DOCSLIB.ORG

The Sadness of Karl Otto Pöhl's Legacy

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Sadness of Karl Otto Pöhl's Legacy The Sadness of Karl Otto Pöhl’s Legacy “We now have the ECB française.” ith the largest ever bond-buying pro- gram by the European Central Bank looming, Bundesbankers were in an By Klaus C. Engelen apprehensive mood when they gath- ered on January 13 for a commemora- tive ceremony to mark the passing of the Bundesbank’s former President Karl Otto Pöhl. Pöhl, who for decades served as a member of TIE’s editorial advi- Wsory board, passed away December 9, 2014, at the age of eighty-five. For those present who are or were important to the institution, the huge quantitative easing program, pushed by the ECB’s President Mario Draghi on shaky legal and economic grounds, is feared to be the Bundesbank’s most damaging setback since the start of monetary union. In the long battle to block massive bond purchases from debt- laden eurozone member states, the Bundesbank under its President Jens Weidmann is being forced to take part in the largest money print- ing experiment post-war Europe has experienced. No wonder one of Weidmann’s predecessors, Helmut Schlesinger, confessed in a recent interview that quantitative easing reminds him of “war financing.” Jens Weidmann has often drawn attention to the fact that the ECB’s THE MAGAZINE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY unconventional monetary measures have huge effects in shifting risks 220 I Street, N.E., Suite 200 and burdens towards member countries and their taxpayers, including Washington, D.C. 20002 Germany. For the Bundesbankers, European monetary union means that Phone: 202-861-0791 Fax: 202-861-0790 the fortunes of German savers and taxpayers have been taken hostage www.international-economy.com [email protected] Klaus C. Engelen is a contributing editor for both Handelsblatt and TIE. 34 THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY WINTER 2015 Engelen The Bundesbank marked the passing of its former President Karl Otto Pöhl in a commemorative ceremony on January 13, 2015. to lower the debt service costs of southern member states and to bail out their banks. The ECB will become the larg- est creditor of eurozone member countries, thus lessening pressure on governments for fiscal consolidation and eco- nomic reforms. Adding insult to injury, Germany’s politicians—led by Chancellor Angela Merkel and Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble—seem to have been looking the other way or else hiding behind the assertion that the (highly politicized) ECB is independent in its “monetary” decisions. In reality, the Merkel coalition government lets the ECB do a large part of the eurozone rescue work while keeping quiet about the fiscal support for fear of getting in trouble with the voters. Former Bank of Italy chief “Super Mario” is succeed- ing in using the Club Med debtor majority to remodel the ECB into what some call “a eurozone wealth-of-nations re- distribution mechanism,” giving not only Bundesbankers a sinking feeling. The Bundesbank under Weidmann is in- creasingly isolated in its struggle to keep the ECB within its monetary mandate. This hurts, but is seen as a challenge to close the ranks with increased resolve to stick to the eco- nomic and legal foundations of European monetary union. Since most remember the years when Pöhl—at the le- vers of political power in Bonn and as vice president and president of the Bundesbank—was dealing with the mon- etary turbulence and challenges of the 1970s and 1980s, How could a central bank some nagging questions were in the air at his memorial cer- emony. How could a central bank that was able to use its dominant position as monetary anchor on the European and that was able to use its dominant position global stages to protect the fortunes of the nation’s econo- my be rendered so powerless now? The answer is obvious: The Deutsche Bundesbank as monetary anchor on the European was once the cornerstone of European monetary stability, but was used as a bargaining chip for politicians negotiat- ing ever-deeper European integration. “Even the ghosts of and global stages to protect the fortunes Germany’s Auschwitz past have been used to intimidate, demean, and sometimes even terrorize those who oppose the dismantling of the Bundesbank and the replacement of the nation’s economy of the deutschmark with ‘political money’,” this Buba- watcher wrote in TIE in 1997. be rendered so powerless now? SON OF A CIVIL SERVANT Karl Otto Pöhl was born in Hanover as the son of a civil ser- vant a few days after