Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments

Fifty Years of German-Israeli Diplomatic Relations WP S Whither the Miracle of Reconciliation? Muriel Asseburg

The 12th of May 2015 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the inauguration of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the State of Israel. While Ger- many’s genocide of the European Jews means that these will never be normal relations, the anniversary sees leading representatives of both countries lauding the almost miracu- lous bond of trust and close web of contacts that have grown between them. And in- deed, with no other country in the Middle East is Germany so closely associated. Never- theless, reconciliation has remained largely a project of the elites, and the two societies are currently growing apart rather than together. Also, differences over a two-state settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are casting a heavy shadow over the rela- tionship. Germany’s political elite and society should therefore take the anniversary as an occasion to reflect on the meaning of Germany’s historical responsibility and the implications for its policy towards Israel.

After the rupture in civilisation of the diplomatic relations German governments Shoah it appeared unlikely that Germany, have worked to deepen ties in the political, as the “country of the perpetrators”, and economic, military and social spheres. Israel, as the “country of the victims”, The relationship was initially exclusively would ever come to any kind of closer co- between the Federal Republic (West Ger- operation. Indeed, in the 1950s there was many) and Israel, as the German Democrat- resistance, above all but not exclusively in ic Republic refused to accept responsibility Israel, to any rapprochement of the two for the crimes of the Nazi regime. Reunifi- young states. Yet from the outset, relations cation then made the Federal Republic’s were not shaped only by the past: While the only German policy towards Israel. Germany’s special responsibility for the state of Israel has dominated the public discourse, cooperation has in reality always Close Bilateral Cooperation been driven by mutual economic and secu- Today the close relations are best expressed rity interests. Since the establishment of by the joint cabinet meetings held alter-

Dr. Muriel Asseburg is a Senior Fellow in SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division SWP Comments 27 May 2015

1 nately in and Jerusalem every year or centrates on profiting from Israel’s prac- two since 2008. Aside from Israel, Germany tical experience in military counter-terror- holds comparable regular top-level meetings ism, in particular house-to-house fighting. only with its closest European partners, On the other side, Israel was the third- as well as Russia, China, India and recently largest recipient of German arms exports also . between 2009 and 2013, with missile The last government consultations in defence systems and submarines especially February 2014 produced, amongst other prominent. Germany donated two sub- understandings, a consular agreement marines free of charge and sold the others allowing Israeli citizens to seek assistance at a considerable discount or in exchange from German representations in countries for arms purchases in Israel. The fifth of where Israel has no diplomatic or consular currently six contracted submarines was presence. The two countries also agreed to launched in April 2013 and is likely to be expand their joint development projects delivered soon. The German government in sub-Saharan Africa, above all on agri- has justified broad subsidies for arms culture, water and desertification. Israel, deliveries in terms of its commitment to which itself received German development Israel’s security, originally in light of Ger- aid until 1996 and only joined the OECD man support for Iraq’s missile and arms in 2010, has recently become a partner for programmes and Iraqi attacks on Israel in Germany in this field. Although its tech- 1991, later increasingly with reference to nical expertise in the water sector is un- the Iranian threat. Germany also possesses deniable, Israel’s discriminatory water an interest in placing orders for its own policy in the occupied territories speaks arms industry and shipyards. against such cooperation, as it leaves the Although these arms exports contradict amount of drinking water supplied to the the principle of not exporting to regions Palestinian population well below the of tension, they have been justified under minimum recommended by WHO. Israel the “if it floats it’s OK” rule attributed to thus violates the human right to water former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Gen- and its duties as occupying power. scher. This was shorthand for exporting defensive weapons systems seen as unsuited for repression in the occupied territories. Trade, Military and This reading ignores, however, the pos- Armament Cooperation sibility of using submarines for offensive Trade relations are close albeit asymmet- purposes, such as landing commandos, as rical. In 2014 Germany was Israel’s fourth- well the aspect of proliferation, to which largest bilateral trade partner, while Israel Germany contributes by supplying carrier was forty-sixth of all Germany’s trade part- technologies. In fact, Israel has converted ners and third in the Middle East (by vol- its submarines to enable them to fire cruise ume). An especially brisk trade has devel- missiles capable of carrying nuclear war- oped in the field of armaments, profiting heads. Although one could argue that Ger- from the close cooperation between the two many makes a decisive contribution to countries’ defence ministries, armed forces Israel’s security by supporting its seaborne and intelligence services. second-strike capability, this capability On the one side, Germany possesses a actually risks escalating tensions in the strong interest in Israel’s high-tech arms region – especially in view of Israeli threats industry, in particular its drone technology. to conduct military strikes against the Since the 1990s Germany has leased un- Iranian nuclear programme. manned aircraft from Israel to deploy in former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan. In joint training and exercises German interest con-

