VALENCE POPULISM in PAKISTAN: MAKING SENSE of IMRAN KHAN's IDEOLOGICAL CLUELESSNESS

VALENCE POPULISM IN PAKISTAN: MAKING SENSE OF IMRAN KHAN's IDEOLOGICAL CLUELESSNESS

Muhammad Umair Khalid

Submitted to Central European University Department of Political Science

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Political Science

Supervisor: Professor Daniel Bochsler

Budapest, Hungary (2020)

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Abstract

Imran Khan and his party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (Pakistan Movement for Justice) (PTI) came

into power following the 2018 parliamentary general elections on the back of robust populist

rhetoric focusing on anti-corruption, morality, governance reforms and demonizing of the previous

ruling elite of the country. Expanding on the populism literature and by employing the Critical

Discourse Analysis and Discourse Historical Approach, the study tries to make sense of Khan's

populist discourse in comparison to the similar populism elsewhere. The study places it into a

'valence' populism category studied in the context of Central and Eastern European political

parties' context. It also tries to look into the specific case of Pakistan in comparison to other valence

populist parties in the world and tries to identify the roots of such populist discourse in Pakistan

by looking into the historical context and differentiates them from other valence parties around the

world. Finally, it outlines the reasons why a leader's ideological transition on the political spectrum

is not pronounced in a democracy like Pakistan as compared to elsewhere.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Professor Daniel Bochsler for his guidance and valuable feedback

throughout the thesis writing process and regular workshops, especially during the lockdown

period, and making the task smooth. I am also grateful to Professor Muhammad Waseem for his

mentorship and guidance.

I would especially like to thank my dear friends Adil, Arafat, and Anam, who helped me

throughout my master's program both academically as well as motivated me in tougher times to

do my best. I owe this to all of you.

Lastly, I would like to thank my siblings and parents for their unwavering support

throughout this journey and dedicate this thesis and degree to them. CEU eTD Collection

Table of Contents

Contents Abstract ...... i Acknowledgements ...... ii Table of Contents ...... iii List of Abbreviations ...... iv Introduction ...... 1 Research Aim: ...... 2 Chapter I: The Current State of Populism Research ...... 4 1.1 Populism in Theory ...... 4 1.2 Populism Across the World ...... 6 1.3 Valence Populism ...... 8 Chapter II: Case Selection and Methodology ...... 11 2.1 Valence Populism and the Case of Pakistan ...... 11 2.2 Research Methodology ...... 13 Chapter III: Empirical Analysis ...... 16 List of Speeches and Policy Documents:...... 16 3.1 Analysis of Speeches and Policy Documents ...... 17 3.1.1 Speech Analysis ...... 17 3.1.2 Policy Document Analysis ...... 37 3.2 Findings and Discussion: Establishing the Case of Imran Khan as Valence Populist ...... 40 3.2.1 Establishing Khan as a Valence Populist ...... 40 3.2.2 Where Does Pakistan Fit in the Valence Populism Debate?...... 43 3.2.3 Why the Ideological Cluelessness Does Not Become Visible in the Case of Pakistan ...... 44 Conclusion ...... 47 Bibliography...... 49

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iii

List of Abbreviations

Word Abbreviation Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf PTI Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz PMLN Pakistan Peoples Party PPP Khyber Pakhtunkhwa K.P. United States U.S. Critical Discourse Analysis CDA Discourse Historical Approach DHA China-Pakistan Economic Corridor CPEC

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Introduction

Despite it being a trending topic in the contemporary political science research, populist

parties and leaders are still considered as 'outsiders' or 'challengers.'1 However, the political events

over the past decade and a half inform us that these populist political parties are integrated into the

national systems of numerous countries (especially in Europe), while populist leaders are emerging

in other places, for example, Donald Trump in the United States (U.S.), Narendra Modi in India,

Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey among others. "The

mapping of various ideational variations of populist parties and leaders represents a critical step in

understanding their effect on the construction of political conflict."2

While the populist political parties or the leaders have been traditionally categorized into

right-wing or left-wing and sometimes centrist, scholars have argued for another category: valence

populists. Along with the 'populist radical right,' the right-wing populist grouping includes

'national-conservative populists,'3 and the 'neoliberal populists.'4 In comparison, the parties in the

left-wing populist group are the ones that co-opt various forms of socialism with populism. These

parties include 'social populists'5 and 'national-social populists.'6 On the other hand, there are

centrist populists, the examples of which could be found in the post-communist Central and

Eastern Europe. However, they fall closest to the category of valence populists.7 These populists

"offer little more than 'valence considerations' and hence, do not fall in the right or left categories,

nor exclusionary or inclusionary, as they 'defy positional definition altogether'." "These principal

CEU eTD Collection 1 See, Mattia Zulianello, “Varieties of Populist Parties and Party Systems in Europe: From State-of-the-Art to the Application of a Novel Classification Scheme to 66 Parties in 33 Countries,” Government and Opposition 55, no. 2 (2020): 1-21. 2 Ibid 3 Rafał Pankowski et al., "Radical nationalism in Poland: From theory to practice," RIGHT-WING IN EUROPE 157 (2013): 162 4 See, Cas Mudde, Populist radical right parties in Europe. Vol. 22, no. 8, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 5 See, Mudde, “Populist radical right”, 1167-1186 6 See, Luke March, Radical left parties in Europe. Routledge, 2012. 7 Zulianello, "Varieties of Populist Parties”, 3

focus of these parties exercising valence politics8 remains on non-positional social and political

issues,"9 for example, fighting corruption, governance reforms, transparency, and moral integrity

while presenting themselves as ones from the ordinary people. The conception of valence populism

falls closer to the 'centrist' populist parties10. However, the difference is that the former (centrist)

terminology "directly or indirectly refers to the ideological or geometric center of the party

system."11 However, the valence populists do sometimes adopt particular positions. Nevertheless,

an unadulterated conception of populism still shapes their position on social and policy issues, and

are "therefore flexible, free-floating and, often, inconsistent." "Valence populists thus subscribe

to a 'pure' version of populism, meaning that they are neither right-wing nor left-wing, neither

exclusionary nor exclusionary."1213

After establishing the valence image of populists and theorizing the populism debate across

different regions of the world, the study taps into the case of Imran Khan, the current Prime

Minister of Pakistan, his political party Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (Pakistan Justice Party) (PTI) and

argues that Khan presents an ideal case of valence populist whose ideological shifts on the political

spectrum have been helped by the valence image.

Research Aim:

The study would argue that the non-ideological nature of valence populists helps them

move on the ideological spectrum by inundating people with the non-ideological populist rhetoric

8 See, Luigi Curini, Corruption, ideology, and populism: The rise of valence political campaigning, Springer, 2017 9 CEU eTD Collection Zulianello, “Varieties of Populist Parties”, 3 10 See, Ben Stanley, “Populism in central and Eastern Europe,” in Kaltwasser et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Populism, Oxford University Press, (2017): 140-158; and Seán Hanley et al., “Economy, corruption or floating voters? Explaining the breakthroughs of anti-establishment reform parties in eastern Europe,” Party Politics 22, no. 4 (2016): 522-533. 11 Peter Ucen, “Centrist populism as a new competitive and mobilization strategy in Slovak politics,” Party government in Slovakia: Experience and perspectives, (2004): 47 12 Marco Tarchi, "Italy: the promised land of populism?," Contemporary Italian Politics 7, no. 3 (2015): 273-285. 13 Andrea Ceron et al., "e-Campaigning in the 2014 European elections: The emphasis on valence issues in a two-dimensional multiparty system." Party Politics 24, no. 2 (2018): 105-117.

of anti-corruption, transparency, and democratic reforms, among others. They are unlikely to take

a hard-ideological stance on issues where ideological leaning matters, hence moving along the

ideological spectrum to benefit their brand of politics.

This contribution will try to further the concept of valence populism by bringing in the

compelling case of Pakistan. Almost all the political parties categorized in the valence category

(in the subsequent section on valence populism) fall in the Central and Eastern European region

with a common link in communist past. These centrist and valence populist parties in the region

emerged during and after the transition period following the dismantling of the Soviet Union. Such

a shared link is absent in the case of Pakistan, and therefore it requires a glance into its past. The

almost 30-year history of dictatorships in the country and the politics of corruption in the 1990s

where four governments were derailed on the pretext of corruption to eventually make way for

another dictatorship provide that missing link of reliance on the non-ideological positions in the

case of Pakistan. This study target to find out how the PTI populism fits into the scholarly debate

on the subject around the world. Therefore, the case of Pakistan not only further explores the theory

of valence populism, but also adds to it from the aspect of peculiar authoritarian political past.