the October 1929 stock market crash. WINTER 2015 THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 35 My Two Pöhl Encounters s someone who began re- Treasury of a German journalist with as monetary hard-liner, for causing porting on the world of high a top U.S. Treasury official turned the “Black Monday” stock market Afinance and central bank- out to be quite successful. Mulford crash of 1987, then the largest one- ing at a time when the old Bretton and Pöhl had never met in private. day market crash in history. The Woods System of fixed exchange After sounding out Pöhl’s assistant, Dow lost 23 percent of its value on rates still existed, I can look back at Gerd Häusler, on a walk along the October 19, 1987. the decades where Karl Otto Pöhl Georgetown Canal, the idea was played important roles as political born to persuade Mulford and Pöhl here was another encounter advisor, key negotiator, and central to meet privately for lunch or dinner with Pöhl that I cannot for- banker. I’ll never forget two memo- in the near future. Tget. I was invited to his office rable encounters with Pöhl. That was easier said than done. to talk about how much his public At the 1986 IMF Annual Under the U.S. rules, a high Treasury standing had been damaged by hav- Meeting, the almost two-year conflict official is not supposed to have an ing been overruled and outmaneu- between the German government exclusive meeting with a top for- vered by the Kohl government on and the Reagan Administration over eign central banker without someone the controversial issue of the timing macroeconomic and exchange rate from the Federal Reserve sitting in. and the exchange terms of German policy following the Plaza Accord in In spite of this, that “peace monetary union. What advice could September 1985 came to a head. meeting” became reality when Pöhl I give? The American delegation, head- visited the new representative office Those television pictures from ed by Treasury Secretary James Berlin showing the president Baker, his deputy Richard of the Bundesbank telling the Darman, and Undersecretary “That private meeting in New York with nation that German monetary for International Affairs Karl Otto was extremely helpful. union was far off in the future David Mulford, was upset that but—as it turned out the next Germany continued to resist From that meeting on we both day—had already been decid- American pleas to stimulate do- started to work on what became ed as a political matter by the mestic demand. Badmouthing the Louvre Agreement.” Bonn coalition government, from the German delegation with exchange rate terms that reaching the American side the Bundesbank had rejected through the press caused more irri- of the Bundesbank in New York. At on economic grounds, damaged tation. The German delegation was the time, Häusler could confirm that Pöhl’s standing irreparably at a his- headed by Finance Minister Gerhard everything went well. toric crossroad of German history. Stoltenberg, his Permanent Secretary In a recent telephone call from He was not only bested by Hans Tietmeyer, and Bundesbank the Davos World Economic Forum, Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Kohl’s President Pöhl. Pöhl, for instance, Mulford, now vice president of Minister of Finance Theo Waigel, had badmouthed Mulford as “just Credit Suisse, recalled: “Yes, that and by their Permanent Secretary a messenger boy who thinks he is private meeting in New York with Hans Tietmeyer. He also was caught important.” Karl Otto was extremely helpful. off guard for everyone to see. Some From U.S. Treasury higher-ups From that meeting on we both started in the Bundesbank had known about too came insults. Pöhl was character- to work on what became the Louvre the momentous government deci- ized as “someone talking from both Accord in February 1987.” Mulford sion, but didn’t inform their president sides of his mouth.” Tietmeyer was recently published a memoir, Packing in time. ridiculed as “not knowing when to for India: A Life of Action in Global But was this reason enough to stop his endless economic lectures.” Finance and Diplomacy (Potomac step down? That was his personal Even Stoltenberg caused irritation Books, 2014). decision. He could have played by because “all the time taking notes in Badmouthing from the top of the the rules and served out his term. Or his class gets on one’s nerves.” U.S. Treasury, it should be remem- he could have followed the principle At the Credit Suisse reception bered, entered into the history books that one could not accept such a hu- at Dumbarton Oaks in Georgetown, a year later when