– Epilogue – Slow Progress towards Democracy? [August 2010]
As nearly two years has passed since the signing of the GPA and the writing of the earliest chapter contained in this volume, it may be useful to provide a brief overview of Zimbabwe’s current polity, particularly as some of the preceding chapters are prognostic. The GPA was presented by the MDC formations as a flawed but workable document, one which would allow incremental progress towards the restoration of the rule of law and democracy in Zimbabwe.1 Contrary to this view, the preceding chapters suggested that the GPA would not be effective as a means to deliver this change. The MDC-T’s policy of ‘protest and capitulation’, which characterized the initial power dynamics within the ‘unity government’, has either continued or been replaced by one simply of quiet capitulation in the face of intransigence, unilateral arrogation of power, and violation of provisions of the GPA by Mugabe and ZANU(PF).2 Nonetheless, the MDC-T leadership insists, in the face of an increasingly sceptical and restless constituency, that it has made slow but significant progress towards its stated goals by virtue of the GPA. A statement by Morgan Tsvangirai at the end of June 2010,3 made after hiring, firing and reshuffling MDC ministers and deputy ministers, serves as a useful point of departure for the analysis which follows. The relevant part of the text appears opposite.
1 See, for example, Tsvangirai’s quixotic address to the US Council on Foreign Relations on 10 June 2009, a transcript of which is available at
152 Slow Progress towards Democracy?
Statement on Cabinet Reshuffle by the President of the Movement for Democratic Change and Prime Minister of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Wednesday, 23 June 2010
Good afternoon Ladies and Gentlemen, I am here today to announce a ministerial reshuffle. This reshuffle is about the MDC delivering to the people of Zimbabwe what they are looking for – real change. Over the past 16 months, we have recorded definite success in certain areas. • We have brought sanity and stability to the economy. • We have revived the health sector, which had all but collapsed. • We have got the schools back up and running, and textbooks distributed. • We now have independent daily newspapers registered to operate. • Basic services such as sewerage reticulation, refuse collection and water provision have been restored in many areas. However, we still have many challenges; and these frankly overshadow our successes to-date. • The pace of reform has been painfully slow. • Abuses of power are still all too common. • Many people are still struggling to make a living wage, and provide for their families. • Infrastructure rehabilitation and energy supply continue to inhibit development. I am acutely aware that these and other challenges have led to a loss of confidence in the new administration amongst the electorate. In response to this, as Prime Minister and President of the MDC, I have just completed a comprehensive review of the performance of the Government, and in particular of my Office and those Ministers who represent the MDC. As a result, I have decided on a number of changes needed to strengthen the performance of the MDC in government and outside government, in order to deliver real change to the people of Zimbabwe. These changes are being made with immediate effect, and the new ministers will be sworn in tomorrow, Thursday 24th June. The changes that are being implemented are as follows: [Details of the hiring, firing and reshuffling of ministers and deputy ministers are then given.] Ladies and Gentlemen, the MDC agreed to form this inclusive Government as it represented the most practical means of moving Zimbabwe forward and halt the needless suffering of the people. …
153 Epilogue
Stabilizing the economy Record hyperinflation over an extended period from 2000 inserted the bizarre and surreal into the smallest and most quotidian of commercial transactions. Dollarization certainly brought some sanity and stability to the economy in this regard. This was no achievement of MDC-T as a party to the ‘unity government’, though they have sought to claim as much, bringing to mind not the adage that politics ‘is the art of the possible’ but rather that politics ‘is art of making the inevitable look planned’. The economy had informally dollarized by November 2008, as no one was willing to accept Zimbabwe dollars in any transaction. By early January 2009, the ZANU(PF) government had agreed to pay health workers in foreign currency,4 by the last week of January, to pay all civil servants in foreign currency,5 and then, on 29 January, the acting ZANU(PF) Minister of Finance, Patrick Chinamasa, announced that hard currency would now be legal tender in Zimbabwe.6 With the adoption of hard currencies, unrealistic price controls were removed and goods which were scarce once again became available as retailers were able to sell at a profit rather than a loss. These policies were in place prior to the formation of the ‘unity government’. While the chaos and bizarre situations that resulted from hyperinflation were thus removed, little has been achieved in regard to Zimbabwe’s macro- economic climate. The basic cause of the current stasis in Zimbabwe’s polity, as outlined in Chapter Five, remains. Zimbabwe requires support from the Bretton Woods institutions for loans and balance-of-payments support to revive the economy. At least US$8.5 billion is regarded as being necessary to restore Zimbabwe’s infrastructure, industry and general economic health.7 This requires the donor community to clear Zimbabwe’s indebtedness to these institutions,8 currently at an almost equivalent amount (US$8.6 billion),9 and, as acknow ledged by the Minister of Finance, Tendai Biti, the donor community has no intention of doing so without some palpable evidence (rather than merely the
4 ‘ZANU-PF govt. to pay health personnel in US dollars’, hararetribune.com, 9 Jan. 2009, available at
154 Slow Progress towards Democracy? implausible claims of the MDC in this regard) of the restoration of democracy in Zimbabwe.10 That Mugabe and ZANU(PF) are determined to prevent, as they cannot remain in power under democratic conditions. In a paper released in July 2010 the IMF reiterated that Zimbabwe required debt relief in order to escape its economic malaise, claiming that ‘Zimbabwe is in debt distress, and the debt overhang cannot be resolved without debt relief even if policies are improved and mineral extraction is increased.’11 Within days of the IMF releasing its report, Mugabe expressed a contrary view: ‘Zimbabwe will not be saved by any country or organisation, least of all Western. Let our partners in the inclusive government get that so we do not waste our efforts on useless initiatives. ‘It is our mineral resources – all these helped by the ingenuity and entrepreneurship of our people which will turn this economy and country around.’12 The ‘useless initiative’ referred to was a July visit by a delegation to the EU to discuss the issues of ‘sanctions’.13 MDC delegates suggested that they would persuade the EU that it was appropriate to ease restrictive measures (notwith standing the failure to reduce the democratic deficit in Zimbabwe) through their ‘body language’.14 Needless to say, nothing of substance was expected to emerge (nor did it emerge) from this meeting. It is also worth elaborating upon the reference to mineral resources made by Mugabe and the IMF, as this currently is a key issue engaging much of the media and political commentary.15 It alludes primarily to diamond extraction in the Chiadzwa/Marange district of Zimbabwe, from what is believed to be an extremely rich alluvial deposit with estimates at one extreme of the scale suggesting that it may provide 25 per cent of the world’s diamonds. Mining of this resource has been mired in controversy due to human rights abuses in the area of the deposits. Zimbabwe’s courts have also held that the mining claims for the area are rightly those of African Consolidated Resources (Limited) (ACR). Notwithstanding the legal position, the Zimbabwe government
1 0 ‘Biti says donors unlikely to help Zimbabwe’, SW Radio Africa, 12 Mar. 2010,
155 Epilogue has forced ACR off the claims and established a complex web of joint-venture companies to mine them. These companies were selected by the ZANU(PF) Minister of Mines without tender and using dubious criteria. The boards of these companies have been partly selected by the same minister and comprise persons who the minister himself has admitted have soiled reputations in the diamond industry or are closely aligned with the ZANU(PF) elite. Clear evidence that diamonds are being smuggled out of Zimbabwe has brought the government into conflict with the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme. It is a widely held view that profits from the sales of diamonds are accruing to members of the ZANU(PF) elite and ZANU(PF) as a party.16 Despite the IMF’s view, the possibility of revenue from the sale of Chiadzwa diamonds has clearly led ZANU(PF) to hope that the economic problems of Zimbabwe will eventually be solved, and their impact on the businesses of the ZANU(PF) elite dissipated, without the need to comply with the governance demands of Western donor countries.17 For ZANU(PF), Chiazdwa diamonds may prove to be a substitute cash cow, adopting the function previously played by Zimbabwe’s Reserve Bank. Initial proclamations of an impending macro-economic recovery spurred by the inclusion of the MDC in government have fallen silent. It was stated, on the formation of the ‘unity government’, that Zimbabwe’s manufacturing sector, then running at a mere 10 per cent of capacity, could increase to 80 per cent within the first year.18 In fact, industry is currently estimated to be oper ating at only 20–40 per cent capacity,19 against a revised target of 60 per cent.20 Growth forecasts (which, it should be remembered, are calculated from a base of negative growth over a ten-year period) have been revised in 2010 from a projected 7% to 4.8%, with a suggestion that the figure might improve in the latter half of the year.21
16 See the reports Diamonds and Clubs: The Militarized Control of Diamonds and Power in Zimbabwe (Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, June 2010),
