april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4

Combating Terrorism Center at West Point CTC Sentinel Objective . Relevant . Rigorous

Contents Defining the Punjabi Taliban

FEATURE ARTICLE Network 1 Defining the Punjabi Taliban Network By Hassan Abbas By Hassan Abbas

Reports 4 The 2008 Belgium Cell and FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline By Paul Cruickshank 8 President Obama’s Overseas Terrorism Challenge By Tom Sanderson 11 Improving India’s Counterterrorism Policy after Mumbai By Paul Staniland 14 Leveraging History in AQIM Communications By Lianne Kennedy Boudali 17 AQAP a Rising Threat in Yemen By Brian O’Neill 19 The Role of the United Nations in Defeating Al-Qa`ida and Associated Groups By Richard Barrett

22 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity Pakistani commandos respond to the March 30 attack on a police academy near Lahore. - Arif Ali/AFP/Getty Images 24 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts n march 30, 2009, militants support for these attacks is attributable launched a deadly assault to what is often labeled the “Punjabi on a police training center Taliban” network.3 The major factions outside Lahore, the capital of this network include operatives from Oof Pakistan’s Punjab Province. Eight Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Sipah-i-Sahaba police cadets were killed.1 Less than Pakistan and Jaysh-i-Muhammad—all a month earlier, on March 3, gunmen groups that were previously strictly in Lahore ambushed members of the focused on Kashmir and domestic visiting Sri Lankan cricket team, killing sectarian violence. About the CTC Sentinel at least eight people. Punjab, the most The Combating Terrorism Center is an populated of Pakistan’s provinces, has Members of these groups are independent educational and research largely escaped the bloodshed plaguing increasingly supporting Taliban 2 institution based in the Department of Social the country’s troubled northwest. Yet elements from Pakistan’s tribal regions Sciences at the United States Military Academy, since 2007, violence has escalated in to conduct attacks in sensitive cities West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses the province. The bold terrorist attacks in Pakistan’s heartland—within Punjab the Center’s global network of scholars and 3 Although Baitullah Mehsud, the head of Tehrik-i- practitioners to understand and confront Province and in the Pakistani capital of Islamabad—show that local logistical Taliban Pakistan (TTP), accepted responsibility for the contemporary threats posed by terrorism and March 30 attack on the police academy, there are wit- other forms of political violence. nesses who heard some of the terrorists conversing in 1 Barry Newhouse, “Pakistani Taliban Claim Responsi- Seraiki—a Punjabi dialect spoken in southern Punjab. This suggests that Punjabi militants either orchestrated The views expressed in this report are those of bility in Lahore Police Attack,” Voice of America, March the attack, or at least collaborated with the TTP. See Sa- the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, 31, 2009. the Department of the Army, or any other agency 2 This consists of the Federally Administered Tribal Ar- brina Tavernise and Sharon Otterman, “Militants Claim of the U.S. Government. eas and the North-West Frontier Province, which both Responsibility for Pakistan Attack,” New York Times, lie near the tumultuous border with Afghanistan. April 1, 2009. 1 april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4 such as Islamabad, Rawalpindi and Perhaps the best explanation of the of the name began in 2007, when Maulvi Lahore. Ongoing investigations into Punjabi Taliban’s structure came from Nazir, a militant leader who with some the Marriott Hotel bombing that rocked Tariq Pervez, the newly appointed official Pakistani support challenged Islamabad in September 2008, in which head of Pakistan’s nascent National Uzbek foreign fighters residing in dozens of Punjabi suspects were arrested Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA): South Waziristan, was hailed by some and interrogated,4 demonstrate the “ideas, logistics, cash [comes] from as a leader of the Punjabi Taliban. This role played by Punjabi militants.5 One the Gulf. Arab guys, mainly Egyptians allegation arose because Maulvi Nazir investigator working on the Marriott and Saudis, are on hand to provide the attracted many Punjabi recruits from attack revealed that “all evidences chemistry. Veteran Punjabi extremists banned organizations to fight Uzbek of the terrorist bombing led to South plot the attacks, while the Pakistan foreign fighters.13 The plan worked, but Waziristan via Jhang [a city in Punjab Taliban provides the martyrs.”9 not without creating another frightening where Lashkar-i-Jhangvi has strong menace in the shape of a reenergized links]. The truck that was rammed into The name “Punjabi Taliban” was first “Punjabi Taliban.” the hotel was also from Jhang.” used for ethnic Punjabis associated with Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam (HuJI) who, The current Punjabi Taliban network has This article attempts to define the under the leadership of Qari Saifullah a number of key features. First, it lacks Punjabi Taliban network, in addition Akhtar, went to support and join the any organization or command structure to profiling the three main factions that regime of Taliban leader Mullah Omar and operates as a loose network of contribute to its ranks. elements from distinct militant groups. Members from Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LeJ), Who are the “Punjabi Taliban”? “The purpose of Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Jaysh- The Punjabi Taliban network is a loose undertaking operations i-Muhammad (JeM) and their various conglomeration of members of banned splinter groups are all considered to militant groups of Punjabi origin— under the moniker of the be part of this loose network. Small sectarian as well as those focused on the ‘Punjabi Taliban’ is that cells unaffiliated with any larger group conflict in Kashmir—that have developed are also involved. This designation, strong connections with Tehrik- they have the freedom to however, does not apply to all members i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Afghan operate without the level of LeJ, SSP, and JeM; it only refers to Taliban and other militant groups individuals or factions who shifted based in the Federally Administered of command and control to FATA or collaborate closely with Tribal Areas (FATA) and North-West inherent when working the TTP, Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat- Frontier Province (NWFP).6 They e-Mohammadi (TNSM) and other militant shuttle between FATA and the rest of for the more established groups from the tribal areas. Pakistan, providing logistical support militant outfits.” to FATA- and Afghan-based militants to Second, many of these militants directly conduct terrorist operations deep inside benefited from state patronage14 in the Pakistan. Between March 2005 and 1990s (and in some cases even later) March 2007 alone, for example, about in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s.10 The and were professionally trained in 2,000 militants from southern and second time the name was used was asymmetrical warfare, guerrilla tactics northern Punjab Province reportedly in 2001-2003 when former Pakistani and sabotage. The Punjabi Taliban are moved to South Waziristan and started President Pervez Musharraf banned increasingly using heavy weapons and different businesses in an effort to some militant and sectarian groups that operating independent of the TTP or create logistical support networks.7 had a support base in Punjab.11 As a result, other militant groups that belong to Given their knowledge about Punjabi some of these elements began moving to the area. In late December 2008, for cities and security structure, they have FATA to seek safe havens and establish example, five Punjabi Taliban killed in proved to be valuable partners for the new camps. These Punjabi militants a drone missile attack were observed TTP as it targets cities in Punjab, such also reportedly established separate “patrolling the area [South Waziristan] as Lahore, Rawalpindi and Islamabad.8 training centers in FATA, especially in in pickup trucks mounted with heavy North Waziristan.12 The most recent use guns and had been firing at drones wherever they spotted them. The vehicles 15 4 The suspects included members of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi 9 Kaustav Chakrabarti, “Taliban Spreads into Pakistan’s were camouflaged with mud and grass.” and Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islam. Heart,” Rediff.com, February 13, 2009. 5 Tariq Butt, “Mastermind of Marriott Bombing Es- 10 Amir Mir, “HUJI Chief Still at Large,” The News, Sep- to Kill 12 in Pakistan,” New York Times, September 12, capes,” The News, November 17, 2008. tember 23, 2008. 2008. 6 Saeed Shah, “Pakistan Blames Taliban for Lahore At- 11 These groups include: Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, Sipah-i-Mu- 13 Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Letter Explains Drive Against tack Which Leaves 11 Dead,” Guardian, March 31, 2009; hammad (SMP), Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Tehrik- Foreign Militants in Waziristan,” The News, April 5, Rahimullah Yusufzai, “And Now There is Tehrik-e-Tali- i-Jafria (TeJ), Jaysh-i-Muhammad (JeM) and Lashkar-i- 2007. ban Baluchistan,” The News, March 4, 2009. Tayyiba. When some of these groups started operating 14 This patronage developed because the country’s intel- 7 Aamir Latif, “Punjabi Taliban Rise in Waziristan,” Is- under new names—TeJ as Islami Tehrik Pakistan, SSP ligence agencies utilized them for supporting the insur- lamOnline.net, April 22, 2009. as Millat-i-Islami Pakistan, and JeM as Khudamul Is- gency in Kashmir against India. 8 This information is based on an assessment shared by lam—they were also banned in 2003. 15 “Twin Drone Strikes Kill 5 Punjabi Taliban,” Daily a senior official of the Ministry of Interior, Islamabad. 12 Pir Zubair Shah and Salamn Masood, “U.S. Reported Times, December 23, 2008.

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Third, most of the groups are Sunni Major Factions of Punjabi Taliban Network that they select “prospective fighters and Salafist in orientation. A recent Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LeJ) from the city [Karachi] and trains International Crisis Group report Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) them in Waziristan and Miranshah for maintained that “violent Deobandi These two associated and banned combating security forces.”26 Despite networks in Punjab lie at the root of groups are largely Punjab-based. being banned, both groups are active Pakistan’s militancy problem.”16 The Estimates place LeJ’s numbers at less throughout Pakistan. Although LeJ has various components of the Punjabi than 1,000, and the group is almost been targeted by Pakistan’s civil and Taliban owe their ideological training entirely composed of militants. The military agencies, the SSP has largely to hardline Deobandi madrasa networks SSP, which is also a political group, has managed to escape such targeting that were nurtured and expanded in been estimated to have around 100,000 because of its larger support base, evident Punjab during President Zia ul-Haq’s active members, but the number of through the fact that prior SSP candidates years in office from 1977-1988. active fighters is probably in the 2,000- have won national assembly seats. 3,000 range.21 Although both groups Fourth, Punjabi militants are distinct are anti-Shi`a in essence, their members Jaysh-i-Muhammad (JeM) from traditional Pashtun Taliban—in have been involved in pursuing A splinter group of Harkat-ul Mujahidin terms of language, dress and other other agendas vis-à-vis Kashmir and (HuM),27 JeM derives its strength from identifiable features. The Punjabi Taliban Afghanistan. For instance, one of the Punjab Province. Although banned are comparatively more educated, better former members of the SSP, identified as in 2001 and having faced internal equipped and technologically savvier “Commander Tariq,” reportedly heads divisions, it is still operative and than their Pashtun counterparts.17 This the local Taliban in Darra Adam Khel, changes its name every few years to is a result of their upbringing in Punjab located between the Kohat area in the evade scrutiny. General estimates place Province (which has better educational NWFP and Orakzai Agency in FATA.22 its active ranks at around 5,000, with facilities) and urban linkages where Tariq, who has been monitored by law about 1,500-2,000 fighters.28 Part of internet access and communications enforcement for years, was previously the reason its cadres are not pursued equipment are more readily available. primarily engaged in sectarian attacks effectively is due to the incompetence on the Shi`a. Lately, however, he has of civilian law enforcement. Pakistani Fifth, unlike TTP cadres and Afghan been found involved in kidnappings- analyst Amir Rana, however, alleges Taliban, the Punjabi Taliban are for-ransom and attacks on foreigners. that another factor explains why JeM purportedly more prone to mercenary He played a central role in the February has retained its strength: “The military actions. Pakistani intelligence sources killing of a Polish engineer who was wants to keep alive its strategic options claim that the Punjabi Taliban can be working in the area for an NGO.23 in Kashmir.”29 Although the government hired by domestic as well as regional of Pakistan claims they do not know operators to undertake freelance Similarly, LeJ is believed to be the the whereabouts of JeM’s chief, Masood operations.18 For instance, it is widely “lynchpin of the alignment between Azhar, it is rumored that he is with known in Punjab law enforcement al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban and Baitullah Mehsud in South Waziristan.30 circles that many in the Punjabi Taliban sectarian groups.”24 LeJ was the first began their careers as criminals.19 They Punjab-based militant group to shift Conclusion originally moved to FATA (after their its members to Afghanistan during the More information is needed to fully organizations were banned) to raise Taliban era. This allowed it to establish understand the dynamics of the Punjabi funds through drug smuggling and early connections with al-Qa`ida’s Taliban network, but early indicators acquire weapons from the weapons leadership in the mid-1990s. are that it is still in the initial stages of markets of Dara Adam Khel.20 development. It caters to the aspirations, Many mosques and madrasas linked financial needs and worldview of those Finally, the Punjabi Taliban are more with LeJ and SSP in Punjab operate militants who believe that they were likely to conduct fidayin attacks, which, as the networking centers for the abandoned by the intelligence agencies in the South Asian context, implies Punjabi Taliban.25 After recent police in pursuance of Musharraf’s directives that the attacker comes equipped with interrogations of LeJ members, Karachi’s weapons and ammunition and is willing police chief publicly maintained 26 Faraz Khan, “5 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Activists Arrest- to fight until death. This is in contrast that these militants “confessed to ed,” Daily Times, April 9, 2009. to suicide bombings, where the death of involvement in attacks on security 27 HuM, largely dismantled, had linkages with the Kash- the attacker is required. forces and NATO suppliers in northern mir theater as well as with al-Qa`ida. Its leader, Fazlur areas” of Pakistan while also admitting Rahman Khalil, was a signatory to Usama bin Ladin’s 16 International Crisis Group, “Pakistan: The Militant 1998 declaration of war. It largely remains committed to Jihadi Challenge,” March 13, 2009. 21 These numbers are derived from various reports. They the Kashmiri cause. 17 “Why Mehsud is Claiming Responsibility for At- are only general estimates. 28 These numbers are derived from various reports. tacks,” Daily Times, April 8, 2009. 22 Personal interviews, Pakistani police officers, Punjab They are only general estimates. 18 According to this allegation, Punjabi Taliban groups Province, March 2009. 29 Chris Brummitt, “Pakistan Militants Strengthen in could undertake operations for radical Muslim groups, 23 Mazhar Tufail, “New Efforts Launched to Recover Re- Heartland,” Associated Press, March 23, 2009. or even the Afghan or Indian intelligence agencies. mains of Polish Engineer,” The News, March 2, 2009. 30 A large JeM-controlled madrasa cum “physical activi- 19 Personal interviews, Pakistani police officers, Punjab 24 “Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge.” ty center” in the heart of Masood Azhar’s home city of Ba- Province, March 2009. 25 Saeed Shah, “Pakistan Bombings Spur Hunt for New hawalpur is still operational. Azhar reportedly launched 20 Ibid. al Qaeda Boss,” Globe and Mail, April 5, 2009. his new book from there in early 2008.

