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Case 2:18-cv-04772 Document 1 Filed 03/29/18 Page 1 of 54 PageID: 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY CITY OF WARREN GENERAL ) No. EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT ) SYSTEM, Individually and on Behalf ) CLASS ACTION of All Others Similarly Situated, ) ) COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF Plaintiff, ) THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS ) vs. ) CELGENE CORPORATION, MARK ) J. ALLES, PETER N. KELLOGG, ) SCOTT A. SMITH, NADIM AHMED ) and TERRIE CURRAN, ) ) Defendants. ) ) DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Case 2:18-cv-04772 Document 1 Filed 03/29/18 Page 2 of 54 PageID: 2 Plaintiff City of Warren General Employees’ Retirement System (“plaintiff”), individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, by plaintiff’s undersigned attorneys, for plaintiff’s complaint against defendants, alleges the following based upon personal knowledge as to plaintiff and plaintiff’s own acts and upon information and belief as to all other matters based on the investigation conducted by and through plaintiff’s attorneys, which included, among other things, a review of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filings by Celgene Corporation (“Celgene” or the “Company”), Company press releases and earning calls, and analyst and media reports about the Company. Plaintiff believes that substantial additional evidentiary support will exist for the allegations set forth herein after a reasonable opportunity for discovery. SUMMARY OF THE ACTION 1. This is a federal securities class action on behalf of all persons or entities who purchased Celgene common stock between September 12, 2016 and February 27, 2018, inclusive (the “Class Period”), seeking remedies under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”). These claims are asserted against Celgene and certain of its officers and/or directors who made materially false or misleading statements during the Class Period. 2. Celgene is a biotechnology company that specializes in the discovery, development and commercialization of therapies for the treatment of cancer and - 1 - Case 2:18-cv-04772 Document 1 Filed 03/29/18 Page 3 of 54 PageID: 3 inflammatory diseases. Its most successful drug is Revlimid, a drug for the treatment of multiple myeloma (a type of plasma cell cancer). The majority of Celgene’s net sales derive from Revlimid, and the drug accounted for more than 60% of Celgene’s total net product sales for the year ended December 31, 2016. The Company has also relied on dramatic increases in the price of Revlimid to drive revenue growth in recent years. Since 2010, the price of treatment with Revlimid has tripled to more than $20,000 per month. 3. Revlimid will lose its patent exclusivity in the coming years, at which point cheaper generics will be able to enter the market. As a result, before and during the Class Period, it was important to investors that the Company develop and successfully commercialize new drugs to diversify and ultimately replace its reliance on revenues from Revlimid sales. Three of the most promising drugs in Celgene’s product pipeline to replace Revlimid were: (i) GED-0301, a late-stage developmental treatment for Crohn’s disease; (ii) Otezla, a commercial-stage treatment for psoriasis approved by the FDA in 2014; and (iii) Ozanimod, a developmental treatment for relapsing multiple sclerosis and ulcerative colitis. 4. In April 2014, Celgene acquired GED-0301 from Irish-based pharmaceutical startup Nogra Pharma Limited (“Nogra”) for $710 million. At the time, Celgene hailed the drug as a “potentially transformative therapy” that had demonstrated “striking clinical activity in a phase II trial.” According to Celgene, - 2 - Case 2:18-cv-04772 Document 1 Filed 03/29/18 Page 4 of 54 PageID: 4 over half of the patients in the study who took higher doses of GED-0301 achieved clinical remission as compared to a placebo or lower doses. The Company stated that it would begin registration for a phase III trial by the end of 2014. 5. Celgene and its top executives went to great lengths to dispel investors’ concerns regarding the viability of GE-0301. Following the drug’s acquisition, they began touting GED-0301 as “a multibillion-dollar asset” and, together with Otezla and Ozanimod, as an eventual “replacement” for the Company’s Revlimid revenues. As an expression of the confidence management purportedly had in GED-0301, Otezla, Ozanimod and Celgene’s other pipeline products, in January 2015 the Company unveiled a five-year strategic plan. The Company projected $21 billion of net product sales by 2020, or nearly triple the Company’s total net product sales for fiscal 2014, which included hundreds of millions of dollars of sales from GED-0301 and an expansion in Otezla sales. 