156 Slow Progress towards Democracy?
As Tsvangirai correctly pointed out in the reshuffle statement reproduced above, the recovery process within industry has been hampered by power short ages, with Zimbabwe importing and generating only 1,100 megawatts against a requirement of 2,000 megawatts.22 The shortage of power also affects the irrig ation of crops, reducing the output from large-scale commercial agriculture, where it still exists. Zimbabwe has always been a heavily agro-based economy.23 Certainly, it could be pointed out that ZANU(PF) has not been able to implement any economic policies which might further damage the economy and impede the supply of goods and services. These policies might have been the imposition of unrealistic price controls, prohibitions on the import of goods, ostensibly to protect local industry, or exorbitant import tariffs. ZANU(PF) no longer has the ability to implement such policies while the MDC retains control of the Ministry of Finance, and the support of the MDC formations is required to enact legislation. The latter aspect, of course, arises through the MDC formations’ majority in parliament, and not as a result of the GPA or ‘unity government’. Some evidence exists that with untrammelled power ZANU(PF) would implement detrimental economic policies on the basis of pure political expedi ence. In October 2007, the then ZANU(PF)-controlled parliament passed the Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act [Chapter 14 : 33]. The Act had no effect until the passage of implementing regulations. Since such regulations may be made by the ZANU(PF) minister administering the Act (Saviour Kasu kuwere), the MDC had no legislative power over the process or the means to prevent such regulations. In January 2010, the ‘Indigenization and Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations’ were gazetted.24 In accordance with the Act, the proclaimed objective of the regulations is that every business with an asset value of or above US$500,000 must, within five years, ‘cede a controlling interest of not less than 51% of the shares or interests therein to indigenous Zimbabweans’.25 Not surprisingly, these regulations had an immediate and adverse impact on the investment climate in Zimbabwe and undermined all the efforts made until then to attract foreign investment.26 The regulations caused
22 ‘Zimbabwe heavy industrial firms in electricity deals with foreign suppliers’, VOANews, 6 Aug. 2010,
157 Epilogue a storm of controversy, not only on account of the damage they inflicted on Zimbabwe’s economy but because the provisions of the regulations appeared more likely to facilitate cronyism and patronage than to empower Zimbabwe’s ‘indigenous’ population.27 While the heated debates over the regulations and investor flight continued, Tsvangirai chose the moment to issue another of his more astounding state ments (in a heavily contested field) manifesting severe cognitive dissonance. Addressing the question of investment in Zimbabwe at a World Economic Forum meeting in Dar es Salaam, Tsvangirai proclaimed, ‘The perceived risk on Zimbabwe does no longer exist’ (sic) adding: ‘The political crisis ... no longer exists. The country is making progress and it is time investors started looking at Zimbabwe from a different perspective.’ 28 Tsvangirai has, however, correctly noted that the majority of Zimbabweans continue to live in abject poverty. In April 2010 UNICEF’s Child-Sensitive Social Protection Unit in Zimbabwe reported that approximately 78 per cent of the population of Zimbabwe is absolutely poor and 55 per cent live below the food poverty line.29 Mugabe and ZANU(PF) have continued to blame ‘sanctions’ for Zim babwe’s economic collapse and inability to recover under the inclusive govern ment. In addition Mugabe has stated that there can be no ‘further concessions’ under the GPA until these ‘sanctions’ are removed.30 As stated elsewhere in this volume, these ‘sanctions’ consist mainly of travel restrictions and the freezing of foreign assets rather than economic sanctions as commonly understood, and their removal will do nothing to secure the loans necessary to restore economic development. The MDC has now joined the ZANU(PF) refrain for
2 7 ‘Indigenous’ was defined so that it effectively referred to black Zimbabweans, meaning that the legislation ought more properly be referred to as ‘black economic empowerment legislation’ as in South Africa rather than economic indigenization. For a detailed discussion of this legislation, see Derek Matyszak, Everything You Ever Wanted to Know (And Then Some) about Zimbabwe’s Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Legislation but (Quite Rightly) Were too Afraid to Ask (Harare: Research and Advocacy Unit, March 2010),
158 Slow Progress towards Democracy? the removal of ‘sanctions’.31 If the reason for so doing is to remove the issue as an excuse for ZANU(PF) obduracy, it is naive.32 ZANU(PF) will not suddenly allow the restoration of democracy in Zimbabwe simply because restrictive measures against its leadership have been removed. The excuse will merely be refined – for example, to assert that ‘illegal sanctions’ remain in the form of a failure to provide balance-of-payments support and debt relief, which, it would be claimed, Western governments are morally bound to give on account of their having ruined the economy, etc.33
Service delivery and education During the cholera crisis of late 2008 and early 2009, Western donors supplied humanitarian aid to deal with the crisis.34 Part of this aid paid the salaries of local health personnel, who returned to the jobs they had left owing to the inability of the state to pay their salaries. The donor community also attempted to address the cause of the cholera outbreak, supplying ‘humanitarian aid plus’ directed towards repairing and restoring Zimbabwe’s collapsed water and sewage reticulation systems.35 This aid was supplied before the inception of the ‘unity government’, but it is arguable that it would not have continued or have been provided in the same quantities without the ‘unity government’ or if the Ministry of Health had not been headed by an MDC minister. Furthermore, aid has been supplied through the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, established as a
31 ‘MDC campaigning for targeted sanctions removal’, SW Radio Africa, 21 Dec. 2009,
159 Epilogue conduit for aid that excludes any handling by ZANU(PF)-aligned government officials.36 This would not have been possible without the ‘unity government’, and Tsvangirai may correctly point to this as one of the positive aspects of the accord. However, the health services remain in a parlous and precarious state and are heavily dependent on continued donor support.37 The position in regard to schooling is bleak. Shortly after Tsvangirai lauded the fact that the government had managed to get the ‘schools up and running’ in his reshuffle statement, the MDC-M Minister of Education, Sport, Arts and Culture issued a statement describing education in Zimbabwe as being in a ‘catastrophic state’.38 While several teachers returned to work on the formation of the new government in solidarity with the MDC and on the understanding that their salaries would shortly be increased as the economic benefits of the ‘unity government’ enabled government to do so, schools remain critically short of teachers, classrooms and textbooks.39 Government has been unable to increase teachers’ salaries to a living wage, resulting in their moonlighting40 and in repeated strikes.41 In order to ease fiscal pressures, government is planning lay off temporary teachers, a substantial number of the total employed.42
Independent daily papers, the media and constitutional commissions There had been no independent daily newspaper in Zimbabwe since the closure of the Daily News in 2003.43 In May 2010, the newly constituted Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC) finally granted licences to publish to four media houses,44 and an independent daily, NewsDay,45 began circulation in June 2010; a further