3 april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4 after 9/11.31 Elements from groups such The 2008 Belgium Cell and A Europe-Wide Problem as Lashkar-i-Tayyiba (and its associated Until recently, the FATA safe haven group, Jama`at-ud-Da`wa), however, are FATA’s Terrorist Pipeline troubled British counterterrorism apparently not linked with the Punjabi officials significantly more than Taliban because their command and By Paul Cruickshank their counterparts in other European control as well as hierarchical structure countries. This was a result of the United has remained intact over the years. In on december 11, 2008, 14 individuals were Kingdom’s large Pakistani diaspora comparison, LeJ and JeM splintered into arrested in Belgium and two in France community.6 The British intelligence 1 smaller groups due to policy differences in a major counterterrorism operation. agency MI5 recently estimated that 75% among leaders and disagreements over The arrests, just hours before an EU of terrorist plots they investigate have properties and finances. Summit meeting in Brussels, made ties to Pakistan.7 Those plots included headlines around the world because one a 2006 failed operation to blow up at It is unlikely that the Punjabi Taliban of the six charged by Belgian authorities least seven transatlantic airliners.8 network will transform itself into an was “al-Qa`ida living legend” Malika organized group in the near future. el-Aroud, the widow of the al-Qa`ida Governments in continental Europe Instead, it will remain a loose coalition operative who assassinated Afghan were more concerned about citizens of members from more prominent Northern Alliance Commander Ahmad gaining terrorist knowledge in Iraq and terrorist organizations. The purpose Shah Massoud two days before the North Africa, a function of continental of undertaking operations under the September 11 attacks on the United Europe’s large Arab diaspora. In the 2 moniker of the “Punjabi Taliban” is States. last year, however, that view has been that they have the freedom to operate changing. While travel flows to North without the level of command and Belgian authorities accuse her of having Africa still cause serious concern, there control inherent when working for the worked together with her new husband, has been a significant reduction in the more established militant outfits. Moez Garsallaoui, a Tunisian militant, number of European militants traveling to recruit individuals for training in the to Iraq, a function of al-Qa`ida in Iraq’s Other analysts are less sanguine. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (AQI) waning fortunes, the extreme 3 Pakistani security analyst Zeenia Satti (FATA) of Pakistan. Police launched barbarism that has tarnished its brand, recently predicted that the “Punjabi the arrest operation after three young and a crackdown on cross-border chapter of the Tahrik-e-Taliban-e- Belgian Moroccans allegedly recruited infiltration networks.9 Few plots in Pakistan will emerge with a ferocity by el-Aroud and Garsallaoui returned Europe have been tied to returnees from 4 that may dwarf the Baitullah Mehsuds from FATA to Belgium. According Iraq.10 Conversely, a growing number of and the Mullah Fazlullahs of NWFP.”32 to Glen Audenaert, the director of the terrorist plots, such as a plot to target This development would amount to a Belgian Federal Police, “We established the U.S. Ramstein Air Base in Germany significant danger to Pakistan because there were contacts between members in September 2007 and a plot to target Punjab is not only the most populous of the terrorist organization in Belgium the Barcelona metro in January 2008, and prosperous province, but is home and the highest levels of Al Qaeda... have seen operatives train in FATA.11 to the army headquarters and sensitive people in direct contact with Mr. Bin 5 nuclear installations. Furthermore, a Laden.” Alain Grignard, who heads major component of the Pakistan Army counterterrorist operations for the comes from the province; if civil strife Based on information drawn from Belgian Federal Police, said that the or civil war were to escalate and the interviews with senior U.S. and Belgian mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan army was called in to control law and counterterrorism officials, lawyers have replaced Iraq as the destination order, it could cause cracks in the army’s involved in the case, and some of the suspects themselves, this article sheds discipline. Although this is a worst case 6 It is estimated that there are more than one million new light on the “terror pipeline” scenario, it is nevertheless critical to people in the United Kingdom of Pakistani ancestry. connecting Europe and FATA in the enhance Pakistan’s law enforcement 7 Duncan Gardham, “MI5 Chief Warns of Threat from context of the alleged Belgian cell. capacity and counterterrorism strategy Global Recession,” Daily Telegraph, January 8, 2009. to prevent this outcome from becoming 8 Senior U.S. officials stated that several of the airline a reality. plotters trained in FATA. See Richard Greenberg, Paul Cruickshank, and Chris Hansen, “Inside the Terror Plot Dr. Hassan Abbas is a fellow at Harvard 1 Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, “Belgian ‘Al Qae- that Rivaled 9/11,” NBC, September 15, 2008. University’s Kennedy School of Government. da Cell’ Linked to 2006 Airline plot,” CNN, February 13, 9 Elaine Sciolino, “Fears of Iraq Becoming a Terror- Previously, he served in the administrations of 2009; “Terrorisme: un Franco-Tunisien mis en examen ist Incubator Seem Overblown French Say,” New York Benazir Bhutto and Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan. pour ses liens présumés avec une filière afghane,” Agence Times, April 8, 2008; Karen DeYoung, “Fewer Foreign- He is also the author of Pakistan’s Drift into France-Presse, December 15, 2008. ers Crossing Into Iraq from Syria to Fight,” Washington Extremism: Allah, the Army and America’s 2 The six individuals were charged with “participation Post, September 16, 2007. War on Terror. in a terrorist group.” For an in-depth profile of Malika el- 10 Ibid. Aroud, see Paul Cruickshank, “Love in the Time of Ter- 11 Souad Mekhennet and Michael Moss, “Europeans Get 31 Amir Mir, The True Face of Jihadis: Inside Pakistan’s ror,” Marie Claire, March 2009. Terror Training Inside Pakistan,” New York Times, Sep- Network of Terror (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2005). 3 Robertson and Cruickshank. tember 10, 2007; Elaine Sciolino, “Terror Threat from 32 Zeenia Satti, “Post Mumbai Hype,” The News, March 4 Ibid. Pakistan said to Expand,” New York Times, February 10, 26, 2009. 5 Ibid. 2008.

4 april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4 of choice for aspiring jihadists from Iraq, along with a section dedicated to to travel to Afghanistan to fight against Belgium and other countries on the the speeches of top al-Qa`ida leaders.17 Americans to restore the Taliban to European continent. According to By the end of 2008, the site had more power. Garsallaoui allegedly emphasized Grignard, “Not since the year before than 1,400 subscribers.18 Authorities that jihad in Afghanistan was a religious 9/11 have we seen as many people travel in Belgium, however, could do little to duty and also cast the fighting in heroic towards the Afghanistan-Pakistan prevent el-Aroud from administering and glamorous tones.23 conflict region.”12 This view is echoed the site due to strong freedom of speech by U.S. intelligence agencies who have protections under Belgian law.19 Garsallaoui’s recruiting was not observed an “an influx of new Western restricted to Belgium. He also recruited recruits into the tribal areas since mid- According to Grignard, websites such two French subscribers to Minbar 2006.”13 In February 2009, Director as Minbar SOS function as recruiting SOS who for legal reasons can only be of National Intelligence Dennis Blair grounds for terrorist operatives who identified by their initials H.A. and warned that “the primary threat from use them to identify individuals willing W.O.24 W.O. claimed he was arrested by Europe-based extremists stems from al- to fight jihad. “It’s a good way to get Turkish police in the summer of 2008 Qa`ida and Sunni affiliates who return people together and then establish a after he tried to return to Europe from from training in Pakistan to conduct FATA. When he was later interrogated attacks in Europe or the United States.”14 by French authorities, he provided “Their accounts suggest an extremely detailed account of his Unlike the Iraqi insurgency, fighting that jihadist networks in journey to the tribal areas of Pakistan. Americans in Afghanistan does not During the interrogation, W.O. stated seem to have lost its luster for European FATA have relatively loose that “calls to jihad” on Minbar SOS were militants. It appears that aspiring organizational structures.” “incessant” and the video propaganda recruits have wised up to the notion he viewed on the site made him want to that joining AQI means leaping aboard volunteer. a rapidly moving conveyor belt for suicide bombing.15 more secret dialogue with people that Travel to FATA are interesting to the organization,” he In December 2007, Garsallaoui’s Recruitment explained.20 Belgian counterterrorism recruits gathered in Istanbul, Turkey. The recent Belgian case provides a officials said that monitoring her There were six in total. Two from France window into how young European website helped identify the presence of and four from Belgium,25 including militants are lured to Pakistan’s tribal a recruiting network for Afghanistan.21 Beyayo and two friends who lived areas. Belgian police claim that el-Aroud on his square in Anderlecht, Ali el- and her husband, Moez Garsallaoui, El-Aroud’s iconic status appears to have Ghanouti and Y. Harrizi.26 Garsallaoui’s acted in tandem to encourage individuals attracted Hicham Beyayo, 23, one of plan was to bribe smugglers to take to leave Belgium to fight in Afghanistan. the young Belgian Moroccans arrested them illegally across the Iranian and El-Aroud, they argue, inspired radical- in the case, who became a Minbar SOS Pakistani borders to FATA. Garsallaoui leaning youngsters to sign up for site administrator before traveling instructed each of the recruits to bring jihad through inflammatory postings to Pakistan.22 Beyayo claims that 2,000 euros for this purpose; he himself on a website she ran called “Minbar Garsallaoui recruited him to fight jihad was carrying a significantly larger sum SOS.” Garsallaoui, for his part, toured in Afghanistan. Christophe Marchand, in cash.27 Garsallaoui set off first and Brussels’ immigrant neighborhoods to Beyayo’s lawyer, said that his client the others followed two weeks later. physically recruit people.16 was approached by Garsallaoui in a They eventually arrived in Zahedan in mosque near his home in Anderlecht, eastern Iran, a border town described During an interview for CNN three a tough immigrant neighborhood, and by the French recruit W.O. as a key years ago, el-Aroud explained how she that el-Aroud’s husband persuaded him administered Minbar SOS, her French 23 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, lawyer for language website. The website included 17 Personal interviews, Malika el-Aroud and Moez Hicham Beyayo, Brussels, February 2009. postings of attacks on U.S. troops in Garsallaoui, Guin, Switzerland, February 2006. For the 24 Details of W.O.’s interrogation by French authorities video of Malika el-Aroud demonstrating her website, see in January and February 2009 were made available to 12 Robertson and Cruickshank. Nic Robertson and Paul Cruickshank, “One Woman’s the author by Christophe Marchand, Hicham Beyayo’s 13 J. Michael McConnell, “Annual Threat Assessment of War,” CNN, February 10, 2009. lawyer. Under Belgian law, defense attorneys can make the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select 18 This figure is based on the author’s own monitoring of public details of the legal case against their clients in the Committee on Intelligence,” U.S. Senate Select Commit- el-Aroud’s website, Minbar SOS. Many more individuals interests of their defense. tee on Intelligence, February 5, 2008. presumably regularly accessed the site. 25 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interroga- 14 Dennis C. Blair, “Annual Threat Assessment of the 19 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism offi- tion. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee cials, Brussels, January and February 2009. 26 Gilbert Dupont, “Les six du réseau kamikaze,” La on Intelligence,” U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intel- 20 Personal interview, Alain Grignard, head of counter- Dernière Heure, December 13, 2008; Personal interviews, ligence, February 12, 2009. terrorist operations for the Belgian Federal Police, Feb- Belgian counterterrorism officials, Brussels, January and 15 Personal interview, Alain Grignard, head of counter- ruary 2009. February 2009. Ali el-Ghanouti and Y. Harrizi were also terrorist operations for the Belgian Federal Police, Au- 21 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism offi- charged in the case. gust 2008. cials, Brussels, January and February 2009. 27 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interroga- 16 Robertson and Cruickshank. 22 Robertson and Cruickshank. tion.

5 april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4 staging point for militants traveling to the name of “Driss” was their principle The three page form, which they signed, fight in the Afghan-Pakistan war zone.28 handler.34 included questions on their marriage From there, smugglers took them across status, health, criminal convictions, and the Pakistani border into the tribal A senior counterterrorism source with whether or not they wanted to become areas, which they entered on January detailed knowledge of the investigation suicide bombers.40 It also set out precise 10, 2008, transiting through Bannu, told the author that during Garsallaoui’s rules for their conduct in FATA such a district that borders both South and time in the Afghan-Pakistan border as the need to unquestioningly obey North Waziristan.29 Beyayo later told region, he developed close connections orders. They were told that they would his lawyer that he was amazed at the with a senior al-Qa`ida operative who be punished if they failed to adhere to lack of controls and how easy it was to orchestrated the 2006 airline plot in the the contract.41 enter the area.30 United Kingdom. The source could not reveal the al-Qa`ida operative’s name According to the interrogation report, Beyayo’s and W.O.’s accounts of their because of the ongoing investigation. W.O. stated that early on in their stay, time in FATA, where they stayed for Separately, Belgian counterterrorism their group, with the exception of much of 2008, provide a rare glimpse into officials believe that Garsallaoui was Beyayo who had fallen ill, completed the terrorist safe haven. Their accounts the main link between the Belgian cell a two week training course, much of and al-Qa`ida.35 it inside a residence. They received “They received both both religious instruction and military W.O., the French recruit, stated that training from Egyptian and Syrian religious instruction and “the Arab camp” was for all intents instructors. Their military trainer military training from and purposes run by al-Qa`ida. He said taught them how to assemble weapons, that the Arab camp was the smallest fire rocket launchers, and how to handle Egyptian and Syrian grouping of foreign fighters in FATA explosives. He even set off a small charge instructors.” with about 300 to 400 recruits, mostly of TNT in demonstration, telling them from Saudi Arabia but some from that the explosive was used to attack other parts of the Middle East and U.S. convoys in Afghanistan and in North Africa.36 According to W.O., al- suicide vests. They each had to pay 400 suggest that jihadist networks in FATA Qa`ida’s fighters and zones where they euros for the course, which included have relatively loose organizational conducted training were spread out structures, a view shared by American across North and South Waziristan for “Al-Qa`ida propaganda led and Belgian counterterrorism officials.31 security reasons. W.O. stated that al- In the 1980s and 1990s, several jihadist Qa`ida’s military commander at the time him to believe that fighters groups, including al-Qa`ida, had of their arrival was Abu Laith al-Libi. lived in groupings of more organizational structures in place, Abu Laith was killed by a U.S. missile mainly centered around Peshawar, to strike in the tribal areas in late January than 50 in an area; the process arriving volunteers. Yet when 2008.37 As for Bin Ladin, the “overall reality was that fighters the Belgian and French recruits crossed commander,” W.O. was told by their into the tribal areas in early 2008, they handler Driss that it was “impossible to were grouped together in received no such greeting. Nobody approach” him.38 units of 10 or less.” knew who they were.32 Although their smuggler introduced them to individuals According to W.O., the Belgian and linked to the “Arab camp” in FATA, they French recruits were asked to fill out a were initially met with open suspicion.33 contract by their handlers, illustrating rent for the dwelling. This illustrates Eventually, however, they were able to that al-Qa`ida’s penchant for paperwork the degree of self-motivation and self- persuade their interlocutors of their has remained intact over the years.39 organization that can be required in jihadist bona fides. The fact that they recruits traveling to FATA. were reunited with Garsallaoui, their 34 Ibid. recruiter, on January 13, presumably 35 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism offi- W.O. described the training as “an helped in this regard. For the next cials, Brussels, January and February 2009. enrollment amongst the Taliban and several months, a Syrian operative by 36 W.O. stated that the largest group of foreign fighters Al Qaeda.” According to his account, in FATA was from East Turkestan in northwest China. Pakistani Taliban fighters mixed freely 28 Ibid. He also stated that there were two Uzbek groups operat- with al-Qa`ida operatives in FATA, 29 Ibid. ing in FATA numbering a total of around 3,000 fighters, illustrating the close connections 30 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, Brussels, and two Kurdish groups. between the two groups. According February 2009. 37 “U.S. Officials: CIA Kills Top Al Qaeda Terrorist in to both W.O. and Beyayo, most of 31 Personal interview, Belgian intelligence official, -De Pakistan,” CNN, January 31, 2008. the Belgian and French jihadists cember 2008; Personal interview, U.S. counterterrorism 38 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interroga- never received “approval” to fight official, March 2009. tion. 32 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, Brussels, 39 In the years before 9/11, al-Qa`ida required recruits to 40 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interroga- February 2009. fill out copious amounts of paperwork. See Peter Bergen, tion. The contract did not have the insignia of any par- 33 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interroga- The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral history of Al Qaeda’s ticular militant group. tion. Leader (Washington, D.C.: Free Press, 2006). 41 Ibid.

