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Zimbabwe Conflict Insight | Sep 2018 | Vol IPSS Peace & Security Report ABOUT THE REPORT Zimbabwe Conflict The purpose of this report is to provide analysis and policy implications to assist the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Member States and Development Partners in decision-making Insight and in the implementation of peace and security- related instruments. The opinions expressed in this report are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies. CONTRIBUTORS Dr. Mesfin Gebremichael (Editor in Chief) Ms. Mahlet Fitiwi (Author) Ms. Alem Kidane Ms. Tsion Belay Ms. Zaharau S. Shariff Situation analysis EDITING, DESIGN & LAYOUT Between gaining independence from the British in April 1980 and 21 Ms. Michelle Mendi Muita (Editing) November 2017, the Republic of Zimbabwe was ruled by Robert Mugabe, Mr. Mikias Yitbarek (Design & Layout) the leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU- PF). Two decades after independence, Zimbabwe had fallen into an extended period of economic decline and crisis, which was primarily linked © 2018 Institute for Peace and Security Studies, to the implementation of a controversial land reform in 2000 - a policy that Addis Ababa University. All rights reserved. led to low agricultural productivity, high unemployment and hyperinflation. In January 2008, the government statistics office announced that inflation had risen to 100,580 per cent from 66,212 per cent the previous month. August 2018 | Vol. 2 GDP contracted by more than 72 per cent between 2000 and 2008, causing a fifth of the population to live in extreme poverty. This chain of events, in CONTENTS turn, became a recipe for growing frustration and protests against the Situation analysis 1 government. Causes of the conflict 2 Actors 3 On 14 November 2017, the Zimbabwean Defence Forces (ZDF) took control Conflict dynamics 5 of the government and placed Mugabe under house arrest. Although the Scenarios 7 military intervention was criticized by some commentators as unconstitutional, it was widely supported and celebrated by a section of the Current response assessment 7 public that blamed Mugabe for the country’s acute socio-economic Strategic options 9 stagnation. After two weeks of steadily rising tensions, Mugabe officially References 10 resigned on 21 November, and three days later Emmerson Dambudzo Timeline 11 Mnangagwa was sworn in as President. IPSS Peace & Security Report GDP PER CAPITA LIFE EXPECTANCY AT HUMAN DEVELOPMENT POPULATION NEIGHBOURS RECS (PPP) BIRTH (YEARS) INDEX (HDI) 15.6 million $1,688 59.2 Index: 0.516 Mozambique COMESA South Africa SADC Rank: 154/188 Botswana Zambia Figure 1: Country profile and demographicsi human rights obligations. As a result, there were Since assuming office, Mnangagwa has pledged to make instances where the police received express instructions extensive changes in the government and revive the “not to investigate or arrest ZANU-PF supporters and country’s economy by introducing new policies to attract their allies implicated in political violence.”ii foreign investment. He is faced with high expectations from citizens to bring about the desired economic, social In the 2008 general election, opposition leader Morgan and political changes, and also to repair Zimbabwe’s Tsvangirai with the Movement for Democratic Change international reputation. (MDC) party garnered 47 per cent of the vote compared to Mugabe’s 43 per cent, necessitating a runoff election. On 30 July 2018, Zimbabwe conducted its first ever The time leading up to the runoff was marred with election without Mugabe on the ballot. The election was violence, forcing Tsvangirai to withdraw his candidacy. monitored by several international and regional Election The country nevertheless went ahead with the election Observation Missions (EOMs), who later endorsed the and, despite assertions by independent observers of the election as free and fair with a few reports of irregularities process being neither free nor fair, Mugabe was in certain parts of the country. The immediate aftermath proclaimed the winner. This prompted widespread of the election was marked by public demonstrations condemnation from international and regional actors and violent conflict between the government and and resulted in a power-sharing deal between ZANU-PF opposition supporters - a clear manifestation of the and MDC. However, in the subsequent election in 2013, people’s demand for real change. ZANU-PF regained their full domination in the government, which resulted in a deepening of public Overall, the unpopular economic reforms in the early grievances and protests. 