36 ‘IMF agrees to set up multi donor trust fund for Zimbabwe’, SW Radio Africa, 28 Apr. 2009,
160 Slow Progress towards Democracy? four licences followed in July 2010.46 The establishment of the constitutional commissions and the reappearance of an independent daily newspaper have been cited by the MDC as evidence of incremental progress being made by virtue of the GPA and the ‘unity government’. This claim obscures a less palatable reality. The constitutional commissions which now form part of chapter XB of the constitution did not come into existence by virtue of the GPA or Constitutional Amendment No. 19.47 A form of the ZMC appeared as the Media and Informa tion Commission in the Orwellian Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA). The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), Human Rights Commission and Anti-Corruption Commis sion were already part of the constitution. In the latter part of 2007 ZANU(PF) and the MDC came to an agreement which included a raft of legislative reforms.48 These reforms made democratic changes to the method of appointment of commissioners to ZEC and the ZMC, previously under the control of the President, and included a constitutional amendment which, inter alia, introduced a Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission.49 With the exception of the Anti-Corruption Commission, by virtue of the 2007 reforms all commissions now comprise persons appointed by the President from lists submitted by the parliamentary Committee on Standing Rules and Orders (CSRO).50 This is an extremely powerful committee in any parliament based upon a Westminster-style system. In Zimbabwe, not only does the CSRO have some control over the selection of commissioners, various other parliamentary committees (such as the important Legal Committee) are also dependent upon its prior establishment.51 Despite (or possibly because of) the importance of the CSRO as a locus of MDC power, the establishment of this body was inexplicably delayed until April 2009. One would have expected the MDC to ensure the establishment the CSRO as soon as possible.
46 ‘Media Commission issues four more licenses, but AIPPA still stands’, SW Radio Africa, 29 July 2010,
161 Epilogue
A leitmotif of this book is that the power that MDC gained after the elections of 2008 is located in the ability of the combined formations to com mand a parliamentary majority rather than in the structure of the executive and distribution of executive powers.52 The MDC’s parliamentary majority is reflected in the CSRO.53 This afforded the MDC the opportunity to ensure that the list of nominees submitted to the President for appointment to the commissions comprised persons with some sympathy for democratic values. However, this power has been undermined by the GPA and the ‘unity government’. The MDC appears to have been persuaded by ZANU(PF) that the government’s principle of ‘power-sharing’ requires that commission posts are distributed along lines which roughly reflect the parliamentary strengths of each party – using the perceived political affiliation or sympathies of the nominees as a criterion.54 No such political proportionality exists in the executive, with executive power heavily weighted in ZANU(PF)’s favour. Under normal circumstances political proportionality in the commissions could be said to be the correct and democratic approach. However, given the undemocratic composition of the executive in the current circumstances, this consideration should arguably give way to the democratic advantage of strengthening the doctrine of separation of powers with an extremely powerful check upon this executive through the commissions. As will been seen from the analysis of the commissions that follows, this opportunity has been lost. The position is symptomatic of an approach where any power held by MDC is to be shared under the principles of power-sharing, unity and inclusiveness; yet any power vesting in the President is treated as being his exclusive domain, notwithstanding provisions in the GPA to the contrary. With this approach, basic mathematics shows the MDC, which won the majority of votes in the election, holding only 25 per cent of political power.
52 Because of this, it was suggested (Chapter Five) that Mugabe might use his power to prorogue parliament for lengthy periods. The same effect has been achieved without the necessity of Mugabe exercising this power. For example, in the nine-month second session of the seventh parliament, the House of Assembly sat only on thirty occasions, many of these sittings being for only ten minutes. As a result, little reformist legislation has been debated, and a private member’s bill seeking to amend POSA has not proceeded past the second reading: Veritas, Bill Watch, 30/2010 (31 July 2010), available at
162 Slow Progress towards Democracy?
The Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC) Pursuant to the Mbeki-brokered negotiations mentioned above, legislation establishing the ZMC in its present form was passed by parliament in late 2007.55 The Media and Information Commission (MIC) established by AIPPA was replaced by the ZMC, though the new ZMC was to have the same function as the defunct MIC. A ZMC is also established by the constitution by virtue of Constitutional Amendment No. 19.56 While the composition of the ZMC established by the constitution is identical to that established by AIPPA, its functions are not. The Fourth Schedule to the Act also sets out conditions in relation to terms of office (which the constitution does not) and prescribes conditions of appointment for commissioners which differ from the constitutional body, creating considerable legislative confusion. However, it has been generally assumed that the two bodies are the same and that the ZMC established by the constitution will carry out the functions provided for and given to a ZMC by AIPPA. These functions involve the regulation by the ZMC of printed media, including the licensing and the accreditation of journalists.57 Most importantly the composition of the ZMC established by the constitution and AIPPA differs significantly from the former MIC. Whereas the MIC had comprised no more than five persons appointed by the minister after consultation with or on the instruction of the President,58 the new ZMC must comprise a chairperson and eight other members appointed by the President from a list of not fewer than twelve nominees submitted by the parliamentary Committee on Standing Rules and Orders.59 As a result, the possibility arose for a list of nominees who were all sympathetic to ensuring of freedom of the press (or at least very few opposed to such a notion) to be submitted to the President, leaving Mugabe with little choice other than to appoint a more benign body than the previous MIC.60 Having delayed the establishment of CSRO which was to submit the list of nominees to the ZMC to the President, parliament began its selection process
55 The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Amendment Act (No. 20 of 2007). 56 Section 100N. 5 7 Sections 66 and 79 of the Act. 58 Section 40 of the Act: ‘The Board shall consist of no fewer than five members and not more than seven members (at least three of whom shall be nominated by an association of journalists or an association of media houses, or both) appointed by the Minister after consultation with the President and in accordance with any directions that the President may give him.’ The association of journalists carrying out this function was ZANU(PF)-aligned. 59 Section 38 of the amended Act. 60 Both Zimbabwe’s High Court and Supreme Court held that the head of the MIC, Dr Tafatona Mahoso, was biased against the publishing house ANZ, and had refused its application for a licence on this basis. A reconstituted MIC was directed to reconsider the application: ‘MIC divided over ANZ fate’, Financial Gazette, 9 Mar. 2006.
