Law, Politics and Zimbabwe's 'Unity' Government

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Law, Politics and Zimbabwe's 'Unity' Government – Epilogue – Slow Progress towards Democracy? [August 2010] As nearly two years has passed since the signing of the GPA and the writing of the earliest chapter contained in this volume, it may be useful to provide a brief overview of Zimbabwe’s current polity, particularly as some of the preceding chapters are prognostic. The GPA was presented by the MDC formations as a flawed but workable document, one which would allow incremental progress towards the restoration of the rule of law and democracy in Zimbabwe.1 Contrary to this view, the preceding chapters suggested that the GPA would not be effective as a means to deliver this change. The MDC-T’s policy of ‘protest and capitulation’, which characterized the initial power dynamics within the ‘unity government’, has either continued or been replaced by one simply of quiet capitulation in the face of intransigence, unilateral arrogation of power, and violation of provisions of the GPA by Mugabe and ZANU(PF).2 Nonetheless, the MDC-T leadership insists, in the face of an increasingly sceptical and restless constituency, that it has made slow but significant progress towards its stated goals by virtue of the GPA. A statement by Morgan Tsvangirai at the end of June 2010,3 made after hiring, firing and reshuffling MDC ministers and deputy ministers, serves as a useful point of departure for the analysis which follows. The relevant part of the text appears opposite. 1 See, for example, Tsvangirai’s quixotic address to the US Council on Foreign Relations on 10 June 2009, a transcript of which is available at <http://www.cfr.org/publication/19613/zimbabwes_ present_and_future.html>. 2 Described by some as a ‘stately silence’; see ‘Tsvangirai weakened’, Financial Gazette, 29 July 2010, <http://www.financialgazette.co.zw/national-report/4996-tsvangirai-weakened.html>. 3 <http://zimbabweprimeminister.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=363:s tatement-on-cabinet-reshuffle-by-the-president-of-the-movement-for-democratic-change-and-prime- minister-of-the-republic-of-zimbabwe&catid=72:prime-minister-press-releases&Itemid=105>. 152 Slow Progress towards Democracy? Statement on Cabinet Reshuffle by the President of the Movement for Democratic Change and Prime Minister of the Republic of Zimbabwe, Wednesday, 23 June 2010 Good afternoon Ladies and Gentlemen, I am here today to announce a ministerial reshuffle. This reshuffle is about the MDC delivering to the people of Zimbabwe what they are looking for – real change. Over the past 16 months, we have recorded definite success in certain areas. • We have brought sanity and stability to the economy. • We have revived the health sector, which had all but collapsed. • We have got the schools back up and running, and textbooks distributed. • We now have independent daily newspapers registered to operate. • Basic services such as sewerage reticulation, refuse collection and water provision have been restored in many areas. However, we still have many challenges; and these frankly overshadow our successes to-date. • The pace of reform has been painfully slow. • Abuses of power are still all too common. • Many people are still struggling to make a living wage, and provide for their families. • Infrastructure rehabilitation and energy supply continue to inhibit development. I am acutely aware that these and other challenges have led to a loss of confidence in the new administration amongst the electorate. In response to this, as Prime Minister and President of the MDC, I have just completed a comprehensive review of the performance of the Government, and in particular of my Office and those Ministers who represent the MDC. As a result, I have decided on a number of changes needed to strengthen the performance of the MDC in government and outside government, in order to deliver real change to the people of Zimbabwe. These changes are being made with immediate effect, and the new ministers will be sworn in tomorrow, Thursday 24th June. The changes that are being implemented are as follows: [Details of the hiring, firing and reshuffling of ministers and deputy ministers are then given.] Ladies and Gentlemen, the MDC agreed to form this inclusive Government as it represented the most practical means of moving Zimbabwe forward and halt the needless suffering of the people. … 153 Epilogue Stabilizing the economy Record hyperinflation over an extended period from 2000 inserted the bizarre and surreal into the smallest and most quotidian of commercial transactions. Dollarization certainly brought some sanity and stability to the economy in this regard. This was no achievement of MDC-T as a party to the ‘unity government’, though they have sought to claim as much, bringing to mind not the adage that politics ‘is the art of the possible’ but rather that politics ‘is art of making the inevitable look planned’. The economy had informally