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Zimbabwe: Election Scenarios

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Zimbabwe: Election Scenarios Zimbabwe: Election Scenarios Africa Report N°202 | 6 May 2013 International Crisis Group Headquarters Avenue Louise 149 1050 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 [email protected] Table of Contents Executive Summary ................................................................................................................... i Recommendations..................................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1 II. GPA Opportunities and Constraints ................................................................................ 2 A. Reform and Resistance .............................................................................................. 2 B. A New Constitution and its Import for Elections ...................................................... 3 C. Political Coexistence .................................................................................................. 4 D. Critical Institutions: Capacity and Reforms .............................................................. 5 1. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) ....................................................... 5 2. Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) ................................................. 8 III. Internal Political Party Dynamics .................................................................................... 10 A. ZANU-PF and the Centralisation of Power ............................................................... 10 1. Factionalism and succession battles .................................................................... 10 2. “Hardliners” and “reformists” .............................................................................. 12 B. MDC-T: Challenges of Capacity and Cohesion .......................................................... 14 1. Factionalism and infighting ................................................................................. 15 2. Fractured internal democracy .............................................................................. 16 C. Other Political Formations: The Plague of Fragmentation ....................................... 16 D. Inter-party Alliances: The Unclear Narratives .......................................................... 17 IV. The Security Sector: Unyielding to Reforms? .................................................................. 19 A. Politics and the Elections ........................................................................................... 19 B. GPA and Security Sector Reform ............................................................................... 21 C. Economic Interests .................................................................................................... 23 V. The Role and Capacity of GPA Guarantors ...................................................................... 25 VI. Election Scenarios: Multiple Possibilities ........................................................................ 28 A. A Deferred Election .................................................................................................... 28 1. What could prompt postponement? .................................................................... 28 2. Consequences of a postponed vote ....................................................................... 30 B. A Disputed Election ................................................................................................... 30 1. A “winner-take-all” election ................................................................................. 31 2. The new constitution and the powerful presidency ............................................. 31 C. A Conclusive Election ................................................................................................ 32 D. Security Sector Intervention ...................................................................................... 33 VII. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 35 APPENDICES A. Map of Zimbabwe ............................................................................................................. 36 B. Glossary ........................................................................................................................... 37 C. About the International Crisis Group .............................................................................. 39 D. Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Africa since 2010................................................ 40 E. Crisis Group Board of Trustees ........................................................................................ 42 International Crisis Group Africa Report N°202 6 May 2013 Executive Summary As the Global Political Agreement (GPA) staggers to an end, continued violations of the agreement, reform deficits, limited institutional credibility and the rejection of a UN election needs assessment mission underscore the continued absence of condi- tions for peaceful and credible elections, despite the new constitution adopted in March 2013. President Robert Mugabe has been forced to step back from a June vote, but his party still pushes for an expedited process with little time to implement out- standing reforms and new constitutional provisions. The pervasive fear of violence and actual intimidation contradicts rhetorical commitments to peace. A reasonably free vote is still possible, but so too are deferred or disputed polls, or even a military intervention. The international community seems ready to back the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which must work with GPA partners to define and enforce “red lines” for a credible vote. The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) is likely to resist further reforms. SADC places particular emphasis on democracy supporting institu- tions, but the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) faces significant challenges. Limited government funding threatens its capacity building, public outreach and ability to ensure the integrity of the voters’ roll. The chairperson of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) resigned, citing the body’s lack of independence and government support, and was replaced by another commissioner with close ties to ZANU-PF. The GPA’s Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) plays an important role in responding to political conflict, but has insufficient support and addresses symptoms, not causes, of violence and intimidation. Certain pro-ZANU-PF security officials may seek to influence the polls. Some have demanded greater political representation; they played a pivotal role in the 2008 vio- lence that secured Mugabe’s victory, for which none were held accountable. The Zim- babwe Republic Police (ZRP) has demonstrated some professionalism, but its leaders openly support ZANU-PF and frequently harass Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations and civil society, which the MDC-Tsvangirai has been powerless to prevent. The GPA provides no basis for credible investigations of the police (or other security elements), which refuse to answer to the co-ministers of home affairs or JOMIC and expose parliament as largely toothless. Political parties face internal challenges. Within ZANU-PF, “hardliner” and “reformist” camps are fighting over who will succeed 89-year-old Mugabe. MDC-T is struggling with a reported drop in popularity, infighting and limited capacity to mobilise its supporters. The international community assesses Zimbabwe’s progress positively, demon- strating its support for SADC’s facilitation. The constitutional referendum enabled the European Union (EU) to lift restrictive measures against most of the individuals and entities (excluding Mugabe, his wife Grace, a small group of security officials and the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation). Zimbabwe and the UK subsequently held their first bilateral talks in over a decade, and a “Friends of Zimbabwe” meeting that offered economic support and the lifting of sanctions against two Zimbabwean banks by the U.S. shows Western commitment to supporting Zimbabwe’s reform. SADC’s priority is “containment” even more than reforms to maintain stability. This objective remains vague, but the organisation must consolidate its promotion of Zimbabwe: Election Scenarios Crisis Group Africa Report N°202, 6 May 2013 Page ii reforms in compliance with its election guidelines. Reforms require monitoring, but JOMIC’s capacity for this is limited and ZANU-PF’s resistance to extending its man- date to focus on elections has frustrated SADC. The regional bloc should establish an office in Harare that complements JOMIC but allows it to independently liaise with the government. If the impasse on election reforms persists, the vote may be rescheduled. Political leaders recognise that to proceed when the risk of large-scale violence is high and when parties and SADC disagree over what constitutes an acceptable threshold for credible elections would be dangerous. Faced with divisions that threaten their per- formance in the polls, ZANU-PF and MDC-T may back postponement. Deferral, if accompanied by firm SADC pressure, presents opportunities to pro- mote reforms, on condition that strict timelines are defined, monitoring is enhanced significantly, political parties understand the risks of failure, and institutional
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