Market Power, Production (Mis)Allocation and OPEC∗ John Asker Allan Collard-Wexler Jan De Loecker UCLA Duke University KU Leuven and Princeton University NBER NBER NBER and CEPR October 18, 2017 Abstract This paper estimates the extent to which market power is a source of production misal location. Productive inefficiency occurs through more production being allocated to higher- cost units of production, and less production to lower-cost production units, conditional on a fixed aggregate quantity. We rely on rich micro-data covering the global market for crude oil, from 1970 to 2014, to quantify the extent of productive misallocation attributable to mar ket power exerted by the OPEC. We find substantial productive inefficiency attributable to market power, ranging from 14.1 percent to 21.9 percent of the total productive inefficiency, or 105 to 163 billion USD. Key words: Market Power, Productive Inefficiency, Misallocation, Cartels, Oil, OPEC. JEL Code: D2, L1, L4, L72 ∗We would like to thank Russell Cooper, Martin Hackmann, Volker Nocke, Michael Whinston, Rob Porter, and Jo Van Biesebroeck, and participants in various seminars and conferences for their comments. Excellent research assis tance was provided for by El Hadi Caoui, Ardis Zhong, Sherry Wu and Yilin Jiang. Financial Assistance from Prince ton University’s Industrial Organization Group, NSF (SPS #220783) and FWO Odysseus Grant is greatly appreci ated. Contact information:
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[email protected]. 1 1 Introduction Market Power and Aggregate Welfare In this paper we re-evaluate the following statement of Harberger describing the state-of affairs in ?When we are interested in the big picture of our manufacturing economy, we need not apologize for treating it as competitive, for in fact it is awfully close to being so.