Update Briefing Africa Briefing N°70 Harare/Pretoria/Nairobi/Brussels, 3 March 2010 Zimbabwe: Political and Security Challenges to the Transition

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Update Briefing Africa Briefing N°70 Harare/Pretoria/Nairobi/Brussels, 3 March 2010 Zimbabwe: Political and Security Challenges to the Transition Update Briefing Africa Briefing N°70 Harare/Pretoria/Nairobi/Brussels, 3 March 2010 Zimbabwe: Political and Security Challenges to the Transition I. OVERVIEW regular functioning of the National Security Council in place of the infamous Joint Operations Command, pub- As Zimbabwe enters its second year under a unity gov- lic consultations on a new constitution and preparation ernment, the challenges to democratic transformation for elections. have come into sharp focus. Despite reasonable progress in restoring political and social stability, ending wide- These delays reflect the two deeper challenges on which spread repression and stabilising the economy since Feb- this briefing concentrates. First, a mature political system ruary 2009, major threats could still derail the reform must develop, so that ZANU-PF and MDC engage as process. In particular, resistance of intransigent and still both competitors in the political arena and partners in powerful security sector leaders and fractious in-fighting the inclusive government. This will be difficult, espe- between and within the Zimbabwe African National Union cially under the divisive Mugabe, but other ZANU-PF (ZANU-PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change leaders, including the factions led by Vice President Joice (MDC) must be addressed now. South Africa and other Mujuru, and Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa, countries in southern Africa – who monitor the accord know that their party has lost much popular support and that guides the transition – must press the parties, and needs a generational shift. For its part, the MDC must particularly President Robert Mugabe, to see the transi- keep faith and engaged with its broad following in the tion through to a successful conclusion. Donors should transition process, including trade unions, human rights back their efforts. groups and women’s organisations. It must also show the country as a whole that it is a viable custodian of the The unity government, created under the Global Political state – competent, transparent, and capable of preserv- Agreement (GPA) signed by Mugabe and MDC factional ing social change since independence. leaders Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara, was born under a cloud of scepticism. Most observers gave Equally challenging are security issues. A relatively small it little chance, predicting that, even as prime minister, number of “securocrats” use their positions and symbiotic Tsvangirai would fall prey to Mugabe’s “divide, rule, relationship with Mugabe to exercise veto power over co-opt and destroy” strategy. Against the odds, the gov- the transition. They are motivated by differing factors: fear ernment started well: schools and hospitals re-opened; of losing power and its financial benefits, fear of prose- civil servants were paid and returned to work; the cution for political or financial abuses, and a belief that Zimbabwe dollar was shelved; goods returned to store they guard the liberation heritage against Tsvangirai and shelves; and a cholera epidemic was controlled. Human the MDC, which they view as fronts for white and Western rights activists reported a significant drop in abuses. Donors interests. Zimbabweans across the political spectrum are generally received well an ambitious yet pragmatic re- quietly considering how to ease these officers into re- construction program calling for $8.5 billion in foreign tirement, even at the cost of allowing them to keep their aid and investment. assets and providing them a degree of impunity from do- mestic prosecution, while simultaneously professional- But major concerns undermining the transition process ising security forces respectful of human rights and a have come to the fore. Hardline generals and other democratically elected government. Mugabe loyalists in ZANU-PF are refusing to implement the government’s decisions, boycotting the new national While the primary tasks ahead rest with Zimbabweans, security organ and showing public disdain for Tsvangirai. the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Farm seizures have continued virtually unabated. Most must take seriously its GPA guarantor role. South African attention has focused on completing the GPA, but ZANU- President Jacob Zuma’s activism as mediator must convey PF has delayed or ignored important commitments in that the message that the region will abide no alternative to document, while stalling constitutional reforms by in- the GPA. His recent actions, including appointment of sisting on preserving broad executive privileges. Key three respected advisers to oversee the Zimbabwe account, blocked steps