The study will focus on the case of the current ruling party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf

(Pakistan Justice Party) (PTI) and its chairperson and incumbent Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran

Khan, and intends to explain the PTI's ideological shifts under the garb of populist politics, and

will attempt to make sense of why such shifts are not more pronounced in under-nourished

democracies like Pakistan as compared to the Western democracies. CEU eTD Collection

Chapter I: The Current State of Populism Research

1.1 Populism in Theory

Populism remains one of the essentially contested concepts14, given that the scholars even

contest the usefulness of the concept. Traditionally, there have been a few influential approaches

to studying populism: the (original) discursive approach by Ernesto Laclau15, the organizational

approach by Kurt Weyland16, and the performative approach by Pierre Ostiguy's17. However,

recently, more and more scholars across the globe have started using the ideational approach18 to

deal with the subject of populism as it moved from Latin America after the turn of the century and

into the Western developed democracies. Moreover, the versatility19 of the ideational approach, as

compared to the other approaches, accommodates the use of quantitative as well as qualitative

methods. Using the ideational approach, Mudde defines the ideology of populism as "one that

views society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous but antagonistic groups, 'the pure

people' versus 'the corrupt elite,' and which contends that politics should be an expression of the

people's general will20."21 While populists may have different socioeconomic interests, this is not

because of class, but because of morality. Mudde further argues that "the people's essence is their

purity: they are 'authentic,' while the elite are the opposite: corrupt, because they are not

14 Cas Mudde, "An ideational approach," in Kaltwasser et al. (eds), The Oxford handbook of populism, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2017): 27; Mudde and Kaltwasser. Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press, 2017. 15 See, Ernesto Laclau, “Populism: What’s in a Name,” in Franscisco Panizza (ed.), Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, Verso, New York, (2005): 48, and Ernesto Laclau, Politics and ideology in Marxist theory: Capitalism, fascism, populism, Verso Trade, New York, (2012) 16 CEU eTD Collection See, Kurt Weyland, "Clarifying a contested concept: Populism in the study of Latin American politics," Comparative politics (2001) 17 See, Pierre Ostiguy, “Populism, Democracy, and Representation: Multidimensional Concepts and Regime Types in comparative politics,” (In conference) University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame (2001), and Pierre Ostiguy et al., “A socio-cultural approach,” in Kaltwasser et al. (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Populism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (2017): 74-96. 18 See, Mudde, “An ideational approach”, 27-47 19 Ibid 20 Mudde et al., Populism, 16 21 Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist”, Government and Opposition, 39 (2004): 542

authentic."22 Although the scholars argue that "the people" is a construction, Mudde argues that its

use has three meanings: "the people are sovereign, as commoners, and as a nation." Furthermore,

all these different uses are connected to another feature: "political power, socioeconomic status,

and nationality, respectively due to which it is rare to find scenarios where only one mentioned the

meaning of people is used."23

The thin ideology of populism "in practice is to be found with established, 'thick or thin'

ideologies."24 It being thin centered explains why it is easily malleable. "Thin or thin-centered

ideologies do not possess the same level of intellectual refinement and consistency as 'thick' or

'full' ideologies, such as socialism or liberalism."25 Instead, they exhibit "a restricted core attached

to a narrower range of political concepts."26 Whereas "populist's common-sense solutions follow

the general will of all the people, the elite's proposed solutions are representations of special

interests."27 The ideational approach to populism considers the people as homogeneous. Hence,

"every call for policies that benefit specific groups, even if it is to remove existing inequalities, is

denounced as 'special interest politics.'"

On the other hand, the elite is portrayed as the manifestation of special interests. In theory,

"populism is primarily juxtaposed to liberal democracy rather than to democracy per se or any

other variant of democracy. Empirically, the most relevant populist actors rally within a liberal

democratic framework."28 Which particular form populism ends up adopting is related to the social

CEU eTD Collection 22 Mudde, “An ideational approach,” 30 23 Mudde et al., Populism, 9 24 See Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist”, Government and Opposition, 39 (2004), pp. 542–563, and Catherine Fieschi, ‘Introduction’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 9 (2004), pp. 235–240. 25 Ibid 26 Michael Freeden, “Is nationalism a distinct ideology?,” Political Studies, 46(4), (1998): 750 27 See Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist” 28 Mudde and Kaltwasser. Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press, 2017: 2

grievances that are dominant in the context in which it operates. Populists detect and politicize

these grievances to their advantage.

1.2 Populism Across the World

For a significant part of the populism studies, the focus has remained on the Latin America

with the continuing and ubiquitous populist tradition as compared to the rest of the world and the

different waves and subtypes of populism witnessed there since the 1930s, i.e., classical (1930s

and 1940s), neoliberal (1990s) and radical (1990s and 2000s).29 Scholars mostly applied the

traditional approaches, mainly Laclau's discursive approach, to study populism in Latin America.

However, as the phenomenon expanded to almost all other parts of the world and became more

relevant in academic studies over the past few decades, scholars have employed different

approaches30 to studying the varying nature of populism in these regions. While populists across

the globe employ the same discourse, the ideology of populism is "extremely heterogenous31

political phenomenon."32

The ever-increasing socioeconomic inequalities in relatively longer democratic periods

explain why the ideology of populism triumphed in Latin America. While the concentration of

29 Carlos De la Torre, "Populism in Latin America," in Kaltwasser et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Populism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (2017): 195 30 While comparing populism in various regions across the world, one finds intrinsic differences on how the phenomena has developed. For example, while it has remained connected to the socio-economic aspect in Latin America, the case is different in Europe where it derives more on the xenophobia and Euroscepticism. Similarly, in India, there was a leftist socialist populism in the 1960s led by then prime minister Indira Gandhi, and the current right-wing Hindutva populism which uses religion in the us vs them debate. Moreover, the cases in Eastern Europe are relatively scarce but the ones that have existed do not fit any other examples around the world. For more distinctions, see the regional debate in The Oxford Handbook of Populism (2017) 31 The Australasian region has the clearest populist tradition. The right-wing populist parties in New Zealand and Australia emerged in the 1990s, following a very similar pattern in the Western Europe at that time. The 1997 Asian economic crisis provided impetus to the emergence of populism in Southeast Asia, resulting in an abrupt end to the rise of the Asian Tigers. The populist leaders

CEU eTD Collection exploited the widespread dissatisfaction with the now discredited old leaders and policies, by combining nationalism and populism and attacking the neoliberal “globalization”. In the case of Africa, populism has been relatively rare, since most of the countries are still authoritarian or at best highly-flawed democracies. In the case of the Middle East, populism became relevant in the region in the twenty-first century, with the exceptions of Muammar Gaddafi (Libya) and Gamal Abdel Nasser (Egypt). Even in democracies like Israel and Turkey, it has become a characteristic of both ruling and opposition parties. While Arab Spring was not populist per se, populist rhetoric was central to the mobilization of many of its participants. For more on populism across the globe, See, Cas Mudde and C.R. Kaltwasser, Populism: A very short introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (2017): 21- 41. 32 Ibid, 21

power with elite appeals the populist discourse, the periodic recognition of relatively free and fair

elections provides a forum for voters where they can channel their dissatisfaction with the state of

affairs, which also explains why populist parties in Latin America garner so much support: "they

promise a government in which people rule themselves instead of being ruled by the oligarchy."33

The U.S. populism also differs from elsewhere in the world in "institutional and historical

aspects."34 Institutionally, the U.S. constitution constrains and fragments political expression.

Instead, "the political candidates in the U.S. express populism in their discourse to a greater or

lesser degree, and within social movements,"35 or as Grattan has argued, "in extra-institutional

formations such as economic cooperatives."36 Similarly, populism in Europe provides another

peculiar picture of the phenomena, where it exists in the form of populist parties, both new and

established, which became a feature of European politics in the 1990s "in response to frustrations

over the effects of both older and newer transformations of European politics and society, such as

European integration and immigration."37 Across the continent, various radical populist parties

emerged, combining the ideology with authoritarianism and nativism. The current xenophobic

nature of populism in Europe derives from the combination with nativism: "a specific conception

of the nation, which relies on an ethnic and chauvinistic definition of the people."38 "Often this

multitude of political parties have been insurgent forces, but over time some of these have moved

into being established parts of their respective party systems."39

33 CEU eTD Collection Ibid, 27-28 34 Joseph Lowndes, "Populism in the United States," in Kaltwasser et al. (eds), The Oxford handbook of populism, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2017): 232-247. 35 Ibid 36 See, Laura Grattan, Populism's power: Radical grassroots democracy in America, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (2016). 37 Mudde et al., Populism, 34 38 Ibid 39 See, Paul Taggart, “Populism in Western Europe,” in Kaltwasser et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Populism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (2017).

The post-communism period nurtured populist sentiments, especially in Central and

Eastern Europe. These feelings were especially strong in the first elections after the fall of

communism, and the 'broad umbrella parties' represented "the people" against the elite of the

Communist Party. As the post-communist societies transitioned, some populist actors tried to

exploit the growing political dissatisfaction with a discourse of "stolen revolution" and rallied for

a "real" revolution to get rid of the corrupt elite post-communism.40

1.3 Valence Populism

Individual populist actors tend to be left or right, conservative or progressive, and religious

or secular depending on the context and region. However, there is another category, where the

populist leaders or the political parties tend not to take hard political or economic stances and

instead stick the non-ideological issues in their political rhetoric: practicing valence politics. These

types of populist leaders and political parties fall closest to the centrist populist parties that mainly

emerged in Central and Eastern Europe following the transitionary period and hopping on the

"stolen revolution" bandwagon.

Barisione presents and develops 'valence image' as the essential trait of such a populist

leader falling in the valence category. "A 'valence image'," according to Barisione, "denotes all

those leadership-related perceived attributes, which are both personal and politically relevant, as

they allow inferences and estimations about the style and quality of a candidate's performance as

a political leader."41 This valence image is ideologically vague and malleable, rather than just

personal or political. "More importantly, it is made up of elements which strictly pertain to the CEU eTD Collection vocabulary of leadership: from such traits as effectiveness or trustworthiness, to the classical

40 Mudde et al., Populism, 36-37 41 See, Mauro Barisione, "Valence image and the standardisation of democratic political leadership," Leadership 5, no. 1 (2009): 41-60.

ingredient of 'vision'."42 It is mainly consensual, avoiding the creation of divisions among the

electorate.

Zulianello has categorized the European populist political parties into right-wing, left-

wing, and the third category of valence populism. Along with the 'populist radical right,' the right-

wing populist grouping includes 'national-conservative populists,'43 and the 'neoliberal populists.'44

In contrast, the parties in the left-wing populist group are the ones that co-opt various forms of

socialism with populism. These parties include 'social populists'45 and 'national-social populists.'46

Zulianello introduces the third category of valence populism47. This category of valence populism

falls closest to the centrist populist parties, the examples of which could be found in the post-

communist Central and Eastern Europe.48 These populists "offer little more than 'valence

considerations' and hence, do not fall in the right or left categories, nor exclusionary or

inclusionary, as they 'defy positional definition altogether'."49 The principal focus of these parties

exercising valence politics50 remains on non-positional social and political issues,51 for example,

fighting corruption, governance reforms, transparency, and moral integrity, while presenting

themselves as ones from the common people.