6 april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4 in Afghanistan. During the next few sending an e-mail from Afghanistan Return to Belgium months, they moved from dwelling to explaining why he was fighting jihad.49 In the fall of 2008, Belgian security dwelling in the mountains of North and services were placed on alert after South Waziristan, frustrated at being One of the e-mails Garsallaoui sent el-Ghanouti and Harrizi, Beyayo’s kept away from the fighting over the to his wife, intercepted by U.S. friends from Anderlecht, returned border. Garsallaoui, according to both counterterrorism agencies in the first from FATA.54 On December 4, Beyayo accounts, eventually received approval half of 2008, contained a photograph returned to Belgium.55 The trigger to fight in Afghanistan.42 W.O. stated of himself firing a rocket launcher for the arrests was an e-mail sent by that he was surprised by the lack of somewhere in the Afghanistan- Beyayo three days later,56 intercepted large groupings of fighters in the tribal Pakistan border region.50 The picture, by U.S. counterterrorism agencies,57 areas. Al-Qa`ida propaganda led him to later posted on el-Aroud’s website, was suggesting he had received the go- believe that fighters lived in groupings clearly useful for propaganda purposes. ahead for an operation in Belgium.58 “It of more than 50 in an area; the reality was impossible for Belgian authorities was that fighters were grouped together at this stage to take any risk,” said the in units of 10 or less.43 “During his time in FATA, director of Belgian intelligence.59 Beyayo claims he had to During his time in FATA, Beyayo claims On December 11, a week after Beyayo’s he had to move frequently to avoid move around frequently return, police rounded up the alleged being targeted by U.S. Predator drones. to avoid being targeted by cell, including Malika el-Aroud. Yet The strikes had a reputation in jihadist when police raided 16 properties in circles of being “very effective.”44 U.S. Predator drones. The Brussels and Liège, they found little Garsallaoui was almost hit by such strikes had a reputation evidence of an imminent attack.60 a strike, according to an intercepted Beyayo’s lawyer, Marchand, said that e-mail he sent his wife.45 The French in jihadist circles of being the e-mail that triggered the arrests and Belgian recruits were told not to ‘very effective.’” was just “tough” talk sent to an impress venture outside their dwellings because an ex-girlfriend and disputed the spies would pass on the coordinates of notion that the group may have been suspected jihadists to the Americans.46 a “sleeper cell” sent back to Europe The accounts corroborate a recent Garsallaoui, posing in a “Rambo” like after deliberately being held back from judgment by U.S. intelligence agencies stance, was glamorizing the fighting. the front lines.61 Beyayo told him he that the strikes, intensified in the In June, Garsallaoui sent el-Aroud returned to Belgium because he was second half of 2008, have put significant an e-mail claiming to have killed five frustrated at not being able to fight in pressure on al-Qa`ida in FATA.47 Americans in Afghanistan.51 According Afghanistan, the uncomfortable living to W.O., Garsallaoui told him when they conditions, and bouts of sickness.62 Communications with Europe met in July in Mir Ali, North Waziristan, W.O., for his part, claimed that he The case reveals that terrorist operatives that he had killed the Americans by grew frustrated with his handlers’ in the Afghan-Pakistan border region firing a bazooka on a U.S. camp near the repeated demands of payment.63 Belgian can maintain contact with the outside Pakistani border.52 authorities, however, insist that the world relatively easily. Garsallaoui, for alleged cell was a potential national example, was in regular e-mail contact On September 26, 2008, Garsallaoui with his wife, Malika el-Aroud, from urged attacks in Europe in an online 54 Dupont. the Afghan-Pakistan border region, statement on Minbar SOS. “The solution 55 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, Brussels, 48 and sometimes even by Skype. He also my brothers and sisters is not fatwas February 2009. periodically tuned in to the forums on but boooooooms,” the posting stated. 56 Ibid. his wife’s website Minbar SOS, even His communication demonstrated al- 57 Jean-Pierre Stroobants, “La cible visée par le groupe Qa`ida’s ability to instigate violence belge démantelé n’a pas été identifiée,”Le Monde, Decem- 42 Ibid.; Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, in the West from the Afghan-Pakistan ber 18, 2008. 53 Brussels, February 2009. border region. 58 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism offi- 43 Ibid. cials, Brussels, January and February 2009. 44 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, Brussels, 59 Personal interview, Alain Winants, director of Bel- February 2009. gium’s State Security Service, Brussels, February 2009. 45 Ibid. 49 This information is based on the author’s own moni- 60 According to Belgian counterterrorism sources, no 46 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interroga- toring of el-Aroud’s website, Minbar SOS. According to explosives, firearms, or attack blueprints were recov- tion. private Belgian counterterrorism sources, his e-mail was ered. 47 Director of National Intelligence Blair testified in Feb- intercepted by U.S. counterterrorism agencies. 61 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, Brussels, ruary 2009 that “in the FATA Al Qaeda lost significant 50 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism offi- February 2009. parts of its command structure since 2008 in a succes- cials, Brussels, January and February 2009. 62 Personal interview, Christophe Marchand, New York, sion of blows as damaging to the group as any since the 51 Robertson and Cruickshank. April 2009. fall of the Taliban in late 2001.” 52 This information was drawn from W.O.’s interroga- 63 During his interrogation, W.O. said his handlers 48 Skype is an online communication website widely tion. behaved like “hustlers.” He claimed that in addition to used around the world to make telephone calls by using 53 This information is based on the author’s own moni- charging 400 euros for training, they charged 900 euros Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technology. toring of Minbar SOS. per person for equipment and weapons.

7 april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4 security threat. All those charged deny President Obama’s a robust propaganda arm, training the allegations against them and are facilities, unrelenting motivation, and set to face trial within the next year.64 Overseas Terrorism like-minded confederates in North Garsallaoui is still at large and believed Challenge Africa, the Middle East and beyond, it to be operating around the tribal areas remains a direct threat to nation-states. of Pakistan, which is of great concern to By Tom Sanderson Belgian counterterrorism officials.65 For the past several years, the primary president barack obama leads the focus of terrorist activity has been Iraq Conclusion United States at a time of heightened and South Asia. With a phased pullout The Belgian case illustrates the global insecurity. Economic hardship of U.S. and coalition forces from Iraq continuing danger posed by al-Qa`ida’s is increasing the ranks of weak and underway, American attention has safe haven in FATA and the urgent failing states that could serve as shifted to Afghanistan and Pakistan need to tackle it. Accounts by those who sanctuaries or incubators for terrorist as both countries descend further traveled there do, however, suggest groups. Although the U.S. homeland into turmoil. With Pakistan’s lawless that the CIA’s increased use of Predator has not been attacked since September Federally Administered Tribal Areas strikes have put pressure on the 11, 2001, extremists in Europe, North (FATA) serving as a terrorist safe Taliban and al-Qa`ida in FATA. While Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and haven, these two complex states Belgian and U.S. intelligence agencies South Asia remain a serious threat. play host to even more confounding successfully tracked the Belgian cell, With the election of President Barack insurgencies, elements of “al-Qa`ida the increased numbers of Europeans Obama, the United States and the central,” and criminal warlords, among traveling to FATA will require intensified world are expecting a new approach other destabilizing forces. Former efforts by Western intelligence agencies to countering terrorism.1 Almost three President George W. Bush’s deputy to track recruiting networks. “The months into his presidency, the Obama national security adviser for combating big task for secret services,” stressed administration has “repackaged” some terrorism, Juan Zarate, described this Winants, is to “identify the network by Bush administration strategies, while conflict zone (in particular Pakistan) which these people leave, where they at the same time making it clear that as “the greatest geo-political problem got the logistical support to go there, development, diplomacy, and other confronting the Obama administration and what they intend to do when they policies will garner greater emphasis. with its FATA safe-haven, creeping come back.”66 radicalization, nuclear weapons, and The administration should capitalize accommodation of radicals.”2 Paul Cruickshank is a Fellow at the NYU on a unique opportunity to emphasize Center on Law and Security and the Barack Obama’s widely admired Pakistan, for its part, is both unwilling Author of Al Qaeda: The Current Threat. personal story and interest in engaging and unable to keep its territory from His reporting on al-Qa`ida has appeared the world to weaken key elements of the being used to launch attacks into in The New Republic, the Washington al-Qa`ida “narrative.” The weakening Afghanistan, and is itself a target of Post and on NBC and CNN. In February of this narrative could, in turn, reduce extremist groups—many of which 2009, CNN aired “One Woman’s War,” a the terrorist group’s recruitment Islamabad had a direct hand in creating. documentary Mr. Cruickshank produced capabilities and capacity to garner Preoccupied by the potential for a on the alleged Belgian terrorist cell, sympathy from the Muslim world. fourth major war with its rival India—a reported by CNN Senior International This article reviews the landscape of country that has strengthened its Correspondent Nic Robertson. transnational terrorist threats and relationship with the United States, and examines the Obama administration’s also its presence in Afghanistan—this early counterterrorism policies. tense situation is unlikely to change. Given the distinct possibility that the A Complex and Worsening Landscape United States and other members of Despite the absence of an attack on U.S. the International Security Assistance soil since September 11, 2001, terrorism Force (ISAF) may depart Afghanistan remains a threat and presents a great without having achieved clear victory, test for intelligence and law enforcement it is possible that al-Qa`ida would be agencies. Since the September 11 attacks, revitalized for being perceived as the al-Qa`ida has been damaged by effective group responsible for such a defeat. Western policies to reduce its funding sources, the killing or capture of key In addition to the abundance of violent personnel, and through its own excesses groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, in Iraq. Nevertheless, it remains intact there are a number of other trouble and potent. With proven global reach, spots. In Bangladesh, extremist movements, which have already targeted the civilian leadership of Prime 64 Robertson and Cruickshank. 1 The anticipation for change was a result of Obama’s 65 Personal interviews, Belgian counterterrorism offi- early statements about the planned closure of the deten- cials, Brussels, January and February 2009. tion facility at Guantanamo Bay, the closure of CIA secret 2 This statement was made by Juan C. Zarate at a Cen- 66 Personal interview, Alain Winants, director of Bel- detention centers, and the repudiation of controversial ter for Strategic and International Studies roundtable on gium’s State Security Service, Brussels, February 2009. interrogation techniques such as waterboarding. March 11, 2009.

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Minister Sheikh Hasina, could take that Yemeni militants affiliated with al- At first glance, the Obama advantage of a nation in turmoil that in Qa`ida have traveled to nearby Somalia administration’s initial few decisions February 2009 witnessed a mutiny by to collaborate with an al-Qa`ida- might cause confusion as to where its own border guards.3 Coupled with affiliated group of Islamist militants the president stands on controversial severe stress on the environment, high known as al-Shabab.5 policies. While President Obama quickly levels of corruption, and a crowded ordered the closing of the detention population living in poverty and Despite the serious damage suffered facility at Guantanamo Bay, and despair, Bangladesh is a dark cloud on by al-Qa`ida, the group continues to directed all U.S. intelligence officers not the horizon. benefit from a widely held perception to exceed the interrogation techniques that the West is leading a “Crusade” found in the U.S. Army Field Manual, Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has made to destroy Islam and to occupy and other decisions have signaled that some strides in countering al-Qa`ida and exploit traditional Muslim lands. The Bush administration policies will be its supporters since the attacks inside global downturn, widely blamed on kept in place or only altered slightly. A the kingdom began in earnest in May American “greed” and “arrogance,” will review of still emerging policies reveals 2003. With thousands arrested and a serve to reinforce this argument and broad objectives and continued, though “disengagement” program targeting prove to be valuable propaganda for modified, tactics. young radicals, these developments, extremists. Usama bin Ladin himself has reportedly used the U.S. financial President Bush’s 2006 National “With a Kenyan father, a crisis as a propaganda tool, claiming Strategy for Combating Terrorism that “the United States is staggering included four main pillars: 1) Prevent middle name of ‘Hussein,’ under the attacks of the mujahidin and attacks by terrorist networks; 2) Deny and a childhood education their consequences…It is drowning in WMD to rogue states and terrorist allies a financial crisis, so much so that it is who seek to use them; 3) Deny terrorists in Indonesia—the world’s begging from big and small countries the support and sanctuary of rogue largest Muslim-majority alike.”6 With global unemployment states; and 4) Deny terrorists control surging, and crackdowns by anxious of any nation they would use as a base country—President Obama leaders worsening, this economic turn and launching pad for terror.8 The Bush shatters much of the of events injects vigor and seeming administration also strongly stressed validity into these arguments.7 “democracy promotion” as the long- negative imagery that some term antidote to terrorism. The military, associate with executive Resetting the Counterterrorism Strategy? intelligence, financial, law enforcement, With these conditions and threats and diplomatic arms of the United States leadership and power in facing the United States and its allies, played key roles in carrying out these the United States.” the Obama administration needs an policies, although too much emphasis aggressive counterterrorism strategy, was probably placed on the military but one that is mindful of other foreign options. Some of the most controversial policy initiatives and of the message tactics employed by the United States according to U.S. Director of National they deliver. It is to be expected that included “extraordinary renditions” Intelligence Dennis C. Blair, “have any new approach will be characterized of terrorism suspects (a policy begun rendered the kingdom a harsh operating by a more nuanced attitude from the under President William J. Clinton);9 environment for al-Qa’ida.”4 White House. Much of Barack Obama’s the use of interrogation techniques, popularity at home and abroad stems such as “waterboarding,” that have The greater regional threat is on the from his pre-election repudiation of been described as “torture”; warrantless southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula certain Bush administration-era tactics surveillance of communication between in lawless Yemen, home to the largest and strategies against terrorist groups. terrorism suspects and U.S. citizens; contingent of prisoners still detained at Given the damaged reputation of al- the indefinite detention of suspects Guantanamo Bay. A weak state, Yemen Qa`ida—best visible by its erosion of at Guantanamo Bay or in CIA secret is host to extremists who operate with support in Iraq—and the enthusiasm overseas prisons; the suspension of relative impunity in towns and across with which the world has greeted the habeas corpus for suspects; and the large areas of ungoverned tribal territory. new U.S. administration, there is an designation of captured individuals as It is from Yemen that many experts opportunity to make gains. “enemy combatants.” Even though some inside and outside of the government of these tactics ended before President anticipate future plots against the West Obama entered office—including the and its Arab allies. There are also signs 5 “Qaeda Bomber Behind Yemen Attack Trained in So- malia,” Reuters, March 17, 2009. 3 Julfikar Ali Manik and Somini Sengupta, “Army’s Bor- 6 On January 14, 2009, a new audiotape purportedly by 8 George W. Bush, “National Strategy for Combating der Guards Rebel in Bangladesh,” New York Times, Feb- Usama bin Ladin appeared on Islamist web forums. Bin Terrorism,” White House National Security Council, ruary 25, 2009. Ladin claimed that the United States is “drowning in a fi- September 2006. 4 Dennis C. Blair, “Annual Threat Assessment of the nancial crisis,” partly as a result of “mujahidin” attacks. 9 “Fact Sheet: Extraordinary Rendition,” American Civil Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee 7 Michael T. Klare, “A Planet at the Brink: Will Econom- Liberties Union, December 6, 2005; Tim Weiner, Legacy on Intelligence,” U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intel- ic Brushfires Prove Too Virulent to Contain?” TomDis- of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday, ligence, February 12, 2009. patch.com, February 24, 2009. 2007).