163 Epilogue only in August 2009, by interviewing proposed candidates. A scorecard marked against pre-agreed criteria was used in the interview of twenty-seven candidates. However, this method of selecting nominees did not determine the list sent to the President. ZANU(PF) was unhappy with the final list and the MDC inexplicably allowed the list to be altered. Several eminently suitable candidates were removed61 and ZANU(PF)-aligned candidates added – some of whom had fared extremely badly in the interview process.62 Parliamentarian Tongai Matutu claims that the list had been altered because ‘the politicians had their own list’ and compromise was necessary to avoid an ‘impasse’.63 Yet if any impasse had resulted, the correct course of action would have been to demand that Mugabe and ZANU(PF) follow the legal provisions establishing the ZMC. The compromise thus seems to have been made through fear of Mugabe flouting constitutional requirements and refusing to appoint a commission at all. It took until December 2009 for ‘the politicians’ to reach a consensus on the list which ‘the CSRO’ would eventually submit. The lack of urgency in the process continued. The establishment of the ZMC was gazetted only on 19 February 2010, with the appointed commissioners believed to be fairly evenly balanced between those perceived as sympathetic to ZANU(PF) and the MDC‑T.64 The commission held its first meeting only in March 2010, eventu ally licensing its first publications in May 2010. The plaudits which followed this ‘success’ in opening democratic space ought to be tempered by several important considerations. Firstly, the final choice of commissioners was a significant concession by the MDC without noticeable reciprocity from ZANU(PF). In addition, to the astonishment of journalists, the discredited chair of the former MIC, Tafa taona Mahoso, re-emerged to head the secretariat.65 The appointments were evidence of further political weakness and pliancy on the part of MDC which contributed towards a pattern of power dynamics within the ‘unity government’,
61 Including Roger Stringer, a well-known and respected publisher who had scored highly in the interview process; see fn. 63. 62 For example Christopher Mutsvangwa, former Zimbabwean ambassador to China, whose suit ability as a commissioner is highly questionable: see ‘Mutsvangwa lashes out at journalists’, Zim babwe Times, 24 Jan. 2010, available at
164 Slow Progress towards Democracy? with the MDC allowing itself to be dominated by ZANU(PF) in areas where it could have asserted authority. The result was an increase in ZANU(PF) arrog ance and arrogation of power and an increase in the sense of resignation and powerlessness within the MDC. Secondly, the basic demand of those journalists and others seeking to open democratic space in Zimbabwe is that the media should be self-regulating (as is common in democracies) and not subject to the control of the state.66 The powers given to the ZMC under AIPPA are regarded as having a chilling effect on freedom of expression, and demands have been made for the repeal of AIPPA in its entirety.67 ZANU(PF) has shown no inclination for allowing the state’s control over the printed media to be eased. While the MDC has proposed the replacement of AIPPA with less restrictive legislation through a Media Practitioners Act, the necessary bill is still at the drafting stage and is unlikely to be debated before 2011;68 in any event, the MDC bill retains the requirement of licensing and accreditation of journalists. The composition of the current commission has certainly led to a more liberal approach towards the press. Apart from the licensing of new publications, journalists report that they have been able to obtain accreditation without any obstacles being placed in their paths.69 However, this liberal attitude is dependent upon personalities and whim and is not due to structural reform. The space may thus be quickly closed on the basis of future political considerations.70 Thirdly, the increased flow of information and opening of democratic space will have little effect in the rural areas, where information is gained primarily through the electronic media. The electronic media is controlled through the Broadcasting Services Authority of Zimbabwe.71 ZANU(PF) is intent upon main taining close control of the electronic media. Although there was nothing in the GPA requiring that its board be reconstituted, in October 2009 the ZANU(PF) Minister of Media, Information and Publicity, Webster Shamu, announced his
66 ‘Media hopes dashed as confusion shrouds ZMC’, Zimbabwe Independent, 22 Jan. 2010,
165 Epilogue appointment of a new board, suggesting either that the parties had agreed to the appointment of a new board or that the five-year term of office of members had come to an end.72 The Shamu-appointed board comprised ZANU(PF) loyalists, with Tafatona Mahoso as chair.73 However, the minister has the power only to fill vacancies on the board74 and not to appoint it. The twelve-member board is appointed by the President, nine ‘after consultation’ with the minister and the CSRO, and three from a list of six submitted by the CSRO.75 As presidential appointments, the GPA and constitution require Tsvangirai’s consent to them. The board is thus not legally constituted, having been appointed neither by the president, nor with Tsvangirai’s consent. No broadcasting licences have been issued by the board to end the monopoly of the state in this regard. The board of Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings, also appointed by Shamu, similarly comprises solely ZANU(PF) loyalists.76 Notwithstanding its dubious legality, the extent to which board intends to retain control over the electronic media space is reflected in the fact that it has sought to close information services (including one established by the Prime Minister’s office) delivered by cell phone whereby a caller can receive pre-recorded information. The board has claimed that these services constitute broadcasting which require licensing by the board.77 Finally, legislation relating to criminal defamation and ‘undermining the authority of or insulting the President’ 78 can be unleashed at any time, re storing repressive conditions and fostering self-censorship. The appearance of an independent daily caused Zimbabwe to rise five points on Freedom House’s press freedom rankings, but it still remains the lowest in the region and is rated 181st of 196 countries.79
The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) To suggest that the ZEC which conducted the 2008 elections was biased in favour of ZANU(PF) would be to minimize its role in this regard. It was little
72 Paragraph 1 of the Third Schedule to the Act. 73 The reconstitution of the board is reportedly part of the recently agreed ‘implementation matrix’ (see below). 74 Paragraph 5 of the Third Schedule to the Act. 75 Section 4(2) of the Broadcasting Services Act. 7 6 ‘Mugabe’s men to block media reform: Analysts’, Zimonline, 7 Oct. 2009,
166 Slow Progress towards Democracy? more than a mechanism by which ZANU(PF) strategy was implemented, as the debacle over the vote recount and delay in announcing election results re vealed (see Chapters Two and Three). The mandatory statutory report on the elections compiled by ZEC for presentation to the President and parliament80 egregiously makes no mention of the endemic violence before the presidential run-off election, now admitted by all, other than to say: ‘According to the police, save for some parts of Mashonaland Central and Mashonaland East provinces where some incidents of interparty violence were reported, the rest of the country was generally peaceful.’81 ZEC now comprises a chairperson, appointed by the President after consul tation with the Judicial Service Commission and the CSRO, and eight other members appointed by the President from a list of not fewer than twelve nom inees submitted by the CSRO. The reconstitution of ZEC with a significant number of reform-minded members is a positive step and may prove to be one of the most useful instruments in the attempt to advance democracy in Zim babwe. However, this salutary development is not unadulterated and is again tainted by the MDC’s seemingly unnecessary compromise on the nominees to this vitally important body. ZEC’s report on the 2008 elections was not debated in parliament and the opportunity to expose the failings of the commissioners responsible for its contents lost. Two of the previous commissioners responsible for the report were reappointed to the new ZEC.82 Furthermore, Justice Mtambanengwe was appointed as chairperson. This appointment is curious for two reasons. Firstly, Prof. Reginald Austin, who had been proposed by the MDC for this position, was quite obviously the most qualified candidate, as a lawyer with extensive international experience in electoral observation and electoral management.83 Secondly, Justice Mtambanengwe is an elderly sitting judge of the Namibian Supreme Court, whose health appears fragile. These factors mean that he is unable to be present at all ZEC meetings or to attend to its responsibilities