Baker blamed miliation by one’s own government Mulford suggested getting together Helmut Schlesinger, the Bundesbank and top colleagues, and step down after the IMF meetings on Friday to Vice President and chief economist, early. The latter happened. talk things over. That meeting in the who had a near-legendary reputation —K. Engelen 36 THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY WINTER 2015 Engelen introduce the deutsche mark to East Germany led to Pöhl not serving out his full term. The Bundesbank was used And Weidmann reminded those present that “Karl Otto Pöhl was also initially skeptical about another project: that of European monetary union, for which he was among as a bargaining chip.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • PDF Edition 2009/1
    Historical Association of Deutsche Bank Bank and History Historical Review No. 19 April 2009 Remembering Karl Klasen Karl Klasen was born in Hamburg on He was awarded a doctorate in 1933 for his April 23, 1909. His family lived close to the thesis on an international law topic. port, where his father, a stevedore by trade, Although civil service was initially on his worked as an inspector at Lütgens & agenda after passing the state examinations, Reimers. Looking back on his childhood, Karl Klasen quickly realised it would be advisable Klasen described how his father’s hard not to continue down the path towards the working day, which began at 6 in the judges’ bench in a national socialist regime. morning, determined every aspect of the He became a member of the SPD in 1931 family’s life. Their circumstances were before joining the Reichsbanner Schwarz- »comfortable yet modest«. In spite of this, Rot-Gold (a multiparty Socialist Democratic Klasen’s parents managed to send both sons paramilitary force set up during the Weimar to university. Karl Klasen started reading law Republic in 1924), which regarded itself as a in 1928. In the first semesters of his studies, dedicated custodian of Germany’s he was employed as a working student at democratic traditions. After working as an Hamburg Port and travel guide at Hapag – assistant judge in a civil court for four the same shipping company where he would months, by coincidence, an opportunity chair the supervisory board three decades arose for him to join Deutsche Bank. Klasen later. was offered a position in the Legal Department of the main Hamburg Branch, where he was employed as a legal adviser from October 1935.
    [Show full text]
  • DEFENDING the WOLF the Useful Contradiction of the Bundesbank Carlo Bastasin
    DEFENDING THE WOLF The Useful Contradiction of the Bundesbank Carlo Bastasin SEP Policy Brief No. 1 - 2014 The Deutsche Bundesbank, the German central bank, is commonly regarded as the Euroarea's boogeyman. The pressure imparted by the German monetary authority, for instance, rendered the European Central Bank reluctant to follow the footprints of the Federal Reserve and of other central banks, and engage in non- standard monetary policy measures that might rapidly put an end to the crisis that has been plaguing the euro zone. At several stages, during the current crisis, the ECB has been forced to take actions and prevent severe economic and financial dislocations. Given the institutional vacuum at the area-wide level and the lack of political capacity of the other institutions, the European Central Bank had often to move across the borders of its traditional domain. This has given reason to a slew of criticisms repeatedly and loudly voiced by the Bundesbank. Being also the most vocal policy actor evoking the fiscal risks associated with effecting implicit cross-border transfers via the ECB's balance sheet, the Bundesbank has appeared to have a “non- monetary” hidden agenda or even a “national political” mission. In fact, the Bundesbank has regularly appealed to two fundamental principles of sound economic and monetary policy management that cannot be easily overlooked by anybody concerned that monetary policy may lose its ability to preserve price stability. Should monetary independence be eroded by the increasing tasks devolved to the central banks, wider economic and political consequences might then arise. The first principle is the need to avoid fiscal dominance, not allowing inflation to be determined by the level of fiscal debts; the second is the “principle of responsibility” that sees a contradiction if individual responsibility is blurred by the intervention of joint liability as in the case of a State running unsound fiscal policies and being automatically bailed out by the mutualization of its liabilities.
