For the study of Liberal, SDP and Issue 39 / Summer 2003 / £7.50 Liberal Democrat history

Journal of LiberalHI ST O R Y

A short history of political virginity Chris Radley, with Mark Pack The story of the SDP Original cartoons from the Social Democrat Bill Rodgers Biography: David Owen Stefan Seelbach Aspects of organisational modernisation The case of the SDP Bill Rodgers and Chris Rennard What went wrong at Darlington? 1983 by-election analysed Conrad Russell, Tom McNally, Tim Benson Book reviews Roy Jenkins, Giles Radice, Alan Mumford Liberal Democrat History Group A SHORT HISTORY OF POLITICAL VIRGINITY he Social Democratic Party Chris Radley, book reviews, and New subscription rates for was launched on 26 March a comprehensive bibliography the Journal T1981, and just under seven and chronology for students of Subscription rates for the Journal years later merged with the the SDP. will be increasing from the new Liberals to form today’s Liberal The original cartoon draw- subscription year, starting in Sep- Democrats. ings themselves – including tember 2003. This is the first rise For most of its existence, the many not reproduced in this for four years; it is necessitated by SDP published a regular news- Journal – will be on display the increasing costs of producing paper, the Social Democrat. One at London’s Gallery 33 (near what is on average a much larger of the paper’s regular cartoonists, London Bridge) throughout publication than hitherto. Chris Radley, has kindly made July 2003. Bill Rodgers, one of An annual subscription to the the originals available for repro- the SDP’s founding ‘Gang of Journal of Liberal History will cost duction in this issue of the Journal Four’, will open the exhibition £15.00 (£7.50 unwaged rate) of Liberal History. at a special showing for Liberal for individuals and £25.00 for Accordingly, this is a special Democrats on Tuesday 1 July institutions. This includes mem- issue on the story of the SDP (6.00–9.00pm). bership of the History Group – the ‘political virgins’, as many Full details of the exhibition unless you inform us otherwise. of them were. Four selections and of how you can purchase the Rates for overseas subscribers of cartoons, together with ac- cartoon originals (Journal readers are £20.00 for individuals and companying commentary, form benefit from a 10% discount!) are £30.00 for institutions; special the core of the issue, but there on the separate order form includ- The Alliance three-year rates are available for is much more: a biography of ed with this Journal. For exhibition gets to grips £55.00 (individuals) and £85.00 David Owen, analyses of the details, you can also contact Maria with tactical (institutions) total. Darlington by-election and of Linforth-Hall, Gallery Administra- voting (‘Social Standing order forms are avail- the organisational innovations tor, Gallery 33, 33 Swan Street, Democrat’, 19 able on request – for contact de- of the SDP, an interview with London SE11 1DF. June 1987) tails, see the page opposite.

2 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 Issue 39: Summer 2003 Journal of Liberal History The Journal of Liberal History is published Special issue: the SDP quarterly by the Liberal Democrat History Group. 4 The SDP: Beginnings, 1981–83 ISSN 1479-9642 Original cartoons from the Social Democrat by Chris Radley; commentary by Mark Editor: Duncan Brack Pack Deputy Editor: Sarah Taft Assistant Editor: Alison Smith 9 Drawing for Social Democracy Biographies Editor: Robert Ingham Reviews Editor: Sam Crooks An interview with SDP cartoonist Chris Radley; by Duncan Brack, Sarah Taft and Mark Pack Patrons Dr Eugenio Biagini; Professor Michael Freeden; 13 What went wrong at Darlington? Professor Earl Russell; Professor John Vincent Original memo on the 1983 by-election disaster by Bill Rodgers; commentary by Chris Rennard Editorial Board Dr Malcolm Baines; Dr Roy Douglas; Dr Barry 18 Rise … the SDP 1983–85 Doyle; Dr David Dutton; Professor David Original cartoons from the Social Democrat by Chris Radley; commentary by Mark Gowland; Dr Richard Grayson; Dr Michael Hart; Pack Peter Hellyer; Ian Hunter; Dr J. Graham Jones; Tony Little; Professor Ian Machin; Dr Mark Pack; 26 Aspects of organisational modernisation in Dr John Powell; Jaime Reynolds; Iain Sharpe political parties: the case of the SDP Editorial/Correspondence Organisational innovations introduced by the SDP; by Stefan Seelbach Contributions to the Journal – letters, articles, and book reviews – are invited. The Journal is a 33 Bibliography refereed publication; all articles submitted will be reviewed. Contributions should be sent to: Key sources on SDP and Alliance history; compiled by Mark Pack Duncan Brack (Editor) 38 Salford Road, London SW2 4BQ 34 … and decline: the SDP 1985–87 email: [email protected] Original cartoons from the Social Democrat by Chris Radley; commentary by Mark Pack All articles copyright © Journal of Liberal History.

40 Biography: David Owen Advertisements Adverts are welcome; please contact the Editor The political career and record of Dr David Owen; by Bill Rodgers for rates.

46 Merger and aftermath: 1987–89 Subscriptions/Membership Original cartoons from the Social Democrat by Chris Radley; commentary by Mark An annual subscription to the Journal of Pack Liberal History costs £15.00 (£7.50 unwaged rate). This includes membership of the History 51 Reviews Group unless you inform us otherwise. The institutional rate is £25.00 Alan Mumford: Stabbed through the Front, reviewed by Tim Benson; Giles Radice: Friends and Rivals, reviewed by Tom McNally; Roy Jenkins: A Life at the Centre, Overseas subscribers should add £5.00; reviewed by Conrad Russell or, a special three-year rate is available for £55.00 (individuals) or £85.00 (instituions). 56 Chronology Cheques (payable to ‘Liberal Democrat History Key dates in SDP and Alliance history; compiled by Mark Pack Group’) should be sent to: Patrick Mitchell 6 Palfrey Place, London SW8 1PA; email: [email protected] Liberal Democrat History Group The Liberal Democrat History Group promotes the discussion and research of historical Cover design concept: Lynne Featherstone topics relating to the histories of the Liberal Democrats, Liberal Party, and SDP, and of Liberalism. The Group organises discussion meetings and produces the Journal and other Published by the Liberal Democrat History occasional publications. Group, c/o 38 Salford Road, London SW2 4BQ

For more information, including details of publications, back issues of the Journal, tape Printed by Kall-Kwik, records of meetings and archive and other research sources, see our web site at: 426 Chiswick High Road, London W4 5TF www.liberalhistory.org.uk. June 2003 Hon President: Earl Russell Chair: Tony Little

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 3 The Social Democratic Party was launched on 26 March 1981. Just under seven years later THE SDP: BEGINNINGS, 1981–83 the SDP merged with the Liberals; a rump Owenite party stayed separate for another two years. For most of its existence, the SDP The formation of the SDP union vested interests, which published a regular (1 May 1982) they held responsible for many of The ‘Gang of Four’ – Roy the shortcomings in British poli- newspaper, the Social Jenkins, David Owen, Bill Rodg- tics and economics. ers and Shirley Williams – were Many were middle class, and Democrat. In the first the principal founders of the Roy Jenkins in particular was of four articles, we SDP. They all were or had been seen as a connoisseur of upmar- senior figures in the Labour Par- ket alcohol – hence the bottle of illustrate the history of ty; Jenkins was a former Deputy claret. ‘Claret and chips’ became the SDP through the Leader. an ironic slogan of the new party. Nevertheless, the new party drawings of one of the was notable for drawing in large Social Democrat’s regular numbers of supporters who had Pendulum politics not previously been members of (10 September 1982) cartoonists, Chris any political party. Dubbed the Many saw the SDP, and then the Radley. Commentary ‘political virgins’, they saw them- Alliance, as a new, fresh foray into selves as wanting to bring com- British politics, in contrast to the by Mark Pack. mon sense to politics, unencum- tired old parties, illustrated in the bered by big business or trade cartoon (right) by the slumped

4 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 THE SDP: BEGINNINGS, 1981–83

figures of Labour leader Michael Foot and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Until the Conservatives’ run of electoral success be- tween 1979 and 1997, the textbook view of British politics had it operating like a pendulum: regular swings from left to right gave the Conservatives and Labour alternating turns in power. The SDP set out to break this duopoly and to try and avoid the damaging reversals of policy that followed in the wake of the electoral swing.

Glamour girl (5 November 1982) Shirley Williams was the and its critics, the SDP was any real values, depending on itself. Once the party was member of the Gang of Four something different from the taste. established, the same title was with the most popular touch, traditional mould of political The Council for Social De- used as the name of the par- bringing a degree of glam- parties – novel and exciting; mocracy was initially set up as ty’s governing body. our and excitement to the or just a concoction of su- a rallying point in the run-up An incomes policy was SDP. To both its supporters perficial showiness without to the formation of the SDP the main plank of the SDP’s economic policies in the early years – in quintessential SDP style, the idea was for people to behave sensibly, talk to each other and come up with reasonable agreements, in this case on wage increases across the economy. It was one of a wide range of policy issues on which there was little difference between the Liberal Party and the SDP. This similarity greatly eased the process of striking the electoral pact known as the Alliance which was agreed in principle in 1981.

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 5 THE SDP: BEGINNINGS, 1981–83

The special relationship closest European ally of US him over the controversial siles in Europe, justifying it (19 November 1982) President Ronald Reagan. policy of basing Cruise as a response to the Soviet Margaret Thatcher was the In particular, she backed and Pershing nuclear mis- Union’s own deployment of intermediate-range nu- clear weapons. The basing of cruise missiles at RAF Greenham Common in Berkshire provoked long- running protests at the site. The future of cruise mis- siles – and of Britain’s own nuclear deterrent – was a frequent cause of tension be- tween the Liberals and SDP, especially once David Owen (a defence hawk) became SDP leader after the 1983 general election.

More economic gloom (3 December 1982) Whilst foreign policy in the early 1980s was dominated by the Cold War, the con- tinuing economic recession was the major domestic issue. The economy only began to turn the corner in the run-up to the 1983 gen-

6 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 THE SDP: BEGINNINGS, 1981–83 eral election. The recession was largely seen as Margaret Thatcher’s personal respon- sibility, due to her insist- ence on the need for radical reform to modernise the economy – almost regardless of the price to be paid.

Crossing the industrial divide (14 January 1983) As the SDP newspaper put it in an early edition: ‘As Social Democrats we are commit- ted to a fresh approach and we are determined to grapple with intractable problems with conviction and courage.’ A key part of this approach was a belief in the need to bring together the different parts of a divided society and, in particular, to overcome the divisions between bosses and unions. By contrast, Tories and Labour were seen as de- structively backing their own side – and not wanting dia- logue or co-operation across this divide. and Callaghan. They found a result, there was remarkably Snakes and ladders For the founders of the ready agreement with the little tension between the (11 February 1983) SDP, these views were rooted Liberal Party, which had been two parties over economic This cartoon, included in a in the failures of Labour’s in- espousing similar policies policy during the lifetime of special free issue of the Social dustrial policy under Wilson since the inter-war years. As the Alliance. Democrat marking the run-up

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 7 THE SDP: BEGINNINGS, 1981–83

local election results in 1982 as voters backed ‘our boys’ by voting Tory. But the run-up to the general election was not without Tory jitters, particu- larly at the possibility of the Liberal/SDP Alliance regain- ing the sky-high poll ratings it had enjoyed shortly after its creation.

Who’s running Labour? (8 April 1983) Many critics of the Labour Party saw its leader Michael Foot, shown below tethered to a tree stump, as a front for the extreme left within the party. The latter, whose central figure was Tony Benn to the 1983 general election, The Falklands in an attempt to value the (lurking behind the hill), epitomises the SDP’s view of (25 March 1983) relative effects of the recovery were seen as using Foot for Tories and Labour as failed Argentina’s invasion of the and the Falkands factor in a thin veneer of public re- chips off the same block. Falkland Islands in 1982 trans- boosting the Tories’ popularity. spectability whilst plotting to They had made many prom- formed British politics and The popular perception at the oust him and seize control of ises in the past and failed to transmuted Mrs Thatcher’s time, though, was overwhelm- the party when the moment deliver, leaving Britain stuck image into that of a battling, ingly that it was the Falklands came. Restrained by the hard with an ailing economy. It successful war leader. The which had transformed the left, including one faction was a desire to break away economic recovery that also Conservatives from seemingly called Militant Tendency, from this old, failed combina- took place at the time has certain defeat to favourites to Foot was viewed by some as tion that attracted many of resulted in much academic win the general election. The a sacrificial lamb, about to go the SDP’s supporters. controversy and exchanges of Alliance faded from its popu- down to electoral defeat. conflicting statistical models lar peak, with a poor set of

8 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 DRAWING FOR SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

Chris Radley, former cartoonist for the Social Democrat, shares his experiences of drawing cartoons throughout the lifetime of the SDP with the Journal of Liberal History. Interview by Duncan Brack, Mark Pack and Sarah Taft.

ow did you get in- poor because they were just living So it was up to you which subjects volved in drawing off the subject from an outsider’s you picked? cartoons? view. You learn quite quickly that The deal I made from the begin- As a child I always if you have a heart for the subject ning was that I would come up wanted to write and you do better cartoons because with a drawing and a line and Hdraw and I couldn’t really see a you go beyond the superficial. unless there was some factual or difference between the two; both Drawing cartoons is just some- technical error, I wouldn’t ac- were expressing ideas. I was always thing that I made a conscious cept a replacement line. It never consciously trying to find ways of decision to earn my living at, but turned out to be a problem. There doing both at the same time. Car- this particular job working with were minor corrections made; toons are one way you can achieve the Social Democrats really just there was only one occasion a both, particularly if you’re not rose out of living in Islington and cartoon wasn’t used for some simply a hack sticking drawings being involved with the party. political reason, although I can’t into someone else’s text. remember which one it was. I started out as a trained jour- Were you doing cartoons from the first I felt very nalist and then went to the Lon- issue of the newspaper? early What made you choose the cartoons don College of Printing to train as A woman called Val Taylor was that you did? a graphic designer before coming the main editor and a colleague on that A lot of this had to do with the back into the media world. Dur- of mine was working at Cowley timing of the cartoons and it was ing early jobs in the newspaper Street producing print materials Margaret my background in daily newspa- and magazine industry, I would with his wife; they had a print- pers that influenced me. do cartoons for pocket money. If ing press in the basement. It was Thatcher I knew Giles and Lowe and all you’re working inside a publish- through that connection that I was mad the great giants among the pre- ing organisation and they’ve got a got introduced. They paid me a and post-war political cartoonists. lot of retail magazines and things sum of money for the first few – not, prob- They would do a drawing the day like that you can earn a fiver by issues, when they had a budget, before, often the evening before, contributing a cartoon here and which I think was something ably, sec- in time to catch the first edition. there. I used to get things in Melo- like thirty pounds, but when I watched them working and dy Maker and magazines like that, money got difficult we just tionable, they would use the energy of the although the cartoons were fairly dropped all that. but mad. previous day’s news to carry the

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 9 DRAWING FOR SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

explain to him that she wasn’t a wonderful woman at all, that she was an extremely dangerous woman and that I had the demo- cratic right to say so in any way I chose. He didn’t buy a cartoon, which I rather hoped he would! I don’t know what my car- toons achieved, but I felt very early on that Margaret Thatcher was mad – not, probably, section- able, but mad. I was very wor- ried about a human being with those propensities getting more and more powerful. I couldn’t see how she would be restrained from going to places that were cartoon. They would know that was. There was a known cast of Cartoon from really worrying and I wanted the people would remember that characters and a fairly restricted the ‘Social alarm I felt to be communicated. someone had made an embar- audience of the educated, impor- Democrat’, I wanted to alarm other people or rassing remark on the TV and that tant people of central London. 20 July 1984. to reinforce their sense of alarm. I you would only have to refer to They knew the game, they knew The electorate would like to think that to some it to take the joke another stage the inside jokes and they knew appear to want extent that happened. further; it was fairly easy to get a the people, so the drawings had merger, but Up to a minor level I was also belly-laugh. to be identifiable in those terms. the parties are bothered by the Labour Party’s Working on this fortnightly I’ve always liked his brilliant divided. leadership. There were one or periodical, you couldn’t rely on draughtsmanship and his cour- two people like Healey who I that overnight buzz. A fortnight age at throwing himself at wild had strong approval of in certain is a long time in politics and subjects. respects, but there are were a lot a whole lot of things happen of hard-left people quite cold- in the interval. You couldn’t Were you consciously trying to achieve bloodedly using the Labour Party anticipate something that was anything with your drawings? to achieve results. That was a going to be big that far ahead, I think I was expressing things whistle I wanted to blow. so you picked a subject that you that I felt angry about. I don’t thought would still have cur- think I would have counted on What kind of reactions did your car- rency a fortnight later. a tangible result otherwise and I toons prompt? Inevitably, some subjects got knew that I was talking to people The editor would pass to me any killed by that process. If you knew that mostly would have shared letters that came in. There were that a vote or some Bill was going my feelings. seldom very many, but there was to go through, or fall, in that pe- I had a very interesting ex- one issue where I had drawn riod and you didn’t have enough perience with Jeffrey Archer. Margaret Thatcher in Number information about it, you didn’t The Association of Cartoonists Ten sitting at a table full of Japa- dare use it because you might just held a fair in the basement of nese businessmen. A whole lot pitch it wrong. You tended to take a hotel somewhere in London of SDP people wrote in saying stuff that had more legs than that; and they’d got cartoonists to that it was ethnically branding things with some sort of abrasion take stalls and sell their work and a group of people as if they had to them. Doing political cartoons Archer, who is a known collec- no character. I think that was that are based on caricatures, you tor of cartoons, happened to be the most angry anyone ever got are being personally unkind to there. He came to my stall quite with me, although there were someone most of the time, so late on and went through every occasions when someone would you have to be really sure of your one of some 170 or so cartoons, write to say that I’d missed the ground before you pitch it that at least fifty of which were Mar- real point, which was probably far ahead. garet Thatcher drawings. I didn’t true sometimes. have any Jeffrey Archer ones Did you consciously model yourself because he was never quite im- You seem to concentrate on external on any other cartoonist? portant enough to draw at the matters rather than the internal go- Gillray is my man and in his day time. Anyway, he gave me a real ings-on of the SDP or the Alliance; he was doing a weekly cartoon in hammering and spent twenty for example, we didn’t see anything of rather the same way that I was. minutes telling me that I was the nuclear defence debate In many ways he was working disgraceful to attack this won- I can’t really defend myself on to the same set of pressures as I derful woman. I did my best to that. It could only have been that

10 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 DRAWING FOR SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

