships into strategic nuclear responses.82 The paper went on to state that NATO’s strategic priorities were the defence of NATO’s ‘power base’, the continental United States, followed by the defence of

79 Ibid., part 3. 80 Ibid., part 5. 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. The Mediterranean Strategy 183 central Europe and then finally the NATO flanks.83 Attacks on the USA and central Europe would be considered least likely as the consequences and the retaliation would be most serious. Much more likely would be attacks or provocations on the flanks or at sea, where the consequences would be less dramatic and more ambiguous. The paper judged that the flanks needed additional support within NATO, as imbalances with the Warsaw Pact were greatest in these areas. Soviet forces greatly outnumbered NATO forces in Norway and Denmark, whilst on the Southern Flank NATO forces lacked cohesion, with the US 6th fleet being the most important qualitative military asset.84 In such circumstances the Navy seemed in a much better position than the Army or RAF to plug this particular deficiency. NATO needed the following forces in the maritime sphere.85 On the nuclear side: ballistic-missile-carrying submarines would be needed to provide an invulnerable second response nuclear strike force, as well as tactical nuclear weapons at sea and air-launched from land bases. On the conventional side offensive capabilities would be needed such as the ability to create maritime zones of control, control sea ‘choke points’ (where sea passage routes converged on a restricted area such as the Dover–Calais gap and the Straits of Gibraltar), to shadow, harass, deter and attack Soviet naval forces, deploy land forces on the flanks to counter Soviet flank moves and to counter Soviet maritime land support operations. Defensive capabilities included anti-submarine defence, air defence, and defence against enemy surface vessels (using hunter-killer submarines, missile-armed helicopters and surface ships).86 The paper then set out how British forces could best contribute to the defence of NATO.87 NATO commanders would welcome any help, as all had expressed concern about shortages in their respective regions. NATO’s strategy did not, however, indicate directly which forces would be most needed – current forces largely reflected national rather than alliance priorities. In the future, British forces would have to be able to shift flexibly between NATO and ‘national’ tasks outside the NATO area. The areas where the British contribution stood in sharpest relief against other allies’ contributions was in the nuclear role, in maritime capability and in the tactical strike/reconnaissance capability. Overall, British policy should involve coming closer to the nations of the European heartland and also the politically weaker countries on the flanks. Foreign exchange factors worked against an increase in permanent deployments in central Europe, so most additional capability would have to be UK-based.88 The actual British contribution to NATO, based on these analyses, would need to include a strategic nuclear capability to insure against US reluctance to

83 Ibid., part 6. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid., part 7. 86 Ibid. 87 Ibid., part 8. 88 Ibid. 184 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic intervene strategically to retaliate against an attack on Europe only, and a tactical nuclear capability to ensure that Europe retained such weaponry if the United States backed away from supporting its European allies. With conventional weaponry, the British contribution should be balanced and strong, and that present contributions should be maintained. With specific regard to the Royal Navy a modern multipurpose Navy would be essential. For ‘many years’ a major and sustained campaign against shipping was considered unlikely, but instead forces should be optimised for the deterrence role at a lower and the middle level. In this regard, the deployment of naval vessels to the Mediterranean would be ‘at least as beneficial’ to NATO as the Atlantic.89 The NATO strategy paper could not have been much more favourable to the Navy short of suggesting a new need for a 60,000-ton strike carrier. The maritime theatre appeared to be of both growing importance and an area where increased force deployments could take place without financial strain. It was a high level paper, some important issues were left unaddressed, such as the best way to deal with the Soviet maritime threat: by land-based aircraft, by hunter-killer submarine or by ship or helicopter-launched guided missiles.90 The paper did, however, provide a template for how Britain could integrate its forces into NATO more effectively, and the influence of the Mediterranean strategy and the naval aspect had clearly been strong. There was still no strategy for the Royal Navy within NATO, as opposed to British forces in general, nor, amazingly, there had been any analysis by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (the new department that combined the three old ‘political’ departments of the Foreign, Commonwealth Relations and Colonial Offices) of how British interests were served by the Mediterranean strategy. A crisis in central Europe would put such studies even further into the background.

Czechoslovakia and the Mediterranean

The invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in October 1968 increased the pressure on the British government to be seen to be increasing its contribution to NATO, and provided an unlikely opportunity for the Navy to increase its Mediterranean presence further. The dilemma that had presented itself to the Ministry of Defence in January remained: how to increase contribution whilst minimising the foreign exchange cost and the financial implications.91 In short, what would be possible without spending much money and preferably spending it in the United Kingdom rather than continental Europe? The answer was, as before, very little except naval deployments. NATO ministers were due to meet to discuss

89 Ibid., part 9. 90 DEFE 13/635, enclosure 46/3, Broadbent to Secretary of State, 22 July 1968. 91 DEFE 13/875, draft paper by DS12 for Defence and Oversea Policy Committee: ‘NATO and Czechoslovakia: further UK contribution to NATO’. The Mediterranean Strategy 185 the crisis between 14 and 16 of November, and as credible as possible a response would be needed from Healey. A major military reinforcement of the British Army on the Rhine – the return of the 6th Brigade to Germany – was ruled out unless the foreign exchange costs could be met by the Germans. This was not forthcoming. A major organisational change, placing the United Kingdom under the control of SACEUR in the event of war, was judged to have political advantages but no real military benefits and might even result in military disadvantages for the United Kingdom.92 Aside from minor additions to land forces (providing a signals unit for SACEUR’s ACE Mobile Force) most of the substantial contributions would have to be naval, and would be in support of the flanks. Proposals included the periodic deployment of carriers from the Western Fleet to the Mediterranean in 1969 and 1970, additional exercises in the Mediterranean would also increase the number of escorts in the sea from 2 to between 8 and 10, whilst the two commando carriers would each spend an additional six months in the Mediterranean in the following two years. Some of these forces would be provided by cancelling an exercise in the Caribbean in early 1969, whilst the carriers would still be assigned to SACLANT rather than SACEUR to placate Admiral Holmes.93 The Navy produced its formal proposals for British naval strength in the Mediterranean from 1971 the day before the NATO ministers’ meeting.94 The paper argued that the Navy’s role in the Mediterranean would be primarily political rather than military: as a peacetime counter to Soviet influence and naval diplomacy in the region, rather than as a military augmentation to NATO forces for use in the event of war.95 The size of Soviet naval forces in 1967 was set out as an average of 1 cruiser, up to 10 escorts, between 7 and 10 submarines, at least one or two of which would be nuclear powered, plus 3 landing ships and a range of auxiliaries. It was not believed that the force could be sustained in the sea for more than six weeks should the Bosphorus be blocked.96 The paper argued for a permanent presence of six escorts, one nuclear submarine and a squadron of maritime patrol aircraft in the Mediterranean. It also put the case for the desirability of one commando ship and one assault ship stationed in the sea at any time. Three of the escorts and the squadron would be assigned to Commander-in-Chief South (reporting to SACEUR), whilst the other three escorts, plus a further three in home waters, the Eastern Atlantic or the Persian Gulf, would be assigned to CinCSouth under Category B.97 This was quite a step up from the force suggested in July: from

92 Ibid. 93 Ibid. 94 DEFE 24/666, enclosure 34, CoS 84/68 United Kingdom Maritime Presence in the Mediterranean in the long term, 13 November 1968. 95 DEFE 24/666, enclosure 34, United Kingdom Maritime Presence in the Mediterranean in the long term CoS 84/68, 13 November 1968, Part 1. 96 Ibid., Part 2. 97 Ibid., Parts 5 and 7. 186 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic two to six escorts, but it did have the strong advantage of cheapness. The Treasury was impressed that the Navy department was ‘refreshingly realistic’ about keeping costs down in the deployment.98 A Soviet challenge in the heart of continental Europe produced a response from Britain that meant little more than the significant strengthening of naval forces in the Mediterranean, many hundreds of miles away from the source of the threat. Ostensibly a wilfully eccentric decision, underneath lay the realities of a currency under continued foreign exchange pressure and a resurgent Navy taking advantage of the strategic gap. Healey’s speech announcing further naval reinforcement in the Mediterranean was cordially received, but the charge of ‘robbing Peter to pay Paul’ was soon being made about proposals which essentially shifted naval resources from one NATO naval command to another: it had previously been planned to allocate the commando ships to SACLANT as anti-submarine carriers, whilst the assault ships plans chimed with SACEUR’s requests that one be allocated to the Northern Flank and the other to the Southern Flank.99 SACLANT had not been happy about the earlier proposals either.100 The forces now allocated were largely those which had been earmarked to remain east of Suez until the decision to withdraw in 1971, and by giving SACEUR what he wished, SACLANT had as a result been displeased. SACLANT argued that these forces would otherwise have been allocated to SACLANT – which was certainly true. The response given to SACLANT was that all NATO members were agreed that the flanks should be strengthened, and that any decision was asyet tentative.101 The real reason was that a SACEUR deployment in the Mediterranean, with opportunities to make the British presence felt to numerous NATO and non- aligned countries as well as the Soviet naval force, had a greater political impact than maintaining a deployment under SACLANT in the Eastern Atlantic.

The British NATO Naval Strategy

A naval strategy for British forces under NATO was a long time in coming; it was not until summer 1969, 18 months after the Mediterranean strategy had started to take shape, and more than six months late, that an overall picture was provided of the Royal Navy’s NATO role.102 The result did not provide many concrete

98 DEFE 13/875, J.F. Mayne to Healey, 18 November 1968. 99 DEFE 13/875, Roles of additional United Kingdom forces recently declared to NATO CoS 85/68, 15 November 1968. 100 DEFE 25/253, enclosure 27A, UK NMR representative SHAPE to MoD UK, 19 September 1968. 101 DEFE 13/875, Acting Chief of the Defence Staff to Healey, 13 November 1968, covering CoS 84/68. 102 DEFE 25/253, enclosure 5C, Acting Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (P) to Charles Elworthy, Chief of the Defence Staff, 29 July 1968. The Mediterranean Strategy 187 conclusions, and repeated much of what had been said in the NATO strategy paper of July 1968. As before the flanks and the Mediterranean were emphasised. The study noted that the Royal Navy was stronger than the US Navy in mine warfare, fast patrol boats and conventional submarines, and that these should be areas where the Navy could complement its most important ally. Superficial numerical comparisons of fleet numbers with allies and adversaries was also potentially misleading, as the variation in quality of warships could vary much more dramatically than with tanks or jet aircraft.103 The paper also avoided hard questions such as the significant land-based air power in the maritime context, and the operational requirements for escorts. On the latter issue, this vagueness deliberately protected the new escort programme, and on the former the Navy had learnt the hard way that addressing difficult subjects head-on in a way likely to inflame inter-service rivalries would be unlikely to provide dividends. The Head of DS22 suggested a more accurate title of ‘some thoughts on War at Sea’ and regarded it as not much more than a ‘mind clearing exercise’ short on concrete recommendations or operational scenarios.104 The naval contention that war at sea might be less prone to escalation was doubted by the Head of DS12, who argued that an attack on a ballistic-missile-armed submarine might escalate warfare to a general nuclear confrontation. The Navy clearly had some way to go before it could convince politicians and civil servants that war at sea was the one arena where limited warfare would be least likely to escalate to general nuclear war.105 Healey’s response to the paper was not as harsh as some of the civil servants. Healey asked for more specifics on how the Navy might be able to limit the transfer of war at sea to war on land. The Secretary of State suggested using the NATO flexible response strategy of demonstrating the credibility of a controlled escalation, Healey asked whether conventional attacks on Soviet naval bases might demonstrate such credibility and what might be the Soviet response.106 Healey, accepting the Navy’s position that the new escort programme should not be affected by the paper, also stated that the study should not be seen as an endorsement of any particular warship type, but then proceeded to contradict himself by raising the issue of adequate air support and cover for warships and asking for proposals for the aircraft carrying cruiser, after it had been through the Operational Requirements and Weapons Development Committees. He also asked to see plans for other elements of the Navy’s proposals to augment its tactical strike capability: the development of helicopter-launched anti-ship missiles,

103 DEFE 11/725, enclosure 2, Concept of NATO Maritime Operations at the higher level (CoS 37/69 & DP 24/68 (revise), 2 June 1969. 104 DEFE 68/23, Nailor (DS22) to Frank Cooper, Deputy Under-Secretary (P), 15 May 1969. 105 DEFE 68/23, Warner (DS12) to Cooper, 25 July 1969. 106 DEFE 68/23, Healey to Elworthy, 22 July 1969. 188 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic a ship-to-ship guided-missile system, a submarine-launched anti-ship guided- missile system and the ship-borne Harrier.107 The naval leadership had now not only ensured that the amphibious force and the Royal Marines were given a justification through the Mediterranean strategy, to such an extent that the conversion of Hermes to a commando ship was based on ensuring the presence of at least one amphibious vessel in that sea during the 1970s.108 The Navy had now also begun to lay the foundations for turning the cruiser into a small Harrier-capable aircraft carrier – Healey’s concerns about organic maritime strike in the Mediterranean following his visit to the sea in July 1968, had now developed into a sympathy for and interest in a small carrier.

Britain’s Interests in the Mediterranean

In October 1969, for the first time, an assessment of Britain’s interests inthe Mediterranean was finally commissioned by a sub-committee of the Oversea Policy and Defence Committee. The Ministry of Defence was not involved in its writing or told of its production. The assessment, made by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, was that naval deployments to the Mediterranean, served no direct interests of the British state. The United Kingdom had no intrinsic core political, commercial or strategic interests in the sea, not least because the closure of the Suez Canal made the sea much less important as a trade or military transit route to the Persian Gulf or the Far East.109 The importance of the Mediterranean only came through British interests in supporting NATO. The Mediterranean strategy was perhaps the first significant instance after the decision to withdraw from east of Suez where foreign policy and defence policy was essentially completely decoupled. This trend would develop over the following 20 years as defence policy focused increasingly on the NATO mission at the expense of protecting British interests worldwide.

Conclusion

The Mediterranean was the stage on which the naval leadership regained its self- confidence and assertiveness in the theatre that was defence and inter-service politics. The Mediterranean strategy allowed the Secretary of State to appear to contribute to NATO more effectively when he did not have the resources to do so. It is arguable the extent to which this was perceived by Britain’s NATO partners, but it appealed to a Secretary of State more inclined to do something rather than

107 DEFE 68/23, Healey to Elworthy, 22 July 1969. 108 DEFE 10/943, OR13/69, Conversion of Hermes to LPH – NSR 7100, 27 March 1969. 109 DEFE 68/23, Head of DS22 to D/DP (C Division), 3 October 1969. The Mediterranean Strategy 189 nothing in the face of difficult circumstances. The personal chemistry between Healey and Le Fanu helped to oil the wheels of this new approach, and the strategy was used to justify retaining the Navy’s amphibious capability, and to support the case for the return of an organic maritime fixed-wing capability. The Mediterranean also provided a stage on which the Royal Navy could adjust to its reduced circumstances, and justify the retention of some of its world- role capabilities. The scene of Royal Naval victories for over 300 years, it was also where much of the naval leadership had fought during the Second World War. Although the Mediterranean capability was scaled down somewhat during the 1975 Defence Review, deployments to the sea continued through the 1970s and the early 1980s. It is not insignificant that the core of the Falklands Task Force consisted of a squadron that had just completed a round-the-world tour that had concluded in the Mediterranean. There is also a strong argument that it was the Royal Navy’s ‘East of Gibraltar’ forces – Hermes and the amphibious force – that made fighting the possible. This page has been left blank intentionally Chapter 7 Building a New Fleet

The cancellation of the aircraft carrier left the Navy’s future surface fleet procurement programme in tatters. Not only had CVA-01 been cancelled, but this cancellation as will be explained below removed the rationale for the both the new escort designs on the drawing board: the large Type 82 destroyer and the fast, light Type 19 frigate. A coherent procurement programme had to be created, almost from scratch, which had a strong chance of approval by a Secretary of State and a Defence Council that had been unconvinced by the Navy’s previous proposals, at a time when the morale of the Navy Department was at its lowest ebb since the end of the Second World War. How did the naval leadership undertake this task? How successful were they? The success of the new programme would not just depend on credible designs but also on complex, sophisticated and increasingly expensive weapon, sensor and automated command systems that would make these vessels credible platforms for fighting and deterrence. This chapter will begin with a review of the machinery of naval procurement, then assess the Navy’s first attempt at producing a new naval programme, its failure, the operational concepts created to justify new forces, followed by analysing each of the major procurement areas in turn: the carrier replacement weapons, the Sea Dart destroyer and the new frigate.