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2 The Politics of Societal that there is estrangement and incompre- Reconciliation hension between the two countries’ popu- Alongside a number of civil society actors, lations. the German government has led the way At the same time perceptions of the in promoting relations also at the level respective other have changed considerably of society through a great diversity of over the past decades. Broadly speaking, exchange and cooperation programmes. Israelis’ views of Germany have become Various projects largely initiated by the more positive, Germans’ ideas about Israel German government (as well as a few bi- more negative. Still, comprehensive studies lateral foundations) play an eminent role, based on opinion surveys reveal a less focusing on exchange and cooperation by dramatic picture than that suggested for politicians, academics, businesspeople, example by anti-Semitic incidents in several journalists and artists. For more than fifty German cities in connection with the 2014 years the German Federal Agency for Civic Gaza War, or emerging from single-issue Education has been running Israel visits polls, especially when conducted at times for opinion leaders. More than one hun- of war. dred German towns and districts are now Germans perceive Israel largely in the twinned with Israeli counterparts. Since twin contexts of the loaded German past the 1950s about 700,000 young Germans and the Middle East conflict. In contrast and Israelis have participated in youth to their political elites, growing numbers exchanges or voluntary service (mostly of ordinary Germans refuse to treat their Germans going to Israel). Currently about country’s historical responsibility as a duty nine thousand school students and young to ensure Israel’s security. Rather, they see adults participate in such exchange pro- German history implying a special respon- grammes each year. sibility to protect human rights and to engage to prevent war. In a Bertelsmann study published in spring 2015, only 40 per- Normalisation and Criticism cent of those surveyed agreed that Germany Despite all these initiatives, German-Israeli bore a special responsibility towards the relations have remained largely a project Jewish people. About two-thirds – and al- of the elites. Apart from those directly most 80 percent of 18- to 29-year-olds – involved in exchanges, they have had little expressed resentment at still being held effect on the two societies, certainly a good responsible for the crimes against the Jews. deal less than the media. They have thus Drawing a line under the past is favoured made only a small contribution to mutual by 55 percent of Germans. In contrast, understanding, still less to a reconciliation almost three quarters of Jewish respond- of perspectives. ents in Israel believe that Germany con- Germans and Israelis have drawn very tinues to have a special responsibility different lessons from history. Put simply, towards the Jewish people, and 77 percent in the country of the perpetrators the motto reject drawing a line under the past. “Never again war!” has been translated into Germans have long ceased to regard a political culture of military restraint, Israel as the underdog David threatened by multilateralism, and relinquishing of sov- an overpowering Arab Goliath, as was still ereignty. The land of the victims, following the case during the 1967 war. Israeli policy the dictum “Never again Auschwitz!” has towards the Palestinians meets with par- placed its faith in resolute independence, ticular criticism by Germans, who blame military strength and nuclear deterrence. Israel at least as much as the Palestinians These approaches have been further re- for the lack of progress in the peace process inforced by the respective geopolitical and recurrences of violence. Israel’s use of environments. It is therefore no surprise force is often perceived as disproportionate.