I couldn’t think of anything smart what he said, I rather respected Just by showing that cartoon of enough to say about it at the him as a person and I wasn’t in John Major with Y-fronts over the time or that I didn’t have a clear the business of just sticking knives front of his trousers they demol- enough view myself. You’ve got into people. ished his credibility. I don’t think to start from a point of view, oth- There were one or two like I’ve ever been quite that cruel. erwise you can’t draw anything. that on the other side of the line. I used to work for Hugh There were one or two oc- I saw Tebbit as a genuine figure of Cudliffe at the Daily Mirror, and casions when I was ambivalent blackness and I put black crows he said that a good journalist has myself about where I stood on an on his shoulders. If I’d been an ear to the contemporary scene; issue, I didn’t always automatically working on a national newspa- not only do they hear and sniff agree with what the party was per instead of a party newspaper out matters but they articulate saying. I would have done much more it first. It’s that split-second of of that. earlier articulation that the public There weren’t very many cartoons reads and has a buzz of recogni- dealing with the Liberals or David Did you ever feel like taking sides on tion; they already feel these things Steel? particular issues? but they just haven’t put them I think I felt that I knew what the I’d come to the conclusion that into words for themselves. Liberal principles were, by and the merger made sense and al- The same thing happens with large. I don’t think anyone had though I would have been pick- advertising. They articulate what realised that the centre ground was ing up enough of the arguments everyone feels about a gen- what you had to take if you really that were going on to make hay eral subject but accommodate wanted to be a new force in poli- if I’d wanted to, I think that’s the it within a brand message and tics. I was concerned that a some- point when I put my independ- articulate it in half a dozen words what left-of-centre social view ence aside and was politic. with a bit of music. Next day half should obtain, but that it should be Owen I was fairly positive the population is singing it, saying not a victim of these doctrinaire about. I knew he was trouble it or using it as their opinion in a positions that the left- and right- but I also felt he was brave and pub dialogue. wing parties were taking. energetic and capable of carrying I think good cartoons can do I just felt that at the time that people with him. When Maclen- the same. the Liberal Party wasn’t terrifi- nan took over, I didn’t have much cally practical because it chased confidence in him as a forceful Do you have a favourite cartoon? those ideals, whereas a bunch of leader and I thought of him as a There are two really. One of them escapees from the Labour Party A good bit milk-and-water. Even with has got the Conservative Party who had been in government Steel, they certainly didn’t look sitting around a table covered and knew about power were journalist like a dynamic duo to me. with a Union Jack tablecloth and much more practically directed. there is an Ethiopian kneeling in I certainly didn’t have any has an ear Were there any occasions you re- front of it. I’ve done a lot of work great critical things to say about to the con- ally wished you’d done a different for development charities and I the Liberals, otherwise they prob- cartoon? always felt very passionately that ably would have featured more temporary There were quite a lot of times the Tories were ignoring a lot of often. I was very pro-David Steel. with Ken Livingstone, who was a terrible human suffering so that I found out later from people scene; not really wonderful target, although one really came from the heart in the SDP that there was quite I did do one of him where I had and I thought it was one of my a lot of friction between him only do him dressed up as Napoleon dur- better drawings too. and Owen, but it hadn’t filtered they hear ing his GLC campaign. In a much earlier one that I through to my attention, so The problem really was that liked, I’d drawn a single figure nobody was loading me with a and sniff the main targets had to be the with Shirley Williams on the point of view on that. Parliamentary Labour Party and front and Cyril Smith on the out matters the Parliamentary Conservative back and I loved it; I just thought Tony Benn features in quite a lot of Party; those were where the big it was exactly what I wanted to your cartoons as a sort of ghost of the but they battles were happening. I felt say. It was at the time when these hard left, but although the overall im- articulate that if the topics of local coun- two parties were trying very hard pression of him is fairly unflattering, cils, even the GLC, become too to work together and here you his actual picture is not particularly it first. I dominant it would pull attention had Shirley Williams and Cyril unpleasant, whereas with Neil Kin- away from the stuff that seemed Smith in the same place; it was nock and Mrs Thatcher you really ac- think good to need pinning down more. funny in every sense, physically centuate the negative features of their and politically. appearance. Was there a particular cartoons What do cartoons achieve that words Unfortunately it went missing. reason for that? can do the can’t? I can’t think that Cyril Smith got I think probably because al- Just think about the power of it, so it’s just possible that it’s sit- though I disagreed with most of same. satire such as ‘Spitting Image’. ting in Shirley Williams’ toilet.

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 11 WHAT WENT WRONG AT DARLINGTON?

The Darlington by- election of 24 March 1983 was a disaster for the SDP. After a campaign which had started with an opinion poll (taken just two days after the Alliance’s overwhelming victory in Bermondsey), showing the SDP in the lead, the outcome was a poor third place. ‘Dear, oh dear, e started as of the doubt. Vincent Hanna was The result dissipated it’s pitiful – I’m favour ites in in a different category, but his ag- the momentum gained afraid it’s time Darlington and gressive style at Darlington was for the old nag finished third. no different from his behaviour at Bermondsey and left to go to grass!’ We should have in by-elections elsewhere. (‘Guardian’, 28 Wwon. What went wrong and what 3. Andy Ellis made his usu- the Alliance entering February 1983) are the lessons? al constructive contribution and the 1983 election – what the First, we should eliminate the local Liberals played their full part campaign on the back press expected irrelevant. in the campaign, led by their Pres- to happen at 1. The organisation of ident, Ian Gale. They loyally sup- foot. Here we reprint, Darlington. the campaign was not at fault. ported the decision that the SDP for the time in the The headquarters worked ef- should fight Darlington and their ficiently, canvass arrangements members were always in evidence. public domain, the were first class and party workers Privately, several Liberals said that were deployed quickly and to the their own (displaced) candidate internal memo Bill right places. The great majority of was not strong and would have Rodgers wrote after voters were canvassed – many of done no better. As for the voters, them more than once – and a vast it was a mistake to assume that any the campaign, together quantity of literature delivered. previous Liberal vote automati- with a commentary 2. Although the Press were cally comes to the SDP (or even to play a part in the undermining stays Liberal). Two-thirds is a fair from the Liberal of our campaign, they were fair proportion to expect. Democrats’ current and conscientious. Correspond- Second, we should remind ents as different as Peter Riddell, ourselves of the nature of the Campaigns Director Peter Hetherington and Robin constituency. In its social com- Chris Rennard. Oakley reported faithfully, oc- position, it was attractive to us: casionally giving us the benefit apparently good SDP territory

12 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 WHAT WENT WRONG AT DARLINGTON?

(although with a small and rather The Labour party fought a amined: our candidate; attitudes unrepresentative SDP member- skilful campaign with massive re- towards the Labour party; policy. ship which played no distinctive sources. Its canvass of the constit- 1. Tony Cook, a television part in the campaign). But it was uency was probably as thorough presenter with Tyne-Tees, won also the archetypal ‘squeeze’ seat, as ours. It equalled and overtook instant recognition on the streets with Labour and the Conserva- our display of posters which made and doorsteps. His folksy, friendly tives dividing the vote between a good initial impact but failed to manner was well liked. This was them in hard-fought marginal grow significantly. At times, it a positive asset. There is no doubt contests. In 1979, 10.2% for seemed as if every full-time trade that he is a decent man and de- the Liberals in Darlington was union official was in Darlington, serves the greatest credit for sur- well below the national average complete with a Granada 2.3. viving the immense personal bat- (14.9% in England). Our best There were more Labour people tering he received. He must not hope was always to push one of – respectable, in collar and tie It is dif- be a scapegoat. But his own fatal the old parties into third place – knocking-up on Polling Day flaw was fatal to the campaign. He and then collapse their vote. The than we had available. ficult to had very little knowledge of poli- need to achieve tactical voting The Labour party presented escape the tics and showed limited aptitude was inescapable. its acceptable face to the voters in for learning. His style and voice The course of the campaign the person of Jim Callaghan who conclusion marked him as a lightweight seems clear. Our initial canvass made two separate visits and was without positive ideas or passion. was optimistic with inexperienced well received. Healey and Hat- that he He was unable to hold his own canvassers giving us the benefit of tersley were both in evidence. at Press Conferences or with the the doubt. The assumption was Silkin made a brief, early, visit but was almost other candidates. For undecided too readily made that the Labour Tony Benn and the far left were the worst voters, needing a pretext for vote was crumbling when it had absent and there was very little supporting the SDP/Liberal Al- only become soft. But a fortnight even of Tribune. An ugly incident candidate liance, he provided an excuse for before Polling Day we were al- in the town centre, on the Satur- returning to their old loyalties. It most certainly in the lead. Labour day before polling, was isolated. we could is difficult to escape the conclu- then began to gain ground (Shil- The fact that something could be sion that he was almost the worst don, Jim Callaghan’s visit and a made of one member of Militant have cho- candidate we could have chosen massive doorstep operation) while seen in the streets of Darlington sen to fight to fight a crucial by-election un- the Conservatives stayed in third was a measure of their absence. der close scrutiny and in a town position without showing much The Conservative campaign a crucial which took its politics seriously. enthusiasm and were not helped is less easy to measure. Activ- The Press came from Ber- by the Budget. They provided a ity appeared to be subdued and by-elec- mondsey rather ashamed of their substantial pool of undecided vot- meetings were poorly attended. treatment of Peter Tatchell and ers. About a week before polling, We can assume that it was steady tion under anxious to redress the balance. Labour voters began returning to and efficient and made great play close scru- Darlington provided them with their traditional loyalties. There of loyalty to the Government. At the opportunity. Tony Cook’s was a short period when Con- one stage, Conservative manag- tiny and vulnerability was clear from his servatives might have turned to ers were resigned to third place. first Press Conference – and ear- the SDP to keep Labour out, but Conservative voters moved back in a town lier, to those newspapermen who the attraction was insufficient and as much because of our failure as had interviewed him. Early in the the Conservative vote stiffened of positive enthusiasm. which took first week of the campaign we over the final weekend. Victory So, to what was our failure its politics provided him with full-time re- was moving away from us rapidly due? search assistance (Alex de Mont, in the final three days. Three factors need to be ex- seriously. then Wendy Buckley) and John

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 13 WHAT WENT WRONG AT DARLINGTON?

The ‘Social O’Brien emerged well from such Democrat’, 1 comparisons. October 1982 Nor did the Labour Council – the SDP present much of a target. Council rising above estates were in reasonable condi- sectarian tion and complaints were few. politics Several former councillors had left the Labour party (the most promi- nent being Ces Smith) and joined the SDP, but they tended to be in the O’Grady mould and uncertain quantities in our campaign. The fact remains that we failed to mount an effective anti-La- bour campaign either by attack- ing O’Brien as less moderate than he seemed or, alternatively (and with greater conviction), as a fig leaf. An early leaflet saying that Peter Tatchell and Ossie O’Brien were members of the same party – with Tatchell in the dominant position – might have made sense. There was criticism of Labour throughout our campaign but it was fierce only in the closing stages. We were too cautious in the period when we were run- ning ahead and too inhibited by Horam became his speechwriter. 2. The Labour vote did awareness of the weakness of our He was taken off canvassing for not crumble and the Labour own candidate. tutorials; given a driver so he candidate recaptured many of 3. The weakness of our might read the morning papers; those who initially preferred to candidate was also an impedi- and provided with an MP at come to us. The acceptable face ment to the positive presentation his right hand. In particular, Jim of the Labour party held its own. of SDP policies. Even when he Wellbeloved was an invaluable There are a number of reasons for could put them across, he was un- presence through most of the this. The Labour candidate, Ossie able to stand up to cross-exami- campaign. Tony Cook’s perform- O’Brien, was respectable, serious nation about them. It was easy to ance improved but it remained and a native of Darlington. He say that someone else had written unimpressive and the damage would have been a good candi- the script. Except on defence, he was done. In the last week of the date, although not an exciting one, was vulnerable on virtually eve- campaign, canvassers increasingly anywhere. The left was carefully rything, including routine issues reported that they had been told excluded from the campaign and like housing and education. on the doorstep about the inad- the Co-operative Party made its Nevertheless, the precise and equacies of our candidate. own moderate and sober contri- thoughtful presentation of SDP It may be that he should never bution. To be a unilateralist and policies in a leaflet – with the em- have taken part in the debate at anti-Common Market was not phasis on national politics, national Polam Hall before an audience evidence of extremism, especially leaders and the Alliance as an from private schools. There is no when Jim Callaghan was prepared alternative government – would doubt that this televised event to bless it. have made sense. In addition, on took the comparison between Most Labour party supporters each day of the campaign we candidates right to the voters. But did not compare their candidate’s could have concentrated on a sin- his weakness had been diagnosed position with a Golden Age of gle issue and given it prominence. by the Press much earlier and it is Labour, long ago: Attlee and We failed to make an impact on very difficult to refuse the chal- Gaitskell were dead before some such major issues as the mixed lenge of at least one three-sided of them were born. The com- economy and trade union reform. confrontation in a by-election. parison was with Peter Tatchell If it had proved difficult to do so in In fact, this is precisely the sort of and the Militants; or, at best, with Darlington during the campaign, occasion the SDP as a new party Tony Benn and Arthur Scargill then it might have been possible should welcome and expect to (Ken Livingstone was not a fa- to contrive major speeches by par- make a positive impression in. miliar name in Darlington). Ossie ty leaders elsewhere. It is possible

14 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 WHAT WENT WRONG AT DARLINGTON?

– to put it no higher – that posi- come. We need the best evidence 4. Optimistic canvassing tive ideas might have held some of the perception of the Labour at Darlington exaggerated our wavering Conservative voters in party to Labour voters and the lead; amateur canvassing in the the final stages. best advice on how to undermine middle stages failed to detect Overall, it might be said that confidence in it. The leadership of the drift away. More to the point, our campaign was insufficiently the party, all MPs, all candidates, much of the canvassing seemed to aggressive and concentrated on including candidates for Coun- have reverted to the old pattern style (and razzmatazz) rather than cil seats, should pursue the same of asking the voter’s intention positive presentation. It is hard to themes. The period up to the rather than positively persuad- believe that the shortcomings of Council elections of 5 May should ing him that he should vote SDP. our candidate could have been be used for such a campaign. This may have been the result of remedied or concealed. But if we Meanwhile, for Cardiff, we ‘Yes’ being a frequent reply to had been reconciled to this ear- should consider an initial leaflet a canvasser’s question. But the lier, we might have been able to which shows the candidate (who voter was not then exposed to construct a campaign that at least apparently lends herself well to the arguments found necessary in part passed him by. this) amongst a circle of faces in the past to persuade him. His Most of the lessons are obvi- including Tony Benn, Arthur well-intentioned support was not ous, but here are some: Scargill, Ken Livingstone and Pe- consolidated. 1. We need the best pos- ter Tatchell. The theme would be, When canvassers arrive in sible candidate for a gruelling ‘This is the real Labour party’ and large numbers, it is not easy to in- by-election and should be free to would be supported by facts and struct them. We may have also as- choose him. It is hardly likely that figures about Militant, the Left sumed that between Warrington we would have displaced Tony generally, constitutional changes and Darlington most had become Cook on this occasion (a newly- in the Labour party and support experienced. But in future there elected television presenter on for Labour from outside, far left should be a form of briefing for the eve of a General Election groups. all canvassers and instant train- with no obvious alternative in 3. We should try once ing for some. They should be sight). But the National Com- again to identify a limited number encouraged to discuss issues with mittee should have the power to of policies which are peculiarly supporters. make the choice. ours and keep driving them home 5. This means at least as In addition, we should be more in a simplified and repetitive many canvassers as we had at ruthless in considering the suit- fashion. At the beginning of each Darlington. In fact, although the ability of candidates for the panel; by-election, such national themes We should initial response was very good, and insistent that all selected can- should be related to local circum- in the final stages the number of didates attend a training school stances and should be promoted try once experienced canvassers was lim- (our present one-day Confer- throughout the campaign. ited. Although virtually all MPs ences do not go far enough and It would be silly to pretend again to visited Darlington, longer stays half of our candidates have failed that the political direction of a identify would have been welcome. More to attend). At by-elections, can- by-election campaign can be seriously, the number of Parlia- didates should be put through a determined at the beginning and a limited mentary candidates appeared to rigorous training session at the maintained throughout. Cam- be few, with fewer still from the beginning of the campaign; and paigns have their own rhythm and number of panel as a whole. provided with an MP as a ‘mind- are volatile. But positive decisions The financial cost of visiting er’, together with proper research made early could be reflected policies by-elections can be high. Not facilities throughout. both in literature and at meet- which are everyone can afford it. But steps In the long run, our selection ings. Each day of the campaign should be taken to make all par- process itself should be reviewed. could be seen as presenting a new peculiarly ties and all candidates aware of It is said that Tony Cook showed theme and visiting speakers could the importance of Cardiff and to up poorly on the shortlist ‘hus- be asked to speak accordingly. ours and pledge attendance. tings’. But voters who had not In every by-election prior to 6. In relation both to the seen him in action voted for him Darlington, we had experienced keep driv- Labour party and the SDP’s own overwhelmingly. This disparity candidates well able to make their ing them positive policies, we should have between members who meet and own judgements and draw on a more sophisticated means of hear candidates and the larger advice when they chose. There is home in judging the movement of opin- number who vote in the postal a limit to the extent to which po- ion during a by-election and ballot has been a common feature litical direction can be imposed a simpli- the best positive advice on how of all selections. on a candidate whose primary to put our ideas over as events 2. Careful thought should responsibility it should normally fied and move on. At Darlington, there be given to a concentrated cam- be. But from Cardiff on, a more repetitive was a large output of literature paign to discredit the Labour party deliberate process of political de- and much thought was given to and show it up for what it has be- cision making should be tried. fashion. it. But judgments were inevitably

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 15 WHAT WENT WRONG AT DARLINGTON? rough-and-ready and design and In 1983, with the SDP ahead in the early mentum and relevance is vital. presentation were not fully con- by-election polls. The background But each SDP leaflet in Darling- sidered. For example, the ‘Good Tony seemed promising, with a gen- ton appeared to have a different Morning’ leaflet for Polling Day eral election likely in the sum- author with a different idea about was the collective work of a few Cook’s mer. Michael Foot’s leadership a good national message to put of us, guessing at the eleventh of the Labour Party was in crisis, across. Previous SDP successes hour about what might prevent third place Mrs Thatcher seemed vulnerable such as Warrington (undeniably the erosion of votes. It may have was a in spite of a successful Falklands a relative success and a campaign- been the right leaflet but we were war and Bermondsey gave the ing triumph), Crosby and Hill- unsure of our market and unsure crushing Liberal–SDP Alliance the essential head had Roy Jenkins and Shirley of our product. momentum that it needed. Williams as the central part of the We now have advertising blow to the As Bill’s memo makes clear, the message. The crucial questions in agents advising us on how to put inadequacy of SDP candidate Tony Crosby and Hillhead were should our national message across and Alliance in Cook was generally considered to Roy or Shirley be in Parliament? providing professional skills to do the run- be the most significant factor in And did they want an Alliance or so. We have private polls and re- the Darlington debacle in which a Tory MP (with Labour out of search activities to help us in our up to the the SDP slid from first place in the the race)? These messages made judgments. All this is absent from early polls to third place on polling it an easy choice for many vot- by-elections: we work in the dark general day. But the first big mistake of the ers. Tony Cook did not have the in an amateur way. As by-elec- Darlington SDP campaign was the same appeal and the Darlington tions are so vital to us and as in- election approach (taken at a higher level campaign (like those of many of formation and experience gained and saved than Tony Cook) of claiming to the SDP MPs who lost their seats at by-elections have a national be in the lead in the beginning. in 1983) appeared to show little significance, is it not time that we Michael It may have been difficult to ap- understanding of tactical voting. brought our advertising agents pear to contradict the early polls Some lessons were clearly and our pollsters to them? Foot’s lead- – but it makes it hard to build learned. The SDP campaign in The outcome of the Darling- momentum, or to make a tactical Portsmouth South (1984) had ton is not that the SDP and the ership of argument, if you appear arrogant not only a popular and effective Alliance cannot win in seats like the Labour enough to be claiming victory local councillor standing in Mike this or that the voters have reject- before the campaign begins. Hancock, but also had a leading ed us. On the contrary, our sense Party. My impression of the Dar- Liberal agent, Peter Chegwyn, of disappointment is because we lington campaign was that it was producing leaflets about local could have won but threw away extremely well organised – as SDP issues and tactical voting. Whilst the chance. by-elections always were with the Fulham (1986) ended up re- very able organiser Alec McGivan peating some of the Darlington 27 March 1983 WTR in charge. SDP campaigns were mistakes, Greenwich (1987) was also much better resourced than the most closely integrated Alli- any Liberal agent could ever ance campaign ever. It had SDP Commentary dream of. The political manage- organisation and money, with ef- (Chris Rennard) ment of some SDP by-election fective Liberal campaigning. Bill Rodger’s memo on the fail- campaigns, however, and Darling- But in 1983, Tony Cook’s ure of the SDP campaign in the ton in particular, was poor. Liberal third place was a crushing blow Darlington by-election makes friends who went to Darlington to the Alliance in the run-up to particularly frustrating reading sent me copies of the SDP leaflets. the general election and saved for anyone involved in the Lib- Apart from thinking that they Michael Foot’s leadership of the eral Party or the SDP at the time. were printed about five times as Labour Party. Prior to Darlington, There were high hopes following expensively as ever I would have the only thing keeping Foot in the successful launch of the SDP been able to afford, I noted that place was the fear of those plot- and the formation of the Alliance. there were no overarching themes, ting against him that he would But the June 1983 general elec- no overall pattern to them and be replaced by Tony Benn. In tion was little short of a disaster no real attempt to make national the approach to the election, for the SDP and a failure for the messages relevant to Darlington. Foot could have been replaced Alliance. The Darlington by-elec- I also noted at the time that the by Dennis Healey as his Deputy tion, in my view, had much to do most effective literature was that without a contest. This might with that disappointment. produced by Michael Fallon, the well have happened without In February 1983, Simon Tory candidate. He came second Darlington – so once again Den- Hughes had won the Bermond- in the March by-election and nis Healey’s leadership ambitions sey by-election with just about went on to win it in the June gen- were thwarted by the SDP – al- the biggest swing mathematically eral election. though in a less intentional man- possible – 44%. The Darlington Literature is crucial to by- ner than when defecting Labour campaign began soon afterwards elections and the message, mo- MPs voted for Michael Foot

