DOCSLIB.ORG

N87- 19393 CE Bith Ab AUTCEETIC TESMINAL EM (BASA) 21 P CSCL 17Ti Unclas H1/06 43501 NASA Tech Ni Ca I Paper 2669

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
N87- 19393 CE Bith Ab AUTCEETIC TESMINAL EM (BASA) 21 P CSCL 17Ti Unclas H1/06 43501 NASA Tech Ni Ca I Paper 2669 ) A SIPSCLATICL EVALUATION GP A N87- 19393 CE bITH Ab AUTCEETIC TESMINAL EM (BASA) 21 p CSCL 17ti Unclas H1/06 43501 NASA Tech ni ca I Paper 2669 1987 A Simulation Evaluation of a Pilot Interface With an Automatic Terminal Approach System David A. Hinton Langley Research Center Hampt o n, Virginia National Aeronautics and Space Administration Scientific and Technical Information Branch Summary with a high potential for mistakes and has limited time to detect and correct any errors. A successful A piloted-simulation study was performed to arrival depends on the correct interpretation of ap- evaluate the pilot interface with an automatic termi- proach chart details, the correct setting of numerous nal approach system (ATAS). The ATAS was con- cockpit controls, and precise aircraft guidance near ceived as a concept for improving the pilot inter- the ground. face with high levels of automation. It consists of Automation in the form of an autopilot has been instrument approach data storage, automatic radio used to reduce pilot work load and improve pilot tuning, autopilot, autothrottle, and annunciation of performance in the terminal area. Research studies These components allow the ATAS flight status. (ref. 2) and airplane accident and incident reports to automatically execute instrument approaches, in- suggest, however, that the probability of pilot error cluding procedure turns, altitude changes, missed actually increases with an increase in automation, approaches, and holding patterns, without requir- partially because of design limitations of the pilot- ing the pilot to set up navigation radios or change machine interface. Conventional autopilot interfaces autopilot modes. provide the pilot with many opportunities to make The results show that fewer pilot blunders were errors because of the requirements to change radio made during approaches when using the ATAS than frequencies and autopilot modes as the approach when using a baseline, heading-select autopilot. With progresses. the baseline autopilot, blunders tended to involve loss The automatic terminal approach system (ATAS) of navigational situational awareness or instrument was developed to study ways of significantly reduc- misreading, while with the ATAS, blunders tended to ing the likelihood of pilot error and the work load involve a lack of awareness of the ATAS mode state. during terminal area operations by improving the The ATAS display provided adequate approach- pilot-machine interface. Elements of the ATAS are status information to maintain navigational situa- instrument approach data storage, automatic radio tional awareness, and a side-task measure did not tuning, autopilot, and autothrottle. These elements show any significant difference in pilot work load are used to automatically fly instrument approaches. between the two levels of automation. The ATAS was designed to fly according to the same rules and procedures that the pilot operates by in the Introduction present ATC system. An automatic missed approach General aviation instrument flight rules (IFR) ac- is executed if the pilot does not assume control at tivities currently involve approximately 18 million the missed approach point. Finally, the ATAS was airport operations per year and are forecast by the designed to accommodate the “real world” require- Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to increase ment of frequent ATC radar vectoring to the final to about 30 million operations per year by 1993. approach course. Most of these operations are conducted by single- A simulated ATAS was developed and a research pilot crews. The air traffic control (ATC) system ex- prototype was built in order to study a concept for pects all aircraft to perform at the same high level. improving the pilot interface with high levels of cock- The high IFR accident rate during the approach pit automation and to evaluate pilot acceptance of and landing phase of flight, as documented in ref- such a system. Details of the simulated ATAS design erence 1, indicates that the required level of perfor- and of its implementation into the Langley General mance has not yet been achieved. It is thought that Aviation Simulator are presented in reference 3. A this level cannot be reached without improvements in piloted-simulation evaluation of the ATAS was then aircraft handling qualities, displays, automatic flight performed. This report presents the results of an control systems, weather information dissemination, evaluation that involved seven instrument-rated pi- training, and ATC procedures. lots, each flying four instrument approaches with The approach and landing is normally the phase the ATAS and four approaches with the baseline of IFR flight with the highest work load. The pi- autopilot. The ATAS was well accepted by