Building on Strength Proposals for US-Norwegian Cooperation on the Operational and Tactical Level

C O N C E P T P A P E R S E R I E S 2/2 0 1 9 Building on Strength Proposals for US-Norwegian Cooperation on the Operational and Tactical Level Ståle Ulriksen and Åse Gilje Østensens This paper suggests that the existing practice of deploying United States Marine Core (USMC) units from Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway (MCPP-N) facilities in Trøndelag to other parts of Norway during crisis and war needs to be rethought. The operational- and tactical-level threats in this area are changing rapidly, and there is a high level of risk inherent in existing practice. We propose a concept based on the use of parts of the Norwegian offshore fleet for both operational and tactical transport and supply of the USMC. REVITALIZING TRANSATLANTIC MARITIME SECURITY The research project “Revitalizing Transatlantic Maritime Security: Filling Capability Gaps with the Norwegian Commercial Shipping Sector” intends to bring forward creative ideas on how to fill logistical gaps by leveraging private -public partnerships with merchant fleet operators. The project is a collaboration between Center for New American Security, Norwegian Institiute of International Affairs and the Royal Norwegian Naval Academy. The project is funded by a research grant provided by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. Norwegian Defence University College Royal Norwegian Naval Academy Concept Paper Series 2 1/2019 To Norway, the US Marine Corps Prepositioning from the Norwegian merchant navy and offshore Program in Norway (MCPP-N) represents an industry. There are several reasons for this. Our important manifestation of the nation’s alliance point of departure is that it is necessary to plan for with the US. It is a pillar of Norwegian defense a “worst case scenario.” We also believe that we policy. To the US, the MCPP-N is a forward base from should train as we fight. If the obligation cited above which the USMC can support operations across is invoked in a crisis, yet there is no plan or concepts Europe and beyond. The cost of the program is for how to implement it, the result will be shared equally between Norway and the US. The suboptimal at best. We argue that a feasible and MCPP-N is an example of a win-win solution in credible concept should be developed, tested, and alliance cooperation. exercised. In a high-intensity war, or in a situation According to the agreement on the MCPP-N where such a war may potentially occur, several from 2006, Norway is committed to provide logistic problems with existing practice would become support for deployed USMC units: “the Government evident. of the Kingdom of Norway shall make available First, although we think it is unlikely that a adequate means to load, transport, and protect major international crisis and/or war will break out equipment of the MCPP-N from Central Norway to between Russia and Norway, a scenario in which it mutually agreed Norwegian sea or air ports of occurs elsewhere and then escalates horizontally is embarkation.” This is relevant for all deployments, far more likely. In other words, a war in the even if the destination is not within Norway. This European high north will most likely result from a commitment appears to have been satisfied, as much larger, and perhaps global, confrontation. If demonstrated by many deployments to the Nordic so, then ships from the US Navy, the Military Sealift region, the Baltic, and the Middle East. Command (MSC), or the US Maritime Administration (MARAD) will be needed elsewhere. If implemented, the proposals in this paper will free US capabilities for other theaters of war. Moreover, if this concept is tested and deemed credible, it may also be implemented elsewhere with American or Norwegian offshore assets. Second, existing practice in exercises is to bring very large ro-ro ships into the northeastern part of the Norwegian Sea. The use of such large Ro- Ro ships in the Norwegian Sea in a heightened crisis or major war presents a very high risk. The concept below reduces that risk by distributing the equipment on a large number of smaller ships capable of using safer sailing routes. The so-called USMC Humvees stored in mountain cave in Frigård, Trøndelag. Photo: Torbørn Korsvold “Inner leads” is a sea route through the Norwegian littorals. The route is sheltered from the harsh But the agreement continues: “In the event the weather conditions of the North Sea and Norwegian MCPP-N is used to reinforce Norway, the Sea. It is also, to a large extent, sheltered from the Government of the Kingdom of Norway shall make potentially substantial submarine threat in the available adequate means to load, transport, and Norwegian Sea. The Norwegian littorals are protect equipment of the