16 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 WHAT WENT WRONG AT DARLINGTON? before joining the SDP. to her position that she was effec- Chris Rennard was the Liberal agent As it was, Labour’s success in tively talking up Labour’s position. in Liverpool Mossley Hill at the time Darlington gave at least a tem- But the Alliance surge came of Darlington. In his constituency the porary fillip to their fortunes too late. Had the Alliance been biggest swing against any party in and the Alliance lost the benefit closer to Labour at the start of England in June 1983 was recorded of the Bermondsey boost. Three the 1983 campaign, then Labour against the Tories (14% Con–Lib) on months later, the Alliance recov- would almost certainly have been a day when Mrs Thatcher triumphed ered momentum and Labour pushed into third place nationally. in much of the country. He was a key faltered badly during the course The story of the 1980s might not member of the fully integrated Alliance of the general election campaign. have been about Kinnock slowly by-election team that was successful The polls towards the end of the dragging Labour back from the in the 1987 Greenwich by-election, campaign showed the Alliance brink, but of the Alliance effec- writing much of the literature. He has overtaking Labour. Indeed, I will tively challenging the Tories ten been the Liberal Democrats’ Director of never forget the Sun front page years before Tony Blair’s electoral Campaigns and Elections since August ‘SDP/LIBS ahead of Labour’. Mrs triumph for New Labour. 1989 and has overseen the party’s by- Thatcher was so worried by the One by-election can make a election wins from Eastbourne 1990 prospect of an Alliance challenge huge difference to history. to Romsey in 2000. RESEARCH IN PROGRESS If you can help any of the individuals listed below with sources, contacts, or any other information — or if you know anyone who can — please pass on details to them. Details of other research projects in progress should be sent to the Editor (see page 3) for inclusion here.

Cornish Methodism and Cornish political identity, 1918–1960s. Liberals and the local government of London 1919–39. Chris Researching the relationship through oral history. Kayleigh Milden, Fox, 173 Worplesdon Road, Guildford GU2 6XD; christopher.fox7@ Institute of Cornish Studies, Hayne Corfe Centre, Sunningdale, Truro virgin.net. TR1 3ND; [email protected]. Political life and times of Josiah Wedgwood MP. Study of the History of the Liberal Party. Roy Douglas (author of The History of the political life of this radical MP, hoping to shed light on the question Liberal Party 1895–1970 and a dozen or so other historical books) is of why the Labour Party replaced the Liberals as the primary popular working on a new book about the Liberal Party and its history. This will representatives of radicalism in the 1920s. Paul Mulvey, 112 trace events from the rather indeterminate 19th century date when the Richmond Avenue, London N1 0LS; [email protected]. party came into existence to a point as close as possible to the present. Recruitment of Liberals into the Conservative Party, 1906–1935. He believes that the story requires attention to be given not only to Aims to suggest reasons for defections of individuals and develop an the glamorous deeds of major politicians but also to such mundane understanding of changes in electoral alignment. Sources include matters as party organisation and finance. ideas, please! Roy Douglas, personal papers and newspapers; suggestions about how to get hold 26 Downs Road, Coulsdon, Surrey CR5 1AA; 01737 552 888. of the papers of more obscure Liberal defectors welcome. Cllr Nick Hon H. G. Beaumont (MP for Eastbourne 1906–10). Any Cott, 1a Henry Street, Gosforth, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, NE3 1DQ; information welcome – especially from anyone having access to [email protected]. material about the history of Liberalism in Eastbourne – particularly SDP in Central Essex. Contact with anyone who had dealings with on his political views (he stood as a Radical). Tim Beaumont, 40 Elms the area, and in particular as many former SDP members of the Road, London SW4 9EX. area as possible, with a view to asking them to take part in a short Letters of Richard Cobden (1804–65). Knowledge of the questionnaire. Official documents from merger onwards regarding the whereabouts of any letters written by Cobden in private hands, demise of the local SDP branches and integration with the Liberals autograph collections, and obscure locations in the UK and abroad for a would also be appreciated. Elizabeth Wood, The Seasons, Park Wood, complete edition of his letters. Dr A. Howe, Department of International Doddinghurst, Brentwood, Essex CM15 0SN; [email protected]. History, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London WC2A Student radicalism at Warwick University. Particulary the files affair 2AE; [email protected]. (For further details of the Cobden Letters in 1970. Interested in talking to anybody who has information about Project, see www.lse.ac.uk/collections/cobdenLetters/). Liberal Students at Warwick in the period 1965-70 and their role in Liberal foreign policy in the 1930s. Focussing particularly on Liberal campus politics. Ian Bradshaw, History Department, University of anti-appeasers. Michael Kelly, 12 Collinbridge Road, Whitewell, Warwick, CV4 7AL; [email protected] Newtownabbey, Co. Antrim BT36 7SN; [email protected]. Welsh Liberal Tradition – A History of the Liberal Party in Wales Liberal Party and the wartime coalition 1940–45. Sources, 1868–2003. Research spans thirteen decades of Liberal history in particularly on Sinclair as Air Minister, and on Harcourt Johnstone, Wales but concentrates on the post-1966 formation of the Welsh Dingle Foot, Lord Sherwood and Sir Geoffrey Maunder (Sinclair’s PPS) Federal Party. Any memories and information concerning the post- particularly welcome. Ian Hunter, 9 Defoe Avenue, Kew, Richmond TW9 1966 era or even before welcomed. The research is to be published 4DL; [email protected]. in book form by Welsh Academic Press. Dr Russell Deacon, Centre for Humanities, University of Wales Institute Cardiff, Cyncoed Campus, Liberal policy towards Austria-Hungary, 1905–16. Andrew Cardiff CF23 6XD; [email protected]. Gardner, 17 Upper Ramsey Walk, Canonbury, London N1 2RP; [email protected].

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 17 Nearly all the SDP’s MPs were defeated in the 1983 general election, and a disappointed Roy RISE … : THE SDP 1983–85 Jenkins stood down as leader, handing over to David Owen. Nevertheless, the Alliance had made a major impact, almost Two parties, one purpose? member, proud of its independ- (24 June 1983) ence, and had firmly blocked any winning more votes David Steel and David Owen possible moves to merge the two than Labour. This were the leaders of the Liberals parties after the 1983 election. As and SDP respectively during the Jenkins put it, Owen ‘essentially second instalment 1983–87 Parliament; Owen had regarded the Liberal Party as a of cartoons from succeeded Jenkins after the 1983 disorderly group of bearded veg- election. etarian pacifists’. Chris Radley, with The Owen–Steel relationship Cyril Smith (‘Big Cyril’) was commentary by Mark was frequently less than harmo- a Liberal MP and frequently nious. The joke about Steel and very critical of the SDP. The Pack, illustrates what Jenkins had been that one was a 1980s were regularly punctu- social democrat leading a liberal ated by bursts of anger and were perhaps the SDP’s party whilst the other was a lib- outrage from Smith over the happiest years, between eral leading a social democratic leadership of the Liberal Party party. But Owen was definitely and the Alliance. 1983 and ’85 . not a liberal – he was an SDP

18 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 RISE … : THE SDP 1983–85

Pavement politics grassroots campaigning, the colleagues the importance managed to put down the (5 August 1983) SDP found – as the Liber- and techniques of ‘pavement same firm local roots which Much of the initial impetus als had a decade and more politics’, with all-year-round the Liberal Party had, and as for the SDP was based on previously – that more mun- community newsletters rath- a result remained far more high political principles. But dane issues came up on the er than wordy policy leaflets. vulnerable to national swings when it came to winning doorstep. SDP activists slowly Despite some local successes, against the Alliance. votes on the ground through learned from their Liberal however, the SDP never quite

A new Labour leader (19 August 1983) Neil Kinnock took over as Labour leader after the 1983 general election. He faced a formidable task in making Labour electable again, and his critics claimed that the left’s continued strength was in fact dooming it to further defeat. Kinnock saw the Al- liance as splitting the natural Labour vote, and so crushing them and uniting the anti- Tory vote behind his party was one of his targets on the road to rebuilding Labour as a party of government.

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 19 RISE … THE SDP 1983–85

More common sense, with a harder political and approach was still very much The two old parties please ideological edge than that one of ‘let’s ignore outdated (10 February 1984) (18 November 1983) shown in the party’s early and divisive ideology and get During the mid-1980s, the David Owen (pictured right, days – encapsulated in his on with applying some com- Alliance continued to posi- above, with Thatcher and slogan ‘tough and tender’ . mon sense’. tion itself as the newcomer, Kinnock) provided the SDP However, the SDP’s overall offering an alternative to the

20 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 RISE … THE SDP 1983–85

old and failed Labour–Tory two-party, first-past-the-post A good Parliamentary by- and needed another by-elec- duopoly under Kinnock and political system. election result could bring tion boost to start it rolling Thatcher (pictured pranc- an upsurge in interest, media again (above). ing around the secret garden, coverage and improved opin- left). Though from different By-election bandwagons ion poll ratings, all of which ends of the political spec- (23 March 1984) could feed off each other and Media coverage trum, they both revelled in Much of the Alliance’s politi- produce a bandwagon effect. (25 May 1984) ideology and happily sup- cal success relied on getting a The bandwagon frequently The Alliance’s relationship ported the cosiness of a successful bandwagon going. ran out of steam, however, with the press was a strange

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 21 RISE … THE SDP 1983–85 one. Critics dismissed the Alliance, and the SDP in particular, as a media- fuelled creation. Those within the Alliance, on the other hand, frequently complained at the lack of media coverage. Amongst newspapers, editorial lines urging people to vote for the Alliance were very rare.

Triumph in Portsmouth (22 June 1984) Michael Hancock was the victorious SDP can- didate in the Portsmouth South by-election (right). Although the European elections on the same day brought the Alliance no victories, the by-election triumph in what had been a safe Tory seat gave the Al- liance an important boost. it was largely Tory rather than divisions within the Labour Party candidates at the next This victory highlighted an Labour councillors who lost Party manifested themselves general election, were a fre- irony in the SDP’s electoral their seats to the SDP. in many ways during the quent source of friction. The appeal - although its found- 1970s and 1980s. Issues about left wanted party activists ers had split from Labour and how the party should be run to be able to deselect MPs, initially talked about replac- Left, more left and yet were as important as policy believing that placing such ing the Labour Party, the more left differences, and indeed both power in the hands of com- SDP made much greater in- (3 August 1984) were important in triggering mittees and meetings would roads in areas of Tory support. The continuing power and the original defection of the benefit their greater enthu- It was Tory rather than La- extremism of the Labour Gang of Four. The rules as to siasm for the nitty-gritty of bour MPs who had most to left was a key reason why how incumbent Labour MPs faction fighting. The soft left fear from an insurgent SDP at the SDP continued to at- could be deselected, and so and right tried to outflank the next general election and tract support. The left-right not able to re-stand as Labour them by trumping their de-

22 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 RISE … THE SDP 1983–85

mand for democracy with To ballot or not to ballot? productive. Most notably, his Saving the GLC? counter-proposals for more (24 August 1984) refusal to hold a ballot of un- (21 September 1984) democracy – taking power The tactics of Arthur Scargill, ion members before calling Faced with the Tories’ de- away from activists and meet- the National Union of Mine- the strike alienated many, yet sire to abolish the Greater ings, and giving it instead workers (NUM) leader dur- he would have been almost London Council (GLC), its to all members with postal ing the miners’ strike, were certain to win such a ballot leader, Ken Livingstone (pic- ballots. often criticised as counter- had he called it. tured below right) resigned,

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 23 RISE … THE SDP 1983–85

with three other colleagues, Punch and Judy show in order to fight by-elections (5 January 1985) as a referendum on its future. The Punch and Judy leit- The Tories responded by motif (above) features regu- boycotting the elections, but larly in third-party politics the Alliance fought them, as a means of encapsulating coming a rather distant opposition to the two main second in each case. (The parties spending so much Alliance did, however, gain time criticising each other. one seat in a by-election in 1985.) Once the dust had settled these by-elections did Disharmony in the little to further the cause of Alliance the GLC – which was in due (2 February 1985) course abolished – or the Frictions in the relations Alliance. between the Liberals and tract them from fighting the The allocation of seats to SDP often seemed to dis- Tories and Labour (above). Liberal or SDP candidates for the general election was a particular point of conflict. An underlying difference in approach generated much of the tension. David Owen’s belief was in the Alliance as a temporary measure to se- cure realignment of the party system, after which the SDP could return to being a fully independent party. Many others saw the Alliance as a staging post towards merger between the two parties.

Economic reform (16 February 1985) Margaret Thatcher’s drive to reform the British economy (left) came at a high price – including unemployment

24 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 RISE … THE SDP 1983–85

of over three million and after a revolt amongst its aca- the 1983–87 Thatcher ad- success and with relations the long-running and bit- demics, many of whom were ministration. within the Alliance compara- ter miners’ strike. The strike very hostile to her political tively cordial. However, as the ended in the eventual defeat approach. cartoon below presciently of the NUM and broke the The SDP’s high point warns, the travails of a third miners as a significant politi- (4 October 1985) party in a first-past-the-post cal force. (The head in the The Tory cabinet The SDP’s autumn 1985 electoral system, along with cartoon is that of their lead- (24 May 1985) conference in Torquay was the fact that the Alliance was er, Arthur Scargill). Thatcher All the people caricatured probably the party’s high not even a single united third was refused an honorary de- in this cartoon (above) were point – riding on the back party, meant it would be easy gree from Oxford University leading Cabinet members of of electoral and opinion poll for it all to go wrong.

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 25 ASPECTS OF ORGANISATIONAL MODERNISATION IN POLITICAL PARTIES THE CASE OF THE SDP

by Stefan n the light of this research duced. This article will look at focus, it has been argued that some of these developments: Seelbach the SDP’s contribution to- � The introduction of a The story of the SDP wards a reformed party sys- computerised membership tem had its limitations. As a register and of subscription has been analysed in Ipolitical party, the SDP remained payment via credit card. depth in articles and a short-lived experiment. While � The emphasis of direct mem- media interest was undoubt- ber participation through academic books. Most edly strong at and after the party’s one-member-one-vote or studies or articles launch in 1981, it receded as the ‘OMOV’. decade progressed. There was not � The introduction of new have focused on the much the party could have done fund-raising approaches about this, because it is an intrin- – the SDP and direct mail. relationship between sic aspect of the media to move � The policy-making organi- the party leaders – the on to other events that will make sation – Council vs. Policy the headlines. The Falklands War Committee. ‘Gang of Four’ – or of 1982 and the Miners’ Strike in they have looked into 1984–85 were two such events that occupied the national head- ‘The party has started’ the party’s contribution lines, and by then it appeared that – how the SDP got off the to policy-making or to the SDP had become just another ground centre party. It might be argued in The launch of the SDP in 1981 the merger debate with retrospect that the SDP was un- was an impressive display of the Liberals. In many able to accomplish its main task euphoria and political deter- of modernising the British party mination. Boosted by a wave of ways, interest focused system and of replacing Labour in popular support and intense me- on the assumption the long run as the second party dia attention, the party had been in Britain. expected to do well, and a total of that the SDP was The true achievements of the ten opinion polls between Janu- SDP, however, can be found on a ary and March 1981 predicted going to represent an different level: the involvement of that the SDP might accumulate entirely new and fresh the Social Democrats in changing between 23 and 30 per cent of and modernising the concept of votes in a forthcoming election.2 approach. The premise ‘party organisation’. The SDP There was talk of an even higher was the SDP would quickly became a vehicle for share of votes for the new party, change in this respect and be- but some predictions were treated strive to achieve one gan to develop and implement a with more caution.3 The SDP objective in particular: number of innovative formats. nonetheless could look to the At the centre of these stood future with anticipation, and a to ‘break the mould’ the idea of making the SDP more feeling that it was at the forefront of the existing party controllable via the instrument of of political change in Britain. ‘centralisation’. The aim of creat- In the light of this successful system and create a ing a centralised organisational launch, the SDP had to deal with fairer system of party structure was the foundation two areas that were central to the which later defined some of the party’s future: the need to attract interaction.1 key innovations the party intro- party members and the equally

26 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 THE CASE OF THE SDP

important requirement of secur- had more than approximately The idea of a national mem- ing sufficient funding to keep 65,000 members, a figure that bership structure was further de- the new party going. Unlike La- was too low to generate the an- veloped by the use of credit card bour and the Conservative Party, ticipated level of revenue. payments, then highly innovative. the SDP could not automatically Individuals who wished to join rely on a steady income flow, the party could do so by simply such as money from the trade Knowing who and where phoning the SDP headquarters unions or ‘big business’. The your members are in London and by giving their logical answer appeared to be to In order to be able to monitor credit card number. Although build up a national membership the development of its individual membership recruitment was network that would ensure a members, the SDP introduced a by no means a brand-new party continual flow of funds. Central Membership Register. function, the introduction of Crewe and King have pointed This national register or database credit card payments, together out that the SDP was well advised became a key tool as part of the with the operational backbone of to avoid the ‘wholly negative strategy to create a more inclusive the National Membership Regis- point of reference’ of the Liberal party. For David Owen in partic- ter, was new and as yet untested. Party, because: ular it was a vital tool in restrict- It was further evidence that the ing the powers of activists and es- SDP was determined to break The nub of the problem was the tablishing the participatory rights the organisational mould of the combination of a decentralised of individual party members. old system. party structure and an inad- It mattered to the SDP to equate membership base. Too install a computerised system of The long-term advantages little revenue was raised from membership registration with a would be considerable too. By subscriptions, and too little of dual function. The system was ensuring the availability of a what was raised found its way to designed to enable the party more accurate and up-to-date the centre.4 leadership to ballot its members register than could be compiled whenever necessary, and also to locally, the computerised list This observation sums up one keep better overall control of would … form the basis of a of the most crucial but also dif- party funds and finances. As the sophisticated communications ficult tasks the SDP faced. The SDP did not have a traditional The launch system within the party, enabling party had to recruit members grassroots substructure in local the leadership to ballot and to in adequate numbers and at the organisations, it gave the lead- of the SDP survey the membership – and to same time to make sure that the ership at the same time the op- appeal for funds.5 money from subscription fees was portunity to create its own brand in 1981 not dispersed amongst local party of organisational system and to The SDP leadership regarded the subdivisions, but was instead take charge of the control levers was an computerised membership sys- channelled directly to the centre of such a system. The introduc- impressive tem as much more than a simple or party headquarters. tion of a computerised register tool for collecting subscription The idea of making subscrip- was, at the time of its launch, a display of money. It was viewed as the cen- tions the key source of money distinctive feature of SDP in- trepiece of a wider communica- was based on the leadership’s as- novation. In 1981, none of the euphoria tion strategy that would provide sumption that the SDP would be other British parties had a system the party with a constant link to able to recruit 100,000 members sophisticated enough to enable and politi- its membership. It would enable in a relatively short time. The re- them to monitor and influence cal deter- the SDP, so the assumption went, ality, however, was different, and the movements of individual to get in touch with its members even at its peak the SDP never party members. mination. whenever necessary and to have