the pilots lot must navigate with greater precision than during and the ATAS runs resulted in lower flight technical the departure or en route phases. Air traffic con- error and fewer pilot blunders than with the baseline trol communications and frequency changes are more autopilot. numerous. The pilot must make frequent changes in aircraft altitude, heading, speed, and configura- Abbreviations and Symbols tion while approaching the ground. Checklists must Abbreviations be accomplished and navigation charts frequently re- ferred to. The pilot is in a highly dynamic situation ADF automatic direction finder AKQ identifier for Wakefield Municipal to a general-purpose digital computer. The cockpit is Airport fully enclosed by the cabin section of a light-airplane fuselage. The simulator instrumentation and avion- ATAS automatic terminal approach system ics are typical of an IFR-equipped high-performance ATC air traffic control single-engine or light twin-engine airplane. They in- AUTO ATAS operating mode that uses stored clude an HSI, dual VOR receivers, an ADF, and a approach data to automatically guide two-axis autopilot. An array of speakers provide re- the aircraft alistic wind and engine noise up to volumes typical of general aviation airplanes. The control yoke (elevator -4 CDI course-deviation indicator and ailerons) is hydraulically loaded to provide the CRT cathode-ray tube appropriate variable force gradients. Rudder-pedal 1 force feel is supplied with springs. This simulator a DME distance measuring equipment has been used for related studies in automation and ECDI electronic course-deviation indicator displays (ref. 2). FREQ navigation receiver radio frequency A mathematical model for a typical high-wing, four-seat, single-engine, general aviation airplane was HSI horizontal-situation indicator used in the ATAS simulation. This model included IAF initial approach fix changes in flight-control effectiveness and force gra- IFR instrument flight rules dients as a function of airspeed, wing-flap-extension effects, an atmospheric wind-turbulence model, and a IJS instrument landing system radio navigation-aid data base. A landing gear model MANUAL ATAS operating mode that uses permitted touchdown and roll-out. manually input parameters to guide The simulation navigation-aid data base (ref. 4) the aircraft permits definition of a real navigation environment MDA minimum descent altitude for non- so that a subject pilot can fly cross-country flights and conduct instrument approaches by using stan- precision approach dard instrument charts. This data base includes the MSA minimum safe altitude location, Morse code audio identifier, and frequency, NAV VOR navigation receiver as applicable, of VOR, DME, NDB, marker beacon, localizer, and glide-slope transmitters. NDB nondirectional beacon The simulator is interfaced with a graphics com- NM nautical mile puter and a visual landing display system (VLDS). OBS omnibearing selector The graphics computer provides the capability to simulate advanced displays or alphanumeric data on PHF identifier for Patrick Henry Interna- cockpit cathode-ray tubes (CRT’s). The VLDS uses tional Airport a 1:750 scale terrain model and a closed-circuit tele- SBY standby mode vision to provide an out-the-windshield view during approach and landing. Realistic cloud-breakout and VLDS visual landing display system low-visibility effects are also provided. VOR very high frequency omnirange Symbols Experimental System h airplane barometric altitude The ATAS concept was designed to manage an h time rate of change of barometric altitude airplane autopilot, an autothrottle, and navigation radios for the pilot during an instrument approach V airplane airspeed from terminal area entry to the missed approach $ airplane heading angle point and, if necessary, through the missed approach. The ATAS performed this management task on the Test Equipment and Procedures basis of stored instrument approach data for each of the approaches to be flown. The purpose of this Airplane Simulation ATAS was to provide a means to study a concept for The current study was performed using the Lang- improving the pilot interface with high levels of cock- ley General Aviation Simulator. This research simu- pit automation. This interface improvement concept lator consists of an enclosed cockpit (fig. 1) interfaced was intended to reduce the number of avionics system 2 inputs (i.e., navigation radio tuning and autopilot heading channel is off, then the indicated heading mode changes) and the throttle control required of on the ATAS display tracks the airplane heading and the pilot during an approach, to improve situational movement of the course knob has no effect. If the status feedback to the pilot, and to reduce the pos-
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Initiating a Missed Approach Below Mda