    [Show full text]
  • Profile Persönlichkeiten Der Universität Hamburg Profile Persönlichkeiten Der Universität Hamburg Inhalt
    FALZ FÜR EINKLAPPER U4 RÜCKENFALZ FALZ FÜR EINKLAPPER U1 4,5 mm Profile persönlichkeiten der universität hamburg Profile persönlichkeiten der universität hamburg inhalt 6 Grußwort des Präsidenten 8 Profil der Universität Portraits 10 von Beust, Ole 12 Breloer, Heinrich 14 Dahrendorf, Ralf Gustav 16 Harms, Monika 18 Henkel, Hans-Olaf 20 Klose, Hans-Ulrich 22 Lenz, Siegfried 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 Miosga, Caren 26 von Randow, Gero 28 Rühe, Volker 30 Runde, Ortwin 32 Sager, Krista 34 Schäuble, Wolfgang 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 36 Schiller, Karl 38 Schmidt, Helmut 40 Scholz, Olaf 42 Schröder, Thorsten 44 Schulz, Peter 46 Tawada, Yoko 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 48 Voscherau, Henning 50 von Weizsäcker, Carl Friedrich 52 Impressum grusswort des präsidenten Grußwort des Präsidenten der Universität Hamburg Dieses Buch ist ein Geschenk – sowohl für seine Empfänger als auch für die Universität Hamburg. Die Persönlichkeiten in diesem Buch machen sich selbst zum Geschenk, denn sie sind der Universität auf verschiedene Weise verbunden – als Absolventinnen und Absolventen, als ehemalige Rektoren, als prägende Lehrkräfte oder als Ehrendoktoren und -senatoren. Sie sind über ihre unmittelbare berufliche Umgebung hinaus bekannt, weil sie eine öffentliche Funktion wahrnehmen oder wahrgenommen haben. Die Universität Hamburg ist fern davon, sich selbst als Causa des beruflichen Erfolgs ihrer prominenten Alumni zu betrach- ten. Dennoch hat die Universität mit ihnen zu tun. Sie ist der Ort gewesen, in dem diese Frauen und Männer einen Teil ihrer Sozialisation erfahren haben. Im glücklicheren Fall war das Studium ein Teil der Grundlage ihres Erfolges, weil es Wissen, Kompetenz und Persönlichkeitsbildung ermöglichte.
    [Show full text]
  • The Group of Twenty: a History
    THE GROUP OF TWENTY : A H ISTORY The study of the G-20’s History is revealing. A new institution established less than 10 years ago has emerged as a central player in the global financial architecture and an effective contributor to global economic and financial stability. While some operational challenges persist, as is typical of any new institution, the lessons from the study of the contribution of the G-20 to global economic and financial stability are important. Because of the work of the G-20 we are already witnessing evidence of the benefits of shifting to a new model of multilateral engagement. Excerpt from the closing address of President Mbeki of South Africa to G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, 18 November 2007, Kleinmond, Western Cape. 2 Table of Contents Excerpt from a Speech by President Mbeki....................................................................2 Executive Summary...........................................................................................................5 The Group of Twenty: a History ......................................................................................7 Preface............................................................................................................................7 Background....................................................................................................................8 The G-22 .............................................................................................................12 The G-33 .............................................................................................................15
    [Show full text]
  • The History of the European Monetary Union and Useful for Opening up New Horizons
    The financial and economic crisis that hit Europe in 2009 brought out the precariousness of the monetary union, accentuating the economic disequilibrium among European nations and strengthening Euro-skepticism. The History of the European The crisis was the catalyst for long-standing and unresolved problems: the creation of a singly monetary area with intergovernmental control, the Monetary Union final act in the construction of a Europe economically united but without a government and a state; the consequent discrepancy between forming a consensus that remains in large part national and the political dynamics in Comparing Strategies amidst Prospects Europe; the sustainability of a monetary union in the absence of an economic- for Integration and National Resistance social union, which presents again the long-standing debate between “monetarist” countries and “economist” countries. This book aims at placing current events within a long-term framework composed of a mosaic of multidisciplinary contributions that can provide the reader with keys which are adequate for an understanding of these events The History of the European Monetary Union and useful for opening up new horizons. Daniela Preda is Full Professor at the University of Genoa and Jean Monnet Chair ad personam in History of European Integration. Former president of the Associazione universitaria di Studi Europei (Italian section of ECSA), she is Daniela Preda (ed.) a member of the Scientific Board for the PhD program in History (University Daniela Preda (ed.) of Pavia). Her most important research interests concern the history of the European Community and the history of the federalist movements. She published many books and essays; she co-edited with Daniele Pasquinucci the following books published by P.I.E.