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 27 ASPECTS OF ORGANISATIONAL MODERNISATION IN POLITICAL PARTIES: THE CASE OF THE SDP

ning; after that the use of direct mail involves other important tasks:

Direct mail fund-raising is both an art and a science. The art involves the selection of issues which have the fund raising po- tential, the preparation of copy, the design of packages, the tim- ings of mailings … and the crea- tive modification of fund-raising techniques to meet the needs of the client.9

How did the first direct mail test work in practice for the SDP? The foundation for a first sched- uled test mailing was already laid in the summer of 1982, when the party decided to contact an American agency which had or- ganised direct mail campaigns in the United States. The test mail- a permanent two-way exchange ‘The party with direct mail in order to ing was scheduled for the first of communication with its has started’ contact its party members first, three months of 1983, and the members. It was also the basis – launch at rather than its voters. To do this, SDP had already set aside the sum for a concept that was largely the Connaught the SDP leadership started a of £10,000. These plans had to pioneered by the SDP in Britain Rooms, London, marketing initiative through a be postponed, though, when the – the use of direct mail as a fund- 26 March 1981 think-tank which was used as government called the general raising tool. a ‘sounding board for advice, election. ideas and feedback for David The SDP organised a mail- Owen’.7 The instruments used ing test after the election, again The SDP and the use of in this campaign included a with the sum of £10,000 put direct mail newsletter to subscribers and aside. 20,000 names were bought Direct mail is, in its origin, an donors and regular lunches and from four different lists compris- American technique. Before it meetings with leading SDP pol- ing four different target groups.10 made its first appearance in Brit- iticians, as well as a telephone The SDP prepared three different ish politics, it was widely used in ‘hotline suggestion box’ with campaign letters (a two-page American campaigning. It had the purpose of giving support- letter, a four-page letter, and a been a technique implemented ers or prospective new members six-page letter, written by David in commercial marketing before the opportunity to bring in Owen). A questionnaire was at- it was later applied in political their own views and ideas. tached to the letters. According to marketing. Richard Voguerie, a There were even ambitious the calculations of the American conservative political consultant, plans to extend ‘membership adviser firm Craver, Mathews, is widely regarded as the ‘modern services’ to insurance and travel. Smith, a 2.5 per cent response pioneer of political direct mail Enthusiasts saw merchandising as from one list and one letter would fundraising’ in the United States.6 a novel means of making money, have been sufficient to make this Back in Britain, the SDP recruiting members and publicis- mailing test profitable for the quickly recognised that direct ing the party all at the same time. SDP. The longest (six-page) letter mail could be utilised as a valua- Sceptics feared the creation of indeed produced an encourag- ble technique and marketing tool. SDP Ltd.8 ing 2.6 per cent return on one As a means of communication list which was almost enough to it offered a two-way approach. make the programme self-financ- The party could not only send How did direct mail work? ing. The average donation from messages to members or sup- The SDP’s approach to this first test was £9.80. porters, but it could also receive using the new tool With the first direct mail test opinions and other feedback, as One of the first steps in the proc- having been a moderate success, well as money, from those it had ess of direct mail is the selection the SDP decided to go for a fol- contacted via direct mail. of lists of names to be mailed. low-up test soon afterwards. In The SDP began to work Having a list is only the begin- all, 29,000 people were mailed

28 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 ASPECTS OF ORGANISATIONAL MODERNISATION IN POLITICAL PARTIES: THE CASE OF THE SDP for this second test. The appeal financial situation. While a to- account the diversity of its mem- was eventually answered by about tal of £760,000 came in from bership. What the bank could of- 1,500 people and raised a total membership subscriptions in fer instead was a much more rigid of £14,552. Although this was the SDP’s first year (1981–82), system, because: not a bad result in view of the this figure was almost halved by party’s relative inexperience with 1985–86, when total subscrip- Its essential function is to main- direct mail, success was somewhat tions of £469,000 amounted to tain an up-to-date list of share- qualified by the fact that the costs 50 per cent of the party’s overall holders’ names and addresses, so were high, at about £9,000 for income.12 Had it not been for that the company can send out the entire test. vigorous financial support from a to them its annual reports, no- few wealthy supporters, most no- tices of annual general meetings tably David (Lord) Sainsbury, the and the like. Such a programme The SDP and direct mail: SDP would have had many more has no call to print out selective how successful was the problems in keeping the party There were lists of members in one part of tool? going. It has been estimated that the country, or those with some The question remains: was politi- Sainsbury alone gave approxi- even ambi- specific interest … The Sheffield cal marketing through direct mail mately £750,000 to the SDP tious plans computer programme, therefore, an overall success for the SDP? between 1981 and 1987.13 lacked the essential capacity, Although in Britain it probably to extend from the SDP’s point of view, of did not attain the same status as selective output.14 a marketing strategy as it did in The pitfalls of ‘member- the United States, direct mail was modernisation: good The error of outsourcing mem- nonetheless deemed a modest intentions and bad execution ship serv- bership lists to a clearing bank success. Crewe and King point The SDP believed strongly that it ices’ to was further exacerbated by a out that: had devised a sophisticated system less than professional approach that was geared towards the needs insurance on the part of the SDP itself. As Three direct-mail appeals to of a modern mass-membership Stephenson explains, many mem- members and supporters [in the party. One of the ironies of social and travel. bership application forms went 1987 general election campaign] democratic modernisation, how- unprocessed from SDP head- produced £700,000 – four ever, was the fact that the SDP by Enthusi- quarters to the Midland Bank, times as much, in real terms, as no means possessed such a mass asts saw where errors regularly remained its appeal to members had raised membership: it never reached unnoticed and unchanged.15 The in 1983 and more than the Con- its envisaged target of 100,000 merchan- whole computerised system in servative Party had managed to members. There were often the end turned out to be an or- raise by the same methods ... By fewer than 300 party members in dising as ganisational mess and was in no the standards of a small British individual area parties and there way the ‘sophisticated’ commu- party largely reliant on small were also substantial differences a novel nication system the party had so personal donations, the direct- between regions. The SDP was means of proudly announced. mail initiative proved to be a most strongly concentrated in the considerable – and unexpected south and in the Greater London making – success. By 1987, the SDP area but was far less so in parts of The SDP and OMOV had, perhaps, begun to crack the the north or in Scotland. money, – enabling the individual in problem of party finance.11 One other truth was even less the party flattering for the self-declared recruiting The launch of the SDP rekindled The SDP became more and more party of modernisation. The SDP members the discussion of the independ- familiar with the language of had opted for the high-tech route ence of MPs. Social Democrats marketing and at times it was not of computerisation, but it had and publi- in particular were aware how the entirely clear if one was listening done so without having anyone in left had gained more and more to politicians or to marketing the party who was familiar with cising the power inside the Labour Party managers. For many in the party, the intricacies of such a modern in the early 1980s. These devel- however, the instruments of po- system. Perhaps the first and most party all at opments had played a key role litical marketing were a kind of crucial fault was to pass the entire the same in the decision to form a new guidance system which helped administration of the centralised social democratic party. It was to the SDP to locate its target voters computer register to the Midland time. Scep- be a party in which the individual and to match its political pro- Bank. The concept that a clear- would be involved in decisions, gramme to the demands of the ing bank would be best suited to tics feared thereby replacing unaccountable political consumer. handle complex membership lists electoral colleges. Fund-raising through direct was clearly mistaken, specifically the crea- The introduction of One- mail was also a very welcome in the case of the SDP. What the tion of SDP Member-One-Vote, or ‘OMOV’ contribution which helped Social Democrats needed was was a reflection of the social to alleviate an otherwise tight a flexible system that took into Ltd. democratic principle of listen-

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 29 ASPECTS OF ORGANISATIONAL MODERNISATION IN POLITICAL PARTIES: THE CASE OF THE SDP ing to the individual member’s ‘There’s nothing in the phone voice. During the lifetime of the book under Social Democrats SDP, OMOV was used on several – perhaps if you want to join occasions, such as National Com- them you have to be an MP mittee elections or constitutional first’. (‘Guardian’, 17 March review ballots (in which party 1981) members had the opportunity to approve or disapprove of con- that limited the scope of stitutional clauses and amend- OMOV. The SDP’s National ments). But perhaps the most Committee, for example, re- important function of OMOV flected to a large extent the remained the election of the par- leadership’s desire to have MPs ty leader. This had become one elected by their fellow MPs, as of the most contentious areas of had been the case in the pre- dispute between social democrats 1980 Labour Party. The SDP and the Labour left towards the National Committee utilised end of the 1970s. David Owen, a similar principle in that up in particular, vehemently fought to ten places on the Com- against Labour’s move to the left mittee were reserved for MPs. and the decision to reduce the Furthermore, those MPs were quota of MPs in leadership elec- elected to the Committee by tions to a mere 30 per cent. their fellow MPs, thereby ex- The first opportunity for the cluding an OMOV-based vote. SDP to assess OMOV came in This left only eight Commit- the autumn of 1981 during the tee members elected by ordi- party’s first leadership election. nary party members, which Ironically it nearly produced a rift constituted a mere third of the between two of the central fig- entire body. ures in the SDP, David Owen and Recognition of gender Roy Jenkins. Jenkins favoured equality was, however, built an option whereby MPs alone into the system of the Na- would choose their new leader, tional Committee, because a similar to the old, pre-1980 La- fair balance between the gen- bour procedure. This concept, ders amongst those elected by however, infuriated David Owen OMOV was guaranteed. The who supported an alternative concept of gender balance also option, allowing all individual emerged during the party’s members of the SDP votes to process of candidate selection elect the new leader. where the shortlists drawn up In the end a compromise by devolved committees in prevailed: the decision on which the local or area parties had option to implement was decided to contain at least two mem- via a membership ballot.16 The bers of each sex.17 There were result of the ballot stipulated that strong voices in the party, most the SDP leader was to be elected notably Shirley Williams’, who by a postal ballot of all members recognised gender balance as a of the party, and that there should very potent symbol for a new be a mandatory review of the and radical party, a party that election system at a later stage. wished to signal that it was fresh and modern. And, of course, positive discrimination would The limitations of OMOV: also increase support amongst the role of the National women voters – that was at Committee least the theory. It is perhaps easy to overstate the importance of OMOV as the key ‘It’s very convenient, you can principle of SDP organisation. join by credit card and at the The party leadership was able same time write everything to retain power within the or- they stand for on the back ganisational build-up of the party of it.’ (‘Guardian’, 27 March through a number of safeguards 1981)

30 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 ASPECTS OF ORGANISATIONAL MODERNISATION IN POLITICAL PARTIES: THE CASE OF THE SDP

Co-operation and Council as the representative make-up was top-heavy in favour participation: the mixed body of elected party members. of the party’s MPs, and since ‘MPs blessings of ‘deliberative In practice the Policy Commit- [were] not mandated nor subject policy-making’ tee and the Council were the to direction or control by any The SDP approached organisa- key players in policy-making in organ of the SDP,’19 membership tional reform in another field of the SDP. It was a distinctive ele- of the Committee represented a potential impact – the coopera- ment of the SDP constitution very strong position from which tion of different party institutions that policies were only made and MPs could effectively influence in the field of policy-making. The finalised if both the Council and the way decisions were being key players were the Council and the Committee had agreed on made in the party.20 the influential Policy Committee. policy drafts (green papers). The The Council for Social De- constitution provided, in cases of mocracy (‘CSD’) was also called persistent deadlock, the final pos- Summary: achievements the parliament of the party. Each sibility of ‘a ballot of all members of SDP modernisation and area party had the right to send on any issue of policy of major the impact of the Social a number of delegates to the importance’.18 Such a ballot Democrats on the centre in Council (between one and four could have been called on the British politics members, depending on the initiative of either the Council or This article has only touched size of the respective area party). the National Committee, but that on some key features of SDP Members of the Council were never happened. modernisation. The introduction elected by postal ballots open to This ‘official’ view of a de- of a computerised membership all party members. With a total liberative partnership between register and the approach towards number of only about 400 del- the Policy Committee and the direct mail as a fund-raising tool egates or representatives, the CSD Council, however, concealed a remain two of the more distinc- was smaller than, for example, the crucial structural disadvantage tive innovations the party had annual Labour Party conference. for the latter. The Council could pioneered in its short lifespan. This was intentional, as the SDP adopt policies, but it could not The common denomina- leadership wanted to avoid the formulate, let alone initiate them. tor that linked all innovations problems they had encountered The important first stage of embraced by the SDP was ad- at Labour conferences in the past drafting the party’s green papers aptation, the realisation that it in the form of block voting and remained the sole domain of the had become necessary to adjust mandated delegates. Policy Committee. The Council to a changed social environ- The Council was supposed could either accept draft policies The SDP ment. The Social Democrats, in to play an important part in the in the form of Policy Committee other words, quickly understood SDP’s plan to create a deliberative motions, in which case decisions leadership the urgency of organisational policy-making process. The men made at the top level of the party wanted to change at a time when political behind the SDP constitution were simply rubber-stamped by parties in general were in danger had designed the policy-mak- the Council, or it could amend avoid the of being sidelined as meaningless ing process to reflect a different Committee motions, thus refer- if they failed to recognise and to style compared to that of other ring them back to the Policy problems address social transformations parties. The aim was to avoid Committee. Yet even this meant amongst voters and party mem- making policy by passing short that the Policy Committee had a they had bers or supporters. or ‘composite’ resolutions – the second bite of the cherry, because encoun- The SDP, and in particular its kind of decision-making that it had the right to resubmit its leadership around David Owen, had become a serious problem original motion to the following tered at stood for a disciplined and au- in the Labour Party. The new Council meeting, perhaps with a thoritative model of party organi- way of SDP policy-making was few changes and amendments. Labour sation. This model emphasised the to be entirely different. It was to The picture that emerged from participatory role of the individ- be ‘deliberative’, taking place in this system of deliberative policy- confer- ual party member, but it left the a smaller Council, resulting in making was thus one of a party ences in key powers of decision-making balanced statements, and giving in which the true power of deci- in the hands of the leaders and, delegates the opportunity for sion-making was weighted heav- the past in as I have outlined, in the hands full reflection on issues where a ily towards the leadership, and of party MPs. It was also beyond difference of view would have which particularly favoured MPs the form doubt that the SDP organisation emerged between different sec- over ordinary party members. was not modelled along the lines tions in the party. Despite the retention of OMOV of block of the Liberal Party, which had no This was the theory and it in the election of Council del- voting and comparable system of centralised sounded very promising, not egates, it was the Policy Commit- cohesion.21 least with regard to the prospect tee in which the key powers of mandated The successor of the old Lib- of fruitful co-operation between policy initiation and implemen- eral Party and SDP, the Liberal the Policy Committee and the tation were vested. This body’s delegates. Democrats, has developed in a

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 31 ASPECTS OF ORGANISATIONAL MODERNISATION IN POLITICAL PARTIES: THE CASE OF THE SDP somewhat different way. It would The SDP abandoned by the Lib Dems, with Roger Craver in his essay ‘Direct be wrong to say that the Liberal the exception of elections for the Mail and Fund Raising with New Democrats are simply following Party Leader and President. Technologies’ (pp. 71–72), in ‘The failed be- Washington Program of the Annen- in the organisational footsteps of The SDP had to change and berg School of Communications’, the SDP, but it can be said that in cause it modernise, because its leaders, New Communication Technologies some areas the two parties show notably David Owen, recognised in Politics (Washington, 1985), certain organisational similari- could not the futility of their struggle in an pp. 69–96. Roger Craver is presi- ties. The Liberal Democrats have unreformed Labour Party. They dent of Craver, Mathews, Smith & reconcile Company, a Washington DC-based a national membership system could either have given up their direct mail and fundraising firm. and also a delegated conference its auto- ideals of a social democratic alter- 7 See Marketing Week, 12 Decem- that consists of representatives native to socialism, or they could ber 1986, p. 6 (‘SDP starts mar- of local parties and the parlia- cratic style have broken away from Labour. keting initiative’). mentary parties: this body is a The Social Democrats were 8 Crewe & King, SDP, p. 247. of leader- 9 Letter from the American Direct reminder of the SDP Council. successful in the sense that they Mail company Craver, Matthews, They also ensure the represen- ship with paved the way for a new outlook Smith & Company to the SDP (‘Di- tation of both genders on the on the potential that a centre rect Mail Fund Raising Needs and party’s decision-making bod- the wider party in Britain would have. But Potential’), 15 November 1982 ies.22 Overall it appears that the the SDP failed because it could (Source: SDP Archives, University of Essex). Liberal Democrats’ constitution notion of not reconcile its autocratic style 10 Theatre-goers, wine drinkers, fre- has acknowledged key aspects of leadership with the wider no- quent travellers, and small inves- of modernisation, but perhaps popular tion of popular participation. The tors. with a less stringent element of participa- Liberal Democrats have so far 11 Crewe & King, SDP, p. 250. ‘discipline’ than the SDP had avoided this dilemma by creating 12 All income and expenditure figures are taken from the SDP Annual displayed. In McKee’s words: tion. a modern party constitution that Reports, presented in Crewe & acknowledges the importance King, SDP, Appendix 5, Table 13.4, Other components included … of a streamlined organisational p. 492 (‘Central income of SDP, a national committee and policy structure but that, at the same 1981/2–1986/7). 13 Crewe & King, SDP, p. 251. committee, plus regional organi- time, respects the Liberal tradi- 14 Stephenson, Claret and Chips, p. sations and multi-constituency tion of federalism and the dis- 95. local parties based on the SDP persal of power on a local and 15 Ibid, p. 95. model. All these features repli- regional level. 16 A total of 78,205 members were cated SDP organisation, as did balloted. They could choose how to elect the leader from three op- the delegate conference, which Stefan Seelbach studied Politics, Soci- tions. A comfortable majority of was adapted from the SDP’s ology and English at the University of 43.5 per cent finally went for the Council for Social Democracy Münster, where he submitted a thesis so-called ‘Option A’, election of the … Finally, as occurred with the on the Foreign and Defence policies of leader by postal ballot of all mem- SDP, the Liberal Democrats’ the SDP. From 1993–2002 he was bers. This option received almost twice as many votes as Option constitution also confers special a lecturer and course co-ordinator at B, election by a ballot of all SDP recognition, with accompany- Strathclyde University and submitted MPs. ing privileges, on select policy a doctoral thesis on the SDP. 17 For further details on this, see and ancillary organisations, e.g. Crewe & King, SDP, p. 231. students, trade unionists and 1 Ian Bradley, Breaking the Mould 18 See SDP Party Constitution, Chap- ter VI, Section A, Clause 2. Europeans.23 (Oxford, 1981) still remains a key handbook on the formation 19 See SDP Party Constitution of the SDP. A second source that 20 See also Gerd Kräh, Die britische The Liberal Democrats may well analyses the background behind SDP. Ursachen für das Scheit- have adopted or even ‘inherited’ a the birth of the new party is Hugh ern der Social Democratic Party key framework of organisational Stephenson, Claret and Chips: The (Baden-Baden, 1993), p. 87. innovation from the SDP and in Rise of the SDP (London, 1982). 21 A point that is also made clear 2 Bradley, p. 91. by Vincent McKee. See ‘Faction- that sense they have modernised 3 Bradley, p. 90, mentions an opin- alism in the Social Democratic far beyond the limits of the old ion poll that had been published Party, 1981–1987’, Parliamen- Liberal Party. But despite this the in the Sun at the end of January tary Affairs, Volume 42, Number 2, Liberal Democrats are not simply 1981. According to this poll a 1989, pp. 165–79. an SDP Mark II – they have kept combined Liberal-Social Demo- 22 The Constitution of the Federal cratic party would have been able Party, amended version, Septem- their own identity as the main to win the support of over 50 per ber 2002, ‘Article 2, Provisions party of the political centre in cent of the electorate. Relating to the Constitution’. Britain. They are a federal party 4 Ivor Crewe and Anthony King, SDP: 23 Vincent McKee, ‘British Liberal and therefore retain a much more The Birth, Life and Death of the Democrats: Structures and Groups decentralised core structure than Social Democratic Party (Oxford, on the Inside’, in ‘The Politics of 1995), p. 245. the Liberal Democrats’, undated the SDP ever did. The principle 5 Ibid, pp. 241–42. discussion paper. of OMOV has also been largely 6 This is how he is described by