    Issue No. 9 INITIATING A MISSED APPROACH BELOW MDA So there you are, on approach, inside the FAF and below MDA. You saw the runway and began descent, but it is raining, visibility is marginal and things are murky and scuddy (technical terms). Wind is directly across the runway at 11G18 and you are crabbing down, passengers are nervous. But you are holding the CDI in the center and maintaining control. Over the runway you go into your wing-low sideslip for the crosswind landing, things are going pretty well and then whoops a big gust destabilizes you so you abort the landing. Now what do you do, go missed or go around for another landing attempt? To provide some context, let’s attach the scenario to an interesting little airport, Andrews- Murphy Airport, NC (KRHP). The instrument approach procedure (IAP) and the takeoff minima and obstacle departure procedure are shown here. This airport is nestled in a scenic valley surrounded by mountains, which are quite close on the north. A topo map can be viewed here or just go to the TopoZone website and search for Andrews, NC, or go to the airport lat/long of 3512N/08352W. You will notice that the MDA is 2329 feet above the runway. Now remember that obstacle protection on a missed approach procedure is based on going missed at the MAP at MDA with a minimum climb gradient of 200 feet per nautical mile. No obstacle protection is assured when you go missed below MDA or past the MAP. In fact, you are not assured of obstacle protection even above MDA if the missed is initiated below MDA or after the MAP.
    [Show full text]
  • Takeoff and Landing Weather Minimums
    Federal Aviation Administration, DOT § 121.651 field elevation for 15 minutes upon VFR weather minimums of § 91.155 of reaching an ETOPS Alternate Airport this chapter apply at those locations. and then conduct an instrument ap- [Doc. No. 6258, 29 FR 19222, Dec. 31, 1964 as proach and land. amended by Amdt. 121–39, 33 FR 4097, Mar. 2, (3) Fuel to account for APU use. If an 1968; Amdt. 121–206, 54 FR 34331, Aug. 18, 1989; APU is a required power source, the Amdt. 121–226, 56 FR 65663, Dec. 17, 1991] certificate holder must account for its fuel consumption during the appro- § 121.651 Takeoff and landing weather priate phases of flight. minimums: IFR: All certificate hold- ers. [Doc. No. FAA–2002–6717, 72 FR 1882, Jan. 16, 2007, as amended by Amdt. 121–348, 75 FR (a) Notwithstanding any clearance 12121, Mar. 15, 2010] from ATC, no pilot may begin a takeoff in an airplane under IFR when the § 121.647 Factors for computing fuel weather conditions reported by the required. U.S. National Weather Service, a Each person computing fuel required source approved by that Service, or a for the purposes of this subpart shall source approved by the Administrator, consider the following: are less than those specified in— (a) Wind and other weather condi- (1) The certificate holder’s operations tions forecast. specifications; or (b) Anticipated traffic delays. (2) Parts 91 and 97 of this chapter, if (c) One instrument approach and pos- the certificate holder’s operations sible missed approach at destination. specifications do not specify takeoff (d) Any other conditions that may minimums for the airport.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter: 4. Approaches
    Chapter 4 Approaches Introduction This chapter discusses general planning and conduct of instrument approaches by pilots operating under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) Parts 91,121, 125, and 135. The operations specifications (OpSpecs), standard operating procedures (SOPs), and any other FAA- approved documents for each commercial operator are the final authorities for individual authorizations and limitations as they relate to instrument approaches. While coverage of the various authorizations and approach limitations for all operators is beyond the scope of this chapter, an attempt is made to give examples from generic manuals where it is appropriate. 4-1 Approach Planning within the framework of each specific air carrier’s OpSpecs, or Part 91. Depending on speed of the aircraft, availability of weather information, and the complexity of the approach procedure Weather Considerations or special terrain avoidance procedures for the airport of intended landing, the in-flight planning phase of an Weather conditions at the field of intended landing dictate instrument approach can begin as far as 100-200 NM from whether flight crews need to plan for an instrument the destination. Some of the approach planning should approach and, in many cases, determine which approaches be accomplished during preflight. In general, there are can be used, or if an approach can even be attempted. The five steps that most operators incorporate into their flight gathering of weather information should be one of the first standards manuals for the in-flight planning phase of an steps taken during the approach-planning phase. Although instrument approach: there are many possible types of weather information, the primary concerns for approach decision-making are • Gathering weather information, field conditions, windspeed, wind direction, ceiling, visibility, altimeter and Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) for the airport of setting, temperature, and field conditions.