The Machinery of Naval Procurement

As with almost every other aspect of the new Ministry of Defence, there were two levels to policy and decision-making: the Navy Department level, and the central Ministry level. Within the Navy Department were, amongst other interested committees, the Fleet Requirements Committee, the Ship Characteristics Committee and the Admiralty Board involved in approving warship designs. The Fleet Requirements Committee set the initial operational requirements that would then lead to the formulation of parameters for designs to be developed whilst the Ships Characteristics Committee would undertake more detailed analysis and approval of the design. The Navy Department staff officer, usually a Captain RN, responsible for this work was the Director of Naval Weapons, Technology and Plans (by 1968 the near-equivalent post was Director of Naval Operational Requirements). Once the relevant service department had set initial requirements for a weapon system, the proposal would be presented to the Operational Requirements Committee in the Ministry of Defence, to approve the proposed system as a Naval Staff Target. Generally, to bring such a system 192 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic to the Committee would require that system to have been approved in principle either by the Secretary of State, the Defence Council or even the relevant Cabinet Committee. This would allow for the release of some funds to investigate whether the requirements set out in the Target were feasible. The members of the Operational Requirements Committee included representatives of the three armed services, the Chief Scientific Adviser’s office, and the central civilian Secretariat. Once such initial investigations had been undertaken the proposal would be returned to the Committee, perhaps with the requirements modified, for approval to become a Naval Staff Requirement. From this point onwards the detailed design development work would commence and systems in due course procured. The design would not return to the Committee unless the operational requirements changed during development. The work would also be reviewed by the Weapons Development Committee, as sister committee to the Operational Requirements Committee. As has been seen, the Navy Department had initially been given the ability to be exempted from the early stages of this process, but this was removed in November 1966. In addition an early exemption from putting ship designs through the Weapons Development Committee was also rescinded by 1968.1

The Future Fleet Working Party

The cancellation of the carrier had called into question much of the rest of the warship building programme, in particular plans for escort vessels. As the need to develop new designs incorporating the second generation of guided missile systems was urgent, in March 1966 the Admiralty Board set up the Future Fleet Working Party under Rear Admiral Adams to provide the Secretary of State with proposals and options for the ships needed for the fleet of the 1970s.2 The studies, eventually resulting in over 100 papers, most of which assessed warship type requirements, coalesced into two main strands: a Concept of Naval Operations and series of fleet options documents, the former providing the operational context to justify the latter. Rear Admiral Adams’ party quickly came to the conclusion that a small ‘cruiser/carrier’ of 17,000–18,500 tons combining command and control facilities, amphibious lift and/or ASW helicopters and a small number of P.1127 VSTOL aircraft for strike, probe and reconnaissance would be the optimum solution to provide the next generation of large surface warships. The idea of using VSTOL aircraft had been first suggested by the Captain of HMS Bulwark in March 1966: he had argued that the capacity of the commando carriers was much underused, that the need for close support aircraft in amphibious

1 DEFE 10/484, OR/M(66)14, item 3, naval procedures, 8 November 1966 2 DEFE 24/149, enclosure 39, background note to Future Fleet Working Party papers by A.R.M. Jaffray, Head DS4, August 1967. Building a New Fleet 193 operations was acute.3 An initial presentation to the Secretary of State setting out ideas for cruiser/carriers was soon followed by the placing of representatives from the central Secretariat on the Working Party in May,4 an ominous sign, but one that was heeded neither by Adams’ party nor the naval leadership. A second meeting with Healey in July provided even stronger indications that the proposals as they were developing were not to the Secretary of State’s liking.5 Healey expressed some reservations about the progress of the studies: he thought that the concept of operations had not sufficiently recognised that low-intensity peace-keeping would be the main role east of Suez, and that Adams’ party had ignored the contribution the RAF and Army could make to operations involving the Navy. Healey expressed doubts about both the P.1127, asking for studies into what capability would be lost if the P.1127 were not included in the plans, and the cruiser/carrier, stating that is was ‘difficult not to have reservations about a new class of 17,000 ton cruiser/carriers’.6 The Secretary of State asked for three additional studies to be set in train to augment the work already being done.7 The first of these studies, ‘The Ladder of Deterrence’, aimed to set out whether there were any overlaps or gaps in the deterrent values of different weapon systems available in the Far East. In effect its aim was to compare both the deterrent and actual capabilities of weapons systems such as sea-borne and land-based fixed-wing aircraft. The second study, what became known as the ‘Byfleet study’, would use operational analysis to assess the need for amphibious forces at all, given existing air base use agreements with allies. A third study would analyse Soviet naval capabilities.8 The first two studies were contentious enough to be handed over to a ‘neutral’ figure to chair: the Deputy Chief Scientific Adviser at the Ministry of Defence, whilst the membership of both committees was dominated by officials from the Central Defence Secretariat. There were only two representatives of the Navy Department.9 A third meeting in late July between the Permanent Secretary and Begg, had the purpose of ensuring that the Navy Department knew what were the Secretary of State’s ‘needs’ from the Future Fleet Working Party studies. Begg set out the three

3 Naval Historical Branch, NHB Study 62, 1997: Background Aircraft Carrier Papers: trials with Kestrel aircraft in RN and USN carriers March–June 1966; Captain HMS Bulwark to CinC Plymouth, 29 March 1966. 4 DEFE 24/149, enclosures 1 and 2, Begg to Healey, 21 March 1966 and 2 May 1966. 5 DEFE 24/128, enclosure 5/1, Healey to Hull, Begg and Dunnett, 8 August 1966. 6 Ibid. 7 DEFE 24/149, enclosure 7, note of meeting with Healey, Begg and various Navy Department officers and officials, 29 July 1966. 8 No further details on this study have been found. It was not incorporated into the Defence Expenditure Studies as had been the case with the ‘Ladder of Deterrence’ and ‘Byfleet’ studies, and its results or mentions of its results have not been found in any Cabinet Committee or MoD files. 9 DEFE 69/452, enclosure 2, list of committee members, undated. 194 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic alternative large ship programmes that the Working Party was considering. They were compared against the 1965 long-term costings where an annual running cost for three strike cruisers, six escort cruisers, two commando ships and two assault ships, including their aircraft, would be £188m. Fleet Option 1 (the Working Party’s preferred option) included six cruiser/carriers and two assault ships at £64.5m a year, Option 2 included four 10,000-ton escort cruisers, three commando ships and two assault ships at £47m a year, and Option 3 six 12,000-cruisers and three assault ships at £62m a year.10 This further warning had ensured that Begg was now fully aware of the situation, but still Adams persisted with the cruiser/carrier. The Working Party report was finally completed in late August 1966. Before the Admiralty Board had approved the report, Adams had sent a summary of the recommendations of the Head of the Defence Secretariat Branch 1, one of Dunnett’s senior civil servants: the proposals that emerged set out a preferred option of up to six 18,500-ton cruiser/carriers, replacing the commando ships and the Tiger class cruisers.11 The report summary argued that aircraft-carrying cruisers at 12,000 or 10,000 tons would be cost ineffective. This would be combined with four Type 82 vessels to get Ikara and Sea Dart to sea as soon as possible and a 2,500-ton ‘standard frigate’ based on the Type 19, but reduced to a sensible speed and incorporating the Wasp replacement helicopter (later to become the Lynx). In the late 1970s a class of 4,500-ton ‘first rate frigates’ with either Ikara or Sea Dart and the large SH-3D helicopter would supplement these escorts. The hunter-killer nuclear submarine programme would proceed to 15 or 16 boats, a programme of up to 32 single-hull mine hunters/sweepers would be embarked on, and 40-ton hovercraft would be procured for inshore patrol. This would be supplemented by a large programme of support ships made up of 12 small and large tankers and four armament support ships. The Concept of Operations stated that the core role of the Navy in the 1970s would be peace-keeping and deterrence: this could be broken down into three parts – a military presence worldwide, a contribution to the maritime shield forces of NATO, and the provision of the nuclear deterrent.12 It was argued that the world military presence aspect would become more important in the future as Britain withdrew from its bases east of Suez. The report also stated that operations would be small-scale and short, usually involving a small group or even single warships. There was little mention of the RAF’s role in such operations, despite Healey’s requests that this be taken into account. This was a large, expensive and ambitious programme given that the Navy’s share of the planned £2,000m defence budget in 1969/70 would be £550m. The cruiser/carrier was estimated by the Working Party to cost £30m and the standard

10 DEFE 24/128, enclosure 4/2, Jaffray to Dunnett, brief for Dunnett’s meeting with Begg, 26 July 1966. 11 DEFE 24/128, Summary Conclusions and Recommendations, Future Fleet Working Party Report, 30 August 1966. 12 DEFE 24/238, ibid., and Future Fleet Working Party Report, Annex B. Building a New Fleet 195 frigate £7m. The Head of DS1 was sceptical about these costings, his handwritten marginalia in the report summary noting that the Type 82, a third of the size, was already costing £20m. He also thought that the standard frigate would probably cost £10m rather than £7m.13 It would be difficult to contradict this opinion, given the soaring costs of building and designing warships at the time; six months later the cost of the Type 82 had risen to £24.5m.14 Many of these increases came from unrealistic tender prices from defence companies and the spiralling costs of the sophisticated weapons, sensors and command systems necessary for modern warships. For example, between 1962 and 1966 the cost estimates of the Sea Dart missile had risen by 48 per cent to £37,000 per missile, the rises attributed to design changes, more detailed costings, improved quality assurance procedures and wage increases.15 The costs of fitting one missile system including radars and launchers (GWS-30) to a ship had risen from £820,000 to £1.4m in the same period, much of the extra costs being attributed to too-low initial estimates by the contractor, underestimates of spares, price and wage increases, the erroneous exclusion of certain cost elements from early estimates, changes in the design to improve the radar tracking capability over land, underestimates in prototype testing and assembling and problems with a new type of valve.16 Even more dramatic cost increases in the Dutch ‘Broomstick’ Type 988 radar, also to be fitted on the Type 82, helped add to the total cost of the design.17 In addition, such increases impacted on the ship’s Action Data Automation computer system: as sensor and weapon systems changed and developed, so would the capacity and capability of the ship’s command system. The cost of the Type 82’s ADA had risen from £8.8m for six systems in December 1964 to £11.7m only 19 months later. The system seemed to be reaching a crisis point in design in mid 1966 with the earliest date for trials having slipped back by 16 months and the realisation that two Ferranti 1600 computers would not be enough to handle all the expected data requirements. In addition, the interfaces between the computers and the systems were more complex than had been envisaged, and the programming requirements were more substantial than had been originally thought.18 Such cost increases were not restricted to weapon systems for the Type 82, and in any case it was envisaged that the cruiser/carrier would share many of the Type 82’s systems such as Sea Dart and Broomstick.19 In such an environment, a £30m estimate for the cruiser/carrier might be regarded as almost recklessly optimistic.

13 Ibid. 14 DEFE 24/128, enclosure 15B, brief for Dunnett, 14 March 1967. 15 DEFE 10/483, OR/P(66)49 NSR6502 – Sea Dart, 30 November 1966. 16 Ibid., Annexes B and C. 17 DEFE 10/532, OR9/67 NSR7890 – Broomstick, 2 March 1967. 18 DEFE 10/483, OR/P(66)35 NSR7898 – Type 82 ADA, 20 July 1966. 19 For other ship and systems cost increases see: DEFE 10/483, OR/P(66)31 NST 6522 – PX.430 (Sea Wolf) 8/7/66, compare with DEFE 10/942, OR61/68 NSR 6522 – Sea 196 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

The Working Party had also opted for something approaching an all ‘high quality’ unit approach for the large ships and escorts, rather than the high/low quality (Type 82/Type 19) mix of the previous programme. An earlier paper had outlined the problems facing the Working Party in assessing the need for escorts. The major constraint on construction was the design capacity of the Naval Constructor’s office. Over the next 10 years they would have the capacity to design one ‘large’ warship and one ‘small’ warship type. In the late 1970s there would then be capacity for another ‘small’ ship. If the large vessel were to be the cruiser/carrier or a smaller cruiser, then only one new escort could be designed in-house, with another in the late 1970s. The Working Party recommended the 2,500-ton ‘standard’ frigate as the first small ship type, followed by the 4,500- ton first rate frigate in the late 1970s. The standard frigate was still a relatively capable vessel, so two options remained for less capable vessels primarily for ‘presence’ work and to make up numbers. A commercial warship design, say for a 1,000-ton corvette, could be developed, or alternatively older frigates would not be modernised and instead operate as presence vessels when their weaponry approached obsolescence. The Working Party had rejected the commercial option, despite lobbying from the Controller, the Third Sea Lord, as the capability of such ships would be much lower than the money saved in procuring them.20 The Future Fleet Working Party Report was a substantial and considered work, and within its assessments and recommendations there were elements that would form the core of later Cold War Royal Navy: small carriers, a high/low mix involving new and old escorts to ensure that all new construction would be of relatively high-quality ships, and an intelligent attempt to assess the future operational landscape in a period of strategic flux. It was also politically maladroit. Only six months after the cancellation of the strike carrier, with the RAF concept of fixed-wing maritime airpower in the ascendant, it seems that the Working Party were unaware of the continued weakness of their position. They also seem to have been blind to the strong warnings that a cruiser/carrier with fixed-wing aircraft would not be acceptable to the Secretary of State, and that costs should be more realistic. This was put to them twice by Healey, and once by Dunnett, via Begg but Adams still believed that he would be able to persuade the Secretary of State, and the Chief of the Naval Staff, of its necessity. He was mistaken.

Wolf, 9 November 1968; DEFE 10/484, OR(67)2/2 Tiger class conversion, 19 January 1967; DEFE 24/128, enclosure 15B, brief for Dunnett, 14 March 1967, increase in costs of SSN07 (HMS Swiftsure). 20 DEFE 24/128, enclosure 4B, Options for Concept of Operations, pp. 3–6, undated, covered by note dated 22 July 1966. Building a New Fleet 197

A New Working Party and a New Report

The Secretary of State was not happy with the resulting report; he asked Begg to come back to him with new conclusions: the role of the RAF and Army should be emphasised in the Concept of Operations, whilst the suggested fleet mix should put forward cheaper and smaller vessels. This response should not have been unexpected, but it led to further rounds of infighting in the Admiralty Board and the end of the career of Admiral Adams.21 Begg, reasserting himself over his fellow Board members, had rapidly to rewrite the Future Fleet Working Party Report.22 A sub-committee of the Admiralty Board was created with Begg in the chair to guide the process, ensuring that there would be no deviation from the First Sea Lord’s line.23 The result was a much cheaper set of fleet options: a command cruiser no more than 10,000 tons to replace the Tiger class cruisers. The new cruiser was formally described as being derived from the Type 82, but the vessel was essentially the smallest cruiser variant of the original studies. A new class of 3,500-ton guided missile frigates armed with a single Sea Dart launcher (which would become the Type 42 destroyer), was proposed as the cheapest and smallest platform to get Sea Dart to sea, again a vessel type put forward as part of the original Working Party studies. The ‘standard’ frigate also survived as the successor to the Leander class. The increasingly expensive Type 82 was itself sacrificed, with only one vessel to be constructed, and her Dutch Broomstick radar (considered essential to secure a Dutch purchase of Sea Dart) used in the command cruiser.24 The aim of the new ship mix was to provide a front line force of small destroyers and frigates for peace-keeping and presence roles backed up by more substantial ships and boats such as the vessels of the ongoing nuclear submarine programme and the projected command cruisers.25 The command cruiser was priced at £25m, the Type 42 at £10m, the hunter-killer submarines at £25m, and the standard frigate at £7m.26 As the total numbers of each ship type had not been finalised total

21 DEFE 13/584, item 1, For example between Admirals Bush and Janvrin over the merits of either the P.1127 or submarine-launched missiles in the anti-surface strike role, PS/Secretary of State, 10 October 1966; Grove, Vanguard to Trident, p. 282. 22 DEFE 24/149, enclosure 8, Begg to various, covering Future Fleet Working Party Report, 26 September 1966. 23 DEFE 24/150, item 1A, Jaffray to Sub-Committee members, 27 September 1966. 24 DEFE 24/149, enclosure 10, Annex 2: ‘Shape of the Future Fleet’. For a detailed analysis of the development of the Type 82 and its place within the Future Fleet Working Party studies, see Andrea Ellner, ‘Innovation and Surface Ships: The Type 82 Destroyer and the Future Fleet Working Party’, Mariner’s Mirror, 91/3 (August 2005): 454–69. 25 DEFE 24/150, item 6A, pp. 121–4, Begg to Admiralty Board Sub-Committee, 11 October 1966. 26 DEFE 24/128, enclosure 9/1B, note on Navy Minister’s submission, 4 November 1966. 198 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic cost figures could not be made. In addition the amphibious, mine-countermeasures and hovercraft patrol sides of the Working Party report had still not been settled. The Concept of Naval Operations had also been considerably altered. Healey’s earlier concern that the Navy Department had ignored the potential ‘visible presence’, deterrent and strike capabilities of non-naval forces (in particular the RAF’s F-111 and other aircraft), had been dealt with by judicious mentions of the need to cooperate with RAF and the vital air defence role that they now provided for the fleet. It was made clear that battle fleet ‘duels’ were a thing of the past, and that the only naval operations that would be undertaken would be peace-keeping and ‘operations short of limited war’.27 Unfortunately, the Navy had defined its worldwide role and the ships for the task with the worst possible timing – just as the Defence Expenditure Studies were being launched.28 Embarking on a new Defence Review, Healey had little time to assess and approve the new warship designs. The Secretary of State stalled, sat on the report for a month, and passed it onto the Admiralty Board and the Central Defence Secretariat for further comment.29

Approving Ships in a Policy Vacuum

Towards the end of October, the Navy Minister, appending the Concept of Naval Operations and Shape of the Future Fleet paper modified in the light of comments from the Admiralty Board and the central staffs, sent a letter reminding Healey of the approval needed for the planned classes.30 The Minister made it clear that there was a desperate need to approve the new designs. There would be significant short- term ramifications if the successors to the Leander and hunter-killer programmes were not approved soon. He also noted that decisions had not yet been arrived at on secondary issues such as the composition of the mine counter-measures force, the use of hovercraft, the amphibious force and the need for support vessels.31 A few days later, Jaffray, the Head of DS4, the section of the central Secretariat responsible for naval matters, sent a note to Dunnett pointing out the urgency of approving the Working Party report. There was a vital need, in order to prevent the obsolescence of the Navy’s surface fleet, to get ships of the new designs ordered quickly, and to explain what their role was, but this was extremely difficult as the Navy could not wait for the defence budget and policy to be clarified. The crucial question, therefore, would be how far the proposed ‘shape [of the fleet] would stand up to any changes in our defence policy in the longer term (if not as

27 DEFE 24/149, enclosure 10, ‘Concept of Future Naval Operations’, Annex 1, p. 2. 28 See Chapter 5. 29 DEFE 24/149, enclosure 9, Healey to Begg, 28 September 1966. 30 DEFE 24/149, enclosure 10, Navy Minister (Mallalieu) on behalf of Admiralty Board to Healey, 28 October 1966. 31 Ibid. Building a New Fleet 199 an immediate result of the £1,850m review)’. Jaffray pointed out that Begg ‘will argue that, although his “New Model” has been carefully related to a concept of operations founded on a continued world wide presence the classes of ships in it would be more or less equally valid in a NATO setting’. The Head of DS4 had doubts about such an assertion: the Type 42, was ‘related primarily to an “East of Suez” strategy’, as was the small frigate at £7m, which was essentially a ‘presence’ vessel.32 Finally Jaffray concluded that if the £25m command cruiser was just going to be used west of Suez might not its command purpose be provided ashore or by allied ships? He did note that the Type 42 design could easily be modified into an anti-submarine type by the replacement of Sea Dart with Ikara making it more appropriate for Eastern Atlantic operations and that the small frigate might be appropriate for NATO duties, but it was clear that Begg’s fleet mix was not one that would have emerged if a purely west of Suez strategy had been in place at the time.33 In short, the rapidly developing strategic situation resulting from the Defence Expenditure Studies was causing problems for Begg’s future fleet. By mid November Healey had eventually read the Future Fleet Working Party Report and had attended the Admiralty Board to discuss the report. He had some deep reservations. He acknowledged the Navy’s wish to get designs approved as soon as possible, but was concerned that the Concept of Naval Operations did not reflect recent studies and thinking; he noted that ‘there are parts of it which I do not find entirely convincing as the basis for shaping a fleet for the 1980s and 1970s’. The concept did not reflect recent trends in Foreign Office thinking regarding the Indo-Pacific region, whilst ‘thought should be given to the detailed implications of a concept of naval operations West of Suez consistent with our current views on NATO strategy as a whole’.34 Healey, seeing the vessel as an expensive and wasteful remnant of a discredited programme, was not convinced of the need to build even one Type 82 vessel but at the Admiralty Board meeting was willing to approve two further Leander class frigates and a further hunter-killer nuclear submarine. Healey was also informed at the Board meeting that given the potential strain on the Naval Constructors Department of completing both the Type 42 and frigate design in a matter of months, placing the design for the small frigate to the shipbuilding industry was being considered.35 In the new environment, the commercial option was being reconsidered, and would eventually emerge as the Type 21 frigate. For the Admiralty Board, the lack of approval for the two escorts was particularly serious. The Type 42 was considered vital given that only one Type 82 would be