32 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 (Reviewed in History Group David Owen, A United King- Newsletter , Spring 1998) dom (Penguin, ) M.B. Hamilton, Democratic David Owen, Personally BIBLIOGRAPHY Socialism in Britain and Sweden Speaking to Kenneth Harris (Macmillan, ) (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, ) Stephen Haseler, The Tragedy of Key sources on SDP and Alliance Labour (Basil Blackwell, ) David Owen, Time to Declare (Michael Joseph, ) history Roy Jenkins, Partnership of Compiled by Mark Pack Principle (Secker & Warburg, David Owen & David Steel, ) The Time Has Come (Weiden- feld & Nicolson, ) Books and booklets N. Carter, Is There Life After Roy Jenkins, A Life at the Hanging? (Centre for the Centre (Macmillan, ) S. Padgett & W. Patterson, A Leighton Andrews, Liberalism Analysis of Social Policy, Bath History of Social Democracy in versus the Social Market Econ- Jeremy Josephs, Inside the Alli- University, ) Postwar Europe (Longman, omy (Hebden Royd Publica- ance (John Martin, ) ) Ken Coates, The Social Demo- tions, ) David Marquand, Russet-coat- crats: those who went and those William Paterson & Alistair Paddy Ashdown, After the Al- ed Captains: The Challenge of who stayed (Nottingham ) Thomas (eds.), The Future of liance (Hebden Royd Publi- Social Democracy (SDP, ) Social Democracy (Clarendon cations, ) Chris Cook, A Short History David Marquand, The Un- Press, ) of the Liberal Party – Peter Bartram, David Steel principled Society (Fontana, (Sixth edition, Palgrave, Giles Radice, Friends and Ri- (W.H. Allen, ) ) 2002) (Reviewed in Journal of vals: Crosland, Jenkins and Hea- Alan Beith, The Case for the Liberal Democrat History, Win- John Martin (ed.), The Mean- ley (Little Brown, 2002) -ng Liberal Party and the Alliance ter 2002–03) i of Social Democracy and Oth William Rodgers, The Politics (Longman, ) er Essays (John Martin, ) Ivor Crewe & Anthony King, of Change (Secker & Warburg, Alan Beith, The Fullness of SDP: The Life and Death of the Don MacIver (ed.), The Lib- ) Freedom (Hebden Royd Pub- Social Democratic Party (OUP, eral Democrats (Prentice Hall, William Rodger, Fourth lications, ) ) (Reviewed in History ) Among Equals (Politico’s, Group Newsletter , December Vernon Bogdanor (ed.), Lib- Michael Meadowcroft, Lib- 2000) (Reviewed in Journal of ) eral Party Politics (OUP, ) eralism and the Left (Liberator Liberal Democrat History, Au- Arthur Cyr, Liberal Politics in Publications, ) tumn 2000) Duncan Brack, The Myth of Britain (Transaction Books, the Social Market (LINk Pub- Michael Meadowcroft, Liber- Hannan Rose (ed.), Where ) lications, ) alism and the Right (Liberator Next?, Radical Quarterly spe- Ralf Dahrendorf, After Social Publications, ) cial edition,  Duncan Brack (ed.), Why I Democracy (Unservile State am a Liberal Democrat (Liberal Michael Meadowcroft, Social David Steel, Partners in One Paper, ) (Reviewed in Democrat Publications, ) Democracy – Barrier or Bridge? Nation (Bodley Head, ) History Group Newsletter , (Liberator Publications, ) Duncan Brack (ed), Dictionary March ) David Steel, Against Goliath: of Liberal Biography (Politico’s Michael Meadowcroft & David Steel’s Story (Weiden- Radhika Desai, Intellectuals Publishing, 1998) David Marquand, Liberalism feld & Nicolson, ) nd a Socialism: ‘Social Democrats’ & Social Democracy (Liberal Duncan Brack and Robert Hugh Stephenson, Claret and and the Labour Party (Law- Publications, ) Ingham, Dictionary of Liberal rence & Wishart, ) Chips: The Rise of the SDP Quotations (Politico’s Publish- Stuart Mole, The Decade of (Michael Joseph, ) Henry Drucker, ‘All the ing, 1999) Realignment: The Leadership John Stevenson, Third Party King’s Horses and All the Speeches of David Steel – Duncan Brack and Tony Lit- Politics since : Liberals, Al- King’s Men’, in Paterson and  (Hebden Royd, ) tle (eds), Great Liberal Speeches Thomas (eds.), Social Demo- liance and Liberal Democrats (Politico’s Publishing, 2001) cratic Parties in Western Europe Matthew Oakeshott, The (Blackwell, ) Road from Limehouse to West- Ian Bradley, Breaking the (OUP, ) Patricia Lee Sykes, Losing from minster (Radical Centre for Mould? (Martin Robertson, the Inside: The Cost of Conflict R Eccleshall (ed.), British Democratic Studies in Indus- ) in the British Social Democratic Liberalism: Liberal Thought from try and Society, ) Party (Second edition, Trans- Ian Bradley, The Strange Re- the s to s (Longman, )(Reviewed ction David Owen, Face the Future a Books, birth of Liberal Britain (Chatto ) (Jonathan Cape, ) in History Group Newsletter , & Windus, ) Tony Greaves & Rachel Spring 1998) David Owen, A Future That John Campbell, Roy Jenkins Pitchford, Merger: The Inside Will Work: Competitiveness and concluded on page 60 (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, ) Story (Liberal Renewal, ) Compassion (Penguin, )

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 33 … AND DECLINE: THE SDP 1985–87 The SDP reached its high point in 1985. From then on it was largely downhill, with Tory political recovery from their midterm nadir and rows within the Alliance.

This third selection of Chris Radley’s cartoons from the Social Democrat illustrates the major political controversies of the period: unemployment, riots in the inner-cities, the Westland crisis that almost brought Mrs Thatcher down (and Neil Kinnock’s speaking style which helped save her), and insider dealing and scandals in the City. The Alliance tried to makes its mark in these debates, but was frequently distracted by internal rows, Market forces unleashed of unemployment came to the over policy positions (18 October 1985) fore. Inner-city riots in Toxteth, and joint selection. During Margaret Thatcher’s sec- Brixton and Tottenham were ond term, much of the economy seen by many as the outcome of Commentary by Mark recovered, and issues of inequality these economic problems and the Pack. and the continuing high levels government’s undue reliance on

34 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 … AND DECLINE: THE SDP 1985–87

market forces. The cartoon Short, sharp shock jecting them to boot-camp Brittan, pictured, and Michael features Nigel Lawson, Mar- (29 November 1985) style physical training was Heseltine particularly at odds. garet Thatcher’s Chancellor of The idea of giving criminals briefly Mrs Thatcher’s flavour Eventually, Heseltine walked the Exchequer at the time. a ‘short, sharp shock’ by sub- of the month during one of out of the Cabinet and Brittan the periodic crime panics. resigned, taking responsibility for a leak of confidential doc- uments designed to under- Westland mine Heseltine. Mrs Thatcher (31 January 1986) herself was nearly also pushed The Westland saga nearly out of office, being caught finished Mrs Thatcher. A dis- up in allegations of complic- pute over the future of a West ity with the leaks. However, Country helicopter firm when faced with a key debate (should it be rescued by a US in Parliament, she survived firm or a European consorti- thanks to a dreadfully inept um?) produced deep divisions speech by the Labour leader, in the Cabinet, with Leon Neil Kinnock (see below).

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 35 … AND DECLINE: THE SDP 1985–87

Economic boom Critics of the Chancellor, privatisation. They argued Welsh verbosity (14 February 1986) Nigel Lawson (pictured), that these were being wasted (28 February 1986) During the late 1980s, eco- argued that economic suc- on a short-term economic His speech in the West- nomic growth took off, with cess was only due to one-off boom rather than invested land debate (see 31 January increasing concerns about benefits of North Sea oil for the long term. 1986) was by no means the the economy overheating. revenues and income from only poor speech made by

36 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 … AND DECLINE: THE SDP 1985–87

Labour leader Neil Kin- Misdeeds in the City profits and large rewards for similar crimes compared with nock. Although he had (14 March 1986) the deal-makers. With this those handed out for offences originally forged a reputa- During the mid-1980s, the came an increasing problem such as social security fraud tion as a fine left-wing ora- combination of privatisations of insider dealing and debates involving only a fraction of tor, he had a tendency to – which greatly increased the over the extent to which the the sums. become verbose, repetitive number of shareholders in the City should be allowed to and ineffectual in many of country – and deregulation of regulate itself. Many critics of his speeches as leader. The financial institutions caused the government’s approach Stand and deliver sobriquet ‘Welsh windbag’ the City and its affairs to gain drew contrasts between the (28 March 1986) was frequently applied. prominence. Its culture was relatively light sentences ap- During this period, the Al- of big financial deals, quick plied for insider dealing and liance criticised the Tories

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 37 … AND DECLINE: THE SDP 1985–87

(represented by Nigel Law- The BBC in the opinion polls, the Al- to be its own undoing was son) for harsh policies to- (27 June 1986) liance was the most popular reflected again in this car- wards the unemployed and The level of Alliance press political group on offer. toon produced during the those on benefits and Labour coverage was a regular source final party conference sea- (represented by Roy Hat- of complaint and dispute. son before the 1987 general tersley) for wanting to over- Based on number of MPs, the The self-destruct button election. The Conservatives tax the rich. Alliance was a minor party. (12 September 1986) set out their stall for a third Based on occasional periods The ability of the Alliance election victory in a row,

38 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 … AND DECLINE: THE SDP 1985–87 whilst the relationship be- tween Labour and the un- ions continued to be a major issue for Neil Kinnock. The differences of view over the future of the Alliance (merger or separation?) were reflected in continuing dis- putes over the selection of candidates for the general election. ‘Joint open selec- tion’ – whereby Liberal and SDP members in a constitu- ency voted together to select a candidate, who could be either Liberal or SDP – was seen as precursor to merger and so supported or opposed by many on that basis.

Spinning and leaking (21 November 1986) Mrs Thatcher’s press secretary, Bernard Ingham, was fre- quently accused by critics of anonymously briefing against Cabinet members. However, as one of them pointed out, he was only ‘the sewer, not the sewage’.

Casino economics (24 January 1987) The Conservatives’ reliance on economic growth fuelled by the service sector, North Sea oil and privatisation proceeds made critics accuse them of only benefiting the south of the country. They saw economic growth pro- duced in this way as inferior to – and riskier than – the more tangible outputs associ- ated in the past with manu- facturing.

Greenwich (6 March 1987) In the immediate run-up to the 1987 general elec- tion, the SDP snatched a dramatic by-election victory in Greenwich, winning a safe Labour seat after Neil Kinnock was saddled with a ‘hard left’ candidate.

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 39 David Owen was one of the ‘Gang of Four’ who, together with Roy Jenkins, Shirley Williams and Bill Rodgers, launched the Social Democratic Party in 1981. He was the Leader of the SDP between 1983–87, but when a majority of members voted for merger with the Liberal Party, he clung on to a diminishing group of supporters until he accepted a humiliating defeat. In this biography, a fellow-member of the Gang of the Four, Bill Rodgers, assesses David Owen’s political career and record. BIOGRAPHY: DAVID OWEN wen had a dis- David Anthony Llewellyn chosen to stand, and in the 1964 tinguished career Owen was born in 1938. Three- election he came third behind the behind him in the quarters Welsh, his father, Dr John Tory victor and Mark Bonham Labour Party; be- Owen, was a general practitioner Carter (who had won the 1958 tween 1977–79, he and his mother, Molly, a dentist. by-election, then lost the seat in Owas Foreign Secretary in James The family home was in Plymp- 1959). But this experience whet- Callaghan’s Labour government, ton, Devon, but during the war ted Owen’s political appetite. dealing with constitutional Owen grew up in Monmouth- Within eighteen months he stood problems over Southern Rho- shire and Glamorgan, often for the marginal Tory seat of Ply- desia. He supported the United looked after by his grandfather, to mouth Sutton and won with a Kingdom’s membership of the whom he became devoted. At the comfortable majority (there was European Community but grew early age of seven he became a no Liberal candidate in 1966, critical of further European eco- boarder at Mount House School and previously Liberal votes were nomic and monetary integra- near Tavistock and, later, at Brad- helpful to Labour). tion. He left the House of Com- Owen’s field College, Berkshire. From As a new Member of Parlia- mons in 1992 and then played a there he went to Sidney Sussex ment, and ahead of his maiden significant role in peace-keeping was not College, Cambridge and, as a speech, Owen was invited to in Yugoslavia. medical student, to St Thomas’s become Parliamentary Private With ambition, energy and a wasted Hospital, London. Secretary (PPS) to Gerry Rey- ability, David Owen also had a life but his Although he had been taken nolds, the Minister of State for streak of authoritarianism, suf- to a meeting addressed by Aneu- the Army. Henceforth, defence fering not only fools but men achieve- rin Bevan during the 1950 elec- and health were to be two of his and women of comparable tal- tion campaign, Owen played no significant themes throughout his ents and similar values. Hoping ment fell part in student politics. But in years in the House of Commons. to reshape British politics, he his early twenties he joined the Given the factions within made a crucial error of judge- significant- Labour Party, which was looking the Parliamentary Labour Party, ment in not bringing together ly short for good, young Parliamentary he was quickly drawn into the his social democrats and the Lib- candidates in the rather bleak po- 1963 Club – held in memory erals. Owen’s was not a wasted of his litical territory of the south-west. of Hugh Gaitskell, the former life but his achievement fell sig- Owen was invited to a selection Labour Leader. Over regular din- nificantly short of his potential. potential. conference at Torrington. He was ners, he met Tony Crosland and

40 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 BIOGRAPHY: DAVID OWEN Roy Jenkins, then rising stars in liamentary Under-Secretary of During the second, and as a consequence of a the Wilson cabinet, and junior State for Defence for the Royal referendum, Roy Jenkins resigned ministers like Dick Taverne and Navy. It was a shrewd choice. hot-house the Deputy Leadership. Bill Rodgers. He also became a The Prime Minister recognised Owen was one of the sixty- close colleague of both David that Owen had ability and would arguments nine rebel Labour MPs who Marquand and John Mackintosh, respond to ministerial opportuni- voted for entry to the EEC in who were among the 1966 intake ties. In addition, in his Plymouth and among defiance of a three-line whip. of Labour MPs. constituency he would benefit the arm- Unlike some other rebels, Owen The Labour government had a from the historic naval vote. This was not sacked, but four months secure majority of almost a hun- turned out to be the case, and in chair con- later he resigned from the Oppo- dred seats but it suffered a precipi- 1970 Owen held on with a ma- sition Front Bench in sympathy tate decline up to and beyond the jority of nearly a thousand votes spirators with Roy Jenkins. Among others devaluation of sterling in Novem- as Ted Heath replaced Wilson at resigning was George Thomson, ber 1967. There was a serious loss Number 10. who were who left Parliament to become of by-elections (fifteen during the The Labour Party was now calling ‘Wil- a European Commissioner when Parliament) and there was wide- in opposition, and with George the Conservative Government spread discontent with the Prime Brown’s defeat in Belper, a va- son must had completed its European leg- Minister and his style. Owen had cancy occurred for the Deputy islation, and Dick Taverne, who originally greatly admired Tony Leadership. Roy Jenkins stood and go’, Owen was to become the victim of his Crosland, the author of the revi- won over both Michael Foot and intolerant constituency party. sionist and influential book The Fred Peart, the centre-right, anti- was promi- For much of the next two Future of Socialism, but he now EEC candidate. It now looked as nent. years the Jenkinsites were ex- saw Roy Jenkins as the strongest if the old Gaitskellites – who were cluded from the mainstream of alternative to Harold Wilson. Dur- beginning to be called Jenkinsites the Parliamentary Labour Party. ing the hot-house arguments and – were coming back to power, They kept together, meeting at among the armchair conspirators with Owen amongst them. But regular lunches at their homes. who were calling ‘Wilson must within less than two years, this Among them were David Owen, go’, Owen was prominent. expectation fell apart. In the first David Marquand, John Roper But in July 1968, with the ap- place, Harold Wilson changed his and Robert Maclennan. As an proval of Denis Healey, Harold mind about supporting entry to informal team they helped to Wilson appointed Owen as Par- the European Community; in the formulate Roy Jenkins’ speeches,