9 april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4 practice of waterboarding10 and the that “if we had a ticking-bomb situation, Perhaps one of the most powerful CIA’s use of secret prisons11—it has and obviously, whatever was being and promising developments in been widely recognized that they caused used I felt was not sufficient, I would counterterrorism is the direct challenge damage to the U.S. reputation abroad. not hesitate to go to the president of that Barack Obama’s ascendancy to the United States and request whatever power and collaborative approach While President Obama is canceling some additional authority I would need.”14 represents to al-Qa`ida’s legitimacy. Bush administration counterterrorism The new administration has also President Bush’s controversial policies, a complete scrapping is not continued—if not increased—Predator policies and public persona appeared likely. The differences between the two Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) to serve as an effective recruiting and presidents do not extend to the core strikes, and is targeting the Pakistani propaganda tool for Usama bin Ladin policy of preventing attacks on the Taliban, specifically the Baitullah United States and its citizens, but rather Mehsud network.15 While this may “The Predator strikes to some of the techniques noted above, arguably complicate counterinsurgency and to the manner with which the United efforts by inflaming public sentiment are one of the only tools States pursues its goals. President and generating additional recruits for at America’s disposal Obama and his national security team, Taliban-affiliated militias, the Predator which includes several individuals strikes are one of the only tools at for killing al-Qa`ida who served in the Bush administration, America’s disposal for killing al-Qa`ida and Taliban leaders recognize the threat posed by al- and Taliban leaders and operators who Qa`ida and other groups, especially are attacking U.S., NATO, Afghan, and and operators who are those seeking WMD capabilities. The Pakistani targets.16 attacking U.S., NATO, Obama administration, for example, has allowed the CIA to continue the The Obama Administration’s Early Moves Afghan, and Pakistani practice of rendition to cooperating While the new administration’s targets.” third countries, but is seeking stronger, counterterrorism strategy is yet to be more reliable assurances that suspects fully determined, the official White will not be tortured while in foreign House webpage on homeland security custody.12 Other actions reflect the provides the broad outlines of its and the extremists who rallied young Obama administration’s acceptance of approach to overseas radicalism and Muslim men and women on his behalf. Bush administration views on the global, terrorism. The strategy pays particular President Obama was immediately and borderless nature of counterterrorism. attention to restoring widely-admired crudely insulted by Ayman al-Zawahiri, This is evident from comments made American values and standards that al-Qa`ida’s second-in-command, upon during the U.S. Senate confirmation many allege were eroded during the last his election victory in November 2008. hearings for Attorney General Eric eight years of the unpopularly named Al-Zawahiri called President-elect Holder and for U.S. Solicitor General “global war on terrorism.” Five key Obama a “house negro,” suggesting Elena Kagan who both suggested that the points of the strategy17 are: that he would in fact be doing the terrorism “battlefield” extends to areas bidding of a presumably racist, white where individuals may be arrested for 1. Find, Disrupt, and Destroy Al- America. This was a clear attempt to providing a range of support to terrorist Qa`ida; denigrate an individual whose personal groups.13 2. New Capabilities to Aggressively story undermines the penetrating and Defeat Terrorists; persistent al-Qa`ida narrative. Additionally, while the Obama 3. Prepare the Military to Meet 21st administration has halted the use of the Century Threats; Indeed, the new U.S. president is an most extreme interrogation tactics, his 4. Win the Battle of Ideas; American minority who has risen to the CIA Director Leon Panetta noted in his 5. Restore American Influence and highest seat of power. With a Kenyan February 6, 2009 nomination testimony Restore Our Values. father, a middle name of “Hussein,” and a childhood education in Indonesia— 10 The last known case of waterboarding in the United the world’s largest Muslim-majority States occurred in 2003. See Renee Schoof, “CIA Direc- country—President Obama shatters tor Acknowledges Use of Water Boarding,” McClatchy 14 CIA Director Panetta did agree, however, that water- much of the negative imagery that some Newspapers, February 5, 2008. boarding constituted torture. For more, see Mark Maz- associate with executive leadership 11 Don Gonyea, “Bush Concedes CIA Ran Secret Prisons zetti, “Pick for CIA Chief Leaves Open Idea of Harsher and power in the United States. His Abroad,” National Public Radio, September 6, 2006. Interrogation,” International Herald Tribune, February 6, personal background, combined with 12 This is considered by many to be either naïve or disin- 2009. the traditional influence enjoyed by genuous given the realities of interrogation practiced by 15 Mark Mazzetti and David Sanger, “Obama Expands the United States, serves to multiply some of the United States’ more aggressive partners. For Missile Strikes Inside Pak,” New York Times, February the power and authority typically more, see Greg Miller, “Obama Preserves Renditions as 20, 2009. available to a U.S. president. In fact, a Counter-Terrorism Tool,” Los Angeles Times, February 1, 16 “Kilcullen Weighs in on U.S. Strikes in Pakistan,” 17-nation poll conducted by the British 2009. Weekly Standard, February 10, 2009. Broadcasting Corporation on the eve of 13 Charlie Savage, “Obama’s War on Terror May Re- 17 This information is drawn from the White House’s Barack Obama’s inauguration showed semble Bush’s in Some Areas,” New York Times, Febru- Homeland Security Agenda, available at www.white- “widespread and growing optimism that ary 18, 2009. house.gov/agenda/homeland_security/. his presidency will lead to improved

10 april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4 relations between the United States and There is an unmistakable tension Improving India’s the rest of the world,” with 67% of poll between the West and Muslim and Arab respondents expressing positive views worlds where a sense of humiliation Counterterrorism Policy of the president-elect.18 and exploitation remains strong. One of after Mumbai the most important goals of U.S. foreign This could mark a great opportunity to and counterterrorism policy will be to By Paul Staniland weaken al-Qa`ida’s appeal. Just as fatawa “communicate to the Muslim world that by senior Muslim clerics around the the U.S. is not at war with them,” but india has emerged as one of the world’s world have questioned the legitimacy rather is interested in greater partnership most consistent targets of Islamist of al-Qa`ida’s actions and reduced on many levels.20 Achieving this goal militants. Although the Mumbai its standing among some Muslim will reduce the ability of al-Qa`ida attacks of November 2008 attracted populations, so too can Barack Obama’s and similar organizations to garner the most global attention, they were life story and worldwide admiration. sympathy from Muslim populations, merely the most recent and dramatic and thereby limit their capacity to in a series of bloody terrorist incidents recruit new members. There is now an throughout urban India. On July 11, “Pointing to the effort to redesign U.S. policy, and by 2006, for example, terrorists planted weaknesses and doing so the Obama administration can seven bombs on the Suburban Railway maintain a strong campaign against of Mumbai, causing the deaths of contradictions in al- terrorism while avoiding mistakes more than 200 people. The November Qa`ida’s message, while that indirectly assist U.S. adversaries. 2008 attacks, however, brought into This efficiency of policy is essential clear focus the inability of the Indian dispensing with any self- given the continued advantages of security apparatus to anticipate and defeating U.S. policies, extremist groups and the worsening appropriately respond to major terrorist global environment that supports their incidents. As one prominent analyst will increase the chances arguments. It is likely that the United wrote, the government’s responses to the of success by weakening States and the world will see an ever Mumbai attacks were “comprehensive more enhanced and sophisticated failures from the point of view of India’s Muslim support for al- terrorist threat, and an equally refined security establishment.”1 While some Qa`ida.” approach to counterterrorism. Indian analysts and politicians prefer to focus on Pakistan’s role as a haven Tom Sanderson serves as deputy director for a variety of militant groups, it is and senior fellow of the Transnational clear that India needs to dramatically Progress in reducing al-Qa`ida’s appeal Threat Project at the Center for Strategic enhance its domestic counterterrorism began while President Bush was in and International Studies in Washington, infrastructure. Improvement will office, and President Obama can quickly D.C. Mr. Sanderson specializes in require significant infusions of build on that momentum. Pointing to counterterrorism, intelligence, and open resources, policy consistency, and the weaknesses and contradictions in source information. For the last four years, political will that are often lacking in al-Qa`ida’s message, while dispensing he has led an effort to model collaboration India. with any self-defeating U.S. policies, between government analysts and non- will increase the chances of success governmental experts on terrorism and This article outlines the current by weakening Muslim support for al- crime. Known as the Trusted Information structure of counterterrorism policy in Qa`ida. Furthermore, the bolstering Network project, the effort has organized India, and then assesses some possible of America’s image and cancellation and tapped expertise on threats in Europe reforms. Thoroughgoing institutional or modification of some controversial and Southeast Asia. He teaches a range reform in India will be challenging. policies could certainly lead more of courses for the intelligence community, The country suffers from a fragmented countries to cooperate with the United and carries out extensive field interviews and inefficient bureaucracy, far fewer States.19 across dozens of countries annually. Mr. resources than developed countries even Sanderson holds degrees from Wheaton though it faces a higher threat level, Conclusion College and Tufts University (Fletcher and a political elite focused primarily A multitude of stresses are impacting School), both in Massachusetts. on electoral politics. It is likely only a vulnerable populations around the matter of time before another significant world, leaving many open to extremist terrorist attack occurs. Nevertheless, ideologies that energize marginalized focusing on a series of substantial people. It is clear that this trend will but distinct tasks, with the support continue in the current economic of India’s international partners, can climate. slowly but steadily improve India’s counterterrorism capabilities. 18 “Global Poll Uncovers Growing Optimism that Obama Will Improve US Relations,” BBC, January 20, 2009. 19 On the other hand, it could also cause some govern- 20 Steve Simon and Daniel Byman et al., Restoring the Bal- ments to refrain from providing intelligence to a new U.S. ance: A Middle East Strategy for the Next President (Wash- 1 Ajai Sahni, “The Uneducable Indian,” Outlook, Decem- administration that is critical of harsh tactics. ington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2008). ber 1, 2008.

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Domestic Structure and Capabilities cumbersome. States and the central sweeping rhetorical claims, juggled India’s police and internal security agencies frequently compete over personnel at all levels, and repeatedly system is highly fragmented and often resources and bureaucratic autonomy, promised better coordination at the poorly coordinated. The country’s and they both do a highly uneven job national level, but key capacity has not federal political system leaves most of cooperating with one another.3 improved. Mumbai finally triggered the policing responsibilities to the states, In addition to these organizational resignation of Union Home Minister which usually possess their own challenges, many of the security Shivraj Patil, on whose watch a series counterterrorism and intelligence units. institutions at all levels of government of previous attacks had occurred. Yet These forces, especially local police, are understaffed, undertrained, and Patil’s resignation and his replacement are often poorly trained and equipped. technologically backward.4 by the more competent Palaniappan Local personnel are frequently hired on Chidambaram (who worked on internal the basis of political patronage and are All of these pathologies were evident in security under Rajiv Gandhi) marks notorious for high levels of corruption. the failure to prevent or appropriately only the beginning of the necessary respond to the Mumbai attacks.5 There changes. India faces a “dire need to There is also a variety of central was in fact significant intelligence redress its numerous deficiencies in its investigative, law enforcement, and suggesting a seaborne terrorist attack internal security arrangements.”9 intelligence agencies. The Ministry of was likely, and even that prominent Home Affairs includes the Intelligence sites such as the Taj Hotel would be The Nature of the Threat: Domestic and Foreign Bureau, Central Reserve Police Force, targeted. This information, however, One common response to India’s Indian Police Service, and new National was ignored by several key bureaucratic counterterrorism failures has been a Investigation Agency, while the Research actors—including the Coast Guard quick acknowledgement of domestic and Analysis Wing and Central Bureau and the Maharashtra state director- weaknesses, followed by a far more of Investigation are answerable to the general of police—because it was vocal demand to “get tough” on Pakistan. prime minister.2 The military—which deemed unactionable.6 Others, such While Pakistan’s role as a sanctuary as the Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism (both voluntary and involuntary) for Squad, at least attempted some kind militants is indisputable, India’s options “Mumbai brought into of preparation.7 The differences in are relatively limited. The coercive clear focus the inability readiness highlight the extent of diplomacy following the December 13, fragmentation among the security 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament, of the Indian security apparatus. Even when Mumbai police named Operation Parakram, did apparatus to anticipate and tried to take preventive action, they not prevent Pakistan’s continued lacked the manpower to sustain patronage of Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and appropriately respond to increased security at the hotels. Once other militant groups operating in major terrorist incidents.” the attack occurred, the security Kashmir.10 Pakistan’s nuclear weapon forces did not have sufficient night- “shield” makes credible Indian coercive vision equipment, heavy weaponry, diplomacy difficult. or information about the attack sites, is primarily geared toward foreign leading to a long response time and the India’s current government has learned threats, including terrorism—also emergence of a disastrous siege.8 this lesson well, and instead engaged in generates intelligence with relevance a coordinated diplomatic offensive that to domestic terrorism, and there is a Previous attempts at reform and has brought at least rhetorical results. centrally controlled National Security improvement have been largely Military threats against Pakistan Guard (NSG) that specializes in hostage inadequate—politicians have made are unlikely to bear fruit, while even and terrorist attack situations. successful diplomacy will have a limited 11 3 “Securing the Home Front,” India Today, January 12, impact. Pakistan simply lacks the The combination of state and central 2009. capacity, and probably the will, to engage authorities is ostensibly coordinated 4 On the understaffing of police, see P. Chidambaran, “A in the kind of domestic policies that will through joint committees, task forces, Clear Command Structure,” Outlook, January 6, 2009. significantly lessen the threat posed subsidiary intelligence bureaus, and 5 Vijay Oberoi, “Never Again,” Indian Express, December to India. Improving India’s internal a Multi-Agency Center. All of these 2, 2008. security apparatus must therefore be coordinating mechanisms aim to 6 Saikat Datta, Smruti Koppikar and Dola Mitra, “The the primary focus of Indian security and harmonize the intelligence gathered by Armies of the Night,” Outlook, December 15, 2008. these agencies and to generate shared 7 The Mumbai police put extra guard on prominent sites threat perceptions and associated and met with hotel officials. The extra guard was not 9 Angel Rabasa et al., The Lessons of Mumbai (Washing- responses, but they are often slow and maintained, however, because of the strain it put on man- ton, D.C.: RAND Corporation, 2009), p. 15. power. Praveen Swami, “Pointed Intelligence Warnings 10 On Parakram and its aftermath, see V.K. Sood and 2 A critical analysis of the Ministry of Home Affairs forc- Preceded Attacks,” Hindu, November 30, 2008. Pravin Sawhney, Operation Parakram: The War Unfin- es can be found in K.S. Subramanian, Political Violence 8 “‘Rot’ at Heart of Indian Intelligence,” BBC, December ished (New Delhi: Sage, 2003); P.R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal and the Police in India (New Delhi: Sage, 2007). For a brief 2, 2008; Praveen Swami, “Lethal Lapse,” Frontline, De- Cheema, and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace overview of RAW, see Jayshree Bajoria, “RAW: India’s cember 6-19, 2008; Saikat Datta, Smruti Koppikar and Process: American Engagement in South Asia (Washington, External Intelligence Agency,” Council on Foreign Rela- Dola Mitra, “The Armies of the Night,” Outlook, Decem- D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007). tions, November 7, 2008. ber 15, 2008. 11 Rabasa et al., p. 21.