80 Required by section 12 of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act [Chapter 2 : 12]. The report was presented on 13 May 2009, five months after the statutory deadline. 81 See D. Matyszak, Hear no Evil, See no Evil, Speak no Evil: A Critique of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Report on the 2008 General Elections ([Harare]: Research and Advocacy Unit, 2009), available at
167 Epilogue other than on a sporadic basis and cannot give robust direction to its affairs.84 As deputy chairperson, Joyce Kazembe, of the previous and discredited ZEC, effectively heads the body.85 There are several other adverse factors that affect the salutary operation of ZEC. ZEC has not attempted to replace the senior members of its secretariat, all of whom are partisan appointees acceptable to ZANU(PF), and has no general power to replace the Chief Elections Officer without the authority of Minister of Justice.86 The Minister of Justice must also approve electoral regulations made by ZEC in terms of the Electoral Act.87 These provisions are unsatisfactory in that the minister is not a politically impartial actor in the electoral process. The Minister of Foreign Affairs also has the power to veto the accreditation of any foreign elections observer.88 It should be noted that, as was the case with the Zimbabwe Media Commission, in establishing the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission in terms of Constitutional Amendment No. 19, no proper consideration was given to the existing provisions of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission Act in relation to the duties, powers and terms of office of the commissioners. The result is two conflicting laws causing unnecessary confusion.89 For example, the constitution provides that the term of office of commissioners is six years; the Act provides for five years.90 Despite these unsatisfactory provisions, they should not detract from the fact that the commission still has power over the conduct of the elections, must ensure that they are free and fair, and will be expected to table a suitably critical report if accepted international standards for a democratic election are not met.91 If the next elections do not meet these standards, given the composition of ZEC, the body is likely to be split by internal dissensions in this regard. and it is difficult to see a report on the elections emerging with the agreement of all. Nonetheless, there will be no repeat of a report on the elections reflecting the views of the commission as a whole which falsely certifies the elections as meeting democratic standards while the current commissioners are in office. ZEC is also responsible for the maintenance and custody of the electoral
8 4 ‘Elections chief to operate from Namibia, Zimonline, 12 Feb. 2010,
168 Slow Progress towards Democracy? roll,92 a responsibility that the previous ZEC (unlawfully) left in the hands of the widely distrusted Registrar-General of Voters.93 The inflated voters’ rolls, containing the names of deceased persons and duplicate entries, has long been believed to facilitate electoral fraud.94 The new ZEC has the power to ensure that an accurate national voters’ roll is in place before the next election.95
The Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) The appointment of commissioners to the ZHRC, first established by Constitu tional Amendment No. 18,96 unlike those to the ZMC and ZEC, cannot presently be viewed as a positive achievement. The President appoints the chair to the commission, ‘after consultation with’ the Judicial Service Commission and CSRO, and appoints eight other members from a list of sixteen nominees submitted by the CSRO, at least four of whom must be women.97 Persons appointed to the ZHRC must be chosen for ‘their knowledge of and experience in the promotion of social justice or the protection of human rights and freedoms’. In contrast to the intense political manoeuvring that took place around the appointments to the ZMC and ZEC, the MDC and ZANU(PF) paid little heed to the composition of this body, an indication of its powerlessness. An Act of Parliament is to confer power on the ZHRC to enable it to carry out its functions;98 however, no such act has been passed nor is one even on the agenda for the next parliamentary session.99 No monies were apportioned for the operations of the body in the 2010 budget, and it has neither the offices nor infrastructure necessary to carry out any activities. Even more telling is the fact that it is presently not properly constituted, and any action taken by it would be subject to legal challenge. The improper constitution arises from the fact that five of the eight appointees selected from the CSRO list are men. At least four must be women. The breach arose from the fact that one of the five men is named Carroll Khombe.100 Having interviewed Prof. Khombe, the
92 Section 100C(1)(c) and (d) of the constitution. 93 See Chapter Five in this regard. 9 4 See, generally, D. Matyszak, 2013 Vision – Seeing Double and the Dead: A Preliminary Audit of Zimbabwe’s Voters’ Roll ([Harare]: Research and Advocacy Unit, 2009), available at
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CSRO was presumably aware of his sex (notwithstanding his first name). Those involved in the political horse-trading that determined the appointees appear not to have been, indicating the disinterest of those involved in the selection process.101 Prof. Khombe is a researcher in animal science and has no known human- rights record. The only one of the eight who might be said to meet this criterion for selection is law lecturer Ellen Sithole, who has been involved in women’s rights, though is not a prominent activist. Rather than having a record of advancing human rights, several of the commissioners have a reputation for the opposite. Jacob Mudenda is a former governor of Matabeleland North. He has been accused of interfering with development and food aid for people in the Binga area, which, despite rampant poverty, has resolutely voted for the MDC.102 He was implicated in the ‘Willowgate’ car scheme scandal.103 Joseph Kurebwa heads the political science department at the University of Zimbabwe. He gained some notoriety by conducting a ‘poll’ (reportedly in collaboration with the CIO and disowned by the university)104 predicting that Mugabe would beat his rivals in the 2008 elections, and in comments supporting a ban by police on public demonstrations: The police are incapacitated. The World Cup is one area they need to focus on, but I think the broader perspective of these bans is to do with the constitution outreach programme, which needs the police to be on high alert. … I know some people are now thinking some political party has started to use POSA again, but let us face the reality, no party would want to come to power without a strict security law. It is in the interest of the country and such laws are important.105 Such sentiments do not inspire confidence that he has the perspective required to protect civil liberties in Zimbabwe.
1 0 1 The Zimbabwe Independent outlined the curricula vitae of the commissioners and referred to Prof. Khombe as ‘she’ throughout; see ‘Scepticism greets rights commission’, Zimbabwe Independent, 9 Apr. 2010,
170 Slow Progress towards Democracy?
Elasto Mugwadi is a former Chief Immigration Officer, well known to human rights groups for his defiance of a High Court order interdicting his deportation of outspoken journalist, Andrew Meldrum. The other commissioners have qualifications in social science, political science and economics. The ZHRC is headed by Prof. Reginald Austin, presumably as part of the compromise which denied him the chair of ZEC (see above). The composition of this commission is something of a mockery when one considers the theoretical importance and role of a body of this nature. It should also be noted that the introduction of a Human Rights Com mission was first mooted by the ZANU(PF) Minister of Justice 106in 2005. Since most international forums (to which successful communications have been made by human rights organizations concerning rights abuses by the Zimbabwe government) require that local remedies be exhausted first,107 the proposal was perceived to be intended to establish a government-controlled hurdle in the form of this local ‘remedy’.108 When active, the ZHRC will still act as an inhibiting mechanism before these bodies can be approached.