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 41 BIOGRAPHY: DAVID OWEN which led to What Matters Now, a Crosland to Jenkins seven or habits and ideas. But there were short book setting out the broad eight years earlier. Nor was Cro- times when his style – youthful, range of his political direction. sland entirely happy about the informal, iconoclastic – overran They were all anxious to show sort of arrogant, good-looking, his judgment. When he recom- that Europe was not their only middle-class man, who seemed mended Peter Jay, a close personal concern, and Owen brought much like himself. But Owen friend and the Prime Minister’s forward his own Children’s Bill made himself useful about those son-in-law, as ambassador to on adoption. In the autumn matters which bored Crosland, Washington, he damaged his and of 1973, Roy Jenkins returned which were not a few. Callaghan’s reputations. to the Labour front bench. He Then, five months later, Cro- In 1975 David Owen had not demolished the reputation of sland had a stroke and Owen played any significant part in the the Tory Chancellor of the Ex- was left in charge of the Foreign European referendum. Now, as chequer, Anthony Barber, on the Office for a few days until Cro- Foreign Secretary, he stayed close eve of the Christmas recess in an sland’s death. He was steady and to the Prime Minister, express- outstanding Parliamentary per- confident in filling this gap and, ing scepticism about monetary formance. But given the state of to everyone’s surprise, the Prime union. In the principal cabinet the Labour Party, most Jenkinsites Minister appointed him Foreign committee, of which he was thought that Labour was unlikely Secretary at the age of 37. chairman, he showed no prefer- to win the general election, and Since the death of Ernest Bevin ence for ministers who were ei- some hoped they would not. in 1950 and during the Cold War, ther pro- or anti-Europe, and his In the event, Harold Wilson the Prime Minister of the day had old colleagues felt that Owen was did become Prime Minister for been effectively his own Foreign unenthusiastic about moving the a second term. Jenkins now re- Secretary (there had been twelve European Community forward. luctantly found himself Home of them in twenty-five years), In 1979 Labour lost the elec- Secretary again but made it clear dealing directly with the President tion with its smallest share of the to Wilson that some of his close of the United States and Euro- vote since the 1930s, although friends and colleagues, including pean leaders. But Owen was now Owen held his own seat at Ply- Owen, should be included in the fourth or fifth in the cabinet hi- mouth (now Devonport, after government. Barbara Castle, who erarchy, with frequent exposure at boundary changes). But in the had become Secretary of State for home and abroad. He spoke with Parliamentary Committee – the Social Services, also welcomed authority, especially when trying Shadow Cabinet – he was elected the idea of Owen joining her to resolve the constitutional prob- near the bottom of the list, and department as Parliamentary lems of Southern Rhodesia. Cy Callaghan moved him to the jun- Secretary; and later in the year, Vance, Jimmy Carter’s Secretary of ior role of shadow Minister for following the second 1974 elec- State, was much taken with Owen Energy. In the House of Com- tion, he moved up as Minister of – a friendship that was to endure mons it was said that Owen had State for Health, soon becoming in different circumstances when been over-promoted and was a a Privy Counsellor. they worked together in Bosnia Jim Calla- loner, lacking political roots. Owen got on well with Bar- fifteen years later. When, in 1977, the Campaign bara Castle. He was knowledge- Jim Callaghan’s biographer says ghan’s biog- for Labour Victory (CLV) – an able and hard-working in dealing that David Owen ‘soon showed his organisation formed to defend with difficult negotiations over capacity as a strong, if sometimes rapher says and promote the democratic the new consultants’ contracts domineering, minister’ with an centre-right of the Labour Party and pay beds. She liked his style ‘authoritarian temper’. He was that David – was launched, Owen supported and he, in turn, liked her, although often unpopular amongst officials, Owen ‘soon it more in name than in practice. she complained about his lack of who found him impatient and But after the election, he began consistency and changes of mood. irascible. It was said that he had showed his to speak out against the Militant But when Callaghan succeeded sacked six different government Tendency, although he rejected Wilson at Number 10 and sacked drivers because he had been dissat- capacity as any possibility of leaving the Castle, Owen stayed on at Health isfied with all of them. When Ivor Labour Party and committed for several uncomfortable months. Richard (the British Ambassador a strong, if himself to fighting inside through Then, in September 1976, when to the United Nations, a former sometimes ‘ten years of hard slog’. He was Roy Hattersley was promoted colleague in the Commons and highly critical of Roy Jenkins’ into the Cabinet, Callaghan put a Defence Minister) attended the domineer- Dimbleby Lecture, Home Thoughts Owen into the vacancy he left as Tony Crosland Memorial Service from Abroad, in November 1979, Minister of State at the Foreign at Westminster Abbey, Owen called ing, minis- implying that Jenkins was now on and Commonwealth Office. Richard in to voice his disapproval. the fringe of politics and out of Tony Crosland, the Foreign His supporters said that Owen ter’ with an touch with those who would save Secretary, was initially less than was blowing fresh air into the ‘authoritar- the Labour Party. enthusiastic about Owen, who fusty corners of the Foreign Of- Then suddenly, he changed had transferred his loyalty from fice and shaking up its traditional ian temper’. gear. At a London conference in

42 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 BIOGRAPHY: DAVID OWEN

May 1980, dominated by Tony Benn, he made an angry, brave impromptu speech on defence that was noisily heckled. As a re- sult he felt personally affronted at the treatment of a recent Foreign Secretary and saw for the first time the extent to which the left had captured the Labour Party. He now began to move with increased momentum towards a break with the party. Within days, on his initiative, he joined Shirley Williams and Bill Rodgers in a public state- ment, rejecting any suggestion from the Labour left that Britain should withdraw from the Eu- ropean Community. Five weeks later Owen and Rodgers, as that a group of Jenkinsites, like ‘Tough and theme of opposing any coming- members of the Shadow Cabinet Dick Taverne, David Marquand tender’ became together between the SDP and (Williams had been out of Parlia- and some non-Parliamentarians, Owen’s slogan the Liberals persisted until 1987. ment since 1979) challenged Cal- were close to Jenkins and treated – combining When the SDP had been es- laghan to justify a series of internal him as the king over the water; a market tablished, Owen began to find his policy changes that leant heavily and he knew that the Dimbleby economy, feet in a difficult, hostile House of towards the left. Then on 1 August Lecture had made Jenkins many strong Commons. He was not a natural 1980, Owen, Williams and Rodg- friends who looked to him to lead defence and speaker in debate and seemed ers, the ‘Gang of Three’, as they the realignment of the left. Jenkins compassion for to force out his words with dif- became known, wrote an open said that he was prepared to sup- the sick and ficulty. But he stood his ground letter to their fellow members of port any one of the three – Owen, unemployed. and his pronouncements carried the Labour Party, saying, ‘We are Williams or Rodgers – as leader (‘Guardian’, weight. When the Falklands War not prepared to abandon Britain to make the new party a success, 13 September broke out in April 1982, Owen to divisive and often cruel Tory but Owen was determined that 1983) was first inclined to oppose Mar- policies because electors do not he alone would lead. In the gap garet Thatcher’s determination to have an opportunity to vote for between the publication of the repossess the islands but he was an acceptable social alternative’. Limehouse Declaration in late persuaded very soon to support It was now plain that the Labour January 1981 and the launch of military action. In the coming Party was getting close to a split. the SDP in March, he proposed weeks, he spoke with a convic- However, Williams and Rodg- that he should become the Chair- tion which raised his profile both ers were still reluctant to leave La- man of the Parliamentary Party inside the Commons and outside. bour, and Owen also recognised (until a leadership ballot) and As a consequence, he became a that there would be a further de- Jenkins should be relegated to strong runner to challenge Roy lay if Denis Healey was elected as fund-raising for the new party. Jenkins as leader of the SDP in Callaghan’s successor. But when Owen was quick to disagree the ballot of members. He lost on 10 November Healey lost and with the views of Jenkins, Wil- by 20,846 votes to 26,256 (in a Michael Foot won, Owen was off liams and Rodgers about the turn-out of 75 per cent) but it the leash. For two months he was SDP’s relations with the Liberal was a much closer outcome than single-minded in coaxing anx- Party. In the first place, he took would have been anticipated a ious Labour MPs closer towards a exception to the proposal that the few weeks earlier. break, and hoping that the ‘Gang SDP and the Liberals should join Owen, however, was disap- of Three’ would go together. together at the next general elec- pointed and he made no special But he was much less enthu- tion, dividing the seats equally. effort to support Jenkins in pre- siastic about the prospect of the Then, a few days later, he com- paring for the general election. ‘Gang of Three’ getting together plained that Williams and Rodg- And while Owen was sulking in with Roy Jenkins to make the ers had too readily agreed with his tent, Jenkins found difficulty ‘Gang of Four’. He saw Jenkins as David Steel at the Anglo-German in adjusting to a less respectful ‘old hat’, a failure, having left the Königswinter Conference on House of Commons than he had House of Commons for Brussels, a joint statement of principles, previously known. As a result, and being twenty years older than including the two parties agree- shaken by an unsuccessful by- himself and already too close to ing to form two commissions to election at Darlington, the SDP the Liberals. He was also aware develop policy. Owen’s constant was not fully prepared when the

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 43 BIOGRAPHY: DAVID OWEN election was called in May 1983. eclectic in tone. It was said that Rodgers (the leading SDP mem- Jenkins had become Prime Min- he had sent it in draft to almost a ber of the Commission), Jenkins ister-designate in the Alliance hundred individuals and amend- and Williams. (the partnership of the SDP and ed it to take account of all their Owen’s behaviour was in the Liberals) with David Steel as diverse ideas. Now, after Salford character. He was enraged about a his deputy, but as the campaign and in the three years ahead, he newspaper headline, ‘Owen’s nu- failed to make progress it was began to turn away from the so- clear hopes dashed’, implying that proposed by the Liberals that cial democratic, ‘conscience and Steel had won on defence policy their role should be reversed. In reform’, centre-left. Owen’s para- and Owen had been humiliated. a tense argument at Steel’s home doxical ‘tough and tender’ slogan Owen could have shrugged it off at Ettrick Bridge, the SDP team encapsulated his social market as a minor hiccup, awaited the – including Williams and Rodg- approach, with ‘tough’ being the final report and negotiated an un- ers – opposed any change in the dominant mood in keeping with derstanding. Instead he punished Alliance leadership. However, his temperament. Jenkins called Had Owen his SDP colleagues for reaching Owen sat on his hands, claiming Owen’s policies ‘sub-Thatcherite’ an agreement with the Liberals that the Alliance leadership was a and a barely suppressed tension advocated in the Commission, and rejected personal matter between Jenkins grew between Owen and Jenkins, merger, the report. and Steel and for them alone. Williams and Rodgers. Owen’s outburst had arisen Later, when the arrangements However, Owen was effec- an almost from an injudicious remark by were left unchanged, Owen ex- tive in the House of Commons, Steel; and now in turn, in Sep- pressed his surprise and approval impressive on television and unanimous tember 1986, the Liberals voted that Steel had been tough enough commanding in the councils of against the two leaders’ proposal to try to push Jenkins aside. his party. This was a high-quality, vote of SDP for European nuclear coopera- The 1983 election result was sustained performance that did members tion partly in response to Owen’s far from a disaster for the Alliance. much to build the reputation and rubbishing of the Commission’s Its share of the vote was 25.4 per name of the SDP. Their members would have report. Owen and Steel tried to cent, only 2.2 per cent short of (the ‘political virgins’) might patch up the row in the follow- Labour’s vote. But with first-past- sometimes feel uneasy but they followed. ing weeks but the Alliance was the-post, the twenty-nine SDP gave their leader the benefit of seriously damaged. Steel’s morale MPs were reduced to six and it the doubt. It was suffered from Owen’s relentless was a major blow to morale, espe- Between Owen and Steel, there also pos- bullying; and Jenkins, Williams cially after the heady excitement was at first a tolerable if strained and Rodgers became increasingly of eighteen months earlier. Owen relationship. While Steel continued sible that cool towards Owen. made it immediately clear that to push for a closer union, Owen Early in 1987 the Alliance was he would challenge Jenkins for was deeply suspicious of any fur- a merged successfully re-launched with a the leadership and that, although ther coming together between the united team of spokesmen. But it he was prepared to accept a brief SDP and the Liberals, hoping that party, So- should have marked the culmi- delay, the principle of a contest proportional representation would cial Demo- nation of joint election planning was not negotiable. By the end eventually enable the two parties – not, in too many respects, its be- of the weekend the matter was to go their separate ways. In assert- crats and ginning. Similarly, the joint policy settled: Jenkins resigned and, fol- ing the SDP’s identity, Owen was booklet The Time Has Come was a lowing the formalities – there was especially determined to preserve Liberals natural mid-term document un- no credible alternative (Williams an independent defence policy, suitable for its launch close to the and Rodgers had lost their seats) making no compromise with together, election. As for objectives, it would – Owen became leader in time the Liberal unease about nuclear would have have been imaginative for Owen for the new Queen’s Speech. weapons. to promote the idea of Alliance He moved quickly to establish As a result, Owen and Steel elected holding the balance in a hung his own authority, style, policy agreed to appoint a joint Alliance parliament earlier in the term, and personal team. This was to Commission on defence and Owen as but was unsuitable when 633 be his own show, erasing the re- disarmament to delay a decision candidates would soon be fight- lationships of the ‘Gang of Four’ on British nuclear weapons until leader, ing to win, as the overwhelming and the spirit of the Limehouse close to the next election. After despite majority of Social Democrats and Declaration. At the SDP Salford eighteen months of discussion, Liberals believed that the ‘hung Conference three months later, both sides were close to agree- previous parliament’ formula ceased to have Owen blocked any discussion of ment when Owen suddenly re- any resonance once the election merger with the Liberals, at least jected the draft report, declaring controver- approached. Owen clung to it, during the next Parliament, and that Britain should remain ‘a nu- however, and the Alliance message tried to stop any joint selection of clear weapon state’. This caused a sies and his was confused. Owen and Steel Parliamentary candidates. major breakdown of relationships authoritar- were obliged to restore a working Owen’s book Face the Future, not only between Owen and relationship, but the shortcomings published two years earlier, was Steel, but between Owen and ian style. of dual leadership were profound.

44 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 BIOGRAPHY: DAVID OWEN

The doctor’s feated at Bath, Major offered Hong not for merging Kong to him, thus closing Owen’s (‘Radical avenue of opportunity. Instead, on Quarterly’, the recommendation of Douglas 1987) Hurd, he became the chief Europe- an negotiator in the Peace Confer- ence of Yugoslavia, from 1992–95 (succeeding Lord Carrington). In this capacity he was the co-author of the abortive Vance-Owen plan to end the war by dividing Bosnia into ethnic ‘cantons’. These efforts were acknowledged in his appoint- ment as a Companion of Honour (CH); and he told the story in his book Balkan Odyssey. In the 1980s Owen and Steel had separate elec- and Liberals together, would have he was a member of the Olaf Palme tion teams and Owen’s own circle elected Owen as leader, despite Commission on Disarmament and was distinct from the formal struc- previous controversies and his Security, and throughout his later ture of his party. authoritarian style. But with the career he played a prominent role However, on the eve of the odds against him, Owen was de- in top-table international institu- election the SDP believed that termined to preserve a separate tions and conferences. they were well-placed for the party made in his own image, and Owen became a director of campaign. Target seats were ade- face the consequences. Coats Viyella in 1994 and Ex- quately – in some cases generous- Following a campaign, and ecutive Chairman of Middlesex ly – resourced, and Owen worked with Owen strongly opposed to Holdings in 1995. He has other hard to raise money, with the help merger, members were divided business interests. of David Sainsbury. In late Febru- 60:40 in a ballot for merger. Owen In 1992 Owen became a peer, ary the SDP won an important then immediately resigned the making his maiden speech three by-election at Greenwich which SDP leadership, and in a bitter and years later and contributing oc- boosted the confidence of its in- lengthy dispute, refused to accept casionally to the House of Lords creasingly professional staff (hold- the majority decision. Instead he on international and European ing Liberal Truro in March was chose to lead the rump mem- Union affairs. In 1999 he became more predictable). But the 1987 bership, claiming the SDP name, Chairman of ‘New Europe’, general election was not a success. despite the clear assumption that committed to opposing Britain’s Social Democrats and Liber- the identity of the SDP would be entry to the Eurozone. als worked well together in the absorbed into a single party. Owen married Deborah constituencies, but the dual lead- The Owenites (the ‘Continu- Schabert of New York in 1968 and ership was unrelaxed and clumsy. ing SDP’) survived for two years, three children followed. Debbie The Alliance vote fell by 2.8 per carried on Owen’s shoulders. His Owen’s charm, intelligence and cent from 1983, three SDP MPs, party fought eight by-elections, loyalty helped to sustain Owen including Jenkins, lost their seats but when their candidate finished through his vicissitudes; and she and the SDP Parliamentary Party seventh out of eight candidates in became a successful literary agent, was reduced to five. Bootle, behind the Monster Rav- with Delia Smith, Jeffrey Archer Within the SDP there was now ing Loony Party, Owen knew that and Georgette Heyer among her overwhelming pressure to merge his time was up. He disbanded his star clients. The Owens created a with the Liberals. Owen hoped to party and in 1991 published his close-knit family, as if to redress delay a decision and to devise an- autobiography, Time to Declare, the balance of David Owen’s own other, perhaps closer, partnership of 800 pages. At the early age of lonely childhood. between the SDP and the Liberals. fifty-three he decided to leave But the SDP’s constitution, the politics, knowing that he would First elected to Parliament in 1962, text of which Owen had approved almost certainly lose his seat at Bill Rodgers served as a minister in several years earlier, made provi- Plymouth, and with no serious five government departments, and in sion for a one-member, one-vote prospect of a further career in the the Cabinet, as Secretary of State referendum on major issues, and House of Commons. for Transport, between 1976–79. the party’s mood was to resolve It was thought that if John Ma- In 1981, along with David Owen, the matter. Had Owen advocated jor returned to Downing Street ion he was a member of the ‘Gang of merger, an almost unanimous vote the 1992 election, he would ap- Four’ who founded the SDP. He was of SDP members would have fol- point Owen as the last Governor- given a life peerage in 1992, and from lowed. It was also possible that a General of Hong Kong. But when 1997–2002 was leader of the Liberal merged party, Social Democrats Chris Patten was unexpectedly de- Democrat peers.

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 45 MERGER AND AFTERMATH: 1987–89

The Alliance’s 1987 election campaign was unimpressive and the outcome was disappointing. Pressure for merger between the SDP and Liberals began to mount almost immediately – in opposition to the wishes of David Owen. Nevertheless, Owen Merger? The Gang of Four splits believed he could (3 July 1987) (17 July 1987) win the party’s ballot David Owen, seen here circling Arguments over merger split the the SDP’s wagons and calling out old Gang of Four, with Shirley over opening merger to the party’s other MPs (above), Williams – along with Bill negotiations, and use was the main defender of the Rodgers and Roy Jenkins – sup- SDP’s independence after the porting the SDP merging with his victory to force out 1987 general election. the Liberals to form a new party. his Jenkinsite critics Owen did not agree. within the SDP. It was a fatal miscalculation. This final selection of cartoons by Chris Radley, from the Social Democrat, charts the SDP’s last year, and the infighting between the merged party and the Owenite rump that followed. Commentary by Mark Pack.

46 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 MERGER AND AFTERMATH: 1987–89

Squabbling to obscurity Liberals collapsed. Pictured members and voters. This was Maclennan – two of the four (14 August 1987) here are Owen and Williams, exacerbated when, in the end, other SDP MPs – backed The Bible tells a story of two leaders of the dispute within Charles Kennedy and Robert merger. women arguing over their the SDP. ‘Big Cyril’ is again children – whose is dead and the Liberal MP Cyril Smith, whose is alive? – to which who was still regularly in- Solomon suggests the an- dulging in outbursts of pub- swer is to cut the one living lic anger (see 24 June 1983). child in two and to give each woman half of it. A similarly self-destructive cycle gripped Owen on his own the SDP at this time, with (18 September 1987) the continuing arguments for The progress towards merg- and against merger risking er between the SDP and making the whole question Liberals, left David Owen a ather irrelevant as the public turned r forlorn-looking figure away from the bickering, and on the political scene, largely support for both the SDP and abandoned by his colleagues,

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 47 MERGER AND AFTERMATH: 1987–89

messy process, with the Liber- als not being able to get what they wished from the SDP, particularly on defence, whose leader in turn could not stop Owen wanting to go off and form his own splinter party.