The conception of valence populism falls closer to the 'centrist' populist parties52. The

difference is that the former (centrist) terminology "directly or indirectly refers to the ideological

42 Barisione, “Valence image”, 55 43 Rafał Pankowski et al., "Radical nationalism in Poland: From theory to practice," RIGHT-WING IN EUROPE 157 (2013): 162. 44 See, Cas Mudde, Populist radical right parties in Europe, Vol. 22, no. 8, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2007). 45 See, Mudde, “Populist radical right”, 1167-1186 46 See, Luke March, Radical left parties in Europe. Routledge, 2012. 47 CEU eTD Collection Zulianello, "Varieties of Populist Parties”, 3 48 Ibid 49 Kenneth M. Roberts, "Left, right, and the populist structuring of political competition," in C. de la Torre (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Global Populism, Routledge, Abingdon (2018). 50 See, Curini, Corruption, ideology, and populism, Springer, 2017 51 Zulianello, “Varieties of Populist Parties”, 3 52 See, Ben Stanley, “Populism in central and Eastern Europe,” in Kaltwasser et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Populism, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2017): 140-158, and Seán Hanley et al., “Economy, corruption or floating voters? Explaining the breakthroughs of anti-establishment reform parties in eastern Europe,” Party Politics 22, no. 4 (2016): 522-533.

or geometric center of the party system."53 While the non-positional social and policy stances

distinguish valence populists from others, the valence populists do sometimes adopt particular

positions. However, an unadulterated conception of populism still shapes their position on social

and policy issues, and are "therefore flexible, free-floating and, often, inconsistent."54 "Valence

populists thus subscribe to a 'pure' version of populism, meaning that they are neither right-wing

nor left-wing, neither exclusionary nor exclusionary."5556

The phenomenon of valence populism has so far been only studied in the context of

European politics. The parties fitting the definition include Human Shield (Z.Z.) and Bridge of

Independent Lists (MOST) in Croatia, ANO 2011 in the Czech Republic, Citizens for European

Development of Bulgaria (GERB) in Bulgaria, Five Star Movement (M5S) in Italy, Lithuanian

Centre Party (LCP) in Lithuania, Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OL'aNO) in

Slovakia, List of Marjan Šarec (LMŠ) in Slovenia, and All-Ukrainian Union' Fatherland' (B.A.) in

Ukraine.57 Except for M5S in Italy, all the parties fall in Central and Eastern Europe. One possible

explanation is the rise of centrist populist parties following the collapse of the Soviet Union.58

Most of these parties emerged on the back of dissatisfaction among the masses in these post-

communist states with the political elite of that time and exploited the bandwagon of "stolen-

revolution" and called for a new "real" revolution. In contrast, scholars peg the emergence of M5S

in Italy to the crisis of representation in the country.59

53 See, Ucen, “Centrist populism,” 47 54 CEU eTD Collection Zulianello, “Varieties of Populist Parties”, 3 55 Marco Tarchi, "Italy: the promised land of populism?", Contemporary Italian Politics 7, no. 3 (2015): 273-285. 56 Andrea Ceron et al., "e-Campaigning in the 2014 European elections: The emphasis on valence issues in a two-dimensional multiparty system." Party Politics 24, no. 2 (2018): 105-117. 57 See Zulianello, “Varieties of Populist Parties”, 4-6 58 See, Ben Stanley, “Populism in Central and Eastern Europe,” in Kaltwasser et al. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Populism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (2017): 140–160. 59 See, Liza Lanzone et al., “Riding the populist web: contextualizing the Five Star Movement (M5S) in Italy,” Politics and Governance, (2015).

Chapter II: Case Selection and Methodology

2.1 Valence Populism and the Case of Pakistan

In the 73 years of its existence as a sovereign state, Pakistan has spent the majority of its

time under military dictatorships, with intermittent truncated periods of democratic rule. In those

under-nourished democratic periods, Pakistan has witnessed two distinct phases of populism in

the country. The first one was during the late 1960s and 1970s, where Zulfikar Ali Bhutto60 made

use of the socialist populism.61 He formed his political party: Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and

included other elements such as religion to further his brand of politics, but the ideological

positioning remained center to the left. His populism exploited the narrative of corruption and

dissatisfaction of the people with the then-dictator General Ayub Khan to propagate a populist-left

brand of politics. Bhutto was elected as the first democratic prime minister of Pakistan and ruled

till 1977 before a military general overthrew him.

The second phase of populism in Pakistan, however, presents an ideological cluelessness

and inclines towards the term valence populism, as discussed above. The entire politics of Imran

Khan, the current prime minister of Pakistan, has focused on demonizing the ruling elite as corrupt,

transparency, governance reforms, social justice, and moral integrity. The last parliamentary

elections in 2018 in Pakistan marked the second successful completion of five years of

uninterrupted democratic rule and a transition of power, without a military coup. Khan's PTI came

into power on the back of populist rhetoric amid what several scholars have called perceived

CEU eTD Collection military support, which was evident from limited electioneering space for the opposition parties as

60 See, Arif Hasan, “The roots of elite alienation,” Economic and Political Weekly (2002): 4550-4553. 61 See, Mudde, “Populist radical right”, 1167-1186.

well as politically motivated cases against the opposition leaders.62 While the PTI was founded in

1996, it only emerged as a significant player in Pakistani politics fifteen years later from 2010

onwards as Khan embarked on a countrywide campaign, with alleged backing of the establishment,

to woo the people against the 'corrupt leadership' of the country. The campaign was partially

successful as in 2013, the PTI managed third-highest representation in the National Assembly, the

lower house of the country's Parliament while gaining a simple majority in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

(K.P.) province and formed a government with coalition partners. Khan continued his populist

rhetoric even after the elections and took to the streets to protest the election results, terming them

as a stolen mandate and calling for electoral reforms and held a 126-days long sit-in in the capital.

This followed the anti-corruption rhetoric against the then incumbent PMLN's remaining term as

the PTI capitalized on the Panama Scandal to propagate an already charged narrative to the masses

and held several political rallies to woo the masses against the ruling leadership.

Zulianello's conception of valence populism becomes helpful in understanding the

particular nature of this populist government. The whole rhetoric of PTI leading up to the 2013

elections and during the whole term of PMLN (2013-2018) ranged from democratic reforms to

arresting the corrupt and improving transparency. Furthermore, the PTI also saw an opportunity in

co-opting the military-establishment when the latter's relations with the PMLN deteriorated over

several foreign policy and domestic issues. Since assuming power in the federal government in

2018, the PTI has continued to propagate the populist rhetoric by blaming all the issues on previous

leaderships and also framing politically motivated cases against the opposition. CEU eTD Collection

62 See, Aqil Shah, ‘Pakistan: voting under military tutelage’, Journal of Democracy 30, no. 1 (2019): 128-142; Aqil Shah, ‘Pakistan in 2018: Theft of an Election’, Asian Survey 59, no. 1 (2019): 98-107.

While the phenomena of valence populism in the context of Eastern and Central European

countries can see a common link in the communist past and the reliance of the centrist political

parties on the dissatisfaction regarding the government affairs during and after the transition period

in the 1990s and 2000s, Pakistan lacks that shared link. Instead, the history of approximately thirty

years of dictatorship and PTI's co-optation of the country's military provides the missing link here.

In the past, all the democratic governments were toppled by the dictators on the pretext of prevalent

corruption, the crisis of governance, and demonizing the politicians as evil. The major examples

of these can be witnessed in the 1990s when four democratically elected governments were

derailed by the military establishment, which eventually resulted in the third military coup in the

country in 1999. The PTI's adoption of this valence rhetoric of corruption among other non-

ideological aspects can be traced back to these similar tactics employed by the military

dictatorships. Moreover, the perceived military support of the PTI in the lead up to the 2018

elections also bolsters the argument.63

2.2 Research Methodology

With a focus on discourse64 and populism, the study employs Critical Discourse Analysis

(CDA)65 and Discourse Historical Approach (DHA)66 methods to analyze the speeches of Imran

Khan and his party's manifesto. These approaches have been widely used in populism studies, and

this study also utilizes the methods to extract vital information needed to answer the research

63 CEU eTD Collection See, Shah, ‘Pakistan: voting under military tutelage’, 128 64 See, Ruth Wodak, Majid KhosraviNik, and Brigitte Mral, eds. Right-wing populism in Europe: Politics and discourse. A&C Black, 2013. 65 See, Linda A. Wood and Rolf O. Kroger, Doing discourse analysis: Methods for studying action in talk and text, Sage, 2000: 3-33; Ruth Wodak, and Michael Meyer, eds. Methods of critical discourse studies. Sage, 2015; Ruth Wodak, and Michal Krzyzanowski. Qualitative discourse analysis in the social sciences. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008; Norman Fairclough, "Discourse and power," in Language and power, London: Longman (1989). 66 See, Ruth Wodak, “The discourse-historical approach” in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer, eds. Methods of critical discourse studies. Sage, 2015

question. The purpose of choosing a qualitative method is to analyze the themes and patterns from

the speeches and texts to ascertain a pattern and establish the findings to support the research aim.

For this purpose, ten different speeches of Imran Khan were chosen for discourse analysis.

Moreover, the PTI's party manifesto was also analyzed to establish the claims made in the

document as compared to the performance of the PTI government since coming into power at the

center in Pakistan. Besides, the scarcity of quantitative data on measuring populism, especially in

the case of Pakistan where hardly any significant work has been done on populism in general and

Imran Khan in particular, makes the use of qualitative method necessary. Hence, the analysis of

populist rhetoric and the type of populism can only be done by analyzing Khan's speeches and

party documents and comparing them to the decisions taken by the PTI in seven years of its

government (two at the center and seven in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (K.P.)).

The peculiar nature of populism in Pakistan is discussed in the previous sections, and a

detailed analysis of speeches and texts follows using the CDA and DHA methodology. More

speeches could have been analyzed, but due to the time and word-limit constraints of the study,

the sample was reduced to the most relevant speeches. Although most of these speeches are

available on YouTube and Dailymotion, among other video-hosting platforms, the content is still

limited. For example, the dozens of speeches that were delivered at the 2014 dharna (Azadi March)

are not all available online due to a ban on YouTube in the country from 2012 till 2016. Therefore,

the newspaper articles were also used to access the transcripts of some of the relevant speeches.