The Anti-Corruption Commission ZANU(PF) and Mugabe have remained in power through electoral violence and an extensive web of patronage, in which the land invasions were an important component. Mugabe is unlikely to permit the existence of an anti- corruption body that threatens this system of patronage. Significantly, the Anti- Corruption Commission was not included when the changes to the method of appointments to the other commissions considered here were introduced in 2007. Until Constitutional Amendment No. 19, the commission consisted of ‘at least four and not more than nine members appointed by the President’ in his sole discretion.109 Constitutional Amendment No. 19 added the phrase ‘in consultation with the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders’ but
106 See, for example, ‘Chinamasa censures NGOs’, Zimbabwe Independent, 18 Mar. 2005,
171 Epilogue anomalously eschewed the formula of using a list submitted by CSRO that was adopted for all the other commissions.110 This body is yet to be appointed. ZANU(PF)’s antipathy to any probe into corrupt activities is reflected in a reluctance to undertake the land audit provided for by the GPA.111 It also emerged, when the Minister of Finance, Tendai Biti, suggested to Cabinet that an investigation be undertaken to establish how the Reserve Bank of Zim babwe became so heavily indebted, that its assets were being auctioned to settle with creditors.112 The suggestion was greeted with outrage by ZANU(PF) Cabinet ministers. As indicated elsewhere in this volume, the Reserve Bank has played a key role in the dispensing of patronage to ZANU(PF) and, besides the distribution of farm inputs and machinery and foreign currency, it is doubtful that its commercial ventures with ZANU(PF) officials were entered into at arm’s length.113 Biti has not sought to exercise his power under the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Act to conduct a full audit of the Bank.114 ZANU(PF) officials have also (unlawfully) prevented a parliamentary com mittee from investigating corruption and rights violations in diamond mining in Chiadzwa, blocking its attempts to visit the area.115 Farai Maguwu, who has exposed human rights abuses taking place in Chiadzwa, has been arrested and charged with ‘publishing or communicating false statements prejudicial to the State’.116 A similar fate befell Harare City Councillors who reported corruption in the sale of municipal properties to senior ZANU(PF) officials by members of the previous municipal administration. They have been charged with criminal defamation,117 providing an interesting cameo and microcosm of the interplay
11 0 Section 100K of the current constitution. 111 Article 5.9(a). 11 2 ‘Biti storms out of Cabinet’, Zimbabwe Independent, 18 June 2010,
172 Slow Progress towards Democracy? between the ZANU(PF)-controlled executive and democratic power in the hands of the MDC.
The abuse of power and the implementation of the GPA A comprehensive review of the abuses of power and violations of the GPA has been done elsewhere will not be attempted here.118 Only the more salient aspects are highlighted below. After a brief initial period of restraint on the formation of the ‘unity government’, the use of repressive state machinery for party political purposes and to the benefit of senior ZANU(PF) officials has continued. The police and military have facilitated continued land seizures, often in violation of court orders. The police, working in tandem with the Attorney-General’s office, have arrested numerous MDC activists, MPs and officials on spurious charges and declined to act against ZANU(PF) offenders, despite clear evidence against them of criminality – highlighting the need for the need for the Attorney-General and the Commissioner-General of Police to be replaced by non-partisan individuals. Public meetings and demonstrations have once more been prohibited, with the MDC co-Minister of Home Affairs supporting the bans in some instances or unable to take any steps to allow public protests to take place. ZANU(PF) has also used its control of the electronic media to broadcast a set of jingles, every half hour, in a manner which indicates that they are official signature tunes rather than a broadcast of music. The lyrics of the jingles emphasize that Mugabe and ZANU(PF) retain political power, but the real message of political power is conveyed by brazenly flaunting the ability to co-opt the state broadcaster for party political purposes, with the MDC powerless to prevent this.119 The state-controlled press has continued to denigrate the MDC-T and Morgan Tsvangirai on a daily basis. In October, 2009 Mugabe finally appointed five MDC ambassadors for Zimbabwe as required. However, when the key post of the Ambassador to South Africa became vacant, Mugabe filled it by seconding the ambassador from Russia. However, this ambassadorial reshuffle was arguably a reassignment rather than appointment which required Tsvangirai’s consent. Mugabe has continued to make other appointments under the constitution and legislation unilaterally without Tsvangirai’s consent, in violation of the constitution and GPA. In May 2010 he appointed four new judges, appointed ZANU(PF)
118 See the regular GNU Watch published by Idasa,
173 Epilogue stalwart Justice Chiweshe as Judge President, and elevated Justice Makarau to the Supreme Court.120 The term of office of the Commissioner-General of Police has also expired, requiring Tsvangirai’s consent for the replacement or reappointment. More significantly, there is no indication that the long-standing dispute over the appointment of Provincial Governors will be resolved.
The SADC response The Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC), established under the GPA to resolve disputes in implementation,121 has proved utterly ineffectual and irrelevant in settling anything other than minor and peripheral issues relating to the GPA, and has essentially been sidelined and ignored by the parties. There is little point in referring issues to this body, which will simply repeat the debates raised by the parties in ongoing negotiations. JOMIC has no powers of enforcement and its composition mirrors that of the negotiation meetings. SADC has proved reluctant to confront Mugabe’s blatant refusal to imple ment aspects of the GPA which fetter his power. The issue of the appointment of Provincial Governors is illustrative. Mugabe initially claimed that he was entitled to appoint the ten governors unilaterally on the basis that the appointments were made in August 2008 before the signing of the GPA, ignoring the fact that they violated the July 2008 MOU between the parties.122 However, the communiqué issued after the extra-ordinary SADC summit in January 2009 in South Africa directed the parties to consider the formula for the distribution of governors and enter into dialogue on all the outstanding issues relating to the implementation of the GPA.123 On 21 May 2009, Tsvangirai announced that an agreement had been reached to split these posts, with ZANU(PF) receiving four, the MDC-T five, and the MDC-M one.124 ZANU(PF) immediately contradicted this, claiming that it was to have the five and that the appointments would only be made when the governors had served a full year.125 August 2009 came and went, with Mugabe then insisting that he had fully
120 ‘Tsvangirai to confront Mugabe over appointment of judges’, SW Radio Africa, 24 May 2010,
174 Slow Progress towards Democracy? complied with the GPA and that there were no outstanding issues except that of ‘sanctions’.126 The MDC hoped that a SADC summit in Kinshasa the fol lowing month would address Mugabe’s recalcitrance in this regard and a host of other issues. Instead, the Communiqué issued merely noted the ‘progress made in the implementation of the Global Political Agreement’ and called for sanctions against Zimbabwe to be removed.127 The MDC then announced that it was disengaging from all forums which required it to interact with ZANU(PF), including Cabinet and the Council of Ministers, until its concerns about the implementation of the GPA were met. These concerns related to the appointment of the Provincial Governors, the Governor of the Reserve Bank and the Attorney-General, Mugabe’s refusal to appoint the MDC’s nominee, Roy Bennett, as Deputy Minister of Agriculture, violence against MDC sup porters, and numerous other issues.128 The pull-out created the necessary sense of urgency within SADC, and, in the face of objections from Mugabe, the issue was considered by the SADC summit of the Troika of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation in November 2009. For the first time, the SADC summit explicitly opposed Mugabe and directed compliance with the requirements of its January communiqué in relation to the outstanding issues. The summit further decided that ‘the political parties signatory to the GPA should engage in dialogue with immediate effect within fifteen (15) days not beyond thirty (30) days’.129 What ‘with immediate effect within fifteen days’ was meant to mean is obscure. The MDC claimed that it was intended that the outstanding issues were to be resolved within thirty days. The MDC had indicated that it would not re-engage with ZANU(PF) until these issues had been resolved.130 Despite the non-resolution of the issues, the MDC ministers attended Cabinet meetings and the Council of Ministers immediately after the summit, the capitulation presumably being reciprocation for SADC paying heed to the MDC’s protest to the extent of directing Mugabe to discuss issues which he had claimed were not open to negotiation.