32 DEFE 24/149, enclosure 12, Jaffray to Peck and Dunnett, 4 November 1966, para. 7. 33 Ibid. 34 DEFE 24/149, enclosure 15, Healey to Dunnett, 14 November 1966. 35 DEFE 24/149, enclosure 15, extract from Admiralty Board Minutes, 9 November 1966 (appended to note by Healey to Dunnett, 14 November 1966). 200 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic built, and there was considered to be an urgent need to get as many Sea Dart systems to sea as possible. Unlike Jaffray, Begg considered the Sea Dart destroyer to be just as important for the Navy west of Suez as east, probably reflecting his doubts about the ability of the Royal Air Force to provide the necessary air defence for naval forces.36 Of the other studies ordered by Healey in early August, the ‘Ladder of Deterrence’ study had barely progressed and the Chief of the Defence Staff, who was ‘not clear as to the reason for the urgency’ for this work, took the opportunity in early October to fold it into the Defence Planning Staffs inter- service ‘British Strategy in the 1970s’ study.37 The Byfleet study on intervention operations had meanwhile not even managed the task of producing its own terms of reference.38 The Chiefs approved the revised Concept of Operations, amended to take account of the launch of the Defence Expenditure Studies, in late December 1966. The document was a much blander and truncated work than the original paper. The fleet options section had been completely removed, whilst the Chief of the Air Staff had concerns that the paper confused the concepts of presence and deterrence to the detriment of the abilities of RAF aircraft to undertake both roles. The paper was approved, however, although the Chief of the Defence Staff did note that it should not be placed out of context, not least because it was ‘not precise in every detail’, but also because it might have to be significantly modified following the outcome of the Defence Expenditure Studies.39 As a basis from which to justify the new programme of command cruisers, Type 42s and Type 21s this was not encouraging, but was also not surprising either. There was still a real risk that the Defence Expenditure Studies might force even more cuts on the Navy. Meanwhile, the ships themselves had still not been approved. Nevertheless the Navy Department, without telling the central Secretariat, began to write a draft section for inclusion in the 1967 Defence White paper announcing the approval of these new warship types, even though such approval had not formally been given. The Treasury soon found out, where it was noted that ‘certainly rather strange and there is no sign that the Central Defence Secretariat have seen it [the draft]’.40 The draft not only set out that the three ship types had been approved but also seemed to imply that more than one Type 82 might be built and also that P.1127 would be added to the command cruisers.41

36 DEFE 24/149, enclosure 12, Jaffray to Peck and Dunnett, 4 November 1966, para. 7. 37 DEFE 4/207, CoS, 53rd meeting, item 6, 11 October 1966. 38 DEFE 69/443, enclosure 3, minutes of working party on interventions operations and amphibious capability, 18 October 1966. 39 DEFE 4/210, CoS, 68th/66, 20 December 1966. 40 T 225/2963, folio 14, J.A. Patterson to P. Nicholls, 23 December 1966. 41 T 225/2963, folio 13, undated White Paper draft covered by letter dated 20 December 1966. Building a New Fleet 201

The Treasury duly invited representatives from the Navy Department to the Treasury for a meeting to ‘clarify’ the situation and informed the Budget and Plans section of the central Secretariat. At the meeting, the situation regarding the ship types was ‘clarified’: only three classes would go ahead and only a single Type 82 would be constructed. Bancroft noted with approval that the plans, saving approximately £25–30m a year in construction costs compared with the earlier Future Fleet Working Party proposals, were ‘as sensible a pattern of new construction as could be devised in advance of the defence studies recently commissioned by DOPC’.42 The meeting might well have reassured the Treasury and helped convince them of the need for a command cruiser, but it also managed to kill any chance of an announcement of the new programme in the 1967 White Paper.43 When the Secretary of State finally saw the Concept of Operations document two months after it had been approved by the Chiefs, he was not impressed: he felt that more work needed to be done to link the types of ships proposed to the Concept of Operations west of Suez, although in the subsequent conversation with Begg he admitted that the extent to which Britain contributed to NATO maritime capabilities was ‘essentially a political, rather than military assessment’.44 The threat of even more cuts in the Navy’s budget, the delay in approving the naval programme and Healey’s seeming lack of interest was beginning to worry some of the senior civil servants in the Ministry. Deputy Under-Secretary Peck, in a note to Dunnett, unusually for such a zealous advocate of reducing military spending, expressed the fear that further heavy cuts in the Navy could undermine its ‘present and past character’. In comparing the Army/Navy reductions option that Healey had suggested, Peck noted that ‘you would have [if the pro-Army option was adopted], I suspect, to cut out any surface ship bigger than a frigate and restrict the role to peace-keeping, stopping gun-running, “showing the flag” and so forth; and of course the nuclear deterrent’ whilst in contrast a cut in the Army down to, say, 120,000 would not affect its fundamental character.45 Nairne dismissed Peck’s note as ‘mental doodling’ but went on to comment to Healey that:

My own anxiety, stimulated again by this minute, is this. We shall reckon that a naval/air strategy [that is, the island strategy supported by naval escorts] makes the best sense for the political point of view and the Foreign exchange angle; but we shall find – as we did in the Defence Review – that it is difficult to make substantive savings by cutting the Army; that you cannot change now, except in a minor degree, the aircraft programme; and that, contrary to the

42 T 225/2963, folios 20–23, note of meeting, 2 January 1967. 43 T 225/2963, folio 24, Bancroft to Nicholls, 16 January 1967. 44 DEFE 25/111, item 21, folios 1–6, Healey to Hull, 10 February 1967 (and attachment: note of meeting in Secretary of State’s room, 9 February 1967). 45 DEFE 13/585, item 15, Peck to Dunnett, 6 March 1967. 202 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

political strategic argument, you are compelled to cut the Navy in order to make budgetary savings, on the scale needed. But I may be wrong.46

Despite this, the Navy Department scored a minor victory, with Healey relenting and allowing the construction of the single Type 82. For the Admiralty Board it was a partial saving of face, resurrecting something from the defunct programme of 1965, but the Secretary of State noted that ‘the Type 82 story provides a warning against premature decisions on major equipment projects while a major review of defence policy is underway’.47 The Type 82 had only gone ahead because to cancel it would have jeopardised the Broomstick Anglo-Dutch radar development agreement, and an Anglo-Australian weapon purchase agreement. The only Type 82, HMS Bristol, would be completed after much delay, and without the Broomstick radar, in 1973. By mid March, with the Navy secure from further significant cuts, and the Army bearing the brunt of the budget reductions, Healey turned his attention to the Navy’s warship plans. Seemingly forgetting his advice concerning the Type 82 a few weeks before, Healey finally accepted, having reviewed a modified version of the Concept of Operations west of Suez paper, that the ship types the Navy Department was proposing did not depend upon the defence policy that might come out of the Defence Expenditure Studies.48 By this time the command cruiser was now estimated to cost £30m, the Type 42 £12m and the standard frigate £8m. The total new construction programme would cost £115m annually from 1971/72 onwards, whilst a decision on the amphibious programme would be delayed until 1968.49 Both the concept and the ship proposals went to the Defence Council a week later for final approval within the Ministry of Defence. Healey, at the Council, declared that the papers were ‘on the right lines’ and so discussion quickly moved away from whether they should be built to the details of the different weapon systems that they would carry. Healey summed up by stating that the Treasury should be informed that detailed design work would start on the command cruiser, Type 42 and the standard frigate and that the Navy Department should start preparing a paper for the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee requesting final approval.50 The Oversea Policy and Defence Committee approved the three warship types: the command cruiser, the Type 42 and the standard frigate, in June.51 The new hunter-killer submarine class was also approved, and first vessel, HMS Swiftsure, was ordered in November 1967.52 The design work on the command cruiser had

46 DEFE 13/585, item 16, Nairne, 14 March 1967. 47 DEFE 24/149, enclosure 29, Healey to Begg, 10 February 1967. 48 DEFE 13/585, item 16, Nairne, 14 March 1967. 49 DEFE 24/128, enclosure 15B, brief for Dunnett, 14 March 1967. 50 DEFE 24/149, enclosures 33 and 34, extract from minutes of Defence Council, 20 March 1967 (covering briefing note for Secretary of State by CNS). 51 CAB 148/31/22, OPD(67)46, Report by the Official Committee, 21 June 1967. 52 Brown and Moore, Rebuilding the Royal Navy, p. 128. Building a New Fleet 203 some distance to go, but work on the Type 42 and the commercial frigate (Type 21), as a stop-gap for the standard frigate (Type 22), proceeded rapidly. Begg was, however, adopting a radical approach, at least for service Chiefs, to warship procurement.

The Attack on ‘Gold-Plating’

The Future Fleet studies also brought, perhaps by accident, another issue to the attention of the Central Defence Secretariat that would bear fruit in unexpected ways in the coming years. Varyl Begg’s ‘new model’ for the Navy’s ships emphasised cheapness and numbers at the expense of sophistication, and this was made clear in a note he produced before the Admiralty Board. This caught the eye of R.N. Hastie Smith, the Assistant Private Secretary to Denis Healey. In the note, Begg, pondering the lessons from the Future Fleet work, emphasised the need to improve the staff requirements process for equipment, weapons and ships to prevent the rapid escalation in requirements and the inevitable increase in costs. Begg noted that there was the ‘probability that a good many of naval operations in the future – as has been the experience in the immediate past, for example in Korea, Malaya and Borneo – will be conducted at a lower level of intensity than was experienced in World War II: and that for this level of intensity some of our ships are over-elaborate’, He continued by noting that this problem was not just an issue for the Navy: ‘All three services have plenty of examples of how technological advance over the past decade or so has lured us into an Oliver Twist approach that ultimately produces something which is universally recognised as over-grown, over-sophisticated and over-expensive for our purposes, for example, CVA-01, TSR 2 and the Conqueror tank’.53 Hastie Smith had passed this memo to Nairne noting that ‘CNS has got a real point here – which has very seldom been voiced by the services themselves. But it relates just as much to the Army and RAF as it does to the Navy and should perhaps be tackled centrally by CDS’. Nairne passed this on to Healey, with a draft of a proposed note to the Chief of the Defence Staff. ‘I think that you will wish to give a nod of encouragement to the CNS’s Admiralty Board memorandum which I attach. I suggest that you may like to send a minute to CDS, as below’. Healey agreed with the sentiments of Hastie Smith and Nairne, and approved the letter to Hull.54 The Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operational Requirements), Air Vice Marshall H.N.G. Wheeler, in advising Hull over his reply, had been blunt: ‘we are all working in a partial vacuum, and it is not surprising that there is a tendency to aim off for the unknown’. He also noted that the 1957 Defence Review had

53 DEFE 13/584, item 27, memo by Begg to Admiralty Board, 28 December 1966 (covered by note by APS/Secretary of State, 2 January 1967). 54 DEFE 13/584, item 27, cover note by Assistant Private Secretary to Secretary of State, 2 January 1967. 204 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic emphasised the importance of equipment quality to make up for a lack of numbers, and that the 1966 Review had not changed or even addressed this approach.55 The lack of choice provided by defence contractors and the difficulty in keeping tabs on project cost increases at Research Establishments were also put to Hull. Hull replied to Healey, bringing out these points as well as emphasising the need for the early settlement of operational requirements.56 He used the example of the Army’s Weapons and Equipment Procurement Committee as an effective way of controlling the temptation to add in new requirements at a late stage. Hastie Smith’s notes to Healey accompanying the Hull’s letter were scathing: ‘this is a dose of soothing syrup from CDS, designed to stop you pursuing a potentially embarrassing subject. As a matter of personal experience (I was its secretary), I can state categorically that the WEPC was virtually useless for the purpose CDS mentions because it was dominated by the General Staff (DCGS [Deputy Chief of General Staff was the] Chairman)’.57 The papers were passed on to one of Healey’s Ministers of State to keep an eye on the issue and follow up.58 The issue did not die, however. With an assertion in writing from a Chief of Staff that the procurement process needed reforming, Dunnett lost no time in setting up structures to allow for the reform once the expenditure studies had finished.59 The First Sea Lord had pointed out one of the fault lines between Civil Service and military control – that of procurement requirements and analysis, and Hastie Smith’s comments leave the reader in no doubt that he saw the domination of the military rather than the civilian element as the problem, not one of just processes and procedures. Begg had also succeeded in raising the positive profile of the Navy Department with the Secretary of State and his private office, still very much needed with the climactic events of February and March 1966 fresh in the mind, but he was playing a risky game. By emphasising the need for cheaper equipment, the Secretary of State might take him at his word and not order the major procurement items that the Navy still hoped to get approved, such as the 10,000-ton command cruiser. In addition he was breaking ranks with his fellow Chiefs of Staff in the Army and Royal Air Force, in an extremely sensitive area, and in an environment in which the push from the top for the civilianisation of the Ministry of Defence was developing. He had also, perhaps inadvertently, launched a Civil Service-led programme for the reform of the operational requirements structure one of whose aims would be to reduce the influence of the three services.60 How successful was Begg’s attempt to prevent the creation of over-elaborate warships?

55 DEFE 25/225, Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Operational Requirements) to Hull, 9 January 1967. 56 DEFE 13/584, item 29, Hull to Healey, 14 January 1967. 57 DEFE 13/584, item 29, note by APS/Secretary of State, 16 January 1967. 58 DEFE 13/584, item 32, APS/Secretary of State to Min(E), undated. 59 DEFE 25/225, item 5, Dunnett to VCDS, DCNS, VCAS, MGO, 17 January 1967. 60 DEFE 4/210, 68th meeting, 20/12/66, item 3. Building a New Fleet 205

The Design Progress of the New Escorts

The Type 42 began as the minimum vessel capable of operating Sea Dart, the ‘first line of naval deterrence’ alongside the frigate force. It was originally envisaged that the ship would only have one missile tracking radar, and be armed with Sea Dart, the new medium gun and the replacement Wasp helicopter. The Sea Dart system would be a pared down version (GWS-31), with a single-armed launcher rather than the twin-armed version on the Type 82, and less than half the weight.61 It soon became clear that Type 42 could include more capability on her hull and a second tracking radar was added, and the Sea Dart returned to being twin-armed, albeit still lighter than the Type 82 version.62 The first Type 42, HMSSheffield , was ordered in 1968 – in such haste that the contract was placed before the Admiralty Board had approved the final design – and completed in 63 1975. Although a ‘minimum’ missile ship, with a number of economies taken to keep her cost down, the design did enable the Navy to get seven Sea Dart systems to sea by 1980 on vessels half the price of the Type 82. Only two export sales were achieved for the Type 42, to Argentina. Between October 1966 and January 1968 the cost of the Type 42 rose from £10m to £12.5m.64 Ten months later the estimated cost had risen to £13.5m.65 The reputation of the Type 42 was questioned after the loss of two vessels in the Falklands conflict; the most recent analysis of the design has more favourably assessed the ships’ sturdiness, but noted that some economy measures such as the lack of emergency generators and smoke barriers significantly reduced survivability.66 The Type 42 was one half of the replacement for the Type 82; the other half would be a warship to get the Ikara anti-submarine torpedo delivery system to sea. Initially the adaptation of the Type 42 hull to ship Ikara in lieu of Sea Dart had been considered for the late 1970s, but with the gradual reorientation of strategy towards west of Suez by March 1967, the need to equip the fleet with Ikara was considered much more pressing, given the greater submarine threat posed by the Soviet Navy than by potential East of Suez enemies.67 The fitting of Ikara to the Leander class hull had been rejected some years before, but under the pressure of the urgency to get the system to sea, this was reconsidered.68 The British version

61 DEFE 10/533, OR25/67 NSR 6528 – GWS 31, 22 June 1967. 62 DEFE 10/533, OR55/67 NST 7096 – Type 42, 4 December 1967; DEFE 10/941, OR 3/68 NST 7096 – Type 42, 31 January 1968; T 225/3323, folios 2–3, P. Nicholls to Bancroft, 8 February 1968. 63 ADM 167/68, A/M(68)10 item 3, Type 42, 21 November 1968. 64 DEFE 10/941, OR3/68 NST 7096 – Type 42, 31 January 1968. 65 ADM 167/68, A/M(68)10 item 3, Type 42, 21 November 1968. 66 Friedman, British Destroyers and Frigates, p. 284. 67 DEFE 10/941, OR2/68 Ikara in Leanders, 8 January 1968. 68 ADM 1/28254, SASS Working Party Remarks on Staff Requirement USW158/62, Stage 1, Section 5, p. 25, 16 January 1963. 206 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic of the original Australian Ikara for the Type 82 had gradually become expensive as additional capabilities and requirements were added, but it was quickly decided to revert to a simpler system for the Ikara Leanders. Initially it was suggested that the last five Leander class vessels (Apollo, Ariadne and three more planned vessels, not yet ordered) under construction should be converted into Ikara ships, but instead the conversion of the oldest existing vessels was approved.69 Converting the older vessels would cost more (£1.5m excluding the fitting of ADA, compared to £0.7m), but would not result in a reduction of total escort numbers. Changing the design of the new vessels half-way through building would have increased construction time, thus delaying the replacement of older vessels; conversion of existing ships would extend the life of the oldest Leanders, taking strain off the standard frigate programme.70 Conversion of the older ships would also provide more flexibility with numbers ensuring that more than five ships could be converted and allowing the delay of the introduction of the Ikara version of the Type 42 for a number of years. Finally, it was planned that the 27th to 29th ships of the Leander class be replaced by the first three Type 21s (see below). All these arguments served to prioritise the ostensibly more expensive option of converting of the older vessels even though the total costs of the Leander conversions had risen to nearly £3m by May 1968.71 Eight Leanders were so converted, completing between 1972 and 1978. The Ikara versions of the Type 42 were never built. The commercial frigate began as a joint Royal Navy/Royal Australian Navy project as a ‘lead-in’ design for the standard frigate, which was not expected to be in service until 1975. However, differing requirements and an Australian preference for US weapon systems, such as Sea Sparrow, combined with political developments associated with the British withdrawal from the Far East, meant that although the class was approved by the Australian Chiefs of Staff, it was eventually built for the Royal Navy only.72 Although initially considered a utility vessel, the Type 21’s requirements were for a vessel that had an all-round self- defence capability and survive in an environment of guided missiles and nuclear submarines.73 Armed with the new medium gun, the Wasp replacement and PX.430, the ship would have a capability close to that of the preceding Leander class vessels. Yarrow and Vosper Thorneycroft were chosen as joint designers and builders. As with almost all other projects, the cost estimates rose as the design was developed; by July 1968 a single Type 21 was estimated to cost £7m at 1968 prices up from £6.5m a year earlier. The vessel was now more expensive than the Leander class she was replacing.74 By October 1971 her cost had increased to

69 DEFE 10/533, OR meeting 13, item 6 Ikara, NSR 7668, 31 August 1967; DEFE 10/484, OR43/67 Ikara, 16 August 1967. 70 DEFE 10/941, OR2/68 Ikara in Leanders, 8 January 1968. 71 T 225/3323, folio 48, R.E. Adams to Patterson, 30 May 1968. 72 DEFE 10/942, OR39/68 NSR 7090 – Type 21, 26 July 1968. 73 DEFE 10/533, OR54/67 NST 7090 – Type 21, 4 December 1967. 74 DEFE 10/942, OR39/68 NSR 7090 – Type 21, 26 July 1968. Building a New Fleet 207