MCPP-N, as well as complex and hard to navigate. But by using ships receive, stage and move onward personnel and and crews experienced in sailing them, a large equipment to predesignated areas within Norway.” advantage is gained. In practice, this part of the agreement has been a Third, we believe that in a confrontation “sleeping paragraph,” i.e., not actually realized. No between Russia and NATO, Russia has few thorough concept has been exercised or tested on a advantages. Among these advantages is the high large scale. Existing practice seem to be that USMC readiness of Russia’s forces, a sophisticated and units are redeployed on US Navy ships. highly mobile A2/AD capability/capacity, and the In this paper, we argue that existing practice geographical distance between Russia and the likely should be replaced by a concept based on assets theaters of operation. Russia cannot win a long war with NATO. To win, Russia would need to ã Royal Norwegian Naval Academy Concept Paper Series 3 1/2019 strengthen its position by pushing forward, of the USMC much harder to fulfill. This theme is establishing a faite accompli, and calling for controversial in Norway. We bring it up here as we negotiations. When forward A2/AD positions are strongly suspect that the choices are being made as established, the cost for NATO to regain lost ground a result of US influence, or at least as a result of what would be high. To handle, or to deter, such a the Norwegians believe would please the US. A scenario, NATO would need to be able to act very small state neighboring an assertive Great Power quickly. In Norway’s case, this would require a needs allies, and accordingly the alliance with the substantial increase to both the size and readiness US is of fundamental importance to Norway. We of Norwegian forces, but also an enhanced ability to believe that the US should have expectations of bring in allied reinforcements rapidly and safely. Norway. But we also believe, as did Admiral Arleigh The equipment stored in Norway represents a large Burke in 1960, that strong Norwegian control of the percentage of what a USMC force would need to be country’s complex coastline is in the best interest of able to fight. But not all. The remaining equipment the US as well. is stored on maritime prepositioning ships of the MSC. These ships are organized in two squadrons. One is based on Guam, the other on Diego Garcia. Ships from Diego Garcia may reach Norway in around two weeks. If the Suez channel is open. If the ships have to go around Africa via the Cape Route, which would take approximately one month. If the MCPP-N arrangement is to be effective in war, such a solution is not very credible. The problem could be solved by storing similar equipment on the US East Coast. We suggest an arrangement whereby Norwegian merchant Ro-Ro ships transport the equipment to Europe in a crisis. We believe it is possible to have a large Norwegian Ro-Ro ship Troops from USMC 1st Recon Battalion and Norwegian Coastal ready to load on the US East Coast within 24 hours, Rangers exercising near Harstad in 2018.. Photo: Jacob Østheim and several such ships within just a few days. This part of the concept could be part of a larger US– Norwegian agreement on strategic sealift. Background Fourth, the agreement of 2006 states clearly During the Cold War, the Norwegian defense that it is Norway’s responsibility not only to concept depended on the mobilization of some transport USMC units, but also to protect them en seven percent of the population. Less than 10 route to their destination. The current long-term percent of the Norwegian population lives in the plan decided that most Norwegian coastal and three northernmost counties, from south to north: littoral capabilities would be terminated by 2025. Nordland, Troms, and Finmark. If the Cold War The Naval Home Guard is already dissolved. The turned hot, the Norwegians assumed that the Soviet coastal corvettes are to follow in 2025. The Coastal Union’s forces would cross the border in Finmark Rangers will lose all heavy organic weapon systems. and march through the relatively flat county. The mine clearing force would lose all specialized Several brigades from Southern Norway stored vessels, while the number of submarines would be their equipment in Troms, the mountainous second- reduced by one-third. However, it was decided to northernmost county, in order to facilitate a rapid make major investments in F-35 fighters (52) and increase in the forces there. The troops would be P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft (5). In flown to airfields in the north to join up with their October 2019, The Norwegian Chief of Defense equipment. The distance between Troms and the presented his advice for the next long-term plan.

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