126 ‘Editor’s Memo: Zanu PF contemptuous of Sadc resolutions’, Zimbabwe Independent, 21 Aug. 2009,
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The dialogue that followed, as with much within the Zimbabwean polity, again bordered on the ludicrous. The parties and newly appointed South African facilitators bogged the process down in self-inflicted bureaucratic procedures which seemed designed to remove any urgency and to delay having to deal with seemingly intractable issues.131 The process adopted was that the negotiators from each party were to discuss the issue, then report to their principals; the South African facilitators were to consider what the principals had to say and report to South African President Jacob Zuma; Zuma was to report to the Troika, and the Troika would report to the SADC summit. The first stages of this process proceeded painfully slowly, as the negotiators were rarely in the country simultaneously, prioritizing minor international conferences ahead of negotiations. A similar situation arose when the negotiators had dealt with the issue and the matter moved up to the principals.132 In April 2010, the parties reportedly agreed an ‘implementation matrix’ which dealt with 24 of 27 areas of dispute except the ‘toxic issues’ of the appointments of the Attorney-General, Governor of the Reserve Bank, and the MDC Deputy Minister of Agriculture designate.133 This implementation matrix was presented to the SADC Troika on the eve of the August SADC summit in Namibia and adopted by it with an instruction that the outstanding issues be implemented within thirty days, though again with no suggestion as to what was to happen if this was not done.134 The SADC communiqué after the summit made no mention of the agreement to implement the GPA, but again called for the lifting of sanctions. A few days later ZANU(PF)’s Minister of Justice indicated that the swearing-in of governors would only take place concurrently with the lifting of ‘sanctions’.135 Mugabe later said that he would not make any more ‘concessions’ to the MDC until ‘sanctions’ were removed.136 The ZANU(PF) position thus indicates no advance on the implementation of
1 31 ‘GNU: Lost urgency music to Zanu PF’, Zimbabwe Independent, 30 July 10,
176 Slow Progress towards Democracy? the GPA. Rounds of negotiations followed by further unmet deadlines fixed by SADC thus appear set to continue.
The constitution-making process and national healing The constitution-making process and the establishment of an Organ on National Healing have been cited by both Mugabe and Tsvangirai as positive achievements of the inclusive government and as an indication that the poli tical arrangement is ‘working’.137 Tsvangirai avoided mention of either in his speech announcing the ministerial reshuffle, and wisely so. The programme for national healing is stymied because the most common response to those canvassing the opinion of the populace on this issue is that there can be no healing or reconciliation without justice, or at the very least some form of truth-telling.138 This ZANU(PF) is not prepared to countenance, has proposed the opposite, and insisted that there will be no retribution or other action taken against perpetrators of political violence.139 The constitution-making process has largely descended into farce. The time frame for the process was set out in the GPA, but discretely excluded from the constitution when Constitutional Amendment No. 19 was adopted;140 it has not been followed and is way behind the twenty-month schedule agreed for the process. Although the first stakeholders’ conference was convened on time, it descended into chaos as some ZANU(PF) delegates disrupted the proceedings by pelting speakers and co-delegates with water bottles and other items and breaking into song to prevent the proceedings from taking place.141 As the process began, so it has continued. There have been disputes over who should manage the process, the composition of the thematic com mittees, choice of rapporteurs, financing, security and whether the ‘Kariba Draft’ should be used as the starting point for the process.142 The process of
1 3 7 See Chapter Seven. 138 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Taking Transitional Justice to the People: Outreach Report (Harare: The Forum, Vol. 1, 2009; Vol. 2, 2010), available at
177 Epilogue public consultation known as the outreach programme has been marred by intimidation and violence, with ZANU(PF) loyalists directing that only a select few speak at the meetings and then often from prepared scripts which reflect the party view,143 particularly on the retention of presidential powers and the question of term limits for the President.144 Those ignoring those directions have been beaten up by ZANU(PF) youths. The presence of known CIO operatives at many of the outreach meetings has been regarded as intimidatory, as is probably intended. The level of violence has reached such proportions that meetings have been cancelled and the MDC has contemplated pulling out of the process altogether.145 The outreach programme, in progress at the time of writing, ought to have been concluded by 13 November 2009. The programme has been a massive logistical undertaking of considerable expense,146 but is little more than a public-relations exercise in which a passing nod is given to democratic process and consultation. Without a rigorous and systematic method of collecting and processing inputs from the public meet ings and confining those inputs to matter of broad principle rather than detail, it will be impossible to process the contributions. It is also unclear how a determination is to be made as to which viewpoints should be adopted and which rejected. For example, if this is to be done on the basis of majority senti ment, some tabulation of the numbers for or against a particular proposition is required. This is not taking place. The matter will ultimately be left to the multi-party parliamentary drafting committee,147 and the final outcome will thus reflect political compromise rather than ‘the views of the people’. As noted in Chapter Seven, regardless of whether the final document is
143 Referred to as Operation Chimumumu [deaf and dumb] and Operation Vhara Muromo [shut your mouth]; see ‘Zanu (PF) launches operation chimumumu’, The Zimbabwean, 8 June 2010,
178 Slow Progress towards Democracy? approved by way of referendum, a two-thirds vote in favour of the draft in parliament is required before it would become law, requiring support for the document by both ZANU(PF) and MDC. The MDC is thus likely to com promise on the draft to be put to a referendum in order to ensure that it is not vetoed in parliament by ZANU(PF).148
Analysis and prognosis Given that ZANU(PF) can ensure, though its power of a veto in the House of Assembly, that only a document acceptable to it emerges from the constitution- making process, the question arises as to why it has mobilized its supporters and intimidatory machinery to interfere with the process. The extent of this mobilization was not anticipated in previous chapters precisely on account of this residual veto power which renders it unnecessary. With the benefit of hindsight, however, it is clear that ZANU(PF) could not allow a programme of this scale to take place at national level without an overt display of control of the process. This relates to the necessity of being seen to be in charge, as discussed in Chapter Seven. It is not coincidental that the lyrics of the jingles referred to above emphasize the fact that real power in the current government lies with Mugabe and the Vice-Presidents, belittling Tsvangirai’s status.149 Furthermore, in the same way that the constitutional referendum of 2000 provided a valuable litmus test of support for ZANU(PF),150 so, too, the current process allows ZANU(PF) to assess the extent of its current ability to control the rural electorate. This assessment is necessary in the consideration of the timing of the next elections, an issue which is the subject of much speculation in Zimbabwe at present. The Constitution requires that the next elections are held before June 2013.151 Although it is frequently and variously stated that the GPA requires that elections be held within two years of the formation of the inclusive gov ernment or after the adoption of a new constitution, the GPA, significantly, makes no mention of the requirement to hold an election within a specified time-frame, indicating that both parties wished to leave the possibility of what was announced as a transitional arrangement lasting the full five-year life-span of parliament.