£10m.75 As with the Type 42 ships, the first vessel, HMS Amazon, was ordered in 1968 and by 1978 eight had been completed, albeit armed with the obsolescent Sea Cat rather than PX.430 because of delays with that system. As with the Type 42s, two vessels were lost in the Falklands conflict. Design work on the standard frigate (Type 22) started once the Type 42 had been ordered.76 As with other ship and weapons projects, attempts were made to make the vessel a joint project with another navy, in this case the Dutch. As with other attempts at cooperation, differences in requirements were irreconcilable and even began with considerable scepticism on the British part.77The Dutch wanted Sea Sparrow, a ship with a medium gun, an air search warning radar and a command system based on the Dutch Betsy system. The British wanted the standard frigate to have Sea Wolf, surface-to-surface guided missiles in place of the medium gun, did not have a requirement for an air search radar, and the British CAAIS command system.78 In almost every respect Dutch and British requirements were different: although in public both navies were aiming for 100 per cent commonality of equipment, behind closed doors, the Dutch Admiral Maas believed that no more than 60 per cent would be achievable.79 The Dutch offered a compromise on the missile system by being prepared to accept ‘Sea Wolf gamma’ (the British system with a Dutch fire control radar), but the British were reluctant even to accept this.80 In this and too many other areas the British position was transparently self-interested. The British assumed that the design work would be wholly carried out by British designers in Bath, and that ‘much of the equipment and engine manufacture will be carried out by British firms’.81 The British also assumed that it could prevail upon the Dutch to allow British shipyards to build 90 per cent of the expected 32 ships (20 British, 12 Dutch), thus gaining a £88m advantage in foreign exchange balances.82 Given such attempts to force the Dutch Navy into supporting the British defence industry and help solve the country’s foreign exchange problems, without any corresponding willingness to produce many evident benefits for the Dutch, it is surprising how long the attempts at cooperation lasted. Towards the end of the talks, the Dutch were even willing to accept almost all of the British terms as long as the Sea Wolf control and guidance radars were Dutch.83 The Navy and the British defence industry were unable to accept even this. Costs were growing on

75 T 225/3604, Bridle to Withers, 21 October 1971. 76 DEFE 10/943, OR6/69 NST 7095 – Type 22, 21 January 1969. 77 T 225/3323, folio 89, J.A. Patterson, note for record, 16 April 1969. 78 DEFE 24/457, enclosures 1, 3 and 7, 1969. 79 DEFE 24/457, enclosure 32, note of talks with Admiral Maas, 10 September 1969. 80 DEFE 24/457, enclosure 74, minute sheet, undated. 81 DEFE 24/457, enclosure 71, briefing for talks with Dutch Foreign Minister, November 1969. 82 DEFE 24/457, enclosures 77 and 79, notes on Type 22 requirements. 83 DEFE 24/457, enclosure 70, telegram 5 November 1969 to Ministry of Defence. 208 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic the Type 22 design as well: from an original estimate of £8m in 1967–68, they had grown to £10m by November 1969.84 The ship had also grown from 2,000 to just over 3,000 tons by 1969. Anglo-Dutch cooperation on the standard frigate ended with the British unwilling to concede Dutch radar and each navy eventually produced its own vessel. The first Type 22 was completed in 1979, four years later than planned and emerged as a highly sophisticated anti-submarine escort larger than the Type 42 at 3,900 tons. Fourteen were built up to 1990, in batches of increasingly larger and more capable vessels. The Dutch built 12 ‘Standaard’ frigates of the Kortenaer class between 1978 and 1983, smaller at 3,000 tons and fitted largely with American weapons and Dutch radar. It was hoped that both the Type 21 and the Type 22 could be armed with the short-range PX.430 anti-aircraft and anti-missile missile system, the planned replacement for Sea Cat. The PX.430 had originally been codenamed ‘Confessor’ as a joint Anglo-Dutch–French project, but cooperation had ended in March 1966, when it became clear that the French requirements differed considerably, and the Dutch explained that they had no funds to help develop the system.85 Attempts to produce the system jointly with the Germans also failed.86 The Germans and Dutch would adopt the US Sea Sparrow and the French would develop their own anti- aircraft system, Crotale. The early requirements were ambitious: a lightweight and flexible missile that could also be launched from Sea Cat systems, but which had the capability to intercept targets travelling at Mach 2 no larger than 0.1 square metres out to 4 km from the launching vessel. This would give the PX.430 the ability to engage quite small guided missiles in addition to aircraft, a dramatic leap forward from the Sea Cat and from other anti-aircraft missiles then available such as the Sea Sparrow. It was expected that development costs would be £22m and cost £600,000 per missile.87 These costs and requirements soon proved too optimistic, and two years later the estimate had increased to £29m with the ability to fire the missile from Sea Cat launchers dropped to save money. It wasstill envisaged that the PX.430 (now Sea Wolf) would be fitted to the Type 21, Type 22 and retrofitted to 16 Leander class vessels.88 In the event, Sea Wolf, like other systems with highly ambitious capability requirements, increased dramatically in cost and complexity, only coming into service as late as 1979 on board the first Type 22 ship, HMS Broadsword. How successful was Begg’s attempt to control the costs of warships, by pushing for lower capability escorts? The Type 22 could be discounted from such an assessment: it did not start design work until after Begg had retired and perhaps

84 DEFE 24/457, enclosure 71, briefing for talks with Dutch Foreign Minister, November 1969. 85 DEFE 10/483 OR/P(66)31 NST6522 – PX.430 8/7/66; DEFE 10/484 OR Meeting 11, item 5, 4 August 1966. 86 Ibid and DEFE 10/942 OR61/68 NSR 6522 – Sea Wolf, 8 November 1968. 87 DEFE 10/483 OR/P(66)31 NST6522 – PX.430, 8 July 1966. 88 DEFE 10/942 OR61/68 NSR 6522 – Sea Wolf, 8 November 1968. Building a New Fleet 209 not coincidentally suffered from considerable ‘gold-plating’ and cost and size escalation. Begg ensured that the vessels procured when he was First Sea Lord were armed with cheaper versions of weapon systems that already suffered from considerable cost escalation (Sea Dart and Ikara), and ensured that the ‘minimum’ practical options were chosen – the Type 42 and Type 21. With the decision to drop the Type 82, there was no alternative to procuring a commercial design, given the limited capacity of the naval constructors to design new vessels. The Type 42 was also the only feasible way to get as many Sea Dart ships as possible to sea in the 1970s. Seven had been completed by 1980. If Type 82 vessels had been procured instead it is unlikely that any more than four would have been at sea by the same date.89 What Begg had little control over was the rapid escalation in the cost of weapon systems and sensors, the associated knock-on costs in expanding and modifying command systems, and in changing warship designs as the volume of computer, electronic and mechanical equipment spaces also increased.90 Neither could the First Sea Lord make much difference to the inadequacies of the British shipbuilding industry.

89 However, the Type 42 only had a magazine capacity of 22 missiles compared to 40 in the Type 82. By the 1970s and the growth in the threat of massed Soviet bombers carrying anti-ship missiles, the Type 42 – with its design heritage as an East of Suez limited war vessel – was placed at a distinct disadvantage. Alternatively, taking the Falklands conflict as a test case, five Type 42s out of eight took part in hostilities (Sheffield, Coventry and Glasgow arriving with the first group of vessels, Exeter and Cardiff arriving in late May). There was a high attrition rate of air defence vessels: by 25 May 1982 the first three vessels had either been lost or heavily damaged. If Type 82s had been procured instead, with four complete by 1980, two or possibly three would have been deployed to the South Atlantic, and given the high level of attrition it is highly likely that the task force would have been left with no modern air defence vessels by the end of May. It might be argued that the Type 82s would have had increased survivability over the Type 42, but even if none had been lost it is more than probable that they would have been very heavily damaged and therefore incapable of undertaking air defence and picket duties necessary to keep the task force in the conflict zone.Quantity of hulls can count significantly to combat effectiveness, and a case could be put that whatever their weaknesses the decision to procure the Type 42 in 1967 was an important factor in ensuring the success of the Falklands task force in 1982. 90 These issues resulted by mid 1968 in a situation where the Admiralty Board had so much difficulty understanding why certain changes in staff requirements could result in such dramatic cost increases that the Controller commissioned a presentation on this ‘unsatisfactory state of affairs’. Another difficulty, and one that would resurface over the coming decades, was the difference between ‘merchant’ and ‘naval’ standards in hull construction, and the costs involved. See Naval Historical Branch Study 62, background paper no. 11: ‘Cost of Ships, Presentation to Controller on 12 July 1968, Introductory Remarks’. 210 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Replacing the Carrier: The Command Cruiser

The Future Fleet Working Party had recommended a suite of weapon systems to replace the capability of the strike carrier. The most prominent of these was the command cruiser, but they also included different ways replace the naval strike capability of the Buccaneer (through submarine-, helicopter- and ship-launched anti-ship missiles) and the airborne early warning capability of the Gannet. In addition, the future amphibious force had to be approved, and as has been seen the anti-submarine warfare capability of the fleet improved as the strategic focus moved to west of Suez. Plans for the command cruiser, initially a 10,000-ton command ship with anti- submarine six helicopters, proceeded in a crab-wise fashion. The vessel – which even the Treasury acknowledge would be completely necessary following the phasing out of the carriers – remained small until mid 1968 when discussions began to take the vessel in a different direction.91 A key factor in this change of direction was the new First Sea Lord, Michael Le Fanu. Le Fanu was in many ways the mirror image of Begg: high profile, charismatic and an advocate of retaining fixed-wing naval air power. Le Fanu had the inestimable advantage of agood working relationship with Denis Healey – the first and possibly the only senior naval figure to do so – forged when Healey visited naval forces off Aden during the retreat from that colony and Le Fanu was commanding the British task force there. Le Fanu signalled his support for naval flying immediately by qualifying as a navigator and flying out to Singapore in a Buccaneer; whilst within the Ministry of Defence, he began to win over Healey and take the plans for a command cruiser in a new direction. Around this time some Admiralty Board members were beginning to conceive the new command cruiser as a ‘tanker hull with a Type 42 armament’, presumably with the empty spaces of the tanks reused as basic hangar space for aircraft.92 In late 1968 the cruiser’s purpose was given a NATO justification: the approval of the new flexible response strategy emphasised the need for ‘Maritime Contingency Forces’ that could be raised at short notice in times of rising tension in order to provide a gradated level of threat response at sea and controlled escalation if necessary. The ‘MARCONFOR’ concept, as abbreviated in NATO terminology, gave a clear justification for the command cruiser as the flagship for such a task force. The emphasis on gradated threat responses and controlled escalation put the emphasis on very high-quality command and control facilities, from the ability to communicate and receive instructions from ashore, to the control of all vessels and aircraft under the cruiser’s command. The size and scope of the cruiser’s command and control facilities was one of the areas that was set first in the design process: a total of 19 UHF, 13 HF, 4 satellite communication and 5 broadcast communication

91 T 225/3200, folios 14–15, J.A. Patterson to Nicholls et al., 29 June 1967. 92 Naval Historical Branch, study 62, supporting document no. 11, ‘Cost of Ships, presentation to Controller on 12 July 1968, Introductory Remarks’, para. 4. Building a New Fleet 211 lines would be required, with a total of three officers and 55 ratings to maintain and operate them. These were capabilities way beyond what even the modern guided missile destroyers of the County, Type 82 and Type 42 classes were capable of and were not too far away from the command capabilities of the existing fleet carriers, Eagle and Ark Royal.93 In the first months of 1969 the move beyond the 10,000-ton £30m original concept to a 17,500–18,500-ton £35m to £36m cruiser with a ‘through-deck’ began. The ostensible reasoning behind the through-deck was that it was no longer considered that six helicopters would be sufficient to keep two helicopters airborne at any one time (the minimum for effective coordinated anti-submarine operations), but that a minimum of seven would now be required. At this point it was stated that ‘it begins to make sense to design the ship for an internal hangar and through deck’.94 Quite soon the assumption of seven shifted upwards to nine once the hangar deck had been decided upon, and three options were laid before the Admiralty Board: Study 21 was 12,750 tons with six helicopters and a half deck, Study 22 was 17,500 tons with nine helicopters and Study 23 was 18,750 tons with nine helicopters and fitted for but not with the new ‘bottom bounce’ bow sonar.95 All vessels included the Sea Dart anti-aircraft missile system and substantial command and control facilities to control not only a naval task force, but also land- based air power. At the same time the possibility of including facilities for VSTOL Harriers was being raised: options including five Harriers and seven helicopters or three Harriers and nine helicopters. A total of 12 aircraft was now bringing the cost up to between £37m and £38m.96 The Admiralty Board approved Study 23, including Harriers, as the ‘most valuable ship for the fleet of the 1980s’.97 In short, the Admiralty Board had approved the turning of the command cruiser into a small aircraft carrier. The Board were aware that the increase in size and cost was a risk

93 DEFE 24/385, enclosure 2, Cruiser command and control, note by DNW, 25 January 1969. 94 DEFE 24/385, enclosure 22, J.D. Bryars, Head of DS4 to S. Redman, Deputy Under-Secretary (Naval Staff), 5 March 1969. 95 DEFE 24/385, enclosure 7, Rear Admiral J.R. McKaig, Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (Operational Requirements) to Vice Admiral E.B. Ashmore, Vice Chief of the Naval Staff, 13/2/69 and enclosure 19, draft concluding note for cruiser presentation, 6 March 1969. With nine Sea Kings it was argued that offensive ASW operations would then be possible in addition to defensive ASW operations. DEFE 24/386, enclosure 98, Memorandum by Director of Naval Air Warfare, 26 August 1969. 96 DEFE 24/385, enclosure 41, Ashmore to Air Marshal Peter Fletcher (Vice Chief of the Air Staff), 8 April 1969. 97 DEFE 24/385, enclosure 19, ibid. As the design went forward through the various Ministry of Defence committees it came to be described instead as ‘study 22’ and a slightly larger and more capable vessel was put forward as ‘study 23’. New study 22 was put forward as the preferred option. In effect, the impression being given was that the naval leadership was not going for the most expensive option, whereas in fact to most intents and purposes they were. 212 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic and asked that options be put forward for cuts that could be made to Study 23 to bring its cost down. They had already stated that the proposed Royal Marine band should not be included and that some reduction in stores and endurance should be made, and also requested that a range of reductions in capabilities and equipment be produced in ‘order of pain’, no doubt as a preparation for the concessions that the Admiralty Board considered very likely during negotiations with the central Ministry of Defence and the Treasury.98 The Under-Secretary of State for the Navy, David Owen, who was a keen supporter of the cruiser concept, had initially asked whether the cruiser could also include an amphibious capability – he was aware that the existing commando carriers were nearing the end of their lives, and perhaps thought that more could be done on the cruiser hull. This was dismissed categorically by the Director of Naval Operational Requirements who stated that it would produce ‘a costly ship with a limited potential, an adverse ship’s company to embarked force ratio, and an unbalanced military force’.99 To create a meaningful commando capability the Sea Dart and much of the command and control would have to be removed from the cruiser and all for only accommodation for 200 marines and commando helicopters capable of lifting 800; many of the helicopters would in any case have to be deck parked. The remaining 600 marines would have to be accommodated on other vessels in an amphibious task group. This was not a practical proposition and design work began on a custom-built single-role commando ship. Various economies were considered over the next few months. The replacement of Sea Dart with Sea Wolf was reviewed, but as the inclusion of Sea Dart was considered one of the key rationales for the cruiser, and a more cost-effective way of a getting a system to sea than a £1.5m cheaper carrier plus an additional Type 42 destroyer (costing £13.5m), Sea Dart stayed.100 The Sea Dart system was identical to the one being fitted to the Type 42 destroyer; and the Director of Naval Weapons argued for a larger magazine than the 22 missiles the Type 42 system shipped, but he was overruled on cost grounds.101 Further reductions in costs considered included the removal of anti-submarine torpedo tubes, 2 Oerlikon guns and the planned integrated navigation system. All of these had been requested by the Controller at the internal Navy Department Ships Characteristics Committee and were removed from the design.102

98 Ibid., and enclosure 42, Ashmore to Captain R.P. Dannreuther (Director of Naval Operational Requirements), 8 April 1969. 99 DEFE 24/385, enclosure 9, Dannreuther to McKaig, 18 February 1969. 100 DEFE 24/385, enclosure 29, McKaig to Ashmore, 25 March 1969; DEFE 24/386, enclosure 5, Draft Admiralty Board Paper, Annex I, 5 September 1969. 101 DEFE 24/385, enclosure 86, paper by Dannreuther, Ship Characteristics Committee, July 1969. 102 DEFE 24/385, enclosure 93, Ship Characteristics Committee, note of meeting, 29 July 1969. Building a New Fleet 213

A surprisingly late addition – first raised by the Second Sea Lord who was keen that the Navy escape from ‘the age of steam’ – was that of gas turbine propulsion. This reduced the ship’s complement by 20, a valuable saving but did add problems of increased space required for exhaust uptakes and silencers, and the ability to replace the turbines.103 With the decision by the Admiralty Board to go forward with the Harrier, the cooperation of the Royal Air Force’s leadership would be essential. Very early on it was conceded that the Harrier should be flown by RAF pilots as part of the plan to obtain their cooperation.104 David Owen many years afterwards suggested that this was a deliberate ruse as the Navy leadership knew that the RAF would not in the end want to operate from the sea and thus by default revert to the Navy in due course.105 In a letter to the Vice Chief of the Air Staff, his naval counterpart argued the case for the Harrier: without such organic air power a gap would occur in air defence between the shore-based capability of the RAF and the ship-based capabilities of escorts and their missile systems and small helicopters, similar to that filled by ASW helicopters. The Harrier therefore provided ‘a flexible quick reaction weapon system with which to probe and indentify the initial contact, and strike at need, outside the range of ship-borne missiles and before the essential shore-based air can be brought to bear’.106 The response of the Vice Chief of the Air Staff was positive, probably more so than one would expect given the animosity of only a few years previously: ‘now that we have lost the F-111 and are to have fewer bases I recognise the advantages which could accrue from the provision of a few VSTOL aircraft on your new cruiser as a flexible quick reaction weapon system’. Although the Harrier’s capability was modest at that time, it could be improved and the Vice Chief went as far as agreeing that it ‘would be prudent to increase aircraft complement of the new command cruiser to make necessary provision for operating three Harrier VSTOL aircraft within the mix’.107 Two months later the Air Staff were suggesting ways in which the Harrier could be made more effective, including the addition of a passive search radar, a stand-off missile system such as Martel, a lightweight fighter sight and air-to-air missiles such as the US Sidewinder.108 The main characteristics of the command cruiser were set very quickly in the first few months of 1969 and by July the design had successfully madeit

