Far Apart but Close Together
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BDOHP Biographical Details and Index Lord Wright of Richmond
BDOHP Biographical details and index Lord Wright of Richmond (28.06.31-06.03.20) - career outline with, on right, relevant page numbers in the memoir to the career stage. Served Royal Artillery, 1950–51 p 3 Joined Diplomatic Service, 1955 pp 2-3 Middle East Centre for Arabic Studies, 1956–57 pp 3-6 Third Secretary, British Embassy, Beirut, 1958–60 - Private Secretary to Ambassador and later First Secretary, pp 12-15 British Embassy, Washington, 1960–65 Private Secretary to Permanent Under-Secretary, FO, 1965–67 pp 10-11 First Secretary and Head of Chancery, Cairo, 1967–70 - Deputy Political Resident, Bahrain, 1971–72 - Head of Middle East Department, FCO, 1972–74 - Private Secretary (Overseas Affairs) to Prime Minister, 1974–77 pp 7-10, 25, 34-35 Ambassador to Luxembourg, 1977–79 pp 30-31 Ambassador to Syria, 1979–81 pp 30-33 Deputy Under-Secretary of State, FCO, 1982–84 - Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, 1984–86 pp 33-34, 36 Permanent Under-Secretary of State and Head pp 11-12, of Diplomatic Service, 1986–91. 16-18, 21, 30 Member, Security Commission, 1993–2002. - General comments on Middle East and United States, pp 6-8; political versus professional diplomatic appointments, pp 15-20; retirement age in diplomatic service, pp 21-23; recruitment, pp 23-25; Foreign Office image, pp 38-40; John Major, pp 40-42; leaking of restricted papers, pp 43-45. Lord Wright of Richmond This is Malcolm McBain interviewing Lord Wright of Richmond at his home in East Sheen on Monday, 16 October 2000. MMcB: “Lord Wright, you were born in 1931, educated at Marlborough and Merton College, Oxford, you did a couple of years’ national service in the Royal Artillery, and then joined the Diplomatic Service, presumably after going to Oxford, in 1965. -
Suez 1956 24 Planning the Intervention 26 During the Intervention 35 After the Intervention 43 Musketeer Learning 55
Learning from the History of British Interventions in the Middle East 55842_Kettle.indd842_Kettle.indd i 006/09/186/09/18 111:371:37 AAMM 55842_Kettle.indd842_Kettle.indd iiii 006/09/186/09/18 111:371:37 AAMM Learning from the History of British Interventions in the Middle East Louise Kettle 55842_Kettle.indd842_Kettle.indd iiiiii 006/09/186/09/18 111:371:37 AAMM Edinburgh University Press is one of the leading university presses in the UK. We publish academic books and journals in our selected subject areas across the humanities and social sciences, combining cutting-edge scholarship with high editorial and production values to produce academic works of lasting importance. For more information visit our website: edinburghuniversitypress.com © Louise Kettle, 2018 Edinburgh University Press Ltd The Tun – Holyrood Road, 12(2f) Jackson’s Entry, Edinburgh EH8 8PJ Typeset in 11/1 3 Adobe Sabon by IDSUK (DataConnection) Ltd, and printed and bound in Great Britain. A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 1 4744 3795 0 (hardback) ISBN 978 1 4744 3797 4 (webready PDF) ISBN 978 1 4744 3798 1 (epub) The right of Louise Kettle to be identifi ed as the author of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, and the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498). 55842_Kettle.indd842_Kettle.indd iivv 006/09/186/09/18 111:371:37 AAMM Contents Acknowledgements vii 1. Learning from History 1 Learning from History in Whitehall 3 Politicians Learning from History 8 Learning from the History of Military Interventions 9 How Do We Learn? 13 What is Learning from History? 15 Who Learns from History? 16 The Learning Process 18 Learning from the History of British Interventions in the Middle East 21 2. -
RW BAILEY INTERVIEW. INDEX. P 2. Education 3-4. Vice-Consul In