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3 At the same time there is little regard for Societies Drifting Apart Israel’s difficult security environment. Demographic trends suggest that the two In this context Germans are also critical societies are likely to drift further apart of their own government’s policy towards with regard to politics and identity. Ger- Israel. While politicians across political many is today more strongly marked by parties again reflexively took the side of generations and population groups that Israeli in the last Gaza War in July/August have no personal connection to the Shoah. 2014 and emphasised its right to self- Still, no significant increase in anti-Semi- defence, almost two-thirds of those inter- tism can be identified in Germany over the viewed in August 2014 by ARD Deutsch- past ten years. Also, the popular view that landTrend held Israel and Hamas equally Muslim immigrants were responsible for responsible for the escalation. A large the anti-Semitic incidents in summer 2014 majority also held that Germany should is not backed up by the statistics. While remain neutral rather than taking sides. anti-Semitic slogans heard at demonstra- According to the aforementioned Bertels- tions against the Gaza War came from mann study, a clear two-thirds majority these quarters, the vast majority of anti- reject arms deliveries to Israel. Semitic crimes are clearly attributable to On the other side, a study by the Konrad right-wing extremists. Adenauer Foundation from January 2015, Israel, in turn, is today noticeably less based on surveys among Jewish and Arab characterised by Jews who have immigrated Israelis, shows that more than two thirds from Europe than it was during its early of Israelis have an overwhelmingly positive years. And the proportion of religious Jews perception of Germany. Among young in the population is increasing, that of Israelis, whose image of Germany tends secular Jews declining. In 2010 every third more to the negative than the average as Israeli child was born to an ultra-Orthodox a result of a school curriculum in which family. This also generates challenges Germany is discussed almost exclusively in for Israeli democracy, associated with the connection with the Shoah, there is para- spread of the conviction that Jewish law doxically currently a Berlin craze. And even (halakha) stands above democratic prin- if most Israelis continue to associate Ger- ciples (in general or at least in particular many with the Shoah, they also see it as a spheres). stable Western democracy with a reputa- These developments are also likely to tion for innovation, high-quality products deepen the polarisation between Jews and and good quality of life. Eighty percent of Arabs in Israel, which has already been the surveyed Israelis regard Germany as an exacerbated over recent years by legislation important partner, and almost 60 percent designed for example to strengthen the believe that Israel can rely on Germany Jewish identity of the state. Not only do the without reservation. Consequently Israelis ultra-Orthodox argue significantly more also wish for Germany to play a more active frequently than others to restrict the politi- role in international politics. But here their cal and economic rights of Arab Israelis. expectations are diametrally opposed to Also, a national-religious discourse assert- those of the Germans, as they would like a ing a claim to Greater Israel has increasing- more active Germany to take Israel’s side in ly taken hold, reaching even into parts of conflicts with the Palestinians and Iran, to the population that do not regard them- stand up for Israeli interests in the Euro- selves as religious. Today almost one quarter pean Union and international organisations, of the Jewish population backs such ideas. and support Israel with arms supplies. The correlation between religiosity and image of Germany is likely to be a factor affecting relations between the two soci- eties. This is reflected in the study by Kon-