103 DEFE 24/385, enclosure 43, Second Sea Lord to Ashmore, 9 April 1969; enclosure 52, handwritten note of meeting chaired by DNOR, 26 April 1969; enclosure 86, paper by Dannreuther, Ship Characteristics Committee, July 1969. 104 DEFE 24/385, enclosure 35, note of meeting held in Under-Secretary of State’s Room, 27 March 1969. 105 Owen, Time to Declare, pp. 144–5. 106 DEFE 24/385, enclosure 41, Ashmore to Fletcher, 8 April 1969. 107 DEFE 24/385, enclosure 51, Fletcher to Ashmore, 23 April 1969. 108 DEFE 24/385, enclosure 72, note by Deputy Director of Air Plans (2), 25 June 1969. 214 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic over the hurdles of internal Navy Department approval: the Fleet Requirements Committee, the Admiralty Board and the Ship Characteristics Committee. Liaison with the Air Force Department was going forward successfully through the cross- departmental Sea/Air Warfare Committee. The next stage was the approval of the central staffs, Secretariat and committees of the Ministry of Defence. In a complete contrast to the situation with CVA-01 this was not in fact a significant difficulty. The response of the Air Force Department to the Harrier was an indication of the change in attitude across the Ministry, led from the top. Healey was no longer averse to a small carrier and with no F-111 to champion, neither the Secretary of State nor the Air Force Department saw small-scale carrier airpower as a threat. It also seems that the centre was not averse to a vessel that was towards the top end of the price range between £32m and £38m.109 Despite some scepticism about the cruiser amongst the central staffs, what concerned both the naval leadership and David Owen more was the attitude of the Treasury to the vessel: would they accept a vessel that was quite clearly not the minimum obtainable to achieve the three stated aims of providing command facilities and contributing to area ASW and air defence?110 The Sea/Air Warfare Committee approved the use of the VSTOL Harrier in late September 1969, and a month later the cruiser went to both the Operational Requirements and the Weapons Development Committees in quick succession.111 The total cost of the programme for three cruisers was £103m for the units themselves, but by bringing in weapon development costs, the expected increases in unit costs and support costs, the whole programme would be £148.5m.112 The first vessel would complete in 1978 and the last in 1980.113 At the Operational Requirements Committee, Rear Admiral McKaig, the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (Operational Requirements), presented the case for the cruiser to his equivalents in the other services and to the two representatives from the staff of the Ministry of Defence Chief Scientific Officer. McKaig emphasised NATO Maritime Contingency Force concept as the main justification for the command cruiser. The committee was largely supportive of the vessel: Major General Jackson for the Army noted that the cruiser would be ‘useful ships’ for another concept NATO was emphasising – operations to reinforce or support NATO’s flanks in Scandinavia or in Greece/Turkey – which would require ‘a substantial sea tail’. The decision to go for a £37.5m vessel with 12 aircraft, rather than a £30m vessel with only six (the design 21 option put forward at the start of

109 DEFE 24/385 enclosure 29, McKaig to Ashmore, 25 March 1969. 110 DEFE 24/385, enclosure 90, Ship Characteristics Committee meeting, 29 July 1969; enclosure 22, Head of DS4 to DUS(N), 5 March 1969; attached to enclosure 63, David Owen to Le Fanu, 28 May 1969. 111 DEFE 24/386, enclosure 20, Bryars to Secretary to McKaig, 6 October 1969. 112 DEFE 24/386, enclosure 32, Bryars to Secretary to McKaig, 15 October 1969. 113 DEFE 24/386, enclosure 29, table: Provision in Long-Term Costings 1969 – command cruisers. Building a New Fleet 215 the year), was supported, largely on the grounds that an increase of under 30 per cent costs produced an over 50 per cent increase in aircraft-carrying capability. That the new Soviet Moskva class helicopter cruisers were believed to have hangar space for 12 helicopters was also noted by the chairman of the committee. The only note of reservation came from the representative from the RAF, Air Vice Marshall Giddings. Giddings stated that he supported the concept of flying VSTOL aircraft from the vessels, but that he was not yet clear that ‘marinising’ a small number of RAF Harriers for service on the cruisers would be cost-effective, and that any RAF Harriers used aboard the cruisers should not mean a reduction in the land-based Harrier force; the costs to pay for them would have to come from outside the existing RAF Harrier procurement budget.114 In fact, this was not necessarily a case of the RAF going back on its earlier agreement to support the VSTOL option, it was more a matter of the RAF’s leadership beginning to get cold feet about operating the Harrier at sea, and was the start of opening the way for the Navy to offer to bear the expense itself and then therefore operate the aircraft. In the short term, however, it meant that there was now no money available for the Harrier purchase. The Operational Requirements Committee accepted the cruiser and a week later the programme when to the Weapons Development Committee for approval. Its procession through this committee was relatively straightforward although the Navy Department was required to undertake full functional costings of the command cruiser programme (or at least investigate their practicality) within the next six months.115 This was more of a concern – the use of functional costings on TSR-2 and CVA-01 in 1964 had highlighted the totality of costs associated with these procurements and made them more vulnerable to cancellation. Although as ever, the devil was in the detail, and in the case of the command cruiser specifically it would depend on what was included in the functional costings or not. The command cruiser was being procured in a much more favourable environment than CVA-01 so there would be grounds for optimism that this would neither obstruct nor sink the cruiser. The next step was the meeting with the Secretary of State. By this time, however, costs creeping up again and were beginning to become a worry. The unit costs have moved up from £103m to £112.5m and the additional costs for the first of class had risen from £1m to £4.5m. This was being compensated by the purchasing of fewer Sea Dart missiles from a total initial purchase of 240 down to 132 and by re-phasing construction to reduce some of the costs in the near term. Overall however, the costs had gone up by £8.8m net.116 Another unaddressed issue was the funding of the Harrier: they were not included in the cruiser programme costs, but nor were the RAF willing to bear them within its own Harrier programme. This

114 DEFE 24/386, enclosure 36, OR meeting 13 item 4, NSR 7097, 20 October 1969. 115 DEFE 13/386, enclosure 40, WD meeting 16 item 2, NSR 7097, 28 October 1969. 116 DEFE 13/386, enclosure 139, R.J. Penney, Assistant Under-Secretary (Naval Staff), to Cooper, 16 December 1969. 216 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic left the question of how many helicopters should be procured: a fewer number assuming that the Harrier would be procured in due course, or more under the assumption that they might not (and thus fully justifying the through-deck).117 Prior to the meeting with Healey, the NATO justification for the cruiser was also enhanced by the decision by the United States to reduce the number of carrier groups declared to Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic down to three strike carriers and two support carriers (the latter largely undertaking anti-submarine work). The naval staff reasoned that the two ASW carriers would be primarily deployed off the eastern seaboard of the United States to counter Soviet ballistic- missile carrying submarines. This would leave the NATO Atlantic Strike Fleet with inadequate ASW protection. This gap could now be filled by the command cruiser and her escorts.118 The meeting with the Secretary of State went well, but Denis Healey was sanguine about the difficulties ahead in justifying the cruiser to the Treasury and to his colleagues on the Oversea Policy and Defence Committee: the vessel was expensive and had grown in size and capability over the last 18 months, and the MARCONFOR concept would need to be explained carefully as would the justification for a complement of seven to nine helicopters. The continued ambiguity over the number of helicopters would need to be satisfactorily explained or resolved. Healey also asked for further work to be done on the costs: how firm was the £40m estimate and where were the risks of cost escalation? Healey also saw £40m as a cost ceiling and that compromises in capability might be necessary to keep the vessel within that cost bracket. Healey hoped that it would not be necessary to put the cruiser through the Oversea Policy and Defence Committee at all, although this would need confirmation by the Treasury, and the Secretary of State asked that papers be prepared for that committee in any event. Healey was not positive about the chances of securing funds for the Harrier, but asked for an options study to be completed.119 Le Fanu had secured Healey’s support and, as has been seen with the case of the F-111 and the RAF, the Secretary of State would be a loyal and formidable ally to a service leadership and its procurement plans, but the real battle would be with the Treasury and other government ministers. When ministers, officials and the naval leadership returned from their Christmas and New Year holidays, they would have found the reports commissioned by the Secretary of State on their desks. A draft paper to the Overseas Policy and Defence Committee had been produced and a number of senior officials had provided their comments and input.120 Frank Cooper, the Deputy Under-Secretary (Planning), reviewing the draft paper recommended that ‘we should start off by trying to clear this between [the] S[ecretary] of S[tate] and the Chancellor and not putting it

117 DEFE 24/386, enclosure 128, Ashmore to Bryars, 14 November 1969. 118 DEFE 24/386, enclosure?52, Captain H.C. Leach, Director of Naval Plans, to Ashmore, 2 December 1969. 119 DEFE 24/386, enclosure 66, Healey to Le Fanu and Owen, 17 December 1969. 120 DEFE 24/387, enclosure 2, Penney to Owen et al., 2 January 1970. Building a New Fleet 217 through [the] O[verseas] P[olicy and] D[efence Committee]. We may fail but we should try’.121 Echoing Healey’s preference for avoiding that committee if at all possible, this seemed the best way to get the cruiser procured, but it would depend on Healey convincing his friend and rival, the Chancellor Roy Jenkins, that the cruiser was a cost-effective option. Cooper, a former Air Ministry civil servant and until very recently a carrier-sceptic, demonstrated his bureaucratic flexibility by recommending the strengthening of the case for the Harrier by emphasising its relative cheapness and ease of adapting the cruiser to take the aircraft.122 An options paper on the Harrier set out two possibilities: Option A – involving the minimum adaptation to the Harrier to enable it to fly from the cruiser, and Option B – a more substantial conversion to enable all-weather reconnaissance, strike and air defence operations. It was recommended that if the more capable option were chosen then the case would be strengthened for using five Harriers from the cruisers rather than three. Option A therefore meant a procurement of 14 aircraft in total costing £0.5m in research and development, £17m in capital costs and £2m annual running costs. Option B would mean 25 aircraft, £10–15m research and development costs, £40m capital costs and running costs of £5m a year.123 Option B would be quite a substantial programme although it would achieve a considerable increase capability, so it is therefore not surprising that the Harrier capability was not included in the cruiser proposals and pushed into the medium term on ‘which no decision is yet needed’.124 Denis Healey sent a letter to the Chancellor covering a copy the paperwork that had been put together in anticipation of a possible Defence and Oversea Policy Committee meeting, noting that the command cruiser was essential for the Royal Navy to play the maritime role expected of it by NATO, that the defence budget could accommodate the cost of building and running three such vessels, and noting that he was not yet convinced by the case for the Harrier as much additional work would be needed on the concept.125 Discussions between Ministry of Defence and Treasury officials followed on 13 January 1970 and proved surprisingly positive: the Treasury accepted that cruiser design in its current form still adhered to the original concept approved in 1967, that there was no need for a formal meeting between the Chancellor and the Secretary of State and that there was also no need to take the vessel to the Oversea Policy and Defence Committee. The only reservation was that the Treasury did not accept that procuring the cruiser also meant tacit approval for the navalised

121 DEFE 24/387, enclosure 4, Cooper to Penney, 5 January 1970. 122 Ibid. 123 DEFE 24/387, enclosure 6, CA(PR) to Healey et al., 6 January 1970. An earlier draft of this report gave the capital costs of option B as £47–60m. It is not clear how they were reduced from the draft to the final paper: enclosure 3, DCA(PN) to CA(PR), 2 January 1970. 124 DEFE 24/387, enclosure 7, final draft DOPC paper, 6 January 1970, para. 11. 125 DEFE 24/387, enclosure 12, Healey to Jenkins, 8 January 1970. 218 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Harrier; a separate set of discussions would be needed to confirm that additional procurement.126 A possible reason for the smooth running of negotiations over the cruiser was the good relations that had been built up over the last few years between Navy Department officials and their Defence Materials Department counterparts in the Treasury – a far cry from the tense relations of the mid 1960s.127 Roy Jenkins’ formal letter approving the cruiser followed a few days after the discussions between officials – the new command cruiser had now, in effect, been approved.128 This decision was then endorsed – rather than fully discussed and debated – by the Oversea Policy and Defence Committee that month.129 The command cruiser was reconfirmed by the succeeding Conservative government, and three ships of this class of what were in effect small carriers were completed between 1980 and 1985. Their procurement was in large part due to the determination of Michael Le Fanu to push forward with a larger ‘through- deck’ vessel and explore the Harrier option, but this was only possible because of the support that the Secretary of State provided to Le Fanu and the concept of the cruiser. As expected, RAF manning of the navalised Harriers was soon dropped, and the aircraft when they first appeared aboard the first of class, HMSInvincible , were manned by Fleet Air Arm pilots – fixed-wing naval aviation would not die out in the 1970s as had previously been planned.

Replacing the Carrier: Missile Systems and Airborne Early Warning

Replacing the maritime strike capability of the aircraft carrier had resulted in proposals for the development of a number of guided missiles launched either from submarines, ships or helicopters. Initial investigations into developing a submarine-launched anti-ship guided missile had been given lukewarm approval from the Secretary of State in November 1966.130 However, the expected costs of a missile launched from the torpedo tubes of a submerged submarine, breaking the surface and then flying in the same way as a standard anti-ship missile to its target meant that permission was given only to explore joint development with other navies.131 Powerful voices, such as Vice Admiral Bush, on the Admiralty Board

126 DEFE 24/387, enclosure 10, Penney to Cooper, 13 January 1970 and enclosure 11, Cooper to Penney, 15 January 1970. 127 T 225/3233, folio 64, Nicholls to Bancroft, 8 November 1968, handwritten note by Bancroft. This worked both ways for the Navy Department, however: the Treasury partly ascribed its ability to reduce escort orders down to two a year in 1968–69 to the good relations it had fostered during regular discussions at its ‘periodical tea parties’ with R.J. Penney, the Assistant Under-Secretary to the Naval Staff. 128 DEFE 24/387, enclosure 12, Roy Jenkins to Denis Healey, 20 January 1970. 129 CAB 148/110/7, Statement on Defence Estimates 1970, 21 January 1970. 130 DEFE 10/532, OR10/67 NST 6525, 28 February 1967. 131 DEFE 10/484, OR meeting 3 item 5, NST 6525, 16 March 1967. Building a New Fleet 219 supported the development of such a missile, even in place of the P.1127.132 The proposed missile, codenamed ‘Ondine’, would be launched from periscope depth, have an above-sea range of 18 nautical miles and a speed of Mach 0.8. Two options were given: optical guidance would be estimated to cost £30m in development and £15,000 per missile if 2,000 were made, with semi-active homing this would be £40m and £25,000 respectively.133 At a cost of between £60m and £90m this would not be a cheap weapon system. In comparison with the development of a proposed conventional anti-ship torpedo, the Mark 25 dual-purpose torpedo, Ondine would have twice the research and development costs but might be ready a year or two earlier in 1976–1977 rather than 1978.134 Despite protracted development and initial interest by the United States Navy, which eventually developed a similar weapon, Sub-Harpoon, Ondine was never procured, the US system being purchased instead nearly 20 years after the first Ondine studies were launched.135 The Mk 25 did not continue development either. The anti-ship capabilities of hunter-killer submarines, despite the acknowledgement of their importance throughout various naval studies in the 1960s depended on these submarines being equipped with an effective anti-ship weapon. The failure to procure successfully any new anti-ship weapon until the purchase of Sub-Harpoon in the mid 1980s, meant that British submarines were dependent on the Mk 8 thermal torpedo, first in service in 1927, for more than 60 years.136 The development of helicopter- and ship-launched anti-ship missiles was rather more successful. Helicopter-launched missiles had been suggested to counter missile-armed fast-attack craft, and in May 1967 the Navy Department proposed a two-stage solution: procuring additional French-made Nord AS-12 missiles for Wasp and Wessex helicopters to fill the gap until a British-developed system was introduced in the early 1980s.137 Small numbers of the AS-12 had already been purchased for the larger Wessex helicopter, but the new purchase would extend the AS-12 to the anti-submarine Wasp helicopter aboard Type 81 and Leander class vessels, and potentially the helicopters of the Type 42 and Type 21 ships. Despite some hostility from the Ministry of Technology, which would have preferred a home-built missile system (the ET-316, later Rapier, with very limited anti- ship capability), and the Air Force Department which felt the AS-12 duplicated

132 DEFE 13/584, item 1, Nairne to Healey, 10 October 1966. 133 DEFE 10/941, OR14/68 NST 6525 – Ondine, 22 February 1968. 134 DEFE 10/942, OR38/68 Report of Sub-Launched Weapon System Working Party, 15 July 1968. 135 DEFE 10/942, OR51/68 Ondine: symposium given at USN Ordnance Laboratory June 1968, 20 September 1968. 136 Roy Corlett, ‘Can British Torpedoes Stay the Course?’ in John Moore (ed.), Jane’s Naval Review 1983–84 (London: Janes’, 1983), pp. 84–92. 137 DEFE 10/532, OR meeting 6, item 4, 4 May 1967; DEFE 10/484, OR19/67 NST 6623, 14 April 1967. 220 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic missile systems it had in development, the AS-12 was quickly purchased.138 The development of a long-term replacement was approved in 1968, and the Sea Skua became operational in time for the Falklands conflict.139 By 1969, the Ministry of Defence was negotiating with the French to purchase the ship-launched version of the Exocet medium-range anti-ship missile, having rejected the development of a British-built missile.140 The failure to develop an effective replacement for the Gannet airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, with serious operational consequences in the Falklands conflict, was the result of the low priority given to this capability by both the Royal Air Force and the Navy. Responsibility for maritime AEW from 1975 was given to the RAF after the cancellation of CVA-01.141 An earlier staff requirement based on a carrier-launched aircraft was replaced by a land-based aircraft, combining the requirement with AEW over continental Europe.142 In April 1967 after the Defence Expenditure Studies, the Air Force Department and the Ministry of Technology doubted the need for such aircraft, and the Chairman of the Operational Requirements Committee noted that it looked unlikely that British forces would be deployed overseas in the future, and that combined with the lack of a need for such an aircraft by NATO, it seemed that an aircraft would not be needed at all.143 The Navy Department acknowledged that there was a reduced need for AEW ‘in terms of quantity and quality’ but argued for cheaper alternatives for AEW over the sea to be investigated in place of the large £120m jet aircraft then being proposed by the Air Force Department.144 Further discussions proposed modifying the SH-3D (later known as the Sea King) helicopter to include a large pulse radar, and initial investigation suggested that this would be practical and inexpensive.145 The Navy Department representatives and the representative of the Chief Scientific Adviser supported the conversion of 14 SH-3D helicopters for the maritime part of the requirement and 7 Andover aircraft for the land part of the requirement, but no agreement could be reached by the Committee, and the matter ended in stalemate.146 The lack of a perceived need for such aircraft on land and the joint nature of the requirement stalled any consideration of a Gannet replacement. AEW was not a high enough

138 Ibid. 139 DEFE 10/941, OR18/68(Revised) NST 6624, 10 April 1968. 140 DEFE 10/943, OR40/69 NST 6533, Exocet negotiations, 4 September 1969. 141 DEFE 10/483, OR/P(66)15, note by Air Force and Navy Departments, 15 April 1966. 142 DEFE 10/484, OR meeting 6, item 3, 21 April 1966. 143 DEFE 10/484, OR meeting 4, item 4, 6 April 1967. 144 Ibid. 145 DEFE 10/484, OR meeting 9, item 2, 11 July 1967. 146 Ibid. Building a New Fleet 221 priority for the Navy Department to undertake a determined attempt to break the stalemate.147

Renewing the Amphibious Capability

Consideration of the future of the amphibious force had been postponed following the acceptance of the revised Future Fleet Working Party Report by the Secretary of State. When the issue was revisited, the new Mediterranean strategy provided a justification for maintaining the amphibious capability, but the funds were lacking for new construction.148 The Chiefs of Staff had agreed that in the long term one commando ship should be available at all times in the Mediterranean, with a second intermittently available in the Eastern Atlantic.149 This required a force of two commando carriers, but there would be times during the 1970s when no commando ships would be available at all due to refit schedules, whilst the existing vessels Albion and Bulwark were ageing and would need replacing in the late 1970s.150 As has been seen, a combined command cruiser and commando ship was rejected. Instead the decision was made to convert Hermes instead. She would fill these gaps, allow for the replacement of one of the existing commando ships early, and provide a vessel in Hermes that could serve until the 1980s. The conversion was approved and Hermes replaced Albion in 1973. Designs to build a new ship to replace Bulwark were developed from early 1969: the first set of sketch options posited three options: (i) a minimum ship of 20 knots, with a single screw, built to merchant standards with accommodation for 1,400, including 650 commandos (or 900 at overload) costing £20m to £25 m; (ii) an intermediate ship with many of the features of the cruiser (30 knots, twin screws, naval standards) but without its command and control and Sea Dart, costing £25m to £30m; and (iii) a full-scale commando/cruiser carrier with nine helicopters, 8 Harriers, 322 commandos (up to 644 at overload) costing £35m to £40m. Given the gradual escalation in costs of the cruiser through 1969 the costings, particularly of the commando/cruiser carrier, look rather optimistic and it is not surprising that further studies were only taken forward on the minimum ship. In the event no replacement for Bulwark was

147 The lack of naval AEW would re-emerge as a procurement issue in the 1970s, again with no decision taken. The Battle and the Breeze, The Naval Reminiscences of Admiral of the Fleet Sir , ed Eric Grove, (Sutton, Stroud 1997), pp. 222–3. The Falklands conflict finally prompted the procurement of Sea King AEW helicopters, 15 years after they had first been proposed. 148 See Chapter 6. 149 DEFE 5/179, CoS 84/68. 150 DEFE 10/943, OR13/69 NSR 7100 – Conversion of Hermes to LPH, 27 March 1969. 222 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic actually procured.151 No further significant Royal Navy amphibious vessels would be ordered until the 1990s, but it perhaps significant to note that the first new vessel to be ordered, HMS Ocean, had characteristics very similar to the minimum ship first proposed more than 20 years previously.

