OCTOBER 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 10

CoMBATING TeRRoRIsM CeNTeR AT WesT PoINT CTC SENTINEL oBJeCTIVe . ReleVANT . RIGoRous

Contents The Strengths and Weaknesses

FeATuRe ARTICle 1 The Strengths and Weaknesses of Jihadist Ideology of Jihadist Ideology By Nelly lahoud By Nelly lahoud

RePoRTs 4 The Role of Lashkar-i- in ’s Khyber Agency By syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi 6 The Torkham Border Closure and Attacks on NATO Supply Convoys in Pakistan By Tayyab Ali shah 9 Mitigating the Further Radicalization of ’s Muslim Community By luv Puri 11 From to Yemen: Al-Qa`ida’s Shifting Strategies By Ryan evans 15 ’s Case Against Abu Bakar Bashir By Arabinda Acharya and Fatima Astuti

18 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 20 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts The site of a suicide bomb attack in Quetta on September 3, 2010. - Photo by Banaras Khan/AFP/Getty Images he central argument espoused human rights and liberties as long as such by jihadist ideologues and singing serves and benefits its interests.2 leaders is that the Muslim Jihadists have thus determined that world is plagued by grievances jihad is the only path toward genuine Tand injustices, many of which are caused change in this world and divine reward by the West. According to their logic, the in the hereafter. Their jihad, they claim, and corrupt, oppressive is to fight to make God’s Law supreme on Muslim regimes are two sides of the same earth. Only then can all Muslims, rulers coin. Jihadist leaders warn Muslims not and citizenry, be equally accountable to About the CTC Sentinel to fall for Western “deceptive” ideas God’s Law. The Combating Terrorism Center is an such as democracy and human rights independent educational and research because they are designed to divert the In view of the prevalence of “Islamic” institution based in the Department of social umma (Islamic community) from jihad expressions in contemporary political sciences at the united states Military Academy, and ultimately paralyze it. Ayman al- discourse, it is critical to distinguish West Point. The CTC sentinel harnesses Zawahiri, for example, asserts that between Islamists and jihadists. the Center’s global network of scholars and the United States has only achieved its Islamists—who share with jihadists the practitioners to understand and confront interests “by spreading oppression and belief that Islamic teachings of social contemporary threats posed by terrorism and terrorism at the hands of its [Islamic] justice are the solution to the malaise other forms of political violence. allies.”1 According to al-Zawahiri, Muslims face today—operate within the Western civilization sings the praises of

The views expressed in this report are those of 2 Ayman al-Zawahiri made this statement in an inter- the authors and not of the u.s. Military Academy, 1 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “al-Badil huwa al-da‘wa wa-al- view with al-Sahab, conducted four years after the at- the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the u.s. Government. jihad,” Minbar al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad, undated, available tacks of 9/11. The interview is available at www.tawhed. at www.tawhed.ws/r?i=8vp6jsjy. ws/r?i=f3rahg23.

1 OCTOBER 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 10 political processes of the nation-state; commands.3 In political parlance, wala’ would-be jihadists from the influence they often form political parties and and bara’ constitute the jihadists’ “social/ of traditional religious scholars.5 This advance their agenda through contesting global contract,” designating those who individualist disposition to interpreting elections. By contrast, jihadists reject the are “in” from those who are “out.” Yet religion empowers the believer to world order of nation-states, believing in their case, loyalty is not subject to serve God directly, freeing him from it to be a continuation of Western the exclusive bureaucratic processes of conforming to what jihadist leaders and imperialism through other means. This ideologues regard as the infidelity of extends to their rejection of political their political and religious authorities. notions such as national sovereignty “This individualist and any regional or international disposition to interpreting Jihad as an Individual Duty (fard `ayn) institutions (such as the Arab League or Jihadist ideologues stress that they are the United Nations). religion empowers the engaged in defensive jihad and draw believer to serve God on the classical/medieval defensive Jihadists have instead opted for a doctrine of jihad to argue that jihad today paradigm exclusively defined by directly, freeing him is the individual duty of every Muslim. religious principles. Given their from conforming to The classical jurists who developed the rejection of the legitimacy of national defensive doctrine of jihad envisaged it and international political norms and what jihadist leaders and would only apply under extraordinary institutions, a religious paradigm ideologues regard as the circumstances when Muslims are allows the jihadists to find alternative under attack in their own territory and sources of legitimacy that would make infidelity of their political therefore did not have the luxury to seek it lawful, in their eyes, to transcend and and religious authorities.” permission to defend themselves. They indeed violate the laws of their home thus made it lawful for Muslims to take regimes and those of the international up jihad on their own initiative without community. Such an ideology, as awaiting the orders or permissions articulated by its adherents, has its the state, as does not define of any religious, political, parental or strengths, but also harbors within itself categories comparable to “refugee,” spousal authority. the seeds of its own destruction. “illegal immigrant,” or “alien.” Instead, every person, irrespective of status, Jihadist ideologues have molded this The Strengths of Jihadist Ideology color, gender or origin could potentially classical legal doctrine of warfare into a There are three key features that lend be accepted into the jihadist community contemporary global military program. themselves to advancing the cause of on the basis of embracing the common They believe that today’s jihad is not jihadism: 1) an idealistic commitment creed. In principle, the process of simply to repel a territorial attack. Instead, to a righteous cause; 2) individualism becoming a jihadist is far simpler than jihad is against both their own regimes in interpreting religion; and 3) the acquiring the citizenship of a state. (the near enemy) and the West (the far conviction that Muslims today are enemy); they have declared their own engaged in defensive warfare (jihad al- Individualism in Interpreting Religion regimes to be in apostasy from Islam and daf`), making their jihad not just lawful Jihadists yearn for the time when they, are fighting against them because they but an individual duty incumbent upon confident that they are the true believers, do not govern according to Shari`a, and each one of them. can be united under the leadership of a they are fighting certain states in the genuine Muslim figure (amir al-mu’minin), West because they lend support to their Idealism who governs according to Shari`a. Yet “apostate” rulers. This popularization Jihadist ideologues project a not only do they believe that Muslim of the defensive legal doctrine of jihad commitment to a righteous cause. They leaders today do not govern according by jihadist ideologues has broken down claim that their battle is waged in the to the justice of Islam, but they are the barriers between the individual, service of God; it is not contaminated equally distrustful of religious scholars especially the youth, and any authority with ephemeral interests. The loyalty and officials who are perceived to have that might prevent that person from of the jihadists is to God alone, not to any ties to the political establishment. joining, in the words of `Abdallah leaders or states. They love what He Usama bin Ladin, for instance, is `Azzam, the “caravan of jihad.”6 In loves and hate what He hates. This adamant that “no official scholar’s essence, this doctrine allows jihadists form of loyalty underpins the bonding juridical decrees have any value as to transcend the authority of the state mechanisms that are meant to unite far as I’m concerned.”4 Similarly, Abu and undermines any form of hierarchy jihadists, namely the paradigm of wala’ Muhammad al-Maqdisi wrote a treatise or authority that may stand between the and bara’: wala’ refers to the loyalty whose purpose is to forbid Muslims to militant believer and jihad. jihadists must have toward those, who, attend state-funded madrasas to shield like them, love God’s friends and hate 5 Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, “I‘dad al-Qada al- His enemies; bara’ refers to those from 3 Ayman al-Zawahiri, “al-Wala’ wa-al-Bara,” Minbar al- Fawaris bi-Hajr Fasad al-Madaris,” Minbar al-Tawhid whom jihadists must dissociate because Tawhid wa-al-Jihad, undated, available at www.tawhed. wa-al-Jihad, undated, available at www.tawhed.ws/ they have compromised God’s Law by ws/r?i=xota0ud8. a?a=2qrikosd. putting worldly concerns ahead of divine 4 Usama bin Ladin, “The Example of Vietnam,” in Bruce 6 `Abdullah `Azzam was instrumental in popularizing Lawrence ed., Messages to the World: The Statements of this doctrine to mobilize Muslims to fight in (New York: Verso, 2005), p. 141. against the Soviet Union.

2 OCTOBER 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 10

The Weaknesses of Jihadist Ideology share their beliefs as unbelievers. The rejectionist mindset that some Notwithstanding the republican This pronouncement is called takfir jihadists ultimately develop combines egalitarianism discernible in the and, for some, carries the license to odd blends of idealism with sectarianism; aspirations of some jihadist leaders, shed the blood of fellow Muslims. commitment to equality with a lack of their exclusive appeal to religious Given the idealistic and individualistic desire to be with equals; individualism principles has rendered jihadism disposition of the jihadists, takfir is not with remarkable indifference even to vulnerable to the limitations that a limited to being declared against non- death itself. The jihadists are trapped religious principle imposes if narrowly jihadists; it is a pronouncement that by their own idealistic goals; the more interpreted. Not all jihadists are driven could be declared by jihadists against principled they are in their ideals, the solely by a sense of political injustice; other jihadists. Thus, for the sake of more likely they will resort to takfir. some hold the conviction that their jihad protecting the purity of the faith, the is designed to fight against Muslims doctrinally-driven jihadist fights the As a result, jihadism’s very strength who do not observe a pure form of unbelievers—including fellow jihadists prevents it from functioning “in Islam. Their desire does not always whom he perceives to have shirked concert” to concentrate, organize stem from a spiritual yearning and it their commitment to the faith—on two and monopolize violence to meet its is not necessarily based on a profound fronts: he does so in word, through objective of establishing an Islamic understanding of religion. Such narrow- declaring takfir against them; and in state or caliphate.9 The consequences deed, through jihad. of this worldview are detrimental to achieving any form of sustainable unity “Jihadism’s very Takfir is not about making friends and within a group, let alone on a global strength prevents it from forging alliances; rather, the mindset scale. Potentially, the jihadist can direct of takfir translates into an obsessive his jihad against not just the “infidels,” functioning ‘in concert’ preoccupation with identifying enemies the “apostate” rulers and their to concentrate, organize and eliminating them. Thus, what takfir collaborators, but also against fellow achieves by way of purifying the faith jihadists. Thomas Hobbes’ apocalyptic and monopolize violence from any perceived signs of unbelief, narrative of life in a lawless state of to meet its objective of it negates by preventing any sustained nature as “nasty, brutish and short” unity among the group. Even more may still be an optimistic description of establishing an Islamic seriously, since jihadism is premised what jihadism can lead to: parts of Iraq, state or caliphate.” on an individualist understanding of Afghanistan and Pakistan now provide religion (until a true Islamic leadership a living reality of the freewheeling of emerges), takfir too can be decided by jihad and takfir. individual jihadists and thus lead to minded jihadists are unwittingly an anarchic use of jihad and violence Jihadist ideologues can applaud empowered by jihadist strategists to execute God’s Law as each religious themselves for mobilizing Muslims who downplay the value of religious zealot sees fit. across the globe to join the caravan of education lest it forestalls the Muslim jihad, but they have ultimately failed to youth’s enthusiasm for militancy. For Does Jihadism Have a Future? distinguish between jihad and power. instance, jihadist strategist Abu Mus`ab What is lacking in the jihadists’ More precisely, they have failed to al-Suri believes that jihad should commitment to equality before God distinguish between what Arendt do away with the complications of a is a deeper conviction that they need, observed as the “instrumental character” religious education. The only obligation in Hannah Arendt’s words, to “act in of violence on the one hand, and power, is to “embrace Islam, then fight.”7 concert.”8 In Islamic parlance, they lack or “the human ability not just to act but an appreciation of the importance of the to act in concert,” on the other hand.10 This ambivalent approach to structured unity of the jama`a, the “community,” Accordingly, the jihadists’ chances of religious education has inevitably made the cornerstone of Sunni Islam. Instead, securing eternal life in paradise are jihadism a magnet for many who embrace the jihadist believes that he has entered probably greater than their chances of jihad even before learning how to pray. into an individual covenant with God: establishing a caliphate in this world. To these nouveaux Muslims, religious he fights to make His Law supreme doctrine is an end in and of itself. For on earth, and in return God reserves a Nelly Lahoud is associate professor at them, the emphasis is not so much on place for him in paradise. The true test the Combating Terrorism Center in the loyalty (wala’) to fellow Muslims; they of the jihadist is his willingness when Department of Social Sciences, U.S. are more preoccupied with those from necessary to dissociate himself from Military Academy, West Point. This article whom they must dissociate (bara’). his group and its members, and declare is based on her book The Jihadis’ Path to Some jihadists take this dissociation takfir against them if necessary. In so Self-Destruction, which was released in further, declaring those who do not doing, he is armed with the conviction October 2010. that while he loses his community, he 7 Abu Mus`ab al-Suri, “The Global Islamic Resistance gains the eternal life of his soul. Call,” excerpts of which are translated in Brynjar Lia, 9 This is based on the definition in Max Weber, The Vo- Architect of Global Jihad: the Life of al-Qaida Strategist Abu cation Lectures (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Com- Mus‘ab al-Suri (New York: Columbia University Press, 8 Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: A Harvest pany, 1994), p. 33. 2008), p. 428. Book, 1970), p. 44. 10 Arendt, pp. 44, 46.