The speeches were deliberately chosen across different years, i.e., 2011-2018, to get a holistic CEU eTD Collection understanding of Khan's politics since emerging as a significant force to challenge the mainstream

established parties till finally winning the elections in 2018 and becoming the prime minister of

the country. A consistent mechanism was devised to breakdown the context, clarities, and situation

of each speech to ensure the extraction of relevant information from each speech and to see whether

the findings are generalizable or not. The analysis employs a mixture of Wodak's Discourse

Historical Approach and Fairclough's three-dimensional model of critical discourse analysis. A

detailed discussion of the findings from the discourse analysis follows to establish the argument

according to the research aim. The empirical analysis will primarily look at discourse employed

by Imran Khan, mainly keeping in view the non-positional issues as discussed earlier in the valence

populism section to establish whether he fits into the definition of a valence populist. Secondly,

the establishing of the previous point will provide a ground on Khan's ideological cluelessness in

politics. Finally, the discussion will go towards the link that provides impetus to such valence

politics in the country and allows movement across the spectrum relatively easily. CEU eTD Collection

Chapter III: Empirical Analysis

Using the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and Discourse Historical Approach (DHA),

the study will analyze the following speeches and texts to support the hypotheses. The selected

speeches from PTI's 2014 dharna (protest) and four speeches from the 2016 Pakistan Ehtesab

(Accountability) March were analyzed together, keeping in view the similarity of speeches at the

same event and condition by the same person.

List of Speeches and Policy Documents:

1. Imran Khan's speech at Minar-e-Pakistan (National Monument of Pakistan)

On October 31, 2011, Imran Khan addressed a gathering of approximately a hundred-

thousand people – termed by many as the breakout moment for Khan at the national level.

2. Selection of 2014 dharna (protest) speeches from Islamabad

In 2014, following a continuous war of words with the opposition and allegations of

irregularities in 2013 general elections, Imran Khan led a protest movement (Azadi March)

to the capital, asking for several reforms and the resignation of the then Prime Minister

Nawaz Sharif. The protest started on August 14, 2014 (Independence Day of the country),

and continued till December 17, 2014. Khan addressed the supporters in dozens of

speeches, and a few selected ones will be analyzed here.

3. Pakistan Ehtesab March 2016

Following the exposure of Panama Papers in 2016, the PTI announced a series of protest

rallies across Pakistan to mount pressure on the incumbent PMLN government, focusing CEU eTD Collection

on the anti-corruption rhetoric and an investigation against the then incumbent prime

minister Nawaz Sharif. Imran Khan addressed four rallies in different cities, culminating

in a massive rally in Lahore towards the end of the year.

4. Victory speech, 2018

Imran Khan addressed the nation in a live televised address on July 26, 2018, soon after it

emerged that his party (PTI) was in a leading position to form a government with the help

of some allies.

5. 2018 PTI Party Manifesto

The study will analyze selected parts of the PTI's latest manifesto, primarily focusing on

the subjects directly related to the valence populism, such as corruption and governance.

3.1 Analysis of Speeches and Policy Documents

3.1.1 Speech Analysis

Speech 1: Minar-e-Pakistan (National Monument of Pakistan) Rally Speech – October 31, 201167

Up until the October 31, 2011 rally in Lahore, Imran Khan and his party Pakistan Tehreek-

i-Insaf (PTI) were hardly considered as a significant force in the political spectrum of the country.

In that context, a gathering of over a hundred thousand people in the provincial capital of Punjab

province changed the political scene overnight. There was a general political vacuum as the

country had returned to democracy only three years ago in 2008 after almost a decade of

dictatorship. In this scenario, where the government of Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) was at odds

with the military-establishment, PTI emerged as the alternative party to the two mainstream

parties: PPP and PMLN. Allegedly backed by the establishment and championing the mantra of

anti-corruption and good governance, Khan launched his political tirade in a series of political

rallies towards the end of the first democratic term since the dictatorship of Musharraf in 2008. CEU eTD Collection

67 The speech can be accessed online here: https://bit.ly/2OLyRAE; and the transcript is available here: https://bit.ly/2ZT0vCp

The October 31, 2011 speech chosen for analysis establishes this mantra employed by Khan over

the next few years till the 2013 general elections.

Questions Clarities Situation

Who? Chairperson Pakistan Election rally at Minar-e- Tehreek-e-Insaf (Pakistan Pakistan (Pakistan's national Movement for Justice) (PTI) tower in Lahore)

On what occasion? General political rally to The political movement launch the political movement capitalized on the poor civil- military relations and the crisis of governance at that time Where? Minar-e-Pakistan Ground, Minar-e-Pakistan is the Lahore national monument of Pakistan. Pakistan Resolution was passed at the place of the monument in 1940, which subsequently led to an independent country in 1947. When? Sunday, October 31, 2011 Although the Election Commission laws of Pakistan state that the electioneering can be done during the interim government period, but most political parties tend to start political campaigns a year in advance. To whom? Explicit Address to the supporters of the party Members of the then Implicit government lead by Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and another rival party Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz

CEU eTD Collection (PMLN)

Via Media Mass media of transmission Orally delivered speech to the attendees of the rally as well as live telecasted to the general public through over 25 private news channels

Purpose Electioneering and asking the The speech was delivered at a politicians to declare their political gathering to make a assets and threatening to a show of power in the civil disobedience movement. traditional stronghold of PMLN (the provincial government of Punjab province) Form Speech Long speech (loud, repetitive and metaphorical) About To gather political capital, The speech is an address to warning the political the masses to make a show of opponents of declaring their power by numbers. This wealth and cleanse the system speech was effectively the of corruption. start of PTI's election campaign for 2013 polls. Rhetorical Genre Speech Deliberative speech speaking about outcomes and intending to generate support for the given action and policy.

Speech Analysis:

Imran Khan's approximately 50-min long speech is laden with metaphors and rhetorical

statements. Being a former cricketer, he tends to use cricket references. Due to the popularity of

the game in the country, he made sure to use references such as "inswinger will dismiss both the

players" – referring to the two main opposition political parties: PPP, PMLN that their time is over

and it was the turn of "honest and godsend politicians"; "you will not be able to buy the umpires

CEU eTD Collection this time around" – referring to alleged corruption in elections with the help of the election

commission. Other than the cricket metaphors, the most used words were "change," "naya (new)

Pakistan," "tsunami (of people)," and his comparisons with the founding fathers of the country:

Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Allama Iqbal. The location of the speech, Minar-e-Pakistan (The

National Monument of Pakistan), further added to the significance of bringing up the founding

father of the country as Jinnah had presented the Pakistan Resolution in 1940. Khan has modeled

his entire political campaign as him being the true follower of the founding fathers and called to

form a naya (new) Pakistan. Other than blaming all ills in the country on the two other mainstream

political parties: PMLN and PPP, the speech directly "otherizes" the followers of these political

parties, terming them as ignorant and presenting himself and PTI as the only viable option for the

country. Khan uses words such as "patwari" (village accountant)68 in a derogatory sense for the

followers of the PMLN while terming the then President of Pakistan Asif Ali Zardari as a coward

and a "goon of the U.S.".

Using the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA), the findings show that Khan's speech is

a manifestation of Pakistani rulers using "constructive and discursive macro strategies"69 to form

a narrative about the Pakistani identity, by associating himself with the founding father of the

nation, while maintaining a belligerent hostility towards 'the other' (the PMLN and PPP). However,

in the case of Pakistan, the problem only exacerbates as the state struggling to form a consensus

on its own national identity is pegged against 'the other.' Contrary to the perceived outlook of the

speech, which was intended to force the politicians to declare their assets and decreasing

corruption, the fifty-minute long address varies from demonizing other political parties as the

scourge of the country and presenting PTI and Khan himself as the messiah. The most repeated

word used is "tabdeeli (change)"; the promised change, which, according to him, will come with

CEU eTD Collection him coming to power. Wodak's socio-diagnostic critique70 helps understand the context which is

68 Patwari maintains the land ownership records in designated localities and undertakes the collection of land taxes 69 Ruth Wodak, “The discourse-historical approach,” in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (eds.), Methods of critical discourse studies, Sage publishers (2002): 71-72. 70 Wodak “Discourse-historical approach”, Methods, 65

concerned with "demystifying the possibly persuasive or 'manipulative' character of discursive

practices."71 Given the context, when Khan was emerging as a significant political player in the

country mainstream scene, the empty language of blaming politicians as the reason of all the ills

facing the country – a tactic employed by the dictators in their almost three-decade intermittent

rule in the country – played well with the masses, as it did when the dictators used the same stance

during their regimes. DHA informs us that a combination of "constructive and destructive

strategies"72 is employed where the continuous demonizing and the otherizing of past politicians

and especially those belonging to the PPP and PMLN is used to shape the opinion of the public.