SWP Comments 27 May 2015

4 rad Adenauer Foundation, where 77 per- in 1994, Germany has been one of the largest cent of secular Jewish Israelis have a posi- donors to the Palestinians, who also receive tive image of Germany, but only 42 percent the highest level of per-capita German aid of the Orthodox and no more than 31 per- and development support. As well as sup- cent of the ultra-Orthodox. Thus the two porting the peace process, Germany has societies will probably show ever decreasing seen the establishment of Palestinian state mutual interest while irritations are likely institutions as the main priority. to increase. Yet it can no longer be ignored that sup- port for the peace process and the Pales- tinian Authority have contributed not to Tense Relations resolving the conflict but to cementing Despite close bilateral cooperation, the a conflictual status quo. Israelis political relationship has been character- and Palestinians have not moved an inch ised by tensions between the Merkel and towards a two-state settlement. Instead a Netanyahu governments. The two heads one-state reality has consolidated in which of government and their advisers have Israel maintains almost complete control repeatedly had heated telephone exchang- over the entire region between the Medi- es, and the German Chancellor has openly terranean and the River Jordan, where criticised Israeli settlement policy – al- residents enjoy different rights depending though only after US President Barack on citizenship, place of residence and Obama led the way. ethnic/religious categorisation. The Pales- Twenty years after the Oslo Agreements tinian Territories are fragmented by settle- between Israel and the PLO (1993–1995) ment construction, the there is great frustration in Germany’s in the , the sealing off of East political elite about the impasse in the Jerusalem and the blockade of the Gaza peace process, for which they hold Benja- Strip, while the political rift between Fatah min Netanyahu largely responsible. On- and Hamas further undermines their unity. going settlement activities in the occupied Despite immense donor support over the territories had eviscerated the credibility past twenty years, sustainable economic of the Israeli prime minister’s 2009 com- development has proved impossible, above mitment to a two-state settlement long all because of the ongoing occupation. before his July 2014 announcement that there would be no sovereign Palestinian State. His March 2015 election campaign Constants and Gradual Change statements merely confirmed what was in Berlin already evident. The German government still adheres to Berlin has thus found Israeli policy to most of the constants that have character- be increasingly in contradiction to its own ised German Middle East policy since the understanding, according to which Israel’s early 1990s, in particular continuing to in- security would be best served by a two-state sist that any resolution to the Israeli-Pales- agreement with the Palestinians, a com- tinian conflict must be an outcome of direct prehensive peace settlement with its other bilateral talks. And it continues to regard Arab neighbours, and regional cooperation. the as the main power broker Since the beginning of the 1990s Germany and moderator of such negotiations. Berlin has been actively supporting the Israeli- also regards pressure on Israel as counter- Palestinian peace process, the multilateral productive, preferring instead positive in- Middle East talks, and EU initiatives aiming centives, and rejects so-called unilateral to integrate Israel into an ever closer web steps (Israeli settlement activities, Palestin- of Euro-Mediterranean relations. Since the ian internationalisation efforts) as harmful establishment of the Palestinian Authority to the peace process. In addition, Chancel-

SWP Comments 27 May 2015

5 lor Angela Merkel feels a very personal obli- The sharpest expression to date of gation to Israel’s well-being and understands German dissatisfaction with Israeli policy its security as part of the German raison remains its abstention in the vote on d’état. She thus also complied with Netan- accepting Palestine as a “non-member ob- yahu’s demand to recognise Israel explicitly server state” at the United Nations General as a Jewish state even though such an eth- Assembly in November 2012. This move nic/religious definition of identity excludes marked a dilution of Berlin’s position on the country’s non-Jewish citizens (who make recognition of Palestine. At the same time up about 20 percent of the population). Germany continues to insist that a Pales- The lack of progress in the peace process tinian state must emerge from negotiations has, however, brought about a gradual and makes recognition dependent on that. change in Berlin’s policy. Germany no longer operates as “Israel’s good ambassador in the European Union”, upon which Prime Perspectives Minister Ehud Barak was once able to rely. The bilateral relationship is likely to come While Berlin is by no means the driving under further pressure in the coming force behind an increasingly Israel-critical months, as the chances of resumption of a stance within the European Union, it does meaningful peace process are nil, especially find itself more in the mid-field of Euro- after the March 2015 Israeli parliamentary pean positions. Germany has repeatedly elections. Already since the last round of attempted to generate joint EU positions, talks was broken off in April 2014 the par- but has also ceased seeking to prevent Euro- ties have been pursuing unilateral steps pean moves that Israel regards as punitive. and Israeli-Palestinian relations have steadi- This applies for example to the suspension ly worsened. This trend is set to continue. of an upgrading of the European Union’s As a consequence the international isola- relations with Israel (that Germany had tion of Israel will also increase – and with supported and that had in principle already it pressure from European partners on Ger- been adopted in 2008) after the 2008/2009 many to take a clear position and support a Gaza War, the adoption of EU guidelines more resolute European line towards Israel. forbidding as of 2014 the funding of Israeli institutions and activities in the territories occupied in 1967, or the request to the Euro- Recommendations pean Commission to prepare guidelines for Seventy years after the liberation of the labelling of settlement products. Auschwitz and fifty years after the estab- Berlin has also come to the conclusion lishment of diplomatic relations, Germany that international parameters for conflict and Israel have every reason to celebrate resolution would be helpful for encourag- the reconciliation of their states. At the ing constructive and goal-oriented negotia- same time Germany should see the anni- tions. Together with the United Kingdom versary as an opportunity to stage a debate and France, Germany presented such para- about its historical responsibility and to meters to the UN Security Council in Feb- critically reassess its policy towards Israel. ruary 2011, but was unable to have them For neither at the political level nor the adopted against US rejection. Berlin did societal can German-Israeli relations be not, however, support a draft Security isolated from the Middle East conflict. The Council resolution introduced by Jordan following elements should be taken into in December 2014 stipulating an end to account in this reflection process: the occupation by the end of 2017, as the Special historical responsibility: A broad German government still rejects any binding social and political debate is needed to clari- timeframe or coercive measures, let alone fy which specific obligations and policies an internationally imposed settlement. for society as well as domestic and foreign