    [Show full text]
  • Go-Around Decision-Making and Execution Project
    Final Report to Flight Safety Foundation Go-Around Decision-Making and Execution Project Tzvetomir Blajev, Eurocontrol (Co-Chair and FSF European Advisory Committee Chair) Capt. William Curtis, The Presage Group (Co-Chair and FSF International Advisory Committee Chair) MARCH 2017 1 Acknowledgments We would like to acknowledge the following people and organizations without which this report would not have been possible: • Airbus • Johan Condette — Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses • Air Canada Pilots Association • Capt. Bertrand De Courville — Air France (retired) • Air Line Pilots Association, International • Capt. Dirk De Winter — EasyJet • Airlines for America • Capt. Stephen Eggenschwiler — Swiss • The Boeing Company • Capt. Alex Fisher — British Airways (retired) • Eurocontrol • Alvaro Gammicchia — European Cockpit Association • FSF European Advisory Committee • Harald Hendel — Airbus • FSF International Advisory Committee • Yasuo Ishihara — Honeywell Aerospace Advanced • Honeywell International Technology • International Air Transport Association • David Jamieson, Ph.D. — The Presage Group • International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations • Christian Kern — Vienna Airport • The Presage Group • Capt. Pascal Kremer — FSF European Advisory Committee • Guillaume Adam — Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses • Richard Lawrence — Eurocontrol • John Barras – FSF European Advisory Committee • Capt. Harry Nelson — Airbus • Tzvetomir Blajev — Eurocontrol • Bruno Nero — The Presage Group • Karen Bolten — NATS • Zeljko Oreski — International
    [Show full text]
  • PRESSURIZED PISTON CRUISER We Fly the Piper M350! FAST™ SOLUTION PREVENTIVE, ACTIONABLE & WIRELESS FULL-FLIGHT INTELLIGENCE KNOW YOUR ENGINE from the INSIDE OUT
    AN MHM PUBLISHING MAGAZINE MArcH/APrIL 2017 [ INSIDE ] SKIES magaz • AIR CANADA REBRANDS • SPECIAL MISSION AIRCRAFT • NORTHERN OPS UPDATE mag.com • PILOT CAREER PATHWAYS I n E • CUSTOM GLOBAL REFURB • TURBOPROP COMEBACK SKIES • CELEBRATING CANADA 150 AvIAtIoN IS oUr PassioN PRESSURIZED PISTON CRUISER WE FLY THE PIPER M350! FAST™ SOLUTION PREVENTIVE, ACTIONABLE & WIRELESS FULL-FLIGHT INTELLIGENCE KNOW YOUR ENGINE FROM THE INSIDE OUT P&WC’s FASTTM solution captures, analyzes and sends full-flight data intelligence electronically to customers within moments of engine shutdown. By providing actionable preventative alerts and prognostics directly to the people who need it, we empower operators to make informed decisions, reduce costs and troubleshoot issues before they happen. With the FAST TM solution we take the words rapid response to a new level. It’s that easy. It’s that powerful. FAST™ Solution: Unparalleled dispatch availability and reduced operating costs. POWERFUL. EFFICIENT. VERSATILE. SOUND LIKE ANYBODY YOU KNOW? You demand continuous improvement in your business, so why not expect it from your business aircraft? Through intelligent design the new PC-12 NG climbs faster, cruises faster, and is even more quiet, comfortable and efficient than its predecessor. If your current aircraft isn’t giving you this kind of value, maybe it’s time for a Pilatus. Stan Kuliavas, Vice President of Sales | [email protected] | 1 844.538.2376 | www.levaero.com SKIES Magazine | March/April 2017 1 Levaero-Full-CSV6I6.indd 1 2016-09-29 1:12 PM March/April 2017 | Volume 7, Issue 2 IN THIS ISSUE 22 58 68 82 14 AIR CANADA 30 ASSESSING THE 58 TURBOPROP 82 IT’S THE SKIES REBRANDS APPROACH COMEBACK THAT BIND As it turns 80, the airline Nav Canada’s flight Simple economics have As Canada celebrates unveils a distinctive new inspection crews regularly revived the business case its 150 th anniversary this livery, stylish uniforms and test navigational aids at more for turboprop aircraft, with year, the nation’s aviation premium on-board products.