Jalal defines this penchant of the Pakistani state to morph history according to conventional

imaging as "projecting the 'us' as the positive self in creative imaginings and 'them' as the negative

other."73 While doing so, Khan manages to create a binary between the 'wretched politicians' and

the 'evil elite' who have stored all their wealth in foreign accounts. In all this, Khan stays away

from criticizing the military's misadventures in toppling the democratic set-ups, while also

presenting himself as the true leader that the nation needs. His calls for civil disobedience in case

the government fails to meet his demands further represent the populist rhetoric and demonstrates

the "destructive macro strategy."74

Throughout the speech, Khan uses religious references such as being the blessed one and

examples from Prophet Muhammad's life to present himself as a godsend, ticking the definition of

a messiah in the minds of the masses. He presents himself as the righteous leaders as compared to

the 'evils' Asif Ali Zardari and Nawaz Sharif. This can be seen from the lens of "preservative or CEU eTD Collection

71 Ibid 72 Wodak and Meyer, Methods, 71-72 73 Ayesha Jalal, ’Conjuring Pakistan: History as official imagining’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 27, no. 1, 1995, 73 74 Wodak and Meyer, Methods, 71-72

justificatory" strategy to conserve the Muslim identity – touted as the reason for the formation of

Pakistan and the only element joining the whole nation together. Especially on the topic of War

on Terror, Khan brings up the Muslim identity and vows to never use the country's military "against

its own citizens" – even against the terrorist outfits. Khan also uses the preservative strategy to

discuss the Kashmir issue by pegging the Muslim identity of Kashmiris against the Hindutva

ideology. The destructive strategy is finally employed, "aiming at the destruction of any other

narrative that is not compatible with Khan's views. For example, despite the available information

regarding the harms of the use of coal as an energy source, Khan terms the opponents of coal

energy as enemy and evils. According to him, coal power is the solution to the country's power

issues despite dangerously rising air pollution levels in the region. Moreover, in the same breath,

he terms Pakistan as a rich country whose wealth (allegedly USD 100 billion) has been stored out

of the country. Finally, he addresses the people and terms his followers as the rebellious against

the system and the government. Wodak's transformative strategy75 can help explain this from the

point of changing the identities.

Speech II: Selected 2014 Islamabad Dharna (protest) Speeches76

In 2014, following a continuous war of words with the opposition and allegations of

irregularities in 2013 general elections, Imran Khan led a protest movement (Azadi March) to the

capital, asking for several reforms and the resignation of the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

The protest started on August 14, 2014 (Independence Day of the country), and continued till

December 17, 2014. Khan addressed the supporters in dozens of speeches, and a few selected ones

CEU eTD Collection will be analyzed here. The purpose of analyzing a number of these speeches together is the

75 Ibid 76 Imran Khan delivered dozens of speeches in the 126-day long protest in Islamabad. Most of the speeches are available online on YouTube and Dailymotion.

similarity of the situation they happened. The protest lasted for approximately four months, and

Khan addressed the participants almost regularly.

Questions Clarities Situation

Who? Chairperson Pakistan Protest sit-in in the capital of Tehreek-e-Insaf (Pakistan Pakistan, Islamabad, Movement for Justice) (PTI), following a range of Member National Assembly allegations of corruption and malpractices in the general elections of 2013 On what occasion? Protest sit-in termed as Azadi PTI, led by Imran Khan, held March (Freedom March) an almost four-month-long sit-in in the capital to protest against the alleged irregularities in the 2013 polls. During the sit-in, Khan delivered several threatening speeches against the government and even called for a civil-disobedience movement against the government. Where? Democracy Square (D- D-Chowk has been a popular Chowk), Islamabad, Pakistan spot in the capital near the Parliament and other top government offices, which has seen various protests in the past. When? August 14, 2014 – December The march began from Lahore 17, 2014 on August 14, 2014, finally reaching Islamabad. The protest continued till December 17, 2014, when it was abruptly called off after a terrorist attack in the northern city of Peshawar. CEU eTD Collection

To whom? Explicit Address to the supporters of the party. Members of the then Implicit government of PMLN, led by Nawaz Sharif, judiciary and Election Commission of Pakistan.

Via Media Mass media of transmission Orally delivered speeches to the attendees of the march and then sit-in as well as live telecast to the general public through news channels and social media.

Purpose Seeking ouster of incumbent The speeches at the Islamabad PMLN government and the sit-in mainly targeted the resignation of Prime Minister; PMLN and its leader Nawaz Electoral reforms; Sharif for alleged vote fraud Anti-corruption reforms; and demanded an inquiry as Re-conduct of elections well as reforms followed by a snap election. Form Speeches Long speeches (loud, repetitive and metaphorical) About Alleged vote fraud in 2013 The speeches at the march elections; demands for Prime usually repeated the same Minister Nawaz Sharif's content of demands and goals. resignation and a snap election Rhetorical Genre Speeches Deliberative speeches, constituting a repetition of demands and specific anti- government rhetoric and intending to generate public support against the incumbent government.

CEU eTD Collection Speech Analysis:

The speeches at the 2014 protests were laden with similar rhetorical elements, as seen

previously as well. While the whole point of these protests was to force the government to conduct

an inquiry into four electoral constituencies, Khan mostly diverged to criticizing the other political

parties, mainly the PMLN (who came into power following the 2013 general elections). Khan

continuously brought up the issue of corruption in elections and continued to link it to the alleged

corruption of the PMLN and PPP without citing any proof. He criticized the Metrobus Transit

systems and Lahore and Islamabad, especially throughout his speeches. At the same time, he

continued to present himself as the messiah, the one who is out there to get every corrupt politician

in the country. The otherization and demonization of anyone who did not support his views and

party continued throughout the speeches while he also incited the followers to civil disobedience

and attacking the government buildings, which resulted in dozens getting injured.

The most used pronoun in Khan's speeches was "I," narrowing down the focus of speeches

to himself. This shows the explicit powerplay at work to tell his point of view.77 In most of his

speeches, he uses phrases such as: "Their time is over, they have looted Pakistan as much as they

could." Here, they/them is used for corrupt politicians, especially the leadership of the PPP and

PMLN, to otherize them as the source of all the evil in the country. He explicitly displays power

by portraying the negative image of his opponents. Imran Khan has used the modal verb "will"

many times in his speeches to show the degree of affinity78. Sometimes, he showed a subjective

degree of affinity and sometimes an objective degree of affinity to display explicit and implicit

power play in his discourse. As far as the vocabulary is concerned, Khan's speeches during dharna

were laden with words like "culprit," "fraud," "murderers" to describe the evil elite while

describing the ordinary people as "poor people," "unemployed," "powerless" and "minorities." By

using these words in his vocabulary, he goes on to establish 'us vs. them' divide, presenting him as CEU eTD Collection

77 Fairclough presents his three-dimensional model of CDA in Language and Power. The model “is an interdisciplinary approach to the study of discourse, for it views language as a form of social practice and focuses on the ways through which social and political dominance is exercised in discourse by ‘text and talk’.” He outlines three dimensions to his CDA model: textual, discursive and societal levels. For more on Fairclough’s 3-D model, see, Norman Fairclough, "Discourse and power," in Language and power, Longman, London, (1989): 36 78 See, Norman Fairclough, "Discourse and text: Linguistic and intertextual analysis within discourse analysis," Discourse & society 3, no. 2 (1992): 193-217.

the savior who will always stand with the downtrodden. At a discursive level79, the speeches show

that Khan has brought the Islamic discourse into the political discourse. While the majority of the

dharna audience being Muslim does present a logical explanation to appease the masses by openly

professing the religious dictums, Khan uses them to incriminate the opposition through his

discourse. At the societal level80, the order of discourse is to specify the relationship of the

instances of social and discursive practice to the orders of discourse it draws upon. In one of his

speeches, he first mentioned the government's efforts to shut down K.P. province, and then uses

another discourse to blame an opposition leader for disallowing people to come to protests. After

that, he threatens Nawaz Sharif that he and his party will shut down the whole country.

Speech III: Speeches During Pakistan Ehtesab [Accountability] March Rallies 201681

Following the Panama Leaks scandal in 2016, where the Sharif family also named among

the list of foreign nationals and dignitaries, the opposition went on the offensive and called for

forming a judicial commission and asking the prime minister to step down to ensure impartial

proceedings. After the government's delaying tactics and call for the formation of a parliamentary

committee instead of a judicial commission, the PTI announced a series of protest rallies across

the country to mount pressure on the government, focusing on the anti-corruption rhetoric and an

investigation against the then incumbent prime minister Nawaz Sharif. Imran Khan addressed four

rallies in different cities, culminating in a massive rally in Lahore towards the end of the year

following which the Supreme Court of Pakistan ordered the formation of a judicial commission CEU eTD Collection

79 Ibid 80 Ibid 81 Peshawar speech: https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x4nmraa, August 7, 2016; Islamabad speech: https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x4omlld, August 13, 2016; Jhelum speech: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wi9f- vRjqys, August 24, 2016; Lahore Speech: https://twitter.com/PTIofficial/status/772132590111354881, September 3, 2016

and tasked the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) to proceed with action against the prime

minister and his family.

Questions Clarities Situation

Who? Chairperson Pakistan Multiple rallies in different Tehreek-e-Insaf (Pakistan cities Movement for Justice) (PTI), Member National Assembly

On what occasion? Protest rallies against the Protest rallies to push the incumbent prime minister government and the judiciary Nawaz Sharif to probe his for the formation of a judicial personal and family's commission to investigate the undeclared offshore properties Sharif family's offshore properties after their name appeared in the infamous Panama Leaks. Where? Peshawar, Islamabad, Jhelum, Lahore

When? August 7, 2016 – September Peshawar protest: August 7, 3, 2016 2016 Islamabad protest: August 13, 2016 Jhelum protest: August 31, 2016 Lahore protest: September 3, 2016 To whom? Explicit Address to the supporters of the party Sharif family, especially the Implicit Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif CEU eTD Collection

Via Media Mass media of transmission Orally delivered speeches to the attendees of the rally as well as live telecast to the general public news channels and social media.

Purpose To demand the establishment The four speeches across a of a judicial commission to span of four weeks focused on investigate the offshore the Sharif family despite properties of Prime Minister numerous other people from Nawaz Sharif and family. Pakistan being also named in Panama Papers, to gain political mileage as the PTI had been championing the cause of anti-corruption. Form Speeches Long speech (loud, repetitive and metaphorical) About Prime Minister Nawaz The speeches intended to woo Sharif's link with offshore the masses against the accounts and properties incumbents on anti-corruption unveiled after Panama Leaks rhetoric. and subsequent demands for inquiry through a judicial commission to prosecute him. Rhetorical Genre Speeches Deliberative speeches focusing on the Sharif family and demanding the judiciary to take action against the Prime Minister for alleged corruption and hiding his assets.