Trying to put it all together again (11 December 1987) Whether or not the two par- ties could be merged into a cohesive and coherent new party was a matter of pro- tracted dispute, most publicly revealed in the long discus-

A new leader Merger, merger, (9 October 1987) merger Robert Maclennan (pictured (20 November 1987) above left) took over briefly The merger process was a as SDP leader after Owen’s protracted one, resulting resignation following his par- in the parties becoming ty’s vote to open negotiations largely introverted for many with the Liberal Party on months, as reflected in the merger. David Steel (pictured frequent cartoons in the above right) remained the SDP newspaper about the Liberal leader. negotiations (right). It was a

48 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 MERGER AND AFTERMATH: 1987–89

sions over the party’s name. The new party nosedives on the verge of disappearing place in Europe loomed For those closely involved it (15 February 1988) from the political stage com- over the latter years of Mrs was a crucial and emotional As a new party slowly and pletely (above). Thatcher’s premiership. issue, though for many out- painfully emerged from the The passage of legislation side it all, going through sev- merger process, it found pub- enabling the creation of a eral different suggested and lic support very difficult to European Monetary single European market in actual names in a short pe- come by: opinion poll ratings, System the mid-1980s passed largely riod of time was more suited membership and finances all (July 1988) without controversy, despite to comedy than to politics. collapsed. The party teetered The question of Britain’s its importance in building

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 49 MERGER AND AFTERMATH: 1987–89

a version of the European thing Mrs Thatcher might merged party as it struggled (North Yorkshire) by-election Community which Margaret like about the process) – were to recover from the debili- in early 1989, after which Thatcher and many in the keen supporters of ster- tating merger process. With Ashdown was moved to float Conservative Party came ling entering the European both parties frequently in an idea of an electoral pact. resolutely to oppose. What Monetary System of fixed single figures in the opinion However, David Owen con- did attract contemporary exchange rates. Although polls, they seemed to many tinued to move sharply to the controversy was the future Mrs Thatcher was eventually to be irrelevant to the main right; this cartoon (below) of sterling. Since 1979 the forced to agree to this, she Tory–Labour political bat- presents him an a leadership Conservatives had tried vari- was never a fan of the idea. tle. Paddy Ashdown, the new debate with Mrs Thatcher, ous schemes of floating and party’s leader, is here (above) moderated by Robin Day. managed exchange rates, pictured racing David Owen In practice, however, although the latter depended Wrong place, wrong race to third place in the polls. Owen’s party never had the on international cooperation. (August 1988) membership or organisa- Elsewhere in the European David Owen refused to ac- tion to pose more than a Community momentum cept the verdict of the SDP’s Leading the right? sporadic threat. It continued towards, first, fixed exchange members who voted for (February 1989) to do badly in local elections rates, and then a single cur- merger. He set up a splinter The Continuing SDP man- and as Ashdown began to rency gathered. Some senior party, the ‘Continuing SDP.’ aged occasionally to threaten get a grip on his own party Tories – most notably Geof- For a brief period his party the merged party in the polls; – which eventually settled on frey Howe and Nigel Lawson appeared to offer a serious their high point was com- the name ‘Liberal Democrats’ (pictured, displaying some- electoral challenge to the ing second in the Richmond – the challenge from Owen faded away.

Own your favourite cartoon All the cartoons reproduced in this issue of the Journal of Liberal History – together with many more – are available for sale. Journal readers benefit from a 10% reduction, and 25% of proceeds will benefit the History Group. See details on page 2 of this issue, or visit: www.liberalhistory.org.uk.

50 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 forms the cover illustration to the book). Acutely aware of the REVIEWS relationship between politi- cians and cartoonists, Steadman deliberately stopped drawing ‘A sign of arrival …’ cartoons altogether in 1988 and urged others to follow his lead, Alan Mumford: Stabbed in the Front: Post-War General claiming that if all the world’s cartoonists shunned them for Elections Through Political Cartoons a year politicians ‘would suffer (University of Kent, Canterbury, 2001, 164 pp) withdrawal symptoms of such withering magnitude that the Reviewed by Tim Benson effect on their egos could only be guessed at. Not even a tyrant oliticians and political car- Indeed, the title of the book is can survive the whiplash of in- toonists have always had a partly a homage to Vicky, who difference.’ Pstrange symbiotic relation- published a post-war anthology Many of the cartoons in ship. As Lord Baker says in his entitled Stabs in the Back. But in this well-researched and well- foreword to this book, for a ris- Mumford’s view ‘although they produced book come from ing politician to be featured in a may seem to be unfair, political the Cartoon Study Centre at cartoon ‘is a sign he has arrived’. cartoons are an obvious assault the University of Kent, one of Drawing cartoons of from the front, not a covert Britain’s hidden treasures and politicians during elections attack from the rear’, and hence a true Aladdin’s Cave of visual is a tradition that goes back a the change. satire. Now more than two long way in Britain. One has The book is divided into fif- decades old, it is effectively the only to think of William Dent’s teen chapters, one for each of the national archive of twentieth- ‘filthy prints’ of the Duchess general elections since the war, century British political car- of Devonshire bestowing her and each chapter has separate toons, with more than 80,000 favours during the famous sections on the background to original drawings, 70,000 1784 Westminster election, or the election in question, election cuttings, 60,000 photographic of the work of the first-ever issues , personalities, results and images and an award-winning staff political cartoonist on a the cartoonist of the election . computer database. Others have daily paper, Francis Carruthers The latter section is a curiosity. been gathered from a variety of Gould (described by former Though it is, of course, inter- sources and, together with Dr Prime Minister Lord Rosebery esting and important to know Mumford’s informative text, as ‘one of the most remarkable who the cartoonists were, it is assets of the Liberal Party’), difficult to assess who was the who was knighted immediately most prominent in any particular after the Liberal election election, and two odd choices victory in 1906. feature amongst the usual sus- In Stabbed in the Front, Alan pects of Vicky, Cummings, Mumford has made a good start Low, Illingworth, Bell, Gibbard, on a potentially vast subject and Garland. These are Nor- by looking at British general man Mansbridge (1966 elec- elections following the Second tion) and Willie Rushton (1992 World War. Produced as a election), neither of whom are large-format (A4) paperback, particularly renowned for their it contains nearly 200 black- political work. and-white cartoons from the The introduction examines pens of more than forty artists the content of cartoons, look- working for the best-known ing especially at the element of national newspapers over the savagery and the use of symbols, last half-century. Dr Mumford, metaphors and references, and, who is also a collector of political following on from Lord Baker’s cartoons, admits to a special comments, discusses their im- liking for Vicky, who was the pact. In this regard, Mumford first cartoonist really to attract quotes Ralph Steadman (whose his attention when he began grotesque New Statesman car- to get interested in politics. toon from the 1997 election

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 51 REVIEWS the result is a refreshing mix Dr Tim Benson is Director of the that makes fascinating reading Political Cartoon Society, an organi- for anyone interested in cur- sation for those interested in history rent affairs, one which will also and politics through the medium of be appreciated by students of cartoons. politics, history, journalism and Visit www.politicalcartoon.co.uk cartoon art.

When personal ambitions collide, mutual co-operation is precluded Giles Radice: Friends and Rivals: Crosland, Jenkins and Healey (Little, Brown & Co., 2002), 382 pp. Reviewed by Tom McNally

et us start with the con- narrative parallels Dangerfield’s clusion. Giles Radice has The Strange Death of Liberal Eng- Lwritten an important land in seeking to explain how book, a very readable book and both a political establishment and one that entirely justifies the a political philosophy lost its way. many favourable reviews it has I watched this story unfold received since its publication in first of all as a Labour Party re- September 2002. By the device searcher in the mid- and late them. In that respect Tony Blair of interweaving the careers and sixties, then as International Sec- and Gordon Brown did learn the ambitions of Anthony Crosland, retary of the Labour Party from lessons of history by cementing Roy Jenkins and Denis Healey, 1969–74 (the youngest since their own non-aggression pact, Radice is able to tell the tale of Denis Healey, who served in the and reaped their full reward for the rise and fall of social democ- post from 1945–52), followed by so doing. racy within the Labour Party in the position of Political Secretary We will never know whether a way that is both readable and to Jim Callaghan from 1974–79, the battles which Neil Kin- understandable to those com- and finally as a Member of Par- nock began in the mid-eighties ing fresh to this period of recent liament from 1979–83. As Denis and Tony Blair completed in contemporary history, while be- Healey once memorably told the nineties could have been ing positively unputdownable for me, it was a vantage point from achieved a decade earlier by a those of us who lived through it which you could peep under more resolute and united centre- as active participants. the table and see the true colour right. I have my doubts. Those The Wilson Government of the political knickers people who remained deny it, but the of the 1960s had probably the were wearing. analysis presented to me by Bill cleverest cabinet of the twentieth Although the book is the sto- Rodgers, when in 1981 I left the century. Radice’s three heroes ry of the rivalry of a triumvirate, Labour Party to join the newly were among the cleverest of my old boss, Jim Callaghan, is a formed SDP, is, I believe, valid: the clever. I disagree with Giles kind of Iago figure, a brooding ‘Tom, what we are doing will Radice that they were the Blair- presence in the narrative whose force the Labour Party to either ites of the 1960s. Both singly and influence on the unfolding trag- reform or die. If it refuses to re- collectively they had an intel- edy is a malign one for our three form then the SDP will replace lectual depth to their politics and noble failures. it.’ Faced with that stark choice, their convictions, the absence of Radice’s central thesis is prob- Labour chose to reform, but which is the most disturbing as- ably true: if mutual jealousies and there was not much stomach for pect of the post-1997 New La- ambitions had not prevented it, it before the arrival of the SDP, bour government. Yet this trio of an alliance between Crosland, as a close examination of the heavyweights, whose basic politi- Jenkins and Healey at almost any careers of some Cabinet mem- cal philosophies were remarkably time between the late sixties and bers would testify. Although the close, lost the battle for the soul the mid-seventies could have de- key reforms lay a decade ahead, of Old Labour. In a way, Radice’s livered the premiership to one of the defining moment came, as

52 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 REVIEWS

Radice records, at the 1981 La- ce’s third element in their inter- Hennessy) that he said: ‘There bour conference when Denis action, which makes the exercise were a lot of them who are clev- Healey defeated Tony Benn for of a triple biography worth tell- erer than me; but I am here and the Deputy Leadership by four- ing in this form: ‘When personal they are not.’ There was no doubt fifths of one percent. In his di- ambitions collided, mutual co- which trio of old rivals he had ary, Giles Radice wrote on the operation was precluded.’ particularly in mind. evening of the Healey victory: So it was that time and chance Giles Radice’s book goes a ‘By beating Benn, however nar- delivered No. 10 to Jim Cal- long way to explaining how he rowly, Denis Healey has saved the laghan. When Jim was elected outsmarted them all. Labour Party.’ If that is so, then I leader of the Labour Party and played a part in that rescue. My appointed Prime Minister in Lord (Tom) McNally is Deputy final vote as a Labour Member of March 1976, it was to me (not, Leader of the Liberal Democrats in Parliament was to vote for Denis as stated in the book, to Peter the House of Lords. Healey at that conference. It was my parting gift to a Labour Party to which, as Roy Hattersley told me at the time, I owed every- thing. But I have my doubts wheth- His books were read er any of our three heroes could have led the Labour Party better Roy Jenkins: A Life at the Centre or more effectively in the 1960s and 1970s than the ‘consensus’ (Macmillan,1991; 658pp) leaders, Wilson and Callaghan. Reviewed by Conrad Russell The structure of the party gave too much power to the trade ell me. Where is fancy bred? power in the end than any of- unions (fine when the unions Or in the heart. Or in fice-holder, and Roy was one of are in the control of the right, Tthe head?’ these. Though he may have been poison when controlled by the ‘ Shakespeare’s question has cu- the most successful post-war left – as Tony Blair may shortly riously been answered by mod- Chancellor of the Exchequer, find out). In addition, the Benn ern science and the answer is in that, by comparison, was a minor reforms on reselection emascu- the head. One may ask the same achievement. lated the Parliamentary Party so question about political power. It underestimates Roy Jenkins that most of them opted for the Is it bred in the heart of govern- even to describe him as a great ‘quiet life’ option of Michael ment, in 10 Downing Street political thinker. When candi- Foot when Jim Callaghan belat- – and perhaps in No. 11 – or is dates are nominated for election edly stood down. it bred in the ideas that are the to the British Academy they Politics is about great issues. petrol such people take from the may be proposed on honor- But it is also about personalities pumps to put in their engines? ary grounds for their service to and how their weaknesses and Politics is Roy Jenkins was perhaps scholarship through public life. strengths play on the great issues. the first major politician since Roy, defender of literary merit, Radice does not allow his ad- about great Gladstone to pursue both sorts Chancellor of Oxford University, miration for his subjects to blind issues. But of political power at once. That drafter of the academic freedom him to their flaws. Tony Crosland is why, though great it is, the amendment of 1988, deserved could be cavalier and peevish, it is also sequence of Home Secretary such a nomination. Yet the biog- Roy Jenkins pompous, and – Chancellor of the Exchequer rapher of Gladstone, Dilke and Denis Healey, in Roy Jenkins’ about per- – President of the European Asquith as a historian of standing memorable phrase, carried light Commission grossly underesti- in his own right also deserved a ideological baggage on a heavy sonalities mates his importance. Plenty of nomination. I know of no-one gun carriage. In the end all that and how twentieth century prime minis- since John Morley who deserved this tells us is that politicians, like ters – Home, Major, Callaghan consideration on both grounds the rest of humanity, have human their weak- even Wilson – did less to shape at once. failings and weaknesses. Whether twentieth century politics than What has not been remarked a politician gets to the top or not nesses and he did. If one calls a man a Calla- upon is the extent to which his depends as much on time and ghanite it has no meaning. If one academic and his political work chance as on personal qualities. strengths calls him Jenkinsite this instantly concentrated on the same issue. Yet what led to Crosland, Jenkins play on tells us what we can say to him The link is perhaps made most and Healey all failing to reach and what we cannot. Those who clear in the Dimbleby Lecture. Number 10 – although at vari- the great prepare the language politicians He said that the British political ous times all three had both their feed into their brains have more system had not changed much time and the chance – was Radi- issues.

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 53 REVIEWS since 1868, but Britain had death wish, it was indeed eclipsed his own was small and notewor- changed very much in those four years later. thy. Among my contemporaries, years, so that stability risked turn- Once it had collapsed it stayed Bob Maclennan was one of its ing into ‘stultifying political ri- collapsed. It is characteristic of recognisably distinguished figures gidity’. He was interested in two ‘first past the post’ that once a from the early sixties onwards. moments when such pressure party becomes a clearly estab- On the other hand the frequent for change ran into conflict with lished second it is very hard to pairing together during the sev- the political system. One was the dislodge. As Machiavelli said: enties of Shirley Williams and rise of the Labour Party and the ‘there is great difficulty in seizing Reg Prentice – of which there other its fall. The big question of the estate of the Turk but once it is a good deal in A Life at the twentieth-century politics that is taken, great ease in holding it’. Centre – is sheer illusion. They Roy did not become conscious It is that great ease which has were united in certain negative of until around 1975, but which kept a Labour Party recognised propositions aimed at Tony Benn may have haunted him since as obsolescent by 1959 firmly and Michael Foot but we can 1959, was whether the rise of the in its place in spite of all inward see now that they were united Labour Party was a blind alley decay. It is almost impossible in very little else. Reg Prentice and a wrong turning. Did it have now for people who learnt their in his final Conservative years any continuing use or should it politics after the beginning of in the House of Lords showed be marked ‘Return to Sender’? the Cold War to understand himself an unadulterated right- Both the rise and the decline the extent to which the Labour winger of a sort who sometimes of the Labour Party force us to Party of those whose beliefs made me prefer Enoch Powell. consider the electoral system. It were formed before 1939 was He reminded me of Donne’s line is not clear whether Roy noticed in hock both to Moscow and to ‘busy old fool, unruly sun, go the relevance of the electoral sys- Marx. Roy Jenkins in A Life at choose sour prentices’. Not even tem to Labour’s rise. The key evi- the Centre complains that he and her worst enemy in the grip of a dence is printed only by Colin Tony Crosland were two of only nightmare could have said any of Matthew in his Gladstone Diaries. three members of the Labour this of Shirley Williams. The Liberal Party of the 1890s Club committee at Oxford who With these came a tradi- needed to attract the growing were not on the Moscow line tion that I identified under the group of working-class politi- on questions such as the Russian name of Comrade Blimp, which cians. It was doing well enough invasion of Finland. The result was Labour only because it for a while, but the near abolition was that they decided to split was working class, while being of the two-member constituency the Club and won a comfortable thoroughly reactionary on eve- in 1885, struck it a near-fatal victory among the membership. rything else. Bob Mellish was a blow. In 1891 Stuart Rendel of Roy was Treasurer of the demo- prime example of this tradition. that ilk submitted a memo to cratic socialists and Iris Murdoch Gladstone in which he pointed of the Moscow traditionalists. out that Liberals in a two-mem- The resulting correspondence ber constituency were prepared between ‘Dear Miss Murdoch’ to choose a working-class can- and ‘Dear Comrade Jenkins’ is didate for the second seat, just as the beatification of incongruity. they are often prepared now to Perhaps the importance of this choose a woman for the second Marxist presence is the extent place on a list. Given single- to which it created a confusion member constituencies they of identity on the Labour right. ceased to choose the working- The persistent awareness of the class candidates. The result was ennemi a gauche enabled them to that Keir Hardie, Ramsay Mac- hold together an unnatural unity Donald and Arthur Henderson against Marxist or Communist all applied for nominations to infiltration and, more seriously, safe Liberal seats and were turned inhibited many of them from down. With those three on developing genuine ideals that board the Liberals would surely they actually held but which they have been in a far stronger posi- made known to very few at the tion to repel Labour boarders. tine. I never knew at the time Roy’s work, and particularly his of Roy’s proposed programmes Asquith, demonstrate a Liberal for Labour of 1959 (A Life at the Party that in 1914 was very far Centre p. 130) but I would have from ready for eclipse and yet, been delighted to have done so. thanks to a quirk of the electoral The liberal right to which system as well as its own internal Roy belonged and that he made