BDOHP: R. W. BAILEY INTERVIEW. INDEX. p 2. Education 3-4. Vice-Consul in Beirut, 1939-41 4-5. Alexandria in the war 5-6. Cairo and return to the FO, 1945-8 7-8. Middle East specialist in the Washington Embassy. (Includes Suez) 8. Khartoum, 1957-60 8-10. Experiences in the Yemen, 1960-62 10-11. Consul-General in Gothenburg 11. Minister in Baghdad, 1965-7 11-12. Ambassador to Bolivia, 1967-71 12-13. Ambassador to Morocco, 1971-5 13. Retirement. Adviser to the Omani government 13-14. Comments on career and British foreign policy, especially in Middle East 1 BRITISH DIPLOMATIC ORAL HISTORY PROGRAMME Interview with R W Bailey, CMG, on 25th April 1996. Interview conducted by Mr John Hutson. Mr Bailey, we have put down on paper the factual details of your education but what it doesn't say is how you came to join first of all the Consular Service. Would you like to tell us about that? Well, I attended King Edward VI School in Southampton and Southampton at that time was the biggest passenger port in the UK. I joined the League of Nations Union, so it was my job as Secretary to invite people to come and talk to this school group. The obvious source were the consuls of most countries, the American Consul and most of the South American countries had Consuls General there, like Brazil and so on and, in fact, I became very - good friends with the American Consul there, John Brooms, and it so happened that we were later colleagues in Beirut and then also he was in the State Department in Washington. -
The Role of HM Embassy in Washington
The Role of HM Embassy in Washington edited by Gillian Staerck and Michael D. Kandiah ICBH Witness Seminar Programme The Role of HM Embassy in Washington ICBH Witness Seminar Programme Programme Director: Dr Michael D. Kandiah © Institute of Contemporary British History, 2002 All rights reserved. This material is made available for use for personal research and study. We give per- mission for the entire files to be downloaded to your computer for such personal use only. For reproduction or further distribution of all or part of the file (except as constitutes fair dealing), permission must be sought from ICBH. Published by Institute of Contemporary British History Institute of Historical Research School of Advanced Study University of London Malet St London WC1E 7HU ISBN: 1 871348 83 8 The Role of HM Embassy in Washington Held 18 June 1997 in the Map Room, Foreign & Commonwealth Office Chaired by Lord Wright of Richmond Seminar edited by Gillian Staerck and Michael D. Kandiah Institute of Contemporary British History Contents Contributors 9 Citation Guidance 11 The Role of HM Embassy in Washington 13 edited by Gillian Staerck and Michael D. Kandiah Contributors Editors: GILLIAN STAERCK Institute of Contemporary British History DR MICHAEL KANDIAH Institute of Contemporary British History Chair: LORD WRIGHT OF Private Secretary to Ambassador and later First Secretary, Brit- RICHMOND ish Embassy, Washington 1960-65, and Permanent Under-Sec- retary and Head of Diplomatic Service, FCO 1986-91. Paper-giver DR MICHAEL F HOPKINS Liverpool Hope University College. Witnesses: SIR ANTONY ACLAND GCMG, GCVO. British Ambassador, Washington 1986-91. PROFESSOR KATHLEEN University College, University of London. -
The South Atlantic Conflict of 1982: a Test for Anglo-American Relations
The South Atlantic conflict of 1982: a test for Anglo-American relations Michael PARSONS Université de Pau et des Pays de l’Adour In the early morning of April 2 1982 Argentine armed forces invaded the Falkland Islands1 in the South Atlantic. Taken very much by surprise, the British government, under the determined leadership of Margaret Thatcher, dispatched a substantial naval task force to repossess the islands and return them to British administration. American support was assiduously sought — the government was acutely aware of the need to avoid a repeat of the Suez crisis of 1956 — and this support was given, though it was only announced after almost a month of official neutrality. The Pentagon in particular provided logistic support and military equipment without which the war would probably have been much longer and the casualties much heavier, and this support began well before the President finally “tilted” in Britain’s favour. American assistance was thus immensely valuable and perhaps even decisive, though the extent of this help was not fully appreciated at the time. Nor could it be taken for granted. The United States administration was seriously divided on the issue, and indeed the conflicting signals sent to the Argentine junta by some sections of the administration may have encouraged the Argentines to think that their coup de main might go unchallenged, and might be accepted, if not condoned, by the United States2. So while there is some justification for seeing the South Atlantic conflict of 1982 as compelling evidence in favour of the existence of an Anglo-American special relationship, there is also a case to be made for seeing it as a revealing example of the tensions within Washington over foreign policy priorities. -