    [Show full text]
  • Federal Aviation Administration, DOT § 91.175
    Federal Aviation Administration, DOT § 91.175 a certificated and appropriately rated in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, is radio repair station or, outside the used, an entry must be made in the air- United States, a test signal operated or craft log or other record by the repair approved by an appropriate authority station certificate holder or the certifi- to check the VOR equipment (the max- cate holder's representative certifying imum permissible indicated bearing to the bearing transmitted by the re- error is plus or minus 4 degrees); or pair station for the check and the date (2) Use, at the airport of intended de- of transmission. parture, a point on the airport surface designated as a VOR system check- (Approved by the Office of Management and point by the Administrator, or, outside Budget under control number 2120±0005) the United States, by an appropriate authority (the maximum permissible § 91.173 ATC clearance and flight plan bearing error is plus or minus 4 de- required. grees); No person may operate an aircraft in (3) If neither a test signal nor a des- controlled airspace under IFR unless ignated checkpoint on the surface is that person hasÐ available, use an airborne checkpoint (a) Filed an IFR flight plan; and designated by the Adninistrator or, (b) Received an appropriate ATC outside the United States, by an appro- clearance. priate authority (the maximum per- missible bearing error is plus or minus § 91.175 Takeoff and landing under 6 degrees); or IFR. (4) If no check signal or point is (a) Instrument approaches to civil air- available, while in flightÐ ports.
    [Show full text]
  • (VL for Attrid
    ECCAIRS Aviation 1.3.0.12 Data Definition Standard English Attribute Values ECCAIRS Aviation 1.3.0.12 VL for AttrID: 391 - Event Phases Powered Fixed-wing aircraft. (Powered Fixed-wing aircraft) 10000 This section covers flight phases specifically adopted for the operation of a powered fixed-wing aircraft. Standing. (Standing) 10100 The phase of flight prior to pushback or taxi, or after arrival, at the gate, ramp, or parking area, while the aircraft is stationary. Standing : Engine(s) Not Operating. (Standing : Engine(s) Not Operating) 10101 The phase of flight, while the aircraft is standing and during which no aircraft engine is running. Standing : Engine(s) Start-up. (Standing : Engine(s) Start-up) 10102 The phase of flight, while the aircraft is parked during which the first engine is started. Standing : Engine(s) Run-up. (Standing : Engine(s) Run-up) 990899 The phase of flight after start-up, during which power is applied to engines, for a pre-flight engine performance test. Standing : Engine(s) Operating. (Standing : Engine(s) Operating) 10103 The phase of flight following engine start-up, or after post-flight arrival at the destination. Standing : Engine(s) Shut Down. (Standing : Engine(s) Shut Down) 10104 Engine shutdown is from the start of the shutdown sequence until the engine(s) cease rotation. Standing : Other. (Standing : Other) 10198 An event involving any standing phase of flight other than one of the above. Taxi. (Taxi) 10200 The phase of flight in which movement of an aircraft on the surface of an aerodrome under its own power occurs, excluding take- off and landing.
