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The Philippines Chips Away at the Abu Sayyaf Group's Strength

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The Philippines Chips Away at the Abu Sayyaf Group's Strength APRIL 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 4 The Philippines Chips notoriety for brazen raids on Philippine MILF worked closely with the ASG, and Malaysian dive resorts and the employing them in bombing campaigns Away at the Abu Sayyaf taking of Western hostages.2 These to give the MILF a degree of plausible Group’s Strength included the April 2000 raid on the deniability.8 More importantly, ties to Malaysian island of Sipadan, and the the ASG gave the MILF a beachhead in the By Zachary Abuza May 2001 raid on the Philippine resort Tausig-dominated Sulu archipelago and island of Palawan; together, the two began to undermine the Moro National since the launch of Operation attacks netted approximately 50 foreign Liberation Front’s (MNLF) hold in the Ultimatum in August 2006, the Armed hostages.3 Between 2000 and 2001, region. Although the MILF remains Forces of the Philippines (AFP) have the ASG abducted approximately 140 overwhelmingly an ethnic Maguindanao scored significant victories against hostages including school children, and Maranao organization, it always the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).1 In the teachers, priests and Western tourists; sought to challenge its rival Tausig- past four months, there has been a 16 of those hostages were killed.4 dominated organization. renewed intensity against the ASG. In mid-March 2010, Philippine President Bolstered by U.S. training and assistance, Re-Degeneration Maria Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo the AFP scored some early successes, The sustained AFP offensive against dispatched 700 additional Philippine including the neutralization of ASG the ASG that began in August 2006 led Marines and Ranger Scouts as well as a leaders Abu Sabaya and Ghalib Andang.5 to the death of the group’s commander, naval task force to the Sulu archipelago By 2004, however, most kidnappings Khadaffy Janjalani (the founder’s to reinforce the existing deployments. had ceased, and in conjunction with younger brother) in September 2006 Although the ASG’s capabilities and members of the Indonesian-based and then Abu Solaiman9 in January resources have waned, it has nonetheless terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiya 2007. The ASG never recovered from regained a foothold in Basilan and on (JI), the group was once again involved the losses of Janjalani and Solaiman. the Zamboanga peninsula in addition in terrorism, including the February Although the ASG was bolstered by to their stronghold in Sulu. The ASG’s 2004 bombing of a Superferry in Manila an infusion of new combatants when coordinated April 13, 2010 raid on harbor that killed 116 people.6 Between disaffected members of the MNLF, Isabela City, the capital of Basilan, 2004 and 2007, the few kidnappings under the leadership of Habier Malik, that left 11 dead affirmed that the ASG resulted in executions, not ransoms, joined with the ASG in March 2007, any remains a threat to Philippine peace including the 2007 beheadings of six cohesion that the ASG was starting to and security. This article traces the workers in Jolo who were working on a display started to unravel. Spread across evolution of the ASG, shows how the U.S.-funded road project.7 the Sulu archipelago from Zamboanga to group remains a weakened organization, Tawi-Tawi, the ASG broke down once identifies its current leadership and Before 2004, the ASG had few again into autonomous units with no finally examines some of its losses on contacts with other militant groups noticeable central command and control. the international front. in the region and in the Philippines. Short on funds and leadership, the That began to change in 2003, when individual units reverted to kidnapping Evolution of the ASG Indonesian and Malaysian militants for ransom beginning in the second half The Abu Sayyaf Group was founded by sought ASG assistance in crossing the of 2007. The year 2008 saw more than Abdurajak Janjalani, a veteran of the Sulu archipelago into Moro Islamic 55 kidnappings, most of which resulted Afghan mujahidin, in 1991, allegedly Liberation Front (MILF) camps in in releases after ransoms were paid.10 with al-Qa`ida seed money. From Mindanao. By 2004, JI members were 1991-1996, the group’s operations were embedded with ASG units. While the The rate of kidnappings declined sectarian in focus, targeting Christian MILF stated that they had no ties to the to roughly 40 people in 2009.11 churches, missionaries and priests. ASG, arguing that the ASG’s campaigns Nevertheless, four people were Following the loss of support from of kidnapping were “un-Islamic,” the beheaded when ransoms were not paid. al-Qa`ida in 1995—when Muhammad The second half of 2009 saw an uptick Jamal Khalifah was not allowed to 2 For details on Operation Bojinka, see Raymond Bon- in bombings. There were nine bombings, return to the Philippines following ner and Benjamin Weiser, “Echoes of Early Design to including one in Zamboanga that his implication in Ramzi Yousef’s Use Chemicals to Blow Up Airliners,” New York Times, killed six, and a bombing in Jolo that Operation Bojinka plot to destroy August 11, 2006. killed two U.S. military personnel.12 In multiple commercial airliners—and the 3 “Abu Sayyaf Kidnappings, Bombings and Other At- 1998 killing of Janjalani in a shootout tacks,” GMANews.tv, August 23, 2007. 