148 Before it is presented for the referendum, the parliamentary committee must present it to a Second Stakeholders Conference, which is likely to be as raucous as the first. 149 The second occasion where ZANU(PF) propaganda has some correlation to the facts, the first being its slogan ‘Land is the Economy and the Economy is Land’. 150 See the Foreword in this regard. 1 51 The life of parliament is five years, calculated from the day the President enters office. Local government, parliamentary and presidential elections must be held simultaneously – sections 28(3) and 58(1) of the constitution.
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Tsvangirai is required to give his consent before the dissolution of parliament as a prelude to elections.152 However, it is likely the GPA will be terminated before any election. The bulk of the provisions of Constitutional Amendment No. 19 apply only while the GPA is in existence.153 Upon either party’s with drawal from the GPA, the exclusive power of the President to call elections is restored. There is some political cost in being seen to be the ‘spoiler’ who withdraws from the GPA, for which reason ZANU(PF) may seek to force the MDC to do so through its continued obduracy and refusal to implement its provisions, or by similar tactics creating an environment where it is stating the obvious to claim that the agreement is not working. There are several cross-currents which make it difficult to predict whether Mugabe will call an election sooner rather than later. Those that flow towards the former are as follows: Many are yet to recover from the violence of 2008. With an atmosphere of fear still prevalent in many rural areas, manipulation of the rural electorate can be achieved through intimidation rather than overt violence. This would make it easier for ZANU(PF) to present itself as legitimately elected. A similar situation prevailed in 2005, when ZANU(PF) regained its two-thirds majority in parliament with significantly less violence than usual, relying on the intimidatory effect of the extreme violence of 2002.154 In 2013 Mugabe will be 89 years old, and it is difficult to state with confidence that his health will be robust enough for him to be the figurehead required on the hustings by ZANU(PF) and to hold the party together.155 Anecdotal evidence that ZANU(PF) has recovered financially to fund an election campaign,156 and the deep visceral distaste for sitting in Cabinet alongside MDC ministers, also point towards an early election. Similarly, reports from the rural areas claim that ZANU(PF)’s behaviour suggests that it is gearing up for an election. The jingles referred to above are cited as further evidence of this. However, these apparent indications of early electioneering are easily confused with ZANU(PF)’s desire to demonstrate political control during the constitution-making process and concomitant referendum. If a compromised constitutional draft emerges from the process as anticipated, existing fissures
152 Article 20.1.3(q) of Schedule 8 to the constitution. 153 Section 115(2) of the constitution. 1 5 4 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Of Stuffed Ballots and Empty Stomachs: Reviewing Zimbabwe’s 2005 Parliamentary Election and Post-Election Period (Harare: The Forum, July 2005). 155 See, for example, ‘Is age taking its toll on Mugabe’s health?’, Daily News, 24 Aug. 2010,
180 Slow Progress towards Democracy? within the MDC may widen, as grassroots cadres, dismayed by the compromise, lobby for a ‘No’ vote against the ‘Yes’ vote of those within the party that support the compromise. A debilitating rift of this nature within the MDC may provide an incentive for Mugabe to call an election at this moment. Mugabe has, however, stated that there will be elections in early 2011, with or without a new constitution.157 SADC and Jacob Zuma are also reported to want the Zimbabwe impasse resolved through elections in 2011.158 On the other hand ZANU(PF) cannot be confident, if an early election is held, of securing an electoral victory which will be regarded as legitimate within the region. A failure to obtain legitimacy will revive all the political problems for ZANU(PF), Mugabe and SADC that were attendant upon the June 2008 result and which the GPA resolved. Mugabe will be under some pressure from SADC not to allow this to happen. The state-controlled press tellingly continues to portray the inclusive government in a positive light,159 and, as argued in this volume, the political power of Mugabe and ZANU(PF) remains largely untrammelled as a result of the GPA, which thus causes little discomfort. An end to the GPA will also be the end of the political cover provided by the MDC, and may revive ZANU(PF)’s problems relating to service delivery and the maintenance of essential infrastructure currently supported by the Western donor community. ZANU(PF) may also gamble that an extended period of showing the MDC leadership as ineffectual and powerless will cause sufficient disgruntlement within the party to cause it to implode in the long term.160 These pros and cons around elections are mirrored in the debate within civil society. Some have argued that it is irresponsible to promote the idea of elections as a way to resolve the Zimbabwe issue and that the wiser path is to open democratic space through the provisions of the GPA.161 This, however, is an ignoratio elenchi, misstating the argument. The argument is more accurately that the GPA is incapable of producing democratic change and that this can be achieved only through an election, but this must be an election which is free and fair. The real point of dispute is how to achieve a free and fair election. One side of the debate insists that this will be achieved by the adoption of a new constitution and incremental reforms attained by the MDC during an extended period of inclusive governance. The other, a view held here, is that no
1 5 7 ‘Principals clash over elections’, Zimbabwe Independent, 20 Aug. 2010,
181 Epilogue such reform is possible through the GPA and constitution-making process and the only possible way to achieve this is through pressure from SADC. This is a risible notion to the other camp on account of SADC’s past record of support for Mugabe, most recently on display at the August 2010 SADC summit in Namibia discussed above. While it is accepted that pressure from SADC is unlikely and extremely difficult to achieve, it is at least theoretically possible. There are several powerful incentives encouraging SADC to resolve the political impasse in Zimbabwe which will be increased by upping the political cost of supporting a manifestly despotic regime. SADC’s repeatedly ignored deadlines for the implementation of the GPA, and the fact that it suspended the operations of the SADC Tribunal rather than deal with Mugabe’s contempt for its rulings,162 increasingly opens SADC to political ridicule, allowing ‘Afro-pessimists’ to place their own interpretation upon the fact that the GPA is touted by SADC as ‘an African solution for an African problem’. Furthermore, as reasons are sought for the unwillingness of SADC to act effectively, the spotlight is turned uncomfortably upon the similarity and affinity with Mugabe and his style of governance by other SADC countries and leaders, particularly Swaziland, Angola, Namibia and the DRC. Extending the current political accommodation and hoping that democratic reforms will take place by some sort of osmotic process caused by ZANU(PF)’s proximity to the MDC does not even appear theoretically possible. Those holding the reins of political power have no incentive to implement such reforms. The opposite is the case, given that democratic conditions will signal their demise. Accordingly, in the absence of firm action by SADC, Zimbabwe seems set for an election which will secure ZANU(PF)’s political power but will not secure the legitimacy necessary to resolve the impasse. For the foreseeable future, Zimbabwe is destined for more of the same.
162 ‘Blow for white farmers as SADC tribunal suspended’. Nehanda Radio, 18 Aug. 2010,
182