In Europe and Korea, Gen. Otto Weyland showed how airpower should support the ground forces.

Then-Lt. Gen. George Patton (l) and Weyland in Nancy, , in 1944.

an “aerial flank”—protecting the swift advance of Patton’s armor in its advance through France. His experience in the Korean War was notably different, for both the Army and Air Force were totally un- prepared for the June 25, 1950 invasion of South Korea by communist North Korea. They had to fight with what they had: outdated and insufficient World War II equipment. Fortunately, Weyland’s wealth of experience and his credibility with both Army and Air Force leaders en- abled the pragmatic airman to adapt quickly in fighting the three distinctly different phases of the Korean War. In the beginning, overwhelming numbers of well-equipped North Ko- rean troops overran the inadequately Weyland’s Wars By Walter J. Boyne

fighter pilot at heart, USAF most Army flag officers in the Korean armed South Korean Army, seeking Gen. Otto P. Weyland in- War. The term “most” does not mean to swiftly conquer the entire penin- stinctively punched his own “all,” however, as he was the target sula. USAF’s woefully inadequate Aticket in exactly the right way to make of bitter criticism by a few Army of- numbers of obsolescent World War II him a top Air Force commander in ficers who preferred “Marine-style” aircraft helped keep ill-equipped and two wars. He was as ardent in sup- . undermanned land forces from being port of strategic airpower as any of Weyland’s achievements were all pushed into the sea. his contemporaries. Yet Weyland also the more remarkable because the Then came the daring Inchon land- achieved spectacular success through wars he fought were so very different ing of Sept. 15, 1950, a move that his determination to support Army in their nature. He commanded suc- turned the tide of the war. Weyland ground operations. cessively larger organizations during still lacked adequate resources but In his own words, he talked the World War II, applying first-class employed his forces so well they Army’s language. resources over huge areas, in con- destroyed the North Korean Army Gen. George S. Patton commended cert with well-equipped, well-trained even before Eighth Army began its Weyland as “the best damn general in Army outfits. The results were un- breakout from the Pusan Perimeter. the Air Corps” of World War II. He precedented. Weyland’s command, Finally, communist Chinese troops then received similar accolades from for the first time in history, provided poured across the Yalu River and joined 62 AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2010 the fighting on the side of North Korea, This might have begun a perfectly the contrasting personalities of Wey- pushing the war into a stalemate. As ordinary career progression except land and Patton. both sides sought to find palatable for Weyland’s determination to learn Harmony thus assured, Quesada’s armistice terms, Weyland effectively how the Army operated at every level, IX TAC worked with Bradley’s First applied his still-marginal resources, and more important, how the Army Army, while Weyland’s XIX TAC implementing a series of successful wanted air operations conducted. It supported Patton’s Third Army in six air interdiction campaigns. For all this, was a unique viewpoint at a time when major campaigns. he drew criticism from some. most Air Corps officers unswervingly This was the sort of leadership that Weyland’s success in the joint supported the concept of strategic led Patton to his famous “best damn operations derived from his intimate bombing, and when a recalcitrant such general” assessment and to another, far knowledge of land warfare. Because as Claire L. Chennault might find his more meaningful tribute: After the war of his effective support of strategic career progress blocked. in Europe was won, Patton personally operations—he was a primary “pick By the time of Japan’s Dec. 7, 1941 told Weyland that he would be pleased and shovel” wielder in the creation attack on Pearl Harbor, Weyland was to have him as an Army corps com- of Strategic Air Command—Weyland a lieutenant colonel, commanding the mander. This was perhaps the greatest had the confidence of his superiors 16th Pursuit Group in Panama and compliment Patton could give. when he advocated additional re- serving as Sixth Air Force chief of Yet, like many of his contempo- sources for tactical operations. staff. Promotions came swiftly now, raries, Weyland languished in staff Weyland was born in Riverside, but he had to serve in staff roles at jobs when demobilization decimated Calif., in 1902. He went through the headquarters before being promoted the strength of American armed forces. classic career sequence of the era. to brigadier general and given the The newborn USAF was hampered Graduating with a degree in mechani- command of the 84th Fighter Wing. by tiny budgets, the drastic need for cal engineering in 1923, he accepted re-equipment with modern jet aircraft, a reserve commission in the US Army Best Damn General and the threat of a nuclear-armed and Air Service. He toyed with the idea of It was a good start to what became increasingly belligerent Soviet Union. working as an engineer for Western a brilliant career in World War II, Just after the North Korean inva- Electric but found that he preferred for in March 1944, he was made the sion of South Korea, Weyland was service life and sought a regular com- commanding general of XIX Tactical given command of TAC, but quickly mission after entering flying school. Air Command. It was here that his relinquished it to proceed to Japan. He trained first at Brooks Field, Tex., personality, experience, timing, and There he was vice commander for and then at nearby Kelly Field. circumstance coalesced into great operations, Far East Air Forces, under Promotion was slow in those days— success. Weyland spiced his taciturn Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer. he was not made a first lieutenant until conversational mode with a subtle lev- Stratemeyer reported to Army Gen. 1930—but there were compensations. ity, which made him an ideal foil for Douglas MacArthur, commander in Weyland went to Hawaii’s Luke Field his Army counterpart, then-Lieutenant chief, Far East. on Ford Island, to command the 4th General Patton. Upon his arrival at his headquarters Observation Squadron. Patton allowed Weyland to dictate on July 20, Weyland realized he was the role of airpower and he not going to immediately reprise his did so ruthlessly. One unique successes in Europe. Instead of a well- consequence is that Weyland equipped Air Force supporting a well- personally accepted the sur- equipped Army, he found both services render of German Maj. Gen. short of men and equipment. Further, Eric Elster’s 20,000 Nazi troops the easy rapport with Patton was not in exchange for