    [Show full text]
  • Missed Approach Point Study Guide for Jeppesen Charts Retrieved From
    Missed Approach Point Study Guide for Jeppesen Charts Retrieved from http://captainslog.aero/?p=1711 Introduction Reading a missed approach procedure is a critical step toward briefing and flying a complete instrument approach to an airport. The missed approach point is the position where the pilot must immediately climb away from the airport if the landing criteria of FAR 91.175(c) are not met. There are two challenges involved in reading the missed approach point: a. Location Where is the missed approach point? The profile view depicts the missed approach point as a block M symbol or as a pull-up arrow, as shown above. A text description also appears in the time and speed table below the profile view. Missed approach points are generally located between the final approach fix and the airport. Each procedure may have two or three different missed approach points. Common locations for a missed approach point include the runway threshold, the primary NAVAID for the approach, and the intersection of the glide slope with the decision altitude. b. Identification How does the pilot know when the aircraft has reached the missed approach point? The pilot must understand the aircraft position relative to the missed approach point while flying each instrument approach procedure. Because each procedure has a unique configuration, the indications and techniques used to identify the missed approach point may be unique as well. Common identifiers for a missed approach point include a named waypoint, a DME fix, and a time and speed table. Revised 7 January © 2015 by Robert Chapin. Jeppesen chart excerpts displayed for nonprofit educational purposes only.
    [Show full text]
  • Descent and Approach Profile Management
    Descent Management Flight Operations Briefing Notes Descent and Approach Profile Management Flight Operations Briefing Notes Descent Management Descent and Approach Profile Management I Introduction Inadequate management of descent-and-approach profile and/or incorrect management of aircraft energy level may lead to: • Loss of vertical situational awareness; and/or, • Rushed and unstabilized approaches. Either situation increases the risk of approach-and-landing accidents, including those involving CFIT. II Statistical Data Approximately 70 % of rushed and unstable approaches involve an inadequate management of the descent-and-approach profile and/or an incorrect management of energy level; this includes: • Aircraft higher or lower than the desired vertical flight path; and/or, • Aircraft faster or slower than the desired airspeed. III Best Practices and Guidelines To prevent delay in initiating the descent and to ensure an optimum management of descent-and-approach profile, descent preparation and approach briefings should be initiated when pertinent data have been received (e.g ATIS, …), and completed before the top-of-descent (typically 10 minutes before). Page 1 of 6 Descent Management Flight Operations Briefing Notes Descent and Approach Profile Management Descent Preparation Insert a realistic FMS flight plan built up from the arrival expected to be flown. If, for example, a standard terminal arrival route (STAR) is inserted in the FMS flight plan but is not expected to be flown, because of anticipated radar vectors, the STAR should be revised (i.e. The track-distance, altitude restrictions and/or speed restrictions) according to pilot’s expectations so as to allow the FMS adjustment of the top-of- descent point; and, Wind forecast should be entered (as available) on the appropriate FMS page, at waypoints close to the top-of-descent point and along the descent profile in order to get a realistic top-of-descent.
    [Show full text]
  • 5−4−21. Missed Approach A. When a Landing Cannot Be Accomplished
    6/17/21 AIM 5−4−21. Missed Approach position at the time visual reference is lost. Adherence to the procedure will help assure that an a. When a landing cannot be accomplished, advise aircraft will remain laterally within the circling and ATC and, upon reaching the missed approach point missed approach obstruction clearance areas. Refer defined on the approach procedure chart, the pilot to paragraph h concerning vertical obstruction must comply with the missed approach instructions clearance when starting a missed approach at other for the procedure being used or with an alternate than the MAP. (See FIG 5−4−32.) missed approach procedure specified by ATC. d. At locations where ATC radar service is b. Obstacle protection for missed approach is provided, the pilot should conform to radar vectors predicated on the missed approach being initiated at when provided by ATC in lieu of the published the decision altitude/decision height (DA/DH) or at missed approach procedure. (See FIG 5−4−33.) the missed approach point and not lower than e. Some locations may have a preplanned alternate minimum descent altitude (MDA). A climb gradient missed approach procedure for use in the event the of at least 200 feet per nautical mile is required, primary NAVAID used for the missed approach (except for Copter approaches, where a climb of at procedure is unavailable. To avoid confusion, the least 400 feet per nautical mile is required), unless a alternate missed approach instructions are not higher climb gradient is published in the notes section published on the chart. However, the alternate missed of the approach procedure chart.