3 OCTOBER 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 10

The Role of Lashkar-i- has morphed from a vigilante crime many AMNAM cadres defected to fighting organization into a terrorist Shakir, who would later create LI in Islam in Pakistan’s Khyber group allied with Tehrik-i- 2004. The other significant group in Agency Pakistan (TTP). the area was Ansar-ul-Islam (AI), led by an Afghan, Pir Saif ur Rehman, who By Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi Background had settled in the area. Even though Khyber Agency is home to approximately both AMNAM and AI were militant, pakistan’s khyber agency remains a 546,730 people, and it is divided into AI was initially less inclined toward bastion of militant activity. Insurgents the administrative sub-units of Bara, violence because of its leader’s have frequently destroyed NATO supply Jamrud and Landi Kotal.7 Khyber is inclinations, which were more moderate convoys in Khyber, including an attack geographically significant because than the brand of Deobandism preached on four NATO oil tankers at the end it borders Peshawar, the capital of by Shakir in AMNAM. Both AI and of August.1 Most recently, a remotely- KP, as well as Nangarhar Province in AMNAM, however, began a causal loop detonated bomb killed three Pakistani Afghanistan. It is also a critical hub of “outbidding” the other by flexing security force personnel traveling of the area’s weapons trade. Khyber their militant muscle through FM radio through the agency on October 20.2 The has been a hotbed of militancy ever station broadcasts. On these networks, Torkham border crossing is located in since the Tirah Valley,8 a desolate but they would deride each other and issue Khyber, which is essential for supplying strategic area, was reportedly utilized sectarian fatawa ordering the other group international troops in neighboring by al-Qa`ida militants to escape into to leave Khyber.13 Afghanistan. Militant groups also use Pakistan after the U.S.-led invasion of Khyber as a base from where they can Afghanistan in 2001. The Tirah Valley These clashes developed into a serious launch attacks on Peshawar, the capital has been the site of repeated Pakistani conflict, which prompted the tribes of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province airstrikes in an effort to destroy to act against AI and AMNAM. Even (formerly known as the North-West terrorist cells planning suicide attacks though both Rehman and Shakir were Frontier Province).3 This latter threat in the settled areas of Pakistan, and the exiled for a time in 2005, this proved is especially concerning to Pakistani valley acts as a key territory used by even more deleterious to peace in authorities and explains why they have anti-state militants.9 the area by bringing to the fore more carried out a number of recent strikes in militant commanders.14 LI was taken Khyber, hoping to shut off or reduce the Militancy became entrenched in over by Mangal Bagh Afridi, and it flow of militants into Peshawar. At the Khyber when local tribesman Haji continued to clash with AI.15 Under end of August, for example, Pakistani Namdar founded the organization Mangal Bagh’s leadership, LI became security forces launched a series of Amr bil Maroof wa Nahi Anil Munkar the most significant and organized airstrikes in Khyber’s Tirah Valley, (Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of militant group operating in Khyber, killing at least 45 people.4 According to Vice, AMNAM) in the Tirah Valley. The while AMNAM and AI were largely Pakistani security officials, the strikes group was based on the Afghan Taliban marginalized. “were carried out after intelligence template,10 and unsubstantiated rumors information [revealed] that militants ascribe this to Ustad Yasir, a prominent The Taliban Arrive in Khyber were preparing to launch suicide attacks Taliban commander who reportedly Until 2008, Mangal Bagh tended in Peshawar and other parts of Khyber prompted Haji Namdar to establish to portray LI as merely a reformist Pakhtunkhwa Province (KP) during AMNAM.11 On the prompting of Yasir, organization fighting against criminals the next week.”5 Airstrikes continued Namdar established an FM radio station such as drug traffickers, gamblers, through October, with Pakistani and employed a radical tribal preacher, kidnappers and car thieves in the Bara helicopter gunships targeting militant Mufti Munir Shakir, to spread Islamist area.16 This paradigm shifted in 2008. hideouts in the Bara area on October 9.6 sermons.12 Namdar could not compete In that year, the TTP began establishing with Shakir’s firebrand oratory, and its hold on the area, and the number of This article profiles Khyber Agency, attacks on NATO supply convoys rose showing how it is suffering from a blend significantly. Due to Western pressure 7 The population estimate is based on Pakistan’s 1998 of sectarian violence and Talibanization. on the state, the Pakistani government census. It also reveals how at least one militant banned AMNAM, LI and AI, and it 8 The Tirah Valley is only accessible through the heart- group in Khyber, Lashkar-i-Islam (LI), launched military operations against land of FATA. The terrain is rugged, there are pockets of militancy all along the way, and the area is desolate, 1 “NATO Oil Tankers Destroyed by Militants in Paki- which is why it has become a militant stronghold. 13 Ibid. Ansar-ul-Islam is Barelvi in persuasion, where- stan,” Sify News, August 30, 2010. 9 “Pakistan Air Raids Kill Scores.” as Shakir follows a strict Deobandi creed. The main bone 2 “Four Security Personnel Killed in Terror Attacks,” 10 For details, see Caroline Wadhams and Colin Cook- of contention between the groups has been their different Daily Times, October 21, 2010. man, “Faces of Pakistan’s Militant Commanders,” Center sectarian ideologies. 3 Khyber Agency is almost contiguous to Peshawar for American Progress, July 22, 2009. 14 Zaidi. through the city’s suburb of Hayatabad. 11 Personal interview, Pakistani security official, Pesha- 15 Mangal Bagh started out in humble circumstances as 4 “Pakistan Air Raids Kill Scores,” al-Jazira, September war, Pakistan, May 2010. Also see Raheel Khan, “The a bus conductor driving the Peshawar-Bara route, and 1, 2010. Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and Conflict in Khyber,” was initially a minor activist of the Awami National Par- 5 Ibid. New America Foundation, April 2010. ty, the ruling secular political party in KP. He rose from a 6 “Gunship Helicopters Target Militants in Barra,” 12 Manzar Zaidi, “A Profile of Mangal Bagh,” The Long commander to the head of LI in just a few years. Dawn, October 9, 2010. War Journal, November 11, 2008. 16 Ibid.

4 OCTOBER 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 10 these groups.17 Since then, there have cordial relations with Yasir because consulate before blowing themselves been four major operations by the state Namdar was seeking an alliance to up.30 They had brought ramps to in the area, titled: Darghlum, Baya strengthen his weakening militant help scale the metal barriers of the Darghlum, Sirat-e-Mustakeem, and position.23 True to its creed, however, consulate, and would have entered the Khwakh Ba De Shum.18 Despite these the TTP wanted total territorial compound if debris from the armored operations, the state did not initially domination, and they soon soured believe that LI had genuine linkages to relations with all the militant entities in the TTP, as the first three operations Khyber by conducting a suicide attack “LI in the Tirah Valley did not seriously target Mangal Bagh on a tribal jirga that killed more than 40 has emerged as a primary and his group. tribal chiefs, representative of all the major factions in the agency.24 During threat to Pakistan’s urban Indeed, Bagh rebuffed several offers the Sirat-e-Mustakeem operation, the centers.” from the TTP to merge with his group TTP suspected Haji Namdar of siding before 2008.19 He remained independent with the Pakistani state against the even during the major Sirat-e- TTP. For this alleged transgression, a Mustakeem government operation in TTP operative assassinated Namdar in personnel carrier had not jammed into June 2008, which directly targeted LI.20 August 2008.25 the barrier.31 Police investigations have Although during this time LI fit into the tied the assailants to LI.32 This incident paradigm of Talibanization by shutting The military operations appeared to is just one of many in a series of major down music shops and even abducting do the TTP’s work for them, as the LI attacks on Peshawar, all of which Christians from Peshawar, the group offensives were instrumental in pushing seemed to originate from the Tirah did not engage in widespread terrorist LI into the arms of the Taliban.26 After Valley.33 attacks against the state, and it did not the Sirat-e-Mustakeem operation, it conduct suicide operations.21 appears that Bagh moved closer to the In the end, the TTP managed to secure TTP in the latter half of 2008. Bagh its position in Khyber by improving For the TTP, securing a positive publicly changed his stance, telling the relations with LI, the agency’s largest relationship with a group in Khyber was government to drop its demand for his faction.34 Authoritative sources have important for its strategic objectives. surrender, saying, “Now it is difficult cited the close symbiotic relationship Gaining operational movement in for us to live in peace. The conflict between LI and the TTP, including Khyber would allow it to effectively will not be confined to Khyber Agency reports that LI is using TTP suicide disrupt NATO supplies to Afghanistan, alone; rather it will spread to the entire trainers such as Said Noor to train which transit through Torkham in the Peshawar region.”27 Shortly after the its fighters.35 The TTP maintains its Khyber Pass. Yet the TTP had initial statement, reports of LI-perpetrated presence in Khyber through local difficulty establishing its influence in terrorism began to appear.28 A daring commanders. These commanders the agency since three strong militant suicide attack on the U.S. Consulate reportedly consist of the TTP’s second- groups already existed in Khyber— in Peshawar in April 2010 is one of tier leadership, who are controlled AMNAM, AI and LI. They all resented several high-profile cases linked to LI.29 by more senior TTP commanders the TTP’s intrusion, clashing with them During that attack, militants arrived in neighboring Orakzai Agency. In on occasion. outside the consulate in two vehicles, Orakzai, TTP leaders coordinate the one of which was detonated near an group’s activities, while on-the-ground To gain influence in Khyber, the armored personnel carrier, while armed operatives tend to liaison mainly with TTP reportedly sent reputed Afghan men exited the other and shot at the LI, particularly regarding attacks on commander Ustad Yasir to the territory. Peshawar.36 This relationship also helps It is not known when he arrived in the 23 Ibid. the TTP destroy NATO supply convoys 22 area, since evidence is anecdotal. 24 Ibid. passing through the area; more than Initially, Haji Namdar of AMNAM had 25 “Pakistan Militant Leader Killed,” BBC, August 13, 700 cargo trucks and military vehicles 37 2008; Roggio, “Pakistani Troops Target Extremists in have been destroyed through 2010. 17 Imtiaz Gul, “Talibanisation of Khyber Agency,” Week- Khyber”; Personal interview, Khyber Agency-based ly Pulse [Islamabad], July 3, 2008. journalist, July 2010. 18 Personal interview, Khyber Agency-based journalist, 26 The Taliban began appearing in Khyber in 2006, al- July 2010. Also see Bill Roggio, “Pakistani Troops Target though then they were usually known as maqami (local) 30 Ibid. Extremists in Khyber,” The Long War Journal, November Taliban since the TTP nomenclature had not yet become 31 Ibid. 24, 2009. common currency. The Taliban would later coalesce as 32 Ibid. 19 Zaidi; Personal interview, Khyber Agency-based jour- a TTP franchise controlled by commanders from neigh- 33 Ibid. nalist, July 2010. boring Orakzai Agency. 34 Bagh has made exaggerated claims to having 180,000 20 Although Sirat-e-Mustakeem directly targeted LI, the 27 Muhammad Amir Rana and Rohan Gunaratna, Al- volunteers. More realistic estimates by authorities, how- government chose not to place a lot of pressure on the Qaeda Fights Back Inside Pakistani Tribal Areas (Lahore: ever, put the figure around at least 10,000 fighters. group. See Daud Khattak, “Forces Clear Khyber, Tirah is Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 2007), p. 43. 35 Personal interview, senior police officials, Peshawar, Next,” Daily Times, June 30, 2008. 28 Personal interview, prominent Peshawar-based re- Pakistan, May 2010. 21 Zaidi. porter, May 2010. 36 Zaidi. 22 Syed Saleem Shahzad, “Taliban Bitten by a Snake in 29 Personal interview, Pakistani security officials, Pe- 37 Bill Roggio, “Suicide Bomber Kills 19 in Khyber,” The the Grass,” Asia Times Online, August 26, 2008. shawar, Pakistan, August 2010. Long War Journal, February 10, 2010.