Conclusion

The near disaster of the Future Fleet Working Party instilled a deep sense of caution in Varyl Begg, so much so that he was soon championing cheap and cost-controlled equipment procurement, a rarity for a Chief of Staff. Begg’s approach, though not heroic, was effective in the constrained circumstances of the Defence Expenditure Studies, suggesting expensive high-quality vessels could have jeopardised the whole escort programme and increased the risk of the axe falling on the Navy for a second time. The ships devised and approved in the Begg era – the Type 42 and the Type 21 – remained relatively cheap vessels and were at least built in some numbers. They were certainly a better mix than the earlier flawed pairing of the Type 82 and Type 19. The various programmes replacing the capability of the strike carrier were of mixed success: ship- and helicopter-launched anti-ship missiles were purchased or developed and proved successful, but the largest loss was the cancellation of the AEW replacement. The cheap helicopter alternatives that had been considered were not pursued and the consequences – the risking of Type 42s on picket duty and the subsequent loss of two such vessels during the Falklands conflict – were great. Despite this, Begg’s deliberate lower profile laid the foundations for a return in time to a more aggressive approach under his successor Le Fanu, this time complemented with more imagination and ambition than had hitherto been in evidence: the Mediterranean strategy described in the previous chapter being a prime example of the new style.

151 DEFE 24/385, enclosure 1, Owen to VCNS, 28 January 1969; enclosure 9, DNOR to ACNS(OR), 18 February 1969; National Maritime Museum, Ship’s Covers, new LPH 1973, Cover 930. Chapter 8 Conclusion

At the start of this book, three core questions were set out in the introductory chapter. Why was the carrier cancelled? How did the Navy evolve and adapt to recover from this blow? And, was the Navy at the end of this process a navy focused primarily on the Eastern Atlantic role in NATO? Each of these will be addressed in turn.

Why Was the Carrier Cancelled?

In comparison with the three main analyses for the cancellation of the carrier programme referred to in the Introduction, those of Grove, Pugh and Kennedy, this book has shown that a number of modifications need to be made to these assessments. Grove highlighted poor presentation of the arguments and insufficient ruthlessness on the part of the naval leadership, budgetary pressures, Treasury hostility, inconsistencies in costings, RAF fears of dissolution, naval acceptance of the land-based strike role, a refusal to countenance a smaller carrier and the new structure of the Ministry of Defence. This study has provided concrete evidence of the above reasons from primary, formerly classified, sources for the first time and as a consequence produced a more nuanced understanding of these issues. With respect to the first of Grove’s reasons, some modification needs to be added in the light of the analysis of the sources. Poor presentation of the arguments was certainly a factor, but insufficient ruthlessness does not represent the issue sufficiently. As has been seen in Chapter 2, naval arguments were put aggressively by Hopkins, and Mountbatten did act ruthlessly at the start of the Defence Review process, but the key factor was poor bureaucratic tactics and a lack of coordination of arguments. Hopkins’ aggressiveness served to discredit his chairmanship of an early key committee and place the naval side at a disadvantage. Mountbatten’s control of the Chiefs of Staff structure bred resentment and was ultimately self-defeating. As Chapter 2 has also shown, the RAF leadership deliberately restrained their firebrands, worked hard to lobby the Secretary of State in informal contexts, and by the creation of a ‘the case against carriers’ document that was constantly updated and passed to the relevant senior RAF figures, ensured that a unified and consistent case was put to Healey and Hardman. In contrast, the naval leadership had considerable difficulty in putting together a consistent case. Chapters 3 and 4 have shown how internal arguments within the Admiralty Board were combined by contradictions in the naval case even in vital meetings. Chapter 3 has shown how the Navy Minister had difficulty presenting a consistent argument at 224 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic the important Defence Council meeting of 7 October 1965, whilst one of the Navy’s key allies, Solly Zuckerman, was humiliated by Mayhew and had to withdraw his proposals at the same meeting. Grove highlighted budgetary restrictions, Treasury hostility and costings inconsistencies. These should be broken down into five different but interrelated factors. First was the very size of the carrier programme at £1,400m, making it a natural target for economies. Unlike the procurement of tanks and aircraft, the few units involved in a carrier programme make it much more likely that economies will result in the deletion of the whole programme rather than piecemeal salami slicing, where a programme of 500 tanks or aircraft might be reduced to, say 400 or 300. Second is the politico-financial factor. As has been seen in Chapter 2 the Treasury quickly surmised that the reduction of individual procurement programmes one by one would be more likely to achieve success in their aim of ending ‘East of Suez’ commitments than an attempt at a strategic reorientation which would result in strong resistance from the Foreign, Colonial and Commonwealth Relations offices. In the crucial year of 1969/70 the Navy was also unlucky in that the cost of the carrier programme in that year was very close to the amount spent above the £2,000m figure the Treasury had committed the Ministry of Defence to achieving. The third factor was the financial-operational one relating of the number of carriers in the carrier force. The naval leadership offered a three-carrier force for much of the Defence Review period, but this could not provide the two-carrier force permanently available East of Suez deemed the minimum to provide a credible force. This dilemma might have been resolved by accepting that because the United Kingdom would no longer intervene against a sophisticated enemy alone, a two-carrier force in the region would not be necessary, a single carrier either operating with an ally or against a less well-equipped enemy being sufficient. This possibility was not considered or explored. The fourth, and hitherto unrecognised, factor related to the introduction of functional costings in 1964. As has been highlighted in Chapter 2, functional costings not only increased the headline cost of the carrier programme from £600m to £1,400m due to the addition of research and development and operating costs, but it also placed carrier-based airpower at a disadvantage by placing land- based airpower support costs in a different category whilst integrating sea-based air power support costs (many of which are borne within the carrier and her auxiliaries) into a single cost item. Fifth and finally was an issue that remained in the background and could not be proven by outsiders given the Navy Department’s control of costings: the likelihood of cost escalation in the programme. Chapter 7 has highlighted the dramatic escalation in costs in warship and weapon programmes, even when there was considerable pressure to control and reduce them. This, combined with the compromises made in designing CVA-01 to keep size and cost down, indicates strongly that the costings carefully prepared by the Navy Department would have been over-optimistic in their assumptions. Conclusion 225

The RAF’s fears of dissolution, a further factor highlighted by Grove, were real enough. As has been seen in Chapter 2, Elworthy’s private secretary described the RAF as being on the edge of a ‘precipice’. This lent an existential urgency to the carrier battle for the RAF that it lacked for most naval staff members, with the exception of former Fleet Air Arm pilots, on the naval side. The refusal to countenance a smaller carrier is vitally important and needs to be seen in the context of the wider arguments over the strategic utility of aircraft carriers. This study has shown that the question of the strategic utility of the aircraft carrier was a matter of two parts: the ‘intervention’ role and the ‘maritime’ role of the strike carrier. This has not been brought out by previous analysts of the decision to cancel CVA-01. The ‘maritime’ role included the air defence of the carrier, her escorts and other ships at sea, airborne early warning and strikes on enemy shipping and submarines. The ‘intervention’ role involved the use of carrier air power to intervene on land, either supporting amphibious landings or undertaking air strikes ashore. The various studies outlined in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 were generally split into these two definitions. The Navy’s justification for the intervention role of the carrier had been dramatically lessened by the decision not to provide the capability to intervene ashore east of Suez against sophisticated opposition without the support of allies. In Chapter 2, it has been shown that the RAF leadership even recognised this distinction, considered their case to be strongest with regard to ‘intervention’, weaker on the ‘maritime’ role, and would have preferred studies that considered the two roles together. The RAF leadership also tried to ensure that their claims to be able to provide air support for naval vessels at 900nm – one of their key arguments attacking the ‘maritime’ role of carriers – were not tested by Operational Analysis. As has been seen in Chapter 4, the Chief of Defence Staff, General Sir Richard Hull, as one of the compromises suggested in the final months of the carrier battle, proposed a ‘maritime role’-only carrier force for the Navy. In Chapter 2 and 4 it has been shown that Healey was also willing to investigate the practicality of a smaller or less capable carrier, and as shown in Chapter 6 later in1968 he was also willing to consider organic naval fixed-wing aircraft. There is strong evidence to suggest that Healey very early on in the review felt that CVA-01 should be cancelled – as seen in Chapter 2, as early as March his Permanent Secretary was advocating cancellation in notes to his Secretary of State – but it does not mean that he would not have been amenable to a smaller ship, or more likely a hybrid vessel. Why was a smaller carrier or a hybrid vessel, operating purely in the ‘maritime’ role not procured in place of CVA-01? Fear of the resurrection of the ‘Thorneycraft’ – with P.1127 aircraft operated by the RAF – proposed by the Air Ministry in 1963 might have motivated the naval leadership’s support for the large carrier or nothing, but the often-stated argument of the cost-effectiveness of a larger carrier was the one put to ministers. As shown in Chapter 2, to provide a full combat air patrol, combined with an effective strike force, cost-effectiveness calculations suggested an aircraft carrier over 50,000 tons. The Buccaneer strike 226 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic force combined both a maritime strike (anti-ship) and an intervention role. Could not smaller carriers operate either a small force of Buccaneers or only the Phantom with a limited secondary maritime strike role, complemented by anti-ship guided missiles? Could not the P.1127 be procured with capability in both the fighter and (limited) maritime strike role? If the carrier was of such importance to the Navy why was no carrier at all better than a force of small carriers? The institutional weight behind the strike carrier was much stronger than that behind the TSR-2 in the RAF, the other extremely large (£1,150m) procurement programme cancelled by Healey. For the RAF the cancellation of the TSR-2 would not be the end of the long-range tactical and strategic bombing capability (especially if the F-111 was procured), but for the Navy, the end of the CVA-01 was believed by many on the naval staff to be the end of full-scale fixed-wing carrier aviation. The atmosphere pervading the Admiralty Board, as shown in Chapter 4, was such that even when serious compromise was offered that would have preserved the carrier order it was rejected. Putting forward only the large carrier option was also a tactic, and a very risky one at that, to ensure that CVA-01 was procured rather than an inferior alternative. In addition, the power and influence of Mountbatten had over the Navy, his long-running support for a carrier replacement, and his willingness to use his power as Chief of Defence Staff to manipulate the formal decisions of the Chiefs and the Defence Planners, would have been just as formidable a brake on the consideration of radical options as was the importance of strong strike carrier advocates in key staff positions. The removal of Mountbatten did not enable the naval leadership to break out of this straightjacket; his shadow therefore continued to dominate the carrier debate until the vessel’s cancellation. The naval leadership’s acceptance of the F-111 forms part of the general argument over the strategic utility of aircraft carriers in the ‘intervention’ role. A radical argument would have been to lobby for CVA-01 and an interoperable Buccaneer 2* instead of the F-111. However, the decision over the carrier was never presented as an alternative between CVA-01 and F-111, and this was because the naval leadership had, for some time, tacitly accepted the need for a land-based strike capability east of Suez. As has been seen in Chapters 2 and 3, in June 1965 all the Chiefs had formally accepted that the F-111 itself would be vital east of Suez, whether the carrier was procured or not. This concession by Mountbatten, when his powers were firmly on the wane, prevented an attempt to fight in favour of the Buccaneer 2*. If Mountbatten’s concession had been to accept the need for an ‘aircraft with the capability of the F-111’ rather than the F-11 per se this would have provided an opportunity for a change of approach. Even when a study by the Chief Scientific Adviser’s Office resulted in the assessment that the Buccaneer 2* was half as effective as the F-111 at half the cost and therefore just as effective per pound spent (with foreign exchange advantages), the Navy still did not push the Buccaneer 2*’s case, despite lobbying by Hopkins within the Admiralty Board to do so. Interoperability studies although not entirely positive had laid the way open to consider the option seriously, but it was not taken up. Trend, perhaps briefed by Zuckerman, expected the naval leadership to use this argument in the final months Conclusion 227 of the carrier battle, but it was not. The radicalism necessary to make a better case for the carrier – either changing to a small carrier, or directly attacking the F-111 – never manifested itself. It is perhaps a supreme irony that Mountbatten, a radical and reforming First Sea Lord, was unable or unwilling to act as a persuader for radical options to ensure the procurement of carriers. A small or hybrid carrier was not considered despite such suggestions by both the Chief of Defence Staff and the Secretary of State, whilst Mountbatten allowed the best approach to secure the large carrier to slip though his hands, by endorsing unreservedly the F-111. The human factor was important in other areas as well, not least in that the naval leadership seemed to be, at times, more at war with itself than presenting a unified front. David Luce, the First Sea Lord, did not have the personal skills to unite his fellow Sea Lords and was distrusted by many senior naval fliers. This made him incapable of reining in his firebrands like Admiral Hopkins when this was needed early on in the battle for the carrier, nor was he able to ensure that a single consistent line was taken in the final stages. The Navy Minister, Christopher Mayhew, in many ways stepped into the leadership role vacated by Mountbatten and unfilled by Luce, but proved in the end a hindrance rather than abenefit. Mayhew was refreshingly direct and energetic, but he increasingly fell out with his political colleagues and from late December 1965, fatalistically expected (and soon came to look forward to) both the cancellation and his resignation. Many of his actions, increasingly eccentric as the battle reached its climax, in fact did more harm than good for the carrier case. The fiasco of both Mayhew and Luce’s resignations demonstrated how far the relations amongst the senior naval leadership had splintered. The structure of the new Ministry of Defence did prevent the naval leadership presenting its case at Cabinet, and had removed the most effective elements of the old Admiralty administration into the DS4 branch of the central Secretariat. However, the failure of Mountbatten to push through full functionalisation ensured that the naval leadership still had its own staff and, although reduced, bureaucracy. As seen at the end of Chapter 2, by June 1965 the naval leadership was opposed not just by the central Secretariat, Healey, the RAF and Army leaderships, but also by the Treasury and the Foreign Office. That the carrier battle would last another nine months is testament to the ability of the naval leadership to use the new structure to its benefit. A final factor not mentioned by Grove must be added to the list of the most important reasons for the cancellation: manpower. The naval leadership argued strenuously that manpower was sufficient throughout the battle for the carrier, but the incredible manpower constraints on the escort programme – due to the requirements of the CVA-01 and nuclear submarine programmes – resulted in demands, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, for impossible ships: 40-knot frigates armed with a medium gun, helicopter and PX.430 and a crew of 80 – impossible, given the level of naval automation 40 years ago and perhaps only just possible in the early 21st century 228 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

That such distortions could develop indicates the real situation regarding naval manpower across the whole service. Manpower was always part of the argument for and against the aircraft carrier, and Healey even lists this as his first factor for cancellation in his autobiography, but it has never figured strongly in accounts of the subject, perhaps because it does not excite naval historians and analysts as much as bureaucratic battles, strategic assessments and inter-service rivalry. That the First Sea Lord sent in 1968 what amounted to a begging letter to retired senior officers to help encourage young men from naval families indicates that this issue did not resolve itself after the cancellation of CVA-01. The manpower issue was vital: the Navy could not have manned the fleet it wanted in 1964 including three aircraft carriers, let alone four, in the 1970s. It was not until plans were put forward in December 1965, as shown in Chapter 4, cutting the escort fleet by 20 per cent and withdrawing the three cruisers early, that the three-carrier fleet became even close to feasible, and then only marginally. Pugh’s cost assessment of the reasons for the cancellation of the carrier can be broadly confirmed by the research. Cost was a significant and one of the most important issues, but again, the issue is more nuanced. Large strike carriers could have been afforded, if large parts of other naval (or other defence) programmes were significantly reduced and would have taken up an increasing proportion of the defence budget. The naval leadership was not willing to do this, and even then probably not to the extent required, until very late in the carrier battle. In addition, technological leaps which would help to prevent the escalation in size of aircraft carriers (similar to the deck landing mirrors, steam catapults and angled flight deck of the 1940s) were available in the 1960s: VSTOL aircraft. Accepting less capability on a smaller hull due to the reduced strategic requirements would have been the most effective method of retaining many of the advantages of carrier air power at a reduced cost. Kennedy’s argument also revolved around cost, but this was part of a much broader analysis of British naval decline as a result of economic decline. Kennedy’s cost argument is confirmed with the caveats set out above, but other research beyond the remit of this study has shown that British relative naval decline was due more to the maintenance of near-wartime levels of defence spending by the United States during the Cold War, combined with the creation of the world’s first military-industrial command economy in the Soviet Union, rather than primarily any intrinsic weakness in the British economy.1 British naval primacy since the mid nineteenth century had rested on the unwillingness of the United States to spend the proportion of its GNP on defence that the United Kingdom was willing to spend. After 1949–50 the United States was willing to do this and even spend beyond this level.

1 William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), chapters 4 and 11; George L. Bernstein, The Myth of Decline: The Rise of Britain since 1945 (London: Pimlico Press, 2004), pp. 667–84. Conclusion 229

One final but secondary factor should also be recognised: the belief held by many that aircraft carriers, and even surface warships, would be obsolete in the not too distant future, to be replaced by submarines and aircraft. Chapter 1 shows that there are indications that Zuckerman believed this to be the case, and Mallalieu clearly stated this to Mayhew, as seen in Chapter 3. Such understandings in the background of the carrier arguments made the job of lobbying for the carrier much more difficult. The belief in a withdrawal from East of Suez commitments by 1980 was another secondary factor that contributed to arguments against the carrier towards the end of the Defence Review arguments. A ship to be commissioned in 1973 would therefore only have seven years useful service. Arguments could have been made for the ship’s utility after this period, although they would have been more effective for a small hybrid ship with secondary commando and anti- submarine roles.