a cessation of going to be repeated, despite the fact air attacks. that Eighth Army and Fifth Air Force Weyland’s ability to get along had set up a joint operations center. extended to another colorful Weyland discovered that the air war commander, his boss at 9th was being directed by MacArthur’s Fighter Command (and com- staff, led by Maj. Gen. Edward M. mander of the “rival” IX TAC), Almond—a man who would try in Maj. Gen. Elwood R. Quesada. vain to thwart him. Someone had the foresight to Almond had attended Air Corps pair the more volatile Quesada Tactical School in 1938 and considered with the quieter personality of himself well-versed in air doctrine. He Army Gen. Omar N. Bradley, objected violently when, only three while similarly placing together days after his arrival, Weyland wrote a memo stating his objections to the way things were being handled. There followed a face-to-face confrontation Weyland (l), then commander in which the quiet but stern Weyland of XIX Tactical Air Command, reminded Almond that he outranked meets with Maj. Gen. Hoyt Van- him, was more knowledgeable about denberg, commander of , in Rennes, France, in air operations, and would carry out his 1944. instructions to run the air war. AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2010 63 expectation of close air support the Weyland was promoted Army never wished to relinquish. to general in 1952, while When FEAF and Bomber Command serving as commander of Far East Air Forces. He turned to more far-reaching targets, made close air support a many Army commanders resisted. top priority during his time The surprise massive Chinese in- in Korea. tervention that began in November and did not grind to a halt until late January 1951 totally reversed the strategic situation. United Nations columns of North Korean forces were thrust back far down the troops and supplies, be- peninsula. Once again, it was airpower lieving that after estab- that enabled UN forces to end their lishing air supremacy, the retreat and create a solid front line. first role of airpower was The new commander of Eighth to conduct an interdiction Army, Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, campaign to cut enemy successfully re-established the morale lines of communication and offensive capability of his army, and supply. In doing so, but soon realized, as the Chinese did, Weyland demonstrated that a complete military victory was his innate flexibility. He no longer possible. Both sides then called upon Far East Air settled down to attrition warfare. Forces Bomber Com- The armistice was more than two mand to execute tactical years away. air strikes, something he By June 1951, Weyland was com- generally deplored. The mander, Far East Air Forces. B-29 strikes were later In his new position, Weyland once It was the start of a long and bitter seen to be very effective. again demonstrated his understanding battle that Weyland won, but which It was not until the coordinated of the requirement of joint operations. Almond never conceded. Weyland first landings at Inchon and the breakout The Army was still short of artillery, had to win the fight in Korea, where his from the Pusan Perimeter that Army and close air support was still required ragtag airpower stiffened the defenses leaders saw the real effects of the as a substitute. Further, the Chinese of Pusan sufficiently for United Nations interdiction campaign. The North had become masters of the art of resup- forces to hold on around Pusan. Korean Army had been scattered to ply at night, making air interdiction Initially equipped with only the the winds, and the roads beyond the less profitable. Frugal Chinese forces Douglas B-26, Boeing B-29, and a Naktong River were littered with dead consumed a minimum amount of sup- handful of fighters, he did the improb- enemy soldiers, shattered tanks, and plies, reducing the effectiveness of able: defending Pusan by concentrat- derelict trucks. attacks on the roads and railways used ing on close air support with the forces to provide them. An effort by Weyland in hand. His force was ultimately Commander, Far East Air Forces in 1951, Operation Strangle, attempted supplemented by Lockheed F-80s Then the accolades began to flow to sever seven enemy supply routes, and North American P-51s, and Col. in. “I am willing to state that no com- but was never entirely successful. The Jack Broughton recalls seeing ground mander ever had better air support than Chinese compensated for diminished troops standing up in their foxholes has been furnished the Eighth Army rail traffic by vastly increasing night- and cheering when Lockheed F-80s by the 5th Air Force,” said Lt. Gen. time road traffic, sometimes sending whistled across the orange and green Walton H. Walker, Eighth Army com- convoys south with headlights blazing. cloth panel that marked the bomb line. mander. “I will gladly lay my cards They provided easy targets for the He also recalls the Chinese soldiers right on the table and state that if it two hard-working B-26 wings, the standing up in their foxholes to fire had not been for the air support that 3rd and 452nd. rifles at the jet aircraft. we received from the 5th Air Force, The problem, as with the succeeding Ironically, the very success of this we would not have been able to stay Operation Saturate, was twofold. First, effort established a heightened set in Korea.” the Chinese, with their masses of labor, of Army expectations for close air One person who was not convinced could effectively repair most damage to support that would haunt Weyland was Almond, who had a less than railways quickly, even as they brought throughout the war. He saw imme- major role in the Inchon landings. in additional anti-aircraft units to pro- diately that the Army was fighting He continued to negatively contrast tect them. Second, 5th Air Force was without the resources on which it Air Force close air support to that increasingly short of aircraft. In Opera- traditionally relied, especially huge provided by the Marines. tion Saturate, 253 fighter-bombers were concentrations of artillery and virtu- The victories stemming from the lost, and only 131 replacement aircraft ally unlimited ammunition. Weyland Inchon landing and the Pusan breakout were provided. committed FEAF to substitute for the seemed about to bring the war to a The most important effect of Wey- artillery and it did so brilliantly. close with the complete occupation land’s air interdiction was to ensure As soon as possible, Weyland of North Korea. A side effect of the that the massive Chinese Army never reached out to decimate incoming intoxicating allied advance was an reached a point that it could undertake 64 AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2010 Weyland congratulates A2C Walter Schwarz, a crew chief for the 18th Fighter-Bomber Wing, on a job well done in Korea in 1952.