5 OCTOBER 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 10

Today, LI apparently pays recruits a Simultaneously, LI in the Tirah Valley The Torkham Border monthly salary, and it offers free meals has emerged as a primary threat to Closure and Attacks on to convince fighters to join its ranks.38 Pakistan’s urban centers. LI, which LI reportedly has a fleet of at least 138 did not get its start as a terrorist NATO Supply Convoys in vehicles.39 The group raises funds by group, has now become a terrorist Pakistan levying taxes on vehicles traveling organization allied with the TTP, a through Khyber, or by smuggling goods. startling development for any observer By Tayyab Ali Shah It also earns money through receiving of the evolution of militant groups in protection funds from embattled Pakistan. This is an exact replication on september 30, 2010, U.S. helicopter minority groups in Khyber, such as of the process that occurred in Swat, gunships left their base in Afghanistan the Sikhs. Nevertheless, Pakistani when Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat- and crossed into neighboring Pakistan.1 authorities argue that even these e-Mohammadi (TNSM) militants joined Once in Pakistani territory, the funding methods do not fully account the Taliban. LI resorted to terrorism helicopters killed two Pakistani frontier for the group’s affluence.40 As for AI after operations were initiated against guards after mistaking them for Taliban and AMNAM, they have been largely it, notwithstanding the fact that it insurgents. The deaths of the Pakistani marginalized due to the symbiotic openly challenged the writ of the state soldiers came in the context of a drastic relationship between the TTP and LI.41 in Khyber by coercing local officials, increase in U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle closing schools, conducting kidnapping (UAV) attacks on militant strongholds Conclusion for ransom, among other expressions of in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Many analysts worry that the troop extremism.43 The TTP was a logical ally Tribal Areas (FATA) during the month surge in Afghanistan has put pressure because of their tactical linkages, and of September.2 The UAV attacks are on Khyber to accommodate militants this relationship allowed LI to sideline largely unpopular in Pakistan, and fleeing across the border. This concern competing organizations in the agency. the government in Islamabad only is especially relevant considering that acquiesces to them privately. Yet the Pakistan’s military is heavily engaged in This case shows that whenever a direct attack on Pakistani soldiers by Waziristan and may not be able to divert dominant militant entity in the tribal U.S. helicopters caused Islamabad to its attention to Khyber Agency until areas is challenged by the state, it tends close the Torkham border crossing in other military operations are concluded. to rapidly evolve along trajectories of FATA’s Khyber Agency in apparent The current offensive in Khyber, which terrorism and insurgency, regardless of retaliation. The Torkham border is a carryover of the Khwakh Ba De what its self-professed intentions once crossing is critical for the international Shum initiative, is limited in scope, were. mission in Afghanistan because at least with only 200 troops, augmented by 25% of non-lethal NATO supplies arrive aerial firepower, deployed in Landi Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi is the author of into Afghanistan through this post.3 Kotal.42 This indicates that the Pakistan two books about the Taliban in Pakistan, Army has not initiated full-scale COIN and has written extensively about the In the subsequent 10-day blockade of operations in Khyber comparable to subject in international scholarly journals. Torkham, more than 150 NATO supply those in Swat and Waziristan. As a He has been a lecturer of terrorism studies trucks were destroyed in Pakistan.4 result, Khyber may become a sanctuary at a British university. His expertise Although attacks on NATO supply for the hard-pressed TTP leadership, or lies in the study of Talibanization and as a conduit for Taliban fighters fleeing transmigration of radical trends from rural 1 Hussain Afzal and Deb Riechmann, “Pakistan Blocks from allied forces in Afghanistan. In to the urban mainstream in Pakistan, and War Supply Route to Afghanistan After NATO Alleg- fact, the Torkham border crossing a deconstruction of jihadist discourse. edly Kills 3 Border Guards,” Associated Press, Septem- near Peshawar caters to a tremendous ber 30, 2010. amount of population flow and transit 2 In September, the CIA launched 21 attacks with UAVs, trade to and from Afghanistan. the most ever during a single month, and more than twice the number in a typical month. For details, see Abdul Sattar, “25 NATO Fuel Tankers Attacked in Pakistan,” Associated Press, October 6, 2010; Karin Brulliard and Karen DeYoung, “NATO Fuel Tankers Are Torched in Pakistan,” Washington Post, October 1, 2010; Mark Maz- 38 Personal interviews, staff of the political agent in Khy- zetti and Eric Schmitt, “C.I.A. Steps Up Drone Attacks ber Agency, May 2010. These details were also corrobo- on Taliban in Pakistan,” New York Times, September 27, rated by senior police officials in Peshawar, along with 2010. a prominent Peshawar-based journalist who requested 3 Karin Brulliard, “Pakistan Ends Blockade, Reopens anonymity. Border to NATO Supply Trucks,” Washington Post, Oc- 39 Ibid. tober 10, 2010. Other sources place this number higher. 40 Personal interviews, senior police and district admin- See Jane Perlez and Helene Cooper, “Signaling Tensions, istration officials, Peshawar, Pakistan, May 2010. 43 Although government operations against LI appear Pakistan Shuts NATO Route,” New York Times, Septem- 41 Zaidi. to explain why the group moved closer to the TTP, the ber 30, 2010; “Nato Supply Lorry in Pakistan Hit by 42 Bill Roggio, “Fighting Intensifies in Northwestern government had little choice. LI’s influence was en- Blast,” BBC, October 5, 2010. Taliban Strongholds,” The Long War Journal, November croaching into Peshawar, and the group was defying the 4 David Rising, “Pakistan Afghan Border Crossing Re- 27, 2009. writ of the state and flaunting its vigilante power. opens for NATO,” Associated Press, October 10, 2010.

6 OCTOBER 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 10 trucks in Pakistan are not unusual, safe due to the territory it crosses in men attacked a NATO container truck this latest campaign of sabotage and Pakistan, as well as the territory it must traveling through a town in Wadh assault marked the first time that pass through in Afghanistan.9 Tehsil of Khuzdar district, while two NATO supplies were targeted in NATO oil tankers were destroyed in such quick succession and in all four In recent years, alternate northern the Mangochar area of Kalat district provinces of the country.5 supply routes have been opened and in Baluchistan Province.14 All three expanded in the former Soviet states vehicles were carrying NATO supplies This article provides an overview of of Central Asia, yet these paths have through the Chaman Pass. the importance of Pakistan as a NATO served to complement, not replace, the supply route, while also detailing Pakistani routes. These latter routes are On October 6, in one of the largest the recent series of attacks and by far the shortest, most direct and well attacks, 77 NATO supply tankers parked identifying the various parties that established. It costs more than twice near a hotel on Grand Trunk Road at may be responsible. as much to move supplies through the Khairabad in Nowshera District were northern routes, and hijackings and gun attacked by multiple assailants armed The Importance of Pakistan as a NATO Supply battles have become common on them.10 with explosives.15 The militants first Route The northern routes are also influenced warned the drivers, their assistants and NATO supplies arrive on the South by Russia and the former Soviet states, guests at the hotel to stay away from Asian continent through Pakistan’s which adds geopolitical variables to the the oil tankers before they attacked southern port of Karachi, and then equation. the vehicles. Fifty-four tankers were travel through two border crossings completely destroyed, while the into neighboring landlocked The October Attacks ensuing fire took 16 hours to bring Afghanistan.6 Fuel from Pakistani The first of the series of recent attacks under control.16 The same day, armed refineries is also transported into on NATO supply convoys occurred men in two vehicles and on motorbikes Afghanistan along these same routes. on October 1, one day after the attacked a NATO truck terminal at Although NATO has attempted to Torkham border crossing was closed. Akhtar Abad on the Western Bypass of diversify its Afghanistan supply routes Approximately 20 militants armed Quetta where more than 30 oil tankers during the last two years, it remains with rocket launchers and assault rifles were parked.17 One driver was killed, heavily dependent on Pakistani torched and destroyed at least 27 NATO while 20 oil tankers were completely territory. supply trucks at Shikarpur in interior destroyed.18 Finally, on October 9, Sindh Province.11 On that same day, a approximately 30 armed men attacked Placing the importance of Pakistani vehicle that was transporting supplies for NATO supply tankers in the Mithri supply routes in context, approximately NATO forces from Karachi to Kandahar, area of Bolan district in Baluchistan 1,000 container lorries and tankers via the Chaman route, was attacked Province.19 Twenty-nine tankers were pass through Torkham on their way to near Baghbana Tehsil in Khuzdar, destroyed in the attack.20 Kabul daily, while another 150 lorries Baluchistan Province; the trailer was and tankers pass through the southern completely destroyed while the driver Who is Behind the Attacks? supply route of Chaman to Kandahar.7 and his assistant were burned alive.12 Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Approximately 150 NATO supply claimed responsibility for the attacks, trucks were stranded at the Torkham On October 3, six people were killed and and it said that they were all carried border crossing one week after the post dozens injured after a group of seven to out by its newly formed Siyara Group.21 was closed, and an estimated 6,500 eight assailants on motorbikes sprayed NATO supply vehicles were backed bullets at 28 NATO oil tankers near 14 “Three Nato Oil Tankers Set Ablaze in Khuzdar, Ka- up across Pakistan along the 930- the Defense Housing Authority Phase lat,” The News International, October 5, 2010. mile route from the port of Karachi to 2 in Islamabad, causing the tankers to 15 “54 Nato Oil Tankers Gutted in Nowshera,” The News Torkham.8 Although the Chaman border 13 catch fire. The following day, armed International, October 8, 2010. crossing remained open, the backed-up 16 Ibid. supply trucks could not be adequately 9 Imtiaz Ali, “NATO’s Khyber Lifeline,” Terrorism Moni- 17 “57 Nato Tankers Set Ablaze in Fresh Assaults,” Daily diverted. The Chaman crossing is not tor 7:1 (2009). Times, October 7, 2010; “46 Nato Tankers Torched in as cost effective because the main U.S. 10 Jason Motlagh, “Pakistan-U.S. Border Spat: Crippling Quetta, Nowshera,” The News International, October 7, bases in Afghanistan, such as Bagram, the Afghanistan Campaign?” Time Magazine, October 4, 2010. are located closer to the Torkham route. 2010. 18 Ibid. Moreover, the Chaman route is not as 11 “Pakistan Supply Truck Ambush Kills 2,” Associated 19 “29 NATO Oil-Tankers Destroyed in Fresh Attack,” Press, October 15, 2010; “Militants Attack Nato Tankers Deccan Herald, October 9, 2010; “29 Tankers Torched in 5 Although Islamabad is technically part of the Islam- in Shikarpur,” Dawn, October 1, 2010; “Terrorists Attack New Quetta Attack,” The News International, October 10, abad Capital Territory, it is within the territory of Punjab Nato Oil Tankers in Shikarpur,” The News International, 2010. Province. October 2, 2010. 20 Ibid. 6 Brulliard, “Pakistan Ends Blockade, Reopens Border 12 “Two Killed as Dozens of NATO Tankers Torched,” 21 Siyara is an Urdu and Pashtu word meaning mobil- to NATO Supply Trucks.” Daily Times, October 2, 2010; “Militants Attack NATO ity, as in a mobile assault group. It is not clear whether 7 “Nato Supply Lorry in Pakistan Hit by Blast.” Oil Tankers in Pak, 5 Killed,” Times of India, October 2, the TTP truly created this group, or if it is just propa- 8 Charles Recknagel, “How Secure is NATO’s Supply 2010. ganda. See “Militants Claim Torching Nato Oil-Tankers Line in Pakistan?” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, Oc- 13 “Six Killed as 28 Nato Oil Tankers Set Ablaze in Islam- in Sindh,” The News International, October 3, 2010; “Tali- tober 8, 2010. abad,” The News International, October 4, 2010. ban Claim Attack on Oil Tankers,” BBC Urdu, October

7 OCTOBER 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 10

Some Pakistani and NATO officials Instead, local Sindhi politicians and Tell me another [joke]. Who in heaven said the same.22 Pakistan’s foreign media are calling the Shikarpur attack are we trying to fool?”29 office, however, associated the October a conspiracy hatched by the Pakistani attacks with public outrage emanating security establishment to make Sindh This is not the first time that from NATO’s incursion into Pakistani Province appear unstable. According Pakistan’s security establishment territory.23 Despite the TTP’s claims to this logic, if instability enters has been accused of supply convoy of responsibility, the identities of the Sindh Province, then the Pakistani attacks. After the daring attacks assailants are not clear. military will have a justification to near Islamabad in June 2010 that create garrisons or cantonments in left dozens of NATO supply tankers Reports suggest that other parties may the province—further increasing its destroyed, Ikram Sehgal, a Karachi- have played a role in the recent string control over Pakistani politics. One based defense and security analyst, said of attacks. For example, the most analyst, writing in the Daily Times, that there could be a nexus between the surprising attack was the incident at encapsulated this theory: Taliban and some low-level intelligence Shikarpur in interior Sindh Province. officials because the militants seemed Shikarpur and neighboring areas of First, it [Pakistani security fully informed about the logistical Sindh have not experienced this type establishment] has ratcheted up importance and movement of that the brinkmanship by stopping particular convoy.30 “Pakistan’s sensitivity to the NATO supply line and then allowing orchestrated attacks Additionally, several trucking NATO incursions and its on the idling trucks. This is companies have expressed suspicion reaction against it may lead reminiscent of the November 1979 that other truck contractors themselves burning down of the U.S. Embassy, are complicit in the attacks.31 They to more border closures, while General Ziaul Haq went on claim that some trucking companies more intense and frequent with his gingerly bicycle ride in hired by NATO sell off the bulk of the Rawalpindi. The mobs torched oil in the tankers, and then destroy the militant attacks on NATO the embassy and killed diplomats tankers to conceal the theft. NATO then convoys, and more tensions in the heart of Islamabad, while reportedly compensates the companies the security agencies stood by. for the loss of their vehicles, or provides in U.S.-Pakistan bilateral The idea was to teach the Yanks a new equipment.32 relations.” lesson so they would do business with the general on his terms.26 Finally, there are allegations that the “trucking mafia” may be responsible Another columnist added, “If Pakistan for some of the attacks. The so-called of militant activity, suggesting an feels it is being nudged beyond the trucking mafia has emerged around expansion of militancy to previously band of cooperation it has deemed the protection of the supply convoys peaceful areas. Yet the Shikarpur acceptable, Pakistan will push back. traveling through both Pakistan and area is also a stronghold of the ruling Supply routes will be closed, attacks Afghanistan, and it consists of security Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and on convoys will mysteriously step up officials, insurgents, smugglers and Sindhi nationalist parties, and Taliban and cooperation in other areas will tribal leaders. The drivers and their operatives are not known to operate in slow.”27 companies have to cut deals with the area.24 Sindh civil society leaders Pakistani security officials (the police rejected the claims of Pakistani officials Yet another security analyst added that and the Khasadars), local contractors that the Taliban were behind the Pakistan’s intelligence and security and tribes to allow the safe passage destruction of the NATO vehicles in apparatus may be encouraging the of their trucks.33 The goods smuggled Sindh, saying that there was no support attacks by “looking the other way” or for the Taliban in the area.25 Jeay Sindh may be themselves behind some of the 29 Kamran Shafi, “An Inauspicious Beginning,” Dawn, Tehreek, a Sindhi nationalist group, operations. The security analyst added, October 5, 2010. organized a demonstration in favor of “The fact that government ministers 30 Aamir Latif, “NATO Convoys a Soft Target in Paki- NATO supplies and against the attacks are calling the attack an expression stan,” Global Post, June 18, 2010. in different towns of Sindh, as reported of public anger shows that some may 31 “Contractors Behind Attacks on NATO Supplies in in the Sindhi-language newspapers just be payback.”28 Another columnist, Pakistan?” ANI, October 10, 2010; “Who is Behind At- Halchal and Sach. who is himself a former Pakistan Army tacks on NATO Supplies in Pakistan?” Xinhua, October officer, wrote, “Militants’ torched 9, 2010. Karachi-based Pakistani journalist and analyst NATO supplies in Shikarpur and (DHA 2, 2010. Zia-ur-Rehman corroborated these claims, while anoth- Phase-II) Islamabad two nights apart? 22 “How Secure is NATO’s Supply Line in Pakistan?” er journalist, on condition of anonymity, dismissed it as 23 “Torching Nato Supply Trucks was Expression of propaganda popularized by the security establishment. Public Anger,” BBC Urdu, October 2, 2010. 26 Muhammad Taqi, “Smokescreen of Sovereignty,” 32 This is not a new allegation, as the Daily Afghanistan 24 The PPP and Sindhi nationalist parties are considered Daily Times, October 7, 2010. reported on December 14, 2008 that local contractors set anti-establishment. 27 Cyril Almeida, “Strategic Stasis,” Dawn, October 8, fire to their trucks to collect insurance provided by for- 25 This information is based on e-mail discussions with 2010. eign companies. Karachi-based journalist and analyst Zia-ur-Rehman, in 28 Riaz Sohail, “Nato Contractors ‘Attacking Own Ve- 33 “Pakistan Roadblock Cuts Off Taliban Funds,” Wash- addition to another anonymous analyst. hicles’ in Pakistan,” BBC, October 6, 2010. ington Post, October 6, 2010.