6. At the start of the Class Period, on September 12, 2016, the Company released topline data from an interim endoscopy trial for GED-0301, known as “CD- 001.” The Company hailed the CD-001 results as demonstrating “both endoscopic improvements and clinically meaningful responses and remission at an early timepoint in this study.” By enrolling more severe Crohn’s disease patients across a wider variety of test sites, the study was designed to address and dispel investor concerns related to phase II trial results. As Celgene’s Global Head of Medical Affairs stated at - 3 - Case 2:18-cv-04772 Document 1 Filed 03/29/18 Page 5 of 54 PageID: 5 the time, “ With the interim results from CD-001, we now feel more confident most of the questions have been addressed .” In the following weeks, the Company continued to receive interim trial data about the efficacy of GED-0301 and to analyze these data, as CD-001 entered a 52-week observational phase after the treatment phase and the Company continued to analyze data from the treatment phase. 7. Celgene had failed to use a placebo control arm in the CD-001 trial, forcing investors to rely on management’s positive characterizations of the drug’s potential. When pressed to defend the lack of a placebo control arm during an analyst call discussing the results, a Company representative claimed that any placebo would have shown “nearly zero” endoscopic remission given the severity of the baseline patient population. In truth, Celgene had designed a faulty interim endoscopy trial in order to dispel investor concerns about its phase II trial, while misrepresenting the import of the results. As Celgene and its top management knew, or recklessly disregarded, but failed to disclose, GED-0301 had not shown meaningful or sustained efficacy through the interim endoscopy trial, and the phase III trial had a materially greater likelihood of failure than publicly disclosed. 8. Over the next year, top Company executives participated in more than a dozen analyst calls, industry conferences and investor meetings in which they claimed that GED-0301 continued to show transformative promise, that the Company’s 2020 guidance would be met or exceeded, and that Celgene would be able to develop the - 4 - Case 2:18-cv-04772 Document 1 Filed 03/29/18 Page 6 of 54 PageID: 6 revenue streams necessary to replace Revlimid and continue the Company’s growth. For example, during a January 9, 2017 analyst conference, Celgene’s Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) Mark J. Alles touted GED-0301, Ozanimod and Otezla as “an opportunity to, literally, change the entire landscape of how these diseases are treated over the next year to 10 years” and help “create a multi-billion-dollar add on to our current product portfolio.” Similarly, on September 14, 2017, Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) Peter N. Kellogg told investors that Celgene had a “tremendously powerful and rich pipeline,” with GED-0301 as a key component that “ will drive our business . throughout the entire next decade .” On September 26, 2017 – with only four days left in Celgene’s third fiscal quarter – the Company’s President of Hematology & Oncology, Nadim Ahmed, stated that Celgene had great “ visibility ” from recent trial data indicating that GED-0301 would be a potential “ blockbuster ,” that Otezla’s “ex U.S. sales” were growing “ at a greater than 100% clip ,” and that, as a result, the Company was “ very, very confident about 2020 in terms of meeting or exceeding our expectations.” 9. Less than one month after the last of these statements to investors, on October 19, 2017, the Company shocked investors when it revealed that it would be abandoning its long-touted drug GED-0301 and discontinuing ongoing trials and would record a $1.6 billion impairment charge (with certain offsets) as a result of the drug’s failure. The move followed a futility analysis by an independent Data - 5 - Case 2:18-cv-04772 Document 1 Filed 03/29/18 Page 7 of 54 PageID: 7 Monitoring Committee that had determined the drug was ineffective, notwithstanding management’s earlier contentions to the contrary. On this news, the price of Celgene stock fell $14.63 per share to close at $121.33 per share on October 20, 2017, a one- day decline of nearly 11%. 10. Then, on October 26, 2017, Celgene released its third quarter 2017 results. The Company once again surprised investors by revealing that certain key drugs had missed expectations for the quarter. Most notably, sales for Otezla – which Celgene representatives had just recently claimed were “going very, very well” – had in fact slowed to only 2% U.S. growth, compared to 41% year-over-year U.S. growth the prior quarter. The Company also posted only an 87% increase in international sales, far below the “greater than 100% clip” touted by Company representatives at the end of the quarter. Worse still, Celgene revised downward its 2020 guidance as a result of the poor results and the loss of projected GED-0301 revenues.