12 april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4 political elites.12 In addition to Pakistan, The Path Forward: Coordination and Capacity- equipping them. A new federal agency India also faces cross-border terrorism Building or set of laws will contribute little to from Bangladesh. Attacks attributed The major domestic response to Mumbai this fundamental task unless they are to jihadist groups such as Harkat-ul- has been an emphasis on streamlined able to sustain the momentum necessary Jihad-al-Islam (HuJI) are believed to coordination between agencies across for years of unglamorous but crucial have been launched from the country. state and federal lines, and the creation training and institution-building. Bangladesh’s political instability and of a new National Investigation Agency Locking in lines of budgetary approval weak state capacity, however, make it (NIA).15 The aim of the NIA is to over a 5-10 year period will be critical difficult for India to consistently shape empower a federal agency to investigate to avoid the effort falling victim to the Bangladeshi counterterrorism policy. major crimes such as terrorism and vicissitudes of domestic politics and organized crime without having to elections. In addition to the limits of putting be asked to do so by the states. There pressure on Pakistan and Bangladesh, will be special courts that can rapidly Second, reform efforts must be properly a number of major attacks have been hear terror-related cases.16 The NIA resourced. India is a poor country with carried out with significant help from will be filled out by new staff drawn many pressing needs, and security Indian Muslims under the aegis of the funding reflects India’s lack of wealth. Indian Mujahidin (IM). This clearly “Once the attack occurred, Compared to the budgets of even much shows that the problem is not simply smaller developed countries, India one of containing Pakistan.13 The the security forces did simply does not provide sufficient money Indian police and intelligence agencies not have sufficient night- for its security agencies on a per capita were forced to scramble in the wake basis.19 This causes them to undertrain of bombings in Jaipur, Delhi, Uttar vision equipment, heavy and understaff their personnel, leading Pradesh, and elsewhere claimed by weaponry, or information to corruption and a reliance on crude the IM, which revealed a significant and often counterproductive policing indigenous capability for terrorism. about the attack sites, techniques. International assistance, Bolstering domestic intelligence will leading to a long response in the form of grants for training and become increasingly central if a trend of equipping police forces, could reduce radicalization continues among small, time and the emergence of the impact of this reform on India’s but potentially growing portions of a disastrous siege.” budget. In the current economic India’s Muslim community. Although environment, large-scale international there have been pockets of radicalization aid is unlikely, but small measures uncovered as far south as Kerala, on could make a significant difference, balance it seems that urban areas of from existing intelligence and law particularly if focused on the cities most north and west India have been the enforcement agencies throughout India. likely to be attacked in the future (Delhi primary recruiting grounds for Islamist An infusion of funding and personnel and Mumbai). radicals.14 into the overall security apparatus has also been promised, and the NSG has Finally, India’s political leadership must Therefore, India faces threats spilling been deployed throughout the country exert the will to push past bureaucratic out of porous borders and weak to offer a quicker response to future and state-centric rivalries. This is an governments both to the east and to the attacks.17 These steps represent a useful enormous challenge for a political class west. These foreign threats coalesce beginning. These efforts on their own, focused above all else on the cut-throat with a troubled internal security however, will lead to little substantive electoral competition that characterizes apparatus and some level of domestic results unless they have three major Indian politics. Despite these challenges, radicalization to create a dangerous characteristics. maintaining a degree of consistency situation. and follow-through is essential so that First, they will need to be sustained the reform process does not stall or over a long period of time. Dramatically end up wasting huge amounts of time bolstering the institutional capacity and money. Government ministers of India’s counterterrorism apparatus must not allow themselves to be used 12 As Shishir Gupta notes, “Pakistan is only part of the is a task of at least half a decade, and as pawns in bureaucratic battles over 18 problem.” See Shishir Gupta, “Less Blame, More Action,” probably longer. The training of turf, resources, and responsibilities. Indian Express, December 5, 2008. new and current personnel alone is Specialized task forces led by elected 13 Animesh Roul, “India’s Home-Grown Jihadi Threat: an enormous task, much less properly officials, and supported at the highest A Profile of the Indian Mujahideen,” Terrorism Monitor levels, must be given the power to 7:4 (2009). 15 The NIA is discussed in R.K. Raghavan, “Terror engage in oversight over the security 14 These are the areas of greatest Muslim demographic Trackers,” Frontline, January 3-16, 2009. apparatus. This will involve overcoming presence and also of communal rioting. Although firm 16 “Govt Tables Bill to Set Up National Investigation a traditional aversion to transparency data is elusive, many experts argue that the 2002 Gujarat Agency,” Times of India, December 16, 2008. on the part of the police and intelligence riots have propelled Islamist recruitment. For more, see 17 “NSG Inks Agreements with Eight Airlines,” Hindu, agencies. “India Fears that Some of its Muslims are Joining in Ter- March 1, 2009. rorism,” New York Times, August 9, 2006; “Ahmedabad 18 See the quote by Praveen Swami in “Will India’s Secu- 19 Sahni, “Uneducable Indian,” argues that the police-to- Attacks: The Usual Suspects,” Hindu, August 1, 2008. rity Overhaul Work?” BBC, December 11, 2008. population ratio in India is 125:100,000.

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Given these deep challenges, the Indian security forces. In addition to helping Leveraging History in AQIM leadership is best advised to manage to prevent and respond to terrorist a pair of distinct projects—first, attacks, increased professionalism Communications building on the short-term changes in might reduce the resentment of the coordination that can leverage existing security forces in parts of the Indian By Lianne Kennedy Boudali assets and capabilities, and second, Muslim community, which perceive the engaging in the much lengthier and police as indiscriminate and brutal.22 al-qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb broader task of improving training Small but meaningful grants could also (AQIM), formerly known as the Salafist and technical capacities across India’s be provided for training and equipping Group for Preaching and Combat security apparatus. Conflating the two police forces. (GSPC), is one of the most active al- into one grand reform agenda is likely Qa`ida affiliate organizations. The to slow both down and undermine the Preparing for the Inevitable group’s primary goal is to overthrow overall effort. India must pursue a Even if significant reform and Indo- the Algerian regime in favor of Shari`a- series of discrete, manageable tasks if U.S. cooperation emerge, however, it is based governance and to end foreign it is to fortify itself against the threats likely that India will be hit once again influence in North Africa. Since its flowing both from across the border and with a significant terrorist attack. One declaration of allegiance to Usama bin from among its own population. of the key challenges after the event Ladin in the fall of 2006 and subsequent will be avoiding yet another cycle name change in January 2007, AQIM has An American Role of rhetorically compelling but under- largely maintained its prior operational The United States can play a helpful role resourced, soon-forgotten institutional focus on the Algerian state, while in bolstering India’s counterterrorism reform. There will be further risks of simultaneously adopting tactics such capabilities.20 There has already been an Indo-Pakistan crisis spiraling out of as suicide attacks and sophisticated extensive cooperation between the U.S. control after a dramatic incident. roadside bombs that are reminiscent of Federal Bureau of Investigation and al-Qa`ida and its global affiliates. Indian security services in the wake The United States and India’s other of Mumbai, illustrating the dramatic partners can be a constituency AQIM’s communications have evolved improvement in Indo-U.S. relations.21 advocating a certain degree of continuity significantly in the last two years There has also been increased to avoid disruptive policy shifts that in both content and sophistication, intelligence sharing with India, most of undermine imperfect but existing undoubtedly due in part to the fact that it obviously related to Afghanistan and reform efforts, while actively trying to it has developed a relationship with al- Pakistan. reduce tensions on the subcontinent. Qa`ida’s al-Fajr Media Center. AQIM The process of bolstering Indian remains dedicated to the removal of The relationship should move beyond counterterrorism capabilities will be the “apostate” Algerian government, investigative collaboration and long and difficult, and is unlikely to yet its messages increasingly reflect intelligence sharing into a broader bring any sudden successes, but it is al-Qa`ida’s orientation toward project of training and capacity building. nevertheless essential. transnational jihadist activity, as One of the traditional strengths of the evidenced by frequent references to U.S. law enforcement establishment has Paul Staniland is a Ph.D. candidate the “Zionist-Crusader Alliance” and been training other countries’ police in political science and member of the the need to re-establish a caliphate. In and domestic intelligence forces. India Security Studies Program at MIT. During short, AQIM’s communications reflect would benefit enormously from even a the 2008-09 academic year, he is also a both local and international jihadist small, but sustained program bringing predoctoral research fellow in the Belfer concerns. Indian police to the United States Center for Science and International for training, and sending American Affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy One of the rhetorical devices by which trainers to India to lecture on successful School of Government. Mr. Staniland AQIM bridges local and international practices. This could be a small program has published in International Security, grievances is the use of references aimed at providing specialized training Security Studies, the Washington Quarterly, to historical figures whose military to state and federal police. two edited volumes, and with the RAND exploits in the North African context Corporation. His field research focuses resonate on both levels of analysis. Even basic training would have on insurgent and paramilitary groups in This article will explore how AQIM has a broader effect of increasing the South Asia and Northern Ireland. sought to bolster its legitimacy through professionalism of India’s domestic repeated references to these well-known historical figures.

20 Lisa Curtis, “After Mumbai: Time to Strengthen US- Heroic Figures in North African History India Counterterrorism Cooperation,” Heritage Founda- AQIM’s communications mention tion, December 9, 2008. historical figures whose heroic actions 21 “FBI Sends Agents to Mumbai,” Wall Street Journal, on behalf of Islam are known to Muslims November 28, 2008. Also see the testimony by FBI Chief in North Africa and elsewhere. Some of Intelligence Officer Donald Van Duyn before the Senate these figures—such as Tariq bin Ziyad, on January 8, 2009 outlining the FBI’s investigation 22 Somini Sengupta, “As Indian Police Crack Down Yusuf bin Tashfin, and `Uqba bin Nafi— in Mumbai, available at www.fbi.gov/congress/con- After Bombings, Mistrust Grows,” International Herald are military heroes from Islam’s seventh gress09/vanduyn010809.htm. Tribune, October 3, 2008.

14 april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4 century conquests in North Africa and have galloped on forever like Alexander guerrilla desert warfare, and his nearly Europe. Others are revered for their the Great, upholding your faith and 20-year campaign against colonial role in resisting colonial influence in fighting the unbelievers!” From AQIM’s forces made him a North African folk the 19th and 20th centuries; these figures perspective, Bin Nafi is relevant because hero. AQIM includes references to him include `Umar al-Mukhtar, who fought of his role in securing North Africa as because he holds particular appeal to Italian involvement in Libya, and `Abd Islamic territory. AQIM argues that it Libyans (AQIM seeks to incorporate al-Karim al-Khattabi, who resisted is defending this same territory against regional jihadist factions under its French and Spanish involvement in infidels and apostates, thus framing its umbrella) and because his anti-colonial Northern Morocco. All of these leaders violence as an extension of Bin Nafi’s activity serves as an example for current are remembered for their roles in original conquest. generations seeking to eliminate foreign combat, conquest, and the defense of influence in North Africa. Islam against occupying forces. Tariq bin Ziyad was a Berber military commander who landed his forces in `Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi was a AQIM references them for a number Spain in 711 and brought the Iberian Moroccan Islamic judge who resisted of reasons: to link successful historic Peninsula (al-Andalus) under control French and Spanish colonial forces in the military campaigns to current terrorist of the Umayya Caliphate within several Rif Mountains of Morocco. He inflicted a activity, to demonstrate a continuity months.2 Bin Ziyad was eventually humiliating defeat on a large contingent defeated in 732 at the Battle of Poitiers, of invading Spanish forces in 1921, “All of these figures are but he is remembered as one of Islam’s and later established an independent great military heroes.3 AQIM references Islamic emirate that strictly enforced either military heroes Bin Ziyad because his military conquests Shari`a.5 Although he was defeated in who played a key role in remind audiences that Spain was 1926 by combined French and Spanish once part of ancient Muslim empires, forces, he was considered an exemplar expanding the territory implying that it is a contemporary duty of resistance to colonial occupation of the early caliphates, or to reclaim this lost territory. and an early proponent of Salafism in Morocco. Al-Khattabi’s piety, his contemporary folk heroes Yusuf bin Tashfin greatly expanded the honored for their role in Muslim Almoravid dynasty in North “By framing AQIM’s Africa between 1074 and 1106. His fighting colonial European empire eventually included present-day actions as a continuation of forces.” Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania, Islam’s past battles, `Abd and parts of Algeria and the Sahel. In 1086, the Muslim rulers of al-Andalus al-Wadud seeks to create a asked Bin Tashfin to bring his forces direct linkage between his of opposition to Western forces and to Spain to fight encroaching Spanish interests, to claim an ancestral linkage Christian armies. Bin Tashfin’s forces group’s terrorism and the to revered historical figures, and to won a key battle at Zalaqa (Sagrajas) glories of the past.” demonstrate the permanent nature of and Bin Tashfin later annexed most their struggle. AQIM is not alone in of al-Andalus to his own empire, seeking to trade on these figures’ appeal: displacing the previous Muslim rulers. Tariq bin Ziyad in particular has been Bin Tashfin, like Bin Ziyad, was Berber, military success against external forces, mentioned in speeches by Usama bin and he enforced a strict interpretation of and his establishment of an independent Ladin and Hussayn bin Mahmud, the Islamic law. AQIM refers to Bin Tashfin emirate make him, like Bin Tashfin, latter of whom is a popular commentator because he was the ruler of a mighty a model for what AQIM would like to on jihadist web forums. A brief review Islamic empire that included southern achieve in North Africa. of the historical figures in question will Spain, and also because he was a native illuminate AQIM’s reasons for choosing North African known for his puritanical All of these figures are either military these individuals. zeal. He is, therefore, a perfect role heroes who played a key role in model for what AQIM would like to expanding the territory of the early `Uqba bin Nafi was an Arab general of accomplish in North Africa today. caliphates, or contemporary folk heroes the Umayya Caliphate who led the initial honored for their role in fighting colonial conquest of North Africa in 662 AD. His `Umar al-Mukhtar, a Qur’anic instructor European forces. They suit AQIM’s forces established the city of Kairouan by trade, led Libyan resistance to Italian purposes because they are known for in Tunisia, which was the first new colonization from 1912 to 1931, when he military actions in North Africa and Islamic city in North Africa.1 According was captured and later executed.4 Al- Europe against non-Muslim forces, as to Arab historians, when he reached the Mukhtar was considered a master of well as for their role in establishing Atlantic Ocean in 682, he rode his horse various forms of Islamic rule in North into the waters, exclaiming, “Oh God, if 2 Ibid. Africa. the sea had not prevented me, I would 3 The name Gibraltar comes from the Arabic Jebel Tariq, or Tariq’s mountain. 1 C.R. Pennell, Morocco: From Empire to Independence (Ox- 4 John Wright, Libya: A Modern History (Baltimore, M.D.: ford: Oneworld Publications, 2003). Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). 5 Pennell.