8 OCTOBER 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 10 and stolen from the convoys often end Mitigating the Further the three stages of radicalization up in Sitara market on the outskirts among India’s Muslim community, of Peshawar.34 They, too, could have Radicalization of India’s and suggests some steps the Indian played a role in the latest incidents. Muslim Community government can take to prevent future violence. India’s Muslim community is Conclusion By Luv Puri the third largest in the world, standing The recent border closure and almost at approximately 160 million people.45 daily attacks on NATO supply convoys in january 2010, U.S. Secretary of Defense It is critical that the Indian government may be the harbinger of developments Robert Gates warned that a “syndicate” does not underestimate the potential to come. The spike in UAV attacks since of terrorist groups, including Lashkar- of further domestic discontent within September—and NATO’s readiness to i-Tayyiba (LT, or LeT), were “operating this community, and India must take attack targets directly on the border under the umbrella of al-Qaeda” to immediate action to increase communal or inside Pakistani territory—could be destabilize South Asia by provoking harmony. a sign that the United States wants to a war between India and Pakistan.1 expand the conflict into Pakistan to place U.S. officials have warned that another Growing Radicalization of the Indian Muslim meaningful pressure on the Taliban 2008 Mumbai-style attack in India Community and force a negotiated settlement to the could cause a violent escalation of First Stage conflict in Afghanistan. Yet Pakistan’s tensions between the two rival states, The radicalization of India’s Muslim sensitivity to NATO incursions and its both of which possess nuclear weapons. community has passed through three reaction against it may lead to more Indeed, Indian authorities allege that stages. The first stage can be traced to border closures, more intense and Pakistan’s intelligence agency helped developments following the destruction frequent militant attacks on NATO organize recent terrorist strikes in India, of the Babri Mosque in 1992 by right- convoys, and more tensions in U.S.- including the assault on Mumbai.2 wing Hindu mobs.6 The images of Hindu Pakistan bilateral relations. Clearly, extremists destroying the mosque, and many different groups have an interest Smooth relations between India and the subsequent riots targeting Muslims in sabotaging NATO’s supply convoys. Pakistan are essential for the success in Mumbai and New , shook the of the U.S. counterterrorism and Muslim community. The wrangling Neither the United States nor Pakistan counterinsurgency mission in South over this disputed piece of land at can afford such developments. NATO has Asia. Any significant escalation of Ayodhya led to religious polarization in failed to diversify the bulk of its supply tensions between the two states would various parts of India, and it provided routes, and any prolonged blockade cause Pakistan to divert its forces an opportunity for extremist groups would hamper the war effort. Pakistan away from its offensive against Taliban to exploit the insecurities of their relies on U.S. financial assistance and militants in the northwest and redeploy respective communities. It was at this the many jobs provided by the NATO them to its eastern border with India. time that domestic terrorism involving supply convoys. Both countries need Therefore, building trust between Indian Muslims began. to prevent such disagreements from India and Pakistan will be a key goal escalating into a more serious fracturing of President Barack Obama’s upcoming One of the most deadly terrorist of the bilateral relationship. visit to India in November 2010. attacks during this first stage of radicalization struck India’s financial Tayyab Ali Shah is a freelance political Although it is clear that Pakistan’s capital of Mumbai in March 1993. A and security analyst specializing in the India-focused terrorist infrastructure series of bombings killed 250 people.7 Taliban and other Islamic extremists. He must be dismantled to prevent the The suspected organizers of the plot, is a Pakistani Pashtun and has a post- further escalation of hostilities, there are Tiger Memon and Dawood Ibrahim, graduate education in Political Science, steps that India can take domestically were Indian Muslims. The attacks Business Administration and Public to help mitigate the growing threat of occurred after violent Hindu-Muslim Policy. He has extensive experience in domestic terrorist attacks. In a number clashes broke out in the city. Right- community development, policy advocacy of recent attacks in India, for example, wing Hindu organizations, such as Shiv and political education with both Pakistani evidence revealed that homegrown and Afghan Pashtuns. He moderates the Indian Muslim extremists have provided 4 India has approximately 1.1 billion people. For a com- Pakhtunkhwa Peace Forum and has written logistical support to Pakistan-based prehensive understanding of the political and social is- 3 for The Jamestown Foundation, Pakistan’s terrorist groups. This article discusses sues confronting Indian Muslims, see Balraj Puri, Mus- Frontier Post and the Daily Times. lims of India Since Partition (: Gyan Publishing 1 Toby Harnden, “Al-Qaeda Trying to Spark India- House, 2007). Pakistan War, Says Robert Gates,” Telegraph, January 5 “Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on 20, 2010. the Size and Distribution of the World’s Muslim Popula- 2 Ravi Nessman and Ashok Sharma, “Indian Gov’t: tion,” Pew Research Center, October 7, 2009. Pakistan Spies Tied to Mumbai Siege,” Associated Press, 6 Some Hindu groups claim that the mosque was built October 19, 2010. by demolishing a Hindu temple in the 16th century. 3 Indian citizens, for example, provided target recon- 7 A fuller account of the planning of the Mumbai blasts is naissance for the militants who assaulted Mumbai in No- detailed in S. Hussain Zaidi, Black Friday: The True Story 34 “Looted Goods from Nato Trucks End Up in Pesha- vember 2008. See Sheela Bhatt, “Mumbai Attack Was of the Bombay Bomb Blasts (New Delhi: Penguin Books, war Market,” Daily Times, June 25, 2010. Planned a Year Ago,” Rediff India, February 27, 2009. 2003).

9 OCTOBER 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 10

Sena, contributed to the tensions, and One of LT’s first attacks in which Indian of them were trained in Pakistan.21 the attacks were viewed as an act of Muslims were involved was in Mumbai Additionally, India’s security revenge against the Hindu community in August 2003.12 Terrorists posing as establishment, after almost a year- for the riots and the demolition of the passengers left bombs in two taxi cabs, long delay, finally admitted that Babri Mosque.8 Civil society groups which then exploded in crowded areas.13 there is a strong possibility that some intervened, which led to the restoration Indian citizens Mohammed Hanif Indian citizens provided help to the LT of calm in the city, but the violence Sayeed, his wife Fahmida and Ashrat militants who carried out the terrorist brought a transformative change to Ansari were convicted for the attack.14 strikes in Mumbai in November 2008.22 Indian society. The discourse of groups According to the prosecution, the three such as the Students Islamic Movement received their instructions from LT Third Stage of India (SIMI), for example, became operatives in Dubai.15 The latest stage of radicalization, more extreme in the 1990s, partly as a however, has been of a different nature. result of these clashes.9 Investigations into attacks since 2003 Its chief characteristics are religious show other incidents where LT has conservatism and intolerance, a Second Stage collaborated with Indian Muslims for development that has long-term societal The second stage of extremism among attacks inside India, such as the attack ramifications for India. India’s Muslim community occurred on the Indian Institute of Science in after the communal violence in Gujarat December 2005.16 In that attack, two In , the state enjoying the in 2002. The Gujarat violence was terrorists fired on a group of professors highest literacy rates in India, activists sparked by the deaths of 59 train who were departing a conference, killing of the Popular Front of India (PFI) passengers, mostly Hindus, whose one of them.17 Most of these attacks were allegedly amputated the right hand of coach was set on fire by a Muslim mob claimed by India-based militant groups, a college teacher on July 4, 2010.23 The in Godhra in February 2002. The attack yet later interrogations of the arrested forced amputation occurred after the sparked retaliatory massacres against indicated that they also had connections teacher allegedly insulted the Prophet Muslims in Gujarat, leaving more than to extremist groups in Pakistan. Muhammad. PFI was established in 700 Muslims and 250 Hindus dead.10 2006, and it is composed of several Around this time, loose extremist These loose extremist cells of Indian organizations, most of them extremist, groups composed of Indian Muslims Muslims would eventually form the who share the goal of mobilizing began to cooperate with LT operatives Indian Mujahidin, a network that has the Muslim community in India and in Pakistan. Although LT had for years become an important asset for LT.18 enhancing the bloc’s political power. PFI conducted a number of operations in Groups such as the Indian Mujahidin claims it promotes communal amity and Indian-administered Kashmir, it was have recruited Indian citizens from social harmony, and it has a network in only after 2002 that LT demonstrated a communally sensitive pockets of six Indian states.24 The group, however, consistent capability to attack different the country such as Uttar Pradesh, has espoused an extremist ideology. In regions of India.11 Analysts believe that Bihar, , Gujarat, Kerala, its first political conference in 2009, for this change in strategy appears to be and Maharashtra.19 example, the PFI reportedly said, partly due to the support LT received In 2008, the Mumbai police arrested from Muslim youth inside India. 27 youths—including four IT-savvy The war on terror is a US agenda. members of the Indian Mujahidin— It is a political tactic shaped by who sent e-mail messages in the name hegemonic forces bent upon world of the Indian Mujahidin after the July domination. The Muslims are the 8 “The Shiv Sena Indicted,” Frontline, August 15-28, 2008 Ahmedabad blasts and before victims of the war on terror. The 1998. The ascendancy of aggressive Hindu nationalism the September 2008 New Delhi blasts Indian government supports the in the early 1990s and fierce anti-Muslim rhetoric con- by hacking into wireless networks in War on Terror (WOT) and makes tributed to the radicalization process of Muslim youth. Mumbai and Navi Mumbai.20 Many available the county’s machinery 9 SIMI is said to be the fountainhead of the Indian Mu- for implementing the plan hatched jahidin. In the 1980s, SIMI’s thrust was on education. by the US-Israel axis. It’s in the In the 1990s, it centered around three issues: the call for 12 “2003 Mumbai Blasts: Court Awards Death Penalty wake of this alliance that we jihad; the declaration of India as dar al-harb (an area of to 3 Convicts,” Indian Express, August 6, 2009. witness the increase in bomb war); and the establishment of the caliphate. See Irfan 13 Ibid. blasts in the country.25 Ahmad, and Democracy in India: The Transfor- 14 Ibid. mation of Jamaat-e-Islam (Princeton: Princeton Univer- 15 Ibid.; “Mumbai Twin Blasts: Three Sentenced to sity Press, 2009). Death,” Press Trust of India, August 6, 2009. 10 “Post-Godhra Toll: 254 Hindus, 790 Muslims,” Press 16 “We Were All Set to Hit Bangalore Again Last Year: Trust of India, May 11, 2005. Lashkar Operative to Police,” Indian Express, January 12, 21 “Mumbai Arrests Expose New Face of Terror: Edu- 11 The LT did execute some attacks outside of Indian- 2009. cated, Professionals,” Indian Express, October 7, 2008. administered Kashmir before 2002. It attacked the Red 17 Ibid. 22 “Indian Guided 26/11 Attackers: PC,” Press Trust of Fort in India’s capital in 2000. There was also a terrorist 18 It is not exactly clear when the Indian Mujahidin was India, February 5, 2010. strike on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, but founded. 23 “Controversial Question Paper: Lecturer’s Hand this attack was carried out by Jaysh-i-Muhammad and 19 “Indian Mujahidin Strikes Deep,” Indian Express, Feb- Chopped Off,” Indian Express, July 5, 2010. the logistical support was provided by youths from the ruary 22, 2010. 24 To see PFI’s “constitution,” visit www.popularfront- contested region of Indian-administered Jammu and 20 “27 Members Charged with Serial india.com/pp/page/constitution. Kashmir. Bombings,” IANS, February 17, 2009. 25 “Here Come the Pious,” Tehelka Magazine 7:40 (2010).