include a land audit, appointment of MDC are welcome indications he will be tougher vis-à-vis governors, an end of arbitrary detentions and arrests, Mugabe on GPA obligations and respect for rule of law. Zimbabwe: Political and Security Challenges to the Transition Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°70, 3 March 2010 Page 2 The broader international community, especially the UK, considered that the African Union (AU), SADC, and U.S., EU and China, should support and complement the primary mediator, the then South African President SADC’s efforts through careful calibration of trade, aid, Thabo Mbeki, had been too accommodating and respectful and investment to encourage progress; maintenance of of Mugabe during the negotiation process. Additional targeted sanctions on those thwarting the transition; and concerns emerged after the GPA was signed, as Mugabe lifting of sanctions on entities key to economic recovery. was allowed to ignore deadlines and otherwise repeat- Donors should provide new recovery and development edly undermined the agreement without consequence. assistance – including for rural development, health and education and strengthening of the judiciary, legislature Now into its second year, however, the inclusive gov- and civil society – through transparent mechanisms, such ernment is making discernible, if slow and painful pro- as the Multi-Donor Trust Fund. gress in a number of areas, bringing a degree of stabil- ity and predictability to a country that twelve months This briefing focuses on political party and security issues, earlier was on the brink of collapse. Most notably, schools as well as South Africa’s mediation. Subsequent reporting and hospitals have reopened, multi-million per cent will analyse other topics vital to the transition, including inflation has come down to single digits, government constitutional and legal reform, justice and reconcilia- revenue has begun to pick up and shops are fully stocked tion, sanctions policies and security sector reform. with food and other commodities. Key Western donors have been slow to embrace the new II. THE INCLUSIVE GOVERNMENT’S government largely because of its failure to fully imple- MIXED RECORD ment the GPA and their continuing antipathy toward Mugabe. For much of 2009, donors provided welcome expansion of humanitarian assistance, but generally Ten months after the violent and disputed 29 March 2008 adopted a wait-and-see posture on longer-term financial elections that led to political stalemate with the long-time support for recovery and reconstruction. This risked ruling ZANU-PF party of President Mugabe, Morgan thwarting the very changes the international community Tsvangirai’s wing of the opposition Movement for is seeking, both by weakening the hand of relative mod- Democratic Change (MDC-T) announced it would enter erates in ZANU-PF and more generally by undercutting the government alongside ZANU-PF and the splinter popular support for the reform process. More recently, the MDC-Mutambara (MDC-M) faction. This followed an U.S., UK and European Union (EU), among others, have extraordinary summit of the Southern Africa Development expanded the definition of “humanitarian assistance” to Community (SADC) on 26 January 2009, whose final cover many important social and economic sectors, such communiqué called for Tsvangirai to be sworn in as the as agriculture, health, sanitation and education. prime minister by 11 February and the remainder of the government two days later.1 A. ECONOMIC REFORMS The unity government was formed under the auspices of the Global Political Agreement (GPA), which had been Rebuilding a devastated economy with a 90 per cent hammered out with SADC assistance during lengthy ne- unemployment rate is a daunting challenge for the in- gotiations. The GPA spelled out a specific continuing clusive government. Finance Minister Tendai Biti has role for the regional mediators in monitoring and sup- won praise for his steps to restore a degree of confidence porting its implementation. This was especially impor- and fiscal stability, but the prospects for rapid recovery tant, since most observers believed that the agreement are weak, not least because the fragile inclusive govern- was essentially unworkable, having established two ment and incomplete GPA have caused investors to shy centres of power within a single government but leaving away. Recently, government workers have gone on strike most real political and military authority with Mugabe, to demand a pay increase beyond the $160 monthly his party and the hardline security establishment.2 Many stipend they are generally now receiving, which they point out is insufficient to cover even basic costs of living in Harare and other urban centres. Nevertheless, there are some signs of recovery. GDP 1 “Communique Extraordinary Summit of the SADC Heads of grew 4.7 per cent in 2009, the first positive totals in a State”, 27 January 2009. On 11
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