***

The decision not to procure the large strike carrier was a complex and protracted one, and the reasons for doing so were therefore as one would expect, complex and multifaceted. Manpower and cost, as has been seen, were important factors; in the latter case, aspects of how costs were presented were almost as important as the cost issue itself; in the former, although perhaps mundane it was nonetheless highly significant. The change in administrative structure played its part as well, but in the end the importance of the individual personalities involved in the decision-making and advocacy were crucial, particularly as the strategic case for and against fixed-wing carrier airpower was difficult to assess given its multiplicity of uses and the fact that almost all the weapon systems under discussion had never been tested in real conflict. This in-depth study has brought the out the importance of personal factors in the decision-making – in the end, such decisions are made by human beings each with their strengths and weaknesses. Denis Healey was a strong and ambitious Defence Secretary who inclined towards the RAF leadership from the start and has admitted so, who quickly set against CVA-01, but whose ‘wobbles’ in October 1965 were not exploited by the naval leadership. Sir John Elworthy, the Chief of the Air Staff, was a very effective bureaucratic fighter and leader who took full advantage of Healey’s inclinations, and was adroit in hiding the weaknesses in his case. Lord Mountbatten, the Chief of Defence Staff, was a giant of post-war defence policymaking who was past his best, had too many enemies waiting to take advantage of his weakening, and failed to leave the naval leadership in a shape to fight its own battles, seemingly more interested in securing his own legacy. Sir David Luce, the First Sea Lord, failed to rise to the admittedly daunting challenge and should take some responsibility for the divided Board that he chaired but never seemed to direct. Nonetheless, he was shabbily treated by Healey, Mayhew and the Sea Lords (especially the last of these if Mayhew’s assessment of the source of the Chapman Pincher leak is correct), as they tried to use his resignation (or non-resignation) for their own ends. Christopher Mayhew, 230 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic the Navy Minister, energetically filled the gap in leadership in the Navy’s camp, but he proved more of a liability than an asset. His behaviour at the crucial Defence Council meeting in October 1965 was erratic at best, whilst from December he seemed more concerned with laying down markers for his new career outside the Labour party, whilst accepting and almost relishing what he thought was the near inevitability of cancellation and his resignation. Ironically, this was just as the enigmatic Cabinet Secretary, Burke Trend (perhaps having been persuaded by that Mountbatten loyalist, Solly Zuckerman), was preparing the ground with the Prime Minister for last-minute radical carrier proposals that never came. With different people and personalities in such key positions it is easy to imagine how the outcome could have been different, but that is nature of the study of history, which in the end is the study of human beings and their actions and interactions within structures and environments created by themselves and their contemporaries.

How Did the Naval Leadership React, Adapt and Evolve after the Cancellation of the Carrier Programme?

The cancellation of CVA-01 and the carrier programme was a profound shock to the Navy, but a new start had to be made. As described in Chapter 7 the initial work of the Future Fleet Working Party provided an intelligent analysis of equipment needs for a fleet without strike carriers, but its recommendations for large ships were a matter of the right recommendations at just the wrong time. That these were then made known despite the disapproval of the First Sea Lord and without approval of the Admiralty Board suggests that there existed a too powerful naval staff that felt confident enough to contradict the Navy’s professional leadership. The sacking of Rear Admiral Adams was the only way for Begg to restore his credibility at the head of his service. As shown in Chapters 5 and 7, Begg’s approach after this set-back was perhaps not heroic, but it was effective. The First Sea Lord concentrated on getting new escort types approved – selecting cheaper options for development from the Future Fleet options than had the original Working Party – in an environment where the threat of further naval cuts was real and serious. Begg’s emphasis on cost-effectiveness, to the disapproval of his fellow Chiefs, could only help prevent further cuts and was broadly successful. Cost escalation continued, often as a result of the technological complexity of warships and weapon systems being procured, but simpler versions of two major weapon systems were developed, Ikara and Sea Dart, and the vessels themselves, the Type 42 and Type 21, were cost controlled to an extent that provided credibility to Begg’s cost-effectiveness drive. Begg ensured that all this was procured during the middle of what amounted to a second Defence Review, and one in which the RAF’s long-cherished island strategy was enshrined in British defence policy as the ‘peripheral strategy’. Emphasising the need for a small 10,000-ton command cruiser was necessary until the policy environment Conclusion 231 changed sufficiently to allow the re-emergence of (albeit limited) fixed-wing naval air power under the charismatic leadership of Micheal Le Fanu. The capability of the strike carrier was broadly replaced by a range of weapon systems in addition to the command cruiser: helicopter- and ship-launched anti-ship missiles being the most successful. The further defence reductions required by the post-devaluation public spending cuts finally cancelled the F-111 and laid the island strategy to rest. Further casualties were the slowing of the nuclear submarine programme and a decision to withdraw the carriers earlier in 1971 (although in the event the last fleet carrier survived until 1977). The Mediterranean strategy, set out in Chapter 6, provided the stage on which the slow re-emergence of naval self-confidence could be played out. The need to give the impression of increasing the defence commitment to NATO whilst spending no additional money was one that only the Navy could respond to – redeploying ships from other regions to the Mediterranean costing little. Such was the financial strain, that even after the Czechoslovak crisis, an increased naval redeployment in the sea was proposed rather than the costly stationing of further troops or aircraft on continental Europe. Arguments that had served the Navy poorly in the past were now used to effect to obtain the objectives of justifying the amphibious force in the new environment and raising the issue of organic air support for naval vessels in that sea. The Mediterranean strategy was, however, an instance of British interests being divorced from commitments (in this case NATO) and the concurrent moving away of defence policy from foreign policy; as shown in Chapter 6 the Foreign and Commonwealth Office found no vital British interests outside those of NATO served by the increased naval presence in the region. The Navy’s recovery from the cancellation of the carrier was slow and gradual, but was real nonetheless. In difficult circumstances the amphibious forces (and by extension the Royal Marines) had been saved and were now justified by the flanks strategy, whilst a new generation of escorts had been procured and the command cruiser and quietly turned into a small carrier. The naval leadership could begin the 1970s with a re-found sense of confidence in the future.

An ‘EASTLANT’ Navy?

Did the dramatic changes of 1964–70 result in a Navy focused on the Eastern Atlantic NATO mission? The answer from the evidence of this work is no. From 1967–68 the focus of strategy moved to the NATO area, but by this time the major escort classes (Type 21 and Type 42) had already been approved, whilst the Mediterranean theatre provided the justification for forces (the amphibious force, and organic fixed-wing naval aviation) whose utility was most apparent outside the Eastern Atlantic. The policy changes between 1965 and 1968 were a gradual process by which East of Suez commitments and bases were given up, not when East of Suez strategic interests ceased or when the naval presence in that region ended. The move in focus to the Eastern Atlantic slowly began in this 232 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic period, but only fully developed later in the 1970s and in particular following the 1975 and 1981 Defence Reviews. The Mediterranean strategy and the continuance of worldwide deployments, maintained the worldwide focus of naval policy well into the 1980s. The deployment patterns of naval vessels in 1972 bear out this continuing naval world role: six escorts each were usually stationed in the Mediterranean and east of Suez, with a further two in the West Indies.2 From the late 1960s to 1975, the post-war ‘Mediterranean moment’ in British naval strategy made the Royal Navy a NATO-focused fleet, but one in which the flanks – and the Southern Flank in particular – were crucially important. The ships that sailed to the South Atlantic in spring 1982 was essentially the fleet that Begg and Le Fanu had created. The mainstay of its ships had either been justified as the naval arm of the long-defunct island strategy (the Type 42s and Type 21s) or the Mediterranean strategy (Fearless, Intrepid, Hermes and to a much lesser extent Invincible), whilst it is significant that the task force was led by a submariner, the core of whose task force had been made up of ships completing a worldwide deployment finishing in the Mediterranean.3 Of the two major casualties of the programme to replace the capability of the strike carrier, the first – airborne early warning – resulted in risking the Type 42s as old-style fleet pickets causing the loss of two and heavy damage to another. The second, the failure to develop Ondine or an equivalent, resulted in the hunter-killer submarine that sank the General Belgrano, the Conqueror, using 60-year-old anti-ship weaponry, though to terrible effect. The over-optimism of the naval operational leadership in the ability of guided missiles to provide air superiority over the Falklands also reflects the change of emphasis in the Navy towards the technologies believed capable of supplementing and even replacing carrier airpower.4 The naval elite had also widened out from that of the 1960s. Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin, the Chief of the Defence Staff, had been the first state-educated leader of the Navy in living memory, whilst the Admiralty Board now included the supply officers and engineers that had been conspicuous by the their absence in 1964. The first full engineer Admiral, Francis Turner, had joined the Admiralty Board in 1968, and the first supply officer would join the Board in 1975. The first two Labour governments of Harold Wilson were momentous for the Royal Navy. They saw the cancellation of a weapon system of totemic importance, sustained cuts from a rolling programme of Defence Reviews, but also a significant strategic reorientation whilst maintaining a worldwide capability, and a rebuilding of self-confidence that placed the Navy in a much stronger position by 1970 than

2 T 225/3606, Sub-Committee on Defence and External Affairs, p. 4, 3 August 1971. 3 Though many of the ships were ‘East of Suez’ or ‘East of Gibraltar’ vessels, the training and operational experience of their crews since 1975 had been primarily in anti- submarine warfare in the Eastern Atlantic. Sir Lawrence Freedman, Official History of the Falklands Campaign (2 vols, London: Routledge, 2008), vol. 2, p. 727. 4 Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (London: W.W. Norton, 1983), pp. 317–18. Conclusion 233 only four years previously. In the build-up to the cancellation, the naval leadership seemed lost in a new and unfriendly environment, particularly after the retirement of Mountbatten, but the cancellation of CVA-01 forced the new naval leadership to look forward and emerge from shadow of the former Chief of Defence Staff. Doing so enabled a slow and gradual regaining of confidence, until the political and foreign policy environment changed in such a way to allow the Navy to re- assert itself in an unexpected theatre. The world role remained, but in a partially hidden form, and a fleet and Navy was created that in 1982 fought and won an expeditionary campaign thousands of miles away from home waters. The period in which Denis Healey was Secretary of State for Defence was one of constructive development and resurgence for the Royal Navy as well as retrenchment and cancellation, and it is these former elements that had the longer- lasting impact on naval policy. At the time, the dissolution of the Admiralty, the cancellation of the carrier programme and the decision to withdraw from East of Suez commitments all within five years, seemed like a momentous turning point in British naval and political power. The passage of time has shown that there was in fact life after the strike carrier and that recovery and professional adjustment was possible. Naval withdrawals or reductions in overseas stations had been an occasional occurrence since the seventeenth century and the rise of an ocean-going English and later British Navy. The withdrawal from East of Suez commitments can now be seen in the context of other strategic reductions, from Fisher’s bringing home of the battle squadrons during the arms race with Imperial Germany to the withdrawal from the Western Mediterranean as a result of the loss of Minorca and the alliance of France and Austria in 1756.5 When the United Kingdom has been recently fighting two expeditionary wars in Iraq and Afghanistan ‘East of Suez’ 40 years after the decision had been made to give up commitments in that region, a much wider perspective can be taken of events that seemed so dramatic for the Royal Navy nearly half a century ago. The United Kingdom is a medium-sized power with international interests resulting from its economic, political and diplomatic position, and as such it must have the ability to defend those interests internationally. The unique flexibility of sea power, particularly when fixed bases are not locally available, must be an essential part of any balanced capability to defend those interests.

5 N.A.M. Rodger, Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815 (London: Allen Lane, 2004), chapter 17. This page has been left blank intentionally Bibliography

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Adams, Rear Admiral John, Assistant Chief HS.681 transport aircraft 20, 47 of Naval Staff (Policy) 192–4, Jaguar fighter 20, 135–6 196, 197, 230 Javelin fighter 127 ADAWS-1 computer command system 35 Kestrel fighter, see P.1127 Aden 25–6, 64, 67, 109–10, 162, 210 Lynx helicopter 194 Admiralty 1, 8, 15–18, 32, 38, 44, 49, 157, Nimrod anti-submarine aircraft, 227 see Comet Admiralty Board, Ministry of Defence 2, P.1154 fighter 20, 42, 47, 90 5, 16, 27, 32, 36, 41, 47, 50, 80–4, P.1127 fighter 20, 29, 47, 96, 101, 88, 94–5, 99–100, 105, 107, 112, 131–2, 134, 137, 158, 188, 192–3, 116–18, 123–4, 131, 132, 135–8, 197n, 200, 211, 213–19, 221, 173, 191–2, 194, 197–9, 202–3, 225–6 205, 210–14, 219, 223, 226, 230, Phantom fighter 27–9, 62, 67, 82–4, 232, 233 89, 95–6, 103, 113, 119, 122–4, Admiralty, Board of, see Board of 129, 131, 135, 145, 160, 163, 178, Admiralty 226 Admiralty building 1 Scimitar bomber 27–8 Afghanistan 127, 233 Sea King helicopter, see SH-3D Africa 24, 61, 67, 127, 181 Sea Vixen fighter 19, 27–8, 136 Aircraft SH–3D helicopter 211n, 220, 147n, Badger bomber 36 194 Buccaneer bomber (all types) 19–20, Shackleton anti-submarine aircraft 20, 27–8, 34, 43, 45–6, 67, 73, 77, 178 83–4, 89–91, 94, 96, 103–4, 113, TSR–2 bomber 19–20, 29, 42–3, 45, 116, 121–2, 124, 129, 131–3, 135, 47, 59, 90, 105, 143, 170, 203, 215, 170, 178, 210, 225, 226 226 C–130 transport aircraft 119 Victor bomber and tanker aircraft 62, Chinook helicopter 82, 119, 132 113 Comet anti-submarine aircraft 20, 64, Wasp helicopter 31, 34, 194, 205, 206, 113, 119 219 F–111 bomber 3, 6, 29, 45–8, 59, 62, Wessex helicopter 27, 31, 34, 82, 219 64, 67–8, 70–1, 73–4, 76, 78, 84–5, Air Force Board, Ministry of Defence 16, 87, 90–1, 93, 96, 103–5, 110, 113, 47 119–23, 128, 130–5, 137–9, 143–5, Air Force Department, Ministry of Defence 147, 151–4, 156–8, 160, 163, 46–7, 55, 61, 63–4, 68, 76, 80, 169–71, 175, 198, 213–14, 216, 83–4, 91, 93, 97, 163, 214, 220 226–7, 231 Air Ministry 15–16, 217, 225 Gannet airborne early warning aircraft Air Staff, Ministry of Defence 19, 29, 53, 27, 31, 135, 210, 220 55, 61, 68, 69, 85–7, 93, 103, 109, Harrier fighter, see P.1127 132, 136, 154, 200, 213, 229 246 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Albania 181 Brunei 9, 23 Aldabra Islands, Indian Ocean 61, 71, 162, Brussels, Belgium 22, 167, 178 163, 169 Bulgaria 180 Algeria 173 Burrows, Sir Bernard, UK Permanent Allied Command Europe Mobile Forces Representative to NATO 178–9 182 Bush, Vice Admiral John, Vice Chief of the Armstrong, Sir William, Permanent Under- Naval Staff 219 Secretary, Treasury 58 Army Air Corps 20, 79 Callaghan, James, Chancellor of the Army Board, Ministry of Defence 16, 104 Exchequer, later Home Secretary Army, British 1, 8–9, 18, 26, 37–8, 47, 8, 147 49, 54, 60, 66, 69, 77, 79, 87, 96, Canada 24, 71, 179 104, 118–19, 132, 143–6, 151–2, Cassels, General Sir Archibald, Chief of 156–62, 174–6, 180, 183, 193, 196, the General Staff 87 201–4, 214, 227 Cassidi, Captain Desmond, naval staff 45 Army Department, Ministry of Defence Central Treaty Organisation 25, 180 16, 76, 155 Chagos islands, Indian Ocean 67–8 AS12 air-launched anti-ship guided missile Chalfont, Lord, see Jones, Alun 34, 219–20 Chiefs of Staff Committee 15–17, 43, Atlantic Nuclear Force 9 48, 50–4, 58, 63, 65, 69, 75, 77, Atlantic Ocean, see North Atlantic Ocean 80, 109, 118, 128, 134, 137–8, 149, and South Atlantic Ocean 154, 157, 159, 173, 175, 180, 204, Attlee, Clement, Prime Minister 8,12 206, 221, 223 Australia 64, 67, 71–2, 74, 109–10, 120, China 23, 110 138, 144, 148, 158–9, 162–3, 169, Churchill, Sir Winston, Prime Minister 1, 202, 206 30 Austria 233 Clarke, Richard ‘Otto’, Second Secretary Treasury 58–9, 77–8 Balogh, Thomas, economic adviser to the Clifford, Clark, Secretary of Defense, Prime Minister 14, 72, 92 United States 177–8 Baltic Sea 22, 167 Cocos islands, Indian Ocean 110, 113 Barham, Lord, see Middleton, Charles Cold War 5, 23, 26, 167, 196, 228 Barnett, Air Chief Marshal Sir Denis 79 Commander in Chief, South, NATO 185 Begg, Sir Varyl, First Sea Lord 141, 156, Commonwealth, The 11, 24–5, 57, 107, 159, 161, 165, 175, 193–4, 196–9, 113, 128, 147, 149, 154, 157, 169, 201–4, 208–10, 222, 228, 232, 232 184, 188, 224, 231 Beira, Mozambique 24 Communist Party 7, 23, 25, 112 Berlin, Germany 168 Confessor missile system, see Sea Wolf Betsy naval command system, Dutch 207 Conqueror tank 203 Board of Admiralty 1–2, 6–7, 14–15, 17 Conservative party 3, 7–9, 12, 15, 20, 23, Borneo 66, 203 41, 63, 107, 122, 135, 137, 171, Bosphorus 185 218 Brook, Sir Norman, Cabinet Secretary 12 Cooper, Frank, Assistant Under-Secretary British Army of the Rhine 22, 72, 158, 185 (Air Staff), later Assistant Under- Brown, George, First Secretary of Secretary (Policy) 55, 149–53, State and Secretary of State for 155–7, 163, 171–2, 216–17 Economic Affairs, later Foreign Secretary 8, 72, 125, 161 Index 247