    [Show full text]
  • Jews and Germans in Eastern Europe New Perspectives on Modern Jewish History
    Jews and Germans in Eastern Europe New Perspectives on Modern Jewish History Edited by Cornelia Wilhelm Volume 8 Jews and Germans in Eastern Europe Shared and Comparative Histories Edited by Tobias Grill An electronic version of this book is freely available, thanks to the support of libra- ries working with Knowledge Unlatched. KU is a collaborative initiative designed to make high quality books Open Access. More information about the initiative can be found at www.knowledgeunlatched.org ISBN 978-3-11-048937-8 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-049248-4 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-048977-4 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial NoDerivatives 4.0 License. For details go to http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Grill, Tobias. Title: Jews and Germans in Eastern Europe : shared and comparative histories / edited by/herausgegeben von Tobias Grill. Description: [Berlin] : De Gruyter, [2018] | Series: New perspectives on modern Jewish history ; Band/Volume 8 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018019752 (print) | LCCN 2018019939 (ebook) | ISBN 9783110492484 (electronic Portable Document Format (pdf)) | ISBN 9783110489378 (hardback) | ISBN 9783110489774 (e-book epub) | ISBN 9783110492484 (e-book pdf) Subjects: LCSH: Jews--Europe, Eastern--History. | Germans--Europe, Eastern--History. | Yiddish language--Europe, Eastern--History. | Europe, Eastern--Ethnic relations. | BISAC: HISTORY / Jewish. | HISTORY / Europe / Eastern. Classification: LCC DS135.E82 (ebook) | LCC DS135.E82 J495 2018 (print) | DDC 947/.000431--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018019752 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de.
    [Show full text]
  • Mr. Tietmeyer Reviews the Central Bank Council of the Deutsche Bundesbank on Its 50Th Anniversary Address Delivered by the President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Prof
    Mr. Tietmeyer reviews the Central Bank Council of the Deutsche Bundesbank on its 50th anniversary Address delivered by the President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Prof. Hans Tietmeyer, during the ceremony marking the 50th anniversary of the first meeting of the Central Bank Council at the Land Central Bank of Hesse in Frankfurt/Main on 5/3/98. On March 8, 1948, eleven men gathered next door in the building of the then Land Central Bank of Hesse. The Central Bank Council - which at that time was still “provisional” - of the Bank deutscher Länder, which had been established on March 1, was meeting for the first time. An American officer of the Allied Banking Commission (appropriately named Mr. Freeman) convened the first meeting at 10.30 a.m. There will be quite a few fiftieth anniversaries in the coming weeks and months occasioned by the flood of major events relating to Germany which took place in 1948 and 1949. Many of these events were certainly more dramatic and spectacular than the first meeting of the Central Bank Council. Yet, if we remember this meeting now, it is because a crucial decision for the future began to take shape at that time. If that which was begun on March 8, 1948 had not met with success, the history of the D-Mark (and perhaps also the history of our country) would have taken a different course. It is true that the preparations for the introduction of the D-Mark were carried out elsewhere and by others, particularly by the Allies themselves. Yet, with monetary reform on June 20, when the first D-Mark banknotes came into circulation, the fate of the new currency began to be linked to the viability and the stability orientation of the German Central Bank Council.