The 1967 Arab-Israeli War Origins and Consequences
The 1967 Arab-Israeli War Origins and Consequences The June 1967 War was a watershed moment in the history of the mod- ern Middle East. In six days, the Israelis defeated the Arab armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and seized large portions of territory includ- ing the West Bank, East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights. With the hindsight of four decades and access to recently declassified documents, two veteran scholars of the Middle East bring together some of the most knowledgeable experts in their fields to reassess the origins of the war and its regional reverberations. Each chapter takes a different perspective from the vantage point of a different participant, those that actually took part in the war, and the world powers – the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and France – that played important roles behind the scenes. Their conclusions make for sober reading. At the heart of the story was the incompetence of the Egyptian high command under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser and the rivalry between various Arab players who were deeply suspi- cious of each other’s motives. Israel, on the other side, gained a resound- ing victory for which, despite previous assessments to the contrary, there was no master plan. Wm. Roger Louis is the Kerr Professor of English History and Cul- ture at the University of Texas at Austin and Honorary Fellow of St. Antony’s College, Oxford. A past President of the American His- torical Association, he is the editor-in-chief of The Oxford History of the British Empire. -
Political and Diplomatic Lessons of the Falklands War
Political and Diplomatic Lessons of the Falklands War Ken Kotani Introduction This paper focuses on the Thatcher administration’s foreign diplomacy and conduct of war during the Falklands War. Full-fledged research on the history of this war has been facilitated by the publication of a detailed official history of the Falklands War by Professor Lawrence Freedman of King’s College London, along with the release of previously closed documents and other material by the British National Archives in December 2012.1 Leaving the details of the Falklands War to Freedman’s official history, this paper shall examine the Thatcher administration’s conduct of war, specifically: (1) the extent to which the Thatcher administration was aware of the situation before the war; and (2) the Thatcher administration’s foreign diplomacy and conduct of war. 1. Did Prime Minister Thatcher have a grasp of the situation? When unraveling the history of the Falklands War, the issues which always become the focus of debate are whether Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was adequately aware of the situation regarding the Falklands before the war, and if so, the degree to which she did and the reasons why she did not take earlier action. The Thatcher administration’s handling of the Falklands issue is often compared with the policy of deterrence adopted by James Callaghan’s Labour Party administration in 1977. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of the Cabinet Office estimated in October 1977 that Argentine forces were plotting a landing on the South Sandwich Islands, which was British territory. Prime Minister Callaghan accordingly made the risky decision to prepare for any contingency by sending a British fleet to stand by in the vicinity of the Falklands.2 Compared to the action taken by the Callaghan administration, the Thatcher administration’s actions in 1982 seem to lack a sense of urgency. -
A 'Special Relationship'?