10 OCTOBER 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 10

The political discourse of groups such Conclusion From Iraq to Yemen: as PFI has already led to heightened Failure to reduce religious violence will bouts of religious anxiety among increase tensions between India and Al-Qa`ida’s Shifting Muslim youth, driving them to target Pakistan, bringing the two nuclear states Strategies people in their own community. Rayana closer to war and serving the interests of Khasi, a 23-year-old Muslim woman al-Qa`ida and the Taliban. To prevent the By Ryan Evans and aeronautical engineer living in further radicalization of the Indian Muslim North Kerala, for example, received community, authorities must integrate in the wake of al-Qa`ida in Iraq’s death threats for not wearing the veil.26 the youth into the political, economic and (AQI) strategic failure following the For Kerala in particular, the exposure social mainstream by addressing real or “awakening” movement and the U.S. to West Asia’s religious traditions perceived grievances. India’s mainstream military’s “surge” strategy, a new is another factor contributing to political parties should take adequate generation of al-Qa`ida has emerged in heightened religiosity among the steps for the economic and political Yemen under the banner of al-Qa`ida area’s Muslim population. Kerala has empowerment of Indian Muslims.30 in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). experienced one of the highest rates of At the same time, India’s Muslim AQAP has pursued a dramatically economic migration to Gulf countries in leaders must proactively prevent further different strategy from AQI, offering a South Asia and many of the returnees are radicalization of their youth. small but interesting case study in the bringing home with them a conservative differences among al-Qa`ida’s regional version of Islam that is in contrast to Indian authorities should also strongly affiliates.1 It also raises the question Islamic practices in South Asia. enforce the rule of law, including over whether AQAP analyzed the arresting Hindu fundamentalists who lessons from the strategic failure in the Exacerbating this cycle of religious commit crimes against minorities in Iraq conflict and adjusted its regional polarization is the resurgence of Hindu India. India suffers from an absence of an strategy accordingly.2 AQAP in Yemen, extremist groups in the region. The independent investigative institutional for example, is largely indigenous to spate of blasts executed by groups such structure at the provincial level, which the Arabian Peninsula and has focused, as the Indian Mujahidin resulted in the often results in weak legal cases and with uneven success, on mobilizing formation of Hindu militant groups failed prosecutions. Effective policing portions of Yemen’s tribal society seeking revenge against Muslims. by Indian authorities is an important through the adoption of grievances and Investigations are still unraveling step to a sound counterterrorism even the provision of social services in about the extent of this development. strategy. the post-2006 period.3 This is a stark Yet recent investigations found that contrast to AQI’s strategy under Abu some attacks in India were planned by India has one of the largest Muslim Mus`ab al-Zarqawi. Hindu extremist outfits such as Abhinav communities in the world, and its efforts Bharat. In October 2007, for example, to integrate this community successfully This article contrasts AQI’s failed strategy Hindu extremists allegedly detonated into the political, social and economic in Iraq with AQAP’s different approach in a bomb at the Ajmer Sharif shrine, a life of Indian society will be a lesson to Yemen. It also suggests that al-Qa`ida’s popular South Asian mausoleum of a 13th the rest of the world, especially those senior leadership may have learned from century Muslim saint.27 In September countries navigating their own mixed its failures in Iraq when developing its 2008, Abhinav Bharat also allegedly religious populations. strategy for the Arabian Peninsula.4 bombed Muslim-inhabited areas of Malegaon and Modasa in the Indian Luv Puri is a political journalist cum researcher 1 For this article, “affiliate” denotes any Salafi-jihadist states of Maharashtra and Gujarat, who just completed Across the Line of Control, terrorist group that has explicitly allied itself with al- 28 killing six civilians. It was discovered published by Penguin, which examines various Qa`ida (such as al-Qa`ida in Iraq or al-Qa`ida in the Ara- that a retired Indian army colonel was sources of radicalization in Pakistan’s Punjab bian Peninsula), while not necessarily adopting the name 29 allegedly involved in this latter attack. Province, Pakistan-administered Jammu “al-Qa`ida” (such as al-Shabab and Jemaah Islamiya). Analysts are concerned that this cycle and Kashmir and the Pakistani diaspora 2 This argument stands apart from other analysts who of violence could quickly escalate if living in the . Mr. Puri was view AQAP’s strategy more as a result of lessons learned authorities do not take action. awarded a Fulbright scholarship in 2008, and from defeats in Saudi Arabia. See, for example, Alistair in 2006 he won the European Commission Harris’ excellent “Exploiting Grievances: Al-Qaeda in Award for Human Rights and Democracy the Arabian Peninsula,” Christopher Boucek ed., Yemen (Asia). He has worked for the Hindu and has on the Brink (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for written extensively for several publications on International Peace, 2010). Pakistan, different ethnic groups of the South 3 According to one study, Yemenis make up a majority of 26 Sovi Vidyadharan, “Young Woman Takes on Kerala’s Asian Muslim community and the conflict in the organization and Saudis more than a third. See Mu- ‘Taliban,’” NDTV, August 28, 2010. Jammu and Kashmir. rad Batal al-Shishani, “An Assessment of the Anatomy of 27 Mohammed Iqbal, “Ajmer Blast Case: RSS Leader’s al-Qaeda in Yemen: Ideological and Social Factors,” Ter- Name Figures in Charge Sheet,” Hindu, October 23, 30 During the 2008 parliamentary elections, for ex- rorism Monitor 8:9 (2010). There is a great deal of cultural 2010. ample, the representation of Indian Muslims declined overlap between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in a number of 28 Christophe Jaffrelot, “Abhinav Bharat, the Male- to 5.1% from 6.2%, whereas the Indian Muslim commu- ways, and as such the Saudis cannot be considered “for- gaon Blast and Hindu Nationalism,” Economic & Political nity composes approximately 13% of India’s population. eign” in Yemen as citizens of other Arab, and even other Weekly 45:43 (2010). See Balraj Puri, “Look Beyond,” Indian Express, June 23, Gulf Arab, countries might be. 29 Ibid. 2009. 4 Other variables may better explain AQAP’s strategy

11 OCTOBER 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 10

Al-Qa`ida in Iraq provoking repression.9 Although AQI AQI’s strategy as it pertained to the AQI’s strategy in Iraq was originally was allied with the Sunni tribes, it population was at the heart of the expressed in a letter from Abu Mus`ab did not seek to make their interests an group’s defeat.15 AQI’s heavy-handed al-Zarqawi to Usama bin Ladin.5 It organic part of the group beyond driving attempts to marry into prominent Anbari revolved around provoking the Shi`a out the invaders and killing the Shi`a. tribal families to solidify its Iraqi base of Iraq through spectacular acts of Maintaining the good will and support contravened local norms against women violence intended to goad the nascent of the tribes was not a chief concern.10 marrying men from outside the tribal and Shi`a-dominated Iraqi government confederation.16 This led to a cycle of into repression and slaughter against Al-Zarqawi’s lack of trust and respect violence, which began when AQI killed Iraqi Sunnis, who would be awakened for Iraqi Sunnis was reflected in the a tribal leader who resisted marrying and mobilized to wage jihad. This non-Iraqi Arab dominance within his daughter to an AQI member. This mobilization would draw in widespread AQI. For the first couple of years of “created a revenge obligation (tha’r)” on Sunni support from other Muslim the war, AQI was primarily a foreign his fellow tribesmen and they struck countries before the Shi`a could solidify organization with only 10% of its back. David Kilcullen recounted: their power in Iraq. As emphasized by ranks filled by Iraqis.11 By 2007, this al-Zarqawi, “Our fighting against the had changed, with Iraqis composing The terrorists retaliated with Shi`a is the way to drag the [Islamic] 90% of the group.12 AQI’s heavily immense brutality, killing the nation into the battle.”6 The larger goal foreign character was not limited to its children of a prominent sheikh in was to drive out the “crusaders” and to leadership. In Mohammed Hafez’s 2007 a particularly gruesome manner, establish a “stem-land” for the Sunni study of suicide bombing in Iraq, only witnesses told us [U.S. forces]. This caliphate that would serve as a base to seven out of 102 bombers were Iraqi. was the last straw, they said, and the overthrow Arab governments and to The rest were from Arab countries and tribes rose up. Neighboring clans eventually liberate Palestine.7 Muslim communities in Europe.13 While joined the fight, which escalated AQI’s cadres always represented a small as AQI...tried to crush the revolt Al-Zarqawi made it clear that he did not proportion of Iraq’s insurgents, their through more atrocities. Soon the hold the Sunnis and the ulama (clerics) impact on the conflict was unmatched, uprising took off, spreading along of Iraq in high esteem. He dismissed the largely because of their prolific suicide kinship lines through Anbar and Iraqi mujahidin as inexperienced and attacks—being responsible for far more into neighboring provinces.17 expressed contempt for those unwilling than any other group—and higher levels to be “martyrs.”8 These sentiments of experience.14 AQI had also begun to take over, were reflected in a strategy that did disrupt, or shut down smuggling and not seek to engage the Sunnis in any construction businesses that the Anbar substantive political mobilization 9 Ibid. tribes—particularly the Dulaimi tribe— beyond demonstrative attacks against 10 AQI’s efforts were largely limited to propaganda, and had dominated since 1991. While this coalition forces and the Iraqi state and they did not extend to creating meaningful partnerships was an effective way for AQI to expand with tribal shaykhs based on shared interests. its financing, this tactical benefit came on the peninsula, including the organic social dynamics 11 Mohammed M. Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The at a larger strategic cost by aggravating 18 of Yemeni society, but these are not considered in this Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom (Washington, D.C.: and alienating local tribal allies. article. United States Institute of Peace, 2007). Furthermore, the puritanical Salafist 5 This article focuses on AQI’s strategic thought during 12 To this day, leadership positions have remained pre- social and legal system that AQI sought the al-Zarqawi period—particularly as it is related to the dominantly non-Iraqi. See Bruce Hoffman, “The ‘Cult of to implement alienated local Sunnis. The Sunni population of Iraq—and the reasons for its failure the Insurgent’: Its Tactical and Strategic Implications,” “awakening” movement that followed to achieve its strategic objectives. AQI was only one, al- Australian Journal of International Affairs 61:3 (2007); in Anbar Province heralded a change— beit the most infamous and prominent, of a myriad of Andrew Phillips, “How Al Qaeda Lost Iraq,” Australian violent frustration with the group’s groups that engaged in armed struggle against the U.S.- Journal of International Affairs 63:1 (2009); David Kilcul- perceived barbarity and contempt for led coalition and the Iraqi government. Most insurgent len, “Anatomy of a Tribal Revolt,” Small Wars Journal, Iraqi Sunni norms and social structures. groups in Iraq were not Islamist in their orientation. August 29, 2007; Bill Roggio, “Al Qaeda Appoints New To Mao, the guerrilla is the fish that Indeed, the insurgency was “kicked off” by disaffected ‘War Minister’ for Iraq,” The Long War Journal, May 14, swims in the sea of the population, former members of the military and political elite of 2010; Bill Roggio, “Iraqi Forces Arrest Leader of Ansar depending on the sustenance it provides. Ba`athist Iraq. The Ba`athists planned to use “fidayin” al Islam,” The Long War Journal, May 4, 2010. The sea in Anbar had dried up. While as a means of providing strategic depth in the event of an 13 Ibid. AQI fights on to this day, the group is a 19 invasion. For details on al-Zarqawi’s letter to Bin Ladin, 14 Hafez noted that suicide attacks were “a major pre- shadow of what it once was. see “February 2004 Coalition Provisional Authority cipitating factor in the Shia-Sunni sectarian spiral of English translation of terrorist Musab al Zarqawi letter violence.” According to Hafez’s study, AQI was respon- obtained by United States Government in Iraq,” U.S. De- sible for far more suicide attacks than any other insur- 15 Kilcullen; Phillips. partment of State, undated. The letter was intercepted in gent group. The highest proportion, from 2003 to 2006, 16 Phillips. January 2004, before al-Zarqawi’s group officially joined targeted Iraqi Security Forces (44%). Nearly a quarter of 17 Kilcullen. al-Qa`ida. This letter will hereafter be cited as “Zarqawi- them targeted civilians and 15% targeted coalition forces. 18 Phillips; Mohammed M. Hafez, “Al-Qa`ida Losing Bin Ladin Letter.” The remaining attacks were against the government and Ground in Iraq,” CTC Sentinel 1:1 (2007). 6 Ibid. political parties, international entities, and tourists. See 19 Linda Robinson, Tell Me How This Ends: General David 7 Ibid. Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq (New York: 8 Ibid. of Martyrdom. PublicAffairs, 2008).