8 Zachary Abuza, “Balik Terrorism: The Return of the with police, the group degenerated 4 These figures are drawn from the author’s own re- Abu Sayyaf Group,” Institute for Security Studies Mono- into a kidnap-for-ransom gang, gaining search. graph No. 625, September 2005. 5 Sabaya and Andang were two of the most notorious 9 Jainal Antel Sali (also known as Abu Solaiman) was 1 A number of the ASG’s top commanders have been kidnappers in the late 1990s, responsible for the Sipidan killed in January 2007. He was one of the top military neutralized as a result of the operation. Operation Ul- and Palawan raids. commanders for the ASG. timatum began on August 1, 2006, after previous of- 6 Simon Elegant, “The Return of Abu Sayyaf,” Time Mag- 10 These figures are drawn from the author’s own re- fensives lost intensity, and the ASG began to regroup in azine, August 23, 2004. search. sizeable numbers. The offensive was unprecedented in 7 Paul Alexander, “Philippine Army Vowed to Crash 11 Ibid. its immediate success and the AFP’s ability to sustain it Abu Sayyaf Militants after Beheadings,” Associated 12 For details on the deaths of the two U.S. soldiers, see over an extended period of time. Press, April 20, 2007. “2 U.S. Soldiers Killed in Philippines Bomb Blast,” CNN, 11 APRIL 2010 . VOL 3 . ISSUE 4 addition, 12 bombs were found hidden Middle East as well as in Malaysia.18 gunmen attacked the town of Maluso on on a ferry in July 2009, indicating the Beneath Mundus is his deputy, Puruji Basilan Island, killing a militiaman and ASG’s continued interest in crippling Indama, a young commander implicated 10 civilians.26 The recent April 13 assault the country’s maritime infrastructure.13 in the beheadings of 10 Marines in July on the Christian-majority capital city of Perhaps the only reason that more 2007 and the February 2010 massacre Basilan, Isabela, was well-coordinated, bombings did not occur was a result of of civilians on Basilan.19 and exposed significant weaknesses the government’s April 2009 seizure among government forces.27 A small of an enormous cache of bomb-making Philippine authorities seem buoyed team of ASG disguised as soldiers was materials.14 by the death of Parad and the dearth able to detonate three bombs in the city, of known leaders or authority figures. followed by automatic weapons fire. The first quarter of 2010 has likewise “There are no young leaders emerging,” The attack left 11 dead, including three seen a precipitous drop in kidnappings Dolorfino assured.20 Another military marines.28 and bombings.15 In part, these declines leader contended that all command and can be explained by more frequent and control had broken down. “There is no Regardless of these setbacks, the ASG costly encounters with the AFP. such coordination among all the groups,” appears weakened by the government’s explained Marine commandant Major renewed offensives and leadership Current Leadership General Juancho Sabban. “The Basilan decapitations. On February 21, 2010, the most notorious group has no contact with the Sulu ASG leader still at large, Albader group or with the Tawi-Tawi group. In The International Front Parad, was killed in an encounter in effect, we have isolated each group and While the ASG is clearly weakened Sulu.16 It was the most recent setback eventually piece by piece we will be able at home, there have been other to the group’s leadership continuity. to neutralize these groups.”21 developments on the international As Philippine Lieutenant General Ben front that are harder to evaluate in Dolorfino explained, “This will be a In addition to killing Albadar Parad, terms of the significance for the ASG’s big blow to the Abu Sayyaf.”17 The Philippine authorities have arrested capabilities. most senior ASG commander, the one- a number of other militants, either armed Radullan Sahiron, has not been ASG or people affiliated with the On January 14, 2010, Pakistan seen since a 2008 encounter, in which Indonesian-based JI. In early March authorities announced that Abdulbasit the AFP claimed to have wounded him. 2010, authorities arrested three people Usman was killed in a U.S. drone attack Other Jolo-based commanders include in metro Manila for plotting a bombing in Waziristan along the Afghan-Pakistan Umbra Jumandail, known as Dr. Abu for the ASG.22 Bomb-making materials border.29 The attack on a compound Pula, and Isnilon Hapilon.
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