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6 policy ensue today from Germany’s histori- for human rights, observance of inter- cal responsibility. national law and preference for peaceful Expansion of exchange and education conflict resolution. Double standards – programmes: In view of the drifting apart for example supplying weapons that serve of the two societies it would be useful to offensive as well as defensive purposes or pay greater heed to today’s social reality in joint exercises where German forces seek to exchange activities and include segments profit from Israeli experience in the context of the population that have tended to be of the occupation – must be avoided. Policy neglected (immigrant groups in both soci- fields where Israel violates human rights eties and non-Jewish minorities and the in the Palestinian Territories should be religious sector in Israel). In Germany more excluded from development cooperation consistent action must be taken against projects. anti-Semitism, racism and xenophobia Active commitment to the two-state through civic education and rigorous judi- settlement: If Germany is committed to the cial prosecution. At the same time, dialogue existence of Israel as the state of the Jewish © Stiftung Wissenschaft und forums that bring together population people, there is no point continuing a policy Politik, 2015 groups with different religious affiliations that indirectly consolidates the illegal All rights reserved should be supported. occupation and prevents a two-state settle- These Comments reflect Engagement in crisis management: The ment. The approach pursued to date, that solely the author’s views. realisation of historic responsibility in for- conflict resolution must be the outcome of SWP eign policy should be based on an empathic bilateral talks between the conflict parties, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik understanding of Israel’s threat percep- has proven ineffective. Germany and its German Institute for tions, but not on unquestioning adoption partners in Europe and in the Middle East International and Security Affairs of Israeli security doctrines. Germany Quartet (United States, Russian Federation, should fulfil its responsibility by expanding United Nations, European Union) should Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 its involvement in regional crisis and con- therefore agree not only on a Security 10719 Berlin Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 flict management. This is all the more Council resolution detailing parameters for Fax +49 30 880 07-100 urgent as Israel finds itself in an extremely a two-state settlement but also to stipulate www.swp-berlin.org [email protected] fragile environment with great risk of a binding timeframe and provide a mecha- violent escalation on several fronts. In the nism for internationally supervised imple- ISSN 1861-1761 past Germany has offered its services to mentation. At the same time a good deal Translation by Meredith Dale mediate prisoner exchanges between Israel more effort must then be put into keeping (English version of and Hezbollah or Hamas, and it would open the option of a viable Palestinian SWP-Aktuell 40/2015) certainly make sense to employ the trust state, for example by insisting on a settle- gained through such activities to prevent ment moratorium. Recognition of a Pales- future military clashes. tinian state would also be consistent with In the same vein, Berlin and its European that policy. Union partners should engage actively for Unless such a commitment, in which a resolution of the conflict over the Gaza confrontation with Israel is unavoidable, Strip, rather than relying on Egyptian or is pursued energetically, a two-state settle- other initiatives. One obvious starting point ment will become ever more elusive. In this would be the German foreign minister’s case serious consideration must be given proposals of summer 2014, including a to alternative approaches to safeguard the deployment of EU monitors to overcome rights of all the inhabitants of the area the blockade and create the preconditions of the former British Mandate of Palestine, for reconstruction, economic activity and even if they are incompatible with the a decent life in the coastal enclave. national ambitions of Israelis and Pales- General principles of German policy: Even tinians. in its special relationship with Israel, Ger- many’s actions should be guided by respect

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