    [Show full text]
  • Airport Chart Legend
    2MAR12 INTRODUCTION AIRPORT-1 q$i AIRPORT CHART LEGEND NOTE: This section of the Jeppesen legend provides a general overview regarding the depiction of airport diagrams and associated information. The following briefly explains the symbology used on airport charts throughout the world. Not all items explained apply to all charts. The airport chart is divided into specific areas of information as illustrated below. To enhance the usability for larger airports, the Communications and Airport Planview sections are depicted on one side of the chart. An added Notes Section along with the Additional Runway Information, Take-off minimums, and Alternate minimums sections are depicted on the reverse side of the chart. FORMAT 1303320999000 1303320999000 HEADING 1303320999000 1— ICAO indicators and IATA airport identifiers. 2— Airport elevation. 3— Airport geographic latitude and longitude shown in degrees, minutes, and tenths of minutes. 4— Chart index number. Same as the first approach chart when the airport chart is printed on the reverse side. 5— Chart revision date. 6— Chart effective date. 7— Airport name. 8— Geographic location name. 9— Jeppesen company logo. 1329509537609 q$z © JEPPESEN, 2012. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. AIRPORT-2 INTRODUCTION 2MAR12 q$i COMMUNICATIONS For Communications Information See Approach Chart Legend — Page APPROACH-2 1303320999000 AIRPORT PLANVIEW 1303320999000 1— The planview is a "To Sca le" graphical depiction of the airport layout, a latitude/longitude grid in degrees, minutes, and tenths of minutes is depicted along the inside of the neat line. 2— The airport magnetic variation is graphically and numerically depicted. 3— Airport operational notes are placed within the planview.
    [Show full text]
  • Crash During Attempted Go-Around After Landing East Coast Jets Flight 81 Hawker Beechcraft Corporation 125-800A, N818MV Owatonna, Minnesota July 31, 2008
    Crash During Attempted Go‐Around After Landing East Coast Jets Flight 81 Hawker Beechcraft Corporation 125‐800A, N818MV Owatonna, Minnesota July 31, 2008 Accident Report NTSB/AAR-11/01 National PB2011-910401 Transportation Safety Board NTSB/AAR-11/01 PB2011-910401 Notation 8046A Adopted March 15, 2011 Aircraft Accident Report Crash During Attempted Go-Around After Landing East Coast Jets Flight 81 Hawker Beechcraft Corporation 125-800A, N818MV Owatonna, Minnesota July 31, 2008 National Transportation Safety Board 490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20594 National Transportation Safety Board. 2011. Crash During Attempted Go-Around After Landing, East Coast Jets Flight 81, Hawker Beechcraft Corporation 125-800A, N818MV, Owatonna, Minnesota, July 31, 2008. Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-11/01. Washington, DC. Abstract: This accident report discusses the July 31, 2008, accident involving East Coast Jets flight 81, a Hawker Beechcraft Corporation 125-800A, N818MV, which crashed while attempting to go around after landing on runway 30 at Owatonna Degner Regional Airport, Owatonna, Minnesota. The two pilots and six passengers were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces. The nonscheduled, domestic passenger flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135. An instrument flight rules flight plan had been filed and activated; however, it was canceled before the landing. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. The safety issues discussed in this report relate to flight crew actions; lack of standard operating procedures requirements for 14 CFR Part 135 operators, including crew resource management training and checklist usage; go-around guidance for turbine-powered aircraft; Part 135 preflight weather briefings; pilot fatigue and sleep disorders; inadequate arrival landing distance assessment guidance and requirements; Part 135 on-demand, pilot-in-command line checks; and cockpit image recording systems.
    [Show full text]