54 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 REVIEWS He once tried in the late 1980s The twenty- save that of colonial freedom The question that needs explain- to divide the House of Lords in are as much keys to the future as ing over Europe is why there has favour of the closed shop and three the past. Some, such as ‘whether been so little meaningful dia- failed because he could not find we can expose and destroy the logue about it. More than any- a fellow teller. The issues of the months abuses and inefficiencies of where else the two sides in Brit- sixties – race and social liberal- contemporary private industry ain have talked past each other ism as well as Europe – split this of Roy without only offering the ster- like ships in the night, generating group apart and exposed what Jenkins’ ile alternative of an indefinite more heat than light. When Jim had always been an artificial extension of public monopoly’, Callaghan spoke of the need to unity. There is very little sign tenure at are at the very cutting edge of preserve ‘the language of Chau- in A Life at the Centre that Roy the current debate within the cer’, what would he have done Jenkins perceived the artificiality the Home Liberal Democrats. That mem- if he had known that Chaucer of these alliances on which he bers of the Labour Party had got wrote equally well in English, perforce depended. The shock of Office re- there forty-four years ago and French and Latin, because he did his split with Gaitskell over Eu- main for were unable to move on is surely not know which of them would rope equally illustrates this lack a terrible indictment of their survive? The more that Enoch of eye for the crevasses under the me one of party. It seems that such ideas, by Powell and Peter Shore ranted snow of their glacier. Bill Rodg- inserting something positive in about sovereignty the better a ers remaining seated with his the high- the face of the negatives that had European they made me. No arms folded and Dora Gaitskell held the Labour right together, wonder Roy Jenkins could not lamenting that ‘the wrong people est points simply exposed a depth of differ- prevail by reason. He was unable are cheering’ illustrate this to of British ence that had long been latent. to address the issues that con- perfection. It was not just Roy’s Euro- cerned his opponents because Only some of the Labour politics peanism that raised this spectre. as soon as he conceded they had right were ever democratic His liberalism at the Home Of- any importance he would have socialists. They were a miscel- since the fice did so just as much and still been forced to abandon his own laneous crew of party bosses, does on some parts of the Labour beliefs. ambitious parliamentarians, war. He was benches today. It was this that Against this background Roy working-class chip wearers (of the great- led Ernst Armstrong to tell Roy, was forced for lack of any other whom David Blunkett is a survi- when he contemplated him as a political outlet to set out on the vor), isolationists, and people like est Home successor to Wilson, that he had course that led to the Alliance. Woodrow Wyatt who are best long expected to support him The clash with David Owen classified as mercurial. They were Secretary ‘but the party was now so fragile once again encapsulated the in- not a stable base for any move- that it needed Callaghan’s bed- coherence of the Labour right. ment. Some of the worst sufferers since Sir side manner’. Maybe it did but The path has been slow because were people like Bill Rodgers Robert there were people who would neither Labour nor Conserva- who were genuine idealists but have gone to the stake for Roy’s tive were as efficient or as sin- spent so long policing the left Peel. measures at the Home Office, gle-minded in their attempts to touchline that their idealism was including his incipient policies commit suicide as Asquith and not made visible even to those on gender and race. Who would Lloyd George. Give them time who would happily have admired have gone to the stake for Jim – they are certain to get there in it if it had been. Bill Rodgers Callaghan? The twenty-three the end. In reading A Life at the on criminal justice is a Liberal months of Roy Jenkins’ tenure Centre and then today’s paper on through and through, but there at the Home Office remain for Europe (22 May) I read of a story is nothing in A Life at the Centre me one of the highest points of that is still going on. Europe, and very little in Labour politics British politics since the war. He like Mount Everest, is there and which might have led anyone to was the greatest Home Secretary while it is, so will we be, for we realise it. since Sir Robert Peel. are the only party that is capable Roy was beginning the search In 1974 Roy submitted a of running a government that has for a new creed as early as his memo in favour of PR to the to deal with it. Roy will be able New Fabian Essays of 1952 in Labour cabinet. It was shot down to enjoy Hilaire Belloc’s epitaph: which he said that Marxist-Len- in flames by Barbara Castle inism was ‘more interested in – his causes were not hers. As When I am dead, I hope it may capital maldistribution as a flaw Roy always said, Labour was a be said, to be used for the overthrow of coalition and that coalition was His sins were scarlet but his the system than in an evil to be falling apart. Thus the rivalry books were read. rectified for its own sake’. His over Europe that has riven all seven great issues of today and political parties except the always tomorrow set out in a Spectator internationalist Liberals was a Conrad (Earl) Russell is a Liberal article of 1959 indicate a pro- consequence as well as a cause Democrat spokesman in the House gramme in which all of the issues of instability in the Labour Party. of Lords.

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 55 CHRONOLOGY OF THE SDP Compiled by Mark Pack

1979 3 May General election won by the Tories. Defeated Labour MPs include Shirley Williams.

June Social Democrat Alliance (SDA) reorganises itself into a network of local groups, not all of whose members need be in the Labour Party. July ‘Inquest on a movement’ by David Marquand appears in Encounter.

22 November Roy Jenkins delivers the Dimbleby Lecture, ‘Home thoughts from abroad’.

30 November Bill Rodgers gives a speech at Abertillery: ‘Our party has a year, not much longer, in which to save itself.’

20 December Meeting of Jenkinsites and others considering forming a new party, organised by Colin Phipps. Robert Maclennan declines invitation. 1980 January NEC refuses to publish report from Reg Underhill detailing Trotskyite infiltration of Labour.

1 May Local elections. Liberal vote changes little, though seats are gained with large advances in Liverpool and control of Adur and Hereford. 31 May Labour Special Conference at Wembley. Policy statement Peace, Jobs, Freedom, including pro-unilateralism and anti-EEC policies, supported. Owen is deeply angered by vitriolic heckling during his speech. 7 June Owen, Rodgers and Williams warn they will leave Labour if it supports withdrawal from the EEC: ‘There are some of us who will not accept a choice between socialism and Europe. We will choose them both.’ 8 June Williams warns that a centre party would have ‘no roots, no principles, no philosophy and no values.’

9 June Roy Jenkins delivers lecture to House of Commons Press Gallery, calling for a realignment of the ‘radical centre’.

15 June Labour’s Commission of Inquiry backs use of an electoral college for electing the leader and mandatory reselection of MPs. 24 July SDA announces plans to run up to 200 candidates against Labour left-wingers.

1 August Open letter to members of Labour from Owen, Rodgers and Williams published in the Guardian.

9 September David Marquand speaks at Liberal Assembly. David Steel says Labour rebels have six months to leave the party.

22 September Group of twelve MPs, led by Michael Thomas, publish statement in The Times, calling for major reforms in Labour’s structure. 29 September – 3 Labour conference at Blackpool votes to change method for electing its leader. Unilateral disarmament and October withdrawal from the EEC are passed as policy. Shirley Williams and Tom Bradley refuse to speak from the platform on behalf of the National Executive Committee (NEC). 15 October James Callaghan resigns as Labour leader.

4 November First round of Labour’s leadership election (Healey 112, Foot 83, Silkin 38, Shore 32).

10 November Michael Foot elected leader of Labour, defeating Healey 139–129.

21 November Owen announces he will not stand again for the Shadow Cabinet.

28 November Williams announces she cannot be a Labour candidate again given Labour’s current policies.

1 December Labour proscribes SDA.

10 December Meeting in Williams’ flat, including Ivor Crewe and Anthony King, who outline considerable possible support for a new party.

56 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 CHRONOLOGY

1981 6 January Jenkins returns to Britain from Brussels.

12 January Liberals publish ten-point plan for economic recovery. Several Labour MPs publicly welcome it.

14 January Meeting of the ‘Gang of Four’ (Jenkins, Owen, Rodgers and Williams) at Williams’ flat.

18 January Gang of Four meets at Rodgers’ house, and agree to issue a joint statement following the Wembley Conference.

24 January Labour Special Conference at Wembley. New electoral college for electing the leader gives trade unions the largest share of the vote (40%, with 30% for MPs and 30% for constituency parties). Owen fails to get ‘one member, one vote’ adopted. Opponents include Neil Kinnock. 25 January Limehouse Declaration issued by the Gang of Four.

26 January Nine Labour MPs join the Council for Social Democracy.

30 January Owen tells his local party he will not be standing for Labour at the next election.

31 January Joint rally by SDA and Association of Democratic Groups, chaired by ex-Labour foreign secretary Lord George- Brown. 5 February Advert published in the Guardian sees 100 people declare their support for the Council for Social Democracy and elicits 25,000 letters of support. Alec McGivan is appointed organiser of the Council. 9 February Council moves into offices in Queen Anne’s Gate. Williams resigns from NEC.

20 February Two Labour MPs resign whip and sit as social democrats.

2 March Ten Labour MPs and nine peers resign whip and sit as social democrats.

17 March Christopher Brocklebank-Fowler becomes the only Conservative MP to join the Council.

26 March Official launch of SDP in Connaught Rooms, Covent Garden, complete with high-tech directional microphones. More than 500 press attend. April Anglo-German Königswinter conference, where Rodgers, Williams and Steel meet and agree on the outlines of an alliance between their parties. 7 May Local elections. Liberal vote rises thanks to increase in number of candidates; take control of Isle of Wight and hold balance of power on eight county councils. The few independent social democrat candidates make little impression. 16 June Publication of A Fresh Start for Britain, a joint Liberal-SDP policy statement, along with photo opportunity of Steel and Williams sitting on the lawn of Dean’s Yard, Westminster. 16 July Warrington by-election. Labour’s majority cut from 10,274 to 1,759. Jenkins (Alliance candidate) comments, ‘This is my first defeat in thirty years of politics and it is by far the greatest victory that I have ever participated in.’ September Liberal Assembly at Llandudno. Jenkins and Williams address fringe meeting. Motion calling for electoral pact overwhelmingly carried. Steel calls for delegates to ‘Go back to your constituencies and prepare for government’. SDP rolling conference. Travels by train between Perth, Bradford and London.

Alliance launched.

22 October Croydon Northwest by election won by the Liberal Bill Pitt.

October Healey defeats Benn’s challenge for the Labour deputy leadership by just 0.426%.

26 November Crosby by-election won by Shirley Williams.

December Gallup poll shows 51% would vote Liberal/SDP.

1982 3 January Rodgers breaks off negotiations with Liberals over seat allocation for forthcoming general election.

25 March Jenkins wins Glasgow Hillhead by-election.

1 April Liberal/SDP negotiations over division for seats for general election are concluded.

2 April Argentina invades the Falklands.

23 April Ballot of all SDP members backs ‘one member, one vote’ for electing party leader.

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 57 CHRONOLOGY

6 May Local elections. Liberals win five times as many seats as SDP, which makes a net loss.

3 June Tories gain Mitcham & Morden in by-election caused by Bruce Douglas-Martin resigning his seat on defecting to the SDP in order to stand again under his new party’s colours. 14 June End of the Falklands war.

2 July Jenkins defeats Owen to be SDP leader.

September Williams elected SDP President.

1983 24 February Simon Hughes wins Bermondsey by-election.

24 March Darlington by-election: SDP candidate slumps to a poor third. Labour’s victory saves Michael Foot’s leadership.

5 May Local elections. Labour wins control of Liverpool (from a minority Liberal administration) as Alliance’s national vote slips, though number of seats increases. 29 May Ettrick Bridge meeting, where Steel attempts to remove ‘Prime Minister designate’ title from Jenkins.

9 June Mrs Thatcher wins general election, and Alliance (25.4%) just fails to win more votes than Labour (27.6%). Liberals move from 13 to 17 MPs, SDP slump from 29 to 6 MPs. Rodgers and Williams defeated. 12 June Foot announces he will not stand again as Labour leader.

13 June Jenkins resigns as SDP leader.

22 June Owen becomes SDP leader unopposed.

7 July David Steel starts three months’ sabbatical.

28 July Liberals fail to win Penrith & Borders by-election by just 553 votes.

September SDP conference at Salford rejects proposals for joint selections (with Liberals) of Euro and Westminster candidates and any chance of merger before the next election. After Harrogate Liberal Assembly Cyril Smith announces his departure into self-imposed exile. 1984 3 May Local elections. Alliance makes net gains of 160 seats, but SDP vote continues to slip.

14 June European elections. Alliance wins 19.1% and no seats but SDP wins Portsmouth South by-election.

20 September Steel defeated at Liberal Assembly over calls to withdraw Cruise missiles from Britain.

1985 2 May Local elections. Alliance gains over 200 seats and twenty-four out of thirty-nine English county councils end up under no overall control. SDP wins a larger increase in its vote than the Liberals. 4 July Liberals win Brecon & Radnor by-election. During July (and again in September), Alliance briefly tops opinion polls.

September Successful SDP conference in Torquay marks high point of party’s strength and self-confidence.

3 December Over 15 million watch John Cleese present a party political broadcast on PR for the SDP. Probably the largest ever audience for a PPB. 1986 8 May Liberals win Ryedale by-election and just fail to gain West Derbyshire. In the local elections, Alliance gains control of Adur and Tower Hamlets and makes a net gain of around 380 seats. 5 June Alliance Defence Commission reports, avoiding decision on Polaris. It is criticised by Owen. Owen and Steel subsequently explore options for Anglo-French co-operation over nuclear deterrence (the ‘Euro-bomb’). 18 July Liberals narrowly fail to win Newcastle-under-Lyme by-election after a hard-hitting campaign which draws criticism from David Steel. 23 September Liberal Assembly defeats leadership over Alliance’s defence policy. Cyril Smith publicly makes his peace with Steel at the Assembly. 1987 26 January Re-launch of Alliance at Barbican rally. Joint Alliance Parliamentary spokespeople announced.

26 February SDP wins Greenwich by-election.

12 March Liberals hold Truro in by-election caused by David Penhaligon’s death in December 1986.

7 May Local elections. Alliance gains over 450 seats. Labour again regains control of Liverpool, but overall Labour loses and Conservative gains lead to Mrs Thatcher calling a general election.

58 Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 CHRONOLOGY

11 June Mrs. Thatcher wins the general election. Alliance’s vote drops by 2.9%. SDP falls from 8 to 5 seats, Jenkins defeated at Hillhead. Liberals win 17. 13 June Owen gives press conference where he appears to reject any attempts at merger.

14 June Steel announces to the media his support for merger. Owen fails to receive his message before being contacted by the press and accuses Steel of trying to bounce a merger on him. June SDP National Committee decides to hold a ballot on whether to negotiate over merger with Liberals.

2 July ‘Yes to Unity’ campaign launched by SDP members to support merger negotiations in the ballot.

5 August Result of SDP ballot: 57% – 43% (25,897 – 19,228) in favour of merger negotiations.

6 August Owen resigns as SDP leader.

29 August Maclennan becomes SDP leader.

17 September Liberal Assembly votes for negotiations over merger with SDP (998 – 21).

September Merger negotiations begin.

10 December Merger negotiators agree on ‘New Liberal Social Democratic Party’ (or ‘Alliance’ for short) as the new party’s name but forced to rethink after the Liberal Party Council protests. 1988 13 January In the early hours of the morning, merger negotiators agree on ‘Social & Liberal Democrats’ as the name, with no official short name. ‘Dead parrot’ policy document (Voices and Choices for All) issued and then withdrawn. 23 January Special Liberal Assembly in Blackpool approves merger (2,099 – 385), subject to a ballot of members.

31 January SDP conference in Sheffield approves merger (273 – 28), subject to a ballot of members. Owenites largely abstain or are absent. 2 March Results of ballots of Liberal and SDP members on merger announced (Liberals vote for merger by 46,376 – 6,365 and SDP by 18,872 – 9,929). 3 March Press launch of Social & Liberal Democrats.

7 March Constitution of new party comes into force at midnight.

8 March Continuing SDP launched with backing of three MPs (Owen, Barnes and Cartwright)

10 March Public launch of Social & Liberal Democrats.

5 May Local elections. Despite significant seat losses, the Social & Liberal Democrats still win 385 seats compared to the SDP’s six. 28 July Paddy Ashdown elected leader of Social & Liberal Democrats, beating Alan Beith by 41,401 to 16,202.

26 September Social & Liberal Democrats agree to use ‘Democrats’ as party’s official short name.

15 December Epping Forrest by-election. Split of votes between Democrats and Continuing SDP gives Tories easy victory.

1989 23 February Richmond (Yorkshire) by-election. Continuing SDP just fall short of victory as split of centre party votes hands victory to William Hague, the future Conservative leader. March Continuing Liberal Party launched, headed by Michael Meadowcroft.

4 May Local elections. Continuing SDP loses twenty-two of the thirty-four seats it was defending.

13 May David Owen admits publicly that Continuing SDP can no longer function as a national party.

June Euro elections: Democrats win only 6%, being beaten easily by the Greens into fourth place. Continuing SDP candidates score even worse. September Last SDP conference held in Scarborough.

16 October Social & Liberal Democrats change name to Liberal Democrats following ballot of party members.

1990 24 May Bootle by-election: Monster Raving Loony Party candidate, Lord Sutch, secures his most notable election result, out-polling the Continuing SDP candidate. 3 June Continuing SDP’s National Executive votes to suspend its constitution, close its HQ and place its remaining affairs in the hands of its trustees.

Journal of Liberal History 39 Summer 2003 59 A Liberal Democrat History Group Fringe Meeting THE FALL OF THE LLOYD GEORGE COALITION The summer 2003 History Group meeting will examine the events which brought an end to the last peacetime participation by the Liberal Party in UK government – when Lloyd George’s coalition was overthrown by a revolt of backbench Conservatives in 1922. The meeting will be held jointly with the Conservative History Group.

Speakers: Margaret Macmillan (author, The Peacemakers), Andrew Thorpe (Exeter University), Stuart Ball (Leicester University), John Barnes (LSE).

6.00 p.m., Monday 14 July (note earlier start time than normal) National Liberal Club, 1 Whitehall Place, London SW1

Bibliography / concluded John Bochel & David Den- in Western Europe (OUP, ) SDP: Is the Party Structurally from page 33 ver, ‘The SDP and the Left- Top-Heavy?’, Government and S.J. Ingle, ‘The Alliance: Piggy Right Dimension’, British Opposition ,  David Thomson, The Shock in the Middle or Radical Journal of Political Science , Troops of Pavement Politics? Alternative?’, Hull Papers in P.G. Richards, ‘The SDP in  An Assessment of the Influence Politics ,  Parliament’, Parliamentary Af- of Community Politics in the John Curtice & Michael fairs 35, 1982 R. Marris, ‘The politics of Liberal Party (Hebden Royd, Steed, ‘Turning Dreams into rationalism: reflexions on the William Rodgers, ‘The SDP ) Reality: The Division of economics of the SDP’, Po- and the Liberal Party in Al- Constituencies between the Geoffrey Lee Williams and litical Quarterly 54, 1983 liance’, Political Quarterly , Liberals and the Social Dem- Alan Lee Williams, Labour’s  ocrats’, Parliamentary Affairs Vincent McKee, ‘Factional- Decline and the Social Demo- ,  ism in the SDP, –’, Colin Seymour-Ure, ‘The crats’ Fall (Macmillan, 1989) Parliamentary Affairs ,  SDP and the Media’, Political John Curtice, Clive Payne Shirley Williams, Politics is for Quarterly 53, 1982 and Robert Waller, ‘The Al- Michael Meadowcroft, ‘East- People (Penguin, ) liance’s First Nationwide Test: bourne Revisited’, Radical Des Wilson, Battle for Power Lessons of the  English Quarterly ,  (Sphere Books, ) Local Elections’, Electoral Michael Meadowcroft, ‘Steel- Studies ,  Corrections Peter Zentner, Social Democ- ing the Party, Radical Quar- racy in Britain: Must Labour David Denver, ‘The SDP- terly ,  We regret that two errors crept into the last issue of the Journal Lose? (John Martin, ) Liberal Alliance: the end of Alan Butt Philip, ‘Europeans (issue 38, spring 2003). the two-party system?’ West- first and last: British Liberals ern European Politics 6,  On page 24 (middle column), and the European Commu- Thomas Shaw did not in fact Articles David Denver & Hugh Bo- nity’, Political Quarterly : become a viscount until the chel, ‘Merger or Bust: What- ,  death of his father (as correctly Anon, ‘Social democracy ever Happened to Members stated in the last column). doesn’t thrive abroad,’ Econo- R. Pinkey, ‘An Active Political of the SDP?’, British Journal of mist  March  Strategy: Liberals in Power in On page 29, the standfirst text Political Science ,  refers to Sir John Harris as MP English Local Government’, Terry Barton & Herbert for North West Hackney; in enry H Drucker, ‘All the King’s Local Government Studies : Doring, ‘The Social and At- fact, as the main text correctly Horses and All the King’s ,  titudinal Profile of Social indicates, he was MP for North Men’, in Paterson and Thomas Hackney. Democratic Activists’, Political Geoffrey Pridham & Paul (eds.), Social Democratic Parties Studies ,  Whiteley, ‘Anatomy of the Our apologies to all concerned.