Speech Analysis:

The speeches at the 2016 protests were laden with similar rhetorical elements, as seen

CEU eTD Collection previously as well. The point of these protests was to force the government and judiciary to initiate

proceedings against Nawaz Sharif, and his family's (who were named in Panama Papers) alleged

offshore properties through a judicial commission. However, Khan used the moment to further

mount pressure on the government by demanding prime minister's resignation, hoping to reignite

his politics after the abrupt end of the 2014 protests. The four speeches in Peshawar, Islamabad,

Jhelum, and Lahore surrounded a single agenda of corruption, mainly focusing on the incumbent

prime minister. Khan's speeches at these rallies followed a similar format. Firstly, he criticized and

launched a diatribe against then-incumbent prime minster, demanding his resignation. Then he

brought up the previous rhetoric of all the current and former leaders being corrupt and how the

country's economic situation has deteriorated over the years. And then, finally, he presented

himself as the solution to all the problems created by the ruling elite.

The use of pronouns "I" and "We" remained high to show his conviction and forming his

opinion as a collective of his followers. The use of these pronouns continuously also suggests a

power play of words. Khan's sentence structure remains rhetoric and argumentative. He adds

unverified numbers and figures to bolster his arguments. For example, while talking about the

country's rulers and previous governments, he states that: "These leaders and other corrupt elite

have stashed nearly USD 200 billion in Swiss accounts and other tax-havens," and then goes on to

connect his argument with the names appearing in the Panama Papers to strengthen his argument.

"They have looted the country for years and taken their wealth abroad… When I was your age

(addressing the youth at rallies), Pakistan had the highest growth rate in the region, now we are at

the last number in the region."

Khan then goes back to cite the founding fathers of the country: "They would have been

ashamed of what has come of this country…" Citing references from Quran and Prophet

Muhammad, he bolsters his arguments regarding the rulers being "honest" and "truthful" according CEU eTD Collection to the religious edicts to sound more persuasive. Khan further cites the examples of Iceland Prime

Minister who resigned amid the Panama controversy and asks Nawaz Sharif to follow suit. Khan

amalgamates his speeches with numerous conditional sentences using the predictive methodology.

For example, "if all the wealth of Pakistanis stashed abroad is brought back, Pakistan would not

need to seek loans from anywhere… The elite of the country has been taking the wealth of the

country. We need to create an environment to increase confidence among people to keep their

wealth in the country. Otherwise, we will keep on losing…" Khan continuously employs the phrase

"have to" to provoke the audience to action against the incumbent leadership or previous ruling

parties.

In all four speeches, Khan brought up his vision – what falls under the societal analysis

under Fairclough's model – by repeating valence statements as eradication of corruption,

improvement in governance, capturing all the corrupt leaders and evils of the society, taking care

of the underprivileged (to seek sympathies), and modeling the naya (new) Pakistan on the model

welfare state of Medina from 1400 years ago (keeping in view that his audience is Muslim

dominated). He continuously cites various cases of Prophet Muhammad and his companions

regarding education and justice and general socioeconomic welfare of the people throughout his

speeches to portray himself as a true follower of religious teachings. "It is a matter of the future of

this country. We need to take action today against this corrupt elite to progress… PTI will hold

everyone accountable, even if it is someone from our party… The judiciary has been compromised

in the past. Nevertheless, we still trust it to take action against the corrupt and will pursue the cases

till the logical end…" While the primary target of these rallies was the incumbent prime minister,

Khan continued to digress to other political parties, demonizing everyone who did not agree to his

agitational politics and continuously threatened to bring the country to a standstill by locking down

CEU eTD Collection the cities. Khan also uses interrogative pronouns – a discourse marker – to connect with the

audience. "Why do they run abroad? Why do they take all the money abroad?"

Speech IV: Victory Speech, 2018 General Elections82

Prime Minister-elect Imran Khan addressed Pakistanis from his private residence in a live-

televised address on July 26, 2018, the day after the 2018 parliamentary general elections, soon

after it emerged that his party (PTI) was in a leading position to form a government with the help

of some allies. PTI won 149 seats in the National Assembly and, with the help of minor parties

and independent candidates subsequently formed a coalition government.

Questions Clarities Situation

Who? Chairperson Pakistan Victory speech a day after Tehreek-e-Insaf (Pakistan 2018 general elections when it Movement for Justice) (PTI), emerged that the PTI was in Member National Assembly the lead and were in a position (Lower house of the to form a coalition Parliament); Prime Minister- government at the center. elect of Pakistan On what occasion? 2018 general elections victory 2018 parliamentary elections speech

Where? Imran Khan's private residence, Bani Gala, Islamabad

When? July 26, 2018 The day following the 2018 parliamentary elections.

To whom? Explicit Address to the nation as well as international audience Threat the opposition of Implicit accountability CEU eTD Collection

82 The video link and full transcript of the speech can be accessed here: https://bit.ly/3eMu3pa

Via Media Mass media of transmission Orally delivered speech broadcasted on the state as well as private and international news channels and social media.

Purpose To claim victory in 2018 Victory speech a day after general elections. 2018 general elections when it emerged that the PTI was in the lead and were in a position to form a coalition government at the center. The purpose was to show the political opponents as well as the followers of the party that they had enough numbers in the Parliament to form a government. Form Speech Long speech (calm, repetitive and metaphorical) About 2018 general elections; The speech is an address to claiming victory the nation in general and PTI supporters, in particular, to claim victory as well as to lay out his government's strategy on a wide range of domestic as well as foreign affairs. Rhetorical Genre Speech Recorded speech about election victory speaking about the proposed strategy of his government, action against corruption and reforms of the system. Speech Analysis:

Most repeated words and phrases in the speech Words and phrases Number of repetitions We 49

CEU eTD Collection I 38 Will 41 Pakistan 29 We will 17 Want to 16 Prophet Muhammad 11

The analysis includes the textual, processing, and social analyses following Fairclough's 3-

D model.83 The textual part focuses on linguistic analysis84. The transcript of Imran Khan's first

speech following the 2018 parliamentary general elections can be divided into three distinct parts

contextually. In the first, Khan addresses his followers and supporters, and thanks for their

continuous support to date. The second part includes a focus on the socioeconomic problems faced

by Pakistan due to the faulty policies of the previous governments. Lastly, the speech moves to the

solutions part and presents PTI's general strategy to tackle the issues both domestically and

internationally. Khan's sentence structure is declarative and argumentative. He brings in facts and

figures to bolster his argument to make them more progressive. For example, while talking about

the previous governments, Khan describes the lifestyles of leaders both in the federal and

provincial governments. "Pakistan's Prime Minister has over 500 workers, dozens of cars, of which

33 are bulletproof. Each of these cars cost 50 million rupees… Then there are helicopters and

airplanes. The Prime Minister house spans over 1100 canals… Then there are extravagant

Governor Houses, Rest Houses, Chief Ministers' Houses. Furthermore, they have hundreds of

secretaries…"

Instead of speaking in the third person, Khan's narrative remains the first person. He uses

"I" and "we" 38 and 51 times respectfully. While it is evident that he uses "I" for himself, the word

"we" is used both for his party PTI as well as when Khan describes his voters as a part of that

collective to show a combined approach of formulating the opinion. Some of the most repeated CEU eTD Collection two-word phrases include "we will" (19), "want to" (16), "will be" (13), "I want" (11), and "we

83 See, Norman Fairclough and Clive Holes, Critical discourse analysis: The critical study of language, Pearson, Harlow, (1995). 84 This Linguistic analysis focuses on “morphology, semantics and syntax, the sound system and cohesion organizations above the sentence level.” For more see, Ibid, 57.

want" (9). Khan makes religious references including from the Quran, Prophet Muhammad, and

his companions, the founding fathers of Pakistan to seek authentication and sound more persuasive

to the masses and make a strong and successful impact on his audience. He delicately uses

discourse markers such as "First of all," "secondly" among others to maintain coherence and retain

the audience. He amalgamates the U.S. economic policies and the glorious Islamic past and the

examples set by Prophet Muhammad and his companions. He compares these policies to the

former Pakistani governments of PPP and PMLN to convince people they have been deliberately

misguided and economically murdered by them.

While Khan mostly uses the Subject-Object-Verb (SOV) structure; he also makes use of

conditional statements. Some of these examples include: "We will have to change our ways, the

way we think… We should soften our hearts for the poor, the downtrodden: half of our population

who cannot even afford two meals in a day. We cannot feed 45 percent of Pakistan's poor

children… Without making a radical change in our approach, we will fail millions of our out of

school children. They need our help. If the country's population continues to increase at the current

rate and we cannot educate our children, they will fail to make a decent livelihood; if conditions

remain so, who will solve the water issue." The phrase "have to" is used to instigate the masses to

action to mobilize the desired socioeconomic change.

"The discourse practice has two phases: institutional process and discourse process,"

according to Fairclough's model.85 For him, "discourse practice straddles the division between

society and culture on the one hand and discourse, language and text one the other."86 Meanwhile, CEU eTD Collection the intertextual process "focuses on the borderline text and discourse practices in the analytical

85 “The institutional process includes the editorial procedures while the discourse process includes the changes the text goes through in production and consumption.” For further details, see, Ibid 58-59. 86 Ibid, 60

framework which is looking at the text from the perspective of discourse practice, looking at the

traces of the discourse practice in the text."87 The speech's processing analysis informs that formal

and contextual links are employed to enhance the cohesiveness of the body. The interrogative

pronouns also work as a discourse marker to grab the attention of the audience as "Why do they

run abroad? Where does all the money go? The Speaker National Assembly had a budget of 16

crores rupees; what did they do?" Both links promote "inter-textuality" in the context.