12 OCTOBER 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 10

Al-Qa`ida Adapting? al-Qa`ida central’s objections to al- warfare in an oft-cited passage: “We are It is clear that AQAP’s structure and Zarqawi’s strategy. Both critiques fall in a media battle in a race for the hearts strategy in Yemen is the result of across the same themes, calling on him and minds of our umma.”29 Toward the the lessons learned from al-Qa`ida’s to focus more on popular support, avoid end of the letter, al-Zawahiri boldly operations and defeats in Saudi Arabia.20 killing so many Shi`a, and to be more asked if “the assumption of leadership Yet the effects of lessons learned from inclusive and less ideologically rigid.25 for the mujahidin or a group of the the Iraqi theater have not been seriously mujahidin by non-Iraqis” might be considered. Yemeni jihadists composed If driving the United States from Iraq a sensitive issue for some.30 These the fourth largest contingent of foreign to establish the emirate is the goal, al- critiques of al-Zarqawi’s strategy fighters in Iraq recorded in the Sinjar Zawahiri explained, then “the strongest were widely discussed within the Records, making up 8.1% of the sample.21 weapon which the mujahidin enjoy… movement and represent a key example Furthermore, there were a plethora is popular support from the Muslim of al-Qa`ida’s learning processes and of strategic critiques and commentary masses in Iraq and the surrounding internal deliberations. Judging by how pieces on AQI strategy during the al- Muslim countries.”26 Al-Zawahiri called al-Qa`ida’s affiliates have since shied Zarqawi period from across the jihadist this the “popular war of jihad.” Without away from al-Zarqawi’s model, these movement that reveal the internal this popular support, al-Zawahiri deliberations seem to have had an effect. debates of a learning process. While al- explained, This seems particularly true in Yemen. Qa`ida is a diffuse movement, its core leadership still exerts some control over the Islamic mujahidin would be Enter AQAP strategy and specific attacks.22 AQAP crushed in the shadows, far from Al-Qa`ida has been active in Yemen has a close relationship with al-Qa`ida’s the masses who are distracted or since the early 1990s, but its re- core leadership as its leader, Nasir al- fearful, and the struggle between branding in 2009 under the name of Wahayshi, was at one time Usama bin the jihadist elite and the arrogant al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula Ladin’s secretary.23 authorities would be confined marked the emergence of a new to prison dungeons far from the generation of al-Qa`ida leadership Two letters from al-Qa`ida’s leadership public and the light of day.27 on the Arabian Peninsula.31 The re- in the tribal regions of Pakistan to al- branding of al-Qa`ida in Yemen also Zarqawi reveal the strategic debate and Atiyah seemed to draw on Clausewitzian heralded a new strategy that differed learning at the highest levels of the and Maoist principles: “Policy must be markedly from AQI’s. A few months movement as AQI’s campaign dragged dominant over militarism.” Atiyah found prior to al-Zarqawi’s death in Iraq, on. The letters, from Ayman al-Zawahiri al-Zarqawi deficient in “embracing the Nasir al-Wahayshi and 22 other Yemeni and Atiyah Abd al-Rahman,24 represent people and bringing them together and jihadists made their “great escape” from winning them over and placating them.” a prison in Sana`a in February 2006.32 20 See, for example, Harris. This, he insisted, “is the foundation while The strategy that has been revealed 21 Some 46% of these Yemenis were designated as suicide military operations must be a servant that after this generational split differs 28 33 bombers and the rest as fighters. A CSIS study placed the is complementary to it.” dramatically from that of AQI’s. Today, percentage of Yemenis higher at 17%. For details, see Jo- AQAP seeks to co-opt existing social seph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al-Qaida’s Foreign Fight- Al-Zawahiri and Atiyah both called for and political structures and genuinely ers in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records (West Point, al-Zarqawi to be more willing to work adopt the grievances and interests of NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2008); Anthony with those who may hold religiously Yemenis, particularly those in the tribal Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, “Saudi Militants in Iraq: unorthodox positions, including “many regions of the country. Rather than Assessment and Kingdom’s Response,” Center for Stra- of the religious scholars and tribal large and spectacular attacks that kill tegic and International Studies, September 19, 2005. leaders and so forth.” Al-Zawahiri scores of people, the group prefers “a 22 Bruce Hoffman and Fernando Reinares eds., Leader- chided al-Zarqawi for focusing so many policy of constant offense consisting of 34 led Jihad (New York: Columbia University Press, forth- attacks against the Shi`a, arguing that small, continual attacks.” Its targets coming). most Muslims do not understand the do not include Yemeni civilians, but 23 For more evidence of ongoing close ties between al- reasoning behind such attacks. He rather foreigners, oil infrastructure, 35 Qa`ida central and AQAP, see Michael Isikoff and Mark similarly took al-Zarqawi to task for the and the security forces. Yet these Hosenball, “Exclusive: A U.S. Intelligence Breakthrough “scenes of slaughter.” Al-Zawahiri wrote in the Persian Gulf?” Newsweek, February 14, 2010. Aside in the letter that “the general opinion 29 Ibid. from the formal communication between al-Qa`ida cen- of our support does not comprehend 30 Ibid. tral and AQAP as reported in Newsweek, there is more that.” Al-Zawahiri then moved to the 31 Gregory D. Johnsen, “Al Qaeda’s Generational Split,” evidence of ties between the hub and the affiliate that issue of the role of media in modern Boston Globe, November 9, 2007. speak to al-Qa`ida central’s ability to influence AQAP’s 32 Barak Barfi, “Yemen on the Brink? The Resurgence of behavior. Also, al-Zawahiri has heaped praise on AQAP 25 “Letter Exposes New Leader in Al-Qa`ida High Com- al Qaeda in Yemen,” New America Foundation, January in propaganda releases in the last couple of years and mand,” translated by the Combating Terrorism Center 25, 2010. described al-Wahayshi as the amir of the group. See “Al- at West Point, September 25, 2006; “Letter from Ayman 33 Al-Qa`ida in Yemen fundamentally changed in orga- Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula,” Australian Govern- al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” published by the nization and strategy after the 2006 “great escape.” ment, available at www.ag.gov.au. Federation of American Scientists, undated. 34 Gregory D. Johnsen, “Al-Qa`ida in Yemen’s 2008 24 Al-Rahman is a senior al-Qa`ida operative and mem- 26 Ibid. Campaign,” CTC Sentinel 1:5 (2008). ber of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) who 27 Ibid. 35 Christopher Boucek, “The Evolving Terrorist Threat joined with Bin Ladin in the 1980s. 28 Ibid. in Yemen,” CTC Sentinel 3:9 (2010).

13 OCTOBER 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 10 attacks are, at this stage, secondary to The easy relationship that AQAP cadres [referring to Marib], and eventually the relationship that AQAP has built seem to have with the people of these Yemenistan. with portions of some of Yemen’s tribes areas is the result of the group’s more in the governorates of Marib, Shabwa, Maoist view of the population in the He warned the United States that the and Abyan, and other constituencies in conflict.42 The poor governance provided fight is with the tribes of the Arabian Yemen.36 by the corrupt and repressive Ali Peninsula rather than just al-Qa`ida. Abdullah Salih regime makes AQAP’s Although al-Qa`ida operatives in Yemen efforts to maintain this harmony easier. While AQAP has non-Yemeni and non- have not historically had a strong As a result, AQAP is taking the regime Saudi cadres, they are not in leadership relationship with the tribes, AQAP today to task by organically adopting a positions or even in positions of spends a great deal of time and energy multitude of local grievances related to prominence.47 According to one analyst, managing its tribal relationships.37 governance in its propaganda.43 Yemenis make up 56% of AQAP and While these relationships may not Saudis comprise 37% of the group.48 always be successful, it is significant The Yemeni tribes that do provide some Only 7% of the group’s members are not to note that gaining and maintaining sort of support for AQAP—whether from either country.49 The same study the good will of the tribes is a primary recruits, resources, or protection— found that AQAP’s “area of influence” concern. The tribes are AQAP’s have different motivations, including “chief constituents,” according to one displeasure with the Salih regime. starts from Abyan in the west and analyst.38 Its propaganda magazine, Their reasons are “predicated on extends to al-Jawf in the south, Sada al-Malahim, is used “as a vehicle for political rather than ideological passing through large areas of dialogue with the tribes.”39 Its articles considerations.”44 To the tribes, al- Shabwa governorate as far as “highlight the martial virtues of their Qa`ida “is just the latest in a long line of Hadramut. From the north, it is sons and the contributions they have groups antagonistic to the government connected to the capital city of San’a made to the jihadi effort. Others warn in Sanaa that have received tribal by Arhab directorate, overlooking of plots the regime is hatching to occupy backing.”45 the Maqfar triangle that connects their regions to strip them of their it to another three provinces: cherished autonomy.”40 Just as some tribes seek to exploit their San’a, Ghamran and Sa’da. The relationship with AQAP, the terrorist result is the formation of an area Abd al-Ilah Haydar, a journalist, spoke group hopes to provoke government known for its tribal affiliations of his experience contacting AQAP in attacks in the tribal areas. One scholar rather than its affiliation to the the tribal regions of the country: explained that the group’s relationship state and an area where there are with some tribes “means that any fight few state institutions and where If you now go to Abyan for example that is designed to be a two-sided affair tribal laws dominate.50 you can meet Al-Qaeda elements between the government and al-Qa’ida because they are present in that will not remain that way.”46 A writer Most AQAP recruits are from the area, especially Marib, Shabwah, in Sada al-Malahim, in the wake of joint tribal areas where the group operates, and Al-Jawf. They are obvious to the Yemeni-American operations against and local tribesmen are in positions people and the people know they are AQAP in Yemen, demonstrated AQAP’s of leadership within the organization. Al-Qaeda Organization elements.41 efforts to appeal to the tribes: Some tribes have allied themselves with AQAP through marriage ties.51 Our disabled nation does not wake up except when it is shocked. Thus, 36 Including those in non-tribal areas of Yemen such this shock, which has led to the death as Hadramawt and Hudayda. See Barfi. Yemeni tribes of tens of Muslim children, women, are not monolithic. The tribes have fragmented power and elders from the faithful tribes, structures and competing centers of power. As a result, will be enough to create Abyanistan, 47 It may be that AQAP’s indigenous leadership is outside groups are often appealed to or exploited—not Arhabistan, Shabwistan [referring merely the result of how the organization evolved out just for advantage against the state or other tribes, but to Shabwa in Yemen], Maribstan of Yemeni society, rather than a conscious decision by for advantage against competitors within the same tribe. al-Qa`ida as a correction of mistakes made in Iraq. This It is also important to remember that not all tribes, or demands further study. even a portion of all tribes, in Yemen are supportive of 42 Bard O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism (Dulles, VA: 48 This analysis is based on a sample of 75 individuals al-Qa`ida. Brassey’s, 1990). During his war against the Kuomintang “associated” with AQAP, but it is unclear if the analyst 37 Whether this effort is successful is beyond the remit and the Japanese military occupation, Mao’s men were used convenience sampling or chose a more rigorous of this article. For more details, see Gregory D. Johnsen, ordered to live in harmony with the populace, be respect- sampling method. For details, see Al-Shishani. “The Expansion Strategy of Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian ful, and pay for goods and services. Only through this 49 Ibid. Peninsula,” CTC Sentinel 2:9 (2009). harmony could Mao be successful, for the people were 50 Ibid. Also see Laura Kasinof, “Local War in Southern 38 Barfi. the cornerstone of Mao’s program. Yemen Pits Government Against Militants,” Christian 39 Ibid. 43 Barfi. Science Monitor, October 18, 2010; “Security Beefed Up in 40 Ibid. 44 Ibid. Oil Sector Fearing Qaeda Retaliation,” al-Arabiya, March 41 Abdulsattar Hatitah, “Yemen: A Talk with Al-Qaeda 45 Ibid. 17, 2010; “Abyan Gov Says He Can’t Fight AQAP,” APS Expert Abdul-Ilah Haydar,” Asharq al-Awsat, March 9, 46 Johnsen, “The Expansion Strategy of Al-Qa`ida in the Diplomat News Service, January 18, 2010. 2010. Arabian Peninsula.” 51 Barfi.

14 OCTOBER 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 10

AQAP is becoming more aggressive can match.”54 This could not be said as time goes on, but is taking care to about AQI or, arguably, any other al- Indonesia’s Case Against advance its military campaign only as Qa`ida affiliate in the history of the Abu Bakar Bashir it perceives that it mobilizes support in movement. As noted, AQI was an Yemen. The Christmas Day plot on an organization led primarily by non- By Arabinda Acharya and Fatima Astuti airliner bound for Detroit at the end of Iraqi Arabs disinterested in political 2009 announced that the organization mobilization along Maoist lines, on august 9, 2010, Abu Bakar Bashir, was advancing to a new phase: high- preferring spectacular and vicious acts the head of profile attacks abroad. AQAP has been of violence against coalition forces and (JAT) and the alleged spiritual leader explicit about this shift, stating in Sada Iraqis—particularly the Shi’a. of Jemaah Islamiya (JI), was arrested al-Malahim in February 2010, “We bring for involvement in terrorist activities. to our nation the good news that the In contrast, AQAP seeks to co-opt His arrest followed the discovery mujahidin passed the stage of defense existing social and political structures of a terrorist training camp in Aceh and repulsion of the aggression to the and genuinely adopt the grievances Province and the detention of three stage where they can take initiatives and interests of Yemenis, particularly senior members of JAT.1 Bashir is now and attack.”52 Beyond Yemen, AQAP (but not only) those in the tribal on extended remand until December 13, seeks to “chase the polytheists out of the regions of the country. Its attacks 2010, while the prosecution prepares to Arabian Peninsula” and form an army are smaller and less spectacular than indict him for his role in the Aceh camp.2 that will establish emirates throughout those of AQI, and the group does not Police claim to have strong evidence the Muslim world until the caliphate is target Yemeni civilians. To be clear, based on testimonies, documents, and reborn.53 The most recent terrorist plot there are prominent influences behind videos that link Bashir to terrorist involving bombs shipped out of Yemen AQAP’s strategy other than lessons activity in the camp. Bashir is also and addressed to synagogues in Chicago learned from the Iraqi theater, but accused of being the amir or spiritual is further evidence of this changing the extent to which al-Qa`ida and the leader of the cross organizational strategy and target-set. Islamist movement as a whole analyzes jihadist coalition known as al-Qa`ida its failures and seeks to correct them Serambi Mekkah in Aceh.3 Conclusion cannot be ignored as a possible factor in When the strategies of AQI and AQAP AQAP’s development. Bashir’s latest arrest has a number are juxtaposed, it is almost surprising of implications. Many Indonesians that both are affiliates of the same It remains to be seen whether or not this think that the arrest is an attempt transnational insurgent organization. shift in regional strategy heralds a larger by authorities to restrict freedom of Gregory Johnsen suggested that turn for al-Qa`ida globally toward a speech and religion in the country. The al-Qa`ida in Yemen “is the most more Maoist attitude. Furthermore, the Indonesian government, for example, representative organization in the differences between Iraq and Yemen has already prosecuted Bashir on two country. [It] transcends class, tribe, as well as the different purposes each previous occasions. In October 2002, and regional identity in a way that no theater serves for al-Qa`ida limit the Bashir was arrested for his alleged other Yemeni group or political party findings of this analysis.55 Only broader involvement in the Christmas Eve and more sophisticated studies of bombings of 2000 and a conspiracy to strategic deliberations within al-Qa`ida kill President Megawati Sukarnoputri. 52 There are limited strategic parallels here with the stag- and their results, as well as the passage Authorities, however, were only able es of Mao’s popular protracted warfare model. The first of time, will reveal the answer. to convict and sentence Bashir on stage is known as the strategic defensive, during which immigration violations. On the day of the overall concerns are survival and mobilization. It is Ryan Evans is an Associate Fellow at his prison release on April 30, 2004, characterized by organization, infiltration, recruitment, the International Centre for the Study of he was arrested again, this time for indoctrination and preparation. Military attacks are en- Radicalisation and Political Violence in involvement in the Bali bombings of gaged in rarely and selectively—limited to harassing ac- London. He also works for the U.S. Army’s October 2002 and the Marriott Hotel tion in the enemy’s rear areas and isolated posts. AQAP’s Human Terrain System. The above piece bombings of August 2003. He was strategy up until the Christmas Day plot seemed to follow represents the views and opinions of Mr. found guilty of conspiracy, but not the same logic. Mao’s second stage, known as the strate- Evans and do not necessarily reflect the direct involvement in the plots, and was gic stalemate, requires an expansion of military opera- official policies and positions of the Human only sentenced to 30 months in prison. tions against isolated outposts, government assets, and Terrain System, U.S. Army, International He was released on June 14, 2006 after a 4 columns. In the second stage, insurgents begin to hold Security Assistance Force, or the U.S. four month reduction in sentence. It is territory to establish and consolidate base areas. The Government. third phase—the strategic offensive—involves the con- 1 “Indonesian Police Allege Bashir Was Instrumental in version into conventional mobile and positional warfare. 54 Gregory Johnsen, “Waning Vigilance: Al-Qaeda’s Re- Establishing Aceh Terror Group,” Globe, August The countryside is consolidated, the cities surrounded, surgence in Yemen,” The Washington Institute for Near 11, 2010. and the government is challenged openly in battle and East Policy, July 14, 2009. 2 “JAT: Perpanjang Penahanan Ba’asyir Berlebihan,” toppled. See Mao Tse-Tung and Samuel B. Griffith, On 55 The differences between the two countries that would Viva News, August 17, 2010. Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago: Urbana and Chicago Univer- need to be considered in a broader study include demo- 3 “Court Told Indonesian Preacher Funded Militant sity Press, 2000); Robert Taber, War of the Flea (Wash- graphics, political culture, sectarian affiliations of the Camp,” Agence France-Presse, October 28, 2010. ington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2002). governing regimes, the relationship between the state 4 “Ba’asyir Quits Jihad Fighters Group MMI,” Jakarta 53 Hatitah. and tribes, and geography. Post, August 5, 2008.