    [Show full text]
  • Edinburgh Research Explorer
    Edinburgh Research Explorer A Panacea for all Times? Citation for published version: Howarth, D & Rommerskirchen, C 2013, 'A Panacea for all Times? The German Stability Culture as Strategic Political Resource', West European Politics, vol. 36, no. 4, pp. 750-770. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2013.783355 Digital Object Identifier (DOI): 10.1080/01402382.2013.783355 Link: Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer Document Version: Peer reviewed version Published In: West European Politics Publisher Rights Statement: © Howarth, D., & Rommerskirchen, C. (2013). A Panacea for all Times?: The German Stability Culture as Strategic Political Resource. West European Politics, 36(4), 750-770. 10.1080/01402382.2013.783355 General rights Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s) and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. Take down policy The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 26. Sep. 2021 A Panacea for all Times? The German Stability Culture as Strategic Political Resource David Howarth and Charlotte Rommerskirchen West European Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4. Abstract The German Stability Culture is frequently pointed to in the literature as the source of the country’s low inflationary policies and, at the European Union (EU) level, the design of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
    [Show full text]
  • Axel a Weber: Global Imbalances – Causes and Challenges
    Axel A Weber: Global imbalances – causes and challenges Introductory remarks by Professor Axel A Weber, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank, at the international conference “20 Years of Technical Central Bank Cooperation”, Eltville, Hesse, 28 October 2010. * * * 1. Introduction Ladies and gentlemen I am highly delighted to welcome you to this notable conference at the Bundesbank Training Centre in Eltville. Central bankers and other officials from 42 countries have gathered here today to discuss various experiences and common challenges. I would like to thank Mr Thomas Gierenstein and Mr Jürgen Sterlepper as well as their team for organising this conference. We are holding it to celebrate 20 years of technical central bank cooperation within the Bundesbank. While the Bundesbank has always been available to provide foreign central banks with technical assistance, the momentous events of the early 1990s prompted the Bank to institutionalise this kind of work. It was, in particular, Hans Tietmeyer, my pre-predecesssor and Vice-President at the time who was quick to grasp the far-reaching importance of those historic events for central banking: the fall of the Iron Curtain, the collapse of the communist regimes in central and eastern Europe, the subsequent transformation in those countries from a planned economy to a market economy as well as the break-up of the Soviet Union and the resulting formation of new, independent states. Many of those states had to start from scratch in establishing their own national central banks. All things considered, there was a major and vital need for central bank cooperation. Hence, in the first few years of its existence, the activities of the Bundesbank’s “Technical Central Bank Cooperation” were very much focused on the process of restructuring the banking system in those countries.
    [Show full text]
  • Europe and the Euro
    This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Europe and the Euro Volume Author/Editor: Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giavazzi, editors Volume Publisher: The University of Chicago Press Volume ISBN: 0-226-01283-2 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/ales08-1 Conference Dates: October 17-18, 2008 Publication Date: February 2010 Chapter Title: How Central Bankers See It: The First Decade of European Central Bank Policy and Beyond Chapter Author: Stephen G. Cecchetti, Kermit L. Schoenholtz Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11670 Chapter pages in book: (327- 374) 9 How Central Bankers See It The First Decade of European Central Bank Policy and Beyond Stephen G. Cecchetti and Kermit L. Schoenholtz 9.1 Introduction Otmar Issing: “There was a clear view from a number of outside observers that we would fail and that it would be a disaster in any respect.” As late as 1997, less than a year before the European Central Bank (ECB) was scheduled to come into existence, there was widespread skepticism about whether the European Monetary Union (EMU) would begin on schedule as a broad union and, in some quarters, whether it would happen at all. Yet here we are a full decade after the advent of EMU and today there are fi fteen countries where the euro is legal tender. The twenty- one members of the Governing Council of the ECB make monetary policy for a region of 320 million people with a gross domestic product (GDP) of roughly €9 trillion.