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Leveraging the Appeal of Historical Heroes linkage between his group’s terrorism death and martyrdom the way Between January 2007 and January 2009, and the glories of the past. The statement you love life, you can expect the AQIM communications have mentioned implies that current generations have battalions of martyrdom and the one or more of these historical figures a duty to continue fighting what is an lions who hold their fingers on on at least 10 separate occasions. These ongoing struggle for Islam. Similarly, the trigger. We will not stop the references have been made by several an October 2008 speech by Abu raids until the Islamic Maghreb different AQIM officials, including `Ubayda Yusuf contained the following is liberated from Sarkozy and amir Abu Mus`ab `Abd al-Wadud (also exhortation to North African Muslims: Bush’s representatives. We will known as Abdelmalek Droukdel), not stop the raids until every open Shari`a committee member Abu I end my message by saluting inch is conquered and liberated `Ubayda Yusuf, and media spokesman the steadfast mujahidin in the by virtuous men such as `Uqba Salah Abu Muhammad. `Abd al-Wadud lands of the Islamic Maghreb, bin Nafi and Tariq bin Ziyad and has mentioned Yusuf bin Tashfin six you the grandsons of Uqba, the Yusuf bin Tashfin and until the times and referred to Tariq bin Ziyad conqueror of the Maghreb, and banner of Islam is raised high and `Uqba bin Nafi four times each in Musa Bin Nasir, the conqueror of and you stop your support and the past two years. Other AQIM officials Andalusia, and Tariq Ibn Ziyad, collaboration with the Crusaders frequently refer to all three figures at the vanquisher of the Romans and and stop your corruption and once, as well as other historical figures the Spanish, and [Yusuf] Tashfin, injustice and humiliation of the such as Musa bin Nusayr, `Abd al-Hamid the hero of Zalaqa, and Abd al- nation.8 bin Badis, and al-Mu’iz bin Badis. The Hamid Bin Badis, the leader of AQIM media committee periodically the reforms. Today you are the Abu Muhammad reiterates the theme references historical figures in its attack pride of the umma in a time of of continuity of struggle against the claims, and several of AQIM’s katibats exploitation; you are the hope West, neatly conflating AQIM’s “raids” (combatant elements) are named after in reclaiming its usurped honor with military campaigns orchestrated historical military leaders. in our broken Islamic Maghreb by Muslim states whose legitimacy was and the appropriated Andalusia, recognized at the time. By identifying AQIM officials are adept at weaving Cordoba, Sicily, and Zalaqa. We AQIM as a modern day extension of historical references into calls for will not rest and we will not be greater action or commitment on the content until we regain every inch “It also frames AQIM’s part of contemporary Muslims, as in of our usurped land including the this September 2008 audio communiqué occupied Sebta and Melilla, and let violence as part of a from AQIM amir `Abd al-Wadud, which us meet with our beloved people multigenerational effort included a message directed to the in the land of Palestine.7 Algerian people: to restore the caliphate, The preceding passage challenges local a goal more traditionally Grandsons of Uqbah and Tariq Muslims to continue their ancestors’ and Yusuf bin Tashfin and Al- achievements. It also frames AQIM’s associated with al-Qa`ida’s Mu’iz Bin Badis and `Abd al- violence as part of a multigenerational vision of global jihadism.” Karim al-Khattabi and `Umar al- effort to restore the caliphate, a goal Mukhtar, rise from your inertia more traditionally associated with al- and put your hands in the hands Qa`ida’s vision of global jihadism. Abu of your brothers, the mujahidin, `Ubayda’s reference to Sebta and Melilla these campaigns, Abu Muhammad is in the al-Qa`ida Organization in (Spanish enclaves in Morocco), which attempting to frame AQIM’s violence as the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb some Muslims consider to be ongoing legitimate acts of war conducted against who have sacrificed their money, colonial occupations of Moroccan enemies of Islam. In other words, he their lives, and their honor for territory, links a current regional is arguing that the Maghreb is in an the sake of protecting Islam and grievance to a historical foe in support ongoing state of war and that AQIM’s the unity and the reverence of the of the argument that North Africa is actions are legally sound responses to Islamic Maghreb. Gather around again “occupied” by foreign forces. Western aggression. Abu Muhammad’s the jihad with which Islam started focus on the “Crusaders” rather than so it becomes the only force In September 2008, AQIM media local regimes places his statement and alternative to the regimes official Salah Abu Muhammad’s speech squarely in line with al-Qa`ida’s focus of apostasy that are ruling our defending AQIM against accusations of on the “far enemy.” countries.6 killing innocent Muslims contained this fiery passage: Conclusion By framing AQIM’s actions as a It is difficult to assess the effectiveness continuation of Islam’s past battles, Be glad, Crusaders and apostates, of any form of terrorist propaganda, `Abd al-Wadud seeks to create a direct with a generation that loves let alone measure the impact of these particular references to historical 6 Abu Mus`ab `Abd al-Wadud, “A Message to Our Na- 7 Abu `Ubayda Yusuf, “Congratulations on the Occa- tion in the Islamic Maghreb,” audio statement, Septem- sion of Id to the Nation of Monotheism,” audio statement, 8 Salah Abu Muhammad, “Who Are the Killers of the In- ber 21, 2008. October 6, 2008. nocent Ones?” audio statement, September 3, 2008.

16 april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4 figures. Short of a verifiable statement as idiosyncratic in tactics and ideas as from a terrorist that described the AQAP a Rising Threat in the country’s politics. It was willing to arguments that convinced him or her Yemen use the time-honored Yemeni culture to join AQIM, the utility of AQIM’s of negotiation, and abided by what historical analogies will likely never By Brian O’Neill were essentially non-aggression pacts be known. Nonetheless, the frequency with the government. Under the new and consistency with which these on march 15, 2009, a suicide bomber leadership of Nasir al-Wahayshi and references appear suggest that AQIM attacked a group of South Korean Qasim al-Raymi, who reorganized the believes that historical references tourists in Yemen, killing four of them outfit following a 2006 prison escape, boost their arguments. If at some point along with their Yemeni guide. Less it has shown an ability to weave itself in the future AQIM were to abandon than a week later on March 18, the South into the larger jihadist framework while such references, it could indicate that Korean delegation sent to investigate the remaining tied to Yemen’s cultural the group determined that they were attack was targeted by another suicide norms. Their leaders have shown respect ineffective. bomber, who detonated his explosives for and knowledge of Yemen’s complex in the middle of their convoy.1 tribal system and are able to use it to For the time being, it is clear that AQIM’s their advantage. Their narrative within references to historical figures support These two attacks show that a rumored Yemen, for example, has focused largely both global and local jihadist grievances, peace treaty between al-Qa`ida in the on the traditional tribal distrust of the allowing the group to leverage historical Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the government in Sana`a. While Yemeni narratives to support its dual objectives Yemeni government is false.2 More nationalism exists, the tribal areas are of overthrowing local regimes and importantly, the terrorist attacks wary of centralization, and al-Wahayshi participating in al-Qa`ida’s vision demonstrate that this reconstituted and al-Raymi expend great effort to of transnational jihad against the far and renamed terrorist group3 is more paint themselves as being on the side of enemy. By referencing historical figures adaptable, tactically flexible, and the tribesmen against the government. closely associated with North Africa, strategically nimble than previously This narrative is a powerful one, and AQIM creates a link between its actions believed. Although the attacks lacked its appeal is rooted in Yemeni tribal and those of past figures who fought to the reach of the 2008 mortar assault culture. In this way, AQAP is different, free the Maghreb from foreign influence on the U.S. Embassy, they proved that and in the long-run more dangerous, and establish Islamic governance. The AQAP remains a threat to both foreign than al-Qa`ida’s troubled franchise in particular figures who are mentioned nationals and to the Yemeni government. Iraq. include individuals from Morocco, This article examines the implications Libya, and Mauritania; all areas where of the two attacks, and how AQAP has The March 15 bombing near the iconic AQIM would like to expand its reach. evolved its propaganda to achieve better mudbrick towers of Shibam highlighted References to figures associated with resonance with the Yemeni population. several important aspects of the group’s Islam’s caliphates and its conquest of strength. The first is that the bomber, European territory dovetail with al- Implications of the Attacks identified as Abd al-Rahman Mahdi Ali Qa`ida’s rhetorical interest in restoring Taken separately, both of the March 2009 Qasim al-`Ujayri, used his body as the a caliphate and focusing jihadist energy suicide attacks are worrisome. Taken as weapon. In the past, al-Qa`ida-affiliated on the far enemy. In sum, AQIM’s a set, they reveal an organization that is operatives in Yemen used vehicles or references to historical figures imbue both gaining strength and demonstrating boats in their suicide attacks; while its statements with multiple layers of a willingness to be influenced by the effective, these attacks did not allow for contextual meaning and support its larger jihadist movement. Al-Qa`ida in as great a flexibility in target selection. arguments that its violent actions are Yemen had, before the destruction of its This change demonstrates the ability to merely the latest stage of an ongoing initial cadre around 2004,4 been largely draw from jihadist tactics used elsewhere, “just” war against the enemies of Islam. such as in Iraq and Palestine. 1 There were no casualties, except for the life of the Lianne Kennedy Boudali conducts research bomber, in the March 18 attack. The second aspect involves the nature on terrorism and insurgency for the RAND 2 In early March, several newspapers reported that there of the bombing itself. AQAP said in a Corporation. She previously served as a was a potential peace treaty between the government and statement that the Koreans were killed Senior Associate/Assistant Professor with AQAP. The terms were rumored to be a one-year cessa- partly in revenge for their government’s 5 the Combating Terrorism Center at West tion of terrorist activity in exchange for the release of cooperation against Islamic terrorism, Point. prisoners. It was never confirmed and was shown to be as well as “the role of these tourists in clearly false. corrupting the ideology of Muslims and 3 Al-Qa`ida terrorists in Yemen were formerly known their morals.” It seems more likely that as al-Qa`ida in Yemen. In late January, it announced that this justification was developed after it was merging with the al-Qa`ida faction in Saudi Ara- the attack. According to witnesses, the bia, and that the two groups would now be known under bomber, rather than targeting a group to one name, al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). 4 Gregory Johnsen and Brian O’Neill, “Yemen Faces Sec- responsible for the bombing of the USS Cole had ceased to ond Generation of Islamist Militants,” Terrorism Focus be a viable organization. 4:27 (2007). By 2004, through a combination of arrests, 5 “Al-Qaeda Claims Killing South Korean Tourists in Re- assassinations and negotiations, the al-Qa`ida franchise venge,” News Yemen, March 27, 2009.

17 april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4 avenge grievances, selected the largest forums, statements, and publications. Indeed, the statement of responsibility group he could find to maximize the In it, AQAP has developed a remarkable for the dual bombings, despite its after- impact; they happened to be Koreans.6 ability to finesse its ideological message the-fact rationalizations, was itself a The fact that al-`Ujayri was able to to strike resonant chords with disparate minor masterpiece that revealed several select his target shows an increased audiences. Their flagship publication, dueling but linked strategies for the level of training and commitment, as Sada al-Malahim (The Echo of Battles), is group. It is easy for an organization he presumably did not detonate his frequently timed for release shortly with broad ambitions to lose sight of explosives prematurely and was able to before or after a new operation, and its domestic objectives, just as it is easy wait until he found a target that would provides justifications that are both for an organization to become overly achieve the most impact.7 This could political and theological, and manages concerned with settling scores at home plausibly be tied to the training he and fail to carry out larger missions; the purportedly received in Somalia.8 “AQAP’s goal is to latter of which increase recruitment by enhancing the organization’s reputation The second attack, although a failure in weaken and bring down and maintain positive morale among terms of body count, was a psychological the Yemeni government the more restless foot soldiers. These success that demonstrated AQAP’s conflicting objectives can potentially operational abilities as well as sending to create a safe haven for overwhelm even the most fervent. It a message that even official status does their group.” must be noted that despite its regional not guarantee protection from its reach. ambitions, AQAP shrewdly has not There are two scenarios of how this abandoned parochial issues, and in its attack occurred. The first is that the statement claimed that the bombing was attack had been planned in advance. The to target both what they see as the in revenge for the government’s August second is that the operation was born apostate regime of Ali Abdullah Salih 2008 killing of al-Qa`ida leader Hamza quickly from a presented opportunity. and the far devil of Islam’s Western al-Q`uyati.11 AQAP has a few reasons for At this time, not enough reliable enemies. Al-Wahayshi’s propaganda making this claim. First, there is truth information exists to determine which wing is on a steep learning curve since to the statement. Second, it reflects a scenario occurred; both, however, are its initial media forays in 2007 and has broader strategy. AQAP has frequently troublesome. seemed to increase in sophistication alleged that its men have been tortured with each message. While its reach in Yemeni prisons, and this is not a If the attack had been planned in tandem may have been enhanced due to the charge that is beyond the pale. By tying with the first bombing, it reflects merger with al-Qa`ida in Saudi Arabia, in its specific grievances to issues held that the strategists of AQAP have the its reputation for professionalism was by the public at large, and specifically foresight to maximize the impact of developed entirely on the Yemeni side. by attempting to make claims that will their assaults. The second scenario, that They gained a reputation for both skilled resonate with tribesmen, who are always of a rapidly-seized opportunity, would presentation and rapid response time wary of interference from Sana`a, AQAP show that al-Wahayshi, in addition to well before there were even rumors of is helping themselves establish safe being able to adapt and rapidly plan an Saudi influence in al-Qa`ida in Yemen. zones outside the government’s writ. operation, has a pool of recruits who are both ready to deploy at a moments notice In the latest issue of Sada al-Malahim, Nayf This strategy is what makes AQAP a and are already trained well enough Muhammad al-Qahtani, a Saudi citizen dangerous force. Its predecessors—al- to successfully conduct an operation and AQAP leader, discussed both the Qa`ida before 2004—were willing to (successful in terms of avoiding arrest recently published list by Saudi Arabia compromise with the government. before the mission is completed). of their 85 most wanted terrorists Under the inflexible leadership of al- and the alleged rape of Muslims by Wahayshi and al-Raymi, however, there AQAP’s Dominance in the “Virtual Space” U.S. soldiers in Iraqi prisons.10 The is no compromise with a “compromised” All of these tactical abilities show issue demonstrates al-Qahtani’s skill government. Eschewing negotiations al-Qa`ida’s flexibility to adapt in in linking the depredations of the does not mean they are abandoning the physical environment. While West with the quisling, “heretical” all Yemeni traditions; they are just impressive, the aftermath of the attacks governments of the peninsula. In doing exchanging one inconvenient tradition is where AQAP has demonstrated its this, he is attempting to tie together with the more appealing system of real power and danger—its increasing several sources of frustration. The near revenge. In utilizing a tit-for-tat strength in what analyst Andrew Exum and far enemies are a usual trope in justification, such as the death of al- describes as their “virtual space.”9 jihadist literature, but the real talent of Q`uyati, they are tying themselves into This refers to the world of jihadist AQAP is to not lose sight of what makes the fabric of Yemeni culture, as well their home terrain unique. as brandishing their anti-government 6 Inal Irsan, “Qaeda Suicide Bomber Behind Yemen Sui- credentials. This is important in tribal cide Attack,” Reuters, March 17, 2009. areas that have a strong libertarian bent. 7 Lin Noueihed, “Qaeda Bomber Behind Suicide Attack Trained in Somalia,” Reuters, March 17, 2009. 11 “Al-Qaeda Claims Killing South Korean Tourists in 8 Ibid. 10 The latest issue of Sada al-Malahim was released on Revenge,” News Yemen, March 27, 2009. Al-Q`uyati was 9 Andrew Exum, “No Place to Hide,” The New Republic, March 21, 2009 and is available on various jihadist web an al-Qa`ida leader killed in a raid by security forces in March 31, 2009. forums. Tarim on August 12, 2008.