15 OCTOBER 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 10 likely that the coming trial of Bashir will Prison where he accepted Bashir as his Ubeid told police that in mid-2009 once again test Indonesia’s frail anti- mentor.10 Later, Ubeid joined JAT as a he visited Bashir to seek financial terrorism legal regime. Analysts are member of its executive council. assistance for the camp. Bashir reportedly already concerned that the government provided $558 and asked Ubeid to meet does not have enough evidence to Based on Ubeid’s statements, Bashir’s with Thoib, JAT’s treasurer, who then convict Bashir of the latest charges. involvement in the training camp began provided Ubeid $1,116.17 In November in February 2009 when Ubeid asked 2009, Bashir allegedly gave $20,000 and This article details the prosecution’s Bashir to meet Dulmatin, another JI $5,000 while Thoib gave another $2,287 allegations against Bashir, while also acquaintance.11 Dulmatin was hiding to Ubeid.18 Dulmatin also received $1,116 showing why his conviction will be out with the Group in the from Thoib in early 2010. Moreover, difficult to achieve under Indonesia’s after having fled Indonesia some of JAT’s members current anti-terrorism legislation. following the Bali bombings of October provided financial assistance as well for 2002, but he slipped back into Indonesia the Aceh training camp.19 Bashir’s Role in Terrorist Training in Aceh On September 17, 2008, Bashir formed “Although the charges Besides financial assistance, Bashir JAT after officially resigning from is believed to have named the training Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) in against Bashir appear camp in Aceh as Tandzim al-Qa`ida July 2008.5 He accused MMI’s leadership formidable, there are Serambi Mekkah.20 He also allegedly of being “un-Islamic” because it favored designed an organizational structure democracy over Shari`a (Islamic law).6 a number of pitfalls that consisted of three sub-structures JAT, which literally means the defender that could result in an (qadi) led respectively by Dulmatin, of the oneness of God, is primarily Abu Yusuf and Ardi. Each qadi had 10 supported by former MMI members unsuccessful conviction, members.21 Bashir reportedly received aligned to Bashir. Bashir claimed that his which would further serve progress reports, including a number new organization would implement true of videos, from the training coordinator Islamic teachings.7 Authorities believe to highlight the weaknesses in Aceh.22 He allegedly visited the Aceh that JAT organized members from JI, in Indonesia’s legal regime camp to monitor the training. Darul Islam, the Action Committee for Crisis Response (KOMPAK), and Aceh’s against terrorism.” The Challenges of Convicting Bashir Islamic Defender Front (FPI) to create a Bashir now faces five counts of charges new coalition called al-Qa`ida Serambi involving terrorism, with a maximum Mekkah. sentence of life in prison or the death in 2009 without the knowledge penalty.23 The prosecution is preparing The police account of Bashir’s role in the of the Indonesian and Philippine to charge Bashir under multiple sections Aceh camp is based on the confession of governments.12 Ubeid and Dulmatin of the 2003 Anti-Terrorism Law. One of Ubeid (also known as Luthfi Haidaroh), supposedly met Bashir at a house in the main thrusts of the charges is proving who was arrested in Medan on April 12, Ngruki, at which time Bashir allegedly that Bashir is an “intellectual actor” 2010.8 Ubeid was an acquaintance of gave his consent to conduct military under section 14 of the law that refers Noordin Mohamed Top and was involved training in Aceh and asked Dulmatin to any person who plans and/or incites in several bombings.9 He was arrested to work with Abu Tholut.13 Abu Tholut another to commit acts of terrorism. in July 2004, sentenced to prison, and was a former regional commander of JI He will also be charged under section was released in 2007. He met Bashir and a military trainer at JI’s Hudaibiyah 14 during his imprisonment in Cipinang camp in the Philippines. Subsequently, ris Aceh,” Tempo, August 11, 2010; “‘Evidence’ Links Abu Tholut was appointed as a member Bashir to Aceh Camp,” Straits Times, August 11, 2010. 15 5 MMI was established on August 7, 2000 with a man- of JAT’s executive council. Bashir also Dulmatin was shot dead during a police raid in Jakarta date from the Indonesian Mujahidin Congress in Yog- allegedly appointed Dulmatin as the on March 9, 2010. For details, see “Bali Bomber Dulma- 16 yakarta. The Congress, which lasted from August 5-7, field commander of the Aceh camp. tin Killed in Raid, Yudhoyono Said,” Bloomberg, March 2000, attracted more than 1,800 participants from 24 10, 2010. provinces in Indonesia. MMI is a hard line umbrella or- 10 “Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama’ah Anshorut 17 “Ba’asyir’s Telling Telephone Call.” ganization that wants to implement Islamic law in Indo- Tauhid,” International Crisis Group, July 6, 2010. 18 Ibid. nesia through legal and constitutional means. See “Mun- 11 Farouk Arnaz and Nurfika Osman, “Police Confident 19 “Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama’ah Anshorut dur dari MMI, Bulan Ramadhan Ustad Ba’asyir Bentuk Bashir Won’t Escape Terror Charges Again,” Jakarta Tauhid.” Organisasi Baru,” Era Muslim, August 8, 2008. Globe, August 19, 2010. 20 “Ba’asyir’s Telling Telephone Call.” 6 Muhammad Haniff Hassan and Mohamed Redzuan 12 “Dulmatin Sudah Latih Perakit Bom,” Jambi Indepen- 21 “The Amir’s Network,” Tempo, August 18-24, 2010. Salleh, “Abu Bakar Bashir: Jihad or Tyranny of Leader- dent, March 11, 2010. 22 According to one report, a video could exist showing ship?” RSIS Commentaries, October 9, 2008. 13 “Ba’asyir’s Telling Telephone Call,” Tempo, August footage of Bashir watching training in the Aceh camp. 7 “Bashir Declares New Political Islamist Group,” Ja- 18-24, 2010. Another report, however, says that the video was about karta Post, September 17, 2008. 14 “Exclusive: Terror Arrests Linked to Abu Bakar training in Aceh which was sent to Bashir. See “Abu Ba- 8 “Lagi, Densus Bekuk Tiga Tersangka,” Radar Lam- Bashir Organization,” Jakarta Globe, May 7, 2010. kar Ba’asyir Faces Life Imprisonment or Death,” Tempo, pung, May 15, 2010. 15 “Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama’ah Anshorut August 11, 2010; “Polisi Kantongi Video Ba’asyir Tinjau 9 “: Noordin’s Network,” Inter- Tauhid.” Latihan Teroris Aceh.” national Crisis Group, May 5, 2006. 16 “Polisi Kantongi Video Ba’asyir Tinjau Latihan Tero- 23 Ibid.

16 OCTOBER 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 10

13 with sub-sections a, b, and c that In another interview after his the prosecution will be unable to link covers the provision of money or other recent arrest, Bashir maintained Bashir’s finances to the training camp assets for acts of terrorism, harboring a that irrespective of the means, i’dad except to the extent substantiated by perpetrator of a terrorist act, and hiding (preparation for jihad) is right for the Ubeid’s testimony. In a previous case information on any act of terrorism, implementation of Shari`a, although involving the hotel bombings in Jakarta respectively. Although the charges the use of weapons could be morally in 2009, prosecutors failed to establish against Bashir appear formidable, there indefensible.27 a direct link between the money given by are a number of pitfalls that could result an alleged Saudi financier, Ali Abdullah in an unsuccessful conviction, which Bashir’s supporters also claim that the would further serve to highlight the training camp in Aceh was designed to weaknesses in Indonesia’s legal regime prepare mujahidin to go to conflict zones “Bashir also allegedly against terrorism. such as Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. appointed Dulmatin as the They argue that if there was a plan First, except for what Ubeid told the to attack targets in Indonesia, their field commander of the police, there does not appear to be leader was unaware of it. The same has Aceh camp.” irrefutable evidence proving Bashir’s been the case with JAT, which, as an involvement in the Aceh camp.24 organization, has maintained a non- Moreover, Ubeid’s statement to the violent stance in public. In a statement, police has to be sustained in judicial Bashir’s successor in JAT, Muhammad al-Khalaewi, and Syaifudin, the man proceedings to be considered acceptable Achwan, maintained, who recruited the suicide bombers. This evidence. There is a possibility that was largely due to the legal ambiguity Ubeid will change his statement during We have actually been under in the Anti-Terrorism Law and Anti- court proceedings. In Bashir’s second physical attack from the police’s Money Laundering Act, both of which trial, Ali Imron—one of the accused— anti-terror squad Detachment also deal with terrorist financing. The changed his statement and refused to 88. Those who can fight back acts are relatively vague about what recognize Bashir as the leader of JI.25 are permitted to use violence as constitutes employment of money for The court also did not accept video long as they have the necessary terrorist activity. This has resulted in conference testimony from a Singapore resources and capabilities. For myriad interpretations and subjective detainee who categorically recognized those who do not yet have the applications of the provisions of the act. Bashir as the leader of JI. necessary resources to wage Additionally, because JI and its offshoots violent confrontation, they such as JAT are not proscribed, it is not Moreover, in his public statements, should wait and remain patient possible to criminalize funding these Bashir has claimed to be against violent as their time will come. The organizations.30 jihad. His statements, however, appear battle still has a long way to go. more ambivalent. For example, in an Islam is not demanding [that] we Third, proving that Bashir was the interview in 2005 about the perpetrators win immediately, but fight and “intellectual actor” behind the training of the Bali bombings, Bashir said, act regardless of the result.28 camp in Aceh will also depend on establishing, beyond doubt, his I call those who carried out these Therefore, both individually and as leadership in al-Qa`ida Serambi actions all mujahid. They all had a the leader of JAT, there could be Mekkah. This appears to be an onerous good intention (niat), that is, jihad difficulties in implicating Bashir as task given the fact that the main accused in Allah’s way...They are right an “intellectual actor” supporting collaborator—Dulmatin—was killed that America is the proper target terrorist activities. in a police raid in March 2010, and because America fights Islam. So Abu Tholut is in hiding.31 There do not in terms of their objectives, they Second, police claim to have material appear to be any other witnesses who are right, and the target of their evidence linking Bashir to the Aceh camp, can testify to this allegation. attacks was right also. But their such as proof of bank account transfers calculations are debatable. My and recorded telephone conversations. Conclusion view is that we should do bombings Ubeid, however, said that the money If the prosecution fails to prove Bashir’s in conflict areas (war zones) not in was physically transferred in cash and involvement in the terrorist training peace areas. We have to target the not through bank wires.29 If this is true, camp in Aceh, he is sure to gain more place of the enemy, not countries sympathy from the broader public 26 where many Muslims live. by Taufiq Andrie, whose questions were formulated by to support his lifelong accusation Scott Atran. For the document, visit www.sitemaker. that the government is acting at the 24 It is not clear if there are other depositions from those umich.edu/satran/files/atranba_asyirinterview020905. arrested at the camp. Police have not mentioned if these pdf. 30 Arabinda Acharya and Fatima Astuti, “Chink in the contain any evidence about Bashir’s involvement. See 27 “Ustadz Abu Bakar Bashir: America Wants Me Re- Armour: Tightening Jakarta’s Counter Terrorist Financ- “Polisi Kantongi Video Ba’asyir Tinjau Latihan Teroris moved from Society,” September 5, 2010, available on ing Regime,” S. Rajaratnam School of International Stud- Aceh.” various websites. ies, July 2010. It is not exactly clear why the government 25 “Ali Imron: Tidak ada Restu Ba’asyir untuk Menge- 28 “Violent Jihad is Tolerated for Those Who Have Re- has not banned JI, and it could be for political reasons. bom Bali,” Detik News, January 20, 2005. sources: JAT leader,” Jakarta Post, August 27, 2010. 31 “Bali Bomber Dulmatin Killed in Raid, Yudhoyono 26 This information is based on an interview with Bashir 29 Ibid. Said,” Bloomberg, March 10, 2010.