    [Show full text]
  • Detailed Program, Pdf-File (700KB)
    The Bucerius summer school on GloBal Governance Crisis of Global and Regional Governance: Toward a G-Zero World? 12 – 25 August 2012 PROGRAM The Bucerius summer school on GloBal Governance Crisis of Global and Regional Governance: Toward a G-Zero World? A two-week seminar of the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius, Hamburg in cooperation with the Heinz Nixdorf Stiftung, Essen Moderators: Theo Sommer, Editor-at-Large, DIE ZEIT, Hamburg Wolfgang Ischinger, Ambassador, Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, Munich Program Director: Sascha Suhrke, ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius, Hamburg 4 The Bucerius summer school on GloBal Governance Crisis of Global and Regional Governance: Toward a G-Zero World? From 12 to 25 August 2012, the ZEIT-Stiftung Ebelin und Gerd Bucerius, in cooperation with the Heinz Nixdorf Stiftung, holds its twelfth annual Bucerius Summer School on Global Gover- nance (BSS). The original idea to create such an institution harked back to Henry Kissinger’s famous International Summer Seminar at Harvard University. In the 1960s, Kissinger brought together emerging leaders from all over the world for a summer course of debates and lectures. Many of the seminar’s alumni went on to become ministers, renowned academics, prominent journalists – leaders in their respective fields. Out of this year’s 166 Bucerius Summer School candidates – nomi- nated by government heads, ministers, company CEO’s, university presidents, media leaders and directors of international organi- zations – we have invited 58 promising business representatives, politicians and academics from 28 different countries – young women and men between 28 and 35 years of age who have already acquired considerable professional experience.
    [Show full text]
  • Marx Oder Markt? Die Ungezügelten Erwartungen Der Re- Gierungspartei Die Preisstabilität Ge- Fährdet Sah
    Deutschland gab. Schröder der Dritte wurde sichtbar. Am Freitag vergangener Woche geneh- sich um die beiden Töchter Klara und Vik- Als Erklärung für seine Gelassenheit zitier- migte sich der Kanzler schon mal einen Vor- toria kümmern. Babysitter Schröder, noch te er einen journalistischen Halbsatz, der schuss auf die Ära ohne Amt. Er müsse ganz dem Amtston verhaftet: „Da wartet wie kein anderer seine Seelenlage erfasst pünktlich um 18 Uhr zu Hause sein, ent- ein interessanter Termin auf mich.“ habe. Für Schröder gehe es 2006, so hatte schuldigte er sich bei den Funktionären der Sven Afhüppe, Markus Feldenkirchen, Gunter Hofmann in der „Zeit“ geschrie- Arbeiterwohlfahrt in Hannover-Badenstedt. Horand Knaup, Roland Nelles, Michael Sauga, Gabor Steingart ben, nur noch um „Sieg oder Viktoria“. Da seine Frau außer Haus sei, werde er Bundesfinanzminister Alex Möller trat schon 1971 zurück, weil er durch Marx oder Markt? die ungezügelten Erwartungen der Re- gierungspartei die Preisstabilität ge- fährdet sah. Einer seiner Nachfolger, Vom schwierigen Umgang der SPD mit dem Kapitalismus Hans Apel („Ich dacht’, mich tritt ein Pferd“), machte sich als Sparkommis- sar unbeliebt. „Weltökonom“ Helmut Schmidt fiel in Ungnade, weil er als Kanzler „viel tiefer ins Fleisch des Sozialstaats schneiden wollte“, als die SPD-Sozialpolitiker ertragen konnten. Als Oskar Lafontaine und Gerhard Schröder nach vorn drängten, gerieten die alten Fronten durcheinander. La- fontaines Thesen zur Aufwertung un- bezahlter Arbeit, zu längeren Maschi- nenlaufzeiten und zur Arbeitszeitver- kürzung ohne Lohnausgleich machten ihn 1988 zum Medienstar und 1990 zum Kanzlerkandidaten. Es galt als auf- DPA / ULLSTEIN BILDERDIENST / ULLSTEIN DPA regend und schick, wenn ein Sozial- SPD-Führung (1969)*: „Die Pferde müssen wieder saufen“ demokrat Gewerkschafter schmähte.
    [Show full text]