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Conclusion The Role of the United members, promotes coordinated It is by accusing the government of Nations in Defeating Al- international action by designing torture, addressing what they see counterterrorist measures mandatory as specific government misdeeds, Qa`ida and Associated for all states; and the United Nations connecting with people on a tribal Groups bureaucracy provides mechanisms that level and not losing sight of their coordinate, monitor and assist states global struggle that the reconstituted By Richard Barrett with the implementation of the policies al-Qa`ida has managed to outstrip its and agreements decided by the General predecessors in threat potential. AQAP in the 12 months prior to April 2009, Assembly and the Security Council.5 is at the forefront of the next wave of groups recognized by the United This article explains these three jihad. The Yemen-dominated merger of Nations Security Council as associated entities, examines which of al-Qa`ida’s the two al-Qa`ida franchises adds Saudi with al-Qa`ida1 carried out operations weaknesses can be exploited, and knowledge to an outfit that has grown in, or directly affecting, 22 countries.2 identifies five steps the United Nations in strength. It has integrated into the They attempted to carry out operations can take to help defeat al-Qa`ida. bewildering morass of Yemeni politics, in 10 others.3 The assault on Mumbai in exploiting the institutional weaknesses November 2008, believed to have been The General Assembly of the government, and is far-sighted carried out by Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, was Since 1963, the United Nations has enough to further chip away at its shaky the only attack that met the standard of elaborated 13 international instruments foundation. AQAP’s goal is to weaken global coverage and visual impact that to counter terrorism and three and bring down the Yemeni government the world generally associates with al- additional protocols.6 These have to create a safe haven for their group; Qa`ida, but the overall range of attacks defined specific acts of terrorism and their strategy is to attack tourism and shows that the al-Qa`ida network, have provided a legal framework within the oil industry, the two tottering pillars however loose-knit, remains very much which to address them. In September of a desperate economy. alive. 2006, the General Assembly adopted by consensus a broad strategy to counter The suicide attacks demonstrated Each country is responsible for terrorism and identified five main areas that AQAP is equally skilled at both its own security, and operational for action: 1) addressing the conditions operations; their concurrent propaganda counterterrorism activity generally conducive to terrorism; 2) preventing outlined the organization’s overall takes place at a national level. Yet, given and combating terrorism; 3) raising the strategy. These developments prompt the international nature of the al-Qa`ida capacity of states to counter terrorism; the need for an equally intelligent network,4 there is a clear need—and 4) strengthening the role of the United counterstrategy. The framework of universal support—for a coordinated Nations in counterterrorism; and 5) this strategy would have to involve a international response. In this respect, ensuring respect for human rights deeper knowledge of the tribal system the United Nations plays an important when countering terrorism.7 Given in Yemen, and the ability to play role. The United Nations contributes long-standing differences over the competing factions in AQAP against in three ways: the General Assembly, definition of terrorism, the adoption of each other to fragment what is now a comprising all 192 member-states, the strategy by all 192 member-states well-run and stable hierarchy. This builds political support for international was a remarkable show of unity and would have to work hand-in-hand with action to counter terrorism and provides determination. strengthening the economic stability legitimacy by drawing up international of the Yemeni government, while legal agreements; the Security Council, The Security Council helping it to increase its legitimacy with its five permanent and 10 elected The Security Council focused on al- with its disaffected citizenry. Presently, Qa`ida following the attacks on the however, the militants are growing U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es 1 For a list of groups established and maintained by in strength while the government is Salaam in August 1998. The next year the UN 1267 Committee as associated with al-Qa`ida, being inversely weakened. If AQAP it adopted resolution 1267, from which Usama bin Ladin, the Taliban and other individuals, is successful, it could bring the most it developed a worldwide sanctions groups, undertakings and entities associated with them, important front in the struggle against regime directed against al-Qa`ida see www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/consolidatedlist. jihad from the wilds of Afghanistan and and the Taliban following the attacks htm#alqaedaent. Pakistan home to the holy lands. of September 11, 2001. The Security 2 These countries include: Afghanistan, Algeria, Aus- Council’s role has been controversial, tria, Canada, China, Ethiopia, France, Germany, India, Brian O’Neill, an independent political both because counterterrorism is more Iraq, Italy, Mauritania, Niger, Pakistan, the Philippines, analyst specializing in Yemen, is a former traditionally the preserve of the General reporter for the Yemen Observer. Mr. Somalia, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, the United O’Neill is the co-author of the forthcoming States, the United Kingdom and Yemen. Israel suffered 5 For a comprehensive presentation of UN action against The Last Refuge: Islam and Insurgency in an attack from an unlisted group calling itself Al-Qa`ida terrorism, see www.un.org/terrorism. Yemen. With Gregory Johnsen, he runs the in the Levant. 6 To view the UN Treaty Collection on terrorism, see website www.islamandinsurgencyinyemen. 3 These countries include: Denmark, Egypt, Libya, Mo- www.untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp. blogspot.com. rocco, Nigeria, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan and the United Arab Emirates. 7 This is drawn from the United Nations Global Counter- 4 This includes al-Qa`ida’s core leadership, its estab- Terrorism Strategy, which was adopted on September 8, lished regional affiliates, and the propagation of its ideas 2006. For the entire document, see www.un.org/terror- to homegrown or self-recruited cells. ism/strategy-counter-terrorism.shtml.

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Assembly, and because its sanctions picture of the international strategy to affiliates have an equally poor track regime has given rise to legal challenges. counter terrorism. record of achievement, having failed Sanctioned parties have challenged the to benefit the people of Iraq, Algeria, legality of the restrictions against them Exploiting Al-Qa`ida’s Weaknesses Saudi Arabia or Yemen. Third, it lacks on the grounds that the procedures National and international action has legitimacy in parts of the Muslim world, adopted by states to implement the reduced the influence of the al-Qa`ida even in extremist circles. It has no Security Council directives ignore their leadership and weakened its ability religious authority and its self-serving basic rights, in particular the right to to launch attacks in all areas except interpretation of Islam has come under be heard and the right to an effective South Asia.12 Pakistan appears to be increasing attack from radicals with judicial review. al-Qa`ida’s base, and the success or better credentials. failure of measures to defeat it there These legal challenges have not yet will decide its long-term future. Yet The United Nations provides an ideal put any country in the uncomfortable the task is exceptionally difficult, and forum from which to expose and exploit position of being unable to implement the greatest burden by far will fall on these weaknesses. In fact, the United a mandatory resolution of the Security authorities in Pakistan. In parallel to Nations is in many ways the natural Council without contravening its own global adversary to the global terrorism laws. This may happen, however, preached by al-Qa`ida. The values and it is clearly a pressing task for “The United Nations can identified with the United Nations— the Security Council to find a way to best counter al-Qa`ida’s such as democracy, individual human maintain its authority without losing rights, the freedom of religion and the willing support of the international message by stressing the promotion of peace—are the exact community.8 repeatedly the criminal values and fundamental freedoms that al-Qa`ida rejects.14 Not only does al- The United Nations Bureaucracy nature of its activity, its Qa`ida condemn the General Assembly There are four main bodies that absence of any real vision and the Security Council as expressions deal with counterterrorism within of secularist state politics, it also the United Nations bureaucracy: 1) for the future, and its criticizes the work of UN specialized the Counter-Terrorism Executive lack of concern that the agencies and peacekeepers—especially Directorate (CTED) helps to monitor those operating in areas of conflict and the implementation of Security Council majority of its victims are weak government—as unwarranted Resolution 1373 (2001),9 which obliges Muslims.” and unwelcome interference on behalf states to establish the legal means of Western interests.15 Indeed, al- to take a range of counterterrorism Qa`ida has mounted two direct attacks measures; 2) the Analytical Support and against the United Nations: in Baghdad Sanctions Monitoring Team helps to whatever military and political action in August 2003, and in Algiers in oversee the sanctions regime established Pakistan may take on its border with December 2007. by Security Council Resolution 1267 Afghanistan, there is much that the (1999) against al-Qa`ida and the United Nations and others can do Five Steps for the United Nations Taliban; 3) the Terrorism Prevention elsewhere to undermine al-Qa`ida’s The United Nations can help to bring Branch of the United Nations Office on image and appeal. about the defeat of al-Qa`ida in five main Drugs and Crime in Vienna (UNODC) ways. First, it must uphold and promote provides training and assistance to Al-Qa`ida has a number of weaknesses. its core values in counterterrorism states in the legal sphere;10 and 4) the First, it appears that it is losing work. The United Nations is uniquely Secretary-General’s Counter-Terrorism credibility with potential sympathizers able to bring governments together Implementation Task Force (CTITF) and supporters, highlighted by its to address topics of global concern in helps to implement the global strategy present failures in Iraq. Furthermore, a neutral setting. It can also isolate adopted by the General Assembly in while it threatens major attacks against an issue from any broader context to 2006.11 These four bodies cooperate Western targets, it has done nothing allow states to discuss joint work on closely and coordinate their work to successful in the West since the attacks terrorism even when they have deep provide member-states with a coherent in London in July 2005. Second, it bilateral differences on other issues. lacks relevance. It has made no useful This convening power allows the 8 For an overview of the legal challenges and a discussion contribution toward resolving any of United Nations some influence over of their impact, see the Al-Qaida and Taliban Analyti- the main political issues affecting the the way that states plan and execute cal Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team’s reports, Muslim community that it claims to available at www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/monitor- defend. For instance, it has not helped 2009 again asserting this, although admitting that al- ingteam.shtml. the Palestinian people despite often Qa`ida had done little to help the Palestinian people. 9 The website for the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee repeating that their plight is a principal 14 Usama bin Ladin’s March 14, 2009 statement criti- 13 can be accessed at www.un.org/sc/ctc/. motivation for its actions. Its principal cized freedom of opinion and freedom of speech. 10 For more on the UNODC’s role in terrorism preven- 15 For example, al-Zawahiri’s statement on Sudan, re- tion, see www.unodc.org/unodc/en/terrorism/the-role- 12 More specifically, in all areas other than Afghanistan leased on March 24, 2009, criticized the United Nations of-unodc-in-terrorism-prevention.html. and Pakistan. for inaction in Gaza while it “pretends to cry over the suf- 11 See www.un.org/terrorism/cttaskforce.shtml. 13 Usama bin Ladin issued an audiotape on March 14, fering of the people of Darfur.”

20 april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4 their counterterrorism strategies, and similarities between them; these will be into still more remote areas, use of it can use this influence to promote the ready for release through major national the internet will continue to give it a argument that any sacrifice of basic and regional networks in the second half wide audience. The CTITF has set up a rights in the fight against terrorism not of 2009. In addition, the film project working group to look at terrorist use only hands the terrorists a victory, but will make brief clips of repentant of the internet. Its general conclusion pushes more people to support them. terrorists for distribution through the concerning the promulgation of the al- internet, designed to dissuade others Qa`ida message is that an open internet Second, the United Nations can weaken from following their course. that allows the exposure of al-Qa`ida’s the appeal of al-Qa`ida’s message message to criticism, and even to by resolving long-standing political Fourth, the United Nations can ridicule, is more effective in limiting its disputes. Al-Qa`ida exploits the sense undermine al-Qa`ida by attacking appeal than any attempt to shut down of frustration and helplessness that the legitimacy of its arguments. This forums and websites that promote it.17 exists where government is weak, should not be done by joining in a where conflict prevails and where debate, which would give al-Qa`ida Conclusion justice is arbitrary. The United Nations more standing than it deserves, but by The United Nations must work with must, on the one hand, find solutions to providing support and encouragement others to expose the gap between these long-standing problems and, on for rehabilitation and reintegration the promises made by the al-Qa`ida the other hand, continue to explain why programs that demonstrate the falsity narrative and the reality of what it terrorism is counterproductive as a tactic. of the arguments used by al-Qa`ida and delivers. It can also help to promote The more progress that the international its associates to justify their violence. a counternarrative through the community can make through discussion People who leave terrorism behind are engagement of civil society, focusing and negotiation, the more marginalized likely to return to the environments this work on those who are tempted to al-Qa`ida will become. from which they were recruited and join al-Qa`ida, rather than those who therefore may be able to influence have already done so. Hardened al- This means that the United Nations others with similar vulnerabilities to Qa`ida supporters are more likely to should use the range of tools available, the al-Qa`ida message. Several states retreat further into their closed groups from the imposition of sanctions to have such programs and other countries in the face of criticism than question the the deployment of peacekeepers and have recently asked the United Nations basis of their beliefs. aid workers, in a coherent manner for help in starting them. The United and within a strategic framework. Nations can compile examples of best To maximize its contribution to the This should include, for example, practices and help craft programs, while defeat of al-Qa`ida, the United Nations reconciliation talks in Afghanistan, taking account of different cultural and must increase the credibility, relevance development projects in the Federally social conditions. and legitimacy of its counterterrorism Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, work as a contrast to the irrelevance, support for the authority of Shaykh Finally, the United Nations can attack illegitimacy and ineffectiveness of Sharif Shaykh Ahmad’s government in the spread of al-Qa`ida’s message. al-Qa`ida. It must play the leading Somalia, capacity building in the Sahel This is the hardest target of all. Al- role in coordinating and promoting and Yemen, and similar assistance in Qa`ida has managed to weave a international action to overcome the other vulnerable areas. seductive narrative that appeals to a threat from global terrorism. wide audience. It offers meaning and Third, the United Nations can highlight action at a time when many people feel Richard Barrett is the coordinator of a New the real consequences of al-Qa`ida’s they lack purpose and opportunity. York-based team appointed by the UN Secretary- actions. It is easy enough to demonstrate It preys on a wide range of grievances General to advise the Security Council on the that the victims of terrorism are and knits them together in the single development and implementation of a sanctions members of the same community from complaint that Western influences have regime aimed at individuals and groups which the terrorists themselves are undermined the political and social associated with al-Qa`ida and the Taliban. drawn, whether in terms of immediate values of Islam. Al-Qa`ida has built an He is also a member of the Secretary-General’s death and destruction or in terms of the enduring myth around its leadership Task Force, established in 2005 to promote a longer lasting economic or other indirect as men of purity and conviction, coherent approach to counterterrorism within consequences.16 When governments able to strike massive blows against the UN system. In his Task Force role he has point this out, there may be a tendency a powerful enemy and successfully responsibility for issues to do with radicalization for some audiences to discount the escape retribution. The United Nations and extremism that lead to terrorism, terrorist message as propaganda; less so when the can best counter al-Qa`ida’s message use of the internet, and terrorist financing. message is promulgated by the United by stressing repeatedly the criminal Before working for the United Nations he had a Nations. The CTITF has a working nature of its activity, its absence of any full career with the British Government. group that focuses on the victims of real vision for the future, and its lack of terrorism, and has projects agreed with concern that the majority of its victims three states to film repentant terrorists are Muslims. and their victims to demonstrate the 17 “Report of the Working Group on Countering the Al-Qa`ida’s appeal will decline if the Use of the Internet for Terrorist Purposes,” UN Counter- 16 For example, the CTITF organized a symposium on leadership is captured or killed. Short Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), Febru- Supporting Victims of Terrorism in September 2008. of this, even if the leadership is forced ary 2009.