From a social analysis88 perspective, Khan starts his speech by thanking his supporters for

their support throughout thick and thin – resembling any other formal commencement speech. He

goes on to present himself as someone whose only pursuit in politics was to rid the country of

corrupt leaders and make it a model "Islamic" welfare state. Such a statement is a general assertion

a political leader makes to appear sincere. Khan cites numerous references from Islamic thought,

as Pakistan has a history of combing religion and politics. He refers to Prophet Muhammad and

asserts that he reformed history by establishing a model welfare state of Medina. Furthermore, he

references the Quran and cites the translation of verses from there. For example, he cites: "In

Quran, God asserts that He would not change the fate of a nation if they are not sincere themselves

and do not strive to change for better." He continues to cite various cases of Prophet Muhammad

and his companions regarding education and justice and the general socioeconomic welfare of the

people. Binding oneself with religion remains one of the aptest approaches in politics in the

country, and that is precisely the reason why Khan reviews the teachings of Islam for the general

population. CEU eTD Collection

87 Ibid, 16 88 The social analysis of a speech according to Fairclough’s model “analyzes the text of the speech in socio-cultural context of communicative events.” For more on social analysis, see, Fairclough and Holes, Critical discourse analysis, (1995).

Khan then talks about the economic situation of Pakistan and the problems that lay ahead.

He then follows it by presenting his tentative plan to address these issues. The prime minister-elect

employs examples from history how other nations resolved these issues. He also brings the

founding fathers of Pakistan into the argument to repeat their vision and how his vision also aligns

with them. Khan also discusses the massive wealth inequality in the country and promises to shift

the balance in favor of the poor of the country by increasing economic opportunities. He also

argues for merit promotion both in the government jobs as well as in the overall culture of the

country. These flurry of statements present Khan's political enthusiasm.

Understanding the lack of tax culture in the country and high practice of tax evasion, Khan

uses the Islamic concept of zakat (almsgiving) to encourage people to pay taxes as religiously as

they pay zakat. The Islamic reference is again employed to present Khan as a true follower of God

who will protect the taxes – hence indirectly vying for more support of the people. Khan then

moves on to discuss the merit and the lack of it in the governmental positions as well as overall in

the society. He again invokes an Islamic edict and asserts that the rulers should be sadiq (truthful)

and ameen (ethical). "They can have no conflicts in their motives. The west has these laws." Khan

makes a comparison with the Western world to gauge how far behind Pakistan is and to encourage

people to make an effort for their own and country's progress. Along with this argument, he also

presents himself as honest and truthful to act as a role model.

Khan then moves on to discuss the country's finances and argues that his party will end

Pakistan's reliance on external debts for the betterment of the financial health of the country. He CEU eTD Collection argues that PTI will mobilize local resources as much as possible to fulfill the financial needs.

Khan then uses emotional statements such as "you need to realize that when these people give us

money, they attach conditions to it." These statements laden with emotions serve the purpose of

gaining sympathy for his mission and also tempt people to start paying their taxes. Subsequently,

Khan invites turns his attention to the overseas Pakistanis. He requests the overseas community to

help their home country and help build the economy by investing as well as bringing their money

from abroad to Pakistan to help the country with its forex exchange problems. "For overseas

Pakistanis, I have a special message. We are going to work hard to create a good investment

environment for you. We want you to move your money to Pakistan and park it in Pakistani banks

to help the country address its foreign exchange issues. Send your money through official accounts.

We need your help." Khan's belief in the overseas Pakistanis stems from the overwhelming support

he got from them in the runup to the general elections. He then moves on to address the underlying

social issues in the country: governance reforms, anti-corruption steps, judicial reforms, replication

of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (K.P.) province police model in Punjab, education and healthcare

reforms, construction of dams, civil services reforms, local body systems to devolve power, and

climate change. Khan finally comes back to criticizing the opposition parties by using the

prediction methodology89, asserting that if Pakistan had elected these 'corrupt' leaders once again,

the country would not have been able to withstand the situation.

3.1.2 Policy Document Analysis

2018 PTI Manifesto90

Most repeated words and phrases in the speech Words and phrases Number of repetitions We will 284 Pakistan 150 PTI 66

CEU eTD Collection Ensure 74 Policy 42

89 “Such approaches are employed to assign varying values, usually uncooperative or prejudice” For more on the predictive methodology, see, Ruth Wodak and Martin Reisigl, The Semiotics of Racism. Approaches in Critical Discourse Analysis, Passagen Verlag, (2001). 90 The 2018 PTI Manifesto can be accessed here: https://bit.ly/2CQ2MVH

Development 40 People 36 Education 33 Climate change 17 CPEC 11

The 2018 general elections PTI manifesto is laden with loud calls of drastic change

(tabdeeli) with slogans of justice and humanity and sets hugely ambitious goals. The party

chairperson Imran Khan promised to root out corruption and make an honorable Pakistan where

people from abroad will come to work. The 2018 manifesto built on the 2013 version, which

focused on education and health as forms of social justice. The 2018 document proposes to extend

PTI's health insurance schemes throughout the country after having a phased launch in K.P.:

extending to government employees after launching it for low-income households.

The manifesto makes tall claims by envisioning ten million jobs and five million housing

units for people without going much into values the specifics of the targets and plans. It is only

backed by the argument that the projects will be financed by curbing corruption and bringing back

the ill-gotten wealth by the corrupt elite from abroad. It also vows to revive Pakistan's industries

and provide incentives for employment generation without going into details. It also touches the

subject of the creation of new provinces, especially the long advocated South Punjab. It also

pledges to transform Karachi, the biggest city of the country, as well as the uplifting of Baluchistan

province. It further promises to bring experts from abroad to help the government. The document

further stresses the need for a green revolution and boasts of PTI's track record in this regard as a

CEU eTD Collection statement of intent.

The PTI's manifesto takes on the established PMLN who are famous for their action and

delivery model. The PTI's central argument in the manifesto remains the fight against corruption.

Much of the message, as discussed in the speeches' analysis previously, revolves around the

ridding of evils that plague the country. PTI also bolsters its argument by claiming credit for the

disqualification and subsequent indictment of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Overall, the

language of the documents is much measured as compared to the 2013 version, where it made

claims such as ending corruption within three months if elected. However, PTI's experience of five

years running a provincial government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (K.P.) perhaps taught them that

some targets are impossible to meet after their government came under criticism for failing to

evolve an accountability system and failing to implement some other significant initiatives.

Furthermore, Khan has remained critical of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)

since its launch in 2014. The word CPEC appears eleven times in the document. The document

raises concerns over the Chinese state companies' monopoly over the projects and lack of job

opportunities for the locals. However, it does term the CPEC as a 'golden opportunity' for Pakistan

only if more and more localization is achieved in the projects through partnerships and local labor.

Moreover, PTI champions sustainable initiatives for economic development to decrease taxation

on businesses and also focuses on curbing tax evasion in the country: termed as one of the main

problems plaguing the country's progress.

The election manifestos in Pakistan hardly ever present the accurate picture of what will

transpire if a party wins the legislative and subsequently gains the executive. Hence, the tall

promises in manifestos and speeches have hardly faced any scrutiny over the years. However,

these policy documents do play a critical role in developing an understanding of the party's intent. CEU eTD Collection

3.2 Findings and Discussion: Establishing the Case of Imran Khan as Valence Populist

As discussed in the previous chapters, these populists "offer little more than 'valence

considerations' and hence, do not fall in the right or left categories, nor exclusionary or

inclusionary, as they 'defy positional definition altogether'."91 The principal focus of these parties

exercising valence politics92 remains on non-positional social and political issues,93 for example,

fighting corruption, governance reforms, transparency, and moral integrity, while presenting

themselves as ones from the common people.

In the context of Pakistan, the study focused on the case of the current Prime Minister

Imran Khan and his political party PTI. The study aimed to look into the populist image of Khan

as a valence populist. Secondly, the study tries to look into the reason for the ideological

cluelessness of such populists. Furthermore, finally, it tries to find out why cases such as Pakistan

are suitable places for the nourishment of such leaders.

3.2.1 Establishing Khan as a Valence Populist

The study argues that the non-ideological nature of valence populists helps them move on

the ideological spectrum by inundating people with the non-ideological populist rhetoric of anti-

corruption, transparency, and democratic reforms, among others. They are unlikely to take a hard-

ideological stance on issues where ideological leaning matters, hence moving along the ideological

spectrum to benefit their brand of politics. Their focus remains on non-positional issues.

The analysis of Khan's speeches over approximately eight years shares similar patterns.

CEU eTD Collection Many themes are repetitive, and his focus remains on non-positional issues. For example, the first

91 Roberts, “Left, right, and the populist structuring of political competition,” (2018). 92 See, Curini, Corruption, ideology, and populism, Springer, 2017 93 Zulianello, “Varieties of Populist Parties”, 3

three sets of speeches analyzed center around the alleged corruption of the country's leadership.

All of these speeches follow a similar pattern: criticizing the then incumbent and previous leaders

of the country as being corrupt, him [Khan] and his party being the only solution to ridding country

of all the problems and presenting himself as a messiah by making religious references, and vowing

to make a new Pakistan on the model of the seventh-century state of Medina. Being one of the

country's most successful cricketer, Khan always employed cricket references in his speeches to

woo the masses, a trend that has continued even after Khan came to power in 2018.

The rhetoric in the four speech analyses remains the same – ridding the country of the

corrupt leaders and changing the fortunes of the country through his party vision of what he calls

Naya (New) Pakistan through "change." In the first speech analyzed from 2011, this remains the

focus of the whole speech. In 2014 dharna speeches, he kept on focusing the same with the

additional context that the 2013 elections were rigged, and the then ruling party PMLN came to

power through voting fraud. While in 2016, the center-point of the rallies was also again corruption

following the Panama Leaks scandal. In all these instances, the demands from Khan almost

remained the same on one pretext or another – the resignation of the prime minister and immediate

elections.