A ‘special relationship’? prelims.p65 1 08/06/2004, 14:37 To Karin prelims.p65 2 08/06/2004, 14:37 A ‘special relationship’? Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo- American relations ‘at the summit’, 1964–68 Jonathan Colman Manchester University Press Manchester and New York distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave prelims.p65 3 08/06/2004, 14:37 Copyright © Jonathan Colman 2004 The right of Jonathan Colman to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Published by Manchester University Press Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9NR, UK and Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk Distributed exclusively in the USA by Palgrave, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA Distributed exclusively in Canada by UBC Press, University of British Columbia, 2029 West Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for ISBN 0 7190 7010 4 hardback EAN 978 0 7190 7010 5 First published 2004 13 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Typeset by Freelance Publishing Services, Brinscall www.freelancepublishingservices.co.uk Printed in Great Britain by Biddles Ltd, King’s Lynn prelims.p65 4 08/06/2004, 14:37 Contents Acknowledgements page vi Abbreviations vii Introduction 1 1 The approach to the summit 20 2 The Washington summit, 7–9 December 1964 37 3 From discord to cordiality, January–April 1965 53 4 ‘A battalion would be worth a billion’? May–December 1965 75 5 Dissociation, January–July 1966 100 6 A declining relationship, August 1966–September 1967 121 7 One ally among many, October 1967–December 1968 147 Conclusion: Harold Wilson and Lyndon B. -
Sir Stephen Wall, GCMG, Interviewed by Thomas Raineau (Université De Paris-Sorbonne)
1 BDOHP Biographical details and index Sir John Stephen WALL, GCMG 2004 (KCMG 1996; CMG 1990); LVO 1983 (Born 10 January 1947) Career outline with, on right, relevant page numbers in the oral history to the career stage: Entry to Diplomatic Service, 1968 pp 4-5 Addis Ababa, 1969–72 - Private Secretary to HM Ambassador, Paris, 1972–74 pp 8-10 First Secretary, FCO, 1974–76 pp 10-12 Press Officer, No 10 Downing Street, 1976–77 - Assistant Private Secretary to Foreign Secretary, 1977–79 pp 13-18 First Secretary, Washington, 1979–83 pp 20-23 Asst Head, later Head, European Community Dept, FCO, 1983–88 pp 23-27 Private Secretary to Foreign Secretary, 1988–90 pp 27-29 Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, 1991–93 pp 29-30 Ambassador to Portugal, 1993–95 pp 32-33 Ambassador and UK Perm. Rep. to EU, Brussels, 1995–2000 pp 34-39 Head of European Secretariat, Cabinet Office, and EU Adviser pp 39-44 to the Prime Minister, 2000–04 2 Sir Stephen Wall, GCMG, interviewed by Thomas Raineau (Université de Paris-Sorbonne) Part 1. Tuesday 14 December 2010. 11.15am. London, The Wolseley Part 2. Tuesday 28 February 2012. 3.00 pm. London, The Wallace Restaurant Copyright: Sir Stephen Wall TR: First of all Sir Stephen, let me thank you one more time for accepting this interview. If you agree with this procedure, we will go through your career chronologically, and try to deal with some particular points and questions about the overall architecture of the European machinery that exist in Whitehall. -
Part I. History, Diplomacy, Democracy and Development – 11
PART I. HISTORY, DIPLOMACY, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT – 11 Part I. History, Diplomacy, Democracy and Development THE MARSHALL PLAN: LESSONS LEARNED FOR THE 21ST CENTURY CHAPTER 1. THE MARSHALL PLAN: HISTORY AND LEGACY – 13 Chapter 1. The Marshall Plan: History and Legacy by Gerard Bossuat The Marshall Plan, officially called European Recovery Program (ERP), was in place from April 1948 to September 1951. Most contemporary actors considered that it played an essential role in the economic successes of postwar Western Europe. The various European programs of modernization greatly benefited from the ERP, since it financed imports essential to reconstruction and modernization. It produced counterparts in European currencies, the allocation of which needs to be clarified, and generated a debate on their use. Moreover, the