Weyland's Wars A
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In Europe and Korea, Gen. Otto Weyland showed how airpower should support the ground forces. Then-Lt. Gen. George Patton (l) and Weyland in Nancy, France, in 1944. an “aerial flank”—protecting the swift advance of Patton’s armor in its advance through France. His experience in the Korean War was notably different, for both the Army and Air Force were totally un- prepared for the June 25, 1950 invasion of South Korea by communist North Korea. They had to fight with what they had: outdated and insufficient World War II equipment. Fortunately, Weyland’s wealth of experience and his credibility with both Army and Air Force leaders en- abled the pragmatic airman to adapt quickly in fighting the three distinctly different phases of the Korean War. In the beginning, overwhelming numbers of well-equipped North Ko- rean troops overran the inadequately Weyland’s Wars By Walter J. Boyne fighter pilot at heart, USAF most Army flag officers in the Korean armed South Korean Army, seeking Gen. Otto P. Weyland in- War. The term “most” does not mean to swiftly conquer the entire penin- stinctively punched his own “all,” however, as he was the target sula. USAF’s woefully inadequate Aticket in exactly the right way to make of bitter criticism by a few Army of- numbers of obsolescent World War II him a top Air Force commander in ficers who preferred “Marine-style” aircraft helped keep ill-equipped and two wars. He was as ardent in sup- close air support. undermanned land forces from being port of strategic airpower as any of Weyland’s achievements were all pushed into the sea. his contemporaries. Yet Weyland also the more remarkable because the Then came the daring Inchon land- achieved spectacular success through wars he fought were so very different ing of Sept. 15, 1950, a move that his determination to support Army in their nature. He commanded suc- turned the tide of the war. Weyland ground operations. cessively larger organizations during still lacked adequate resources but In his own words, he talked the World War II, applying first-class employed his forces so well they Army’s language. resources over huge areas, in con- destroyed the North Korean Army Gen. George S. Patton commended cert with well-equipped, well-trained even before Eighth Army began its Weyland as “the best damn general in Army outfits. The results were un- breakout from the Pusan Perimeter. the Air Corps” of World War II. He precedented. Weyland’s command, Finally, communist Chinese troops then received similar accolades from for the first time in history, provided poured across the Yalu River and joined 62 AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2010 the fighting on the side of North Korea, This might have begun a perfectly the contrasting personalities of Wey- pushing the war into a stalemate. As ordinary career progression except land and Patton. both sides sought to find palatable for Weyland’s determination to learn Harmony thus assured, Quesada’s armistice terms, Weyland effectively how the Army operated at every level, IX TAC worked with Bradley’s First applied his still-marginal resources, and more important, how the Army Army, while Weyland’s XIX TAC implementing a series of successful wanted air operations conducted. It supported Patton’s Third Army in six air interdiction campaigns. For all this, was a unique viewpoint at a time when major campaigns. he drew criticism from some. most Air Corps officers unswervingly This was the sort of leadership that Weyland’s success in the joint supported the concept of strategic led Patton to his famous “best damn operations derived from his intimate bombing, and when a recalcitrant such general” assessment and to another, far knowledge of land warfare. Because as Claire L. Chennault might find his more meaningful tribute: After the war of his effective support of strategic career progress blocked. in Europe was won, Patton personally operations—he was a primary “pick By the time of Japan’s Dec. 7, 1941 told Weyland that he would be pleased and shovel” wielder in the creation attack on Pearl Harbor, Weyland was to have him as an Army corps com- of Strategic Air Command—Weyland a lieutenant colonel, commanding the mander. This was perhaps the greatest had the confidence of his superiors 16th Pursuit Group in Panama and compliment Patton could give. when he advocated additional re- serving as Sixth Air Force chief of Yet, like many of his contempo- sources for tactical operations. staff. Promotions came swiftly now, raries, Weyland languished in staff Weyland was born in Riverside, but he had to serve in staff roles at jobs when demobilization decimated Calif., in 1902. He went through the headquarters before being promoted the strength of American armed forces. classic career sequence of the era. to brigadier general and