The 2011 speech, laden with metaphors and rhetorical statements, was a polemic against

the country's two mainstream parties PMLN and PPP. Instead of focusing on any particular issue

or providing any evidence to his claims against the other party leaders, Khan employs general

rhetoric, using religion to bolster his arguments. Another major theme is recalling the founding CEU eTD Collection fathers of Pakistan to portray himself as honest and truthful as them. He, throughout referred to

making a new Pakistan that fulfills the ideals of the founding fathers. Another theme is the

otherization of everyone who disagrees with Khan's narrative, terming them as the evil in the

country. Similarly, the 2014 dharna speeches, whose theme was to pressure the incumbents into

to election reforms and investigating the alleged corruption in 2013 elections fell into similar

template: blaming the PMLN and PPP as corrupt and thieves and presenting himself as the

solution. In 2016, protest rallies were conducted in four major cities of Pakistan to force the

government and the judiciary for the formation of a judicial commission to investigate the offshore

properties of the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Again, all four speeches followed similar

patterns. Unproven claims such as "these corrupt leaders have stashed USD 200-300 billion in

Swiss accounts" were made throughout.

The 2018 speech after the general election was relatively measured, given the occasion.

While most of the cricket metaphors and religious references were there, Khan's words towards

the opposition leaders, in general, were relatively measured. One of the possible explanations

could be the possible need to contact other smaller parties to form a coalition, and the continuous

hostile attitude towards previous governments could have created hurdles in that regard.

Subsequently, the coalition government that was formed included a PML faction by the name of

PMLQ – which was formed by General Pervez Musharraf in his dictatorial regime from 1999-

2008 and included most of the forced defectors from PMLN and other pursuant of power through

king's party. Similarly, the other coalition partner was the Muttahida Qaumi Movement Pakistan

(MQM-P) – blamed by Khan himself as being the party full of criminals and its leader being

charged with treason. Moreover, most of Khan's cabinet consists of either the personalities who

served in Musharraf's cabinet or retired army officers, who serve as Special Assistants to the Prime

CEU eTD Collection Minister or as the heads of the state organizations.

This changing of stance against corruption and taking the same old elite of the country on

board to form a government with the co-optation of the army perfectly fits into the valence image.

As Zulianello has argued, the position of such populists remains "flexible, free-floating, and often,

inconsistent."94

3.2.2 Where Does Pakistan Fit in the Valence Populism Debate?

After establishing the valence image of Imran Khan and his party PTI, the study looks into

the unique nature of Pakistan. As discussed in the earlier chapters, the studies95 on valence

populism have been mainly done in Europe so far. Moreover, almost all the parties categorized96

as such have mainly risen in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Soviet Union and later

on at the start of the twenty-first century as a reaction to the governing parties' failures. The

specificity of the Pakistani case lies in the historical context. Almost all the parties from the

countries in Central and Eastern Europe share a communist past. Furthermore, the development in

these countries' post-communist era followed a similar reaction from the opposition political

parties.

In the case of Pakistan, there is no such common link. However, Pakistan's over three-

decade-long history of dictatorships97 does help in making sense of these populist attitudes. Khan's

tactic of focusing on corruption and demonizing the politicians is argued to be inspired by the

country's military establishment and the history of decades of authoritarian regimes. Pakistan's first

democratically elected Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was dismissed in a military coup in

1977 on charges of corruption and deteriorating law and order situation and later executed on

unsubstantiated charges. During the first two dictatorships (1958-196998 and 1977-1988)99, CEU eTD Collection

94 See, Zulianello, “Varieties of Populist Parties”, 1-21 95 Zulianello, “Varieties of Populist Parties”, 1-21 96 Ibid, 4-6 97 See, Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A modern history, Hurst, 2009 98 See, W. M. Dobell, “Ayub Khan as president of Pakistan,” Pacific Affairs 42, no. 3 (1969) 99 See Tahir Kamran, "Politics of Elections and Autocracy in Pakistan: Apprising the Electoral Process During Zia ul Haq's Regime," Journal of Political Studies 15 (2009)

political parties were partially or fully banned, and politicians were demonized. Democracy was

restored in 1988, but the next decade saw the dissolving of four governments under the military

establishment's pressure, which eventually resulted in another coup in 1999. Although political

parties were allowed to operate in the last dictatorship of Musharraf (1999-2008), most of the

political opposition were either jailed or forced to exile. Many were forced to join Musharraf's

political party PMLQ to provide legitimacy to the president. One common theme throughout was

the nabbing of politicians on corruption charges. Hence the same stance worked for Khan to woo

the masses as it worked.

Thus, the current Pakistan regime fits into the puzzle of valence populism. While, as argued

earlier, most of these valence populist parties and leaders emerged in the post-communist Central

and Eastern Europe, Pakistan100 is an aberration as it sided with the U.S. during the cold war.

However, the explanation to such a regime lies in the country's dictatorial past and the current

nature of the hybrid regime, which again bolsters the military establishment's narrative.

3.2.3 Why the Ideological Cluelessness Does Not Become Visible in the Case of Pakistan

Pakistan has always lacked the serious policy discussions and is one of the reasons why

the promises made in the party manifestos leading up to the elections are hardly taken seriously as

the blueprint of the party's intent if elected to power. This lack of serious discourse in public in

general and scholars and experts in particular stems from the absence of neutral institutions and

weak democratic institutions. This is one of the primary reasons why leaders such as Khan in

Pakistan have it easy while making populist claims in their speeches. CEU eTD Collection

100 See, Mariam Mufti et al., eds. Pakistan's Political Parties: Surviving Between Dictatorship and Democracy, Georgetown University Press, (2020).

The answer to this all again lies in the country's history marred by dictatorships that

continuously abolished the constitution of the country and kept on adding clauses that empowered

the executive at the expense of the other branches: legislature and judiciary. Eighth101 and

seventeenth amendments are examples of infamous amendments which empowered the military

dictators to bypass the legislature. Although amendments have been made in the recent past to

undo these clauses in the constitution, the democratic institutions in the country remain weak.

Moreover, the reason why the ideological leaning of a party leader does not play a

significant role in the elections is the country's patronage politics. The vote banks are divided, with

most of the voters opting for the option that their family or patronage networks supported

irrespective of the ideological leanings. Such an attitude has also allowed the frequent jumping

ships between the parties by the political leaders, especially to the "King's party."

Other than establishing PTI and Imran Khan under the definition of valence populism and

discussing the case of Pakistan, the study also looks in some of the points that Khan emphasized

in his speeches and party manifesto but failed to implement them took an opposite stance on the

issue in later stages. Starting with corruption, Pakistan has fallen one point on Transparency

International's CPI from 33 in 2018 to 32 in 2019 – indicating a worsening of the situation in that

regard. Since 2018, numerous opposition figures were arrested by the country's National

Accountability Bureau (NAB) under frivolous charges and were kept in custody without a charge-

sheet, raising concerns from various advocates of democracy both locally and abroad. Most of

these leaders were later exonerated by the courts, dealing a blow to the government's accountability CEU eTD Collection drive.

101 Government of Pakistan, “The Eighth Amendment,” Constitution of Pakistan (1973)

Secondly, Khan continuously argued in his election campaigns and rallies for renegotiating

the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) terms. However, after coming to power, the work

on the projects almost stalled for almost two years. After almost two years, the pace of the work

on the projects increased as Khan took a backstep on his commitments, and the military-

establishment stepped in by forcing the government to appoint a retired lieutenant general to head

the CPEC Authority.

Similarly, on education and health, the budget allocations have hardly seen any significant

increase. The budget for Higher Education Commission – the authority which oversees the affairs

of universities and funds the public institutes – was cut by half in two years. Moreover, the promise

of expanding the healthcare insurance system throughout the country also remains unfulfilled.

Moreover, as compared to the general focus of valence populists on non-positional issues

such as corruption, transparency, and governance, Khan continuously used religion throughout his

campaign and even after coming to power. This again shows that sometimes such populist leaders

do take some positions which add to their advantage. Moreover, focusing on religion in a Muslim-

dominated conservative country does serve the same purpose. Hence the constant references of

modeling naya Pakistan on the seventh-century Islamic state of Medina.

CEU eTD Collection

Conclusion

Expanding on the populist literature, the study looked into the various forms of populism

across the globe and different approaches employed to study it in academia. With a research aim

to study the ideological cluelessness of some populist leaders, the study specifically focused on

the valence populism, which has been studied in the context of Central and Eastern Europe in the

post-communist regimes in the region. After establishing the valence populism as a potential

framework, the study moved to analyze the case of Pakistani populism.

The current ruling party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and its chairperson and the current

Prime Minister of Pakistan Imran Khan came to power on the back of populist rhetoric following

the 2018 parliamentary general elections. 2011 saw a sudden rise of Khan on the political scene of

the country employing populist rhetoric focusing on anti-corruption, morality and governance

reforms and continued up till his election as the prime minister of the country in 2018. The study

analyzed various sets of Khan's speeches to find out the themes and discourse he employed and

proved his compatibility with valence populism. The study then discussed the specific case of

Pakistan in terms of valence populism as compared to Central and Eastern Europe, where the

phenomenon has been previously studied. The study identified the differences between the case of

Pakistan and the valence political parties of Central and Eastern Europe. While the latter region

shared a communist past and transitioned to democracies at almost the same time, and therefore,

the emergence of valence populist parties in the region was also synced, Pakistan had a different

history. While the Soviet communism did not directly impact it, Pakistan did side with the U.S. in CEU eTD Collection the Cold War. However, the roots of valence populist rhetoric lie in the three-decade-long

dictatorships in the country. These dictators sometimes even held elections to seek legitimacy and

employed similar populist rhetoric to champion their rule. The inculcation of the demonizing of

politicians transcended generations, and even a return to democracy in the country was not smooth

because of these reasons. Therefore, it became an acceptable tool for some parties like Khan's PTI

to employ valence populist rhetoric to demonize the previous government by terming them corrupt

and immoral.

Lastly, the study focused on the reasons why the ideological cluelessness and a shift on the

ideological spectrum by some leaders are not as pronounced as the case of Western democracies.

The reasons identified were the undernourished democratic institutions because of the truncated

democratic periods in the country. The latest democratic cycle is only 12-year-old with 2018

elections being only the second successive time where a democratically elected government

finished its five-year term. Furthermore, it was also argued that the existence of patronage politics

in the country also impedes the focus of the citizens on the ideological positioning of the leaders,

hence helping leaders such as Khan move on the spectrum relatively easily to their political benefit.

CEU eTD Collection

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