17 OCTOBER 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 10 behest of the United States to restrict Recent Highlights in Province, killing more than 60 people. his “legitimate” religious activities. According to Dawn, both Lashkar-i- Unfortunately, if failure does occur, it Terrorist Activity Jhangvi and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan will not be due to the incompetence of claimed responsibility for the attack. Indonesia’s counterterrorism units such September 1, 2010 (UNITED STATES): – RFE/RL, September 4; Dawn, September 4; as and the police. By The United States placed Tehrik- CNN, September 4 any account, their activities have been i-Taliban Pakistan on its terrorism commendable in containing the threat of blacklist. The group’s two top leaders, September 3, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Two terrorism. Instead, the ultimate outcome Hakimullah Mehsud and Waliur suspected U.S. drone strikes killed will depend on the overall legal regime Rahman, were also identified as at least 12 people in North Waziristan against terrorism that remains weak and “specially designated global terrorists.” Agency of the Federally Administered debilitated in Indonesia. As a result, the – AP, September 1 Tribal Areas. One strike targeted a house field is wide open for extremists such as with suspected militants inside on the Bashir to continue with their activities September 1, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): A outskirts of Miran Shah, while the other unhindered. bomb killed Mohammad Hassan Taimuri, destroyed a car traveling through Datta a senior Afghan government official in Khel. – AAJ News, September 3 Arabinda Acharya is Research Fellow and charge of organizing pilgrimages to the Head of Strategic Projects at the International Islamic holy sites of Mecca and Medina. September 3, 2010 (TAJIKISTAN): A Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism He was assassinated in Kandahar city. suicide bomber in an explosives-laden Research (ICPVTR) in the S. Rajaratnam – Fox News, September 1 vehicle drove into a police station in the School of International Studies, Nanyang northern city of Khujand, killing a senior Technological University, Singapore. Mr. September 1, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Three police official. Authorities blamed the Arabinda is an author/coauthor of four suicide bombers exploded among a bombing on the Islamic Movement of books including Targeting Terrorist procession of Shi`a Muslims in Lahore, Uzbekistan, yet a previously unknown Financing: International Cooperation killing more than 30 people. Tehrik-i- group called Jamaat Ansarullah in and New Regimes, Terrorist Threat in Taliban Pakistan claimed responsibility Tajikistan claimed responsibility. Southern Thailand: Jihad or Quest for for the attack. – BBC, September 1; CNN, – AFP, September 3; Reuters, September 9 Justice and Ethnic Identity and National September 2 Conflict in China. He has also published September 4, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): a number of articles and reviews in book September 1, 2010 (ALGERIA): A A bomb attached to a motorcycle chapters and journals such as Georgetown suicide bomber drove an explosives- detonated in the northern city of Journal of International Affairs, Harvard laden vehicle into a military convoy near Kunduz, killing four Afghan policemen Asia Quarterly, Washington Quarterly, Zemmouri, 25 miles east of Algiers. Two and three civilians. – AFP, September 4 Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and soldiers were killed. – Reuters, September 1; Journal of Money Laundering Control. AFP, September 2 September 4, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A suspected U.S. aerial drone targeted Fatima Astuti is Associate Research Fellow September 2, 2010 (PAKISTAN): a house and vehicle near Miran Shah at the ICPVTR. Born in Indonesia, she Militants ambushed and killed a in North Waziristan Agency of the has worked with several human rights female teacher in Bajaur Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, organizations in Indonesia and continues Federally Administered Tribal Areas. killing five militants. – Daily Times, to be involved in extensive field research, Two colleagues of the slain teacher were September 5 especially in respect of political violence and wounded. – AFP, September 2 terrorism in the region. September 5, 2010 (IRAQ): Five suicide September 3, 2010 (GLOBAL): Qari bombers and at least one other assailant Hussain Mehsud, a Taliban operative launched a sophisticated attack on Iraqi known as the “trainer of suicide Army facilities in central Baghdad, bombers,” threatened to launch attacks killing approximately 12 people. – AFP, on the United States and Europe “very September 5; Wall Street Journal, September 6 soon.” He also said, “Shiites are also our target because they too are our September 5, 2010 (RUSSIA): A suicide enemies.” – Telegraph, September 3; Reuters, bomber detonated an explosives-laden September 3 vehicle at a military firing range in Dagestan, killing four soldiers. The September 3, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A bomber entered the secure facility suicide bomber detonated explosives by ramming his vehicle through the near a mosque belonging to the minority security gate. – New York Times, September 5; Ahmadi sect in Mardan District, killing Wall Street Journal, September 6 at least one person. – RFE/RL, September 4 September 6, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A September 3, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A suicide bomber rammed an explosives- suicide bomber targeted a procession of laden vehicle into a police station Shi`a Muslims in Quetta, Baluchistan in Lakki Marwat District of Khyber

18 OCTOBER 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 10

Pakhtunkhwa Province, killing at September 9, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A September 14, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A least 19 people. The Pakistani Taliban suicide bomber tried to assassinate Mir suspected U.S. aerial drone targeted claimed responsibility. – AFP, September Asim Kurd, the finance minister for a vehicle near Miran Shah in North 5; BBC, September 6 Baluchistan Province. Kurd survived Waziristan Agency, killing four the attack, but three other people were militants. – Voice of America, September 14 September 6, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A killed. – Dawn, September 10 suspected U.S. aerial drone fired two September 15, 2010 (GLOBAL): Al- missiles at a vehicle in the Datta Khel September 9, 2010 (PAKISTAN): Police Qa`ida second-in-command Ayman area of North Waziristan Agency, killing in Pakistan arrested three suspects al-Zawahiri released a new audiotape, five militants. – AFP, September 6 over links to the failed Times Square stating, “Nine years after the beginning bombing in New York City on May 1, of the crusade against Afghanistan and September 6, 2010 (TAJIKISTAN): 2010. The men were reportedly detained then Iraq, here is the crusade reeling A bomb ripped through a nightclub in Islamabad two weeks ago. – Australia after being weakened by the blows of frequented by locals in Dushanbe, Network News, September 9 your devoted sons, the mujahidin.” He wounding five people. Authorities also railed against the “corrupt state of blamed radical Islamists, although the September 9, 2010 (SOMALIA): A affairs in Pakistan.” – AFP, September 15 party responsible was not immediately suicide bomber in a vehicle exploded clear. – Reuters, September 6 at the gate to Mogadishu’s airport, September 16, 2010 (NIGER): Militants killing at least 14 people. Two other abducted seven foreigners, including September 7, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A bomb suicide bombers on foot tried to enter five French nationals, from northern ripped through a police headquarters in the terminal building, but failed. At the Niger’s uranium mining zone. The Kohat District of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa time of the bombing, a high-ranking hostages are employees of French Province, killing at least 20 people. international delegation was meeting construction company Vinci and nuclear – Radio France International, September 8 with leaders of Somalia’s Transitional energy firm Areva. Al-Qa`ida in the Federal Government at the airport. Islamic Maghreb claimed responsibility. September 8, 2010 (IRAQ): Four – GaroweOnline, September 9; al-Jazira, – Reuters, September 16; BBC, September 17; AFP, prisoners with ties to al-Qa`ida in September 10 September 21 Iraq escaped from the U.S.-controlled section of Baghdad’s Karkh prison, September 10, 2010 (DENMARK): September 17, 2010 (JORDAN): formerly known as Camp Cropper. Authorities arrested a man in downtown Authorities in Jordan reportedly – BBC, September 9 Copenhagen after he apparently detained Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, detonated a bomb in the restroom of the a prominent Islamist leader and the September 8, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A busy Hotel Jørgensen. Media reports former mentor of Abu Mus`ab al- suspected U.S. aerial drone fired missiles speculated that the man may have been Zarqawi. – AP, September 19 at a house owned by a member of the a suicide bomber. The man survived in North Waziristan injuries sustained from the bomb September 18, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): Agency of the Federally Administered explosion. – BBC, September 10 Afghanistan held its second Tribal Areas. Six militants were killed. parliamentary elections. – New York Times, – AP, September 8 September 12, 2010 (RUSSIA): Gapal September 18 Gadzhiev, a leading counterterrorism September 8, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A official, was assassinated in Dagestan. September 18, 2010 (SOMALIA): Al- suspected U.S. aerial drone targeted a – Voice of America, September 12 Shabab and Hisbul Islamiyya insurgents car transporting men associated with the seized control of Horn Afrik and GBC Haqqani network in North Waziristan September 12, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A radio stations in Mogadishu. – BBC, Agency of the Federally Administered suicide bomber’s explosives detonated September 19 Tribal Areas. Four militants were prematurely in Pakistan-administered killed. – AP, September 8 Kashmir. The bomber, who died in the September 19, 2010 (IRAQ): A suicide blast, was identified as a local resident. bomber killed six people, including September 9, 2010 (RUSSIA): A suicide There were no other casualties. – AFP, three Iraqi soldiers, in Falluja, Anbar bomber detonated an explosives- September 12 Province. – AFP, September 19 laden vehicle outside a busy market in Vladikavkaz in North Ossetia. At least September 14, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A September 19, 2010 (PHILIPPINES): 16 people were killed. The Battalion of suspected U.S. aerial drone killed at Philippine militants reportedly killed Martyrs Riyadus-Salikhiyn claimed least 10 militants in Shawal district Abdukarim Sali, a member of the responsibility for the attack. – Los Angeles of North Waziristan Agency in the Abu Sayyaf Group who helped plan Times, September 10; Reuters, September 17 Federally Administered Tribal Areas. and execute the kidnapping of three – Voice of America, September 14 Americans and 17 Filipinos from a popular resort in 2001. – New York Times, September 19

19 OCTOBER 2010 . Vol 3 . Issue 10

September 20, 2010 (FRANCE): France September 25, 2010 (YEMEN): Two CTC Sentinel Staff raised its terrorism threat level due to alleged al-Qa`ida fighters ambushed a concern of an imminent attack from bus carrying Yemeni security personnel Editor-in-Chief al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb. in Sana`a, injuring 10 people after Erich Marquardt – Telegraph, September 20; Voice of America, spraying bullets at the vehicle. The Senior Editor, CTC September 22 gunmen then fled. – AP, September 25

Editorial Board September 20, 2010 (SOMALIA): A September 26, 2010 (SOMALIA): An COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. suicide bomber detonated his explosives unidentified military helicopter attacked Department Head at the gates of the presidential palace a house reportedly used by al-Shabab Department of Social Sciences (West Point) in Mogadishu, wounding two soldiers. fighters in Somalia’s Lower Shabelle – Reuters, September 20 region. The helicopter appeared to have COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. originated from warships off Somalia’s Deputy Department Head September 21, 2010 (YEMEN): Yemeni coast. – New York Times, September 26 Department of Social Sciences (West Point) authorities announced a wide-scale offensive against al-Qa`ida in the September 27, 2010 (PAKISTAN): A LTC Reid Sawyer country’s southeastern province of suspected U.S. aerial drone killed four Director, CTC Shabwa. – CNN, September 21 militants in North Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Christopher Heffelfinger September 23, 2010 (UNITED STATES): Areas. – AFP, September 27 FBI Fellow, CTC A New York district court sentenced Aafia Siddiqui, a U.S.-educated September 28, 2010 (FRANCE): French Pakistani neuroscientist, to 86 years in authorities temporarily evacuated the prison for trying to shoot U.S. soldiers in Eiffel Tower in Paris due to terrorism a police station in Afghanistan in 2008. concerns. – UPI, September 28 Contact – Christian Science Monitor, September 23 Combating Terrorism Center September 28, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): U.S. Military Academy September 23, 2010 (INDONESIA): A suicide bomber assassinated 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall Mohammed Sofyan Tsauri, a former Mohammad Kazim Allahyar, the deputy West Point, NY 10996 Indonesian police officer, told governor of Ghazni Province. The Phone: (845) 667-6383 authorities that he helped train 170 blast also killed five additional people. Email: [email protected] members of a new terrorist network in – France24, September 28 Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ Aceh Province. Tsauri, who is being charged for multiple crimes, said that September 29, 2010 (SPAIN): Spanish * For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 he became “affiliated with al-Qa`ida” authorities announced the arrest of a after he left the police force in 2008. U.S. citizen suspected of sending money – AP, September 23 to al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb. The suspect, Mohamed Omar Debhi, is September 24, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): of Algerian descent and was arrested in Multiple suicide bombers attacked a Barcelona. On September 30, however, support NATO base in Paktia Province, but authorities released Debhi due to lack The Combating Terrorism Center would there were no ISAF casualties. At least of evidence, although the investigation like to express its gratitude to its financial five militants were killed in the attempt is still open. – BBC, September 29; Wall Street supporters, for without their support and to breach the perimeter of the base in Journal, October 1 shared vision of the Center products like Gardez. – Reuters, September 24 the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If September 29, 2010 (YEMEN): you are interested in learning more about September 24, 2010 (RUSSIA): A suicide Suspected al-Qa`ida fighters ambushed how to support the Combating Terrorism bomber wounded at least 30 people in a convoy of cars that were carrying the Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma. Dagestan. The bomber detonated his governor of Shabwa Province along edu/support/ or call Wayne Richardson at explosives after approaching police. with senior Yemeni security officials. West Point’s Association of Graduates at – Dawn, September 25; CNN, September 25 The governor was not injured, although 845-446-1553. one of the convoy’s guards was killed. September 25, 2010 (RUSSIA): Russian – AP, September 29 counterterrorist forces killed Alibek Abunazarov, identified as the head September 30, 2010 (AFGHANISTAN): of a rebel group in Dagestan. – Reuters, A suicide bomber in a vehicle detonated September 25 his explosives next to a NATO convoy in Kandahar, killing three civilians. The views expressed in this report are those of – Reuters, September 30 the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

20