2000s acted as a catalyst – resulting in turmoil, economic decline, suppressive measures, public protests and Economic factors ultimately, the military intervention that overthrew Mugabe’s government in November 2017. Zimbabwe’s economic decline originates from 1997/1998 when the country became involved in a war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Returning Causes of the conflict war veterans demanded to be paid a gratuity as high as ZWD $50,000 per year, causing a budget crisis and an Issues of democratic governance increase in expenditure. Two years later, a controversial land reform law triggered severe development From the late 1990s onwards, Zimbabwe became a challenges across all sectors of the economy. The four significant focus of the West due to concerns over main commercial field crops - wheat, tobacco, soybeans government accountability, transparency, the rule of law and sunflowers - experienced reduced cultivation and and human rights infringements. Almost all power was output levels due to low uptake and use of land, concentrated in the hands of the then President Mugabe, combined with a lack of experience and resources on the who was the oldest sitting president in Africa at the time part of new farmers. Although the exact number is still of his resignation. In practice, there was no clear contested, the Commercial Farmers’ Union claimed that separation of power between the state, ZANU-PF and the more than 1,600 commercial farmlands were military. The human rights provisions in the country’s repossessed and occupied by war veterans in 2000 alone. constitution were ignored, neither did the government Such drastic changes in the economy in general, and land enact or amend existing laws to bring them in line with ownership in particular, widened income inequality gaps Zimbabwe’s constitution or its international and regional among citizens. In addition, the middle class was virtually i Sources: Human Development Index (HDI) 2016. ii Human Rights Watch, “Our Hands are Tied” Erosion of the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe, 8 November 2018. 2 Zimbabwe Conflict Insight | Sep 2018 | Vol. 2 gutted during the post-2000 crisis, as sectors such as when Mugabe’s authority began to wane in the eyes of health, education and other basic services, once regional the public, the veterans continued to express support for models, collapsed. In 2009, the government was forced the aging leader. As the party’s grip on power began to to adopt the US dollar as its national currency, but with falter, several splinter factions, including Lacoste and frequent shortages, it had to resort to the introduction G40, emerged to replace Mugabe. His advanced age, of bond notes denominated in the US dollar currency poor health and weak public performances only further despite stiff resistance from citizens. In the subsequent fuelled the succession battle between the First Lady and years, economic and social problems such as Mnangagwa. hyperinflation, massive unemployment and weakened social service provisions became bottlenecks in the Lacoste faction country, greatly contributing to increased public grievances and support for the November 2017 military Mnangagwa was long-viewed as Mugabe’s right-hand intervention. man until Grace became politically ambitious and began to edge him out. He has strong support within ZANU-PF Power struggles within the ruling party and the veterans in the military. After replacing Mugabe as president in 2017, Mnangagwa appointed Factionalization within ZANU-PF goes back to the 1990s Constantino Chiwenga, a former Commander of the ZDF when members of the party were torn between factions and Commander of the Zimbabwean National Army, as loyal to Mnangagwa (Lacoste faction) and those loyal to the ruling party’s Vice President. Unlike MDC, ZANU-PF the late army general Solomon Mujuru. After Mujuru’s managed to gain support from the rural areas due to its suspicious death in 2011, his wife (who was then a Vice patriotic role during the liberation fight for President), was sacked out of fear that she might plot a independence and its strong influence over traditional coup against Mugabe. Generation 40 (G40), a faction leaders. Due to his reformist government manifesto, consisting of younger party members, became Mnangagwa is also winning back the white and Indian prominent in 2014. 2017 saw an escalation in the internal minorities in the country, with whom wealth is feuding within ZANU-PF over who would succeed concentrated.iii President Mugabe, particularly between the Lacoste faction supporting Mnangagwa and the G40 faction who Generation 40 (G40) faction threw their support behind Grace Mugabe, wife of President Mugabe. This ruction eventually resulted in The Grace Mugabe-led Generation 40 is a group of Mnangagwa’s dismissal from his position for allegedly young leaders within ZANU-PF. Vying to succeed plotting against the government and being disloyal. Mugabe, the group is mostly comprised of party members who are younger and more educated than the Actors veterans. The G40 wanted to side line Mnangagwa, who saw himself as Mugabe’s heir apparent, though the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic president had frequently and clearly indicated that he Front (ZANU-PF) was not going to easily hand over power to any specific individual. After the military intervention in November The ZANU-PF party has been the main and most 2017, ZANU-PF expelled the “G40 cabal”, including Grace prominent political party since Zimbabwe gained Mugabe, Kudzanayi Chipanga, Jonathan Moyo, Saviour independence in 1980.
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