dollar ized by November 2008, as no one was willing to accept Zimbabwe dollars in any transaction. By early January 2009, the ZANU(PF) government had agreed to pay health workers in foreign currency,4 by the last week of January, to pay all civil servants in foreign currency,5 and then, on 29 January, the acting ZANU(PF) Minister of Finance, Patrick Chinamasa, announced that hard currency would now be legal tender in Zimbabwe.6 With the adoption of hard currencies, un realistic price controls were removed and goods which were scarce once again became available as retailers were able to sell at a profit rather than a loss. These policies were in place prior to the formation of the ‘unity government’. While the chaos and bizarre situations that resulted from hyperinflation were thus removed, little has been achieved in regard to Zimbabwe’s macro- eco nomic climate. The basic cause of the current stasis in Zimbabwe’s polity, as out lined in Chapter Five, remains. Zimbabwe requires support from the Bretton Woods institutions for loans and balance-of-payments support to revive the eco nomy. At least US$8.5 billion is regarded as being necessary to restore Zim babwe’s infrastructure, industry and general economic health.7 This requires the donor community to clear Zimbabwe’s indebtedness to these institutions,8 currently at an almost equivalent amount (US$8.6 billion),9 and, as acknow- ledged by the Minister of Finance, Tendai Biti, the donor community has no intention of doing so without some palpable evidence (rather than merely the 4 ‘ZANU-PF govt. to pay health personnel in US dollars’, hararetribune.com, 9 Jan. 2009, available at <http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/jan10a_2009.html>. 5 ‘Zimbabwe formally agrees to pay civil servants in foreign currency’, apanews.net, 25 Jan. 2009, available at <http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/jan26_2009.html>. 6 ‘2009 budget: Govt drops populist policies’, Zimbabwe Independent, 30 Jan. 2009, <http:// www.theindependent.co.zw/local/21916-2009-budget-govt-drops-populist-policies.html>. 7 The figure is variously given as being US$8.5 billion and US$10 billion. ‘Zimbabwe debt to hit US$8,6b’, Zimbabwe Independent, 11 June 2010, <http://www.theindependent.co.zw/ business/26835-zimbabwe-debt-to-hit-us86b.html>. 8 International Monetary Fund, Statement at the Conclusion of an IMF Staff Mission to Zim­ babwe, Press Release No. 09/249, 2 July 2009, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/ pr09249.htm>. 9 ‘Zimbabwe debt to hit US$8,6b’. 154 Slow Progress towards Democracy? implausible claims of the MDC in this regard) of the restoration of democracy in Zimbabwe.10 That Mugabe and ZANU(PF) are determined to prevent, as they cannot remain in power under democratic conditions. In a paper released in July 2010 the IMF reiterated that Zimbabwe required debt relief in order to escape its economic malaise, claiming that ‘Zimbabwe is in debt distress, and the debt overhang cannot be resolved without debt relief even if policies are improved and mineral extraction is increased.’11 Within days of the IMF releasing its report, Mugabe expressed a contrary view: ‘Zimbabwe will not be saved by any country or organisation, least of all Western. Let our partners in the inclusive government get that so we do not waste our efforts on useless initiatives. ‘It is our mineral resources – all these helped by the ingenuity and entrepreneurship of our people which will turn this economy and country around.’12 The ‘useless initiative’ referred to was a July visit by a delegation to the EU to discuss the issues of ‘sanctions’.13 MDC delegates suggested that they would persuade the EU that it was appropriate to ease restrictive measures (notwith- standing the failure to reduce the democratic deficit in Zimbabwe) through their ‘body language’.14 Needless to say, nothing of substance was expected to emerge (nor did it emerge) from this meeting. It is also worth elaborating upon the reference to mineral resources made by Mugabe and the IMF, as this currently is a key issue engaging much of the media and political commentary.15 It alludes primarily to diamond extraction in the Chiadzwa/Marange district of Zimbabwe, from what is believed to be an extremely rich alluvial deposit with estimates at one extreme of the scale suggesting that it may provide 25 per cent of the world’s diamonds. Mining of this resource has been mired in controversy due to human rights abuses in the area of the deposits. Zimbabwe’s courts have also held that the mining claims for the area are rightly those of African Consolidated Resources (Limited) (ACR). Notwithstanding the legal position, the Zimbabwe government 1 0 ‘Biti says donors unlikely to help Zimbabwe’, SW Radio Africa, 12 Mar. 2010, <http://www. swradioafrica.com/news120310/biti120310.htm>. 11 International Monetary Fund, Zimbabwe: Staff Report for the 2010 Article IV Consultation (Washington, DC: IMF, IMF Country Report No.
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