Marshall Plan was at the origin of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), created to encourage European unity. The Marshall Plan was a political tool in the hands of the American administration in the context of the Cold War and the defense of the West. What was the role of the Marshall Plan in the development of a consumer society? Was the Marshall Plan Americanizing European societies? The ERP thus also held a socio-cultural dimension. Finally, over the last 60 years the Marshall Plan has become a myth. Whenever our countries are hit by a crisis, the media or politicians ask for a “new Marshall Plan”. The Marshall Plan was, and remains, appreciated, but it also raised criticisms in Europe. So we have to separate what belongs to history and what belongs to the collective memory or to the myth. -
Recollections of John Cloake's Diplomatic Career
BDOHP Biographical Details and Interview Index John Cecil CLOAKE (born 2 December 1924) CMG 1977. Career (with, on right, relevant pages in interview) Entry to FO, 1948 pp 2-5 3rd Secretary, Baghdad, 1949 pp 6-11 3rd then 2nd Secretary, Saigon, 1951 pp 11-17 Geneva Conference, 1954 pp 17-18 FO, 1954 pp 17-19 Private Secretary to Permanent Under-Secretary, 1956 pp 19-21 Private Secretary to Parliamentary Under-Secretary, 1957 pp 21-22 1st Secretary, 1957 - Consul (Commercial), New York, 1958 pp 22-27 1st Secretary, Moscow, 1962 pp 27-32 FO, 1963 pp 32-33 Diplomatic Service Administration Office, 1965 pp 33-37 (Counsellor, 1966) (Head of Accommodation Department, 1967) Counsellor (Commercial), Tehran, 1968–72 pp 37-42 Fellow, Centre for International Studies, LSE, 1972–73 pp 42-43 Head of Trade Relations and Exports Department, FCO, 1973–76 pp 43-44 Ambassador to Bulgaria, 1976–80 pp 45-54 1 RECOLLECTIONS OF JOHN CLOAKE’S DIPLOMATIC CAREER RECORDED AND TRANSCRIBED BY ABBEY WRIGHT, APRIL 2013 Entry to Foreign Office and Information Research Department, 1948 AW: This is Abbey Wright speaking with John Cloake on Wednesday 3 April 2013. We’re going to start at the beginning of your diplomatic career, John, and it’s summer 1948; and I’m going to ask “What took you into the Foreign Office?” JC: I had always been very interested in the possibility. I had an uncle who was very much my mentor and role model and who was in the Home Civil Service in the War Office for most of his career and then a Ministry of Defence Under Secretary. -
The Role of Uk Foreign Policy in the Development of the Eastern European Sovereign Debt Crisis, 1970- 81
USES OF THE PAST IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS FROM HEATH TO THATCHER: THE ROLE OF UK FOREIGN POLICY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EASTERN EUROPEAN SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS, 1970- 81 Catherine LeFèvre UPIER WORKING PAPER Vol. 13 SEPTEMBER 2019 UPIER WORKING PAPER Vol. 13 Foreword UPIER Working Papers series reflects the Work in progress of the researchers associated With the HERA- funded Project Uses of the PaSt in InternaZonal Economic RelaZons and of others Whose papers directly address UPIER research themes. The papers are peer revieWed by UPIER and associated researchers and seek to advance our underStanding of hoW the past has been constructed and used in internaZonal economic relaonS over the Past 200 years. The vieWs expressed in this Working paper, and all errors and omissions, should be regarded as those solely of the authors and are not necessarily the vieWs of the affiliated instuons. For more inFormaZon on UPIER viSit: WWW.uPier.eu Author Catherine LeFèvre is finishing her PhD in the Economic and Social HiStory department at the University of GlasgoW. Through Wring her diSSertaon she is contribung to UPIER WP2 : Reputaon, RiSk and Moral Hazard in Sovereign Debt MarketS. Contact email addreSS: [email protected] 9/1/2019 From Heath to Thatcher: The role of UK Foreign policy in the 1 development of the Eastern European Sovereign Debt Crisis, 1970- 81 UPIER WORKING PAPER Vol. 13 Abstract The sovereign debt crisis of the 1980s Was a World debt crisis Which started in Eastern Europe in 1981 beFore spreading to other regions of the World.