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Recent Highlights in March 4, 2009 (SOMALIA): Masked March 8, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber gunmen assassinated Shaykh Ali Afyare, driving an explosives-laden motorcycle Terrorist Activity a prominent cleric affiliated with the blew himself up near a police academy in Sufi Ahlu-Sunna wal-Jama movement. Baghdad, killing 28 people. The Islamic March 1, 2009 (IRAQ): The mayor of He was killed in Mudug region. – Garowe State of Iraq later took credit for the Samarra, Mahmoud al-Khalaf, was Online, March 5 operation in an online statement. – New wounded when a roadside bomb struck York Times, March 8; AFP, March 11 his convoy. – Reuters, March 1 March 5, 2009 (IRAQ): A pickup truck rigged with explosives detonated in March 8, 2009 (IRAQ): The Iraqi and March 1, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Suspected a crowded livestock market in Babil U.S. governments announced that U.S. unmanned aerial drone strikes Province, killing 12 people. – The Age, 12,000 U.S. troops will leave Iraq by the killed eight people in South Waziristan March 6 end of September 2009. – AFP, March 8 Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. At least four of the dead March 5, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Taliban March 10, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide were believed to be foreign fighters. militants blew up 16 stores selling DVDs bomber targeted tribal leaders in Abu Various press reports alleged that the and music in Takht Bhai town northwest Ghurayb, killing at least 30 people. strikes targeted the forces of Tehrik- of Peshawar. There were no casualties – Bloomberg, March 10 i-Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud. as the explosives were detonated during – Dallas Morning News, March 2 the night of March 4-5. – AFP, March 4 March 10, 2009 (SOMALIA): Somalia’s cabinet voted to implement Shari`a law March 2, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide March 5, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Suspected across the country. The proposal will bomber killed six people at a religious Taliban militants blew up the mausoleum now be presented to the parliament for school for girls in Balochistan Province. of 17th century Sufi saint Abdul Rahman final approval. – Reuters, March 10 Pakistani press reports stated that the Mohmand, also referred to as Rahman attacker wanted to assassinate a senior Baba, in Peshawar. According to one March 11, 2009 (UNITED STATES): leader of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl press report, “Caretakers of the complex Officials at the FBI and National (JUI-F), who was scheduled to speak said they had received a warning letter Counterterrorism Center testified at the school. The JUI-F leader was not from purported Taliban militants three before Congress that “tens” of harmed in the attack. – Bloomberg, March 3; days before the attack threatening Somali-Americans, primarily from Daily Times, March 3 to blow up the mausoleum if women Minneapolis, have traveled to Somalia continued to visit it.” – Washington Times, to fight with the Islamist militant group March 3, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Gunmen in March 14 al-Shabab. One of the recruits included Lahore, the capital of Punjab Province, a 27-year-old male who blew himself up attacked the visiting Sri Lankan cricket March 6, 2009 (UNITED STATES): The in a suicide attack. According to FBI team as it was being driven to the Gadaffi U.S. Supreme Court dismissed accused national security official Philip Mudd, Stadium. The attack, which occurred in al-Qa`ida operative Ali al-Marri’s however, “These folks aren’t going over daylight, left at least seven Pakistanis appeal, which sought to challenge there to become part of terrorist cells.” dead. Six members of the Sri Lankan his indefinite military imprisonment. Nevertheless, officials could not rule out team, along with a British coach, were – Reuters, March 6 the possibility that some of the recruits injured. Lashkar-i-Jhangvi and Jaysh- could eventually return and attack the i-Muhammad were suspected of being March 7, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide United States. – Reuters, March 11 behind in the attack. – Independent, March car bomber killed seven officers at 4; Reuters, March 4; UPI, March 6 a roadblock established to inspect March 11, 2009 (YEMEN): Yemen vehicles traveling from Khyber Agency charged 16 suspected al-Qa`ida March 4, 2009 (IRAQ): Iraqi security to Peshawar. – AP, March 7 operatives with forming an al-Qa`ida forces claimed to have killed Hamza cell that planned a series of attacks, Ubid Idris, also known as Abu al- March 7, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Tribal including a March 2008 attack on the Ansar, an al-Qa`ida leader allegedly officials in South Waziristan claim that U.S. Embassy in Sana`a. The men— responsible for directing attacks in Taliban militants shot down a low- 14 Yemenis and two Syrians—were western Iraq. He was killed in Anbar flying unmanned aerial drone. The U.S. arrested on separate occasions during Province. – The Age, March 6 military denied that one of its unmanned 2007 and 2008. – AP, March 11 aircraft was shot down. – AFP, March 7 March 4, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide car March 12, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Suspected bomber killed two police officers in March 7, 2009 (SOMALIA): Shaykh U.S. unmanned aerial drones launched Mosul, Ninawa Province. – UPI, March 4 Hassan Yaqob, spokesman for the al- approximately four missiles at a Shabab factions that control Kismayo militant camp in Kurram Agency of the March 4, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): and the southern Jubba regions, told Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Insurgents attacked Bagram Airbase. reporters that his fighters are “no threat” An estimated 24 suspected militants were A car bomb exploded outside the base’s to neighboring Kenya. He said that killed in the strikes. – Reuters, March 13 gates, quickly followed by a suicide “there is ongoing propaganda intended bombing. At least three people were to destroy the security and order of the injured. – Guardian, March 4 Jubba regions.” – Garowe Online, March 7

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March 12, 2009 (THAILAND): Thailand March 16-17, 2009 (PHILIPPINES): March 21, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): announced that it will be sending 4,000 Philippine troops fired on suspected NATO forces killed senior Taliban additional troops to the south in an effort Abu Sayyaf Group rebels who have commander Maulawi Hassan and nine to quell an intensifying insurgency. The been holding three Red Cross officers of his associates in Helmand Province. Thai prime minister acknowledged that hostage since January 15 in the southern – AP, March 23 the mission in the south has so far been Philippines. A military spokesman said, “unsuccessful.” – TNA, March 12 “Two bodies of the Abu Sayyaf were March 23, 2009 (UNITED STATES): recovered by the operating troops and Alleged al-Qa`ida terrorist Ali al-Marri March 14, 2009 (GLOBAL): Al-Jazira have been positively identified as sub- pleaded not guilty to conspiracy and broadcast a new audiotape purportedly leader Jul Asbi Jalmaani and Mudar supporting terrorism in a federal court by al-Qa`ida chief Usama bin Ladin. Hadjail, his trusted man. Seven others in Peoria, Illinois. U.S. District Judge During the recording, Bin Ladin are believed wounded or dead in the Michael Mihm set a tentative trial date accused some Arab leaders of being fighting.” The hostages, however, are for May 26. Al-Marri has been in U.S. “complicit” with Israel and the West still being held captive. – Reuters, March custody since December 2001. – Los in a “Crusader-Zionist alliance against 16; Mindanao Examiner, March 17 Angeles Times, March 24 our people.” Bin Ladin urged a holy war to liberate the Palestinian Territories March 18, 2009 (YEMEN): A suicide March 23, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide and also called on jihadists to liberate bomber attacked a convoy of South bomber detonated explosives in a Iraq from the U.S. military. He called Korean officials investigating the Kurdish funeral tent in Jalula, Diyala the recent Israeli intervention in Gaza a March 15 attack that killed four Korean Province, killing at least 15 people. “holocaust.” – AFP, March 14 tourists in Yemen. The South Korean – Independent, March 24 ambassador to Yemen was in the convoy March 15, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A at the time of the latest attack. No one in March 23, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): suspected U.S. unmanned aerial drone the convoy was injured. – AP, March 18 Taliban militants ambushed a police strike killed two Arabs and three other vehicle in Kandahar Province, killing people in Bannu District of the North- March 19, 2009 (GLOBAL): A new audio eight policemen. – AFP, March 23 West Frontier Province. – Washington message purportedly from al-Qa`ida Post, March 16 leader Usama bin Ladin appeared on March 23, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide Islamist web forums. Bin Ladin tells bomber detonated his explosives in March 15, 2009 (YEMEN): Four South Somali fighters that President Shaykh Islamabad, killing a policeman. It Korean tourists were killed in a suicide Sharif Shaykh Ahmad should be appeared the bomber wanted to enter bombing in Hadramawt Province. Two “dethroned, fought and removed with a police station before detonating his Yemenis were also killed. The Yemeni armed force” because he has “changed to explosives, but was stopped at the gate. government blamed al-Qa`ida for the partner up with the infidel.” – RTTNews, – Washington Post, March 24 attack and claimed that the bomber March 19; CNN, March 19 was trained in neighboring Somalia. March 24, 2009 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida – AP, March 15; BBC, March 15; AFP, March 16; March 19, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Dad second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri Reuters, March 17 Mohammad Khan, a key anti-Taliban released a new videotape, in which he lawmaker from Helmand Province, urged the Sudanese people to prepare March 15, 2009 (YEMEN): Yemen’s was killed along with four others after for a “long guerrilla war” in light of the Interior Ministry announced that they a bomb ripped through their vehicle International Criminal Court’s decision recently captured Abdullah Abdul- in Helmand. According to one report, to charge Sudanese President Umar al- Rahman Mohammed al-Harbi, one of “The killing took to 10 the number of Bashir with war crimes. “The Sudanese the most wanted militants in Saudi MPs who have died in attacks since regime is too weak to defend the Sudan, Arabia. Al-Harbi was apprehended in they were elected in Afghanistan’s so you must do what was done by your Taiz Province. – Saba, March 15 first democratic parliamentary vote in brothers in Iraq and Somalia,” al- 2005.” – AFP, March 19 Zawahiri said. He stated that he was March 16, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): “not defending Umar al-Bashir or his A suicide bomber wearing a police March 20, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): regime...the issue is one of making uniform detonated his explosives inside Taliban and police clashed in northern excuses for more foreign interference in the main police building in Lashkar Jawzjan Province, on the border with the Muslims’ countries in the framework Gah, Helmand Province. At least three Turkmenistan. Nine Afghan policemen of the contemporary Zionist Crusade.” policemen were killed. – AP, March 15 and a district chief were killed. – AFP, – Bloomberg, March 24; CNN, March 24 March 19 March 16, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide March 25, 2009 (GLOBAL): The U.S. bomber killed 14 people in the garrison March 21, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A government offered up to $11 million city of Rawalpindi. The bomber suicide car bomber detonated his in rewards to find or capture Baitullah detonated his explosives outside a explosives at a police checkpoint in Mehsud, Sirajuddin Haqqani, and al- restaurant. – AFP, March 16 Nangarhar Province, killing three Qa`ida operative Abu Yahya al-Libi. All civilians and one policeman. – AP, three men are believed to be operating March 20 in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. – AFP, March 25

23 april 2009 . Vol 2 . Issue 4

March 25, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A with supplies for NATO forces in CTC Sentinel Staff suspected U.S. unmanned aerial drone Afghanistan. The fighters besieged strike killed approximately seven Farhad terminal on the outskirts of Editor-in-Chief militants in South Waziristan Agency Peshawar, using rockets and petrol Erich Marquardt of the Federally Administered Tribal bombs to destroy the parked vehicles. Senior Editor, CTC Areas. Two vehicles were reportedly – AFP, March 28 targeted. – AFP, March 25 Editorial Board March 28, 2009 (ALGERIA): Al- COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. March 25, 2009 (YEMEN): Yemen’s Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Department Head Interior Ministry released a statement demanded that 20 of its members be Department of Social Sciences (West Point) claiming it had arrested six men for released from detention in Mali and other plotting attacks against foreigners in countries in exchange for the release of COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. the country. The statement said that the six Western hostages. AQIM says that Deputy Department Head men were recruited by al-Qa`ida. – AP, it is holding two Canadian diplomats Department of Social Sciences (West Point) March 25 kidnapped in Niger in December, along with four European tourists kidnapped MAJ Reid Sawyer March 26, 2009 (IRAQ): A car bomb in Mali in January. – Reuters, March 28 Director, CTC exploded on a commercial street in a Shi`a area of Baghdad, killing at least March 30, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): Brian Fishman 20 people. – AP, March 26 A suicide bomber in a police uniform Director of Research, CTC detonated his explosives inside March 26, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): A a government office in Kandahar Christopher Heffelfinger suicide bomber prematurely detonated Province, killing at least nine people. FBI Fellow, CTC his explosives as he was “saying good- – AP, March 30; Reuters, March 30 bye to his associates” before his mission, killing six militants. The incident March 30, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Militants occurred in Helmand Province. – Reuters, attacked a police academy in Lahore, Contact March 26 Punjab Province, killing seven cadets and Combating Terrorism Center one civilian. Four militants were killed U.S. Military Academy March 26, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): in the eight hour gun battle with security 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall Taliban militants attacked a police forces. Tehrik-i-Taliban leader Baitullah West Point, NY 10996 convoy in Ghazni Province, wounding Mehsud claimed credit for the operation. Phone: (845) 667-6383 six policemen. Four militants were – Reuters, March 31; AFP, March 30 Email: [email protected] killed. – AP, March 26 Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ March 30, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide March 26, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): car bomber rammed his vehicle into a * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 Taliban militants attacked a police Pakistani military convoy, killing three checkpoint in Helmand Province, killing soldiers. The attack occurred in Bannu nine policemen. – AP, March 26 District of the North-West Frontier Province. – AFP, March 30 March 26, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide support bomber detonated his explosives at a March 31, 2009 (IRAQ): A suicide car The Combating Terrorism Center would restaurant in South Waziristan Agency, bomber drove his explosives-laden like to express its gratitude to its financial killing 11 people. Pakistan’s Taliban truck into a police compound in Mosul, supporters, for without their support and movement claimed responsibility. Ninawa Province, killing seven people. shared vision of the Center products like – Voice of America, March 26 – Reuters, March 31 the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you are interested in learning more about March 27, 2009 (AFGHANISTAN): March 31, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Tehrik-i- how to support the Combating Terrorism An Afghan soldier shot and killed two Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud vowed Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma. U.S. coalition soldiers in northern to “amaze everyone in the world” edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at Afghanistan. The assailant killed with an attack on Washington, D.C. West Point’s Association of Graduates at himself immediately following the The Federal Bureau of Investigation, 845-446-1553. incident. – AP, March 27 however, said Mehsud has made similar threats before and that they had not seen March 27, 2009 (PAKISTAN): A suicide any indications of an imminent plot on bomber blew himself up inside a mosque Washington. – AP, March 31 in Khyber Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, killing at least The views expressed in this report are those of 50 people. – Voice of America, March 27 the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency March 28, 2009 (PAKISTAN): Taliban of the U.S. Government. militants destroyed 12 trucks loaded

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