Toksan dam, which provided irrigation water for the vital North Korean rice crop. That May 13 attack not only took out the dam but damaged five railway bridges, a huge section of the main highway, and five square miles of rice crops. This hurt the North Koreans in two areas: communications and providing food for the Army. The fact that the air war he was conducting suffered from so many eco- nomic and political restrictions made Weyland a realist. He was adamant that there should be no consideration of United Nations forces crossing the Yalu River and expanding the war unless they had access to nuclear weapons. a decisive offensive. When the nature that the Army remained critically short In spite of the difficulties, the of the war rendered air interdiction less of artillery ammunition. As a result, shifting campaign, and the shortage profitable, Weyland’s staff offered more despite Weyland’s desire to increase of equipment, however, Weyland had productive options. Col. Richard L. the interdiction campaign, he made successfully balanced the Army’s des- Randolph led a staff team which sug- close air support FEAF’s first prior- perate calls for close air support with gested an “air pressure” strategy that ity during the frigid winter of 1952. the enduring need to use airpower for Weyland backed, against an expanded strategic purposes. group of targets. Tactical Airpower Advocate Weyland remained in command of Although Ridgway’s successor, Lt. Yet, when successively pressured FEAF until March 1954. That May, Gen. James A. Van Fleet, initially es- by Almond, Ridgway, and Army Gen. he returned to the United States as poused what Weyland called the “Army Mark W. Clark to cede control of commander of Tactical Air Com- party line” with regard to control of tactical air operations, Weyland suc- mand. There he continued to assert CAS, he soon became one of Weyland’s cessfully defended his turf, preparing the need for tactical operations and greatest supporters. the way for the later introduction of to convince others that limited wars “The war that does the most damage his own views on the value of air in- were an important future consider- to the enemy [in Korea] is from the air. terdiction. More formal recognition ation. One of his innovations was the It is an almost one-service war that came with Weyland’s promotion to creation of the composite air strike goes on, air war, doing the damage to general in July 1952. force, a predecessor of the modern the enemy deep in his own territory,” FEAF had also maintained air su- air expeditionary force. Van Fleet told Congress in 1953. “If periority despite the inherent advan- Weyland’s efforts to build up TAC the Army had been adequately supplied tage possessed by the enemy, which were hampered by budget cuts and the with ammunition, ... it would consume had superior numbers and flew from inevitable but expensive requirement more of the enemy, the enemy supplies, “off-limits” air bases close to the MiG for TAC to acquire a nuclear capability. create problems for him, which, in turn, Alley battleground. In the spring of He insisted that TAC retain its pro- would help our air service.” 1953, when the communists attempted ficiency with conventional weapons Van Fleet’s comments were a vir- to use 10 North Korean airfields for and sought flexibility because future tual echo of Weyland’s previously MiG operations, Weyland responded enemies would be extremely flexible expressed opinion that “tactical air- with vigor, sending the B-29s in to in their use of conventional weapons. power will contribute more to the knock them out. Weyland retired from the Air Force in success of the ground forces and The air pressure strategy led to 1959, but continued, until his death to the overall mission of a theater strategic attacks against the North in 1979, advocating for the use of commander through a well-planned Korean electric grid and against such tactical airpower as a deterrent and a interdiction campaign than by [any] vital but controversial targets as the war-winning force. n other mission short of the attainment of air supremacy.” Walter J. Boyne, former director of the National Air and Space Museum in Wash- Weyland knew that the foot soldiers ington, D.C., is a retired Air Force colonel and author. He has written more than loved to see his aircraft in action, and 600 articles about aviation topics and 40 books, the most recent of which is Hyper- that they had no way of measuring the sonic Thunder. His most recent article for Air Force Magazine, “When the U-2 Fell effects of air interdiction. He also knew to Earth,” appeared in the April issue. AIR FORCE Magazine / August 2010 65