given the The newborn USAF was hampered Graduating with a degree in mechani- command of the 84th Fighter Wing. by tiny budgets, the drastic need for cal engineering in 1923, he accepted re-equipment with modern jet aircraft, a reserve commission in the US Army Best Damn General and the threat of a nuclear-armed and Air Service. He toyed with the idea of It was a good start to what became increasingly belligerent Soviet Union. working as an engineer for Western a brilliant career in World War II, Just after the North Korean inva- Electric but found that he preferred for in March 1944, he was made the sion of South Korea, Weyland was service life and sought a regular com- commanding general of XIX Tactical given command of TAC, but quickly mission after entering flying school. Air Command. It was here that his relinquished it to proceed to Japan. He trained first at Brooks Field, Tex., personality, experience, timing, and There he was vice commander for and then at nearby Kelly Field. circumstance coalesced into great operations, Far East Air Forces, under Promotion was slow in those days— success. Weyland spiced his taciturn Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer. he was not made a first lieutenant until conversational mode with a subtle lev- Stratemeyer reported to Army Gen. 1930—but there were compensations. ity, which made him an ideal foil for Douglas MacArthur, commander in Weyland went to Hawaii’s Luke Field his Army counterpart, then-Lieutenant chief, Far East. on Ford Island, to command the 4th General Patton. Upon his arrival at his headquarters Observation Squadron. Patton allowed Weyland to dictate on July 20, Weyland realized he was the role of airpower and he not going to immediately reprise his did so ruthlessly. One unique successes in Europe. Instead of a well- consequence is that Weyland equipped Air Force supporting a well- personally accepted the sur- equipped Army, he found both services render of German Maj. Gen. short of men and equipment. Further, Eric Elster’s 20,000 Nazi troops the easy rapport with Patton was not in exchange for a cessation of going to be repeated, despite the fact air attacks. that Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force Weyland’s ability to get along had set up a joint operations center. extended to another colorful Weyland discovered that the air war commander, his boss at 9th was being directed by MacArthur’s Fighter Command (and com- staff, led by Maj. Gen. Edward M. mander of the “rival” IX TAC), Almond—a man who would try in Maj. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada. vain to thwart him. Someone had the foresight to Almond had attended Air Corps pair the more volatile Quesada Tactical School in 1938 and considered with the quieter personality of himself well-versed in air doctrine. He Army Gen. Omar N. Bradley, objected violently when, only three while similarly placing together days after his arrival, Weyland wrote a memo stating his objections to the way things were being handled. There followed a face-to-face confrontation Weyland (l), then commander in which the quiet but stern Weyland of XIX Tactical Air Command, reminded Almond that he outranked meets with Maj. Gen. Hoyt Van- him, was more knowledgeable about denberg, commander of Ninth Air Force, in Rennes, France, in air operations, and would carry out his 1944. instructions to run the air war. AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2010 63 expectation of close air support the Weyland was promoted Army never wished to relinquish. to general in 1952, while When FEAF and Bomber Command serving as commander of Far East Air Forces. He turned to more far-reaching targets, made close air support a many Army commanders resisted. top priority during his time The surprise massive Chinese in- in Korea. tervention that began in November and did not grind to a halt until late January 1951 totally reversed the strategic situation. United Nations columns of North Korean forces were thrust back far down the troops and supplies, be- peninsula. Once again, it was airpower lieving that after estab- that enabled UN forces to end their lishing air supremacy, the retreat and create a solid front line. first role of airpower was The new commander of Eighth to conduct an interdiction Army, Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, campaign to cut enemy successfully re-established the morale lines of communication and offensive capability of his army, and supply. In doing so, but soon realized, as the Chinese did, Weyland demonstrated that a complete military victory was his innate flexibility. He no longer possible. Both sides then called upon Far East Air settled down to attrition warfare. Forces Bomber Com- The armistice was more than two mand to execute tactical years away. air strikes, something he By June 1951, Weyland was com- generally deplored.