Cottrell, Professor Alan, Deputy Chief Director of Naval Weapons, Technology Scientific Adviser, Ministry of and Plans, naval staff 181, 212 Defence 66, 90–1, 113, 133 Douglas-Home, Alec, Prime Minister 7 Cuban missile crisis 168 Dover-Calais gap 183 Cyprus 25, 57, 102, 180 Dunbar-Nasmith, Commodore David, Czechoslovak crisis 166, 181, 184–6, 231 Head of Defence Plans 51, 53, 67–8 Daily Express, newspaper 136 Dunlop Ltd 38 Daily Telegraph, newspaper 124 Dunnett, Sir James, Permanent Under- Dardanelles, The 180 Secretary, Ministry of Defence Dartmouth, Royal Naval College, 142, 144–51, 157–8, 161–2, 171, see Royal Naval College 194, 196, 198, 201, 204 Dartmouth Defence Council 2, 6, 14, 16–17, 77, Earle, Air Chief Marshal Sir Alfred, Vice 91, 94, 98–104, 107–9, 111–12, Chief of Defence Staff 121 116–17, 191–2, 202, 224, 230 Eastern Bloc 22 Defence Establishments Committee, East of Suez strategy 4, 26, 29, 71, 141, Ministry of Defence 16 199 Defence Expenditure Studies 13, 141–65, Elizabeth II, Queen of United Kingdom 198–200, 202, 220, 222, 230 1–2 Defence Operational Analysis Elworthy, Air Marshall Sir Charles, Chief Establishment, Byfleet 63, 151, of the Air Staff, later Chief of the 193 Defence Staff 20, 30, 43, 46–7, Defence Planning Staff, Ministry of 53, 60–1, 63–6, 68, 86, 91, 94, Defence 17, 46, 50–1, 53–4, 65, 100, 102–4, 130, 136, 146, 154–5, 67, 117–18, 157, 159–60, 166, 200 173–4, 179, 225, 229 Defence Review (1957) 165, 203 European Economic Community 23, 24, Defence Review (1964–66) 6, 13, 19, 147 41–140, 142, 146, 158, 165–6, 168, European Free Trade Association 23 171, 174, 201, 223–4, 229, 233 Defence Review (1975) 6, 189, 232 Falklands conflict 127, 189, 205, 207, Defence Review (1981) 232 209n, 220–2, 232 Defence Review Working Party 120, 128, Far East 24–6, 60, 62, 66–7, 70–2, 88, 132, 149, 151, 154, 156 104, 119, 131, 133, 135, 137–8, Defence Secretariat, Ministry of Defence 144–5, 147–62, 165, 168, 188, 193, 16, 67, 88, 146, 173, 193, 198, 206 200, 203 Far East Fleet 26 Defence Secretariat, Branch 1, 194 Fisher, Admiral Sir John, First Sea Lord Defence Secretariat, Branch 4, 16 233 Defence Secretariat, Branch 12, 178 Fleet Air Arm 2, 18, 36, 45, 50, 68, Denmark 169, 173, 182, 183 79–80, 83, 91, 95, 100–1, 104, Department of Defense (United States) 15 109, 124, 131, 218, 225 Department of Economic Affairs 12 Fleet Requirements Committee, Ministry Devonport (constituency) 8 of Defence 191, 214 Diego Garcia, Chagos Islands, Indian Flight, magazine 98 Ocean 71 Foreign and Commonwealth Office 107, Director of Naval Plans, naval staff 2, 53, 184, 188, 231 64, 172 248 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Foreign Office 8, 41, 70–71, 76, 83, 97, Holmes, Admiral E P, US Navy, Supreme 119, 128, 147, 149–51, 155, 157–8, Allied Commander Atlantic 167, 161, 175, 177, 199, 227 185 France 11–12, 23–4, 34, 167, 178, 233 Hong Kong 72, 144, 156 Frewen, Admiral Sir John, Vice Chief of Hopkins, Vice Admiral Frank, Deputy the Naval Staff 116, 122 Chief of Naval Staff 2, 55, 60–61, Functional costing 13–14, 43, 54, 56, 58, 112, 116–17, 122, 223, 226–7 68–9, 76, 215, 224 House of Commons 7, 137 Future Fleet Working Party 5, 194–9, 201, Hull, General Sir Richard, Chief of the 210, 221–2, 230 General Staff, later Chief of the Defence Staff 53, 107, 121, 128, Gan airfield, Maldives 67–8, 113, 162–3 135, 137, 147, 152, 154–6, 194, Gaulle, General Charles de, French 203–4, 225 President 23 Geddes, Raey 38 Ikara anti-submarine missile system 32, Geddes report 38–9 34, 194, 199, 205–6, 209, 230 Germany, Federal Republic of 10–11, 22, India 2, 10, 74 26, 79, 137, 143–5, 148, 158, 168, Indian Ocean 19, 26, 62, 66, 70, 74, 99, 174, 176, 178, 185, 233 109, 113, 119, 128, 144–5, 162, Gibraltar, Straits of 165, 181, 183, 189 168 Giddings, Air Vice Marshal 215 Indochina, see also Vietnam 23 Greece 23, 169, 173, 177, 180, 182, 214 Indonesian confrontation 9, 23–4, 58, 67, Grove, Eric 3–4, 141, 223–5, 227 78 Guam, Pacific Ocean 110 Iraq 25–6, 127, 233 Island Strategy 11n, 19, 48, 63, 69, 87, 90, Hamilton, Admiral Sir John, Commander 105, 144, 159, 161–3, 169, 201, in Chief, Mediterranean Fleet 165 230–2 Hardman, Henry, Permanent Under Italy 10, 11, 127, 165 Secretary, Ministry of Defence 51, 54–6, 60, 64–6, 69–71, 75–6, 78, J79, jet engine 82–3, 89 100, 103–4, 108, 117, 122–3, 141, Jaffray, A R M, Head of Defence 223 Secretariat Branch 4, 198–9 Hartley, Air Marshal Christopher, Deputy Japan 10–11, 38 Chief of the Air Staff 46 Jellicoe, Lord George, First Lord of the Hastie-Smith, R N, Assistant Private Admiralty 1 Secretary to the Secretary of State Jenkins, Roy, Chancellor of the Exchequer for Defence 203, 204 169, 217–18 Healey, Denis, Secretary of State for John, Admiral Sir Caspar, First Sea Lord Defence 4, 7–9, 13, 16–17, 36, 2, 79 41, 43, 46–7, 49, 51, 54–7, 59–60, Jones, Alun, Lord Chalfont, Minister for 65, 67–81, 83–4, 86, 88, 89–91, Disarmament 8, 161 93–4, 96–105, 107, 109, 111, 113, 117–26, 128, 132–9, 142, 145–50, Kennedy, Paul 3–5, 223, 228 152, 154–61, 169–71, 173, 175–80, Kenya 73, 110 185, 186–9, 193–4, 196–204, 210, Kenyatta, Jomo, President of Kenya 73 214, 216–17, 223, 225–9, 233 Kipper air launched anti-ship guide missile Hitch, Charles, Controller of the Budget, (Soviet) 34 United States 14 Korea 44, 203 Index 249

Kuwait 25–6, 52, 57, 71–2, 119 122–8, 134–7, 141, 223–4, 227, Johnson, Lyndon, United States President 229–30 120 Mediterranean Sea 2, 5–6, 22, 26, 57, 68, Jones, Alun, Lord Chalfont 8, 161 70, 72, 88, 109, 137–8, 156, 160, Jordan 44 165–89, 221–2, 231–3 Labour Party 7–10, 25, 42, 155, 230 Middle East, 25, 72, 74, 88, 119, 128, 137, Lebanon 44, 110 145, 156, 180–1 Leeds South-East (constituency) 7 Middleton, Charles, Lord Barham, First Le Fanu, Admiral Sir Michael, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty 1 Lord 173, 189, 210, 216, 218, 222, Ministry of Aviation 15, 39, 47, 83, 125 231, 232 Ministry of Defence 1–2, 6, 13–18, 27, 39, Lemnier, General L.L., US Army, Supreme 41–5, 48–9, 54–9, 63, 66, 70–3, Allied Commander Europe 167 75–9, 81, 86, 89–90, 92, 96–8, 100, Lewin, Captain Terrence, Director, Tactical 102, 107–8, 111, 119, 124–5, 128, Division, naval staff, later First Sea 130, 132, 141–2, 146–50, 155, 159, Lord and Chief of Defence Staff 165–6, 169–72, 174–5, 179–80, 45, 232 184, 188, 191–3, 202, 204, 210, Libya 52, 57, 71–2, 180 212, 217, 220, 223–4, 227 Limbo anti-submarine mortar 34 Ministry of Technology 39, 219–20 Luce, Admiral Sir David, First Sea Lord Minorca 233 2–3, 49–50, 52–4, 63–4, 66, 73, 76, Mountbatten, Admiral of the Fleet Lord 94–6, 100–3, 105, 107, 116, 122, Louis, Chief of Defence Staff 6, 128, 130, 133–8, 141, 227, 229 9–10, 15, 20, 25, 41, 46, 48–54, 56–9, 63–7, 69, 73–7, 87, 93, 112, Maas, Admiral, Royal Netherlands Navy 146, 168, 223, 226–7, 229, 230, 207 233 McKaig, Rear Admiral Rae, Assistant Mozambique 24 Chief of the Naval Staff Mulley, Fred, Deputy Secretary of State for (Operational Requirements) 214 Defence and Army Minister, later McLachlan, David, journalist 124–6 Minister of State, Foreign Office McNamara, Robert, US Secretary for 46, 102, 125, 175 Defense 13, 70, 121 Multilateral force 9 McNaughton, John, US Under-Secretary for Defense 120 Nairne, Patrick, Head of Defence Macmillan, Harold, Prime Minister 23–4 Secretariat Branch 4, later Private Malaya 66, 203 Secretary to Secretary of State Malaysia 9, 23, 52, 71, 101, 109–10, 117, 44–5, 55–6, 62, 90–91, 104, 121, 127, 149, 152, 154, 156, 158, 161 128, 150–1, 154–7, 201, 203 Mallalieu, Joseph, Under-Secretary of National Economic Development Council State for the Navy, later Minister 12 for the Navy 88, 97–8, 111, 229 Naval staff, Ministry of Defence 2, 19, 45, Mansfield, Captain Gerard, Director of 49, 80, 114, 124, 178, 216, 225 Naval Plans 64 Navy Department (Ministry of Defence) Mark 25 dual-purpose torpedo 219 27, 30, 33, 39, 41, 44–5, 47–8, Maritime Airpower Study 60–4, 117 54–6, 58, 64–5, 68, 73, 79–80, 84, Mayhew, Christopher, Minister of State 87, 89–91, 93–4, 105, 107, 113, for the Navy 3, 8, 81, 83, 87–9, 116, 128, 130, 132, 134–5, 141, 96–7, 99–105, 107–9, 112, 116–17, 250 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

153, 186, 191–3, 197, 200, 202, Portugal 22 204, 212, 214, 218, 219–21, 224 Prague Spring, see Czechoslovak crisis Nelson, Admiral Lord Horatio 1, 36 Programme Evaluation Group, Ministry of Netherlands 179 Defence 152–3, 160 New Scientist, magazine 98 Pugh, Philip 3–5, 223, 228 New Guinea 110 PX.430 missile system, see Sea Wolf New Zealand 71, 120, 148 Nigeria 110, 169 Quinlan, Michael, civil private secretary to Norfolk, Virginia, United States 22, 167 Chief of Air Staff 43, 54 North Atlantic Council 178 North Atlantic Ocean 22, 173 Rapier, anti-aircraft missile system 178, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 7–9, 220 22–5, 70, 143–5, 156, 160, 166–9, Rhodesia 24, 127 171–89, 194, 198–9, 201, 210, 214, Rolls Royce Ltd 28, 82–3 216, 217, 220, 223, 231–2 Royal Air Force 3–4, 18–22, 26, 29, 43, Norway 169, 171, 173, 182–3 45–9, 53, 59–64, 66–9, 72, 74, 77, 79–80, 85, 87, 89, 90–3, 96, O’Brien, Rear Admiral William, Naval 99–105, 189–90, 111, 116–9, 121, Secretary 49–50 123–4, 126–7, 131–3, 138, 144–6, Observer, newspaper 98 153, 156–7, 159, 170, 174–5, 178, Ondine anti-ship missile 219, 232 183, 193–4, 196, 198–200, 203–4, Operational Requirements Committee, 213, 215–16, 218, 220, 223, 225–6, Ministry of Defence 16, 148, 187, 229, 230 191–2, 203–4, 212, 214–15, 220 Royal Australian Navy 206 Oversea Policy and Defence Committee Royal Fleet Auxiliary 151 51, 54, 72, 100, 117–20, 126, 128, Royal Marines 56, 118, 158–60, 171, 133–5, 161, 172, 188, 202, 216–18 175–6, 188, 212, 231 Owen, David, Under-Secretary of State for Royal Naval College, Dartmouth 2, 136, the Royal Navy 8, 212–14 180 Oxford University 7 Royal Navy 1–2, 5–39, 55, 70, 87, 97, 105, 111–12, 123, 126–7, 143–4, Pacific Ocean 2, 117, 119, 123, 128, 199 146, 159, 168, 180, 184, 187, 189, Parachute Brigade, later Regiment, 56, 171 196, 206, 217, 222, 232–3 Paris, France 22, 167 Rumania 181 Peck, A.D., Deputy Under-Secretary (Budget and Plans) Ministry of Sandys, Duncan, Minister of Defence 25 Defence 89, 124, 146–7, 149–50, Scandinavia 214 152–3, 201 Scarborough, Yorkshire 21 Peden, G.C. 59 Sea/Air Warfare Committee, Ministry of Persian Gulf 24–6, 70, 109–10, 117, 138, Defence 214 168, 178, 185, 188 Sea Cat anti-aircraft missile 31, 207–8 Peters, James, Private Secretary to Navy Sea Dart anti-aircraft missile 32, 144, 191, Minister 87, 89 194–5, 197, 199, 205, 209, 211–12, Philippines 110 215, 221, 230 Pincher, Chapman, journalist 136–7, 230 Sea Skua anti-ship missile 220 Plan Addington 101 Sea Sparrow anti-aircraft missile 206–8 Polaris, ballistic nuclear missile system 9, Sea Wolf anti-aircraft missile 206–8, 212, 32, 45, 48, 125, 182 227 Index 251

Second World War 10–12, 18, 23, 29, Threat to Shipping Study 64–5 32–3, 141, 165, 189, 191 Times, The, newspaper 155 Shackleton, Lord Edward, Air Force Transport Command, Royal Air Force 74 Minister 43, 46, 98, 125 Treasury, The 3, 41–2, 52, 57–9, 69, 75–8, Ship Characteristics Committee, Ministry 114, 124, 128, 130, 141–2, 146–7, of Defence 191, 214 155, 171–2, 174, 186, 200–2, 210, Shuckburgh, Sir Evelyn, British 212, 214, 216–18, 223–4, 227 Ambassador to Italy 165, 177 Trend, Burke, Cabinet Secretary 42, 74–5, Simonstown Agreement 24 119–21, 130–33, 135, 148, 155, Singapore 9, 23, 64, 109–10, 117, 149, 226, 230 151–2, 154, 156, 158, 161–3, 169, Turkey 169, 173, 177, 180, 182, 214 210 Turner, Admiral Francis, Fourth Sea Lord Six Day War 169 232 Slessor, Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Type 988 ‘Broomstick’ radar 195–7, 202 Sir Jack 98 Smeeton, Vice Admiral Sir Richard, Flag Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 2, 7, Officer Naval Air Command 50 11, 25, 173, 177, 228 South Africa 24 Navy of 2, 181–2, 205 South Atlantic Ocean 72, 88, 209n, 232 United States of America 7–8, 11, 13, 15, South East Asia 10, 19, 25, 145, 161, 163 22–5, 47, 70–2, 74, 110, 119–21, South East Asian Treaty Organisation 25, 127, 134, 143, 145, 148, 162–3, 57, 109–10, 156 168–70, 182, 183–4, 216, 228–9 Southern Rhodesia, see Rhodesia Army of 167 Soviet Union, see Union of Soviet Navy of 1–2, 111, 127, 167, 187, 219 Socialist Republics Special Air Service 171 Vietnam 23, 25, 85, 120, 163, 168, 175, Spey, Rolls Royce jet engine 28, 82–3, 89 177 Squid anti-submarine mortar 34 Vosper Thorneycroft Ltd, shipbuilders 206 SS11 air-launched anti-ship guided missile 34 War Office 15 Standing Naval Force Atlantic 173, 182 Warsaw Pact 160, 168, 173, 181–4 Sub-Harpoon anti-ship missile 219 Warships (all Royal Naval ships unless Suez canal 169–88 otherwise stated) Suez crisis 23 Aircraft carriers Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic 22, Albion, see amphibious ships 167, 172, 174, 176, 179, 185–6 Ark Royal 27, 28, 82, 95, 116, 122, Supreme Allied Commander Europe 22, 129, 211 167, 172–4, 176, 178–80, 185–6 Bulwark, see amphibious ships Syria 173 Centaur 27–8 CVA-01 3–6, 18, 21–2, 27, 29, 32, Tanzania 24, 60, 110 37, 39, 41–139, 141, 143, 191, Templer, Field Marshal Sir Gerald 79 214–15, 220, 224–30, 233 Templer report 79–81 CVA-02 81–3, 93, 95, 99, 102, Territorial Army 47, 72 122, 128, 131 Thailand 25, 109 Eagle 27–8, 80, 82–3, 94–5, 102, Thorneycroft, Peter, Minister and later 122, 124, 127, 129, 132, 211 Secretary of State for Defence 15, 20 252 From East of Suez to the Eastern Atlantic

Hermes 27–8, 80, 82–3, 95, 116, Leander class 31–2, 48, 59, 88, 122, 129, 131–2, 188–9, 221, 114–15, 197–9, 205–6, 208, 232 219 Invincible, see also Command Type 12 31 Cruiser 218, 232 Type 14 31 ‘Pike ship’ concept 19 Type 19 32, 88, 108, 114–15, Queen Elizabeth, see also 191, 194, 196, 222 CVA-01, 3 Type 21 115, 199–200, 202, 206, Shangri-La, USS 94–6, 101, 116 208–9, 219, 222, 230–2 ‘Thorneycraft’ concept 19, 225 Type 22 202, 207–8 Victorious 27–8, 116, 122, 129 Type 41 31 Amphibious ships Type 61 31 Albion 30, 179, 221 Type 81 31–2, 219 Bulwark 30, 179, 192, 221 Submarines Fearless 30, 232 Churchill 30 Intrepid 30, 232 Conqueror 232 Ocean 222 Dreadnought 33 Cruisers Swiftsure 202 Command Cruiser 97, 158, 172, Weapons and Equipment Procurement 197, 199–202, 204, 210–18, Committee, Ministry of Defence 221, 231 204 General Belgrano, Argentinean Weapons Development Committee, Navy Ship 232 Ministry of Defence 16, 187, 192, Tiger class 31–2, 37, 81, 131, 151, 214–15 179, 194, 197 Western Fleet 185 Destroyers West Indies 72, 88, 160, 232 Battle class 31 Wheeler, Air Vice Marshal H N G Wheeler, Bristol, see also Type 82, 202 Assistant Chief of Defence Staff ‘C’ classes 31 (Operational Requirements) 203 County class 31–2, 37, 48, 88, Wigg, George, Paymaster General 8, 93, 129, 172, 211 125 Daring class 31–2 Wilson, Harold, Prime Minister 7–9, 14, Emergency classes 31 21, 23–4, 26–7, 42, 57, 71–4, 78, Sheffield, see also Type 42, 205, 119–21, 124–6, 130–7, 139, 141, 209n 147, 158–61, 170, 232 Type 42 197–200, 202, 205–12, Wright, C.W. Assistant Under-Secretary 219, 222, 230–32 (Policy) 67–8 Type 82 32, 34, 37, 48, 88, 108, 114, 122, 191, 194–7, 199–200, Yarrow Ltd, shipbuilders 206 202, 205–6, 209, 211, 222 Yugoslavia 181 Weapon class 21 Frigates Zambia 127 Amazon, see also Type 21, 207 Zuckerman, Solly, Chief Scientific Adviser, Apollo, see also Leander class 206 Ministry of Defence, later Chief Ariadne, see also Leander class Scientific Adviser, Cabinet Office 206 16, 21, 22, 63, 66, 77, 92–4, 100, Broadsword, see also Type 22, 208 102–5, 107–8, 113, 120, 224, 227, Kortenaer class 208 229–30